

28 FEB 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : The Inspector General's Survey of Foreign
Intelligence Collection Requirements

Known: DDP

1. I have read this report with great care and interest. It is a significant achievement. I am strongly sympathetic to what seem to me its most fundamental themes: the folly and danger of the Information Explosion, the extremely limited usefulness of formal bureaucratic systems, the importance of maintaining a vital collector-consumer dialogue, the really inviting potentialities of requirements tailored closely to capabilities. The points at which I take issue with the report are chiefly those at which it seems to lose contact with its own basic themes and to advocate, instead of a creative dialogue, the kind of bureaucratic controls and record-keeping which elsewhere it deplures. It is not an inconsiderable quality of the report that its excellent prose makes the study of a fundamentally arid subject infinitely more interesting.

2. For the Clandestine Services, I endorse enthusiastically the emphasis on a rigorously pruned and constantly updated IPC List, supplemented by a wide variety of tailored requirements and collection guidance. I must dissent, however, on one fundamental aspect of the proposals on the IPC List, and I have discussed this point at some length in its proper place. I welcome the favorable comments on the Clandestine Services' internal program of self-examination, described in the report as "the most useful evaluation program that we have noted within CIA"--and I am anxious to avoid any dilution of its quality. Later in this memorandum I shall respond specifically to all recommendations which call for action on my part, and to a number of others which affect the Clandestine Services. These responses are largely favorable although I have had to withhold concurrence from two recommendations and to propose amendments to several others, particularly where I felt the need for collector representation in various enterprises had been

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overlooked.

3. Before proceeding to the recommendations, I should like to make some general observations. First, with respect to the Information Explosion. As the report makes clear, the Clandestine Services have been largely spared this explosion. The volume of our disseminations has been level for the past six years and is down 13 percent from the 1957-59 average. This is partly the result of our emphasis on quality above quantity in agent recruitment and field reporting. It is also due in part to our rejection or avoidance of a good many requirements, and to a certain capacity on the part of our station chiefs for ignoring some of the more unnecessary ones that have been accepted. Nevertheless, we have been scattering an excessive amount of effort that ought to have been concentrated; and we are taking a number of steps to correct this. I have recently called on the station chiefs to re-examine all their requirements, whether from Washington, from local customers, or self-generated, and to submit recommendations for cutting back marginal collection. Simultaneously, in the separate but related field of operational direction, we have been working out new and better ways of ensuring that all operational directives call for maximum concentration on essential targets.

4. My second observation concerns the main thrust of the report with respect to the Clandestine Services. Here I agree that we have been too complaisant in accepting requirements without sufficiently rigorous attention to the crucial question of whether they necessitate clandestine collection. I agree also that we need to go well beyond what we have thus far achieved in the use of the solicited requirement tailored to capabilities. As I have already said, I cannot go along fully with the proposals on the IPC List, though I favor making that document a much tighter instrument. Technically, what is done with the IPC List will depend in part on what is done about the PNIOs and CNIOs, but in essentials the List can be improved under any form of National Intelligence Objectives.

5. My remaining observations concern the most serious defect which I find in the report. This is the treatment of the relationship between the Collection Guidance Staff and the Clandestine Services. I am not referring to the strictures against "tribalism"--a vice which I agree should be rebuked wherever it occurs--and it has. Nor am I objecting wholesale to the specific suggestions, many of which make good

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sense. Least of all do I take any exception to the obviously sound position that the relationship in question should be cooperative, cordial, and productive. I refer rather to what I consider a distorted picture of the actual and potential role of CGS in relation to Clandestine Services collection. I do not suggest that the distortion is deliberate. But the critical faculties so evident in other aspects of the report are surprisingly inactive in this one.

