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EXCOM 83-016
9 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
FROM: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director
SUBJECT: Minutes of 18 November 1983 Executive Committee Meeting: Long-Range Planning: (1) Clandestine Technical Collection Sensors and (2) CIA External Analysis Program

1. The Executive Committee met on 18 November 1983 to discuss a paper titled "Clandestine Technical Collection Sensors," prepared by the DDS&T, and to discuss a DDI paper titled "CIA External Analysis Program." Both papers were topics identified for further EXCOM study by the 1982 CIA Long-Range Plan. [redacted] chaired the session; participants included Messrs. Fitzwater (DDA); Stein (DDO); Hineman (DDS&T); Gates (DDI); Taylor (IG). Childs (Comptroller) [redacted]

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Clandestine Technical Collection

2. [redacted] opened the meeting by pointing out that in 1979 former DDCI Carlucci established a Clandestine Technical Collection Panel (CTCP) to monitor Agency sensor activities. The panel has not been useful because it was not kept informed about sensor operations. He suggested that a revived CTCP could work, or some other mechanism, such as a new organizational entity, could assume its role.

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3. Mr. Hineman, while reviewing the executive summary for the clandestine sensors study, noted that a study group had reviewed past sensor operational failures, as well as successes, and when drafting its paper had reached several conclusions. Foremost, successful operations were planned from the beginning and then executed with the full participation of technical, intelligence and operations officers. Failures occurred when insufficient attention was given to the collection requirement, hardware, or to operational realities. Mr. Hineman said that

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[redacted] therefore, he supported the study group's recommendation that a new entity be created and staffed by DI, DS&T, and DO employees and that it have program responsibility for sensors. Whether the entity would be a

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program office in the S&T or a staff, Mr. Hineman said he was not yet prepared to make a suggestion. He agreed to do so if the Committee agreed that a new organizational entity was required. He concluded by saying it is time to abolish the CTCP.

4. Mr. Stein agreed with the foregoing conclusion about the CTCP and suggested that consideration be given to creating a small staff in the DS&T composed of officers from the three concerned directorates. It would bring together, as required, a team of technical and requirements people under the aegis of DO and DI specialists familiar with operating in the target area. The group would define collection requirements, develop the sensor package, and conduct the operation under the direction of senior DO management.

5. [redacted] asked who would be in overall charge of the operation. Mr. Hineman said that the person who runs the staff would be in charge. Mr. Taylor noted the present precedent of shifting responsibility for sensor operations from the technical officers to operational officers as the activity is moved toward emplacement in the field. He emphasized that someone has to be nominally in charge.

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6. Mr. Gates said he was attracted to the small entity approach: creation of a new unit is a good solution for it offers flexibility, establishes a permanent cadre with an institutional memory, and permits regular funding, which so far has been hit-or-miss. [redacted] interjected that he assumed he was hearing that covert collection systems are worthwhile and that certain collection could not be accomplished by other means. Mr. Gates continued by noting that there has been a chain of collection successes using sensors. A capability is being

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[redacted] which have broad target applications. They involve technical and operational activities which only CIA can accomplish. Mr. Childs referred to [redacted] remarks and suggested that it would be useful to assemble a group to look at technical intelligence gaps which could be satisfied clandestinely. Mr. Gates responded that gaps were addressed in a paper on collection requirements which had been prepared and was on his desk for approval. The new unit would need guidance and he has under preparation a study of collection requirements. The study, however, does not address non-CIA clandestine technical collection programs. He concluded by noting that it would be necessary to size the sensor program and integrate its resource requirements into the budget process, as well as fit it in with other Agency sensor projects.

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7. Mr. Fitzwater agreed with the concept of a small unit in the DS&T. The DI should prepare requirements, DS&T should build the sensor, and the DO should take over the operation.

8. Mr. Taylor said he had read the entire sensor study but did not see much forward thinking. The study and executive summary talked about operations which succeeded or failed because

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[REDACTED]

Mr. Taylor said he agreed with Mr. Stein's small entity concept, and was against a "big clanking institutionalized" sensor office. Whatever is created, it will stand or fall on the working arrangements between directorate specialists; in any case, senior management attention will still be required and senior levels will need to focus on sharing S&T knowledge. Mr. Taylor concluded by observing that no other agency can conduct clandestine sensor operations overseas without the DO being involved, and the Agency ought to assert its charter for clandestine operations.

9. [REDACTED] ended the discussion by concluding that there are requirements for clandestine sensor operations which cannot be filled by anyone else or by other techniques, the operations are technically and operationally viable. A central staff-- probably in the DS&T--is required; and a regular funding is needed. [REDACTED] asked Mr. Hineman to prepare a proposal, with DI assistance, and coordinate it with the other Deputy Directors. The proposal would then go to the Executive Committee.

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External Analysis Program

10. Mr. Gates referred the Executive Committee to the analysis program paper distributed to the members and said he had already accepted or planned to accept most of the study's recommendations. He noted that external analysis was essential for the DI which has limited expertise in certain areas. He foresaw a growing need for outside assistance on technical subjects. There had been some criticism of external analysis in the HPSCI, but HPSCI criticism of external analysis had been aimed foremost at the Department of Defense, while DI discussions with the Committee generally went well. It was agreed that the external analysis study was well done, and that its findings were appropriate, whereupon the Executive Director adjourned the meeting.

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cc: DDCI
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