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US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to consider what we can expect from the Soviets over the next 6 - 24 months and how we should attempt to steer East-West relations in that same period. It concludes with a summary of possible Soviet initiatives, suggested US responses, and possible US initiatives. These conclusions are based on analysis of:

- the Andropov regime's view of the world situation and of how Soviet interests can be advanced;
- the strength of Andropov's political position and the resources and constraints that define what he can attempt and achieve; and
- our view of American interests and what we would like to see the Soviets do, stop doing, or abstain from doing insofar as their conduct affects our interests.

This study is based on the long-term framework for US policy toward the USSR established by NSDD 11-82.

THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Assets and Liabilities

In assessing its inheritance, the Soviet leadership finds major gains and assets:

- superpower status and global reach;
 - a quarreling, economically shaky West;
 - domestic political stability; and
 - an economy strong enough to support massive military outlays while keeping popular discontent within tolerable limits;
- . . . as well as problems:
- discontent in Eastern Europe;
 - declining productivity, morale and economic growth (to below 2% percent per annum);

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- the Afghanistan predicament; and
- Western--especially American--rearmament.

With regard to military competition, the regime finds itself with:

- rough overall balance, with Soviet leads in ground forces, long-range INF missiles, and ICBMs, as well as reduced American advantages in naval and other power projection forces and in military technology;

. . . but also:

- prospective loss of the Soviet advantage in INF, as well as American strategic modernization and restored American naval and technological supremacy.

Basic Choices

On balance, Brezhnev's successors will be sufficiently content with these conditions, unsure of how to effect basic change, and sober about the consequences of unregulated competition or direct confrontation with us that they will not be inclined to depart from the country's general historical course.

The leaders probably think the economy can sustain roughly the current pace of military effort (4% per annum growth) and international aggrandizement, but not much more. It would take a much graver economic crisis than expected to force the regime to consider military and international contraction, given that this would mean abandonment of Brezhnev's main achievement: Soviet might and reach comparable to ours. At the same time, the deteriorating economic situation will make the regime cautious about taking on a larger military burden and new international liabilities. In sum, the regime will opt for neither an expansionist surge nor broad retrenchment.

Nothing in Andropov's background or character suggests that he would be predisposed to swing widely from Brezhnev's course. Moreover, while his position in the leadership is strong--in part because his colleagues want a strong leader--he is bound by consensus, and particularly beholden to Ustinov and Gromyko. These factors also militate against major domestic or international shifts.

Foreign Policy Directions

This by no means implies passive continuity in foreign policy. The difficulty of effecting domestic change could encourage foreign policy dynamism, albeit within the framework

set under Brezhnev. The Soviet leaders may see more sophisticated, innovative, agile, and diversified diplomacy as the best and cheapest way to undercut and pressure us, expand their influence, relieve internal pressures, and perhaps cut the political costs of some of their more exposed positions abroad. They may be contemplating a mix of selective international "opportunity-seizing" and "loss-cutting," but in both cases with costs, risks and deviations kept to a minimum.

The new leadership, like the old, sees in Washington an Administration that refuses to respect Soviet status and prerogatives as an equal superpower, even while--in their view--exaggerating Soviet military advantages. They see us as having raised the costs and risks of military and international competition. However, they may doubt the Administration's ability to maintain a national consensus in support of restoring American strength, or to forge a Western consensus around Washington's East-West outlook and policies. They doubt our willingness to respond positively to anything less than a broad Soviet retreat, which they will not contemplate.

For some in Moscow, this assessment of Washington calls for a more confrontationist approach, an expanded Soviet military effort, greater sacrifice, and less regard for Western public opinion. There may be those at the other extreme who believe the USSR must deal directly with American concerns in order to avert a level of competition and confrontation the country cannot afford. However, while resource constraints will work against the advocates of a major military and international surge, they will not dictate retreat either. Thus, the view most likely to prevail is that US-Soviet relations should be placed in a holding pattern until it becomes clear whether or not this Administration's strategic approach is a passing phenomenon.

Thus, on the whole, with the possible exception of START, it is unlikely that the Soviets see much percentage in making major concessions in the hope of satisfying this Administration. They may probe our willingness to do business with them, but their expectations will be low. They are more likely to try even harder to put us on the defensive politically and to stimulate a public and Allied backlash against our policies. In the process, however, they might be induced to take some real if limited steps that would partially meet our concerns.

With regard to arms control (notably START and INF), the Soviets have a definite interest in somehow heading off unrestrained competition. Indeed, the leadership may be less than sanguine about having to back up threats of stepped-up Soviet military programs in the event that our effort continues. At the same time, they doubt that we are genuinely interested in agreements that take account of their concerns

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(e.g., cruise missiles), and their military establishment is in a position to block "disadvantageous" deals. The Soviets will therefore follow an integrated arms control strategy combining propaganda with real but limited concessions, their purpose being to cut off domestic and Allied support for our build-up while leaving open the possibility of our addressing their concerns and thus reaching agreements. To the degree they succeed in cutting off our support, they will care less about actually reaching agreements with us, since they could then avoid reducing their forces without fear of being forced into an expanded military effort.