6. What I am describing appears more clearly in the text of the report than in the recommendations. By pervading the text, however, it is certain to influence some interpretations of the recommendations. Briefly, without ever denying that CGS is a component of the Directorate of Intelligence, with authority derived from, and certainly no broader than, that of the DD/I (or DD/S&T if certain proposed changes are made), the report nevertheless discusses the CGS role as if CGS were or should be an executive arm of the Director, with responsibilities extending into the Clandestine Services. This is done in a variety of ways, the effects of which are cumulative: by writing "CIA" instead of "DD/I" or "DD/I and DD/S&T"; by writing "central" without saying central to what, and "supervision" without saying who is to be supervised; by continually urging the expansion of CGS activities without indicating limits to that expansion; and, among other ways, by calling on "the upper management of CIA to do everything possible to fortify this function." The phrases quoted appear in context in the following paragraphs from Chapter VIII. The underscoring is mine.

"The establishment of CGS has provided a helpful centralizing force within CIA, and subsequent experience has shown the value of central supervision. . . . We believe that CGS should be given strong CIA support in its dual role as manager of requirements and as broker for both the requesters and those who do the collecting." (VIII-4.)

"We have found a great deal of healthy self-examination already going on in the technical collection fields, especially SIGINT. Similar scrutiny is being applied only in piecemeal fashion to human-source collection. We believe that CGS is uniquely equipped to apply it--with some authority in CIA and by persuasion and example in the rest of the community--but it will need strong executive backing to do the job. Now more than ever there is a pressing need for a central requirements

control mechanism. We conclude that the upper management of CIA should do everything possible to fortify this function." (VIII-5.)

The foregoing passages, with their references to "the upper management of CIA," to CGS as "a helpful centralizing force within CIA," etc., are among a number which seem to suggest that CGS has a higher mission which should not be affected by the established lines between the directorates. However, Recommendation No. 26, to which the second of these paragraphs leads directly, is something of an anticlimax, since it merely calls on the Deputy Director for Intelligence to "furnish all necessary support" to CGS in certain of its major efforts. One is left uncertain whether the strong language quoted above from the text is to be taken as giving a meaning to Recommendation No. 26 beyond what the words of the recommendation itself would indicate. I shall allude to this question again in my comment on that recommendation.

7. In any case the heavy emphasis on extending the role of the Collection Guidance Staff is inconsistent with principles which the report itself declares basic. The "Principal Findings" state: "There is too little useful communication between originators of requirements and those whose function it is to satisfy them." (Page 2.) Yet it has been our observation that by intervening between analyst and collector the CGS tends to inhibit, not increase, useful communication. Again from the "Principal Findings": "We find the gradually growing ability of CIA to tailor such guidance to the capabilities of human sources to be far more valuable than any aspect of the formal requirements process as currently managed." Agreed that the tailoring of guidance to capabilities is more valuable than the formal requirements process; what the sentence does not say is that it is CGS which manages whatever is most formal in the requirements process (including the "A-2 acceptance" ridiculed in the report), whereas it is not CGS but the collectors (in direct cooperation with consumers) who have produced the best tailored guidance. Where CGS has ostensibly produced such guidance, it has usually served only as an unnecessary middleman.

8. I note that D/DCI/NIPE, in his memorandum of comment addressed to you and dated 10 February 1967, follows generally the position of the IG report in stating: "The Collection Guidance Staff of DD/I was designed to fill the need for an instrumentality to bridge the gap between busy analysts and busy collectors." That a gap existed at one time between certain elements of OSI and the CS collectors, and

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between certain elements of DD/I (with the notable exception of OCI) and the CS collectors, cannot be denied. It is my strong belief that the efforts we have made in recent years have indeed narrowed these gaps and eliminated some of them. It may be also that the efforts of the Collection Guidance Staff have aided in this process. I wish to point out, however, that as the gaps narrow and close, there is no room for a middleman.

