

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 18

N.I.A. 9th Meeting

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 214,
Department of State Building,
on Wednesday, 12 February 1947, at 11:00 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Personal Representative of the President
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. J. S. Earman, Acting Secretary

DOE review completed.

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~
NIA 9th Meeting

Document No.
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS (S) C
Next Review Date:
Auth.: HR 70-3
Date: <u>26 Aug 91</u>
By:

~~TOP SECRET~~

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING
TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENTS
AND POTENTIALITIES

(N.I.A. 6)
REPRODUCED FROM THE
 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ARCHIVES

SECRETARY PATTERSON gave a brief report on the present status of N.I.A. 6. He stated that the Atomic Energy Commission desired to retain three people to go over information contained in the files to be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group. He said that these three people were to search these files for information pertaining to uranium deposits and such information was to be retained by the Commission. Secretary Patterson suggested that C.I.G. take up the matter of the transfer of the personnel with Mr. Lilienthal.

After some discussion, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Agreed to the transfer of the personnel mentioned in N.I.A. 6 and directed the Director of Central Intelligence to work out the details with Mr. Lilienthal.

(Transfer subsequently completed on 18 February 1947)

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

At Secretary Marshall's request, GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that his last report was rather comprehensive in pointing out the accomplishments of C.I.G. since its inception. However, this time he wished to report some of the difficulties encountered by C.I.G. He said that before taking up these difficulties he wished to point out a few accomplishments recently effected by C.I.G.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that when it was first agreed that the C.I.G. take over the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the South American field, there was some doubt as to whether C.I.G. could ably accomplish this assignment. He mentioned that he had received a letter from Ambassador Pauley which commended the smooth transfer of these activities accomplished by the C.I.G. representative attached to his staff. General Vandenberg also mentioned that Mr. Dawson of the State Department had also stated that the


~~TOP SECRET~~

NL: 9th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

C.I.G.'s representatives who had replaced the F.B.I. personnel were of a particularly high type. General Vandenberg brought out the point that C.I.G. had a roving mission to check these newly assigned personnel in South America and their reports indicated that they were carrying out their functions in an exemplary manner. 25X1

GENERAL VANDENBERG then gave a brief report on



GENERAL VANDENBERG said that [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] prior to a 25X1

trip to South America, had consented to being briefed and seemed enthusiastic regarding the method of collaboration proposed by C.I.G. General Vandenberg went on to state that [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] had said he would be more than pleased to be briefed by C.I.G. before any future trips that he might make and also that he would make available any of his employees whom C.I.G. might desire to brief prior to trips they might make. 25X1

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that C.I.G. was coordinating the exploitation of documents collected in the Far East and that plans are now being completed for similar exploitation of documents from Europe.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated he would now like to mention some of the principal difficulties being encountered by C.I.G. in its operations. He said that what he believed to be essential coordination to reduce duplication had been retarded by an uncertainty as to the directive authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. He said that the President specified that the Director of Central Intelligence shall "plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission." (Paragraph 3 of President's letter of 22 January 1946, emphasis added)

GENERAL VANDENBERG further stated that the National Intelligence Authority specified that; "Recommendations approved by this Authority will where practicable govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be responsible for insuring that approved recommendations are executed within their respective departments." (NIA Directive No. 1, par. 4)

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the National Intelligence Authority specified that: "The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all federal foreign activities related to the national security to insure that the overall policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed." (NIA Directive No. 5, par. 3, emphasis added)

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that it was the feeling of the agencies (Intelligence Advisory Board) that the current interpretation of coordination was "by mutual agreement." This placed the Director of Central Intelligence only in the position of an executive secretary to the I.A.B. and that he did not believe this was what was contemplated by the N.I.A. General Vandenberg then pointed out that in some instances it

had taken six to eight months to get agreement on a paper. He stated that in order to rectify this he recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence be considered as having authority similar to that given to the Joint Research and Development Board - "The Joint Research and Development Board shall operate within its jurisdiction as an agency of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Board so that its decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such." (JRDB 1/1, 6 June 1946, as amended 3 July 1946)

RECOMMEN
#1

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that as an alternative to the above recommendation that C.I.G. forward its implementing directives to the N.I.A. members for subsequent issuance from their offices. However, such a practice would be cumbersome and involve a great loss of time on the part of all concerned.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that the production of strategic and national policy intelligence had been hindered further by an uncertainty among the agencies as to its definition. In order to clarify this situation, C.I.G. had developed the following definition, which he requested the N.I.A. approve:- ("Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department.)"

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated it was his understanding that those persons who developed the plan for the creation of a Central Intelligence Group had in mind that the C.I.G. would replace the Joint Intelligence Committee. This, so far, had not taken place, nor had any working relationship been achieved;

~~TOP SECRET~~

further, that J.I.C. continues to have responsibilities paralleling those of C.I.G., and until this is resolved, complete coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency in the national intelligence mission can not be attained. General Vandenberg recommended that J.I.C. be abolished, and that C.I.G. provide the necessary intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, however, he believed that some members of the J.C.S. had stated that if this were done, it would lower the original concept of a Central Intelligence Group. General Vandenberg said it was difficult for him, in appearing before appropriation committees, to defend C.I.G.'s request for funds since he was constantly confronted with the question as to the amount of overlap in intelligence. It was his understanding that one of the principal tasks expected of the Director of Central Intelligence was the reduction of such overlap to an absolute minimum.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated he would also like to point out that when C.I.G. went to the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments for information, there was constant friction as to whether J.I.C. or C.I.G. should have priority. In short, two agencies were asking for the same type of intelligence but requested in a slightly different manner. This duplication was unnecessary and occupied the time of personnel which should be engaged in more productive intelligence activities.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL then asked whether the question of dissolution of the J.I.C. and the assignment of its duties to C.I.G. had been taken up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL VANDENBERG answered that he believed it had through the I.A.B. members.