In general, the Soviet leaders may feel that Soviet interests are best served by isolating and "outflanking" us as much as possible--that is, by orienting their foreign policy away from US-Soviet relations, and by trying to come to grips with some of their problems without reference to us. This would enhance their freedom to ignore our concerns, their ability to weaken our relations with others, and their ability to pursue new initiatives. In INF, the direct negotiations with us are secondary, indeed subordinated, to the task of turning Europe against deployments. Even in START, where they must deal with us, they will try to reach American public opinion over our heads.

Trying to operate around the US over the next 6 - 24 months would represent a necessary "tactical"--and, they probably hope, temporary--departure from the Soviets' basic emphasis on the centrality of the US-Soviet relationship in managing world affairs.

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Assessment

Our program to re-establish American ascendancy involves rearmament, world economic recovery, respect for international law and order, and the promotion of democratic values. Progress in achieving these goals affects and is affected by our competition with the Soviet Union.

- The more successful we are in our overall program, the more able we will be to induce more restrained Soviet conduct or, failing that, to counter Soviet misconduct.
- The Soviets want to impede our program, mainly by dividing us from those at home or abroad whose support we need for success.

The results we have achieved so far are mixed:

- We have succeeded in making the Soviets more cautious but we have not caused them to retreat from existing positions.

● We have increased public awareness of the Soviet challenge here and abroad, but we have not laid to rest questions about our own commitment to better East-West relations--questions which the Soviets are quick to feed.

Our Goals

Over the next 6 - 24 months, our chief aims toward the competition should be:

● to consolidate domestic consensus in support of sustained growth in defense spending, and thus to convince the Soviets that they are not witnessing a passing phenomenon;

● to prevent further Soviet encroachments;

● to reduce existing international problems caused by the Soviets, and to increase the costs to the Soviets of those problems on which there is no progress;

● to maintain control of the East-West agenda, the terms by which problems are dealt with, and the standards by which Soviet behavior is measured;

● to strengthen our general Western coalition and keep our coalitions on specific issues intact;

● to reduce Western contributions to Soviet power and dependence on East-West trade;

● to engage the Soviets constructively on issues where our interests overlap; and

● to show that our approach to East-West relations is bearing fruit, in the sense that both Soviet behavior and our competitive position are beginning to improve.

Because the Andropov regime will probably follow a more active and sophisticated foreign policy, oriented away from addressing problems with us and on our terms, and because it may find it easier to mollify others than to satisfy us, we need to preserve our influence over the manner in which outstanding issues are played out. This does not mean that we should alter our general stance: we should remain in a broadly reactive posture, in the sense that only genuine improvement in Soviet conduct will bring about more positive American policies toward the USSR. At the same time, in view of the Soviet policies we foresee, we may need to take initiatives to maintain our coalitions and to maintain demanding but attainable standards for Soviet conduct on outstanding problems.

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Because we cannot force broad Soviet retreat, we should be selective and opportunistic ourselves if we want to cause concrete improvement in Soviet conduct in the next two years. To remain relevant regarding international problems the Soviets would like to deal with without reference to us (e.g., Poland, Afghanistan, Kampuchea), we have to be, and appear to be, realistic in setting near-term goals. Our long-term goals concerning such problems could become obsolete if we don't define the near-term progress we want. We should be true to our promise to respond positively to real improvement in Soviet international conduct and reasonable in recognizing what is real and what is not or else we will lose our capacity to influence Moscow and to keep our partners with us. We will assist the Soviets in their effort to isolate us if we are seen as staking out rigid and maximal positions that we know cannot be a basis for progress, however noble those positions might be.

Just as the Soviets may now try to outflank us, we have to be ready to execute our own political flanking movements to ensure that they cannot escape from our agenda of concerns and our standards for responsible conduct and real progress. This means we should consider how to use not only US-Soviet relations to induce improved Soviet behavior but also our relations with other key actors, such as our European Allies, Japan, China, ASEAN, Pakistan, and African Front-Line States. Only if we frustrate Soviet efforts to divide us from our support, at home and abroad, can we induce them to move from shadow to substance as they attempt to reduce the costs to them of the problems they have caused.

With regard to arms control, we should above all avoid being left in a position in which Soviet programs are not limited while ours cannot be sustained due to lack of public and Allied support. To the degree the Soviets can convince our own and European publics that we do not want progress, they may succeed in blocking our rearmament while avoiding reductions and retaining their advantages. Our aim must be to avoid being outmaneuvered in this way without compromising our principles of reductions, equality and verifiability.

