French Socialists in Government: Origins, Attitudes, and Policies

A Research Paper
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French Socialists
in Government: Origins,
Attitudes, and Policies

Summary
Information available as of 1 June 1984 was used in this report.

There are surprising continuities between the origins and attitudes of Socialist policymakers and those of officials under the earlier Giscardian regime, considering the bitterness that has traditionally divided the left and right in France. This paper examines the educational, professional, and social backgrounds of Socialist political appointees, which—we have found—help account for similarities in policy between the Socialists and their predecessors.

This paper is one of a series designed to explore the relationship between changes in political elites of major West European parties and political trends in their countries. We believe that the individuals included in this study—though currently working in the government rather than the Socialist Party apparatus—constitute the core of the present and future Socialist leadership. When they eventually return to party positions, they will have a strong influence over the future direction of the party.
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French Socialists in Government: Origins, Attitudes, and Policies

Echoes of the Past

Scholars and journalists have noted recently that government policy under President François Mitterrand now differs little from the policy of the Giscard d'Estaing regime. The frequently heard comment that the Socialists' policy is "Giscardism with a human face," though facetious, has a considerable basis in fact. In domestic affairs, after about a year of stereotypical leftist policies—nationalizations of businesses and high public spending intended to stimulate the economy, reduce unemployment, and increase social benefits—the Socialists began a reversal in 1982 and adopted economic austerity policies that increasingly resembled those of Raymond Barre, Giscard's last prime minister. Moreover, an elaborate program for granting increased political power to regional and local governments espoused by the Socialists during the 1981 campaign apparently has been assigned a lower priority now that electoral reverses have weakened the left's control at the subnational level.

In international affairs, there have been changes in emphasis since the Giscard years, but these generally have not been in a "leftist" or neutralist direction. From the beginning of Mitterrand's term, France has given less attention to being an interlocutor between East and West and has supported US efforts to redress the imbalance created by Soviet power in Europe. The government has also moved to strengthen France's own nuclear arsenal and resisted suggestions by other West European socialists that French nuclear weapons be a subject of negotiation at the Geneva talks with the USSR. Moreover, French troops were sent to Lebanon and Chad to help maintain stability in the Middle East and Africa. Thus, Mitterrand's foreign policies have displayed a basic congruity of outlook with the United States; they generally have met with approval from the center-right opposition, while opening a gap between the French President and the mainstream of West European socialists.

The explanation for the substantial continuities with Giscard's policies, in our judgment, lies mainly in the objective conditions confronting the Socialists and in Mitterrand's personal attitudes. Only the strongest ideologues, for example, could have argued in 1982 for a continuation of Keynesian economic policies, when the pursuit of such policies under contemporary world conditions was driving France toward an economic abyss. The practical concern that a deviation of power might strengthen the center-right parties and the Communists had a similar negative effect on the decentralization program. On international issues, orthodoxy according to Mitterrand generally has been imposed from the top.

Nevertheless, we believe that external constraints and Mitterrand's outlook have not been the only forces influencing government policy. The values and goals of key Socialist Party policymakers—the ministers of the government, the Elysee staff, and the ministers' staffs—have also played a part in the formulation and implementation of the Socialists' agenda. The fact that Socialist appointees share many background characteristics and attitudes with the technocratic elite that governed France under Giscard makes the continuities of policy from Giscard to Mitterrand much more understandable.

Working Within the System

Like the Giscardians, Socialist appointees are drawn disproportionately from the upper levels of society. Many have been trained in special government schools whose mission is to staff the top ranks of most major professions in France, including public administration. The fact that Mitterrand and his lieutenants have continued quietly to appoint officials with backgrounds in the civil service has been another important point of continuity.

1 For a description of the policymaking process under Mitterrand, see the appendix.
Academic studies have identified certain attitudes that characterize officials from these backgrounds. Although many graduates of the elite state schools have had leftist sympathies and some have developed a taste for extensive reforms, more generally these institutions instill a sense of limitations that discourages experimentation, particularly in economic affairs. We believe this has been true of most appointees since 1981, even though a large majority are avowed Socialists. As Minister of Industry and Research Laurent Fabius, himself a graduate of three elite state schools, told an audience of industrialists last year, "I don't check the textbook before making a decision. I'm pragmatic. My wish is to make France more efficient." These statements are a good brief characterization of the grandes écoles outlook on government.