9. There are really two inconsistencies here. One is between the desire for a consumer-collector dialogue untrammelled by "pompous and sterile correspondence" and the idea that there must be a "broker" between consumer and collector. In an effort to harmonize these ideas, the report comes up with the proposition that the broker will actually foster the dialogue. In practice this is not what happens. The dialogue flourishes best when the broker is absent. For the Clandestine Services, at least, a broker is unnecessary and even a hindrance, not only in dealing with consumers outside the Agency but often in dealing with those inside as well. The second, related inconsistency is between the desire for informality and the supposed need of formal controls. As remarked above, the report finds in the Clandestine Services "the most useful evaluation program that we have noted within CIA." (IV-26.) This program involves a direct and effective collector-consumer dialogue. The report, however, reflects concern that "neither the method nor the result, in terms of collection guidance to the field, has any systematic relationship to the managed development and expression by substantive offices of intelligence needs and priorities." (IV-29.) It proposes (a) that each DD/I and DD/S&T division chief "ensure that informal requirements and evaluation requests are recorded as soon as possible for purposes of managerial control" (VIII-2); (b) "that CGS should be informed of all requests by the FI Staff for evaluations by CIA analysts" (IV-30); and (c) that the FI Staff provide CGS with the intelligence gaps and guidance derived from its reporting assessments (Recommendation No. 15). These proposals trouble me for two reasons. One is that this massive paperwork may kill the program. The other is that the merits of a simple, limited program which actually improves collection will have been sacrificed in the interests of the mere concept of "managed development... of needs and priorities."

10. I do not think it is appropriate in this memorandum to go into minute detail concerning the wide range of statements made in

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the report about the Collection Guidance Staff. Suffice it to say that there has been some misunderstanding on the part of the writers of the report with respect to CGS's real role and accomplishments.

11. I read with great interest the chapter entitled "Responsibilities of Management," and was surprised to find not a single word to suggest that the management of the Clandestine Services (or any other collection organization) has any responsibilities in the area touched on by the report. Clearly, the authors of the report are not unaware of the general responsibilities of management in the Clandestine Services. Yet the total blank on this subject suggests that their thoughts were not directed to it. Actually, I came to the conclusion some time ago that on the collection as well as the production side, management has "inalienable responsibilities" in the field of requirements and collection guidance. It is worth recalling that there are many kinds of collection guidance, and that some of them are tightly interwoven with operational direction. This detailed, operationally oriented guidance can of necessity be done only within the Clandestine Services. It is the direct responsibility of the management of the Clandestine Services. To the extent that the Collection Guidance Staff predicates its relationship with the Clandestine Services upon a recognition of the responsibilities of that management, I foresee no difficulty in developing a relationship of increasing mutual advantage.

25X1A 12: There are many items of interest in the report which cannot be noted here without unduly prolonging this memorandum. I have asked my staff to consider carefully each of the numerous suggestions scattered through the text. Occasionally the text anticipates a negative Clandestine Services response--sometimes without warrant. For example, the report endorses an opinion expressed by officers of the [redacted] that "many of the requirements addressed to the Clandestine Services should have gone first to [redacted], to determine whether the job could be done faster and more cheaply by overt collection" and that "the IPC List should be checked against [redacted] capabilities." (III-29.) The report continues: "We gather, however, that the FI Staff would regard this as an intrusion into the relationship between it and the customers for whom it provides a service of common concern." Not so. While it is a Clandestine Services position that all ad hoc requirements addressed to it must come directly and without detour, there

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is no objection whatever to the simultaneous routing of many of the same requirements to [] for the purpose stated. Indeed, FI Staff has several times suggested to CGS that this be done. Nor have we ever indicated any objection to the suggestion reported above on the IPC. It would seem to me that the DD/I representative on the IPC (who is also a member of the Collection Guidance Staff) has a responsibility to check out, to the best of his ability, all draft IPC sections submitted for his examination, to determine whether any items can be acquired by overt collection of which he has knowledge (in [] or elsewhere) and may thus be recommended for exclusion from the List. It is firmly the position of the Clandestine Services that whenever requirements can be satisfied overtly, there is no justification for levying them on the clandestine collector.

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Comments on the specific recommendations follow. Where amendments are suggested, proposed additions are underscored and proposed deletions appear in square brackets.

