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The Director of Central Intelligence  
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National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Graham E. Fuller  
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SUBJECT: US Policy Concerns if Amin's National Reconciliation  
Collapses

1. If Amin Gemayel attempts to impose national unity upon other confessional groups through use of the Lebanese Army, any hope of national reconciliation will die. Lebanon would then revert to small confessional fiefdoms engaged in sporadic military struggles among themselves. Other developments would include:

- the collapse of the LAF as a truly national force; at best it will be seen as a Christian surrogate, at worst the LAF could fragment with its Christian elements joining the Phalangist forces;
- the Lebanese Forces would probably become the primary instrument of power for the Gemayel government;
- the Gemayel government would have no further significant claim to be the national government of Lebanon and would essentially become a Phalangist instrument ruling over at least East Beirut and the Christian hinterland;
- Amin Gemayel might be replaced by another Phalangist leader; and
- Syria would probably not challenge directly the Phalangist government as long as it remained within its traditional area but would orchestrate the Muslim opposition.

2. The Phalangist government would probably seek to maintain the MNF in Beirut to augment its strength. The use of the MNF for this purpose, however, would represent a considerable departure from original intent of allowing the MNF to serve as a buffer during a process of national reconciliation. The Phalangist government furthermore would probably not need MNF assistance since it:

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-- would be capable of self-defense through use of Phalangist militia; and

-- Israel would wish to ensure the survival of the Phalangist state.

3. US withdrawal of MNF support could be predicated on the fact that the US had made an intensive good faith effort to unite the countries' warring factions. Since the parties could not agree upon national reconciliation, the MNF is no longer appropriate and would be regretfully withdrawn. US prestige would no longer be tied to the attainment of this historically elusive national reconciliation process. The chief US interest in Lebanon would then be to preserve at least a nominal Lebanese government, internationally recognized, which would be responsive to Western interests. Israel would assist in that goal.

4. A major concern for the US would then be the possibility of the non-Christian elements outside the Maronite heartland -- representing most of the territory of the country -- would declare that they, not the Phalange, represented "Lebanon" in terms of potential international recognition. They would have Syrian support for such claims and would represent nearly all the Shia, Sunni and Druze population as well as a small Christian population in the north. Such a government would probably be relatively moderate, but less sympathetic to Western interests and probably hostile to Israel.

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