Global Terrorism: The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

A Research Paper

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A Research Paper

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Global Terrorism:
The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

Summary
Information available as of 24 August 1984 was used in this report.

The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) is a very efficient terrorist organization whose meticulous planning has allowed it to attack Turkish interests worldwide with virtual impunity. From its inception in 1975, JCAG has shunned connections to other terrorist groups or patron states, preferring to view itself as an elite cadre of freedom fighters, "un-uniformed soldiers," engaged in a war with Turkey for recognition of the Armenian genocide. JCAG's terrorist attacks are designed to force Turkey to admit responsibility for the deaths of about 1.5 million Armenians in 1915.

The Justice Commandos' parent organization, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), is in competition with the other major Armenian terrorist group, the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), for control of the Armenian revolutionary movement. The escalation of terrorist violence by ASALA since 1979 has convinced the ARF that it must step up terrorist activities to retain the membership of the young radicals who demand action against Turkey.

JCAG and the ARF have the support of a segment of the worldwide Armenian community, which views the Justice Commandos as freedom fighters, not terrorists. Recent large-scale Armenian immigration to the United States has resulted in the development of a well-organized JCAG infrastructure in Los Angeles and the radicalization of portions of the Armenian community in California. Although JCAG has heretofore avoided and criticized attacks on non-Turkish targets, Armenian community perceptions that the United States is bowing to Turkish pressure to halt international investigation or recognition of the Armenian genocide may trigger JCAG terrorist violence against US interests.

We believe the spiral of Armenian and anti-Armenian attacks began with the 1982 slaying of the JCAG leader. Pressure to retaliate against Armenian terrorists may result in more attacks against Armenian communities worldwide.
Global Terrorism: The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

Background to Armenian Terrorism
The Armenian terrorist group, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), first appeared in 1975, but terrorism has intermittently held an important position in the cause of Armenian nationalism for nearly 100 years. The Armenian revolutionary movement and the terrorism it inspired grew out of the late-19th-century self-defense organizations developed by Armenians to protect themselves against victimization by Turks, Kurds, and Azeris. Modeled on Russian nihilist organizations—which advocated the use of intimidation, terror, and assassination—these paramilitary groups evolved into well-trained soldiers, influenced strongly by the revolutionary ideals promulgated by Russian social democrats.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was one of the early nationalist revolutionary organizations. Founded in 1890, the ARF quickly developed a strong sense of national identity and fostered early dreams of an Armenian homeland—nonexistent since Armenia was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the mid-13th century. The ARF produced the first real fighting units—"fedayihs"—volunteers who left home, lived off the land, and defended Armenian land and rights. The heroism, valor, and sacrifice of the early fighters provided a nucleus of values important to contemporary Armenian history. The ARF also provided a hero hierarchy around which the Armenian national consciousness was awakened and with which modern day Armenian terrorists have identified their exploits. Indeed, the "fedayihs" oath to "kill the enemy or die trying" has served as a model for at least one recent suicide attack by Armenian terrorists in their attempts to gain international recognition of the genocide of 1915.

Terrorism has been an important tactic of the ARF since its inception. The ARF's first success in gaining Western European attention for the plight of Armenians massacred under the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid resulted from a terrorist act. On 26 August 1896, ARF terrorists seized the Ottoman bank in Istanbul and held it for 18 hours, thereby gaining guarantees from Russia to press Turkey to promulgate reforms that favored the Armenians. The subsequent release of the terrorists and their safe conduct out of the Ottoman Empire provided a psychological victory for the ARF and a stimulant for the continued use of terrorist tactics.

Nemesis, the shadowy predecessor of JCAG, was created by the ARF in 1921 to assassinate former Ottoman government officials it believed responsible for the massacre of 600,000 to 1.5 million Armenians in 1915—an event that has become known as the Armenian genocide. While officially sanctioned by the ARF, these attacks were blood-feud killings carried out by Armenian assassins whose family members had been killed in the forced relocation march in 1915. Between 15 March 1921 and 25 July 1922, four principal figures in the defunct Ottoman government—including Minister of Interior Talaat Pasha—were slain by Armenians believed linked to Nemesis. ARF-sponsored attacks on Turkish Government officials ceased after the deaths of the officials most prominently linked to the genocide. The dispersion and subsequent assimilation of the Armenians after the massacres seemed to presage an end to terrorism.