In our judgment, officials whose training leads them carefully to consider practical factors such as the balance of payments, the inflation rate, and business investment have helped move the government toward the current policy of economic austerity. The government’s refusal to adopt an autarkic economic policy—which some leftwing Socialists argued would permit continued pursuit of classic Socialist goals—reflects in part the lack of respect for protectionist ideas in the elite state schools. The current campaign to restructure and modernize French industry also reflects a technocratic spirit found in the grandes écoles, which emphasizes efficiency and sees the state as a major source of innovation in society. Finally, graduates of the elite state institutions—at least where they are personally involved—tend to favor the centralized approach to government that is so traditional in France. This tendency may help explain the difficulties in maintaining momentum toward the party’s declared goal of government decentralization. All these tendencies have been recognized and criticized recently in books by leftwing Socialists.

French foreign policy traditionally is the “privileged domain” of the president, and most observers agree that for some time Mitterrand’s control over this process has been as strong as any of his predecessors. Doubtless his tendency to practice a thinly disguised form of classic power politics rather than the ideologically based formulas developed earlier by the party is due more to his own predispositions and his reading of France’s needs than to his staff’s influence. Nevertheless, we believe that Mitterrand’s inclinations are reinforced by the advice he receives from his staff and—to a lesser degree—the Foreign Minister’s staff. These groups, like policymaking groups in some other issue areas, are dominated by graduates of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), the prestigious training ground for government officials (see the inset). According to Embassy reporting, the foreign affairs specialists have deemphasized ideology and concentrated on analyzing power relationships in international affairs. With the partial exception of Regis Debray—the Elysee’s token revolutionary whose influence has declined even further in recent months—Mitterrand’s personal foreign policy advisers have worked to limit frictions with the United States (see the inset).

Elitism Reincarnated

As a self-proclaimed party of the masses, the Socialists criticized Giscard for having a “monarchical” approach to governing. Their most common complaint was that he and a small group of unelected technocrats in the Elysee were dictating policies that would affect the lives of all Frenchmen. After the left’s electoral victory in 1981, the fact that the regime would be the first since the Fourth Republic without a graduate of a prestigious grande école in either the presidency or prime-ministership seemed at first glance to presage a new egalitarianism in government. Even before 1981, however, there had been signs that the attack on elitism might be largely rhetorical, for the Socialists were not always forthright in their own policy pronouncements. They preferred to criticize the
**The Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA)**

The best known of the grandes écoles, ENA was founded in 1945 to select and train future civil servants for important administrative posts. Its creator, Michel Debre, hoped it would help broaden recruitment for the high bureaucracy and reduce dependence on the grands corps, the small groups at the apex of the administrative elite (see the inset) by producing a different type of bureaucrat. So prestigious are the grands corps, however, that the top graduates of ENA have consistently chosen to serve in them. Approximately 10 percent of each class of about 140 are allowed this privilege.

About one candidate in 10 who takes ENA's competitive entrance examination is admitted. Debre had thought originally that many students would enter from the lower levels of the bureaucracy, but applicants coming directly from one of the other grandes écoles usually are better prepared to succeed on the examination; as a result, they consistently outnumber the "internal" students. According to some graduates, a broad knowledge of French civilization and elegance of exposition are the keys to success at ENA. Academic studies have shown that students from upper-class backgrounds have a much better chance of gaining admission, and of achieving a high ranking once they are there.

Contrary to popular belief, ENA trains generalists rather than specialists. The faculty tries to impart an integrated social science knowledge, largely through practical case studies in government. Some alumni have claimed that ENA is more a device for bringing together and ranking future officials than for educating them. Nevertheless, most graduates believe they are capable of dealing with any governmental problem.

ENA alumni also tend to regard themselves as more than implementors of policy. Much of their training consists of mock policymaking, using efficiency and the general interest of France as their main criteria. The fact that leaders like Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Jacques Chirac, and Michel Rocard are ENA graduates has confirmed for many young people that the school is part of the optimum career path for a politician.