Recommendation No. 1

"(a) The Deputy Director for Intelligence chair an ad hoc committee of senior representatives of the production and collection components of CIA to develop a firm, authoritative CIA position with respect to the proper content of DCID No. 1/2, "Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives," and DCID No. 1/3, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives."

"(b) This committee prepare a revision of DCID No. 1/3, for proposal by CIA to USIB, which will contain a short list of specific, unequivocal objectives defined as those questions upon which our national survival depends.

"(c) The committee prepare such a revision of DCID No. 1/2, for proposal by CIA to USIB, as will appropriately cover other subjects of proper concern to intelligence which do not affect our national survival."

Concur in general. I strongly agree that, in the language of the accompanying text, "the PNIOs should concern themselves exclusively with national survival." And I agree with the statement that "their value would lie in their emphatic exclusiveness; they would not teach anybody anything he didn't already know, but would remind us all of the fundamental reason for our existence..." Whether the second half of this recommendation--the proposed revision of the Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives--will serve an equally useful purpose is a point on which I have still to be convinced, but I do not object to the effort's being made. I should add that my interest in the PNIOs is largely related to my concern with the IPC List, discussed under Recommendation No. 3.

Recommendation No. 2

"The Agency position include, for presentation to USIB, proposals that USIB rescind its requirement for a strict annual schedule for revising DCID No. 1/3, and that USIB abolish the quarterly supplements to DCID No. 1/3 as serving no necessary or even useful purpose."

Concur.

Recommendation No. 3

The Deputy Director for Plans

- a. Direct the Chief of the FI Staff to prepare and coordinate within CIA a draft revision of DCID No. 5/5 suitable for proposal to USIB by its CIA member, to the end that the IPC can be made into a satisfactory mechanism for stating the needs of the community for clandestine collection by CIA.
- b. Direct the Chief of the FI Staff, as Chairman of the IPC, to revise IPC procedures in ways which will make them responsive to the instructions of the new DCID and the needs of the Clandestine Services.
- c. Direct the assignment of sufficient manpower to the IPC secretariat to make possible the early completion

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of the IPC List and to ensure that it is thenceforth kept complete, and to exclusion of redundancies between clandestine and other systems of collection, and suspend all other normal operations of the Clandestine Services' requirements system, except the development of requirements tailored to known reporting sources, until this is accomplished.

Nonconcur. I take this position with great regret, since I found the chapter on the IPC List full of stimulating and valuable ideas, and since I agree with much of the criticism in it. To explain why I am unable to concur, it is necessary to go past the language of the recommendation itself--which, in effect, merely says that the charter and procedures of the IPC should be revised--to the passages in the text which tell to what end that revision should be directed. Let me say at once that I am not defending either the IPC List as it stands or the theory on which it has, for some years, been constructed. Rather, I am offering my own idea of how it should be reformed, as an alternative to the proposals in the report. If anything, I would fault the report for accepting, rather than challenging, a position which we have--in my opinion, erroneously--been developing in the Clandestine Services: namely, that the IPC List should be "the basic mechanism for stating the needs of the community for clandestine collection" (III-14). I believe the List should be something much more restricted.

The essence of the position taken in the report is expressed in this passage:

"With all these shortcomings, does the List serve any purpose which justifies its retention? We say yes, ... because it fulfills the useful bureaucratic function of guiding outside requirements pressures upon the Clandestine Services into channels which can be kept under reasonable control. Its principal utility is to keep within workable bounds the community's levying of individual ad hoc requirements...; without the List the indiscriminate, conflicting, and unrealistic pressures could get out of hand." (III-9.)

From this concept of the function of the List the report proceeds logically to the conclusion that the word "Priorities" should be dropped from the name of the committee (III-4) and that:

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"A new DCID No. 5/5 ought to recognize the List as an embodiment not of the PNIOs but of the Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives (DCID No. 1/2) as they apply to the Clandestine Services." (III-5.)

