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83-1932

EXCOM 83-009
21 July 1983

DD/A REGISTRY

FILE: 100-4-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
FROM: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director
SUBJECT: Minutes of 18 July 1983 Executive Committee Meeting: (1) Review of Beirut Embassy Bombing; (2) Status of Alcohol Program

1. The Executive Committee met on 18 July 1983 to review developments related to the Beirut Embassy bombing and to be briefed on the Agency's alcohol program. [redacted] chaired the session; participants included Messrs. Fitzwater (DDA); Stein (DDO); Hineman (DDS&T); Gates (DDI); Taylor (IG); [redacted]

2. The meeting began with Mr. Stein providing a status report on the interrogation of the bombing suspects. He said he now questions the stories of the two prime suspects in the bombing and noted that an Iranian or Syrian connection with the incident is beginning to fade. The suspects may have been involved but they apparently are from the lower ranks and whomever was behind them is not known. Consideration was given to questioning the suspects outside of Lebanon but it was decided that the disadvantages of moving them outweigh the advantages. The investigation is continuing with the FBI's active participation.

3. [redacted] summarized his report ("Review of Beirut Bombing Incident of 18 April 1983," dated 6 July 1983). He noted that the State Department was aware of the vulnerability of the Beirut Embassy as late as last February. The Embassy was given authority then to take corrective measures to prevent a car bombing. As for CIA's performance, [redacted] said that after talking to people throughout the Agency, he could find no indication that CIA had failed to disseminate all information available relative to a terrorist act against the Embassy. There were indications, as there have been in Beirut for a number of years, of hostile action against the Embassy, and certain precautions were taken, but there was no evidence that a massive bomb attack would occur. He also found widespread feelings that the Agency should be more assertive on security issues relative to the State Department's responsibility for the safety of U.S. Government employees overseas. It was the general opinion of people he interviewed that State would not act on its own; and, without the Agency intervening, no corrective action would be

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taken. This view was so widespread that it led to recommendation a. (that the DCI discuss overseas security with the Secretary of State) and to recommendation b. (that the DCI reassure Agency employees that he is working on overseas security with State on their behalf). In a response to a question by [redacted] Mr. Taylor observed that the IG staff had heard similar comments about State Department security practices and had commented on them in the NE Division survey. He noted that the Agency is not very assertive on security issues in a number of areas, among them [redacted]. He said that the EA Division inspection report recommended that one senior Agency official have the responsibility for dealing with State on security matters. He closed by observing that the EXCOM may be worrying about a truck bomb when the next attack may be a rocket through an Embassy window.

4. Mr. Fitzwater said that the State Department security enhancement program, which was started in 1980, covers 60 posts. Work at four posts has been completed and 24 additional posts will be completed in the near term. Of the \$135 million authorized for security enhancement, it is believed much of the money went for communications facilities and for improving information security. He noted that both State and the Agency have to work through the Federal Building Operations (FBO) Office, which is concerned foremost with design and construction. As architects control State Department's building program, aesthetics and function are the principal design factors; State Department Security's (SY) hands are tied.

[redacted] asked whether, if the Secretary of State were approached with this problem, he would do anything more than to turn it over to Tom Tracy, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Administration. Mr. Gates interjected that the Agency is dealing with a State culture which sees security as a problem. Security at the White House is the same. People from both organizations do not come from a culture, such as the Agency, where everyone feels security is their personal responsibility. Mr. Briggs asked whether the group was talking about personal safety as well as document protection. It was the EXCOM's general view that just as the Secretary of State won't let his people be polygraphed, there is a cultural phenomenon at State involving all forms of security.

[redacted], because when the Embassy building for [redacted] was designed, anyone could walk without restriction to the roof. The DA had even loaned the State Department two security officers but when he discussed the IG report of weaknesses in security in Africa with Tracy, the FBO people, who were present, in effect ignored him. He agreed that the DCI should talk to Shultz and emphasized the necessity of giving State security the security enhancement authority that it needed. Security, he noted, should be based on the vulnerability of the installation not merely the country: [redacted]

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observed that a post cannot be protected if the terrorists are willing to risk their lives. He concluded by stating that the Agency needs to establish more of a paper trail to keep the DCI informed of problems encountered with State. From time to time the Agency's responsibilities in security issues need to be defined; for example, the DDCI has instructed both the DDA and DDS&T to play a secondary role with regard to security [redacted]

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20A1 [redacted] Mr. Fitzwater acknowledged that he should follow up on the question of the Agency's role in the security of embassies overseas.