The Relationship of Short-term and Long-term Goals

Even if we succeed over the next two years in preserving support for our policies, in preventing new Soviet encroachments, and in reducing one or more outstanding problems, the basic facts of US-Soviet relations will persist: the Soviets will still have the means and incentive to challenge our interests in the Third World; they will be able to maintain the internal discipline needed to bear a massive military burden; and they will continue to try to undermine support for Western rearmament.

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If we want to alter these facts fundamentally within the next two years, the approach outlined above is inadequate. Some would therefore argue that instead of trying to reduce existing problems, we should allow them to get worse for the sake of weakening the Soviets. By this reasoning, we should, for example, not help the Soviets find a way to put their Afghanistan encumbrance behind them. We should not facilitate Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea, nor address Soviet objectives as part of the give-and-take of arms control. And we should do nothing to avert turmoil in Eastern Europe--much less in the USSR itself--that could relieve the Soviets' burden.

Others believe that there are several basic flaws in this line of reasoning:

- It seriously underestimates the Soviets' ability to cope with their problems and to resort to extraordinary harshness to maintain control and avoid defeat.
- It overestimates our ability to preserve essential support among those at home and abroad who want to see outstanding problems solved, even if the Soviets might stand to gain.
- It ignores our genuine interests in easing human suffering (whether in Kampuchea or Afghanistan) and advancing reconciliation, justice, and human rights (as in Poland).
- Most fundamentally, it overlooks the fact that we are in a dynamic situation, dealing with volatile problems which could lead to dangerous instabilities we may not be able to control. Southwest Asia and nuclear arms competition are but two graphic examples. Simply put, while we may be able to damage Soviet interests through uncontrolled competition, we cannot be confident of safeguarding our own. Thus, we want to contain and reduce conflict, even as we force the Soviets to pay a high price for their misdeeds.

In sum, having advanced a set of goals for improved Soviet behavior, this Administration should not and cannot now fail to seize whatever opportunities present themselves to achieve them, even if the Soviets can benefit from a lessening of the problems they have created. Moreover, if we can show in the course of the next two years that we are causing the Soviets to behave more responsibly, we will help to establish a durable political basis for this Administration's approach for the rest of this decade and beyond.

THE INTERSECTION OF SOVIET CONDUCT AND US INTERESTS

In view of the foregoing assessment, we must anticipate our interests being affected by Soviet policies in the following specific areas:

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Sino-Soviet Relations. The Soviets may be willing to make limited but concrete concessions, like modest withdrawal of forces from the border, in order to pressure us and give themselves more maneuvering room. Also, insofar as the Soviets might be disposed to show flexibility and cut costs on such problems as Afghanistan, they would have an interest in playing such movement as concessions to Beijing, not us.

Broadly speaking, we want to avoid having our freedom of action toward either country limited, more than it already is, by the prospect and reality of progress between them. We also have an interest in preventing a reduced Soviet threat to China from increasing the Soviet threat to NATO, Southwest Asia, or other US interests. We have an interest in maintaining influence over Chinese policies, e.g., toward Taiwan and Southeast Asia, influence that could be eroded if the Soviets draw Beijing into closer relations. Finally, we have an interest in maintaining the confidence of our friends--especially Japan, but also the Europeans--in our ability to manage US-Soviet and US-Chinese relations in a way that keeps chances of Sino-Soviet rapprochement to a minimum.

Japan. The Soviets may try to use conciliatory actions--perhaps punctuated by threats--to reverse the growing Japanese inclination to support firmer East-West policies on a global basis, even though they must know they cannot shake the basic US-Japan bilateral security relationship. Rapidly advancing Sino-Soviet relations (and deteriorating Sino-American relations) could make the Japanese more susceptible to Soviet blandishments.

We have an interest in seeing a genuine reduction of the Soviet threat to Japan, e.g., a pull-back from the disputed islands; but we must hope--and can expect--that the Japanese would not be lulled by tokenism nor regard Soviet concessions as a reason to reverse their movement toward a more solid stance on East-West relations generally. We also have an interest in showing both the Soviets and the Japanese that we will not ignore attempts to intimidate Japan.

Kampuchea. A Soviet attempt to nudge the Vietnamese toward withdrawal would fit with Moscow's interests in cooperating with Beijing, gaining respectability with ASEAN, and easing an existing problem on their terms and without reference to us. At the same time, the Soviets greatly value their relationship with Hanoi and will be reluctant to strain it.

Our interest lies in total withdrawal and Kampuchean independence and non-alignment. The conflict is not such a burden on the Soviets that we should wish it to continue; indeed, we would welcome some reduction in the conflict and especially the threat to Thailand. We must, of course, guard

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against mere gestures designed to crack our coalition with ASEAN and China. But we would welcome Soviet pressure on Vietnam, and we are confident that our coalition will survive possible moves in Kampuchea as long as the Soviets and Vietnamese represent a continuing threat in the area.

