

IAC-D-50/11

Priority National Intelligence Objectives in
the Field of International Communism
(18 Apr 1957)

IAC-D-50/11.1

Priority National Intelligence Objectives
(4 June 1957)

IAC-D-50/10.2 Priority National Intelligence Objectives
(5 Aug 1957)

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IAC-D-50/8
(First Revision)
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IAC-D-50/11.1
4 June 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Priority National Intelligence Objectives

1. In accord with the IAC action of 7 May 1957 (IAC-M-288) the Board of National Estimates has reviewed the draft Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the Field of International Communism (IAC-D-50/11). The Board recommends that IAC-D-50/11 be approved subject to the deletion of the word particularly in objectives a, 2 and b, 2 under First Priority Objectives.

2. The Board has also reviewed IAC-D-50/8 (Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives) as directed by the IAC (IAC-M-288) and finds no inconsistencies with DCID 4/6. At such time as the EIC and the Board have completed their review of the new draft Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives (the revision of which had been planned by the EIC prior to this recent IAC action), the three lists will be submitted together for final review and approval by the IAC.


Secretary

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18 April 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the
Field of International Communism

The attached memorandum and draft "Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the Field of International Communism," prepared by the Committee on International Communism, will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for appropriate action with respect to the Committee's recommendation.


Secretary

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18 April 1957

MEMORANDUM

25X1A To : [REDACTED], Secretary, IAC

25X1A From : [REDACTED] Chairman, Committee on International
Communism

Subject : Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the Field
of International Communism

Reference : IAC-D-99/2, dated January 24, 1956; IAC-D-99/3,
dated July 17, 1956

Pursuant to the terms of reference for the Committee on International Communism (IAC-D-99/2) and in keeping with the intention indicated in the Committee's interim report (IAC-D-99/3, para. III. B.), the Committee submits the attached list of "Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the Field of International Communism." This list is based upon DCID 4/6 (approved by the IAC on 30 October 1956) and is designed to serve as a constitutional authorization for collection and production rather than as a detailed collection and production guide.

The Committee recommends that the IAC review and approve the attached draft as the Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the Field of International Communism.

The Committee is now considering the precise means to employ this priority list and will submit its proposals to the IAC in the near future.

Attachment:

List of Priority National Intelligence
Objectives in the Field of International
Communism

April 8, 1957

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18 April 1957

Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the
Field of International Communism

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Directive No. 4, DCID 4/6 (approved by the IAC on October 30, 1956) established a list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.
2. In order to establish a list of priority national intelligence objectives in the field of international Communism, the IAC Committee on International Communism has derived the following intelligence objectives from DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be revised when required by revision of DCID 4/6.
3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical factors relating to international Communism requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between two levels of priority within the general priority category.
4. The relevant DCID 4/6 objective is quoted first, followed by an indented outline listing of the national intelligence requirements for collection and production of intelligence material.

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I. First Priority Objectives*

a. "Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet or satellite armed forces." (DCID 4/6, I. a.)

1. International Communist movement activities
indicating Soviet intentions with regard to hostilities.
2. Soviet plans for the use of the international
Communist movement, ~~particularly~~ in war or
preparation for war.

b. "Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces." (DCID 4/6, I. b.)

1. International Communist movement and Chinese
Communist Party activities indicating Chinese
Communist intentions with regard to hostilities.
2. Chinese Communist plans for the use of the Asian
Communist movement ~~particularly~~ in war or
preparation for war.

* First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate, and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which would occasion greatest benefit to the US.

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c. "Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack on the United States or key U. S. overseas installations and for defense against air (including missiles) attack." (DCID 4/6, I. c.)

1. Communist Party and international Communist movement capabilities and plans to facilitate Soviet nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations through sabotage.

d. "Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the US or key US overseas installations." (DCID 4/6, I. d.)

1. International Communist movement activities indicating Soviet plans and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the US or key US overseas installations.
2. Soviet plans to use the international Communist movement in the clandestine delivery of unconventional weapons against the US or key US overseas installations.

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II. Second Priority Objectives*

a. "Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to orient non-Bloc countries toward the Soviet Bloc, to weaken and disrupt US and US-supported alliances, or to foment antagonism among the Western powers and between these powers and the rest of the free world." (DCID 4/6, II. b.)

1. International Communist movement activities, especially clandestine, including changes in "line" or organization, and shifts in emphasis among target groups which might reveal Soviet objectives and policies with regard to:

- (a) Attracting non-Bloc countries;
- (b) Weakening and disrupting US and US-supported alliances;
- (c) Fomenting antagonism among the Western powers;
- (d) Promoting antagonism between the Western powers and the rest of the world.

* Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.

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b. "Soviet (including Satellite) political strengths and weaknesses; the actual locus of power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling groups; Soviet-Satellite relations with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations." (DCID 4/6, II. c.)

1. Conflicts within the Satellite Communist parties.
2. Friction between the Soviet Communist Party and those of the Satellites.
3. Soviet control of the Satellite Communist parties.
4. Influence and control of the local Communist party within each Satellite.
5. Effect of Soviet Bloc friction on the international Communist movement.

c. "Major Chinese Communist international political objectives and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed to foment antagonism between the Western and Asian powers and to extend the area of Communist influence and control in Asia." (DCID 4/6, II. h.)

1. International Communist movement and Chinese Communist Party activities indicating Chinese Communist:
 - (a) International policies;
 - (b) Efforts to divide the Western and Asian powers;

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(c) Plans to extend Communism in Asia;

(d) Party relations with the overseas Chinese.

d. "Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the degree of Soviet influence or control, the extent of Chinese Communist freedom of action, actual or potential strains on the relationship, and the process of arriving at and coordinating joint policies." (DCID 4/6, II. j.)

1. Relations between the Chinese Communist Party and that of the USSR.
2. Relations of the Chinese Communist Party with Yugoslavia and Satellite parties.
3. Effects of Sino-Soviet relations on the international Communist movement.

e. "The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the population of mainland China." (DCID 4/6, II. i.)

1. Strength, aims, organizations, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Chinese Communist Party.
2. Personal or policy conflicts within the Chinese Communist Party.
3. Chinese Communist capabilities to support and influence the international Communist movement.

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f. "Sino-Soviet Bloc efforts and capabilities to direct espionage against the US from abroad, against US interests in foreign areas, and against non-Bloc countries." (DCID 4/6, II. x.)

1. Communist party and international Communist movement espionage and sabotage activities, organization, capabilities, plans, techniques, and targets.
2. Communist espionage, infiltration and sabotage against the US from abroad, against US interests in foreign areas and against non-Bloc governments, armed forces and military installations.

g. "The stability and policies of the Middle East Arab states,* Iran and Israel, with particular reference to oil concessions and installations, other commitments to the West and the Suez situations; the possibility of Arab-Israeli hostilities; and vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda and subversion, and Bloc political and economic inducements." (DCID 4/6, II. q.)

1. Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Communist movement in the Middle East Arab states,* Iran and Israel.

* Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and the principalities and colonial or semicolonial areas on the Arabian Peninsula littoral."

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2. Plans, policies and capabilities of the Communist movement to infiltrate, influence, control, or undermine the governments and ruling groups of these states.

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1. Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Communist movement in Japan.
2. Plans, policies and capabilities of the Japanese Communist movement to influence Japanese policy toward Communist China, the USSR, India, Southeast Asia and Japanese rearmament.

i. "The stability and orientation of India, with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power, its relations with Communist China and the USSR, its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia, and the progress of economic development." (DCID 4/6, II. p.)

1. Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Indian Communist movement.

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2. Plans, policies and capabilities of the Indian Communist movement to influence India's policies and especially Indian relations with Communist China and the USSR, and its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia.

j. "West German attitudes and policies toward the reunification problem and Soviet proposals with respect thereto; rearmament and the NATO alliance; tendencies toward the revival of ultranationalism and militarism." (DCID 4/6, II. t.)

1. West German Communist Party plans, policies and capabilities to influence West German policy on German reunification, rearmament and NATO, including efforts to stimulate West German nationalism and neutralism.
2. International Communist policy and activity regarding proposals for German reunification, rearmament and relations with NATO, especially as these activities may indicate Soviet intentions.

k. "The military, political, and economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime, its political and military objectives and intentions, Chinese Communist military and political intentions with respect thereto, and the relative degree of Soviet and Chinese Communist influence, control, and economic activity in North Korea." (DCID 4/6, II. m.)

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1. Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the North Korean Communist Party.
2. Chinese Communist Party relations with the North Korean Communist Party and its policies toward North Korea.
3. Soviet Communist Party relations with the North Korean Communist Party and its policies toward North Korea.
4. The relative influence of the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties in North Korea.
5. North Korean Communist plans and capabilities for clandestine activity in South Korea and Japan, including infiltration of their military establishments.

1. "The political and economic strengths and weaknesses and the general military capabilities, of the Viet Minh regime, the nature of its relationships with the USSR and with Communist China, its political and military objectives and intentions, and its capabilities and intentions for clandestine and subversive activity in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." (DCID 4/6, II. n.)

1. Strength, aims, organization, finances, internal condition, appeal, orientation and vitality of the Viet Minh Communist Party.
2. Relations between the Viet Minh Communist Party and the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties and with the international Communist movement.

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3. Viet Minh Communist plans and capabilities for clandestine activity in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, including infiltration of their military establishments.

m. "The stability of US base rights overseas; factors affecting the security of US military bases and installations in foreign areas."
(DCID 4/6, II. v.)

1. International Communist movement actions and policies affecting US base rights abroad; especially Communist capabilities and efforts to influence public and official opinion adversely to US possession of base rights; Communist capabilities, plans and efforts to penetrate and sabotage US military bases.

n. "Franco-German relations; France's will and ability to fulfill its NATO commitments; French policy toward North Africa particularly with respect to nationalist unrest in the area and Communist connections therewith." (DCID 4/6, II. s.)

1. French Communist will and ability to obstruct fulfillment of French NATO commitments.
2. Communist relations with North African nationalist unrest and capabilities for affecting it.
3. French Communist aims and influence regarding French policy toward North Africa.

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o. "The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities (political, subversive and clandestine), vulnerabilities and tactics of Communist parties and groups outside the Soviet Bloc and of international Communist front organizations, particularly the international role of the Yugoslav Communist party and the political and paramilitary capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Communist parties in France and Italy." (DCID 4/6, II. w.)

1. Strength, aims, organization, composition, internal condition, interrelationship, appeal, propaganda, and political, subversive and clandestine capabilities, vulnerabilities and tactics of non-Bloc Communist parties and groups everywhere and international Communist front organizations.
2. Yugoslav Communist Party relations with the international Communist movement, the Socialist parties and the Socialist International, its role in the evolution of Communist ideology.
3. Channels of communication used by the international Communist movement and among Communist parties, including that of the USSR; Communist finances; machinery and techniques for policy and action coordination; plans, intentions, ideological developments and evolution; relations with the Socialists, extremist parties and with trade union organizations.