An isolated event in 1973 triggered the return to terrorism by Armenians. The revenge slaying of two Turkish diplomats in 1973 by an aged Armenian whose entire family had been slaughtered in 1915 captured widespread media attention (see inset) and provided inspiration to many young Armenians who were frustrated by the inability of the Armenian community to gain an international investigation of their claims against Turkey.

This act of vengeance and the subsequent publicity surrounding a campaign to obtain his parole became the springboard for Armenian terrorism throughout

SECRET
Gourgen Yanikian

On 28 January 1973, Gourgen Yanikian, a retired Armenian engineer haunted by memories of having watched while most of his family was slaughtered in Turkey almost 6 decades earlier, lured the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles and his aide to the Biltmore Hotel in Santa Barbara and shot them. At his trial Yanikian refused to acknowledge that his act had been criminal, claiming to have killed the diplomats in just retaliation for the deaths in 1915 of 24 of his family members. He also used the occasion to draw world attention to the Turkish massacre of 1.5 million Armenians and the dispersal of thousands of other Armenians throughout the world.

The ethnic cohesiveness of the Armenian community and its inherent distrust of non-Armenians provide a distinct advantage for Armenian terrorists. In addition to a reluctance by most Armenians to talk to police, some segments of the community have rallied around arrested Armenian terrorists, providing financial and moral assistance. We suspect that a small portion of the Armenian community may also be involved in peripheral support to terrorist actions— including preoperational casing, weapons procurement, escape arrangements, and propaganda distribution.

Organizational Structure. Worldwide investigations of acts committed by JCAG since 1975 have determined that JCAG is a component of the ARF. The ARF political structure resembles a pyramid with individual chapters throughout the world forming its...
POLITICAL RALLY
AND CONCERT

to benefit the Los Angeles Five

featuring

in concert

KARNIG SARKISSIAN

VIKEN YACOUBIAN

DEFENSE COMMITTEE

BENEFIT CONCERT
FOR LOS ANGELES FIVE

LA 5

Sponsors:

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Saturday, February 25, 1984

at the

Henry Ford Community Center

3:30 p.m.

Hors d'oeuvres — refreshments

Donation: $10.00

ALL PROCEEDS TO GO TO LA 5 DEFENSE COMMITTEE
base. A small intellectual elite makes up the central committee, which has strict authority over the rank-and-file members. Central committee members’ names, activities, and missions are kept secret to thwart Turkish retaliation. The central committee members, in turn, are subordinate to a geographic bureau composed of five of the most important ARF figures. Party dues and solicitations at public meetings appear to provide the main source of funds for the ARF to conduct its political, social, and educational activities, including the clandestine operation of its military wing, the Justice Commandos.

Every four years the ARF holds a world congress at a secret location to elect a new ARF bureau, which is the supreme ruling body for all ARF members. Delegates to this congress are drawn from a worldwide network of central committees and are elected every two years by delegates—one for every 15 members—from individual local chapters. Central committees assure implementation of ARF bureau decisions and are responsible for maintaining a strong membership.

**Figure 3**

Typical Armenian Assassination Attempt

A car with driver and diplomat is held up in traffic

Diplomat

Driver

Two men fire into rear window

Then run to sides to fire into side windows

Assassination teams

1-3 members

9 mm automatics

**Modus Operandi of Attacks.** JCAG assassinations—15 have been successful since 1974—are meticulously designed to maximize the chance of success. Preliminary planning includes extensive surveillance of the target’s movements and identification of an area where the victim is most exposed and vulnerable. It focuses on frequently used routes and aims to pinpoint a location where the victim is forced to stop or slow
for turns or traffic signals (see diagram). At least 12 JCAG assassination attempts have taken place when the victim was in a slowed or stopped automobile or when he was entering or leaving his home or office.

All sites chosen for assassinations have included carefully chosen escape routes. The effectiveness of this meticulous planning has been reflected in the failure of police to capture JCAG terrorists at the scene or identify them through police investigation. Only the actions of bystanders on the scene resulted in the capture of one JCAG assassin—Haroutoun Levonian, arrested in Belgrade immediately after the slaying of the Turkish Ambassador in 1983. To date only three JCAG assassins have been arrested and stood trial. All three have been convicted.

