Comments on Developments of Concern

Andropov

An overriding one is Jife with Andropov--reflected in one way or another in most other areas.

Clear that intent to be active

--pursuing initiatives in variety of directions

--has political and propaganda skills that one would expect a man

to develop in directing KGB over 15 years

--have to expect imaginative and unexpected thrusts.

Probably would like to attack the economic problem, already giving signs of establishing himself as Mr. Clean by attacking corruption--close allegiances appear to be with Defense Minister Ustinov, Chief of Staff 2000,, and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Single most significant fact seems to me to be that Andropov emerges at a time which places in his lap an opportunity which may be fleeting to take huge strides on to major Soviet objectives, i.e., separating the US from Europe and diverting the US by enhancing the Cuban threat on its soft underbelly.

INF

The INF opportunity is a big one and it must be exploited during the year 1983.

The Soviets don't want the Pershings in Europe because they can reach Soviet missile sites and command centers with only 6-8 minutes warning.

This capability would destroy many years of careful preparation to respond to any first-strike attempt by launch on warning--it would also completely change the way the Soviets would have to fight a war in Europe by requiring them to go after NATO missile sites immediately.

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Along with this, they see the great reluctance of the European countries to deploy--they read public opinion polls showing increasing resistance-there are plans for huge demonstrations of public resistance--this creates an opportunity for a political as well as military victory.

So Andropov has to work hard to seize this opportunity until any doubt about deployment is eliminated.

Creates huge dilemma for us--if we don't make an offer, that will be trumped as a failure to negotiate and therefore a reason for the Europeans to renege on deployment. If we do make an offer, it will be used to get a moratorium to give negotiations a further chance and to renegotiate where a reduced number of weapons should be deployed.

Caribbean

In the Caribbean, the increased supplies come into Salvador.

New shipments of Vietnam weapons reported today via Cuba and Nicaragua from the government general's clash indicating intensified internal political conflict.

In Managua, over the weekend there was a demonstration of 200-300 people against the government which is unexpected and remarkable.

Mexico, with 24,000 Guatemalan refugees on its border, with insurgents and supplies moving across the border, is in a precarious position, certainly financially and possibly politically developing throughout the country.

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Middle East

	In	the Mide	dle I	East,								
to	give	Hussein	the	backing	he	needs	to	enter	negotiations	with	Israelis.	

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Begin and Sharon drag their feet on withdrawing from Lebanon, partially with good security reasons, partially to get delay on peace process as they advertise to bring new people into West Bank settlements to hamper Hussein's effort to get himself in a position to take the risk of joining the peace process.

Still have some 30,000 Syrians--15,000 Palestinian fighters and 15,000 Israelis in Lebanon--while the writ of Gemayel's government is pretty much confined to the Beirut area.

Meanwhile, the Soviets work to reenter the Middle East

--building two SA-5 sites in Syria

--moving equipment from Syrian port to the sites.

These sites will threaten Israeli transport planes in northern Israel and over Lebanon to protect against Israeli pre-emptive strikes and SA-6s being deployed in area of SA-5 sites.

Israeli pre-emptive strike will be much more difficult when the SA-5 should become operational. A few hundred will have to come to Syria to will of Mark SA-5s are to be operational. Although this decision was probably made under Brezhnev, we see this as Andropov's first attempt to renew the Soviet position in the Middle East. I full that the us to the Iran

Iran

Preparing another attack on Iraq. Iraq probably will continue to hold for a while but Iran appears to be betting that in the long term superiority in numbers and intensified subversive activity into Iraq will turn the tide.

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Government exiles made up of Shia Iraqis ready to project subversive activity into Iraq. Long-term threat continues to be Iranian projection of Shia subversives into Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia--also, Soviet subversives into Iran. Even the Khomeini government worries about its ability to control Soviet subversion.

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Khomeini's government also showing concern about Soviets and neighboring Afghanistan. Over million Afghan refugees in Iran, in addition to 2 1/2 million refugees in Pakistan.

Despite stories about Andropov's position to send troops into Aghanistan and the possible value of withdrawal and rapproachement with China, we're skeptical about Soviet withdrawal. Geopolitical position--500 miles closer to Straits of Hormuz and improved position to move on Iran or Baluchistan is too valuable. Subversive activities into Baluchistan continue as to strengthen and improved airports and other facilities in Western Afghanistan continues.

China/USSR

China and USSR continue dialogue. Both have good reason to improve relations but stronger reasons to be wary of each other. Soviets can reduce troops on Chinese border but military will resist significant reductions. Soviets unlikely to give up Afghanistan and Vietnam positions. Vietnamese increasing pressure on Cambodia resistance.

Africa

In Africa, Libyan increased support of insurgents in northern Chad and train and send additional insurgents into southern Chad from Central African Republic and Benin. Habre's government having great difficulty handling this

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In Western Sahara, Polisario strength reduced but continue to tie up 100,000 Moroccan troops with heavy burden on Moroccan economy.

In Southern Africa, South Africa is more aggressive in supporting Savimbi in Angola and pressing on Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Growing strength of South African rebels in Mozambique has brought Soviet advisors there and likely to bring in a few thousand Cuban troops.

Have reports same type of Interior Ministry force sent to Angola initially is being made ready in Cuba. South Africa continues to hang tough on Namibia until Cubans leave Angola. No sign that that can happen to any significant degree soon. While the South Africans are now in the process of granting limited political rights to Coloreds and Asians--a significant move by the Botha government that split the ruling National Party earlier this year--there is little prospect that this process will extend to black South Africans, who now outnumber whites by a ratio of five to one.

On the economic front, continuing struggles with debt burden and prospect where of reduced oil prices are of major concern--lower oil prices will bring some relief to debt burdened companies, but this is likely to be _______ as oil rich countries find revenues shrinking and cut down on aid. Very good DDI study on how this will impact on strategically located countries like Sudan, Pakistan, Egypt--much more seriously than relief provided by lower oil prices.

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