MR. EDDY stated that he thought that it was important now to abolish J.I.C. and to have all interdepartmental intelligence under the C.I.G.

~~TOP SECRET~~
NL 9th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

After some discussion,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

a. Agreed that while they believed that the J.I.C. should be abolished and its functions assumed by C.I.G., they desired to withhold decision until such time as it had been discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Noted that Admiral Leahy would take up this matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At Secretary Marshall's request, GENERAL VANDENBERG then reread his first recommendation.

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that he saw no alternative to the N.I.A. approving this recommendation. He added, however, that a proviso should be inserted in the recommendation to allow any aggrieved agency to appeal to the N.I.A. through that agency's respective Secretary.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said it was realized that each agency has the inherent right to appeal through its respective Secretary any objection to a specific directive.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he recommended approval, but that he was in agreement with Secretary Patterson's proviso.

SECRETARY PATTERSON raised the question as to whether General Vandenberg's recommendation would involve C.I.G. entering into the field of operational intelligence of the agencies.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that this was not the intent.

MR. EDDY asked, if authority was delegated by the N.I.A. to the Director of Central Intelligence that his directives shall be considered as emanating from them, would such authority be interpreted to allow the Director of Central Intelligence to draft personnel from other agencies to perform specific jobs.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that C.I.G. had no intention of interpreting this authority as indicated by Mr. Eddy.

~~TOP SECRET~~
NIA 9th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRETARY PATTERSON asked if C.I.G. was contemplating recommending that some of the intelligence manuals now published by the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments be discontinued.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated he would like to have an opportunity to look over these publications before answering this question.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated he believed that the proviso to be added to General Vandenberg's recommendation under discussion should read along the following lines: "Provided in cases of objection to specific actions, any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."

MR. EDDY stated he assumed that any directives, before being issued by C.I.G., would normally have had prior discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

GENERAL VANDENBERG concurred.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY;

Approved the recommendation that "The Director of Central Intelligence shall operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy to the Director of Central Intelligence so that his decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such, provided any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."

At Secretary Marshall's request, GENERAL VANDENBERG then repeated his recommended definition of "Strategic and national policy intelligence."

After some discussion, in which General Vandenberg pointed out the reason why an approved definition of this term

~~TOP SECRET~~
NIA 9th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

was needed,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved the following definition; "Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department."

SECRETARY MARSHALL stated that in a recent conversation Congressman Taber was concerned from a security standpoint with reference to appropriations for intelligence activities. Secretary Marshall further stated that Mr. Taber had said that it appeared to him that too many people had to be consulted in considering such appropriations. Secretary Marshall went on to state that he believed the best way to maintain proper security was for the President or the Secretary of State to control these funds, and that a request should be made for a flat appropriation.

GENERAL VAIDENBERG stated he had appeared recently before a joint committee, which he was told before appearance would consist of four or five people. However, upon arrival he found there were actually twenty-two people present. He went on to state a subsequent meeting had been called and he would continue to be careful of the information presented. However, he agreed that security of intelligence operations could best be protected by funds which should be concealed and appropriated in a lump sum controlled by one person.

~~TOP SECRET~~
NIA 9th Meeting

- 9 -

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 29 *JJA*

N.I.A. 1st Meeting

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212,
Department of State Building
on Tuesday, 5 February 1946, at 11:30 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Personal Representative of the President
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers,
Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Mr. Davidson Sommers, War Department
Mr. Edward Hidalgo, Navy Department

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group

CONFIDENTIAL

1. PROPOSED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(N.I.A. 1)

SECRETARY PATTERSON suggested deleting the word "prior" in the 8th line of page 3, in order to make it clear that approval by the Authority was not required.

ADMIRAL SOUERS suggested that this might also be accomplished by substitution of the words "action by" for "prior reference to". He also recommended that a period be placed after "departments" in line 4, paragraph 7, page 4, and that the remainder of the sentence be deleted.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:-

Agreed to the following amendments in N.I.A. 1:

- a. Substitute "action by" for "prior reference to" in line 8 of page 3.
- b. Place a period after the word "departments" in line 4, paragraph 7 of page 4 and delete the remainder of that sentence.

2. PROPOSED TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(N.I.A. 2)

SECRETARY BYRNES asked what paragraph 2 a on page 1 contemplated as to foreign policy. He pointed out that he is responsible for reporting to the President on matters of foreign policy.

ADMIRAL SOUERS explained his understanding was that the President wanted him only to go through the dispatch traffic and make a digest of significant developments. Admiral Souers emphasized that there was no intention that he should interpret these dispatches or advise the President on any matters of foreign policy. His report was intended to be purely factual as regards the activities of the United States in the field of foreign affairs.

SECRETARY BYRNES stressed the fact that it was his function to furnish the President with information on which to base conclusions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed his understanding that the President wanted the information from all three departments (State, War and Navy) summarized in order to keep him currently informed. Admiral Leahy pointed out that Secretary Byrnes presents the viewpoint of the Department of State while the President would like to receive significant information available in all three departments in a single summary.