The analysis of eyewitness accounts of several JCAG assassinations reveals a uniformity in the techniques and type of perpetrator. The attackers are described as two or three men in their late teens or early twenties, often wearing jogging outfits to allay suspicion and frequently carrying two weapons to ensure the success of their mission. One or more of the attackers approaches the victim, fires several shots at the target, then steps in to administer the coup de grace if necessary. Analysis of autopsy reports and forensic evidence indicates these attackers are skilled and practiced marksmen who are able to fire rapidly into small areas with remarkable precision. The weapons—intraceivable in most instances—are left at the scene by the assassins, who flee to waiting escape vehicles, frequently driven by local supporters.

Immediately after an attack, telephone calls to press agencies in cities throughout the world claim the attack; for JCAG, frequently emphasizing the distinction between the Justice Commandos and their rival group, ASALA. Written communiques—usually forwarded to news agencies and wire services—provide elaboration on the attacks and reiterate Armenian demands.

**JCAG Versus ASALA: A Deadly Rivalry.** The rivalry between the ARF and ASALA has existed since the creation of ASALA in 1975. ASALA’s emphasis on terrorism to further the Armenian cause found a ready audience with young ARF members who could see no results from the ARF’s political activities. ASALA’s propaganda organ, Armenia, fueled the rivalry by publishing interviews with ex-ARF youths who had been involved in ASALA operations as well as criticisms of ARF refugee programs that helped Armenians to relocate rather than attempt to return to an Armenian homeland. Claims by ASALA to terrorist attacks conducted by JCAG have further heated the enmity between the two groups. Successful attacks by one group often have prompted attacks by the other.

ASALA’s taunting criticism of JCAG’s terrorist tactics—“cowardly hit-and-run assassinations with little fear of capture”—which began appearing in the Armenian press in 1982 and 1983, may have stung the ARF to vary its tactics. On 27 July 1983 a group of Armenian terrorists, identifying themselves as members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), attempted to take over the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon. Circumstantial evidence indicates that the ARF probably ordered the attack. We suspect the Embassy seizure, which resulted in the deaths of two Turks and five terrorists, was intended to be a lengthy hostage situation aimed at garnering extensive publicity. It followed by less than two weeks a spectacular ASALA bombing at Orly Airport in Paris—which killed nine and injured 60 and received considerable publicity in the world press.

We doubt this rivalry between the ARF and ASALA will abate, and it may even increase in intensity. In a letter to the Armenian Reporter in December 1983, ASALA cited recent ARF criticisms of ASALA as a tactic to gain control of the Armenian community and threatened violent retaliation against the ARF. This struggle for control of the Armenian revolutionary movement may prompt further changes in tactics by both groups and could trigger more indiscriminate violence.
The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia

The second prominent Armenian terrorist organization, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), is a Marxist group with links to Palestinian terrorist groups and Middle Eastern patrons. Like JCAG, ASALA demands an Armenian homeland and official Turkish recognition of the 1915 genocide.

ASALA was formed in January 1975, advocating an armed struggle to achieve the liberation of Armenia and to improve the lot of the "exploited classes." ASALA sharply criticized the ARF for its lack of progress in furthering Armenian goals and provided an alternative to radical young Armenians who embraced ASALA's terrorist ideology.

ASALA initially conducted attacks, mainly bombings and assassinations, solely against Turkish targets. After the capture of three of its members in 1980 in Switzerland and France, however, ASALA—using coven names such as Orly Group and 3 October Organization—began retaliatory attacks against other countries who held ASALA militants.

ASALA terrorist attacks in 1983—the June machine-gun attack in the Istanbul bazaar and the July bombing of the Turkish Airlines counter at Orly Airport in Paris—indicated a growing pattern of indiscriminate violence aimed at garnering maximum publicity. This trend has provoked fragmentation within ASALA; one splinter group, the ASALA Revolutionary Movement, insists on limiting its attacks to its traditional enemy, the Turks.
"A Moment to Reflect"

A commemorative service for
The Lisbon Five

Hosted by the following AYF-YOARF chapters:

Chicago Ararat Chapter
January 21 at 7:30 p.m.
Armenian All Saints Apostolic Church
Shahnazarian Hall
1701 North Greenwood Avenue
Glenview, Illinois

Detroit Kepnerik-Tandourjian Chapter
January 28 at 8:00 p.m.
Armenian Community Center of Greater Detroit
19310 Ford Road
Dearborn, Michigan

Washington Sevan Chapter
January 15 at 8:00 p.m.
Soorp Khatch Church
4906 Flint Drive
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Detroit Kepnerik-Tandourjian Chapter
January 28 at 8:00 p.m.
Armenian Community Center of Greater Detroit
19310 Ford Road
Dearborn, Michigan