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
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IAC-D-50/10.2
5 August 1957

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Priority National Intelligence Objectives

1. Attached is a draft statement of Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives, as approved by the Economic Intelligence Committee, which is designed to supersede the previous statement of such objectives approved by the IAC on 21 August 1956 (IAC-D-50/10, as revised in IAC-D-50/10.1). Pursuant to the direction of the IAC (IAC-M-288, item 6) the Board of National Estimates has reviewed these draft objectives from the standpoint of their consistency with the over-all Priority National Intelligence Objectives (DCID 4/6) and finds no inconsistencies.
2. As reported earlier (IAC-D-50/11.2, 4 June), the Board, on the basis of a similar review of the draft Priority National Intelligence Objectives in the Field of International Communism (IAC-D-50/11) and the Priority National Scientific and Technical Objectives (IAC-D-50/8), recommended striking the word "particularly" from paragraphs I, a, 2 and I, b, 2 of the 19 April 1957 draft of IAC-D-50/11. In other respects, the Board found no inconsistencies between those two statements of objectives and DCID 4/6.
3. These three sets of objectives will therefore be submitted together for final IAC review and approval at an early IAC meeting.


Secretary

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IAC-D-50/10.2*
30 July 1957

PRIORITY NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/6 (DCID 4/6), dated 30 October 1956, lists the priority national intelligence objectives established pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production. DCID 4/6 covers military, political, scientific, technological, and economic intelligence objectives on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Free World.

2. All economic intelligence objectives listed below are related to DCID 4/6 and as defined in that directive are deemed to be essential elements of priority national intelligence objectives. In conformity to the directive, distinction is made among three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these three categories is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the category.

* This supersedes the previous statement of Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives, approved by the IAC on 21 August 1956 (IAC-D-50/10 and the minor revision thereof in IAC-D-50/10.1).

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3. Foreign activities covered in the priority national economic intelligence objectives will be subject to continuing surveillance within the framework of responsibility laid down in DCID 15/1. It is not intended that the following list of objectives shall be a definitive or limiting statement of responsibilities, but rather that these objectives shall provide guidance for programming of economic intelligence collection and production.

I. FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES *

a. "Soviet over-all ... intentions ... particularly with respect to initiating hostilities"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, emphasis will be placed on the recognition and analysis of economic indications of Soviet preparations for initiating hostilities.

b. "Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations and for

* "First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US." (Quoted material is taken directly from DCID 4/6.)

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defense against air (including missiles) attack."

Under this priority national intelligence objective, emphasis will be placed on analysis of all economic factors relating to Soviet production and production capabilities in the following fields:

1. Nuclear weapons;
2. Guided missiles and guided missile weapons systems;
3. Aircraft and related delivery systems;
4. Air defense systems; and
5. Long-range submarines.

II. SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES *

a. "The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc; the capabilities and

* "Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US."

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vulnerabilities of the Soviet and Satellite internal communications systems."

Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward the following:

1. Assessment of the over-all as well as the particular economic capabilities of the Soviet and the European Satellite economies in relation to their economic and military programs;
2. Identification of economic developments which may reflect changes in Soviet Bloc intentions, such as shifts in priorities accorded to various sectors of the economy (for example, the level of investment, the relationship between light and heavy industry, the volume and composition of defense expenditures, the changes in the volume and character of foreign trade, and the emphasis given consumer welfare); and
3. Analysis of those economic problems or weaknesses that could modify or detract significantly from the future growth of Soviet capabilities.

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b. "Soviet and Satellite ... technical strengths and weaknesses substantially affecting Soviet military, economic ... capabilities"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward evaluation of the effect of technological developments in Soviet industry on production by war-supporting industries.

c. "Major Soviet international ... economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to orient non-Bloc countries toward the Soviet Bloc"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward analysis of the nature and extent of Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in the Free World, with particular reference to expanded economic activities in underdeveloped countries by various means such as trade, economic development programs, extension of long-term capital credits, reorientation of trading relations, provision of technical services, and export of military end items.

d. "... Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control"

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Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward the following:

1. Analysis of the magnitude, composition, direction, and terms of Soviet-Satellite and inter-Satellite foreign trade and continuing review of trade policies among these countries;
2. Appraisal of the extent of economic specialization and integration within the Bloc; and
3. Analysis of the organization of Soviet control mechanisms, their strengths and weaknesses.

e. "Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the ..." stability of such relations.

Under this priority national intelligence objective, attention will be directed primarily toward the following:

1. Analysis of the magnitude, composition, direction, and terms of Sino-Soviet trade, credit arrangements, and technical assistance;
2. Appraisal of the role of Sino-Soviet trade in the development program of Communist China; and

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3. Analysis of the costs imposed on the USSR in meeting the requirements of Communist China's economy.

f. "The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy; plans for its development, and progress therein ... technological strengths and weaknesses affecting economic and military capabilities; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal communications and communications with the USSR."

Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward the following:

1. Assessment of the present capabilities and future potential of agriculture in terms of its role in supporting China's essential foreign trade, its industrialization program, and its population growth;
2. Analysis of other key sectors of the economy, such as transportation, upon which future industrial growth and war potential depend; and
3. Evaluation of progress toward and prospects for China's long-term industrialization objectives.

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g. "The ... economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, attempts will be made to assess the degree of economic integration, particularly in the heavy industry sector, of Manchuria and North Korea, the degree of Soviet and Communist Chinese economic activity in North Korea, and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

h. "The ... economic strengths and weaknesses ... of the Viet Minh regime"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, attention will be directed primarily toward the degree of economic integration with Communist China, including trade relationships, and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Free World

i. Economic conditions and trends [REDACTED] especially those which relate to external viability, internal growth, defense capabilities, and pressures for trade with [REDACTED]

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j. Economic conditions and trends in India, particularly those related to the progress of economic development, with special attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.

25X6 k. Economic conditions and trends in the Middle East Arab states, Iran and [REDACTED] with particular attention to oil concessions and installations, the Suez situation, and Bloc economic inducements.

l. Economic conditions and trends in Yugoslavia, with particular attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.

III. THIRD PRIORITY OBJECTIVES *

a. Economic conditions and trends in the Republic of Korea and in Taiwan which have a bearing on the economic viability and defense capabilities of those states.

* Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US."

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b. Economic conditions and trends in the countries of Southeast Asia*, with particular attention to Bloc economic inducements to these countries.

c. Economic conditions and trends in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Ceylon, particularly those related to prospects for economic growth, with special attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.

d. Economic conditions and trends in the countries of [REDACTED] particularly [REDACTED] with particular reference to economic capabilities to fulfill defense commitments and ability to maintain satisfactory levels of employment and rates of growth.

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e. Economic conditions and trends in Greece and Turkey, with particular reference to prospects for economic stability and growth, with attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.

* Southeast Asian countries encompassed are Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya, and Singapore.

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f. Economic conditions and trends in Iceland, with particular reference to prospects for economic stability and growth, with attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.

g. Economic conditions and trends in Africa, with special attention to vulnerabilities to anti-Western economic influences; the extent and nature of these influences and the availability to the US of strategic materials.

h. Economic conditions and trends in the countries of Latin America, including the Caribbean countries and European dependencies, with special attention to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, giving particular emphasis to prospects for economic growth, economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and the availability to the US of strategic materials.

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IAC-D-50/10.1
21 August 1956

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E


Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives

1. On 21 August the statement of Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives, which had been approved by the Economic Intelligence Committee on 7 August 1956 and subsequently circulated to the IAC members (IAC-D-50/10, 15 August 1956), was approved by the IAC, subject to the amendment of the second sentences of paragraph 1.

*Page }
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2. Please substitute the attached page, dated 21 August, which incorporates the amendment approved by the IAC, for page 1 of the statement previously circulated (Attachment to IAC-D-50/10).

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Secretary

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
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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IAC-D-50/10.1
21 August 1956

PRIORITY NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/5, dated 18 October 1955, lists the priority national intelligence objectives established pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production. DCID 4/5 covers military, political, scientific, technical, and economic intelligence objectives on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Free World.

2. All economic intelligence objectives listed below are related to DCID 4/5 and as defined in that directive are deemed to be essential elements of priority national intelligence objectives. In conformity to the directive, distinction is made among three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these three categories is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the category.

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
IAC-D-50/10
15 August 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives

Reference: IAC-M-225, 10 January 1956, item 3

1. Attached is a statement of Priority National Economic Intelligence Objectives, approved by the Economic Intelligence Committee on 7 August 1956.
2. This statement was prepared to identify and expand the economic aspects of DCID 4/5, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," for guidance to the agencies participating in the EIC, in their economic intelligence activities.
3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for appropriate action.



Secretary

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IAC-D-50/10.1
21 August 1956

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3. Foreign activities covered in the priority national economic intelligence objectives will be subject to continuing surveillance within the framework of responsibility laid down by DCID 15/1. It is not intended that the following list of objectives shall be a definitive or limiting statement of responsibilities, but rather that these objectives shall provide guidance for programming of economic intelligence collection and production.

I. FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES *

a. "Soviet over-all ..., intentions, ..., particularly with respect to initiating hostilities ..., and to disarmament"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, emphasis will be placed on the recognition and analysis of economic indications of Soviet preparations for initiating hostilities or for disarmament.

b. "Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations and for defense against air attack."

* "First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which would occasion greatest benefit to the US." [Quoted material is taken directly from DCID 4/5.]

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Under this priority national intelligence objective, emphasis will be placed on analysis of all economic factors relating to Soviet production and production capabilities in the following fields:

1. Nuclear weapons;
2. Guided missiles and guided missile weapons systems;
3. Aircraft and related delivery systems;
4. Air defense systems; and
5. Long-range submarines.

II. SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES *

Sino-Soviet Bloc

a. "The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet and Satellite internal communications systems."

* "Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US."

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Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward the following:

1. Assessment of the over-all as well as the particular economic capabilities of the Soviet and the European Satellite economies to support military and foreign economic programs;
2. Identification of economic developments which may reflect changes in Soviet Bloc intentions, such as shifts in priorities accorded to various sectors of the economy (for example, the level of investment, the relationship between light and heavy industry, the volume and composition of defense expenditures, the changes in the volume and character of foreign trade, and the emphasis given consumer welfare); and
3. Analysis of those economic problems or weaknesses that could modify or detract significantly from the future growth of Soviet capabilities.

b. "Soviet and Satellite ... technical strengths and weaknesses substantially affecting Soviet military, economic, ... capabilities."

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Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward evaluation of the effect of technological developments in Soviet industry on production by war-supporting industries.

c. "Major Soviet international ... economic policies and actions,"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward analysis of the nature and extent of Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in the Free World, with particular reference to expanded economic activities in underdeveloped countries by various means such as trade, economic development programs, extension of long-term capital credits, reorientation of trading relations, provision of technical services, and export of military end items.

d. "... Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control;"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward the following:

1. Analysis of the magnitude, composition, direction, and terms of Soviet-Satellite and inter-Satellite foreign trade and continuing review of trade policies among these countries;

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2. Appraisal of the extent of economic specialization and integration within the Bloc; and
 3. Analysis of the organization of Soviet control mechanisms, their strengths and weaknesses.
- e. "Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the ..." stability of such relations.

Under this priority national intelligence objective, attention will be directed primarily toward the following:

1. Analysis of the magnitude, composition, direction, and terms of Sino-Soviet trade, credit arrangements, and technical assistance;
 2. Appraisal of the role of Sino-Soviet trade in the development program of Communist China; and
 3. Analysis of the costs imposed on the USSR in meeting the requirements of Communist China's economy.
- f. "The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy; plans for its development, and progress therein; ... technological strengths and weaknesses affecting economic and military capabilities; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal communications and communications with the USSR."