Giscardian ministers and their staffs for catering to special interests rather than confront the question of whether a technocratic elite was necessary or desirable. Indeed, since their victory, the Socialists have done little to diminish the influence of elitist institutions.

Socialist policy toward the Ecole Nationale d'Administration is revealing. The government responded to criticism of the school by creating a few new openings for students from outside the administrative "caste." This has done little to change the composition of the ENA student body, however, and has left unanswered the larger question of the school's influence on government (see the inset).

Some academic observers contend that the composition of Socialist policymaking groups has electoral as well as policy implications. Mitterrand himself told a colleague in 1981 that the Socialists would succeed in government if they recruited officials whose origin corresponded to that of the party's electorate, which draws substantially from all social groups (see the figure). The Socialists have not, however, achieved this correspondence. Only at the level of government ministers can a case be made that the Socialists have been more egalitarian than the Giscardians in opening positions to individuals of humble parentage. But this is offset by the ministers' successful professional lives and high educational attainments, which had generally placed them high on the social ladder before they took office.

On the Elysee and ministerial staffs, moreover, some minor changes since the Giscard years cannot conceal the fact that the reign of the technocrats continues.
Civil Servants in Politics

France has long been renowned for its powerful and stable bureaucracy. Many observers in academia and the media have pointed out that, during the Fifth Republic, the civil service in some ways has grown even more influential due to a blurring of the distinction between politicians and civil servants. Under de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard—and to a considerable extent under Mitterrand—civil servants have played a major role in policy formation, either as advisers to politicians or as politicians. The most influential of these are the fewer than 1,000 members of the so-called grands corps—the Inspectorate of Finance, the Court of Accounts, and the Council of State—which constitute the pinnacle of the administrative elite.

Entry into one of the grands corps confers a number of perquisites. Members are not restricted to work in a given ministry or agency, and they are sent throughout the government on prestigious assignments as troubleshooters. Many are allowed to organize their work and their time largely as they see fit. Like all French civil servants, they are also free to accept positions on the personal staffs of government ministers, to work for political parties, and to run for and hold public office. If they work for a minister, their salary continues to be paid by their corps, and their place in the corps is always secure regardless of any political excursion they may take. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Jacques Chirac are only two of the politicians whose careers have been subsidized by their membership in the grands corps.

Although studies have shown that about three-quarters of the membership in the grands corps comes from the highest social stratum, they also indicate that a substantial percentage of high civil servants have leftist sympathies. During the Giscard years, these functionaries had incurred no real penalty for their views except exclusion from the higher levels of political decision making. Mitterrand’s transition team, therefore, had no trouble manning the new government with high civil servants who were both experts and Socialists. In many ministries, moreover, the new broom did little sweeping: throughout the government, fewer than 100 public officials identified with the right were replaced. According to the US Embassy in Paris, some delegates to the Socialist Party congresses in 1981 and 1982 criticized the government for not conducting a more drastic purge of officeholders.

This retention of personnel is partly due to the reputation of impartiality gained by the upper bureaucracy over the years. High civil servants, as opinion surveys have shown, generally see themselves as defenders of the public interest and as above politics. Although high civil servants adapted fairly easily to serving different political masters after 1981, we believe that because of their training and professional experience they exert an influence on the Socialist leadership away from radicalism.

Mitterrand and his colleagues initially expanded ministerial staffs by more than 50 percent overall, and, like the center-right governments, they have filled a large majority of staff positions from a preconstituted pool of elite candidates. Moreover, academic studies extending back several years have detected similar dynamics within the Socialist Party apparatus. Although party workers at the grassroots level include a substantial number of people from all occupational categories, this balance is lost at higher levels, and the directing committees of the party are dominated by highly educated individuals of high social status.

Government Ministers

Most of the Socialist ministers came to the government directly from the upper levels of the party apparatus, where they had worked together for years. The ministers represent the diverse ideological currents in the party, although the predominance of the Mitterrandists who have backed the new moderate policies has grown. Almost all the ministers have held seats in parliament, and many still hold local offices; but the right’s monopoly on power before 1981 had prevented most from having ministerial experience.
Socialist Party Support From Occupational Groups

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<th>Percent</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>80</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue-collar workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clerical/administrative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business executives/liberal professions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
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<tr>
<td>No profession</td>
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Socialists

*First round, 1981 presidential election.