Providence Varanlian Chapter
January 22 at 12:30 p.m.
Sts. Vartanants Church Hall
402 Broadway
Providence, Rhode Island

New York Hyootik and
New Jersey Arsech Chapters
January 29 at 3:00 p.m.
Sts. Vartanants Church Hall
461 Bergen Boulevard
Ridgefield, New Jersey
The Turkish Response. The fanaticism of Armenian terrorism has strengthened the Turkish Government's public refusals to make concessions or political gestures to Armenian nationalists. Turkey has consistently denied any responsibility for the massacre of the Armenians in 1915. While admitting that deaths occurred, Turks cite attacks by bandits and the ravages of economic deprivation as the cause.

Turkish Government efforts to underscore the plight of Turkish victims of Armenian terrorism and generate support for Turkey's position have largely failed. The European press has tended to side with the Armenians in the matter of the genocide and has not focused attention on the Turkish victims of Armenian terrorist attacks. Media campaigns—particularly in France—that sympathetically depict the Armenian claims have hurt relations between Turkey and its European allies.

Turkey's frustration over Armenian terrorism has led to intensified diplomatic efforts to obtain international assistance against Armenian terrorism.

Public expressions of sympathy by several West European governments for the Armenian cause and the perceived reluctance of them to provoke retaliation from Armenian terrorists have apparently fueled Turkish suspicions that the West Europeans are doing far less than they could to thwart Armenian violence against Turks.

The continuation of Armenian terrorist violence has resulted in increasing domestic political pressure on the Turkish Government to deal more effectively with the terrorist threat.

Retaliatory attacks against Armenians may also have convinced the Turkish Government that violence would hurt more than help the Turkish case. Recent press reports have linked the bombing of the newly unveiled Armenian Genocide Memorial in Alfortville, France, on 3 May to the Turkish Government, which has been harshly critical of the French Government's recognition of the Armenian genocide. A previously unknown terrorist group, the Anti-Armenian Organization, claimed credit for the bombing and threatened more attacks in retaliation for Armenian attacks against Turkish targets.

Armenian Terrorism in the United States. Armenian terrorism is not confined to Europe and the Middle East, but has become an increasing problem in the United States in the past two years. Most Armenian terrorism in the United States since 1980 can be linked to the Armenian community in southern California. Analysis of evidence gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicates that the US
leadership of JCAG is in Los Angeles. FBI investigations also indicate that suspected JCAG members in Los Angeles have been informed of JCAG attacks conducted elsewhere. Forensic evidence has linked the Los Angeles organization to JCAG bombings in New York. FBI investigation has also determined that the attempted bombing of the honorary Turkish consul in Philadelphia on 22 October 1982 was planned by JCAG members in Los Angeles. Six of the eight JCAG members arrested worldwide have been apprehended in California.

Political Initiatives. The success of Armenian terrorism can be measured in the resurgence of expatriate community efforts to redress their grievances. Public terrorist trials, particularly in Los Angeles and Paris, have repeatedly focused attention on Armenian grievances and provided public forums for Armenian efforts to publicize the genocide. Concern is growing within the Armenian communities that the impact of these trials—and the sacrifices of the “freedom fighters” —will be lost if the momentum of the new wave of nationalism cannot be translated into political gains.

Worldwide political organizations—linked to both JCAG and ASALA—are also attempting to exploit for political ends the extensive publicity generated by terrorist actions. The ARF has created its own political action committee, the Armenian National Congress, to orchestrate political initiatives regarding the Armenian cause. The ARF is attempting to return to the Socialist International and establish closer relations with socialist parties to elicit support for the Armenian cause. ASALA, too, was active behind the scenes in organizing the Second International Armenian Congress in July 1983, which drafted a constitution for a permanent organization to lead the Armenian Diaspora.

Armenian communities in North America and Western Europe now appear to be turning to political organizations in individual countries to push for recognition; in the United States they have organized direct mailing campaigns to stimulate pressure for Congressional resolutions to acknowledge the genocide and to cancel US aid to Turkey. Armenian communities worldwide are exploring international avenues, such as asking the European Community Court of Justice for reparations for losses stemming from the Diaspora and successfully petitioning the United Nations to reopen deliberations on Paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Commission on the Prevention of Genocide.
Other grassroots organizations have appeared in the past 10 years to assist these political initiatives. Groups such as the Society for the Recognition of the Genocide Committed Against the Armenians have embarked on a wide range of activities—including development of a film series documenting testimony from genocide survivors and publication of a series of historical books explaining the genocide—to aid the campaign for international recognition of the genocide. These groups help organize and participate in worldwide demonstrations and rallies on 24 April every year to commemorate the genocide and to encourage the Armenian community to rededicate itself to the struggle.