SECRETARY BYRNES pointed out that Admiral Souers would not be presenting the viewpoint of any single department. Although the Central Intelligence Group would be composed of personnel from all three departments, Secretary Byrnes believes that any man assigned to that Group must be responsible solely to Admiral Souers.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADMIRAL SOUERS suggested that, in order to clarify the meaning of paragraph 4 on page 3, it might be reworded as follows:

"Production of daily and weekly summaries of the significant developments in the field of intelligence and operations related to the national security and to foreign events for the use of the President, the members of this Authority, and additional distribution shown in Appendix 'C'."

After further discussion,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:-

Agreed to defer final action on N.I.A. 1 and N.I.A. 2, pending further study by Secretary Byrnes.

JM

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 29

N.I.A. 2nd Meeting



NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212
Department of State Building
on Friday, 8 February 1946, at 10:15 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Personal Representative of the President
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers,
Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Alfred McCormack, Department of State
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Mr. Davidson Sommers, War Department
Capt. William R. Smodberg, USN

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group

CONFIDENTIAL

1. PROPOSED TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(N.I.A. 2)

SECRETARY BYRNES stated that he had discussed the intent of paragraph 4-a of the enclosure to N.I.A. 2 with the President, who assured him that only factual statements were desired. Secretary Byrnes therefore suggested adding the words "containing factual statements" after the word "summaries".

ADMIRAL SOUERS questioned whether daily factual summaries would not prove sufficient. He therefore recommended deletion of the words "and weekly" in paragraph 4-a.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved N.I.A. 2 subject to rewording of paragraph 4-a of the enclosure thereto as follows:

- "a. Production of daily summaries containing factual statements of the significant developments in the field of intelligence and operations related to the national security and to foreign events for the use of the President, the members of this Authority, and additional distribution shown in Appendix 'C'."

2. PROPOSED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(N.I.A. 1)

ADMIRAL SOUERS suggested the following rewording of the 3rd and 4th sentences of paragraph 5 of the enclosure to N.I.A. 1, which had been suggested by Mr. McCormack's office for budgetary reasons:

"As approved by this Authority and within the limits of available appropriations, the necessary funds and personnel will be made available to you by arrangement between you and the appropriate member of the Intelligence Advisory Board. You may determine the qualifications of personnel and the adequacy of individual candidates."

ADMIRAL LEAHY thought that the arrangements should be made between Admiral Souers and the appropriate Department through its member on the Intelligence Advisory Board, rather than between Admiral Souers and the appropriate member of that Board.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved N.I.A. 1 subject to the following rewording of the 3rd and 4th sentences of paragraph 5 of the enclosure thereto:

"As approved by this Authority and within the limits of available appropriations, the necessary funds and personnel will be made available to you by arrangement between you and the appropriate department through its member on the Intelligence Advisory Board. You may determine the qualifications of personnel and the adequacy of individual candidates."

JAC
27

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO. 27

N.I.A. 3rd Meeting

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212,
Department of State Building
on Tuesday, 2 April 1946, at 11:00 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal

{NOTE: Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal Representative of the President, subsequently approved the action taken at the meeting.}

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Howard C. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Mr. Edward Hidalgo, Navy Department

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1. PROGRESS REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

At Secretary Byrnes' request, ADMIRAL SOUERS gave a brief report on the progress of organization of the Central Intelligence Group, and noted some of the more important projects now in progress. He invited attention to the fact that the most urgent problem concerning the disposition of the Strategic Services Unit was covered by the paper for consideration at this meeting. Admiral Souers also explained that further details concerning current projects were available in the weekly Status Report which was distributed to the Authority.

2. POLICY ON LIQUIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
(N.I.A. 3)

SECRETARY PATTERSON suggested the following amendments:

a. The addition of a new paragraph to the proposed N.I.A. Directive (page 4) as follows:

"5. The War Department shall retain the right to determine what portion of War Department funds, personnel and facilities can be made available to SSU by the War Department."

b. Insert the words "within your capabilities" in the second line of the third paragraph following the word "service", and in the sixth line of the third paragraph following the word "available".

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved N.I.A. 3 subject to the above amendments (Enclosure A thereto subsequently circulated as N.I.A. Directive No. 4).

CONFIDENTIAL

Houston

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 28

~~TOP SECRET~~

N.I.A. 4th Meeting

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 212
Department of State Building
on Wednesday, 17 July 1946, at 10:30 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Acting Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal
Representative of the President
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State
Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National
Intelligence Authority

25X1

Document No.	
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified	
Class. Changed to: TS (S) C	
Next Review Date:	
Auth: HQ TOS	
Date: 26 Aug 91	
By:	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~1. REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SECRETARY BYRNES asked General Vandenberg to give the members a report on present and future matters concerning the Central Intelligence Group.

GENERAL VANDENBERG invited attention to the conclusions contained in the "Progress Report on the Central Intelligence Group" by Admiral Souers, former Director of Central Intelligence. General Vandenberg explained that at the present time each intelligence agency is working along the lines of primary interest to its department. It is his belief that C.I.G. should find out what raw material received by one department is of interest to the others. In order to do this, C.I.G. must be in a position to see and screen all raw material received. For example, as regards a given steel plant, State is studying what products are made there and the rate of production. War Department, however, is interested in the construction and physical details of the plant, the railroads serving it, and other data required for target information. State Department, if it broadened the base of its studies, might well be able to furnish at least part of that type of economic intelligence. It is the job of C.I.G., therefore, to find out the needs of all the departments and to meet them, either by recommending that one department expand its activities or by performing the necessary research in C.I.G. In order to do this, an adequate and capable staff is urgently required in C.I.G. It is extremely difficult administratively to procure the necessary personnel under the present arrangement. General Vandenberg therefore feels that he must have his own funds and be able to hire people. This means that C.I.G. must be set up as an agency by enabling legislation.