Complete statistical data are not available on the family backgrounds of the 36 Socialist government ministers, but the parents of these ministers appear to come from a fairly broad socioeconomic range, with a scattering from humble parentage. The fairly representative character of the ministers' social origins seems to derive from the fact that many are longtime party stalwarts who became politically active when people from modest backgrounds had a better chance than they do today of rising high in the party organization. As academic studies have noted, the younger generation of politicians today passes through a long series of filters, notably in the educational system. In this process, an upper-class background provides a valuable headstart.

Education was the key factor in the ministers' upward mobility. A large majority of the ministers have had specialized graduate training. Only three ministers of the current government have graduated from ENA, but they are important figures: Laurent Fabius (Industry and Research), Claude Cheysson (Foreign Relations), and Michel Rocard (Agriculture). Twelve others attended grandes écoles, while many of the others have done graduate work in the university system.

The upward mobility that has characterized the current ministers' careers became especially evident once these individuals settled into their professions. Largely through intellectual attainments, most moved into—if they were not already in—the upper middle class. Sixteen of the 36 Socialist ministers became educators—most at the university level—while four became high civil servants. Only Pierre Beregovoy, the Minister of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, has ever been a blue-collar worker.

Overall, the governments headed by Pierre Mauroy have differed somewhat from earlier governments due to increased representation of party leaders and educators, and a moderate reduction in the percentage of civil servants (who constituted 40 to 50 percent of Giscard's ministers). The Mauroy governments are little different from Raymond Barre's, however, in the educational level or social status of their members.

Professors and teachers play major roles in the current government, as they have long done in the Socialist Party. In addition to a strong representation among the ministers, almost 60 percent of the Socialist deputies in the National Assembly are former teachers. The educational profession is also strongly represented in the party organization; on the ministerial staffs, however, educators are outnumbered by civil servants.

Although academicians in government sometimes display a taste for abstraction, we believe that the educators serving under the Mauroy government generally share the realism and the sense of limitations traditionally characteristic of high civil service technocrats in France. The vast majority of teachers in politics have actually been civil servants because, except for the Catholic schools, French education has

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In many cases, they belonged to the forerunners of the Socialist Party.
Table 1
Elysee Staff
Percentage of ENA/Polytechnic Graduates

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<tr>
<td>De Gaulle</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pompidou</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giscard</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitterrand</td>
<td>30</td>
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Table 2
Elysee Staff
Percentage of Civil Servants
(Including Judges and Educators)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De Gaulle</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pompidou</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giscard</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitterrand</td>
<td>57</td>
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long been under stringent government control. Scholars have noted, moreover, that French educators, while generally attracted to reformist ideas, also tend to respect the institutions that have awarded them a relatively high social status. It would be an exaggeration to say that this group invariably promotes continuity of policy, but most seem disinclined to push for leftist reforms when these would be impractical.

The Elysee and Matignon
The Mitterrand regime in its staff appointments has sought to avoid (or at least avoid the appearance of) dependence on institutions such as ENA that are associated in the public mind with Giscard’s technocratic elite. In this they have been only partly successful. Although their number fluctuates, graduates of ENA and the Polytechnic School have constituted about a third of Mitterrand’s staff—as opposed to 60 percent at one time during Giscard’s tenure (see table 1). Nevertheless, the two most influential officials in the Elysee—General Secretary Jean-Louis Bianco and Mitterrand’s “idea man” Jacques Attali—are graduates of ENA, as are a majority of the most important foreign affairs experts.

In contrast to Giscard’s staff—in which civil servants once held 89 percent of the posts—the level of former high bureaucrats in the Mitterrand Elysee has hovered just under 60 percent (see table 2). The grands corps, the pinnacle of the administrative elite, which once furnished more than 60 percent of Giscard’s team, contributed only 19 percent to Mitterrand’s staff as of 1981. From the corps, Mitterrand has shown a marked preference for drawing on the Council of State—a group of legal experts known for their political impartiality—rather than the financial experts whom Giscard himself seemed to epitomize.