In short, the List is to be "the proper vehicle for carrying most of the collection requirements to be acted upon by the Clandestine Services." (III-30.) Finding that the List, by this standard, is incomplete and that large parts of it are always out of date, the report proposes strenuous efforts to make and keep it "complete, accurate, and current." These efforts, of course, would require personnel. Of the secretariat, the report states: "We are impressed by their battle against overwhelming odds, but this is clearly not enough manpower to accomplish all that doing the job, in the name of the DCI, USIB, and the DDP requires." (III-14.) It goes on to say that "some permanent increase in the secretariat is necessary"--as indeed it would be, to accomplish what is proposed. This statement does not appear in the formal recommendation. Except for this omission, the discussion and recommendation hang together well if the purpose of the IPC List is accepted as "the useful bureaucratic function" of channeling outside pressures.

In my view, the purpose of the IPC List should be quite different. In the phrase previously quoted on the PNIOs, it should be to "remind us all /in this case the Clandestine Services/ of the fundamental reason for our existence." I believe therefore that the new IPC List should be keyed to the new Priority (not Comprehensive) National Intelligence Objectives and that it should consist exclusively of requirements necessitating clandestine collection on matters affecting the national survival. This narrow delimitation which I propose for the IPC List will be a further step in my program for focussing the efforts of the Clandestine Services intensively on the "gut" issues of national survival for which any clandestine intelligence service exists. If the course I propose is taken, it is obvious that certain of the other concerns of the report will fall away: there will no longer be any great difficulty in keeping the List (within its newly and narrowly defined limits) complete, accurate, current, and confined to subjects necessitating clandestine collection. Nor will it be necessary to add personnel in order to do this.

I grant that my proposal will not accomplish everything that the proposal in the report is intended to accomplish. It would not pretend

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to "give the managers a better feel for the total scope of the Clandestine Services' work"; it would not provide a place for the proposed requirements on "area-wide ~~problems~~ such as anticolonialism in central Africa, racial conflicts in southern Africa, " or problems in the Caribbean, the Arab world, etc.; it would not test the proposition that "a complete List could be made a good deal shorter than the incomplete one we have now, and would be much easier to revise." (III-10.) However, in the report these points are all subordinated to the "principal utility" of the List, the "useful bureaucratic function" cited above. I will therefore address myself to that point.

It may well be that a List of the type proposed in the report, aiming at completeness and currency, would indeed guide outside requirements pressures into "channels which can be kept under reasonable control." It could not, of course, be really complete or really current. Most useful political requirements are received informally or developed internally. Try as the secretariat might to put salt on their tails, these requirements would never stand still long enough to be caged in the IPC List alive. Still, with the strenuous efforts of an expanded staff, I grant that it would be possible to have a List which would be much more complete and much more current than any we have had. Possible; to some extent useful; but still not worth the effort.

Is it really true that "without the List the indiscriminate, conflicting, and unrealistic pressures could get out of hand"? I cannot bring myself to believe so. No doubt there may be some resistance within the IPC itself to the narrowing of the List. No doubt, also, there will be a tendency in the community to react to the narrowing of the List by proliferating ad hoc, numbered requirements on subjects excluded from it. Undoubtedly these developments will be vexing and time-consuming; but I question whether it will be any more of a task to cope with them directly than to guard against them by creating a Great Pyramid in the form of an enlarged IPC List.

I believe it may be necessary for the Agency and the Clandestine Services to take a stand on certain home truths. One is that the Clandestine Services are not a mail-order store, committed to filling all orders. Another is that our essential responsibilities are defined for us through command channels, and that so-called "requirements channels" are merely a supplementary way of obtaining detailed guidance, to enable us to carry out more precisely and efficiently the

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general collection responsibilities already imposed on us. I strongly endorse what this report says about the value of solicited requirements, tailored to collection capabilities. As for unsolicited requirements, it will probably be necessary for the Clandestine Services to intensify their efforts to forestall, dissuade, and deflect, and, much oftener than in the past, to reject outright requirements that, however comforting to the analyst, are useless to the collector.