SECRETARY BYRNES expressed the understanding that the N.I.A. was intentionally established as it is in an effort to avoid the necessity for an independent budget.

SECRETARY PATTERSON agreed, and explained that this was designed to conceal, for security reasons, the amount of money being spent on central intelligence.

SECRETARY BYRNES thought that it would be difficult to explain to Congress the need for intelligence funds without jeopardizing security.

GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that such considerations should be balanced against the added administrative difficulties they caused. He expressed the belief that the important thing was that the Central Intelligence Group should be an effective and efficient organization.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was always understood that C.I.G. eventually would broaden its scope. It was felt, however, that the Departments initially could contribute sufficient funds and personnel to get it started. He is about convinced that N.I.A. should now attempt to get its own appropriations. These appropriations, however, should be small, since the three departments should continue to furnish the bulk of the necessary funds.

SECRETARY PATTERSON thought that the administrative problems could be worked out under the present arrangements.

SECRETARY BYRNES believed that the major problem was to find a way for the departments to give C.I.G. the money it needed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that he was perfectly willing to direct Army Intelligence to furnish the necessary funds to C.I.G. and then let the Director of Central Intelligence pick his own personnel with those funds. He opposed a separate budget because he does not want to expose these intelligence operations.

SECRETARY BYRNES agreed that we could not afford to make such disclosures in this country.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that each personnel action must be handled at present by 100 people in each department. This means that knowledge of C.I.G. personnel is exposed to 300 people in the three departments. He feels that handling personnel actions within C.I.G. itself would improve security.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that it was undesirable that so many people in the departments should have knowledge of C.I.G. He felt that if each department gave C.I.G. funds, personnel actions could be taken by C.I.G. itself without exposing them.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that this would still require defending three separate appropriations acts before the Senate and the House of Representatives.

DR. LANGER agreed that the funds would have to be defended before the Congress in any case.

SECRETARY BYRNES recalled that members of Congress had offered to include the State Department intelligence budget under such terms as "investigations abroad" or as an added amount in any other budget account. He felt that since Congress was apparently willing to do this, the funds might easily be hidden in this manner within departmental budgets.

DR. LANGER thought that Admiral Leahy's suggestion would be very effective. It might be possible to give N.I.A. an independent budget for the more overt activities, and hide other funds in departmental appropriations. This would serve as ideal cover for covert activities. Moreover, he believed that an independent appropriation for C.I.G. would make General Vandenberg more effective in supporting departmental intelligence budgets.

ADMIRAL LEAHY felt that this problem must be approached very carefully. He believed that no one was better qualified to advise N.I.A. on this than Secretary Byrnes, with his Congressional background. Admiral Leahy stated that the President authorized him to make it clear that the President considered the responsible agency in the present arrangement to be the N.I.A. The President stated that the Director of Central Intelligence is not responsible further than to carry out the directives of the N.I.A. Admiral Leahy said there were some indications that the Director of Central Intelligence, with the Intelligence Advisory Board, might tend to assume greater control over intelligence activities than was intended. Admiral Leahy reiterated that the President holds the Cabinet officers on N.I.A. primarily responsible for coordination of intelligence activities.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN compared the Director of Central Intelligence to an executive vice president who carries out the instructions and policies of the N.I.A.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that with regard to a bill to obtain an independent budget and status for N.I.A., the President considers it inadvisable to attempt to present such a bill before the present Congress. The President feels that there is not enough time for the N.I.A. to give this question sufficient study. The President feels, however, that a bill might be drafted and be under study by the N.I.A. with a view to the possibility of presenting it to the next Congress. Admiral Leahy stated that in the meantime he felt that General Vandenberg should be given, so far as practicable, all the assistance that he requires.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that C.I.G. is not an agency authorized to disburse funds. Therefore, even with funds from the departments, it would require disbursing and authenticating officers in all three departments, plus the necessary accounting organization in C.I.G. He felt that this was requiring four fiscal operations where one should suffice.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested, and SECRETARY BYRNES agreed, that this might be taken care of by the wording of an appropriations act.

DR. LANGER questioned this possibility unless C.I.G. was given status as a disbursing agency.

SECRETARY BYRNES thought this status could be given the agency by the President under the authority of the Emergency Powers Act.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he understood that this solution was decided against because it might indicate that N.I.A. was a temporary expedient which would terminate with the end of the President's war powers.

SECRETARY BYRNES was sure that it could be done by the President under his reorganization authority and without reference to the Emergency Powers Act. Secretary Byrnes undertook to talk with the Bureau of the Budget on this matter and report back to the N.I.A.

ADMIRAL LEAHY was convinced that C.I.G. must have funds for which it does not have to account in detail.