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Under this priority national intelligence objective, efforts will be directed primarily toward the following:

1. Assessment of the present capabilities and future potential of agriculture in terms of its role in supporting China's essential foreign trade, its industrialization program, and its population growth;
2. Analysis of key sectors of the economy, such as transportation, upon which future industrial growth and war potential depend; and
3. Evaluation of progress toward and prospects for China's long-term industrialization objectives.

g. "The ... economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime,"

Under this priority national intelligence objective, attempts will be made to assess the degree of economic integration, particularly in the heavy industry sector, of Manchuria and North Korea, and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

h. "The ... economic strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Minh regime"


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Under this priority national intelligence objective, attention will be directed primarily toward the degree of economic integration with Communist China, including trade relationships, and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Free World *

i. Economic conditions and trends in non-Communist Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

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k. Economic conditions and trends in Yugoslavia, with particular attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.

* The EIC considers that the priority positions of all the Free World countries indicated should be reconsidered in connection with the next revision of DCID 4/5. For example, the underdeveloped countries generally (III c) should probably be included in the second priority category.

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III. THIRD PRIORITY OBJECTIVES *

a. Economic conditions and trends in the Republic of Korea and in Taiwan which have a bearing on the economic viability and defense capabilities of those states.

b. Economic conditions and trends in the countries of Western Europe, particularly France, West Germany, and Italy, with particular reference to economic capabilities to fulfill defense commitments and ability to maintain satisfactory levels of employment and rates of growth.

c. Economic conditions and trends in the underdeveloped countries (other than those indicated above), particularly those related to prospects for economic growth, with special attention to economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the nature and extent of economic assistance from the Bloc.

* "Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US."

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IAC-D-50/9
15 May 1956


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Possible Amendment of NSCID 4, Affecting Also

DCID 4/3 and DCID 4/5

1. Members of the President's Board of Consultants, in discussion with representatives of CIA and NSC, have raised the question concerning the operation of NSCID 4, particularly paragraph 2 thereof, which provides that the Director shall select priority matters "in collaboration with the other agencies concerned, and under the guidance of the NSC Staff." The members of the Board of Consultants have specifically suggested that this provision may place an unrealistic responsibility on the Staff of the NSC, and might be amended either to provide for guidance by the NSC itself, or to remove the provision altogether.

2. Accordingly, the Director of Central Intelligence has requested that the IAC have a preliminary discussion of this matter, and it has been placed on the agenda for the IAC meeting scheduled for 22 May 1956.



Secretary

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
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21 June 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Draft Revision of

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4

Pursuant to the direction of the IAC, the attached draft revision of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, provisionally agreed to at the IAC meeting on 19 June, is circulated for further consideration by IAC members before any proposed revision is submitted to the NSC. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 26 June.



Secretary

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IAC-D-50/9.1
21 June 1956

Draft Revision of
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4

National Intelligence Objectives

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 (d) (5) of the National Security Act of 1947 and for the purpose of providing intelligence support for the preparation of studies required by the National Security Council in the fulfillment of its duties, it is directed that:

1. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the other agencies concerned, shall prepare a comprehensive outline of national intelligence objectives applicable to foreign countries and areas to serve as a guide for the coordinated collection and production of National Intelligence.
2. The Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the other agencies concerned, shall select from time to time and on a current basis sections and items of such outline which have a priority interest. These selections will be issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to supply the desired priority guidance for the production of National Intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency and for the contributions to such production by other agencies concerned.
3. The Director of Central Intelligence shall formally report such outline and selections to the NSC for information.

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27 December 1955


INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Priority National Scientific and Technical

Intelligence Objectives

1. Attached is a statement, prepared jointly by the Scientific Estimates Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, of priority intelligence objectives in the scientific and technical fields.
2. These have been prepared as an elaboration of the more general objectives set forth in DCID 4/5, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," dated 18 October 1955, and, on approval, will be used by the members of these committees to guide their intelligence efforts.
3. This paper will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for IAC approval.

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Secretary

*Approved by IAC
(IAC-M-225, 10 Jan 1956, item 3 a)*

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Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9

Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Directive No. 4, DCID 4/5 established a list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. In order to establish a list of priority national scientific and technical intelligence objectives, the Scientific Estimates Committee and the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee-- each in its own sphere of responsibility and with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee--have derived the following scientific and technical objectives from DCID 4/5. The statement of these objectives will be revised when required by revision of DCID 4/5.

3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national scientific and technical intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category.

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Order of listing within these three groups has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

I. First Priority Objectives*

A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/5, para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the scientific and technological aspects of Soviet work on:

1. Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and special nuclear materials.
2. Non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and warheads.
3. Bomber aircraft (including nuclear propulsion therefor).
4. Guided missiles (including intercontinental ballistic, long-range non-ballistic/cruise type, air-to-surface, and submarine-launched surface-to-surface types).

* First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which would occasion greatest benefit to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 a).

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5. Submarines (including nuclear propulsion therefor) capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear delivery vehicles, and electronics countermeasures systems.

B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc against air attack (DCID 4/5, para. 1 c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of scientific research and development on:

1. Nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, rockets and artillery.
2. Piloted defense aircraft.
3. Guided missiles including surface-to-air and air-to-air types.
4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.
6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground control intercept, airborne intercept, IFF, and missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers

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and communications networks; and electronics counter-measure systems.

7. Passive defensive measures.

C. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the US or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/5, para. I d). Particular reference is made to detection of specific scientific and technological accomplishments, such as the development of specialized weapons and the solution of the peculiar problems in packaging, transporting, and storing that will make such delivery feasible.

II. Second Priority Objectives*

A. Sino-Soviet Bloc scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses affecting their military, economic, and political capabilities (DCID 4/5, para. II e). The priority assigned to these strengths and weaknesses applies, in the first instance, to the detection of scientific and technological developments which could

* Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 b).

give the Sino-Soviet Bloc a technological advantage. When such developments are detected, the priority of the subsequent intelligence effort will be determined by the extent to which the development affects US national security. In addition, second priority coverage will be given to the scientific and technological strengths which are basic elements in Soviet economic and military capabilities and to those technological weaknesses which may reflect grave Soviet vulnerabilities. Therefore, particular emphasis will be placed on:

1. Research and development which are most likely to lead to important technological advances
 - a. Basic scientific research undertaken without specific focus on any particular application (for example, research in solid state physics, cosmic rays, radio astronomy, low temperature physics, upper atmosphere, enzymology, and catalysis).
 - b. Development of new applications of existing scientific knowledge (for example, earth satellites, weather control, long-range transmission of useful


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- or destructive energy, means of influencing human behavior, advanced communication systems, and nuclear power for long-range guided missiles).
2. Technological developments which can affect significantly the economic potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
(For example, automation, methods of increasing food supply, and solar and nuclear power.)
 3. Technological developments which can affect significantly the military potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
(For example, biological and chemical warfare, armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc.)
 4. The organization, control and status of science
 5. Fields in which technological weaknesses may reflect grave Sino-Soviet vulnerabilities
(For example, biological and agricultural sciences related to improved food supply, automatic data processing system for air defense, and intercontinental ballistic missile defense.)

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
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III. Third Priority Objectives*

In addition to the priority objectives outlined in paras. I and II, above, it is recognized that scientific and technological developments may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have such significance as to affect US security. For that reason, certain third priority objectives (DCID 4/5, para. III) are stated below:

A. Non-Sino-Soviet Bloc nuclear energy research and development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials for weapons or other purposes.

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* **Third Priority Intelligence Objectives** are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US (DCID 4/5, para. 3 c).

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5. Submarines (including nuclear propulsion therefor) capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear delivery vehicles, and electronics countermeasures systems.

B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc against air attack (DCID 4/5, para. 1 c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of scientific research and development on:

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4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.
6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground control intercept, airborne intercept, IFF, and missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers

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and communications networks; and electronics counter-measure systems.

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 - b. Development of new applications of existing scientific knowledge (for example, earth satellites, weather control, long-range transmission of useful

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27 December 1955

or destructive energy, means of influencing human behavior, advanced communication systems, and nuclear power for long-range guided missiles).

2. Technological developments which can affect significantly the economic potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc

(For example, automation, methods of increasing food supply, and solar and nuclear power.)

3. Technological developments which can affect significantly the military potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc

(For example, biological and chemical warfare, armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc.)

4. The organization, control and status of science

5. Fields in which technological weaknesses may reflect grave Sino-Soviet vulnerabilities

(For example, biological and agricultural sciences related to improved food supply, automatic data processing system for air defense, and intercontinental ballistic missile defense.)

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
27 December 1955

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DCI

H. Mans
[Signature]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Revision of Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives

1. This memorandum is a briefing note in connection with an IAC agenda item on 5 March.

2. The SSG, JAKIC and GMIC have recently completed a revision of IAC-D-50/8 (Priority National Scientific and Technical Objectives) with particular reference to changes necessitated by issuance of DCID 4/6, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," in October 1956. The Office of Scientific Intelligence has participated in the revision and is in agreement therewith.

3. As anticipated by the participating committees, only minor revision of IAC-D-50/8 was deemed necessary at this time:

a. First priority objectives are changed only to the extent of (1) upgrading nuclear power for long-range missiles (I-4-4) from former second priority; and (2) specifically identifying missiles under air attack (I-5, first sentence) and communications under electronics countermeasures systems (I-5-6).

b. Under second priority objectives, we state the possibility of major technological breakthroughs (II-A, first sentence), and we identify under subjects for particular emphasis the quality and quantity of Soviet scientific and technical manpower (II-A-5).

c. Under third priority objectives, we have replaced [redacted] by "Western Europe." We have accordingly deleted former paragraphs III-B-2 (relating to [redacted]) and III-C (relating to other non-orbit countries), which are covered by the newly added reference to Western Europe.

4. A copy of IAC-D-50/8 is enclosed, with the changes underlined in red.

[Redacted Signature]

Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

Enclosure:
IAC-D-50/8

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
21 February 1957


I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Priority National Scientific and Technical

Intelligence Objectives

1. Attached is a communication from the Chairmen of GMIC, JAEIC and SEC, enclosing a joint statement by those committees of "Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives," which they propose as a replacement for IAC-D-50/8 (approved by the IAC 10 January 1956) in the light of DCID 4/6, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives " (approved by the IAC 30 October 1956).

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for review and appropriate action.



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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
(Proposed Replacement of IAC-D-50/8,
same subject, approved by the IAC on
10 January 1956)

1. Transmitted herewith is subject statement, which (a) was prepared jointly by the Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee, each in its own sphere of responsibility, and (b) is proposed to replace IAC-D-50/8 in the light of DCID 4/6, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," dated 30 October 1956.

2. We request that the Intelligence Advisory Committee review the enclosure with a view to issuing it as an IAC document to supersede IAC-D-50/8.

25X1A

/s/

/s/

[Redacted]
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Chairman

[Redacted]
Chairman
Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee

Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

/s/

[Redacted]
Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee

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Enclosure:
(As stated)

13 February 1957

Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
(Draft)
21 February 1957

Priority National Scientific and Technical

Intelligence Objectives

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 2, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/6 (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. The Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee--each in its own sphere of responsibility and with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee--have derived the following scientific and technical intelligence objectives from DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be revised when required by revision of DCID 4/6.