We believe that it would be incorrect, however, to infer from this substantial eclipse of the grands corps that the influence of former bureaucrats has been substantially reduced, or that leftist ideology has triumphed. If other categories of bureaucrats are included, 57 percent of the Elysee staff comes from the civil service (see table 2), compared with 30 percent from outside of government. Many of the latter group are “men of letters” or journalists rather than businessmen, and some of the ex-businessmen also worked for the government at one time.

Like their predecessors, the Socialists have found that civil servants are a useful free asset for their staffs. Their salaries are paid by their corps rather than from the Elysee budget, and they possess a network of personal contacts that can be used to surveil, prod, and cajole their erstwhile colleagues. Academic studies have pointed out that, in dealings with the compartmented and turf-conscious French bureaucracy, such an informal network is vital for the survival of the government’s programs.

Like the Elysee, the Prime Minister’s team has a strongly partisan political background. Pierre Mauroy’s closest collaborators are mostly men of humble or middle-class origin who accompanied him to Paris from his home city of Lille. Perhaps because of this, the Prime Minister’s staff prides itself on being down-to-earth and nontechnocratic; one of the Prime Minister’s key staffers told an interviewer in 1981 that “here, at least, there are no ENA graduates.” The statement, however, is incorrect. Although
the chiefs of staff and those in liaison with parliament and the press are old Mauroy cronies, ENA graduates form a majority of those responsible for various aspects of the government program. Moreover, a large majority of these specialists are civil servants, and a substantial smattering are from the grands corps.

**Other Ministers' Staffs**

Surveys of several hundred staffers in the ministries have demonstrated that these officials, like their Giscardian predecessors, come from the upper echelons of society; indeed more than half come from upper-class families. Another 31 percent are the offspring of members of the middle class, including teachers. Only 15 percent come from a background classified as “modest.” Most of the staff people, therefore, started higher on the social ladder than the average minister of the government. From fragmentary figures, we estimate that 30 to 40 percent of the group have fathers who were high civil servants. Thus, academicians' claims that a caste of officials has been created under the Fifth Republic have a basis in fact, even under a government of the left.

The preponderance of ENA graduates on the ministerial staffs has been reduced somewhat since the Giscard years. One academic study found that after June 1981 the total of graduates from ENA and the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique made up 42 percent of the ministerial staffs, down from 61 percent under Giscard. We believe, however, that these figures do not adequately characterize the influence of the grands écoles on the government of the left, because the alumni have gravitated toward the most important positions. On the ministerial staffs, for example, a considerably higher percentage of alumni are found in chief of staff positions. Even more significantly, another academic study found in 1981 that ENA graduates alone held 50 of 102 key staff positions throughout the government. We suspect, moreover, that the Socialists later quietly hired more technocrats once the value of such officials in administration had become more apparent, and after media attention to the “new crowd” had worn off.

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<tr>
<td>Staffers in Socialist Ministries, Profession Before Appointment</td>
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</table>

| Civil service | 68 |
| Education | 10 |
| Party/union jobs | 14 |
| Private sector, including journalism | 7 |
| Other | 1 |

The most frequently represented grande école in the ministries is the Institute of Political Science, which 45 percent of staffers attended. We believe that, like ENA graduates, these officials—who are also recruited from among the highest caliber students—form a self-confident, self-reinforcing clique. Also like ENA, they provide any government with a pool of potential officials who are highly qualified in objective terms to assume governmental responsibilities.

Even more than schooling, the professional backgrounds of the Socialists on ministerial staffs show that they originate in an elite subculture (see table 3). Even without counting teachers as civil servants, 68 percent of staff members come directly from important posts in the bureaucracy. About 21 percent were salaried officials in the Socialist Party, labor unions, or civil associations. Only 11 percent of staff personnel come from the rest of the private sector, including journalism, letters, medicine, law, and business.

Ministerial staffers—in contrast to those under Giscard—have been heavily involved in party politics, even though they generally are not ideologues. Fifty-nine percent of ministerial staff appointees in 1981 were active members of the Socialist Party, while

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* Their fathers are high-ranking civil servants, important businessmen, high-ranking military officers, doctors, or lawyers.

* Some later went on to attend ENA.