DR. LANGER questioned whether General Vandenberg was not more concerned over the cumbersome arrangement for handling personnel actions in all three departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stressed the fact that without money there could be no personnel actions. For example, he noted that the State Department does not have sufficient funds to pay personnel required for C.I.G. General Vandenberg agreed, however, that personnel actions were extremely difficult under present arrangements. For example, it takes an average of six weeks to obtain security clearance from the Departments, and he does not feel that he should employ anyone without such clearance. General Vandenberg stressed the fact that his greatest interest was in getting C.I.G. into operation by whatever means possible. He felt that time was of the essence during this critical period.

SECRETARY BYRNES believed that the only way at present to avoid the administrative difficulties was to arrange to have each department transfer the necessary funds to C.I.G.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out the difficulty of obtaining funds from the Departments. For example, although the State Department requested about [redacted] for N.I.A., only [redacted] is being made available. While he appreciated the need of the State Department for the other funds, this case exemplified the fact that C.I.G. could never be certain of receiving the funds which it requested and defended unless they were appropriated directly to C.I.G. 25X1

DR. LANGER believed that this situation would not recur in the future; but he did agree that State's contribution to C.I.G. was not adequate. He did not see, however, how this could be increased except through a deficiency bill. 25X1

SECRETARY SULLIVAN asked why additional funds might not be secured from the President's emergency fund.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that total funds available to C.I.G. for the fiscal year 1947 were [redacted] which left a shortage for effective operations of [redacted]. He asked whether it might be possible to obtain permission to spend available funds at an accelerated rate in anticipation of the submission of the deficiency bill. 25X1

SECRETARY BYRNES thought that such permission could not be obtained. He noted that what General Vandenberg had stated was that C.I.G. had [redacted]

Dr. LANGER questioned whether any mechanism was to be available for reviewing this proposed budget. 25X1

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he had the details available. He noted, however, that comprehensive review meant that this information must be widely disclosed to personnel in three departments.

SECRETARY SULLIVAN felt that since the President's remarks indicated that he held N.I.A. responsible, they must know the details regarding any C.I.G. budget request.

At Secretary Byrnes' request, GENERAL VANDENBERG then made a brief report on C.I.G. activities. He noted that C.I.G. was taking over Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service and all clandestine foreign intelligence activities. In addition, however, C.I.G. is receiving daily requests to take over functions now being done by various State, War and Navy Committees. One example is the suggestion that C.I.G. centralize the handling of codes and ciphers to improve their security. Another example is the concern of the War Department about exchange of information with the British. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has a subcommittee covering this exchange, but it handles only about 20 or 30 percent of the information actually exchanged. This subcommittee confines itself purely to secret matters, whereas the Army Air Forces believe that a central clearing house should be established where the bargaining value of this information may also be taken into account.

DR. LANGER pointed out that the SWNCC subcommittee deals only with technical military information. He feels, however, that the problem also involves such matters as the transfer of non-military information and the declassification of material. Unless these matters are centralized, each department will continue, as at present, going its own way.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL VANDENBERG reported that he has already set up an Office of Special Operations. He has also established an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, but only on a skeleton basis because of his need for additional personnel.

SECRETARY PATTERSON felt that all of General Vandenberg's present problems should be solved if the Secretary of State can obtain help from the Bureau of the Budget.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated his problems, briefly, were that he needed money, the authority to spend it, and the authority to hire and fire.

SECRETARY BYRNES felt there were really two problems: First, to find ways to handle the money now available, and second, to get whatever additional funds are required. He thought it would be difficult to get additional funds fifteen days after the fiscal year had begun. He questioned whether present funds should not be sufficient since the understanding was that C.I.G. was primarily continuing functions which have been previously performed.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that C.I.G. was now under-25X1 taking certain new functions and also expanding some existing ones. In answer to questions, General Vandenberg stated that he proposed to have about [] people in secret intelligence and a total of something less than [] in C.I.G. by the end 25X1 the fiscal year.

DR. LANGER stated that he agreed with almost everything that General Vandenberg had said, but that he was impressed with the imposing size of the proposed organization. He thought there should be a definite review of the program before a request for an additional [] is approved. 25X1

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that there is a clear need for additional appropriations for intelligence in view of changing conditions. During the war there were American forces all over the world who were procuring information and intelligence in connection with military operations. These operations were not considered as intelligence activities, however, and the funds required for them were not charged to intelligence. These operations are now shrinking rapidly. It is necessary, therefore, to have intelligence agents all over the world to get the same information which during the war was handed to intelligence agencies on a silver platter.

SECRETARY PATTERSON agreed with this statement. He noted that in each theater of operations G-2 activities were merely a part of the Army's operations and were not considered to be part of the intelligence organization directed from Washington.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then discussed briefly his proposed organization chart for the Central Intelligence Group. He noted that there would be an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff to assist in the coordination of all intelligence activities related to the national security. There would then be four offices to conduct C.I.G. operations, namely, Special Operations, Collection, Research and Evaluation, and Dissemination.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

After further discussion,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

- a. Noted General Vandenberg's report on the Central Intelligence Group.
- b. Noted that the Secretary of State would discuss with the Bureau of the Budget the solution of the problems mentioned by General Vandenberg, and would report back to the Authority.
- c. Noted the organization of the Central Intelligence Group which General Vandenberg was planning to put into effect.

~~TOP SECRET~~

no circulation
~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 19

N.I.A. 5th Meeting

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 214,
Department of State Building,
on Wednesday, 7 August 1946, at 10:30 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Personal
Representative of the President
Colonel Donald H. Galloway, USA, representing
the Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Assistant Secretary of State Donald Russell
Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden
Colonel William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and
Intelligence
Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN

SECRETARIAT

Colonel Donald H. Galloway, USA, acting for
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.