3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national scientific and technical intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order

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of listing within these three groups has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

I. First Priority Objectives*

A. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the scientific and technological aspects of Soviet work on:

1. Nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads, and special nuclear materials.
2. Non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons and warheads.
3. Bomber aircraft (including nuclear propulsion therefor).
4. Guided missiles (including intercontinental ballistic, long-range non-ballistic/cruise type, air-to-surface, submarine-launched surface-to-surface types, and nuclear power for long-range guided missiles).

*First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 a).

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

5. Submarines (including nuclear propulsion therefor) capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear delivery vehicles, and electronics (including communications) countermeasures systems.

B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for defense against air (including missiles) attack (DCID 4/6, para. I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of scientific research and development on:

1. Nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, rockets and artillery.
2. Piloted defense aircraft.
3. Guided missiles including surface-to-air and air-to-air types.
4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground control intercept, airborne intercept, IFF, and missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers and communications networks; and electronics (including communications) countermeasure systems.
7. Passive defensive measures.

C. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the US or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. 1 d). Particular reference is made to detection of specific scientific and technological accomplishments, such as the development of specialized weapons and the solution of the peculiar problems in packaging, transporting, and storing that will make such delivery feasible.

II. Second Priority Objectives*

A. Sino-Soviet Bloc scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses substantially affecting their military, economic, and

* Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 b).

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

political capabilities, including the possibility of major technological breakthroughs (DCID 4/6, para. II e and k). The priority assigned to these strengths and weaknesses applies, in the first instance, to the detection of scientific and technological developments which could give the Sino-Soviet Bloc a technological advantage. When such developments are detected, the priority of the subsequent intelligence effort will be determined by the extent to which the development affects US national security. In addition, second priority coverage will be given to the scientific and technological strengths which are basic elements in Soviet economic and military capabilities and to those technological weaknesses which may reflect grave Soviet vulnerabilities. Therefore, particular emphasis will be placed on:

1. Research and development which are most likely to lead to significant technological advances
 - a. Basic scientific research undertaken without specific focus on any particular application (for example, research in solid state physics, cosmic rays, radio astronomy, low temperature physics, upper atmosphere, enzymology, and catalysis).

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First Revision

- b. Development of new applications of existing scientific knowledge (for example, earth satellites, weather control, long-range transmission of useful or destructive energy, means of influencing human behavior, and advanced communications systems).
2. Technological developments which can affect significantly the economic potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (For example, automation, methods of increasing food supply, and solar and nuclear power)
3. Technological developments which can affect significantly the military potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (For example, biological and chemical warfare, armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc.)
4. The organization, control and status of science
5. The quality and quantity of Soviet scientific and technical manpower


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First Revision

6. Fields in which technological weaknesses may reflect grave Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities
(For example, biological and agricultural sciences related to improved food supply, automatic data processing system for air defense, and inter-continental ballistic missile defense)

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III. Third Priority Objectives*

In addition to the priority objectives outlines in paras. I and II, above, it is recognized that scientific and technological developments may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have such significance as to affect US security. For that reason, certain third priority objectives (DCID 4/6, para. III) are stated below.

* Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them which could occasion substantial benefits to the US (DCID 4/6, para. 3 c)).

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

A. Non-Sino-Soviet Bloc nuclear energy research and development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials for weapons or other purposes.

B. Significant scientific and technological developments in



which affect directly the military and economic potential.

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
Final
5 March 1957

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives

1. On 5 March the IAC approved, as amended, the statement of "Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives" (IAC-D-50/8, First Revision, 21 February 1957), which had been proposed as a replacement of IAC-D-50/8 (approved by the IAC on 10 January 1956) in the light of DCID 4/6, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives" (approved by the IAC on 30 October 1956).
2. The attached statement of objectives, dated 5 March, incorporates the revisions as approved by the IAC and therefore supersedes IAC-D-50/8, dated 10 January 1956.



Secretary

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*See IAC-D-50/11.1, 4 June 1957,
for results of Board of National
Estimates review of this paper.*

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
Final
5 March 1957

Priority National Scientific and Technical

Intelligence Objectives

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 2, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/6 (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.
2. The Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee--each in its own sphere of responsibility and with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee--have derived the following scientific and technical intelligence objectives from DCID 4/6. The statement of these objectives will be revised when required by revision of DCID 4/6.
3. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national scientific and technical intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order

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of listing within these three groups has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

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First Revision
5 March 1957

5. Submarines (including nuclear propulsion therefor) capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
6. Electronic systems including blind-bombing, long-range navigation, defensive fire control of nuclear delivery vehicles, and electronics (including communications) countermeasures systems.

B. The capabilities of the USSR to conduct research on and develop weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for defense against air (including missiles) attack (DCID 4/6, para.

I c). Particular emphasis will be placed on the determination of scientific research and development on:

1. Nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles, rockets and artillery.
2. Piloted defense aircraft.
3. Both surface-to-air and air-to-air guided missiles.
4. Defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.
5. Anti-aircraft rockets and artillery.

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First Revision
5 March 1957

6. Electronic systems including early warning, ground control intercept, airborne intercept, IFF, and missile guidance radars; air defense filter centers and communications networks; and electronics (including communications) countermeasure systems.
7. Passive defensive measures.

C. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the US or key US overseas installations (DCID 4/6, para. I d). Particular reference is made to detection of specific scientific and technological accomplishments, such as the development of specialized weapons and the solution of the peculiar problems in packaging, transporting, and storing that will make such delivery feasible.

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
5 March 1957

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First Revision
5 March 1957

- b. Development of new applications of existing scientific knowledge (for example, earth satellites, weather control, long-range transmission of useful or destructive energy, means of influencing human behavior, and advanced communications systems).
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
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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
5 March 1957

6. Fields in which technological weaknesses may reflect grave Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities
(For example, biological and agricultural sciences related to improved food supply, automatic data processing system for air defense, and inter-continental ballistic missile defense)

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III. Third Priority Objectives*

In addition to the priority objectives outlines in paras. I and II, above, it is recognized that scientific and technological developments may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have such significance as to affect US security. For that reason, certain third priority objectives (DCID 4/6, para. III) are stated below.

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
5 March 1957

A. Non-Sino-Soviet Bloc nuclear energy research and development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials for weapons or other purposes.

B. Significant scientific and technological developments in

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
21 February 1957

*Superseded by
5 March draft*


I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Priority National Scientific and Technical

Intelligence Objectives

1. Attached is a communication from the Chairmen of GMIC, JAEIC and SEC, enclosing a joint statement by those committees of "Priority National Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives," which they propose as a replacement for IAC-D-50/8 (approved by the IAC 10 January 1956) in the light of DCID 4/6, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives " (approved by the IAC 30 October 1956).

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting for review and appropriate action.



Secretary

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Priority National Scientific and Technical
Intelligence Objectives
(Proposed Replacement of IAC-D-50/8,
same subject, approved by the IAC on
10 January 1956)

1. Transmitted herewith is subject statement, which (a) was prepared jointly by the Scientific Estimates Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee, each in its own sphere of responsibility, and (b) is proposed to replace IAC-D-50/8 in the light of DCID 4/6, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," dated 30 October 1956.

2. We request that the Intelligence Advisory Committee review the enclosure with a view to issuing it as an IAC document to supersede IAC-D-50/8.

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/s/

/s/

[Redacted Signature]

[Redacted Signature]

Lt. Colonel, USAF
Chairman

Chairman

Guided Missile Intelligence Committee

Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee

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/s/

[Redacted Signature]

Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee

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Enclosure:
(As stated)

13 February 1957

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision
(Draft)
21 February 1957

Priority National Scientific and Technical

Intelligence Objectives

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 2, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 4/6 (DCID 4/6) established a list of priority national intelligence objectives as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

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IAC-D-50/8

First Revision

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

- b. Development of new applications of existing scientific knowledge (for example, earth satellites, weather control, long-range transmission of useful or destructive energy, means of influencing human behavior, and advanced communications systems).
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3. Technological developments which can affect significantly the military potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc (For example, biological and chemical warfare, armored vehicles, naval vessels, etc.)
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
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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

6. Fields in which technological weaknesses may reflect grave Sino-Soviet Bloc vulnerabilities
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III. Third Priority Objectives*

In addition to the priority objectives outlines in paras. I and II, above, it is recognized that scientific and technological developments may occur outside those areas discussed, which will have such significance as to affect US security. For that reason, certain third priority objectives (DCID 4/6, para. III) are stated below.

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IAC-D-50/8
First Revision

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
IAC-D-50/1.1
25 October 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Director of Central Intelligence Directive 4/6
Priority National Intelligence Objectives

1. The attached draft text of DCID 4/6 has been approved by the IAC representatives.
2. This paper has been placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 10:45, Tuesday, 30 October.

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Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

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IAC-D-50/7.1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 October 1956

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/6
PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 2, the following list of priority national intelligence objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these three groups is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

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3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, this directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It will be reviewed annually, or on the request of any member of the IAC. It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring ad hoc treatment, and that the criteria on which the following priorities are established shall remain under continuing review. These criteria were issued in IAC-D-50/7, 16 August 1955, and define categories of priority as follows:

a. First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US.

b. Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.

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c. Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (1) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and (2) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US.

4. DCID 4/5 is hereby rescinded. 1/

I. FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES

a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces. [and to disarmament and arms inspection.]2/

b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly with respect to initiating hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces.

c. Present and probable future Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack on the United States or key US overseas installations and for defense against retaliatory [air] attack.

1/ DCID 4/5, "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," was issued 18 October 1955.

2/ Sections in brackets are recommended for deletion; underlined sections are recommended as new additions.

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d. Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against the US or key US overseas installations.

II. SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES

The USSR and European Satellites

a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions, of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of [the] NATO. [Bloc].

b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to orient non-Bloc countries toward the Soviet Bloc, to weaken and disrupt [the NATO alliance] US and US-supported alliances, or to foment antagonism among [between] the Western powers and [Asian powers] between these powers and the rest of the free world.

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c. Soviet (including Satellite) political strengths and weaknesses: the actual locus of political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling groups; Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations.

d. The strength and weaknesses of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet and Satellite internal communications systems.

e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses substantially affecting Soviet military, economic, and political capabilities, including the possibility of major technological breakthroughs.

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- f. The general capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces. The Far East (including South and Southeast Asia)
- g. The Chinese Communist estimate of US capabilities and intentions with respect to the Chinese Communist regime and to the situation in the Far East.
- h. Major Chinese Communist international political objectives and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers, and to extend the area of Communist influence and control in Asia.
- i. The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime: actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the population of mainland China.
- j. Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the degree of Soviet influence or control, the extent of Chinese Communist freedom of action, and actual or potential strains on the relationship, and the process of arriving at and coordinating joint policies.

