Approved For Release 2007/10/19 : CIA-RDP85B01152R000200160007-4

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) [redacted] Restricted Access Processor

DD/A Registry 83-1433/1

25X1

FROM: [redacted]
Director of Security
4E-60 Headquarters

EXTENSION

NO. Ref: DDA 83-1433

STAT

DATE 8 JUN 1983

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. EO/DDA 7D-24 Headquarters	9 JUN 1983	9 JUN 1983		Attached is a brief answer to DDA's recent question about [redacted] Restricted Access Processor. 25X1
2. ADDA 7D-24 Headquarters		9 JUN 1983		
3. DDA 7D-24 Headquarters	10 JUN 1983			STAT
4 [redacted]	10 Jun 83			STAT Att [redacted]
5.				
6.				10-10
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
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13.				
14.				
15.				OS 3 1470/A

FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 1-79

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
1982 Mitre Report

FROM:
Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director for Administration
7D 24 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO. DDA 83-1433

DATE 2 June 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1 Director of Security 4E 60 Hqs				Bill:
2.				I wonder if [redacted] is aware of the work Mitre is doing on the "Restricted Access Processor."
3.				[redacted]
4.				
5.				Att
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REFERENCE

OS REGISTRY
83-1470

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Local-Area Networks

Automated office equipment for word processing, data processing, image distribution, graphics processing, and voice exchange is becoming commonplace. Local-area networks can tie these functions together, providing data, voice, and video communications within and between buildings up to several miles apart. We are working on several local-area networks that can serve specific communications needs and support new automated office systems.

Broadband local-area networks are preferred because of their versatility and capacity for expanded service. We are developing and testing pilot and interim networks at Hanscom and Andrews Air Force Bases. Our work has also involved design and implementation of data communications gateways between these pilot networks and other networks, such as military and commercial telephone systems.

Although most of our work in the networking area is for the Air Force, at MITRE we have one of the largest operating local-area networks in existence—MITRENET. And we are designing two more: one for the Air Staff in the Pentagon, the other for the Canadian House of Commons in Ottawa.

This view of the Tigris-Euphrates valley and the Persian Gulf region was seen from the Space Shuttle orbiter Columbia during its third mission in March 1982. MITRE has supported the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in this program since its beginning, mainly in hardware acquisition, software development, and training for the network control centers.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

In this time of reduced funding for space programs, NASA needs better, trimmer, data-handling systems for the 1990s. The systems must be flexible enough, and expandable enough, to cope with NASA's workload, while minimizing life-cycle costs.

NASA's data network will be significantly changed by 1985. The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) will have replaced most ground tracking stations. We are helping NASA develop long-term control facilities for the new TDRSS network by planning a network control center for operation in the mid- to late 1980s.

Satellite communications and tracking resources must also be made more secure in order to accommodate DOD missions in space. DOD and NASA are coordinating a security upgrade program including ground and spaceborne elements and involving mission planning, scheduling, and control systems. At Goddard Space Flight Center in particular, we are responsible for specifying security improvements. A key contribution is development of the Restricted Access Processor, a computer used to isolate uncleared civilian users from classified information; the concept is largely based on computer security technology developed by MITRE.

With completion of the Shuttle Orbiter test program, NASA, and later DOD, will begin flying operational shuttle missions. Both NASA and DOD missions will be controlled initially by NASA facilities at the Johnson Space Center—with DOD missions under security controls. For the future, however, DOD plans a facility in Colorado Springs. There, the Air Force will plan and control space missions, develop Shuttle software, and train astronauts and flight controllers. Air Force and NASA systems will have sufficient commonality to permit

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