* The dearth of lawyers, characteristic of the Fifth Republic, is somewhat deceptive. Some former civil servants have been trained in the law and have done legal work for the state.
Mitterrand's Key Foreign Policy Advisers

Jacques Attali, a young intellectual, has emerged as Mitterrand's "idea man" as well as the main channel of communication to the President and a government spokesman. He has easier access to the President than any of the other staffers do, partly because he occupies the office adjoining Mitterrand's. Attali has the distinction of having graduated first in his class at both ENA and the Polytechnique, the premier school for engineers. During the 1970s he taught economics at those institutions and the University of Paris, while becoming increasingly involved with Socialist study groups. During the same period he tutored Mitterrand in economics.

Attali has been attacked by leftwing elements in the party for being more social democratic than socialist. Although we believe he was a major architect of the regime's nationalization plans, Attali has also played a role in shaping the subsequent austerity programs. He has been a driving force behind France's efforts to develop high-tech industries. A key figure in relations with the United States and the EC, Attali believes that France and the United States should resist Soviet expansionism.

In conversations with US officials, he has often been critical of the oppression and inefficiency in the Soviet system. Although he is leery of US economic influence in France, we believe he has helped promote cooperation with the United States on a variety of international political questions.

Jean-Louis Bianco, who as secretary general of the Elysee sees Mitterrand very frequently, has a hand in a wide variety of policy matters, including foreign relations. His background too is typically technocratic—he earned a degree from the Higher National School of Mining before his administrative studies at ENA. A member of the prestigious Council of State, he served on the Socialist Party's study committee on the economy during the party's years in opposition even though he is not a party member. Although Bianco had little grounding in foreign affairs before taking office in July 1982, his duties have demanded that he become knowledgeable about fast-moving situations such as Lebanon, Chad, and Central America. He also has a role in overseeing the French intelligence service. On the domestic scene, US Embassy sources report that he is a convinced partizan of "rigeur" (austerity).

Hubert Vedrine a protege of Mitterrand, heads the small "diplomatic cell" at the Elysee. He sees the President almost daily on a wide variety of international issues, but his personal expertise is on the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Vedrine views international affairs from the perspective of the balance of power. According to US diplomats, he has urged that the United States proceed with INF deployment, and he opposed the French Government's decision in 1982 to purchase Soviet natural gas. He also sees a need for West European countries to strengthen their military defenses.

Jean-Michel Gaillard, Vedrine's principal assistant, is a career diplomat. For several years, he taught a seminar in French foreign policy at ENA. He believes that France should be active on the world scene both
by itself and as part of a strong Europe. In his classes he sometimes stressed the need for France to avoid dependence on the United States.

Pierre Morel, whose main responsibility is to help Attali in laying the groundwork for summit meetings, also went from ENA into the diplomatic corps. Morel closely follows relations with those countries that will be represented at the summits, and also has responsibility at the Elysee for EC issues. US diplomats have remarked that he tends to sympathize with US positions, particularly in East-West relations.

Others who play a part in the foreign policy field include Guy Penne, a former professor of dentistry and part-time politician who handles African affairs. In his frequent meetings with US officials, Penne almost invariably emphasizes his desire for close cooperation with the United States. The word “pragmatist” has often been applied to him in US Embassy reporting and in the French press. He has a reputation for being anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and distrustful of the Socialist Party’s left wing. Penne’s only foreign experience before his arrival at the Elysee palace was as a leader of an international student organization. The press has noted, however, that the most important qualification for the Elysee’s African specialist is that African leaders know he has Mitterrand’s ear. With Penne, that is clearly the case.

Mitterrand’s primary military adviser is Jean-Michel Saulnier, a high-ranking Air Force general with no known connection to the Socialist Party. Saulnier’s advocacy of a strong nuclear deterrent coincides with the President’s own ideas, and we suspect that Saulnier’s belief in the necessity of NATO’s INF deployment may have reinforced the President’s analysis of the strategic situation. According to US Embassy reporting, Saulnier’s advice to the President regarding the need for France’s military presence in Chad and earlier in Lebanon gave him a crucial role on those issues. The Lebanon Embassy and the press have also reported that Saulnier has some responsibility on terrorism, arms sales, and intelligence issues.