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k. The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy; plans for its development, and progress therein; scientific and technological strengths and weaknesses affecting economic and military capabilities; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal communications and communications with the USSR.

l. The [strength, composition, disposition] general capabilities [and weaknesses] of the Chinese Communist armed forces. [including their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, and their logistical support.]

m. The military, political, and economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime, its political and military objectives and intentions, Chinese Communist military and political intentions with respect thereto, and the relative degree of Soviet and Chinese Communist influence, [or] control, and economic activity in North Korea.

n. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses, and the general military capabilities, of the Viet Minh regime, the nature of its [political] relationships with the USSR and

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with Communist China, its political and military objectives and intentions, and its capabilities and intentions for clandestine and subversive activity in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

[o. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Viet Minh armed forces, including the nature and amount of the military aid received from Communist China and the USSR.] ^{3/}

[p. The political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of non-Communist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.] ^{4/}

[q. The reactions of the governments and peoples of South and Southeast Asia to developments in Indochina and to the General

^{3/} Covered in revised paragraph II n above.

^{4/} Downgrade to Category III.

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threat of further Communist aggrandizement in the region; strength and cohesiveness of the SEATO alliance; Communist political and subversive capabilities in those countries.]^{5/}

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p. [Former III c.] The stability and orientation of India, [policy of the Indian government] with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power, its relations with Communist China and the USSR, [and] its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia, and the progress of economic development.

5/ Downgrade to Category III.

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
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Middle East

q. [Former s.]^{6/} The stability and policies of the Middle East Arab [League] states, Iran, and Israel, with particular reference to oil concessions and installations, other commitments to the West and the Suez situation; the possibility of Arab-Israeli hostilities [Middle East defense plans]; and [both external and internal Communist influence and capabilities] vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda and subversion, and Bloc political and economic inducements.

Europe



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tensions, to the increasing power of nuclear weapons, and to increasing Soviet nuclear warfare capabilities; the effect of such reactions on the coherence and effectiveness of the NATO Alliance.

^{6/} Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and the principalities and colonial or semicolonial areas on the Arabian Peninsula littoral.

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s. [redacted] [France's reaction to Soviet proposals regarding Germany]; France's will and ability to fulfill its NATO commitments; French policy toward North Africa particularly with respect to nationalist unrest in the area [French North Africa, including] and Communist connections therewith. [and French policy toward the area]

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u. [Former w.] The stability and orientation of the Yugoslav government, its strategic intentions in the event of war, and the strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of its armed forces.

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General

v. The stability of US base rights overseas; factors affecting the security of US military bases and installations in foreign areas.

w. [Former x.] The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities (political, subversive, and clandestine), [and] vulnerabilities and tactics of Communist parties/and groups outside the Soviet Bloc and of international Communist front organizations, particularly the international role of the Yugoslav Communist party and the political and paramilitary capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Communist parties in France and Italy. [Trends in global and local Communist party tactics.]

x. Sino-Soviet Bloc efforts and capabilities for espionage and sabotage.

III. THIRD PRIORITY OBJECTIVES

Far East [the Near East, and Africa]

a. Political and economic stability of the South Korean regime; ROK objectives and intentions toward North Korea and the US.

b. Political and economic stability of the Chinese Nationalist regime with particular reference to [and] its objectives and intentions

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toward Communist China and the US and its ability to resist Communist pressures and inducements.

South and Southeast Asia

c. [Former II p.] The political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of [non-Communist] the regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.


d. [Former II q.] The stability [reactions] of the governments [and peoples] of [South and] Southeast Asia; ^{7/} reactions to Communist China's developing power position (developments in Indochina) and to the general threat of further Communist aggrandizement in the region; strength and cohesiveness of the SEATO Alliance, of other regional groupings, and of neutralist forces; Communist, political, and subversive capabilities in those countries; and the area's vulnerability to Bloc political and economic inducements.

e. [Former d.] The stability of the governments of Pakistan, [Iran], Afghanistan, and Ceylon [Burma] with particular reference to Communist influence and capabilities.

^{7/} Southeast Asian countries encompassed are Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, the Malay States, and Singapore.

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- h. The political and economic stability of Greece and Turkey.
- i. [Former h.] The Cyprus issue, particularly its effect on the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, [and on the Balkan Alliance] and on Greek and Turkish relations with each other, NATO, and the US.
- j. [Former i.] Anti-American sentiment in Iceland and [political opposition to] policies toward NATO [the continued presence of the US-manned NATO airbase at Keflavik]; also extent of Communist influence [trade union movement] and stability of the economy.

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Africa

k. [Former e.] The stability and policies of independent North African states. Racial tensions [hatred] and political unrest throughout [in] Africa [south of the Sahara], with particular reference to areas of [possible violent unrest] militant nationalism and availability to the US of strategic materials; vulnerabilities to anti-Western economic and other influences and the extent and nature of these influences.

Latin America

l. [Former j.] The development of militant nationalism in Latin America, including the Caribbean countries and European dependencies, with particular respect to anti-US sentiment and Communist exploitation thereof; the availability to the US of strategic materials in Latin America.

m. [Former k.] The stability and policy of the governments of Brazil, Argentina, [and] Chile, and Venezuela.

General

[i.] Economic conditions and trends in backward countries, particularly as they affect vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda on the one hand and attitudes toward the United States and the West on the other.

n. [Former l.] Non-Soviet nuclear energy research and development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials for weapons or other purposes.

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Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9

IAC-D-50/7
16 August 1955

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

Criteria for Determining

Priority National Intelligence Objectives

1. On 16 August the IAC approved the attached statement of criteria to be used in determining the priority national intelligence objectives based on the comprehensive objectives set forth in DCID 4/3.
2. These criteria will therefore be used in arriving at a revision of the present list of priority objectives as set forth in DCID 4/4, and in making subsequent semi-annual revisions.

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IAC-D-50/7
16 August 1955

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be directly related to the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy. They should flow directly from the intelligence mission as set forth by the NSC and are therefore merely more detailed specifications of the intelligence required to fulfill that mission. They should provide the basis for determining appropriate research and collection requirements.
2. Most of the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of normal intelligence collection and research. Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be limited to those critical factors which require special attention and effort.
3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, a statement of Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be designed to remain valid over an extended period. It should therefore exclude topics of urgent, but transitory, interest, which will require and receive ad hoc treatment in any case.
4. Broad generalities are of little practical use as priority guidance to collection and research. Priority National Intelligence Objectives should therefore be specific enough to provide guidance for planning the allocation of collection and research resources, but not so specific as to constitute in themselves research and collection requirements.
5. Although all items in a statement of Priority National Intelligence Objectives should be worthy of special attention, it is obvious that some will be of greater urgency or importance than others. Any listing of such objectives must be based on an analysis of the world situation and US security interests and should be reviewed semi-annually. The following criteria will serve as guidance for determining the relative importance of Priority National Intelligence Objectives.
 - I. First Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (a) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would occasion gravest consequences to the US; and (b) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion greatest benefit to the US.

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- II. Second Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (a) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have serious consequences for the US; and (b) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion great benefit to the US.
- III. Third Priority Intelligence Objectives are those which will permit the US: (a) to anticipate and counter those policies or actions of foreign states which would have harmful consequences to the US; and (b) to stimulate policies or actions of foreign states (or actions within them) which could occasion substantial benefits to the US.

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IAC-D-50/6
29 March 1955

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Release to Overseas Activities of


DCID 4/3 "Comprehensive National Intelligence Objectives" and

DCID 4/4 "Priority National Intelligence Objectives"

1. This statement is issued in view of the interest manifested by the several intelligence agencies in releasing DCID's 4/3 and 4/4 (titles as above) to their overseas activities.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence interposes no objection to such release of these documents under applicable security regulations. The same controls will be applicable to these documents as are prescribed for National Intelligence as set forth in IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953. Each of the IAC agencies is therefore authorized to send copies of these documents to its overseas intelligence activities whenever it considers it desirable to do so.

3. Additional copies of these documents may be obtained from the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.



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RETURN TO USIB/S

IAC-D-50/5.1
11 June 1956

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Paper on Intelligence Requirements and Collection Tasks in

Relation to Priority National Intelligence - DCID 4/5

1. The attached paper was submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence by Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination, [REDACTED] in fulfillment of the assignment explained to the IAC in IAC-D-50/5, 20 January 1955. In the preparation of this paper informal consultation was held by [REDACTED] office with those principally interested, Army, Navy, Air Force, [REDACTED] and State, and the paper is designed to reflect the various facts obtained in that consultation.

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2. The Director has accepted this report and requested that it be disseminated to the IAC members for their information. It will not be placed on the agenda except at the request of a member of the IAC.

[REDACTED]

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IAC-D-50/5.1
11 June 1956

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND COLLECTION TASKS IN
RELATION TO PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE --

DCID 4/5

25 May 1956

1. You requested that, in collaboration with representatives of IAC agencies, I conduct a review of the existing provisions for the development and coordination of information requirements and collection tasks in conformity with established Priority National Intelligence Objectives. This was explained to the IAC in IAC-D-50/5, 20 January 1955.

2. Description of the existing provisions:

a. Priority National Intelligence Objectives, as approved by the IAC and noted by the NSC, authorize the fundamental direction which the community's intelligence production and collection efforts should take. They do not, however, serve as the sole or exclusive guide to the work of either research or collection offices, each of which devotes a portion of its effort to meeting "departmental" intelligence needs. These "departmental" intelligence needs coincide in many instances with the needs expressed in the Priority National Intelligence Objectives.

b. In the course of research to meet Priority National Intelligence Objectives and departmental needs, research offices ascertain gaps in available information which require collection action to fill. Such research will in certain fields be subject to some coordination: for atomic energy thru JAEIC; for science and technology, SEC; for guided missiles, GMIC; for economics, EIC; and for basic intelligence, NIS. Such committees have in the past engaged in some coordination of requirements, most usefully in regard to those requirements rating a high priority. Requirements thus endorsed are translated into requests for collection action by the agency responsible for the research.

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c. Available to all research offices are "Requirements Officers" who serve as middlemen between research and collection components. Their services are essential because of the size and complexity of our intelligence system which makes extensive direct individual contact between analysts and collectors administratively unfeasible. It is the function of these Requirements Officers to insure (a) that Washington resources have been exploited before requests are sent to the field; (b) that the desired information is expressed in the form most clearly understandable and usable by the collector(s); and (c) that the request for information does not duplicate other requests. It must be remembered that the research officer is responsible for determining the substance of the information desired. The Requirements Officer can contribute thru his understanding of research needs and collection machinery and capabilities and can frequently suggest other informational needs and other possible sources. The need expressed by the analyst in turn depends upon the research tasks to which he has been assigned. It should also be noted that the "coordination" performed by these Requirements Officers is essentially limited to requests originating within their own research components.*

d. The collection offices of the IAC agencies also include "requirements" elements whose task it is to act as a focal point in dealing with research components and further to insure that any given requirement does not duplicate one

* Requirements emanating from the research components of CIA, or submitted from any part of the intelligence community to a CIA collection facility are subjected to a further "coordination" by the Office of Central Reference. (This office reviews the selection made by the research office of the collector most appropriate to obtain the desired information, makes a determination of the collector to be requested to assume the responsibility and insures that a request does not unprofitably duplicate other requests already levied.)

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which has already been received and acted upon. They are usually a part of the collecting offices reports machinery which engages in a cyclical system of requirements, reports, and evaluations. It should be noted that these officers do not decide if collection will be undertaken. That is a command decision of collection supervisors, depending upon the capacity to collect and his other responsibilities.