These international political initiatives are beginning to show concrete gains. At least in part as a result of these efforts, the United Nations has scheduled deliberations during the summer of 1984 on Paragraph 30—referring to the existence of the Armenian genocide—for possible inclusion in the United Nations Human Rights Commission report on preventing genocide. Armenian groups have been successful in having candidates for office in the United States sponsor several resolutions before the US Congress concerning the genocide and Armenian grievances against Turkey, including one that would curtail US aid to Turkey.

Outlook
We anticipate no early end to Armenian terrorism. We doubt that any of the Armenian political initiatives being undertaken—even if successful—will have a long-term ameliorating effect on the violence. Armenian terrorism is rooted in the frustrations of an ethnic group that feels terrorism offers it the best chance of ultimately achieving its goals. The refusal of the Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide will continue to antagonize the worldwide Armenian community and may provide impetus for even more terrorism within the Armenian Diaspora.

Although the Justice Commandos have suffered some serious setbacks in the past two years—the arrests of eight of their members, the deaths of the Lisbon Five and the disappearance of their leader—

The California Connection

California's large Armenian population has been largely responsible for making it the focal point for Armenian terrorism in the United States. Following the genocide, thousands of Armenians settled in the San Joaquin Valley of California and quickly became assimilated. A second wave of Armenian immigrants, who arrived from the Middle East over the past 10 years, have proved, however, to be a destabilizing force. According to numerous open-source articles these immigrants have been radicalized by the violent political instability of Turkey in the 1970s and the Middle East—following the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli invasion of Beirut—as well as exposure to the Palestinian model of politics and terrorism.

Fired by a resurgent Armenian nationalism and an enhanced sense of identity, these newer immigrants attempted, at first unsuccessfully, to spur the older, politically passive Armenian community into action. According to academic and press articles, both cultural and economic differences—between a disproportionately wealthy group of third-generation Armenians and newly arrived, destitute immigrants—hindered unified political action by the California Armenian community.

The killing of the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles in January 1982 proved to be the catalyst that unified both segments of the Armenian community. Extensive publicity surrounding that assassination focused US attention on Armenian grievances against Turkey but, more importantly, directed Armenian attention to its neglected cultural heritage. Numerous press sources have reported that, in the eyes of the older generation of Armenians, the assassination demonstrated that terrorism obtained results whereas the peaceable efforts of 69 years had failed. To the young, third-generation Armenian-Americans, the terrorists represented romantic figures who did more than merely talk about the genocide. Various open sources note that, while most Armenians recognize that terrorism alone can never solve the Armenian questions and gain justice for the Armenian cause, many Armenians have become convinced that, if it had not been for the use of violence, no one would be aware of Armenian grievances.
we do not believe these reversals will curtail JCAG terrorist activities.

To date, the Justice Commandos have not attacked US interests despite the arrests of six JCAG members in the United States. We note that ASALA's targeting of only Turkish diplomats changed radically to include retaliatory attacks against other governments when they began arresting ASALA members. According to FBI analysis, JCAG may conduct retaliatory attacks against US targets if it comes to feel that the United States is restricting JCAG's activities as a result of Turkish political pressure.
Appendix A

Modern Armenian Terrorism:
The Historical Background

The intense passion that inspires modern Armenian terrorism is rooted deeply in centuries of conflict between Armenians and Turks. Armenia has not existed as an independent state since the mid-13th century, when the Ottoman Turks conquered the area which now comprises parts of Turkey, Iran, and the Soviet Union. Although given some measure of autonomy—in exchange for passive political loyalty—the Armenians were always considered by the Turks as zimmis, a Turkish term meaning tolerated infidels. The delicate balance of interests between the Muslim Turks and the Christian Armenians was shattered by the rapidly escalating decay of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire played a key role in creating the conditions that resulted in large-scale massacres of Armenians by Turks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries—and which, in turn, spawned the current blood feud being waged by some Armenians. The decline of the Ottoman Empire had encouraged European involvement in Turkish affairs. Simmering discontent by minorities throughout the empire proved a readily exploitable avenue for foreign intervention. This foreign involvement, coupled with religious antagonism and deep-seated economic jealousy of minorities, including the Armenians, focused Turkish anger and repression on the Ottoman minorities, particularly the Armenians. Moreover, Armenians—who had frequently looked to Russia for guarantees of protection under the umbrella of Christianity—became convenient scapegoats. The oppression came to a head during the years 1890 to 1915 under the Young Turk regime, which blamed Armenians for the inevitable disorders and upheavals that were resulting from centuries of Ottoman decline.