Finally, I can say with confidence that no CS division chief or station chief lacks clarity with regard to the important requirements, in the sense of intelligence needs, on his area at any moment. If a station chief were to wait for a political requirement to appear in the IPC List before developing a capability for answering it, he would never satisfy a single such requirement until the need had passed. Formal requirements are useful on PNTI items and on certain other subjects--mainly scientific and technical, sometimes military or economic--where CS capability, responsibility, and need for guidance are acknowledged. Otherwise, they are unnecessary. If this statement be treasonous to the accepted convention that the whole structure of intelligence needs must be fully articulated in a set of related paperwork, then I plead guilty of such treason.

Recommendation No. 4

Concur, subject to the amendments indicated.

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence instruct the Collection Guidance Staff to draft, and coordinate with the Chairman of the IPC and with all elements of CIA which produce clandestine collection requirements, a notice for Agency publication which:

"a. Describes /defines/ the function and responsibilities of the CIA member of the IPC.

"b. Describes /defines/ the function and scope of the IPC List and directs Agency originators of requirements to consult and cite it in formulating their needs for clandestine collection."

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The responsibilities of the IPC and its members can be defined only by USIB and, within the framework set by USIB, by the IPC itself. Coordination with the Chairman of the IPC will ensure that any description prepared by CGS will be consistent with the established definitions.

Recommendation No. 5

"The Deputy Director for Plans direct the Chief of FI Staff to reject ad hoc requirements for collection which do not clearly satisfy the criteria for clandestine collection established by USIB in DCID No. 5/5; namely, that such requirements necessitate clandestine collection and exclude subjects that can normally be covered by other methods."

Concur, with some reservations as to feasibility. This recommendation is an injunction to apply literally and inflexibly certain criteria which have hitherto guided our acceptance and rejection of requirements in what I agree has been too easygoing a manner. We can tighten up a great deal in applying these criteria to formal requirements. But there is one real difficulty which the report has not had to face: the fact that many valid requirements cannot be separated with surgical precision into a part which is wholly collectable overtly and a part which is solely collectable clandestinely.

Recommendation No. 6

Concur, subject to the amendment indicated.

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence

"a. Direct the Chief, Collection Guidance Staff, in consultation with the Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff and the

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[redacted] to revise Form 986.

"b. Take measures to ensure that Form 986, as revised, is correctly and consistently used by all CIA writers of collection requirements.

"c. Issue a notice instructing analysts and their supervisors on the preparation of requirements."

Since the form is to be used in levying requirements on collectors, it seems reasonable that collectors be consulted.

Recommendation No. 7

Concur, subject to the amendment indicated.

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence direct the Chief of the Collection Guidance Staff to develop, in collaboration with the Chief, FI Staff and the [redacted]

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[redacted] requirements officers of the Clandestine Services and the [redacted] a means whereby the levying of new requirements upon CIA collectors by CIA analysts is preceded by an inquiry as to the feasibility of satisfying such a requirement with current assets, to the end that formal ad hoc requirements be limited to those of immediate practical value as collection guidance. "

This amendment is in the interest of precision. The Clandestine Services contain many requirements officers in various components. The responsibility in question belongs in the FI Staff.

Recommendation No. 9

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Plans, arrange for the regular exchange of officers between the Requirements and Evaluation Branch of the Intelligence Group of the Foreign Intelligence Staff and the Human Resources Group of the Collection Guidance Staff. "

Nonconcur. This recommendation appears to be offered as a substitute for coping directly with any problems of "communication" and "team work" that may exist between the two staffs. I would prefer a candid ventilation of such problems, in the interest of the best and most cooperative possible performance by each staff of its own job. Short-term rotations between the directorates have not generally been satisfactory. The short fact of the matter is that the Clandestine Services have a security problem. We have learned to discuss our intelligence product freely with our customers. We must never learn to discuss our sources beyond a strict need-to-know. The acceptance of CGS

officers on short-term detail would result either in a violation of our need-to-know principles or in a diminished participation by FI Staff officers in the things that really matter. There are also some other disadvantages to the proposal. In effect, one officer from each staff would be continuously in a state of training and orientation. The FI Staff, with three requirements officers, could afford this less well than the Human Resources Group of CGS with some 15 or more; but neither can really afford such use of personnel, nor, in my opinion, can the Agency.