3. The above outline delineates the general procedure by which the need of an analyst for information is transmitted to a collector whose task it is to obtain the information. There are, of course, exceptions and special interagency arrangements have been established which permit decisions on priorities for collection as limited resources might require: USCIB and IPC.

4. In considering the problem posed in IAC-D-50/5 in the light of the procedures generally followed by the intelligence community as outlined above, certain lines of inquiry are explored below:

a. A review of the existing provisions for the development and coordination of information requirements in conformity with Priority National Intelligence Objectives is not concerned basically with the activities of requirements officers attached either to research or to collection elements since these officers do not have the primary responsibility for determining the substance of requirements, or whether collection will be undertaken. Rather, it is their task to establish efficient and effective arrangements to those collectors who may be able to meet the need expressed in the requirements. Such a review, rather, must directly involve the administration and management of research components, since the substance of requirements stems principally from the tasks assigned the research components by their chiefs and the collection of information finally depends on the inherent capabilities and the administration of the collection facilities. In other words, the degree to which requirements are "developed and coordinated" in conformity with Priority National Intelligence Objectives depends upon the degree to which the tasks undertaken by the research components have been developed and coordinated in conformity with the Objectives.

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IAC-D-50/5.1

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b. In the present framework of the intelligence community, collection tasks, developed in accordance with the needs of the research components, are allocated to collectors within certain areas of responsibility in keeping with the NSCIDs (NSCID 2, 5, 7 etc.) and DCIDs. The individual collection office, acting within the sphere assigned to it by appropriate directives, endeavors to meet the needs expressed to it by research offices translating requirements into requests for collection action by the responsible agency. A review of the "development of collection tasks" thus again leads back to a review of the administration and direction given to research components, from which derive the needs which collectors try to meet.

c. Collection offices do not and in the nature of things cannot concentrate all their efforts, plan their activities, and strive to build their resources toward meeting Priority National Intelligence Objectives. Each collection facility has been allocated a definite sphere of responsibility by NSCID, and must operate within that sphere. External considerations place definite limitations upon each collector. The Department of State, for example, is responsible for overt collection overseas of political information. If requirements stemming from research to meet Priority National Intelligence Objectives were the primary or only factor governing the allocation of the political reporting resources of the Department, the distribution of overseas personnel of the Foreign Service would be vastly different from what it actually is. In reality, however, the Department's allocation of resources is dictated by such factors as the limitation on the number of diplomatic personnel who can be stationed at posts behind the Iron Curtain, limitations on the useful information which such personnel are able to collect, and by other demands for political information not related to Priority National Intelligence Objectives. FI provides an equally striking example of the same phenomenon. A substantial portion of FI resources are necessarily allocated to areas and activities which, though not directly

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IAC-D-50/5.1
11 June 1956

related to Priority National Intelligence Objectives produce information of use in important research of lower over-all priority.

5. The above considerations lead to the conclusion that the allocation of effort within his collection resources to various tasks is a command decision by the Chief of each collection facility, in the light of all the factors affecting the capabilities and limitations of the facility, as well as all of the requirements placed upon it.

6. Insofar as collectors are faced with competition for their capabilities, they might well inquire of the originator of the requirements whether they are identifiable as supporting PNIOs and if so, which PNIO. This procedure has, in fact, been applied thru the IPC and to a certain extent the USCIB.

7. NSCID's and other directives specify areas of responsibility among collectors, either by subject area (NSCID 2, 10), or by method of collection (NSCID 5, 7). NSCID 2 and DCID 2/1 provide a mechanism for coordinating overt collection tasks overseas. With regard to the coordinating responsibility assigned to Chiefs of Mission overseas by DCID 2/1, the Department of State has, over the years, endeavored to insure that coordination is effected thru procedures appropriate to each post. As a result of these efforts, DCID 2/1 is now, in general, being implemented in a reasonably satisfactory manner. The IAC agencies under the leadership of the Department of State have in the last two years sent instructions to their representatives urging coordination of collection requirements as received in the field in order to obtain maximum benefit from the capabilities available. The replies give evidence that the field is complying with those instructions. I do not believe a further review of overseas coordination, as it pertains to the problem at hand, is required. NSCID-5 places upon the DCI responsibility for coordinating overt and covert collection activity. This is accomplished for the DCI principally in the field thru coordination between the [redacted] representative at each post, and the representatives of other agencies, and at headquarters by CIA not accepting for clandestine collection by CIA requirements which can be obtained thru overt means.

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IAC-D-50/5.1
11 June 1956

8. At the outset of its Post Mortem experience the IAC requested that the members prepare a single report on actions they had taken in pursuance of a Post Mortem. This was done in the case of China--SE 27 (for report see IAC-D-57/1). Thereafter and in lieu thereof, the agencies have been asked in response to each Post Mortem to take such action within their own spheres of responsibility as they deem appropriate. It is presumed that "such action" initially means research with requirements for collection following as necessary. While the original procedure might be profitably reinstated it would not be responsive to the problem at hand inasmuch as the requirements emerging from Post Mortems are not necessarily, and in many cases are not, in line with PNIOs. Post Mortem review is only one of the measures taken by research offices to initiate appropriate action to fill gaps which become obvious in the course of research. The re-establishment of the original Post Mortem procedure is not recommended as a means of making collection more responsive to PNIOs.

9. There is a possibility that the IAC might establish a subcommittee to expand the PNIOs into an IAC approved requirements list in an effort to insure that requirements are indeed responsive to PNIOs. However, valid requirements cannot be developed in a vacuum; they must relate to an actual research need. The subject areas regarding which the IAC agencies can usefully coordinate their research programs (and thus their requirements) in terms of PNIOs have already been identified and subcommittees established, and additional coordination can be directed by the IAC as needed. It is believed unnecessary and unwise to try to effect "coordination" where a major overlap of interests does not exist.

10. Each agency or research component thereof has stated that its research program is responsive to PNIOs. Such programs will be affected as changes occur in national problems as reflected by needs of the NSC, its Planning Board, or individual operating agencies, as well as by revisions of the PNIOs. A new IAC subcommittee either to coordinate research programs over-all or to insure that research programs are responsive to PNIOs is not recommended.


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IAC-D-50/5.1
11 June 1956

11. Summary Conclusion: That no new provisions are required for the development and coordination of information requirements and collection tasks in conformity with DCID 4/5.

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Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Coordination

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IAC Files
Revised 50/5
13

22 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Objectives (IAC 7 50/3)

1. Pursuant to the IAC action with respect to the National Intelligence Objectives paper, there still remains some unfinished business. In order to finish this up, I recommend:

- a. that you inform the IAC that the Board of National Estimates will coordinate the reconsideration of the criteria for determining priority national intelligence objectives and the semi-annual review of such objectives.
- b. that you request the IAC members to transmit their suggestions regarding criteria to the Board at an early date and to designate representatives to act with the Board in this matter.

2. To be fully effective, the adoption of DCID h/a should be followed up by a review of existing provisions for the development and coordination of specific information requirements and collection tasks in conformity with established priority national intelligence objectives, with recommendations to the IAC for their improvement, if need be. The IAC agencies expect this and Mr. Sheldon has already prepared certain preliminary proposals, taking into account recent USCIB developments. I recommend that you:

- a. assign to your Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination the task of conducting this review; and
- b. so inform the IAC, requesting its members to designate representatives to work with him on this problem.

**Assistant Director
National Estimates
CONCUR.**

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DIRECTOR INTELLIGENCE

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Re: IAC-D-50/3, p. 7

Several possible solutions of the issue presented by the footnote on page 7 of IAC-D-50/3 are listed below in order of Board preference.

1. Deletion of the footnote.
2. Adoption of four categories of priority instead of three, the additional category to come between the present I and II and to include II(b), II(f), and as many of the following items as can be agreed upon, in the following order of preferences: II(d), II(e), II(a), II(c).
3. Inclusion of II(b) and II(f) in Category I, but with an asterisk on items I(a), I(b), and I(c) and a footnote reading as follows:
"These items are of paramount interest to the National Government."
 4. Reference of the issue to the NSC.
5. Inclusion of II(b) and II(f) in Category I, but without amendment of I (c).
6. Acceptance of the Service and State footnotes.

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[REDACTED]

*13 Dec
1110 hrs.*

*[REDACTED] came by
to discuss the attached. He
has discussed subject paper
with [REDACTED]*

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Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9

IAC-D-50/5

20 January 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Review of Provisions for the Development and Coordination of Specific Information Requirements and Collection Tasks

1. In order to insure that DCID 4/4 "Priority National Intelligence Objectives", approved by the IAC on 14 December 1954, is fully effective, it is desirable to review the existing provisions for the development and coordination of information requirements and collection tasks in conformity with established priority national intelligence objectives.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence has, therefore, assigned [redacted], Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination, to conduct such a review in collaboration with the IAC agencies.

3. It is requested that you designate a representative to work with him on this problem. The names of designees may be communicated to the Secretariat, Code [redacted]

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**Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee**

cc: Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination

[redacted distribution list]

131/77063 [redacted] tel. 24 Jan) 25X1A
131/55509 [redacted] tel. 24 Jan)
131/74683 [redacted] tel. 24 Jan)
191/3267 [redacted] s secretary/55 tel. 26 Jan.)
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131/76963 [redacted] IAC-D-50/5 25X1A
20 January 1955
tel. 30 Jan)
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IAC-D-50/3
30 November 1954

I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E

National Intelligence Objectives

1. The attached paper has been prepared pursuant to the action of the IAC on 4 August 1953. (IAC-M-115, paragraphs 7 and 8.)
2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC meeting scheduled for 7 December 1954.



Secretary

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IAC-D-50/3
30 November 1954

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 November 1954

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

THE PROBLEM

To review DCID-4/1 and DCID-4/2 (Second Revision), in the light of NSCID-4, and to submit recommendations regarding their basic revision. (IAC-M-115, 4 August 1953, paragraphs 7 and 8.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That DCID-4/1 and DCID-4/2 (Second Revision) be rescinded.
2. That the draft DCID-4/3 in Appendix A be approved as a response to the first requirement of NSCID-4.
3. That the draft DCID-4/4 in Appendix B be approved as a response to the second requirement in NSCID-4.

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4. That the current DCID on priority national intelligence objectives be reviewed at least annually hereafter.

5. That the statement of criteria in Appendix C be approved as guidance for such a review.

- 2 -

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APPENDIX A

DRAFT

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE No. 4/3
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 1, the following comprehensive national intelligence objectives, generally applicable to all foreign countries and areas, are hereby established:

- a. Basic descriptive data as outlined in NIS Standard Instructions.
- b. Social, economic, and political stability and trends of development; susceptibility to foreign influence or coercion; vulnerability to subversion.
- c. Military capabilities and vulnerabilities, offensive and defensive, including economic, scientific and technical, and psychological factors.
- d. Capabilities to influence, coerce, or subvert other governments and peoples; capabilities for espionage, sabotage, and other clandestine operations in other countries.

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e. Foreign policy, including strategic concepts and intentions; international alignment, with particular reference to alignment with or against the US or the USSR; disposition and intention to interfere in the internal affairs of other states; preparation for and intention to resort to armed action against other states.

2. Priority national intelligence objectives, with reference to specific countries and subjects, will be set forth in a separate DCID.