Afghanistan. The Soviets might show limited flexibility in an effort to satisfy the Paks, the Chinese, and our Allies and to pinch off support to the Afghan resistance. Beyond reducing political costs, Andropov probably would like to find a way to wind down the war itself--presumably unilaterally but not ruling out a settlement on terms that would leave the Soviets in control with fewer troops committed. Threats to increase military pressure on Pakistan would not be inconsistent with these objectives.

As in Kampuchea, we want total withdrawal, non-alignment, and a government of the people. Given that these goals are unattainable, at least in the near term, we face a dilemma. On the one hand, we would welcome some improvement in conditions for the Afghans and a reduced Soviet threat to Pakistan, provided partial progress did not deprive us of the means (mainly Pak support) to press for an acceptable solution. On the other hand, a continuation of the conflict has benefits for us insofar as it is a military and political burden on the Soviets. In either case, we have an interest in preserving our ability to influence the terms of a settlement, in maintaining Pak support for Afghan resistance until Soviet occupation ends, and in making the war as painful as we can as long as it goes on. Whether we should work actively to push the Soviets from cosmetic to real movement depends on whether we believe our interests are served more by reducing conflict in Southwest Asia than by keeping the Soviets tied down in a no-win--if also no-lose--war.

Middle East and Persian Gulf. The Soviets will exploit lack of progress on our peace initiative, as well as our support for Israel, to recover if not expand their influence among the Arabs, if possible beyond their standard clients. Efforts to destabilize regimes are not excluded but would likely be quite tentative. Like us, the Soviets cannot drive the Iran-Iraq war toward either a military or political conclusion.

Our interests are clear: minimize Soviet influence in the Arab world and defeat any attempts to sabotage the peace process, subvert our friends, or exploit instability around the Gulf. We want to be sure the Soviets understand that we will do whatever is necessary to protect our vital interests in this region.

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The Horn of Africa. The Soviets are unlikely to consider engineering a draw-down of Cuban forces in this area. It is more likely that they will test us here--if they are disposed to test us anywhere--since their Ethiopian clients have a military advantage and since they may doubt our willingness and ability to save Siad if pressed.

Our interest over the next year or so is in stabilizing the status quo while gradually building up Sudan and Somalia. Our interest in a Cuban draw-down is not as immediate here as it is in Southern Africa. We also have a long-term interest in reorientation of Ethiopia toward the West, but we cannot gear our policies to this highly difficult possibility.

Southern Africa. The Soviets are likely to be uncooperative with regard to a Namibia-Angola settlement unless convinced that they will bear the onus for failure throughout black Africa, or that they can somehow benefit from or share in the credit for success.

Our interest in a Namibia-Angola settlement includes but goes beyond our desire to weaken the Soviet position in this volatile and strategically important area. We will not achieve our immediate goal of Soviet acquiescence if Moscow believes we would crow about and try to exploit a Soviet retreat. In fact, we can succeed without requiring a clear Soviet defeat. US and Soviet interests hardly coincide, but they may intersect.

Central America. The Soviets are unlikely either to escalate or to try to curb the Cubans, unless they see Havana drawing them toward a confrontation with us that they do not want. They will try to keep up pressure through low-risk support for Marxist elements because of their long-term interest in having us become pre-occupied with instability along our frontier.

Our interest is in defeating subversion, advancing economic and political development, and eventually restoring tranquility on our Southern porch. Our aim should be to convince the Soviets that we have a far more compelling interest in defeating threats in Central America than they do in fueling them--and thus, that we will do what it takes to prevail in a show-down, e.g., over introduction of MIGs or Cuban combat units into Nicaragua. These interests apply throughout the Caribbean, but especially on the mainland.

Eastern Europe and Human Rights. Andropov may try subtly to exploit Romanian and Yugoslav problems, while balancing between crackdown on political dissent and tolerance of controlled economic reform elsewhere. Moscow probably thinks that the peak danger of an explosion in Poland, and of spillover to the rest of the Bloc, has passed. They will

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probably permit tightly controlled moves toward minimal reconciliation in Poland while hoping that the West will contribute to economic recovery without insisting on significant political quids.

We have an interest in evolution toward greater pluralism, national autonomy, and respect for human rights in the East. Our immediate aims include convincing the Soviets that the risks of pressuring the Yugoslavs are prohibitive and that we will not exploit--indeed we will respond positively to--real movement toward greater openness in Eastern Europe. While we can--indeed, must--distrust Soviet motives for tolerating some economic and political loosening up, we should nevertheless encourage it because controlled erosion is still erosion.