TOP SECRET
NIA 5th Meeting

TOP SECRET1. WITHDRAWAL OF F.B.I. REPRESENTATIVES FROM LATIN AMERICA

MR. RUSSELL stated that the Department of State was very much concerned over the intention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to withdraw its representatives from Latin America prior to the time that the personnel of the Central Intelligence Group could properly replace them. He outlined the understanding of the Department of State that the F.B.I. was obligated to remain in Latin America until June 30, 1947, if necessary.

ADMIRAL LEAHY indicated that that was the understanding of the National Intelligence Authority, and he was surprised to learn that the F.B.I. was withdrawing its representatives from the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica by August 16. He inquired as to whether or not General Vandenberg had been informed.

COLONEL GALLOWAY stated that General Vandenberg had been informed and that he had requested the Director of the F.B.I. to reconsider his decision and to retain his personnel until the C.I.G. representatives could adequately replace them. However, Mr. Hoover had informed General Vandenberg that this was impracticable.

MR. BRADEN stated that he had made efforts to induce the F.B.I. to keep its personnel in these two countries without avail, and that he had also been informed, on August 6, that the F.B.I. was contemplating withdrawing their personnel from Haiti, El Salvador, and Tegucigalpa on 30 September.

{ COLONEL GALLOWAY informed the N.I.A. that the C.I.G., by withdrawing an operative from a European post, was prepared to send him immediately to Costa Rica to replace the F.B.I. agent being withdrawn from that locality; that the Department of State had been advised to this effect, and that the only thing that was preventing the departure of this C.I.G. operative was the processing of his papers by the Department of State. }

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Directed the representative of the Central Intelligence Group to draft a letter, for the signature of the members of the Authority, to the Attorney General, requesting him to direct the F.B.I. to retain its personnel in the Latin American countries to which presently assigned until C.I.G. personnel could properly replace them. It was also desired that a period of turnover be provided for so that the new organization could be properly oriented and be given contacts in each country.

The meeting adjourned at approximately 11:00 a.m.

TOP SECRET
NIA 5th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~COPY NO. 19N.I.A. 6th Meeting

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 214,
Department of State Building,
on Wednesday, 21 August 1946, at 11:00 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in the Chair
 Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
 Personal Representative of the President.
 General Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
 Director of Central Intelligence.

ALSO PRESENT

Assistant Secretary of State William Benton
 Colonel William A. Eddy, Special Assistant
 to the Secretary of State for Research
 and Intelligence
 Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State
 Colonel Charles W. McCarthy, USA
 Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.

25X1

Document No.	
No Change in Class.	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified	
Class. Changed to: TS (S) C	
Next Review Date:	
Auth.: HR 70-3	
Date: 26 Aug 91	

~~TOP SECRET~~

NIA 6th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN
ATOMIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENTS AND POTENTIALITIES
(N.I.A. 6)

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that the present position is that, despite the President's directive establishing N.I.A. and its implementation, the Manhattan Engineer District under General Groves has a small division collecting information on foreign activities in the field of atomic energy. It seemed to Secretary Patterson senseless to have this division isolated without any connection with or relationship to C.I.G. He stated that he had talked with General Groves about this problem. Secretary Patterson believes that the N.I.A. will be carrying out the President's directive only if this division is transferred. He is not concerned particularly as to where it is transferred, although he approves the proposed transfer to C.I.G. This intelligence division has nothing to do with the Manhattan Engineer District proper and therefore has nothing to do with the Atomic Energy Commission. Even if it did, it would still come under the terms of the President's directive to N.I.A. At the present time the intelligence on this subject is lost and is not available to the agencies represented on N.I.A.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL questioned whether it is intended to deny the use of this information to the Atomic Energy Commission.

SECRETARY PATTERSON felt that the information involved has nothing to do with ideas for improving our own atomic energy program since we are already so far ahead of other nations.

SECRETARY ACHESON said that he was troubled by this paper and had spoken about it to the President who was not familiar with it. Secretary Acheson said that he had been informed that the Atomic Energy Commission would be almost entirely dependent on foreign sources of uranium ore. He understood that it was one function of General Groves' intelligence group to find out where uranium ore is and how to get it to this country or to deny it to others. The President expressed the opinion that this paper might be all right but that, if it is carried out before the Commission is established, it may take away from them an important part of their activities. The President felt that it would be wiser to let the matter rest until the Commission is established.

SECRETARY PATTERSON pointed out that the transfer of only a few people here and abroad is involved. Their sole job is to watch what is going on in foreign countries in the development of atomic energy. The present position is hard to defend and Secretary Patterson believed that the N.I.A. should have taken this action before this. He noted that this was an Army unit under General Groves, about which General Vandenberg knows nothing. Secretary Patterson expressed the belief that it has nothing to do with the statutory authority of the Atomic Energy Commission since it involves what he considers to be a military intelligence unit.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he was favorably impressed with the paper but had not wanted to act on it in a hurry. He found no fault with it on the assumptions expressed by Secretary Patterson.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL felt that it was urgent that something be done. He stressed the fact that there was no intent to deny the information involved to the Atomic Energy Commission.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRETARY PATTERSON agreed on the urgency. He felt that the Commission will have a big job to do, of which this is only a small segment. He believed that the Army and Navy would be open to serious criticism if they did not act on this matter. He felt that they could not go on treating this new field of intelligence concerning atomic energy as if it didn't exist because they knew nothing about it.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he would hate to have anyone think that C.I.G. withheld material from any governmental agency that needed it, since the furnishing of such information is basically the mission of C.I.G. If the N.I.A. authorizes C.I.G. to furnish this information to the Atomic Energy Commission, he will certainly do it. He feels that C.I.G. can perform this function more efficiently since it can use all collecting facilities, whereas neither General Groves nor the Commission are or will be able to do this. At the present time the intelligence agencies are not cooperating with the Manhattan Engineer District because it is a one-way street. The best source of this information, according to General Groves, has been SSU, which will be replaced by C.I.G.'s Special Operations. If this nation is to know about foreign developments in this field, it must use all sources. If the N.I.A. approves this paper, the entire intelligence organization of the government will be utilized.