The date of 24 April 1915—when the leaders of the Constantinople Armenian community were rounded up by the Turks and sent away to their deaths—is commemorated annually by Armenians worldwide in remembrance of the Armenian genocide. This date marked the beginning of mass deportations to the desolate Syrian wilderness of Deir al-Zor (Dayr az Zawr), which stripped central Turkey of its Armenian population and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Armenian men, women, and children. Estimates from foreign observers of the death toll range from 600,000 to 1.5 million Armenians, who died as a result of Turkish and Kurdish attacks, starvation, and privation.

Death statistics alone fail to illustrate both the magnitude of the loss and the effect on the survivors. Armenian scholars claim that nearly every Armenian household lost relatives in the massacres. The disrupted existence of the survivors in the years immediately after the massacres forced the internalization of the pain and suffering. Few Armenians forgot, however, and, as the immigrant press began to develop in countries where the survivors had fled, the genocide became the primary topic. Sixty-nine years after the event, the genocide is still referred to in the Armenian press, along with demands for international recognition of Turkey’s role in the slaughter.

Turkish historians have routinely dismissed Armenian accounts of the atrocities of 1915 as propaganda. They cite the anger of local Ottoman bureaucrats over alleged Armenian treachery in aiding Russia during the First World War as the reason for any excesses which occurred during the deportations. Moreover, Turkey disavows all responsibility for the policies of the Ottoman regime.

Testimony and evidence from numerous international sources—missionary, press, and diplomatic, especially the reports of the US Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau—have influenced historians that the massacres occurred. The point of contention has been whether it was an organized, government-directed genocide or a series of spontaneous outbreaks of racial violence. International attempts to investigate Armenian allegations of genocide have been consistently thwarted by the Turkish Government.
The denial of the genocide by Turkey has provided a powerful stimulus for modern Armenian terrorism. The ARF has been uniquely qualified to lead Armenian efforts to gain international recognition of the Armenian genocide. Efforts of the ARF in 1915 to organize and direct the few pockets of resistance against the Turks have become imprinted in the Armenian psyche through literature, art, and music, providing the ARF with powerful emotional leverage over the Armenian Diaspora today.

The dispersion of Armenians following the massacres of 1915, however, spawned a generation free from Armenian violence against Turkey. The survivors' struggle to relocate, rebuild their lives, and overcome economic deprivation supplanted the desire for revenge. Traumatized by the massacres and frequently discriminated against by the communities where they settled, Armenian immigrants hastened to lose all traces of their Armenian background. This assimilation resulted in a temporary rejection by many Armenians of Armenian culture, language, and politics.

A series of events in the period after World War II spurred the Armenian Diaspora to a recovered sense of national identity. The appearance of the term "genocide" during the Nuremberg war trials in 1946 awoke bitter memories within the victims who had survived the events of 1915. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96 on 11 December 1946—identifying and condemning genocide as a crime under international law—and the demand of the Convention on Genocide in 1948 that states punish those responsible for committing genocide provided an international basis for Armenian claims against Turkey. These milestones, combined with changing international political attitudes toward ethnic and minority movements and their problems of identity, stirred Armenian hopes for legal redress of their grievances against the Turks.

Armenian political activism received its first important stimulus from events surrounding the publication of the United Nations Human Rights Commission Report on Preventing Genocide. Paragraph 30, referring to the Armenian genocide, was removed at the insistence of the Turkish Government. A statement of the Special Rapporteur claimed that no proof existed that the genocide of Armenians occurred. Despite intervention by the United States, the USSR, France, and others, subsequent attempts to restore Paragraph 30 have been unsuccessful to date.

This denial of the massacres without a hearing in any international forum sharply radicalized the diaspora. Lacking a state to present its case to international organizations, Armenian communities tried to create media interest in their cause. They had little success, however, until Armenian terrorist activities began to garner publicity.

1 "Passing to the modern era, one may note the existence of relatively full documentations dealing with the massacre of Armenians, which has been described as 'the first genocide of the 20th century.'