We want the Soviets to permit national reconciliation and a resumption of reform in Poland. But we also have an interest in ensuring that cosmetic concessions not undermine West European support for our stance nor increase pressures on us to agree to a CDE.

It can be argued that our interests our best served by making the Eastern European burden as heavy as possible for the Soviets, and thus that we favor turmoil instead of reform and independence in Poland and elsewhere. However, if we were to eschew limited progress in hopes of promoting crisis, there is a serious danger that we would witness only more severe and unremitting oppression without really taxing the Soviets' ability and will to maintain control and simultaneously bear their heavy military burden.

Western Europe. Blocking INF deployments will be the highest foreign policy priority of Andropov and his colleagues. To achieve this, they will try to offer a deal that our Allies feel would justify cancellation or postponement (which would be tantamount to cancellation) of our deployment program. They will increase Allied incentives to succumb by painting a frightening picture of the alternative. If and when the point is reached at which the Allies want to settle, we would have to accept or else witness collapse of support for deployment anyway. (Further discussion on arms control follows below). The Soviets will also try, with carrots and sticks, to abort our attempt to achieve Western agreement to constrict East-West economic relations. They may try to play on European, especially German, desires to preserve the human gains of the past decade.

We have a vital interest in beginning INF missile deployments at the end of 1983, since we know that the threat cannot possibly be eliminated through arms control. Our interest in minimizing political turbulence in Western Europe is strong but subordinate. We have an interest not only in

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defeating Soviet efforts to isolate us by making us appear unreasonable, but also in deterring and/or countering Soviet threats against our Allies should it come to that.

Arms Competition and Arms Control. We cannot exclude that the Soviets will decide that serious arms control negotiations will not be possible until there is a new US administration. However, it would be far more consistent with their overall outlook, internal situation, and likely international strategy for them to become even bolder in this area. Whether or not they believe we genuinely want agreements, they have an interest in confronting us with choices between: on the one hand, agreements in START and INF which meet their concerns; and, on the other, collapse of our domestic consensus and Alliance consensus in support of our defense program and INF deployment, respectively. Either outcome would offer some easing of their military burden, though with respect to INF they would probably prefer splitting the Alliance over reaching an agreement. In addition, focusing US-Soviet relations on arms control would be consistent with their aim of taking the agenda of international problems out of our hands. Although Andropov will face internally-imposed limits on how far he can go, we should be prepared for further Soviet concessions.

Our interest is in drawing the Soviets toward our goals of reductions, equality and verifiability, while keeping popular support for our negotiating efforts and force programs intact. We also have an interest in keeping arms control from dominating the bilateral agenda. We probably cannot use the prospect of arms control progress to get Soviet concessions on international problems, unless we were prepared to abandon our insistence on reductions, equality, and verifiability.

Unless arms control proves to be so extraordinarily successful in the next two years that it alters fundamentally our strategic concerns, we have an interest in compounding Soviet military problems and frustrating Soviet planning. Exploiting new technologies and geographic advantages is key. Improved force projection capabilities and NATO conventional defense are the highest priorities. But in addition, we should explore how to increase the Soviets' estimate of the multiple risks to the Russian homeland of any conflict with us.

US-Soviet Cooperation. In addition to possibilities mentioned above (notably Southern Africa), we have an interest in getting the Soviets to cooperate concretely on functional problems where we and they have overlapping interests and where the Soviets matter. The most obvious is non-proliferation; the Andropov regime should be amenable to helping us tighten up international safeguards and IAEA effectiveness. At the same time, Moscow is unlikely to view such highly selective US interest in cooperation as a sign of a generally more

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constructive attitude on our part. In a different vein, challenging the Soviets to provide more support for economic development might produce modest but welcome results, or at least undercut their pursuit of closer "East-South" relations.

Less Likely Developments. If our overall assessment of the view from Moscow proves to be too conservative, the most likely contingencies that could affect important US interests--for worse or better--include:

- Soviet-directed escalation in Central America;
- support for large-scale aggression against Somalia;
- significant pressure on Yugoslavia;
- shipment or deployment of "offensive arms" to Cuba;
- a major effort to expand Soviet influence in Iran;
- major concessions on Afghanistan, including substantial withdrawal;
- concessions in START and/or INF of a magnitude clearly intended to satisfy us and assure agreement, as opposed to weakening our support;
- heavy pressure to restrain proxies (Cuba, Libya, Vietnam); and
- an unexpected surge in Soviet military spending.

Such actions would present us with more straightforward--if not easier--choices. The real dilemmas will arise when the Soviets make more limited encroachments and/or concessions. We will have a harder time gaining support for effective responses to more subtle Soviet misconduct, and conversely, preserving support for our positions when the Soviets take partial steps to satisfy others' concerns but not ours. This is exactly the sort of conduct that seems most likely, and toward which the remainder of this paper is addressed.

