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**THE WHITE HOUSE**

**WASHINGTON**

**November 19, 1983**

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER**  
**The Under Secretary for Political Affairs**  
**Department of State**

**MR. FRED C. IKLE**  
**The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**  
**Department of Defense**

**VADM ARTHUR MOREAU, JR.**  
**Assistant to the Chairman**  
**Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**MR. DANIEL BOGGS**  
**Deputy Secretary**  
**Department of Energy**

**MR. ROBERT GATES**  
**Deputy Director for Intelligence**  
**Central Intelligence Agency**

**DR. ALTON G. KEEL**  
**Associate Director for National Security and**  
**International Affairs**  
**National Security Council**

**SUBJECT: Follow-up Actions to NSPG on U.S. Policy Toward**  
**the Iran-Iraq War (S)**

**We have reviewed the Terms of Reference (TOR) prepared by State**  
**and the DOD. Before the President takes a final decision, we**  
**believe that the following subjects should be included in the**  
**TORs for diplomatic consultations: (U)**

**REMARKS:**

**A further approach to Israel regarding alleged transfers**  
**of spare parts to the Iranian military. (This subject**  
**might be broached with Shamir and Arens and our case**  
**could be more persuasive if we can determine whether or**  
**not the Israelis are procuring an extraordinary amount**  
**of critical spares (e.g., F-4 parts) from U.S. manu-**  
**facturers. (S)**

**A U.S. position on the possible construction of another**  
**pipeline outlet for Iraqi oil, either to the Red Sea**  
**or Mediterranean. (We might even be able to assist in**  
**the preliminary planning and technical assessments for**  
**constructing such a pipeline on the basis that it would**  
**help make Iraq more "bankable" over the near-term. (S)**

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NSC review completed.

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
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The TOR on military consultations should be revised to include an option on the possible need for tactical air (TACAIR) support for the protection of non-belligerent shipping against Iranian air attacks. While convoying may be useful to deter attacks on shipping if air attacks are undertaken by the Iranians, a TACAIR "umbrella" might be a more effective means of defeating either aerial or even surface attacks on shipping in the Gulf. In short, our consultations with the Gulf Arabs and Europeans should include the possible use of U.S. TACAIR to protect non-belligerent shipping against the most likely Iranian threats. (S)

Finally, the problem of whether and how we can improve force closure time on receipt of tenuous warning of possible Iranian attacks requires elaboration. In view of the predictably sudden and marked impact on a curtailment in the flow of oil on the international energy picture, this problem is of focal importance. We would like DOD to investigate measures we could take to reduce closure times for mine countermeasures, land-based TACAIR, and ground units to a maximum of 48 hours. The steps necessary to facilitate force closures within this time frame should be included as an option for our consultations with the Gulf Arabs. (S)

Request these modifications be submitted by COB Monday, November 21, 1983. (U)



**J. M. Poindexter**  
Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National  
Security Affairs

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November 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
The Department of State


THE HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE  
Under Secretary for Policy  
The Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Follow-up Actions to NSPG on U.S. Policy Toward  
the Iran-Iraq War (S)

In order to advance U.S. preparations for dealing with the consequences of new escalation in the Iran-Iraq War, it was decided at the NSPG, which met on Monday, November 7, that State should take the lead in formulating Terms of Reference to guide urgent consultations with our European and Japanese allies and the Gulf states. Our focus should be on joint actions necessary to deter efforts to close the Straits of Hormuz or inflict damage on the oil production and distribution facilities of the Gulf Arab states. (S)

Defense should take the lead in preparing a more operationally oriented TOR for separate talks at the military level that could quickly follow upon the general consultations at the political level. Additionally, a separate paper is needed regarding immediate steps that we should take to enhance our operational readiness and reduce force closure times for tactical air, mine-countermeasures and counterterrorist deployments. (TS)

Papers should be submitted to the President by COB Friday, November 11. (S)



John M. Poindexter  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

CC: Mr. Donald P. Gregg, OVP  
The Honorable Pat Collins, Under Secretary of Energy  
Dr. Alton Keel, OMB  
Mr. John N. McMahon, CIA  
VADM Arthur S. Moreau, Jr., JCS

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506**

**November 5, 1983**

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs**

**MR. CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
The Department of State**

**COL. JOHN STANFORD  
Executive Secretary  
The Department of Defense**

**MR. WILLIAM VITALE  
Executive Secretary  
The Department of Energy**

**MS. JACKIE TILLMAN  
Executive Assistant to the United States  
Representative to the United Nations  
Department of State**

**MR. ALTON KEEL  
Associate Director for National Security  
and International Affairs  
Office of Management and Budget**

**[Redacted]  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency**

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**BGEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**SUBJECT: Agenda for NSPG Meeting, Monday, November 7, 1983  
12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m. (C)**

Attached is the agenda for the NSPG meeting on U.S. Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War, to be held Monday, November 7, 1983, in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, 12:00 noon to 1:00 p.m. (C)

The agenda will be distributed to Principals only. (C)

*Carolyn E. Cleveland*  
**Robert M. Kimmitt**  
Executive Secretary

Attachment: as stated

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AGENDA

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
The Roosevelt Room, The White House  
Monday, November 7, 1983  
12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m.

U.S. Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War

- I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)
- II. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT. . . . .William J. Casey  
(5 minutes)
  - A. Current developments in the latest Iranian offensive
  - B. Iraqi CW weapons capability
- III. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY. . . . .George P. Shultz  
(10 minutes)
- IV. MILITARY PLANNING AND FORCE  
DEPLOYMENTS. . . . .Caspar Weinberger  
(15 minutes) GEN John Vessey
  - A. Status of current contingency plans
  - B. Cooperation/collaboration with Gulf Arabs and key Allies
  - C. Force readiness
  - D. Measures to improve U.S. military posture in the region
    - 1. Improving force closure times in light of likely warning indicators of an expanded conflict
    - 2. Precautionary deployments of tactical air and mine countermeasures-forces
- V. DISCUSSION . . . . . Principals  
(15 minutes)
- VI. ISSUES FOR DECISION. . . . .Robert C. McFarlane  
(10 minutes)
  - A. U.S. posture and public positions on Iran-Iraq War
  - B. Consultations with Gulf Arab states
  - C. Consultations with key Allies
  - D. Policy guidance for contingency planning

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