SECRETARY PATTERSON pointed out that if General Groves had information that the Russians were prepared to use atomic bombs, the members of N.I.A. would not know about it.

SECRETARY ACHESON stated that he was not clear about the facts. He agreed that insofar as this involves finding out what other countries are doing, it should be under General Vandenberg. If, however, it involves finding out where uranium ore is, this is of vital interest to the Atomic Energy Commission.

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that General Groves is performing this function in complete isolation. Mr. Patterson feels this is hostile to the spirit and probably the letter of the President's directive establishing N.I.A.

ADMIRAL LEAHY believed it was conceivable that the Commission might find it necessary to build up an intelligence organization of its own. He felt that this organization, however, should coordinate with C.I.G.

SECRETARY ACHESON thought it would be a mistake to do anything in the week or ten days before the Commission is appointed. He also understands that this is the President's wish.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL could see no great harm that would be done by acting now and was very reluctant to delay action on this matter.

SECRETARY PATTERSON pointed out that this could not be accomplished after the Commission is appointed because then the personnel involved would be under the Commission. If he was a member of the Commission, he would ask for all that General Groves has, would take up the important problems first, and in the meantime freeze all personnel. It would, therefore, involve serious delay to ask the permission of the Commission.

SECRETARY ACHESON felt that these points were the strongest reasons for not acting at this time.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that it was the intent of N.I.A. to draw together all intelligence activities of this type. He felt that there should not be one unit separate and isolated. If this principle were sound, he believed the N.I.A. should approve this paper.

SECRETARY PATTERSON reiterated that this involved only military information. The whole subject involved is military and will be unless the United Nations is perfected and international controls are effected. He considered that it would be extremely derelict to frame major policies without considering what other countries are doing in this field.

ADMIRAL LEAHY believed that the Commission could get better information from C.I.G. than from any organization that might be set up for some time to come. He pointed out that the N.I.A. has the authority to direct C.I.G. to furnish this information to the Commission.

SECRETARY ACHESON observed that naturally all N.I.A. members would do whatever the President desires. He suggested that Admiral Leahy might clear this paper with the President.

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that he of course had no objection to taking it up with the President but questioned the need since the matter falls so clearly within the directive to N.I.A.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he agreed with Secretary Patterson and Secretary Forrestal. He thought it would be possible to reverse the decision, if necessary, after the Commission is established.

SECRETARY ACHESON was concerned about acting too hurriedly. He said that the wording sounded all right to him but that this was a very complex subject. He thought that if similar wording were used regarding a matter of finance, the N.I.A. wouldn't act because they would be familiar with the fact that the Treasury Department would be deeply concerned. He agreed that it might be necessary to coerce the Commission on this matter, but in any case he felt that they should have an opportunity to express their views.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that C.I.G. was interested primarily in obtaining the existing organization since C.I.G. is not now getting the necessary information. He suggested that the unit might be transferred to C.I.G.; then if the Commission asks N.I.A. to reconsider, the unit will be intact for any future disposition decided upon.

SECRETARY PATTERSON noted that he had taken the view regarding other units of the Manhattan Engineer District, that they should be kept intact for the Commission. This unit, however, dealt with military intelligence and fell within the terms of the President's directive to N.I.A. He, therefore, felt that the proposed action could be taken immediately.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked why it would not be possible for C.I.G. to go ahead and do this type of intelligence in addition to Groves' people.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that this might result in having two agents in the field on the same mission, which always results in one exposing the other.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then suggested that the N.I.A. direct C.I.G. to collect and evaluate the information, without transferring the unit at this time.

GENERAL VANDENBERG noted that the individuals are a part of General Groves' personal staff and they have been brought to the point where they know generally all that General Groves knows. They are, therefore, in a position to tell other agencies to collect certain information without divulging their background knowledge on atomic energy. If, however, C.I.G. sets up a new unit it must inform additional people of the basic atomic energy secrets, which might further jeopardize their security.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL believed that N.I.A. would be doing a dangerous thing to mark time on this matter.

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that he already has the power to send the intelligence personnel involved to G-2 right away. He can not, however, transfer them to C.I.G. without N.I.A. agreement.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that he wanted the record to show that, if the Atomic Energy Commission is created, he does not want the military people who are charged with national defense to be denied this vital information regarding foreign atomic energy developments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG noted that that was exactly the position to date.

MR. LAY suggested that, since the Atomic Energy Commission was not mentioned in the directive, an additional paragraph might be added to the effect that intelligence produced as a result of this directive should be made available as required to the Commission.

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested amending this to indicate that C.I.G. would make the intelligence available "as directed by N.I.A."

MR. BENTON suggested an additional paragraph to the effect that this directive would be reviewed with the Atomic Energy Commission when established.