INITIATIVES

Possible Soviet Initiatives and US Responses

The following possible Soviet initiatives during the next six months would be consistent with our analysis of how the Andropov regime thinks it can advance Soviet interests given its constraints. They are illustrative; the exact description of each initiative is not as important as the thought that

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action generally along such lines is possible. We have not attempted to assign probabilities; some of the contingencies approach the edge of the band within which we expect the Soviets to operate. The order of presentation is from East Asia through Southwest Asia and Africa, Eastern and Western Europe, and finally, the Western Hemisphere. Possible American responses are also indicated.

1. A Soviet offer to the Chinese to withdraw forces from the border, or a unilateral withdrawal.

American responses:

- Ask the Chinese to insist that withdrawn Soviet forces be demobilized.

- Depending on the size of withdrawal, publicize the potential increased threat to others.

2. A Soviet nuclear arms control proposal to the Chinese.

American responses:

- Reaffirm our insistence on global INF limits.

- Consult with the Chinese on the dangers to both of us presented by Soviet attempts to regionalize nuclear arms control.

- Welcome any substantial reduction to the nuclear threat to our East Asia friends.

3. A Soviet offer to Japan to reduce forces on the disputed islands, or a unilateral partial withdrawal.

American responses:

- Encourage the Japanese to drive a hard bargain.

- Welcome real reduction of the threat.

4. A Soviet threat or move to build up forces on the disputed islands.

American responses:

- Explicitly reaffirm our commitment to Japanese security.

- Privately offer to increase US forces in Japan.

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5. Soviet pressure on Vietnam and/or announcement of more reasonable terms for settlement in Kampuchea.

American responses:

- Welcome real moves in the right direction.
- Work with ASEAN and China to reiterate our terms and to see whether and how the Soviets and Vietnamese can be drawn toward more substantial movement.

6. A Soviet proposal to the Chinese and/or Paks involving, for example, termination of support to the Afghan resistance and acceptance of the Afghan regime in return for phased draw-down in Soviet forces as resistance declines.

American responses:

- Mobilize Pak-PRC-European coalition to reaffirm our terms.
- Remind Paks of the consequences of being separated from us.
- Indicate interest in discussion of real moves toward our desired outcome.

7. A Soviet "Indian Ocean Peace Offensive."

American response:

- Resist efforts to link Soviet flexibility in Afghanistan with reduction in US presence in the Indian Ocean.

8. Stepped-up Soviet subversive activities in Iran or elsewhere near the Gulf.

American responses:

- Explicitly reaffirm that we will not allow our interests near the Persian Gulf to be damaged.
- Look for opportunities for direct or indirect dialogue with Iranians.
- Activate contingency planning with key partners.

9. Soviet diplomatic initiative in Southern Africa.

American responses:

- Welcome any real moves to facilitate a settlement.

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- Attempt to capture any Soviet concessions within our peace effort, as opposed to letting the Soviets start a separate track.

10. Offers of major new economic deals with our Western partners.

American response:

- Attempt to get decisions postponed until our East-West studies have been concluded.

11. Release of dissidents or increased Jewish emigration from the USSR.

American responses:

- Welcome on humanitarian grounds; if numbers are significant, welcome on political grounds as well.

- Resist attempts to use this as pretext for de-railing our East-West economic studies.

- Express hope that this can lead to progress in CSCE. Possibly relax one of our formal CSCE human rights demands. Assuming that Soviet human rights moves fall well short of our needs, find a graceful way to end Madrid meeting, e.g., agreement on follow-on experts groups.

12. Soviet acceptance of our position on the CDE zone.

American responses:

- Welcome Soviet acceptance of the need for CBMs on Soviet territory.

- Reaffirm insistence on human rights balance in CSCE. Convince Allies that, in view of Soviet move, best strategy to reach agreement in Madrid is maximum solidarity and pressure on human rights.

13. Significant further Soviet concessions in INF talks, linked to zero NATO deployments.

American responses:

- Welcome Soviet willingness to consider reduction in nuclear threat. (The Soviets probably welcome categorical US rejection of Soviet moves insofar as it helps them paint us as being unreasonable.)

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- Consult with Allies at highest level about the imperative of not letting the Soviets drive a wedge between us.

- Secure Alliance reaffirmation of insistence on equality in INF arms control and commitment to proceed with deployments if the Soviet threat is not eliminated.

14. Stepped-up threats against our Allies in the event our missiles are deployed.

American responses:

- Declare that we regard threats against our Allies as threats against ourselves, and that our Allies can count on us in the face of all pressures.

- Exploit by underscoring Soviets "true colors" and reinforcing European appreciation of the need for solidarity.

15. Significant Soviet movement toward acceptance of significant cuts in ICBM warheads linked to limits on strategic cruise missiles and non-deployment of INF.