3. DCID-4/1 "National Intelligence Objectives," 5 February 1948, is hereby rescinded.

- 4 -

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APPENDIX B

DRAFT

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE No. 4/4
PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. Pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, paragraph 2, the following list of priority national intelligence objectives is established as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy.

2. By definition, all items in this listing are deemed to be critical national intelligence factors requiring priority attention and effort. Distinction is made, however, between three levels of priority within the general priority category. Order of listing within these three groups is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within the group.

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3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, this directive is designed to remain valid over an extended period. It will be reviewed at least annually. It is recognized that urgent interim requirements may arise requiring ad hoc treatment.

4. DCID-4/2 is hereby rescinded.*

I. HIGHEST PRIORITY OBJECTIVES: Those of such critical importance as to require a maximum intelligence effort.

- a. Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly Soviet intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces.
- b. Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly Chinese Communist intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces.

*NOTE: DCID-4/2, "Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives," was issued 28 September 1950 and revised 12 June 1952 and 4 August 1953.

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- c.* Soviet development, production, and employment of weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for nuclear attack on the United States and/or key US overseas installations or for defense of the Soviet Bloc against air attack. Particular reference is made to the development, production, and employment of nuclear weapons; aircraft, guided missiles, and related base facilities; and electronic components of air defense systems.
- d. Soviet operational capabilities for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; Soviet intentions to deliver such an attack.

NOTE: Order of listing within Category I is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

- * The representatives of G-2, ONI, AFOIN, and JIG consider this item too restricted. They would amend it to cover all forms of attack by deleting the words "nuclear" (in line 2) and "air" (in line 4). They would also raise item II(f) to Category I.

The State representative supports the text as it stands, but considers that, if item II(f) is raised to Category I, item II(b) should be also.

The Board considers that, if items II(b) and II(f) are raised to Category I, items II(a), II(c), II(d), and II(e) should be also.

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II. HIGH PRIORITY OBJECTIVES: Those of such high importance as to warrant an intensive intelligence effort.

The USSR and European Satellites

- a. The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions, of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc.
- b. Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance or to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers.
- c. Soviet political strengths and weaknesses: the actual locus of political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the

NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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Soviet and satellite apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations.

- d. The character of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, political, and military strength of the Soviet Bloc.
- e. Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses affecting Soviet economic and military capabilities.
- f. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces, including their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, their logistical support, and military production and stockpiling.

NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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The Far East (including Southeast Asia)

- g. The Chinese Communist estimate of US capabilities and intentions with respect to the Chinese Communist regime and to the situation in the Far East.
- h. Major Chinese Communist international political objectives and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers and to extend the area of Communist influence and control in Asia.
- i. The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime: actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the population of mainland China.

NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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- j. Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the degree of Soviet influence or control, the extent of Chinese Communist freedom of action, and actual or potential strains on the relationship.
- k. The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy; plans for its development, and progress therein; scientific and technological strengths and weaknesses affecting economic and military capabilities; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal communications and communications with the USSR.
- l. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist armed forces, including their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, and their logistical support.
- m. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime, and the relative degree of Soviet and Chinese Communist influence or control in North Korea.

NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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- n. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the North Korean armed forces, including their political reliability and their logistical support.
- o. The political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Minh regime, the nature of its political relationships with the USSR and with Communist China, and its political and military objectives.
- p. The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Viet Minh armed forces, including the nature and amount of the military aid received from Communist China and the USSR.
- q. The Political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of non-Communist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
- r. The reactions of the governments and peoples of South and Southeast Asia to developments in Indochina and to the general threat of further Communist aggrandizement in the region; Communist political and subversive capabilities in those countries.


NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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


NOTE: Order of listing within Category II is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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General

- w. The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities (political, subversive, and clandestine), and vulnerabilities of major Communist parties outside the Soviet Bloc and of international Communist front organizations, particularly the political and paramilitary capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Communist parties in France and Italy; trends in global and local Communist party tactics.

III. LOWER PRIORITY OBJECTIVES: Those of sufficient importance to warrant priority in relation to normal coverage.

South Asia, the Near East, and Africa

- a. The policy of the Indian Government, with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power,

NOTE: Order of listing within Category III is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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its relations with Communist China and the USSR, and its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia.


- b. The stability of the Government of Iran, with particular reference to Tudeh strength and capabilities.
- c. Arab-Israeli relations, with particular reference to the possibility of an outbreak of open warfare.
- d. The stability and policy of the Egyptian Government, with particular reference to developments relating to Middle East defense plans, the Suez base, and the Sudan.
- e. Nationalist unrest in French North Africa and Communist connections therewith.

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NOTE: Order of listing within Category III is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

- 15 -
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- h. The stability and orientation of the Yugoslav Government, its strategic intentions in the event of war, and the strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of its armed forces.

Latin America

- i. The development of militant nationalism in Latin America and Communist exploitation of this trend.

General

- j. Economic conditions and trends in backward countries, particularly as they affect vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda on the one hand and attitudes toward the United States and the West on the other.
- k. Non-Soviet nuclear energy research and development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials for weapons or other purposes.

NOTE: Order of listing within Category III is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of specific items within that category.

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APPENDIX C

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PRIORITY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OBJECTIVES

1. Priority national intelligence objectives should be directly related to the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy. NSC 162/2, paragraph 10a (which is reproduced in IAC-D-55/7 [Final], page 1), provides general guidance in this respect. More specific guidance can be obtained by analysis of the basic policy objectives set forth in NSC 162/2 and in other NSC documents, and by direct consultation with the NSC Planning Board.

2. Most of the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy will be the product of normal intelligence collection and research. Priority national intelligence objectives should be limited to those critical factors which require special attention and effort.

3. In order to afford a stable basis for intelligence planning, a statement of priority national intelligence objectives should be designed to remain valid over an extended period. It should therefore exclude topics of urgent current, but transitory, interest, which will require and receive ad hoc treatment in any case.

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4. Broad generalities are of little practical use as priority guidance to collection and research. Priority intelligence objectives should therefore be reasonably specific. On the other hand, it must be recognized that such objectives cannot serve as specific collection requirements. The translation of priority national intelligence objectives into specific information requirements requires further analysis by research personnel; the translation of specific information requirements into specific tasks of collection requires further analysis by collection personnel.

5. By definition, all items in a statement of priority national intelligence objectives should be worthy of special attention, but it is obvious that some will be of greater urgency or importance than others. Some means of indicating priority within the general priority category is therefore necessary, but care must be exercised lest the system adopted should, in actual effect, deny priority to a high priority objective. For example, a highly schematic arrangement based on country priorities would have the effect of giving a low priority topic relating to a first priority country a higher priority than a first priority topic relating to a lower priority country, which might well not represent their true order of importance. This difficulty can be avoided by recognizing levels of priority within the general

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priority category, with topics relating to a particular country entered at any appropriate level, as in Appendix B. This system would require the maximum exercise of judgment in relation to each item, but nevertheless, for the reason given, is preferable to any rigidly schematic system based, in the first instance, on country priorities.

6. Recapitulation: Priority national intelligence objectives should be:

- a. Directly related to the intelligence required in the formulation and execution of national security policy.
- b. Limited to pressing substantive intelligence problems.
- c. Designed to remain valid over an extended period.
- d. Expressed in reasonably specific terms (but not as a final formulation of specific collection requirements).
- e. Stated in such a way as to indicate broad levels of priority within the general priority category (but not in so rigidly schematic a manner as to distort the relative priority of specific objectives).

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IAC - D - 50 / 2
5 August 1953

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives

DCID 4/2 (Second Revision)

At its meeting of 4 August 1953 (IAC-M-115) the IAC approved a Second Revision of DCID 4/2. This revision, attached as Tab A, introduces a new paragraph 3. Present paragraphs 4 through 8 were formerly numbered 3 through 7.

[Redacted Signature]

Secretary

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IAC - D - 50 / 2
5 August 1953

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE

NO. 4/2 (SECOND REVISION)

Priority List of Critical National Intelligence Objectives
(Revised 8/4/53)

In accordance with DCID 4/1, paragraph 3, the following list in order of priority of critical national intelligence objectives, with respect to the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China) is established; so the highest priority shall be given to the collection of information and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet and Satellite capabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental United States;
2. taking direct military action, employing USSR and Satellite Armed Forces, against vital U.S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;
3. conducting clandestine attack by mass destruction weapons against the Continental United States, vital U.S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit, and Western Europe;
4. interfering with U.S. strategic air attack;
5. interfering with U.S. movement of men and material by water transport;
6. production and stockpiling, including location of installations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical weapons and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;
7. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to U.S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives;
8. interfering with U.S. political, psychological and economic courses of action for the achievement of critical U.S. aims and objectives.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
Security Information
IAC-D-50/1
5 June 1952

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DCI 4/2

PROPOSED DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4/2 (REVISED)

PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
(Additions are underlined; deletions in brackets)

In accordance with DCI 4/1, paragraph 3, the following list in order of priority of critical national intelligence objectives, with respect to the USSR and its Satellites (including Communist China) is established; so the highest priority shall be given to the collection of information and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet and Satellite capabilities and intentions for:

1. taking direct military action against the Continental United States;
2. taking direct military action, employing USSR and Satellite Armed Forces, against vital U. S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit ~~[Union]~~, and Western Europe;
3. interfering with U. S. strategic air attack;
4. interfering with U. S. movement of men and material by water transport;
5. production and stockpiling, including location of installations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical weapons and equipment, and critical transportation equipment;

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-50/1

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Security Information

IAC-D-50/1

5 June 1952

6. creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to U. S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives;

7. interfering with U. S. political, psychological, and economic courses of action for the achievement of critical U. S. aims and objectives.

WALTER B SMITH
Director of Central Intelligence

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DCI 4/2

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

IAC-D-50/1

5 June 1952

TAB A

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
IAC-D-50
19 May 1952

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

Joint Intelligence Committee

JICM-309-52
2 May 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Subject: Critical National Intelligence Objectives
with Respect to Communist China

In view of the increasing military strength of Communist China, it is requested that the Intelligence Advisory Committee prepare a priority list of critical national intelligence objectives with respect to Communist China under the same procedures as those used to establish DCI 4/2, 28 September 1950.

/s/ [REDACTED]
Secretary

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S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-50

TAB B

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
IAC-D-50
19 May 1952

DEVELOPMENT OF DCID 4/2

1. DCID 4/2 was proposed initially in an Air Force request of 10 July 1950 that the IAC prepare a list of "Critical National Intelligence Objectives with respect to the USSR," giving the highest possible priority to the Defense Department list which had been approved by the JIC on 22 May 1950.

2. The Air Force felt that a National List was necessary "in order to definitely focus the attention of the intelligence collection resources of all IAC agencies on the objectives which are presently of highest priority and critical character with respect to national security." Their memorandum further stated: "The

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operations. Thus, to adequately collect intelligence on these objectives, a collection effort is required beyond the limited overt operations participated in by the service intelligence agencies, and beyond the authority of the purely military representation on the United States Communications Intelligence Board which states the priorities of the national communications intelligence effort."

