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TS No. 196650

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Report on Foreign
Intelligence Collection Requirements

REFERENCE : DDCI Memorandum, above Subject,
dated 18 January 1967

1. In response to your request the subject report has been reviewed in detail by me and by all offices of this Directorate. The following comments respond to those conclusions and recommendations pertaining to the scientific and technological areas of interest.

2. This Directorate fully appreciates the depth of the problem involved and the need for a concerted effort toward solution. In part, our views coincide with those in the report. In certain areas, however, this Directorate feels that the corrective procedures recommended will not result in the practical achievement desired. We trust that our suggested modifications in the recommendations will prove to be constructive and complement the spirit of the report.

Chapter 2 - The Problem of Priorities

Recommendation #1


Concur.

Recommendation #2

Concur.

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Chapter 3 - Requirements for Collection by Human Sources

Recommendation #3

While we agree with the need to revamp the IPC process, we are, nevertheless, concerned with the tone of recommendation #3c. This reads, in part, as follows: "...all other normal operations of the Clandestine Services' requirements system, except the development of requirements tailored to known reporting sources, until this is accomplished." We believe that the type of review suggested here would be time-consuming, and we are therefore concerned about any approach which keeps an already bad situation static. It would seem that to accept a situation, even for a brief period, wherein requirements are tailored to known reporting sources is a step backward. We believe that improvement of the Clandestine Services collection effort requires concentration on requirements not being covered by existing reporting sources. Further, we feel that such a shift of emphasis is of immediate concern.

With regard to manpower requirements for the IPC Secretariat, we believe that a careful examination of the application of automatic data processing to this problem area should be included with the study of such manpower needs.

Recommendation #4

Concur.

Recommendation #5

While agreeing fully with the necessity for controlling requirements levied on any collection resource, it appears that this recommendation tends to treat the Clandestine Services too reverently. We believe the basic language of DCID 5/5 can be challenged. Why should the Plans Directorate collect certain information only when no other collection method could be used? With the tremendous cost and the processing problems associated with photographic collection and other technical means it appears that there are times when clandestine collection should be tried simply because it is easier, cheaper, and possibly quicker and more accurate.

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In short, we would oppose a scheme which gives any collector the right to reject unilaterally requirements on his collection system.

Recommendation #6

Concur. DD/S&T would be happy to participate in a review of Form 986.

Recommendation #7

Our concern about this recommendation is similar to that expressed with reference to recommendation #5, above. The thrust here seems to put emphasis again on collecting that which we already know how to collect rather than collecting what we really need.

The practice of having analysts make queries prior to placement of a requirement is basically a good idea; however, it has been the experience of DD/S&T analysts that the Clandestine Services' policies and practices tend to deny dissemination of meaningful information concerning their current assets or collection capability. This is not an attempt to debate the need for tight security and need-to-know. Nevertheless, we doubt the practicality of this recommendation unless there is a significant change in the amount of information the collectors are willing to provide.

Again, we express the concern that this concept would result in the further entrenchment of existing programs and a general lessening of attention to the establishment of new efforts to meet critical needs.

Chapter 4 - Collection Guidance

Recommendation #8

Non-concur. This Directorate cannot support implementation of this recommendation, and we find little in the substance of the report that truly supports the need for any change in the existing relationship with CGS. Although we do

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not understand how CGS exercises "supervision" over collection guidance within the Intelligence Directorate, we are not anxious to have a staff element of another Directorate exert supervision over DD/S&T areas of interest and responsibility. This recommendation appears to be inconsistent with the implementation of later recommendations strengthening command responsibility at all levels in the requirements process, and tends to substitute staff supervision for command responsibility.

We continue to feel that there is a need for even closer contact between analysts and collectors, and are concerned over any concept that gives a staff element authority to broker requirements between them.

Recommendation #9

No comment.

Recommendation #10, #11, #12

It is difficult for this Directorate to understand the rationale of the IG Report with regard to CIRL. Whereas the report identifies CIRL as "the most useful single method of collection guidance produced in the community" it would appear to be, on the contrary, one of the principal contributing factors in the "information explosion." While CIRL might be quite useful in the political field, we believe that it has been singularly unproductive in stimulating the collection of information in the scientific and technological fields of interest to this Directorate.

Recommendation #13

Non-concur. Without much more careful study, we are not anxious to support a major effort toward the preparation of collection guidance documents. OSI has had long experience in this area and is particularly aware of the amount of analysts' time required to do this job well. We believe the likely payoff from a major effort in this area is questionable, except perhaps in a very few carefully selected situations.

Here again a much closer coupling between the analyst and the field collector seems to be the answer, and very often.

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the direct involvement of the analyst in exploitation of the source has been the most productive approach.

Recommendation #14

Non-concur. It seems doubtful that this Agency can afford the luxury of a separate collection guidance program for each separate collection mechanism. Our concern, again, is the non-productive use of the analysts' time if we are to embark on a major effort geared specifically to the [REDACTED]

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Recommendation #15

It would appear to be more desirable for the Chief, FI Staff, to make this type of information available directly to the offices concerned with intelligence production. We would not, of course, object to having this information go to the CGS but do not believe that CGS should attempt to serve as the only focal point for interaction with the FI Staff.

Chapter 5 - Some Problems of Requirements

Recommendation #16

This recommendation raises the question of division of responsibility between the CGS and the SPINT Staff. It would appear that one group brokering the SIGINT account should be adequate. This Directorate has no strong feeling as to whether the CGS or the SPINT Staff should be so charged.

Recommendation #17

No comment.

Recommendation #18, #19

No comment.

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Recommendation #20

Since the subject of COMOR and SIGINT Committee responsibility is currently under review, we recommend that action on this recommendation be deferred.

Recommendation #21, #22

We believe that the spirit of these two recommendations is already being complied with through regular information exchanges between ELINT collectors and OSI/FMSAC analysts. We have, however, no objection to this being done in a more formal way.

Chapter 6 - Recommendations for Overhead Imagery

Recommendation #23

Concur, and suggest that the recently constituted DDI/DDS&T Pre-COMOR would be in an excellent position to implement this recommendation.

Chapter 8 - Responsibilities of Management

Recommendation #24

Concur, except that one statement in paragraph 2a. of the discussion causes us considerable concern. This relates to the stipulation that the division chief certify that the information needed to fill a gap in national intelligence "is not already available." If interpreted literally, satisfaction of this requirement in many instances may never be possible or may take many man weeks of effort for almost any given question. In short, it would be necessary to interpret "not already available" with considerable latitude.

Recommendation #25

Concur.

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
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Recommendation #26

It is difficult to find specific fault with this general recommendation. We would again like to note, however, that the solution to the requirements problem must rest with the command echelons of the Agency and not with any one staff element.

Recommendation #27


Concur.



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Carl E. Duckett
Acting Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

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