5. Mr. Fitzwater suggested that the IG discuss IG reports with the State Department IG. Mr. Taylor agreed it would be useful for both him and the DDA to talk with State. It was his impression that a great deal of the \$135 million authorized for security improvement went for the TERPS. John Stein noted that Agency people definitely earn their special pay overseas. For example, when an ambassador is told one of his local employees is involved in terrorism, ambassadors often are reluctant to act and say they can't upset the system. When told that someone is probably a spy for the Soviets, they don't fire the employee, he is moved. SY has no power to make the State security system work. CIA has pointed out deficiencies in the past but nothing changes. The only way to get action is to take away the ambassador's power and force the bureaucracy to change its ways. There has to be a trade-off between security and day-to-day embassy operations and it needs to be made intelligently. The group discussed ways to galvanize the State Department, including encouraging the DCI to surface with the Secretary of State the Department's "scandalous" inaction. Mr. Stein noted that he did not agree with recommendation f (for a study to establish a legal basis for reprisal or retaliation). In the general discussion that ensued, the obvious flap-potential in any suggestion of reprisal was recognized, as were constraints on Agency actions. [redacted] noted that the recommendation was meant to serve as a catalyst; he was not necessarily suggesting Agency action but rather some form of U.S. Government response. Mr. Gates noted that he felt that (with reference to recommendation e--on over compartmentation) there is complete sharing of information between the DO and the DI but less with the Office of Security. Although the Office of Security does not have an evaluative function, he noted that they need raw reports. Mr. Fitzwater indicated that the Office of Security did not receive the [redacted] The EXCOM agreed that the dissemination of all pertinent terrorist threat information to all components can be easily arranged.

6. Mr. Hineman said that the Agency lost some good evidence [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] He and Mr. Fitzwater agreed that OTS, security, logistics, medics, and possibly the FBI, should have a team ready to respond rapidly to future terrorist incidents. Mr. Gates reiterated that it was time to have the DCI

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tell the Secretary of State that the Agency has had it. Also, he suggested, the Agency may have to use leverage in Congress and NSC with regard to where the State Department's \$135 million went. Mr. Stein noted that he was opposed to having the DCI act on recommendation b (that he reassure Agency employees that action is being taken to improve their security overseas) until there is some demonstrable success with the Department.

Mr. Stein noted that if employees are led to believe improvements in overseas security are being made and nothing occurs, there will be a backlash. He concluded by saying that he felt that the EXCOM's discussion of the bombing had been a worthwhile exercise. [redacted] closed the discussion about the bombing and said he would prepare a summary for the DCI.

25X1 7. [redacted] then introduced Bob Ingram, Director, OMS, and [redacted] Alcohol Program Coordinator, and said they would provide a status report to the EXCOM. He noted that the DDCI is particularly interested in having the Agency conduct an effective alcohol program. [redacted] noted that the Agency alcohol program was started in 1978 and that last spring OMB examiners assessed the Agency program as the best they had ever seen.

25X1 8. [redacted] then observed that nationwide 10% of any working force has employees in either the early, middle or late stages of alcoholism. The Agency has a program because alcohol can reduce an employee's productivity by 50% or more during the withdrawal stages. OMS has a current case load of [redacted] employees and family members, of which [redacted] are employees. The length of service of employees who, on their own initiative, contact the program is 15 years. The highest incidence of alcoholism appears to be in the DO and DA, but cases are probably more evident in these components because OMS has more frequent access to DO and DA staffers who are officially referred to OMS for overseas processing.

25X1 9. [redacted] asked whether employees who go through the program feel penalized subsequently. [redacted] said there have been cases when people who were about to be fired subsequently received three promotions after entering the program. About 3% of the employees who are identified as alcoholics leave the Agency. [redacted] added that there are people who recognize they have a problem and do nothing about it; by the time OMS has clinical evidence of alcoholism the employee is in a late stage of the disease. Discovering employees in the early stages requires managerial help. A training program for DI and DS&T managers has been completed and the DA program begins in December. Training for DO managers will follow. The purpose of the training is to make more supervisors sensitive to behavioral patterns indicating a need for medical assistance.

25X1 10. [redacted] asked whether OMS alerts supervisors when it discovers a problem. Dr. Ingram said that if alcoholism is discovered as part of an official fitness for duty review, it is

reported to supervisors. If discovered as the result of the person walking into OMS, it is not routinely reported. If the employee volunteers for the program, OMS will place the employee under a standard medical hold and not specifically advise his supervisor that the employee has an alcohol problem.

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11. [redacted] passed out posters and brochures and advised that she believed OMS had successfully publicized its alcohol and consultative services program. Supervisors can refer employees to OMS without saying they are concerned about alcoholism. Mr. Gates observed that he was aware that one program staffer wanted the alcohol program combined with other family services to take away the stigma. He said he was not proposing anything at the moment but believed there is a high level of unawareness. Mr. Taylor agreed that people do not know about the program; he said State has a monthly column in its newsletter. Dr. Ingram said in response that OMS is doing a brochure describing all of the services OMS provides, among them the bi-annual physical, social and psychological services consulting.

12. The meeting was adjourned.

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