3. The State Department and the overt collection units of CIA felt that they were already doing what they could to collect this information and that such a list would not help since such exact priorities were not a problem to them. Their needs could be met by establishing categories, by priority, of intelligence needs, and it was unnecessary to rank the items in the first category. It is believed that this comment also applied to the communications intelligence effort. However, [redacted] felt that a list of national intelligence objectives would give them a tool with which to decide pressing questions of priority between the several agencies.

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4. After informal consultation the IAC agreed about 21 July that such a list should be developed. State, AEC, and FBI submitted their lists to CIA which combined them with its own lists and the JIC paper and submitted a draft for consideration of IAC representatives in mid-August 1950. The IAC members approved the final redraft by memorandum on 28 September 1950.

5. In retrospect it is not thought that any of the collectors have changed their views on the utility of DCID 4/2. [redacted] considers it to be most useful to them. With the consent of IPC it has been interpreted broadly to apply to the Soviet European Orbit and as applicable [redacted] is also applied it with respect to Communist China--thus in fact already giving military requests a priority over economic, political, and other requirements.

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S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
IAC-D-50
19 May 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CRITICAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES
WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA

1. The attached memorandum (TAB A) has been received from the Secretary of the JIC.
2. The background of DCID 4/2 is briefly set forth for information in TAB B.

Recommendation:

3. That if any formal action is desired, DCID 4/2 be amended, with appropriate modifications, to cover all of the Soviet Orbit, including Communist China.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary

MAY 21 1952
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IAC-D-50

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
IAC-D-49
21 April 1952

PROPOSED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA AND SPANISH MOROCCO

The following proposal is submitted by the National Estimates Board for consideration of the IAC.

PROBLEM:

1. To initiate a National Intelligence Estimate on probable developments in French North Africa and Spanish Morocco.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

2. The State Department is preparing a draft NSC paper on French North Africa, Spanish Morocco, and Libya. There is no National Intelligence Estimate on this area.

DISCUSSION:

3. The current tension and outbreaks in Tunisia and earlier outbreaks in Morocco are symptoms of the growing nationalism in French North Africa which is creating increasingly serious problems for France and potentially for the U. S. Growing friction between the French and powerful local nationalist elements in the area may lead to further outbreaks with serious repercussions, particularly since the North African nationalists are being backed by the Arab-Asian bloc in the U.N. Complications have also arisen as a result of Spanish policy toward the Arabs, and recent developments regarding Tangiers.

4. The Board of National Estimates believes that the probable future development of nationalism in the area, probable French and Spanish ability to cope with this development, and the implications for U.S. interests are appropriate subjects for an early NIE. Such an estimate would serve as essential background for NSC consideration of the problem.

5. Although it is presently planned to include Libya in the NSC paper, the Board believes that the NIE need only cover French North Africa, Spanish Morocco, and Tangier. Not only is the Libyan problem more closely akin to those of the Arab States and more properly treated in that context but there is not the same need for national intelligence backing on this area. The State draftsmen of the NSC paper have concurred informally with the omission of Libya.

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S-E-C-R-E-T
21 April 1952

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Security Information
IAC-D-49
21 April 1952

6. The Board believes that the estimate should have no fixed time limit, but should look as far ahead as seems feasible. This is consistent with the long term nature of the draft NSC policies which will be considered and with the general desirability of longer range estimates.

7. Intelligence representatives of the Department of State, upon whom the main estimative burden would fall, informally concur in the desirability of this estimate. Since the tentative target date for completion of the State draft NSC paper is 1 July, the Board believes that the NIE should meet the same deadline.

RECOMMENDATION:

8. That the DCI request the IAC to approve initiation of the following estimate:

NIE-69: Probable Developments in French and Spanish North Africa.

James Q. Reber
Secretary

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-49

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Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
IAC-D-47
14 April 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CENTRAL ELECTRONIC INTERCEPT ANALYSIS GROUP

The attached paper will be placed on the IAC Agenda
for Thursday, 24 April 1952, for consideration.

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-47
14 April 1952

Approved For Release 2001/12/04 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000400070001-9

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Security Information
IAC-D-47
14 April 1952

CENTRAL ELECTRONIC INTERCEPT ANALYSIS GROUP

1. There is a need to strengthen the present electronic (ECM) intercept program by providing a suitable mechanism for prompt and thorough exploitation of the available electronic intercept material on an all-source basis and of rapid feedback of evaluated intelligence for guidance to the operational intercept activities.

2. The importance of electronic intercept as the most reliable intelligence source for determining Soviet electronic capabilities is recognized by all intelligence agencies. In this connection IAC support is needed for a program which will provide for more effective exploitation of electronic intercept material.

3. The enclosure "Review of Electronic Intercept and Analysis Activities" discusses the present methods of handling electronic intercept information and points out the need for a centrally located group to expedite this work.

4. It is recommended that the IAC lend its support to the immediate establishment of a central electronic intercept analysis group in or around Washington. It is suggested further, that the direct administrative responsibility for the organization and operation of such group be assigned to the Navy, which has suitable space and available facilities at the Naval Communication Annex.

5. Detailed recommendations are set forth on page 4.

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-D-47
14 April 1952

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
IAC-D-47
14 April 1952

Review of Electronic Intercept Analysis
and Evaluation Activities

1. There has been much concern in the intelligence community recently with attempts to estimate Soviet capabilities in air defense as a key factor in the preparation of national estimates. The recent intelligence from Korea makes the situation particularly urgent. Of the information necessary to make a sound estimate of Soviet air defense capabilities the greatest uncertainties concern the electronic systems and particularly the components essential to early warning, ground control of interception (including both the radar and the communications links), airborne radar interception, and possible infrared or other passive means of interception. All of these electronic devices transmit or receive electromagnetic waves as an essential to their basic function. The electromagnetic radiations from enemy devices are susceptible to being received by proper receiving equipment and to subsequent analysis revealing much valuable information concerning the capabilities and limitations of the enemy's all-weather air defense.

2. Recognizing the potentialities for obtaining both strategic and tactical intelligence through analysis of radio signals of this type, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have initiated a number of collection activities variously called signal interception, Ferret operations, etc., which are usually lumped together under the general term "ECM intercept." These activities are now being utilized with some success to determine the location and system characteristics of radar and electronic navigation devices being employed in the Korean theater, in the satellites, and along the borders of the USSR. ECM intercept is a powerful weapon in penetrating the Iron Curtain and obtaining factual scientific and technical intelligence.

3. This intercept information, when integrated with that obtained from all other sources, can give a very complete picture of Soviet capabilities for air defense. The need for such a picture is current and continuing. For this reason the greatest help to the existing ECM program would be in improving the collection, analysis, evaluation, and distribution of the intercept material. This important phase of the problem is suffering most acutely from lack of a concentrated and unified effort for performing these functions with all the pertinent information available from all sources. The problem, therefore, is to strengthen the present ECM program and activities by providing a suitable mechanism for prompt and thorough exploitation of the available intercept material on an all-source basis and of rapid feed-back of guidance to the operational intercept activities.

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Facts Bearing on the Problem

25X1C
4. At the [REDACTED] conference on electronics intelligence in March 1951, it was unanimously agreed that ECM intercept and analysis promises the greatest return of any form of electronics intelligence and that immediate attention should be given to improving the methods and utilization of this type of intelligence. A formal paper was prepared and distributed to all participating service and civilian agencies in the United States.

5. There is growing recognition within the Military Services and CIA of the need for more effective processing and distribution of ECM intercept materials on an all-source basis for operational and planning uses of all USA agencies and for adequate and timely support to all collection efforts. So far this recognition has not been duly implemented.

6. There is good work being done by the Army, Navy and Air Force, but the responsibility for the analysis of ECM intercept data is presently subdivided between these agencies and the liaison suffers from geographical separation and other factors. There is much duplication of effort and at the same time much material is not being included.

7. At the present time there is no permanent, centrally located facility charged with the responsibility for the expeditious handling, analysis, evaluation, collation and distribution of all the ECM intercept material now being obtained by the several different collection activities. There is no facility feeding evaluated and timely intelligence back to the collection groups for guidance in planning future operations. 25X1D

[REDACTED]

9. There is at present a Joint Signal and Evaluations Analysis Sub-Panel of the Joint Electronics Warfare Panel of the Joint Communications and Electronics Committee of the JCS which considers the intercept material previously and separately analyzed and evaluated. At intervals the Sub-Panel produces a summary for limited distribution.

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The personnel of this group are service members representing operational, research and development, and intelligence groups who work on the Sub-Panel on a part time basis in addition to their normal full time laboratory or military responsibilities; consequently the group is not able to process the ECM intercept material promptly and adequately. There is no CIA participation in the activities of this Sub-Panel.

It is recommended that:

10. A Central Electronic Intercept Analysis Group be established in Washington or in the area contiguous to Washington to be jointly supported by the Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA. The functions of this group will be:

a. Analysis and collation of all electronic intercept material received on an all-source basis;

b. Prompt dissemination of this intercept material to all interested activities;

c. Preparation and dissemination through proper channels of recommendations for the guidance of collection activities on a world-wide basis; and

d. Establishment at this central location of a library and repository of signal characteristics data, such information to be cross-indexed for ready reference and to include all known signal emission information such as frequency, type of modulation, location, spectra analysis, oscilloscope photographs, recording of signals, etc.

11. The Central Electronic Intercept Analysis Group should be established as a permanent full time working organization functioning under the general direction of the Navy Department with participation by Army, Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Group should be physically located within the immediate Washington area, preferably at the Navy Communications Annex in close proximity to AFSA. It should have adequate representation from the three services and CIA to accomplish its mission.

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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

PROPOSED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The following proposals are submitted by the National Estimates Board for consideration of the IAC.

PROBLEM

1. To initiate National Intelligence Estimates on the Argentine, Chile, and Venezuela.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. No NIE has yet been written on these important Latin-American countries.

3. Informal discussions between the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State and the Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA have indicated that a need is felt for an evaluation of the effect of current developments in those countries on the security interests of the US.

ILLEGIB

DISCUSSION

4. In Argentina, the deterioration of the economic situation, accompanied by an increase in President Peron's anti-US propaganda, may portend a situation that would adversely affect US interests in South America.

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5. Chile, with one of the largest Communist parties in Latin America, has a general election scheduled for this year. The Communists have always exploited their superior organization to draw full benefit from electoral periods. There are also candidates who are oriented towards the anti-US line of Peron's personal press and radio organizations. The Chilean elections and the forces released in connection with them are [possibly] of importance to US security interests in the area.

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6. Venezuela's oil and iron constitute a major asset for the Western World in its struggle with the Soviet bloc. The protection this asset must be a major objective in US cold-war strategy. The

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*Action Democrática
not CIA, but left
+ a possible shield of CIA*

present military junta of Venezuela has powerful enemies, and its ability and willingness to support US policies, as well as its prospects, should be assessed.

RECOMMENDATION

7. That the IAC approve the initiation of the following estimates:

a. NIE-66: Probable Developments in Argentina. Priority: High. Target date: 15 May. OK

b. NIE-67: Probable Developments in Chile with Particular Reference to the Implications of the Electoral Period. Priority: Routine. Target date: 15 July + 9/5/52

c. NIE-68: Probable Developments in Venezuela, with Particular Reference to Factors Affecting the Availability to the US of Strategic Materials. Priority: Routine. Target date: 1 July.

➔

JAMES Q. REBER
Secretary

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