American responses:

- Declare that we will refuse to consider altering our INF program except in the context of a reduced Soviet INF threat to our Allies.

- Welcome movement on ICBM cuts.

- Affirm our readiness to discuss cruise missile limits.

16. Increased Soviet-Cuban support for Central American Marxists.

American responses:

- Take steps to counter on the ground.

- Warn Soviets of the danger to their interests here and elsewhere. Advise them that we are prepared to do whatever is required to protect our interests and deliver them a defeat.

- Apply direct pressures on Cuba.

17. Soviet efforts to restrain Cuba.

American responses:

- Signal our acknowledgement.

- Seize opportunity to pursue US-Soviet dialogue on Cuban behavior.

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General Patterns and Responses

The foregoing mix of Soviet moves and US responses reflects our expectation of, on the one hand, limited risk-taking and threats, and on the other hand, limited cost-cutting and peace offensives, occurring along a basically unchanged center-line of Soviet policy that falls between broad expansionism and broad retreat. The pattern of Soviet behavior that actually emerges could of course have a more conciliatory center-line or a more menacing center-line. Therefore, in addition to preparing specific responses, we have to ensure that our overall response fits the overall pattern. The key to indicating general direction is our rhetoric:

- For now, we should stick to the line that US-Soviet relations will improve if, but only if, the Soviets behave more responsibly. We should be firm, quiet, and inject only a hint of hopefulness. If we raise expectations now, the pressures to fulfill them will be mainly on us--and conversely, we will bear the blame for disappointment.

- If the Soviets become both more conciliatory and more menacing--i.e., roughly what we expect--we should, rhetorically at least, "reward" the positive and "punish" the negative, while stressing that improvement in the relationship can, at best, be narrow unless improvement in Soviet behavior is broad.

- If risk-taking and threats emerge as the dominant quality, we should warn that the new Soviet regime appears to be headed down a path which could threaten peace and Soviet interests. Our rhetoric should convey total resolve but be unprovocative. One reason to be quiet and slightly hopeful now is to be sure that it cannot be said that we were responsible for getting off on the wrong foot.

- If the emergent trend is toward Soviet cost-cutting, conciliation, caution, and peace offensives, our rhetoric should become more hopeful, stressing that we welcome good intentions but insist on good behavior. We should credit Andropov for being more constructive than his predecessor, while crediting oursevels for having produced a shift. The most difficult task will be to sustain public awareness of the threat and the need for continuing rearmament without appearing to ignore the beginning of progress. Obviously, we can refine this further depending on how much, if any, substance there is in Soviet peace initiatives.

Specific US Initiatives

In addition to anticipating Soviet moves and correct US responses, we should consider moves of our own. Our overall

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purpose should be to avoid being outflanked on international problems and outmaneuvered in arms control. More specifically, we should aim to:

- preempt Soviet moves;
- illuminate Soviet tokenism and spur them toward real movement;
- signal our interest in progress;
- cement our support, at home and abroad;
- update our terms for solutions; and
- prevent the Soviets from thinking they can address problems without reference to us, and keep them engaged in a dialogue on our agenda of concerns.

Such initiatives would, of course, be in addition to efforts already underway to induce improved Soviet behavior, to strengthen Western cohesion and firmness, and to prepare ourselves better to defend our interests. What we are currently doing with regard to the US defense effort, INF deployments, security assistance, reduced Western "subsidization," calling attention to Soviet misconduct, pressing for progress in the Middle East, high level Sino-American dialogue, and so on, are all relevant--indeed, essential--to the next 6 - 24 months.

New steps might include internal USG planning, consultations and actions with others, and actions within the US-Soviet relationship. The following possibilities should be viewed as building blocks, which can be assembled into an overall, internally-consistent approach when it becomes clearer which initiatives we want to pursue on their own merits.

A. Internal planning

1. Form a select interagency group to develop contingency plans for possible new Soviet encroachments. Rationale: Existing plans may not suffice, given that the new Soviet regime may take a different view of opportunities and risks.

2. Develop a plan for using prospective US-Soviet trade to induce improved Soviet performance, e.g., on human rights. Rationale: In addition to working out security-related "denial" guidelines with the Allies, we need to know the political role of those elements of US-Soviet trade that need not be denied on security grounds.

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B. Actions with others

1. Conduct early extensive (and tailored) bilateral consultations on prospective Soviet policies/initiatives with our Allies, Japan, Pakistan, ASEAN, China, and possibly others. Rationale: We need to be sure others are prepared to drive hard bargains, not be lulled, and not be separated from us.

2. Conduct early consultations with China on possible Soviet military/negotiating moves, with the aim of reaching an understanding (perhaps tacit) that each will avoid agreeing to anything that would damage the other (e.g., shift of SS-20s from West to East or troops from East to West). Rationale: We need to probe Chinese intentions and ensure they understand that we expect them not to damage our interests as they pursue Sino-Soviet relations, especially if they expect us to be sensitive to their interests.

