

ESPIONAGE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

(The Prime Case and Others)

1. The Espionage Damage Assessment will identify, review, and analyze in detail the full range of US classified information compromised by Geoffrey A. Prime, William Kampiles, Christopher Boyce/Andrew D. Lee, and other persons or incidents which have resulted in similar compromises. This is intended to be a comprehensive examination of classified information, primarily as related to US technical collection sources, exposed to the Soviets over a period going back fifteen years and more. The objectives are to identify Soviet activities countering US technical collection that may be tied to these compromises; to examine the possibility that the Soviets have engaged in deception activities, especially in strategic matters; to assess the impact of collection denials and possible deceptions on our finished analyses, past, present, and future; and to recommend measures that may be instituted to reduce the probability of future compromises.

2. This study is being conducted under the sponsorship of the DCI's Intelligence Producers Council, which will review the final results. A Steering Group (with CIA, DIA, and NSA participation) responsible for the implementation of the study, meets regularly to review progress and provide direction to the Study Director. The Study Director [redacted] is assigned to this task full time until completion. He chairs a Working Group to provide overall management, and is the officer charged with accomplishing the day-to-day work, and writing monthly status reports and the final report. Six task groups are being formed to carry out each of the following main tasks:

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- prepare an integrated, chronological inventory of the information compromised;
- identify observed Soviet measures and activities countering US technical collection efforts;
- undertake an all-source assessment of whether compromised information has been used by the Soviets in attempts to deceive the United States, particularly in strategic matters;
- determine the impact of Soviet denial and deception activities on Community analyses.
- evaluate the potential impact of similar Soviet activities on future collection and analysis;
- recommend steps to help prevent or attenuate future compromises.

3. There will be monthly status reports, commencing in mid-February and including preliminary findings as they are developed. For planning purposes a mid-summer [redacted] set of recommendations and findings are envisaged.

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