François de Grossouvre is a close friend of the President, but he is regarded by the press as a “mystery man.” Initially, he appeared to be the Elysee’s main liaison with the intelligence service, but he apparently has forfeited some responsibilities in that area. This wealthy ex-businessman and agricultural entrepreneur formerly undertook special missions in France on behalf of Mitterrand and the Socialist Party; now he performs a similar role on the international level. A friend of the Gemayel family, he has often been sent as a special envoy to Lebanon. Mitterrand also has given him special responsibilities for relations with Gabon, North Korea, Yugoslavia, and Morocco.

Charles Salzmann, a specialist in information systems and industrial strategy, is a longtime friend of the President’s. He is a graduate of the Higher National School of Aeronautics, and also holds an M.S. degree from Columbia University. Salzmann has major responsibilities for relations with the US private sector, and he also advises Mitterrand on France’s “image” in the United States.
another 10 percent belonged to the Communist Party or another party represented in the government. Few of these people have held high positions in their parties, but most have done more than obtain membership cards. During the left's years in opposition, 42 percent of these staffers participated in the Socialist Party's Study Committees—groups of intellectuals and experts who drafted leftist alternative policies on many different issues. Moreover, 31 percent had run for local or national office.

The typical staffer or adviser, therefore, is a Socialist intellectual, and often a civil servant who has taken advantage of the flexible rules allowing participation in partisan politics. Under Giscard and his predecessors, civil servants on ministerial staffs often used their positions as springboards into political careers, particularly in the National Assembly. For the most talented and politically adroit staffers, this route still seems to promise good results. In our judgment, moreover, this path into national politics may eventually come to overshadow the more traditional pattern for Socialists of building a local political base before moving to the national level.

The Inner Circle of Foreign Policy

Foreign relations have long been a "privileged domain" of the president of the republic, and as Foreign Minister Cheysson himself admitted privately to a journalist last fall, foreign policy is still made for the most part at the Elysee. Of course, one extremely busy man with a foreign affairs staff of fewer than 10 people cannot, in our view, shape every dimension of French foreign policy. The bureaucracies in the Ministry of External Relations and the Ministry of Cooperation and Development often play an integral role in policy formation, and, according to the US Embassy in Paris, Mitterrand consults where appropriate with Cheysson, Minister for European Affairs Roland Dumas, and Minister for Cooperation and Development Christian Nucci.

With the possible exception of the fading Debray, the Elysee foreign affairs specialists—though all are Socialist Party members or sympathetic to the left—generally do not have an ideological frame of reference, according to Embassy and press reporting. The head of this group, for example, told a reporter in February that Mitterrand's historic contribution would be to bring the French left to accept realism, especially on international and defense issues. The Elysee foreign policy specialists, in our judgment, have tended to reinforce the pragmatic approach Mitterrand has favored on most issues. Five members of this key group—all relatively young—are graduates of ENA.

Similarly, Claude Cheysson has assembled at the Quai d'Orsay a staff of foreign affairs specialists with leftist sympathies. More than half of his staff, for example, were members of the CFDT 1 local at the Quai. At the same time, however, more than half of these officials, including the influential political director, Jacques Andreani, are graduates of ENA, and almost all are drawn from the diplomatic corps. This may explain why, according to analyses in the press, Cheysson's group tends to be even more practical and unideological than the Elysee staff.

Implications for the Socialist Party

We believe that the tendency of the Socialist Party to draw its leadership from traditional elite institutions is likely to persist. Indeed, this trend may even become more pronounced, because when the party eventually falls from power many of the most capable and highly regarded Socialists will begin to filter into the party structure. This may cause some temporary dislocation and resentment, but we doubt that it will have a substantial negative effect on the party. In our judgment, the individuals holding party positions have no illusions that those currently in the government will allow them to continue their management of the party when it once again becomes the main forum for Socialists.

Although the awkward question of elitism poses some political risks for the Socialists, we believe that if skillfully handled it need not be a major electoral handicap. The increasing size and complexity of

1 The Confederation Francaise Democratique de Travail is the trade union federation closest to the Socialist Party.
society, which have enhanced the importance of postgraduate education for officials, have affected most of the political parties; the only major party that has not become visibly more technocratic in recent years is the Communist Party—which has been losing support. Moreover, it is not unusual in Western democracies for the leaders of a political party to have different social origins from the electorate. Indeed, although the situation may be somewhat more extreme today, academic studies show that French Socialist leaders in past decades were also much better educated than their grassroots workers and voters.