Secret
Appendix B

**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,**
**October 1973–June 1984**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>Group/Name Used</th>
<th>Incident Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October</td>
<td>New York City, United States</td>
<td>Yaglian Commandos</td>
<td>Smoke bomb sent to Turkish Consulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October</td>
<td>New York City, United States</td>
<td>Yaglian Commandos</td>
<td>Bomb sent to Turkish Consulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 January</td>
<td>Beirut, Lebanon</td>
<td>Prisoner Karekin (Gourgen)</td>
<td>Bomb discovered at World Council of Churches office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February</td>
<td>Beirut, Lebanon</td>
<td>Yaglian Group</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish Airlines office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 October</td>
<td>Vienna, Austria</td>
<td>ASALA and JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish Ambassador and driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 October</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>ASALA and JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>Zurich, Switzerland</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish Consulate and a Turkish bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>New American Resistance * (NAR)</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish tourism office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>Rome, Italy</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January</td>
<td>London, England</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish bank</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Bombing of apartment of a Turkish Embassy counselor</td>
</tr>
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<td>2 June</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>ASALA and JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of brother, wife, and chauffeur of Turkish Ambassador to Spain</td>
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<td>6 December</td>
<td>Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish Consulate</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 December</td>
<td>Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish Consulate</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Madrid, Spain</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of British Airways and TWA offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish tourism office and Turkish labor attache's office</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 October</td>
<td>The Hague, Netherlands</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of son of Turkish Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December</td>
<td>Rome, Italy</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Bombing of El Al and British Airways offices, injuring nine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 December</td>
<td>Amsterdam, Netherlands</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish Airlines office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>Commandos of Armenian Avengers (probably JCAG)</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish press attache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 January</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of British Airways, TWA, Swissair, and Sabena Airlines offices (JCAG later denied responsibility)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Secret**
## A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism, October 1973–June 1984 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>Group/Name Used</th>
<th>Incident Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 February</td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Bombing of Aeroflot and Turkish Airlines offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Bombing of Soviet information office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 February</td>
<td>Bern, Switzerland</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April</td>
<td>Rome, Italy</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 October</td>
<td>Beverly Hills, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Firebombing of Turkish Consul General's residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 October</td>
<td>Los Angeles, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of Music City Tours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New York City, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish mission to the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 December</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of British Airways, Lufthansa, and Sebena Airlines offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 December</td>
<td>Sidney, Australia</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish General Consul and bodyguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 April</td>
<td>Copenhagen, Denmark</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Attempted assassination of Turkish labor counselor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June</td>
<td>Anaheim, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of Anaheim convention center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 November</td>
<td>Los Angeles, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish Consulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 January</td>
<td>Los Angeles, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish Consul General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 March</td>
<td>Cambridge, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish Consulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>Ottawa, Canada</td>
<td>ASALA and Armenian Liberation Front (probably linked to JCAG)</td>
<td>Attempted assassination of Turkish Commercial Counselor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 April</td>
<td>Cologne, West Germany</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Attempted bombing of Turkish bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dortmund, West Germany</td>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>Bombing of Turkish bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>Boston, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of the honorary Turkish consul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May</td>
<td>Ottawa, Canada</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish military attachan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June</td>
<td>Lisbon, Portugal</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish attach and wounding of wife, who later died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 September</td>
<td>Burgas, Bulgaria</td>
<td>Combat Units of Justice Against Armenian Genocide (probably JCAG)</td>
<td>Attempted assassination of Turkish administrative attachan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 October</td>
<td>Boston, United States</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Attempted bombing of honorary Turkish Counsel (alleged member of JCAG arrested aboard aircraft in Boston)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March</td>
<td>Belgrade, Yugoslavia</td>
<td>JCAG</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July</td>
<td>Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td>ASALA, JCAG, and ARA</td>
<td>Assassination of Turkish administrative attachan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July</td>
<td>Lisbon, Portugal</td>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>Takeover of Turkish Embassy, which resulted in killing of hostages and deaths of five terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>Vienna, Austria</td>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>Car bomb assassination of Turkish labor attachan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Analysis of the types and nationalities of targets, locations, and forensic evidence indicates the NAR may also be a cover name used by the ARF in claiming attacks against Turkish targets.*

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Figure 7
Attacks Linked to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation

Historic Area Claimed by Armenian Terrorists

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