3. Organize a new initiative on Afghanistan with Pakistan, China and possibly the EC, calling for phased, complete withdrawal, transition leading to safeguards of Afghan non-alignment, self-determination, and return of refugees. Rationale: We need to preempt the Soviets, maintain our coalition, and set demanding but attainable standards for progress. If we can get the Soviets engaged, so much the better.

4. Discuss with Allies a realistic step-by-step plan for reform, reconciliation, and recovery in Poland. Rationale: Our current stance could become obsolete, and we could find ourselves without clear goals and means in post-martial-law conditions. We should also consider presenting it to the Poles and Soviets. Step-by-step removal of sanctions could be linked to progress.

5. Discuss with Allies possible steps in INF arms control. Rationale: We could find ourselves trapped by a Soviet zero/zero-plus position with broad appeal in Europe (e.g., an improved "Andropov proposal"). We must have Allied agreement that more than zero on the Soviet side must mean more than zero on our side. In this connection, we should analyze the idea of a 300/300 missile warhead proposal mentioned in the JCS comments on the previous version of this paper.

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C. Actions with Soviets

1. Follow up US-Soviet talks on non-proliferation, Southern Africa, human rights. Rationale: It is important to show the new regime--and others--that we are prepared to join in practical efforts to achieve progress, even if the base is narrow.

2. Early Hartman-Korniyenko tour d'horizon. Rationale: We need to impress upon the Soviets that we will persist with our list of international concerns--i.e., that they can't ignore us. We also need to set agenda for Shultz-Gromyko meeting, perhaps in April or May. If the Soviets show a reluctance to enter broad and substantive discussion, we should not demandeur, but we should publicize that the Soviets appear not to want dialogue.

3. Propose and facilitate rapid progress toward a nuclear CBMs agreement. Rationale: This is in our interest. It will also relieve "freeze" pressures, albeit slightly in the US and not at all in Europe. Finally, it would enable us to show Soviets and public that we want progress where possible.

4. Communicate to the Soviets that we are prepared to agree to START limits on strategic cruise missiles provided there is agreement significantly to cut ballistic warheads. Rationale: It is in our interest to convince the Soviets that we are prepared for a give-and-take negotiation and to create a dynamic that could lead to an agreement along our lines within the next two years.

5. Announce our willingness in principle to hold a summit in 1983, pending outcome of a late-spring Shultz-Gromyko meeting. A Reagan-Andropov meeting at the 1983 UNGA might be preferable to a more grand version. Rationale: The pressures to hold a summit before our INF deployments begin will be enormous. It is better to preempt this, get some credit, and establish a clear track that suits our interests than to get dragged into it. More importantly, a summit could be an important tool in our effort to induce more responsible Soviet behavior, provided we guard against the possibility of it appearing to ignore Soviet misbehavior. The Soviets will not pay a price to have a summit. But they can be expected to make a genuine effort to have a successful summit, which means they might offer concessions if they are able to foresee some gains for themselves.

6. Take steps to improve our access to Soviet society, e.g., opening consulates in Kiev and Tashkent. Rationale: Paradoxically, we can show our willingness to advance bilateral relations and expand our penetration. We should consider what we can get in return, e.g., in the human rights area.

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7 Expand military-to-military contacts at a measured pace. Rationale: Such contacts would develop a valuable interface currently available only in formal negotiations.

Public Diplomacy, Information, and Action

To be effective over the next 6 - 24 months--assuming the Soviets act as we believe they will--our public information effort must demonstrate:

- that our concerns about Soviet behavior are valid;
- that our positions are correct;
- that we want progress and will be reasonable; and
- that our policies are working.

Obviously, it is not enough to assert these points; they must be evident from and supported by our policies. If any one of the four points does not come through, the effect of the others will be weakened. For example, if we are seen as exaggerating Soviet misconduct, it will be hard to hold support for our positions. If we are perceived to be sticking to positions that we know cannot produce progress, we will be judged as wanting no progress rather than praised for the correctness of our positions. Finally, if we cannot show that our approach is beginning to work, doubts about its efficacy will eclipse acceptance of its correctness--thus, we at least need to be in a position to claim that any improvement in Soviet positions that does occur is attributable to our policies.

Public initiatives should be predicated on and used to reinforce policy initiatives. Among the possibilities are:

- An early speech on US-Soviet relations by Secretary Shultz laying out our positions, hopes and standards for progress, and resolve if there is none.
- A speech by the President in, say, two months, when we will have a better fix on where the Soviets are headed and what we want to do, especially with regard to START, INF, key international problems, and a possible summit.

In addition, a select interagency group should be formed to consider what public initiatives we should consider to reinforce the particular US initiatives identified in the preceding pages.

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