Recommendation No. 10

Concur, subject to the amendment indicated.

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Deputy Director for Plans, issue a notice explaining the status and use of the CIRL."

The text of the report strongly stresses the use of the CIRL by Clandestine Services officers, citing one returnee from the field who called it "our Bible." Actually the CIRL, which does not discriminate between items for overt and clandestine collection, is for the Clandestine Services at best a supplementary document useful for general orientation but not to be confused with requirements imposing an obligation to collect. Any wider use of the CIRL by Field Stations would tend to dissipate the discipline I am trying to establish with regard to concentration on prime clandestine targets. Therefore, any notice relating it to use by the Clandestine Services should be coordinated with the DD/P.

Recommendation No. 13

Concur, subject to amendments indicated.

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, direct the preparation and implementation of a program for the production and periodic revision of comprehensive collection guides on selected intelligence subjects, the selection of subjects and the planning of specific guides to be coordinated with the collection organizations for which the guides are intended.

As the accompanying text points out, "guides should be confined to a few important subjects." The word "program" seems to imply too many guides, and it is too reminiscent of the guides formerly produced and now rightly disparaged in the text. The proposed addition at the end of the recommendation is intended to support the view expressed in the text that guides "must be oriented toward the collector and written in terms of possible collection action." This is the only way to avoid waste of effort.

Recommendation No. 15

Concur, subject to the amendment indicated.

"The Deputy Director for Plans direct the Chief, FI Staff, to make available to the Collection Guidance Staff, in generalized/sanitized/ form, all intelligence gaps and new collection guidance which it derives from its own reporting assessments."

There seems to be something anomalous in the Clandestine Services being requested to provide collection guidance to the Collection Guidance Staff. I have, however, no objection, provided it is understood that what makes up the bulk of these studies is a vast amount of operational detail, related to individual sources and presented in a context permeated by operational concerns. Such detail, of course, we cannot make available. It is not feasible to sanitize these studies except by presenting their main findings in concise, generalized form. This we shall be glad to do. Hence our preference for the term "generalized" in the recommendation.

Recommendation No. 17

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Plans, ensure that duplication between COMINT and human-source requirements on the Free World is reduced to the necessary minimum."

Concur, with respect to the DD/P coordination called for by the recommendation.

Recommendation No. 26

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence furnish all necessary support to the Collection Guidance Staff in its efforts to:

"a. Mitigate the deleterious effects of the Information Explosion that are already being felt.

"b. Apply strict selective criteria to all foreign intelligence requirements in order to prevent the Information Explosion from getting completely out of hand.

"c. Introduce progressively more order and system into human-source requirements."

Comment. Taken without regard to its context, the language of this recommendation is unexceptionable, and its substance appears to be confined to matters within the competence of the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Unfortunately the preceding discussion contains a good deal of vague language in which an ever-enlarging role is envisioned for the Collection Guidance Staff without any reference to the established responsibilities and authorities of the managers of collection. I have discussed this point more fully in the first part of this memorandum. I suggest it be formally understood that this recommendation does not imply the assumption of responsibilities by CGS which would require an extension or reinterpretation of its charter. Should such be proposed, the proposal should be made in the most explicit terms, and an opportunity should be afforded to examine it carefully.

Recommendation No. 27

"The Deputy Director for Intelligence, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Deputy Director for Plans, arrange briefings on the collection guidance system for analysts in the Agency's intelligence production offices."

Concur.

In conclusion, I should like to say with great sincerity that although some of my comments may appear to deal quite sharply with some of the proposals in the report, I feel that the report has been a great success

in that, through its sheer readability and its forthright confrontation of such primary problems as the Information Explosion, it has forced management throughout the Agency to face these problems and to think about them.

/s/

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans