

16 August 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : JIIRG Report

25X1A9a 1. I have read through the papers that you left me and feel that some good points are made in them. I believe that [REDACTED] memorandum speaks particularly well to the matter I discussed with you concerning the desirability of a single manager. This memorandum will give you some tentative comments concerning the memos and the JIIRG report.

2. It does not appear to me that [REDACTED] has completely made his case in his memorandum of 10 August. One argument against his position can be that COMOR has become so involved in exploitation because there has been no committee like COMEX. By this argument, COMEX would only be taking over from COMOR those functions more properly in the exploitation field, thus achieving a more effective division of labor. 25X1A9a

3. I commend for your attention paragraph 2 of Jim Brammell's memorandum. A never ending problem has been how to bring the intelligence analyst together with the collector and the photo-interpreter. The JIIRG report is no more successful in dealing with this than most reports of this nature written by persons not involved in intelligence production. Somewhere along the line, explicit provision should be made on whatever committee is established for representation from the intelligence producing components of CIA and DIA. Paragraph 4 of Brammell's memorandum is on the side of the angels but can be disregarded so far as the present exercise is concerned.

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4. There are several aspects of the JIIRG report which suggest that it may have been conceived as a vehicle to present certain first steps leading ultimately to more sophisticated solutions. If this was in fact one intent of the report, then the establishment of COMEX and the choice of Option 2 could be construed as stages leading toward some further solution. If that is so, then from a political point of view it may be desirable to buy the recommendations of the JIIRG report even though they seem less than completely satisfactory to me.

5. My most serious problem with the JIIRG report lies in the degree to which it seems to represent half-way solutions. I believe that the problem for the community posed by the need for effective mission preparation and efficient exploitation of US reconnaissance resources is too big for committee management. Tidwell to the contrary notwithstanding, the question is not whether COMOR and NPIC working together can do the job. I think it is demonstrated that they can not. By the same token I do not believe that COMEX working with COMOR can do the job either. Sooner or later the intelligence community is going to turn to a single manager for all non-substantive aspects of the reconnaissance problem. This manager would be responsible to the Director, would report to USIB, and would have authority to make decisions in the areas of targeting and exploitation now covered by COMOR and the projected COMEX.

6. I endorse the plan you mentioned to cost the options discussed in the JIIRG report. I would be interested to know whether over a 20-year period Option 1 would be any more costly than Option 2. If it cost no more, or if it cost only a little bit more, then I believe that Option 1 should receive serious consideration.

Sooner or later the intelligence community is going to centralize all basic support exploitation in the national center created to serve the national intelligence authorities. Option 2 is clearly the easy way out of the present problem. There is nothing in the JIIRG report, however, to suggest that Option 2 is the best approach over the long run. The creation of central data bases in NPIC tells me that the authors of the JIIRG recognize the desirability of centralizing the results of basic support exploitation but cannot bring themselves to support the Option that would have that result.

7. Another feature of the JIIRG report that needs further examination is the question of the manpower implications of the various Options in terms of support personnel. It appears to me that the report, as now cast, takes the easy way out in limiting its focus to photo-interpreters. From the standpoint of long-run budgetary implications, the PI's are only part of the costs, and the smaller part at that.

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