In international affairs, the party leadership gives every sign of adhering to certain Gaullist principles that have long been part of the national consensus, especially the need to maintain a militarily strong and politically independent France. This legacy has helped erase from the minds of French Socialists the period of the 1950s, when they were accused of being clients of the United States, and they can now cooperate openly with Washington in the many areas where national interests are perceived to be parallel.

There are indications, moreover, that the French public does not have a negative view of intellectuals in politics. High prestige attaches to education in France; a recent survey shows, for example, that the public has greater trust in professors (75 percent of those surveyed) than in any other occupational group. Even more significant, in our judgment, is the public’s willingness to vote for ENA graduates. Twenty-three ENA alumni were elected to the National Assembly in 1981, and although this was a smaller number than in the old Assembly, the number of Socialist ENA graduates rose from eight to 13. Furthermore, surveys of Socialist supporters have long shown Michel Rocard—an ENA alumnus—to be their choice for the presidency. If, unexpectedly, a strain of anti-intellectualism developed in the French electorate, the center-right parties would be in a poor position to exploit it, since the leading opposition figures are two ENA graduates and a former economics professor.

On balance, the trends outlined in this paper point toward a future Socialist party that will seek to redress economic inequalities but continue to reject more radical views of class conflict. The party shows no signs of moving toward a clearly Marxist approach; indeed, recent public statements by Mitterrand hint at a more social democratic outlook, characterized by increasingly open acceptance of a mixed economy. On the other hand, the party seems unlikely even in the long run to abandon extensive state planning and intervention in the economy.
Appendix

Policymaking

The French Government today operates within the framework of Fifth Republic institutions, which vest many powers in a strong executive while limiting the powers of the parliament. The Socialists have done little to change this institutional reality, and today the president of France is the master of everything he has the time and staff to survey.

According to academic studies and US Embassy reporting, the president normally decides on major lines of policy in consultation with the prime minister and the relevant government ministers. Senior presidential advisers and party Secretary General Lionel Jospin may also be included in the process according to the issue. Since sending its most important leaders into the government, the party has become more an appendage of the latter than an originator of policy, but Jospin personally carries considerable weight, meets frequently with Mitterrand, and resembles a member of the government without portfolio. The president also consults frequently with union leaders and other nongovernmental figures whose advice has considerable impact on government policy. In certain areas of acute presidential interest such as foreign relations, Mitterrand personally decides details of policy.

Mitterrand said repeatedly in the early months of his administration that he did not want his personal staff to usurp the functions of the government, and some of his management methods have been consistent with this position. The Elysee advisers do not meet as a body to consider issues. Moreover, Mitterrand often tasks more than one staffer to report on the same issue in order to avoid becoming a prisoner of his counselors' advice. Nevertheless, the development of recommendations for the president allows individual advisers sporadically to exercise considerable influence. They lay the groundwork for restricted interministerial council meetings chaired by the president where major policies are developed. And the staff's organization—each adviser in effect duplicating the responsibilities of a ministry—still has some features of a shadow government. Moreover, the Elysee staff under Mitterrand has expanded and gradually gained power at the expense of other agencies of the government.

Nevertheless, the limited size of the Elysee staff and the sheer magnitude of government business preclude complete control by the presidency over government policy. The prime minister and his much larger staff at Matignon also play a role in determining policy in a few areas, and in securing its implementation. Since Mitterrand became president, more interministerial meetings are being chaired by the prime minister.

The role of the ministers' personal staffs and the bureaucracy proper in the policy process is more subtle. No policy can be presented, however, until it is sufficiently staffed out, and this process—however apolitical in intent—affects the substance of policies. In France perhaps more than other Western democracies, permanent bureaucrats participate in drafting legislation. Furthermore, the bureaucracy has an important role in rulemaking, which the French Government has traditionally used extensively in lieu of legislation. To ministry personnel, expertise is power; it is guarded jealously from other ministries and exploited in relation to the politicians heading the government—even though the civil servants recognize they are always subject to being overruled by the ministers, the prime minister, or the president.