ADMIRAL LEAHY proposed certain editorial amendments. He then suggested that the proposed directive be rephrased either with or without the proposed amendments, and sent by telegram to the President with a notation to the effect that the N.I.A. recommends approval without prejudice to any future change that may be desired by the Atomic Energy Commission.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:-

a. Agreed to recommend that the President approve the directive in the Enclosure to N.I.A. 6, amended as follows, with an understanding that any action taken by the N.I.A. will be without prejudice to future change that may be desired by the Atomic Energy Commission:

(1) Page 3, paragraph 1, line 4 change "N.I.A. coordination" to read "coordinationa by N.I.A."

(2) Page 3, paragraph 1, line 5, change "affecting" to read "which may affect."

b. Noted that Admiral Leahy would transmit the above agreement to the President by telegram. (The President subsequently replied that he wished to defer taking action until he returned to Washington.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

S E C R E T

COPY NO. _____

N.I.A. 7th Meeting

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 214
Department of State Building
on Wednesday, 25 September 1946, at 11:15 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Acting Secretary of State William L. Clayton, in the
Chair
Secretary of War Robert F. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Personal Representative of the President
Lieut. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Under Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen
Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.

SECRET

NIA 7th Meeting

1. REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL VANDENBERG, using a series of charts, presented a report on the activities of the Central Intelligence Group.

GENERAL VANDENBERG first noted the objectives of the C.I.G. as expressed in the President's letter of 22 January 1946 and N.I.A. Directives Nos. 1 and 5. He then presented a definition of "intelligence related to the national security" as interpreted by the C.I.G. He enumerated the following steps as essential to the production of such intelligence:

- a. Anticipating needs.
- b. Determining most effective means.
- c. Ensuring collection.
- 4. Receiving all available intelligence information.
- e. Checking each item against all others.
- f. Correlating political, military, economic and other implications.
- g. Reporting in useful form to appropriate officials.

GENERAL VANDENBERG showed the initial organization of the C.I.G. which was designed primarily for planning, except for a small staff preparing the daily factual summary of incoming cables and dispatches. He noted that the question of central intelligence services was left for subsequent decision.

GENERAL VANDENBERG submitted a list of 31 projects which had been referred to C.I.G. for study by one or more intelligence agencies. In the light of the study of these projects and the experience gained up to that time, C.I.G. was reorganized on 22 July along lines explained by General Vandenberg. He noted that the need for such a reorganization was noted in Admiral Souers' final report to the National Intelligence Authority. General Vandenberg analyzed the personnel allocations for this organization at the present time and as estimated for 31 December 1946.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then listed over 20 accomplishments of the C.I.G. to date, stressing the fact that while many of these were incomplete and continuing projects, an agreement as to the proper line of action in each case had already been reached.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that he was dubious about the destruction of the F.B.I. operation in Latin America. He considered these peripheral areas, such as Mexico, Cuba, etc., to be extremely important to our national security, and thought that the F.B.I. had conducted a very effective intelligence activity there. He asked General Vandenberg whether he was satisfied with the present arrangement.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that the F.B.I. had conducted a very effective intelligence operation. He explained, however, that the F.B.I. had agreed to turn over to C.I.G. the contacts it had developed in Latin America. This turnover, of course, would take time to accomplish, but if it is carried out as agreed at present, there should not be any serious interruption in the operation.

In answer to a question by Mr. Hickerson, ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that, at the insistence of Mr. Hoover, the C.I.G. was precluded from hiring former F.B.I. men in Latin America.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he was recruiting personnel on this activity by personal contact.

[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

SECRET

GENERAL VANDENBERG then listed 19 problems in the coordination of intelligence activities that are in process in C.I.G. for which solutions have not yet been devised.

ADMIRAL LEAHY commented that the problems enumerated were very far-reaching, and it was not hard to understand why solutions had not yet been found.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained certain general plans for C.I.G. intelligence operations overseas and for the F.B.I.S. activity.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then presented some of the difficulties faced by C.I.G. of which he felt the N.I.A. should be apprised. First of all, he stressed the fact that C.I.G. could not produce national intelligence without all the intelligence information available to the Government. In this regard he felt strongly that only trained C.I.G. personnel could determine whether a given piece of information contained important intelligence implications. He noted that to the best of his knowledge the State and Navy Departments were furnishing complete coverage of their information. Some of the main sources of information to which C.I.G. did not have access were the President's messages, General Marshall's messages, and War Department OPD "eyes only" messages. He felt that the best solution was to have a trained C.I.G. officer who was acceptable to each department stationed in the message center of each department where he could review the messages and transmit to C.I.G., subject to any necessary restrictions, those messages having intelligence value.

SECRETARY PATTERSON expressed the belief that such an arrangement could be made.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then noted the difficult problem of the relationship between C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He pointed out that the Joint Intelligence Committee duplicates the work of C.I.G. Also, J.I.C. intelligence coordination activities may conflict with similar C.I.G. activities. He said that J.I.C. studies generally receive priority in the War and Navy intelligence agencies since the J.C.S. were the immediate superiors of the heads of those agencies. The possibility of combining C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) had been considered, but raised difficulties since C.I.G. might then be serving two masters. He said that the solution was a difficult one, but that it was being carefully studied.

SECRETARY PATTERSON said that he did not see why the J.I.S. should not be disbanded.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that this appeared to be the proper solution, and said that he had so stated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He observed that this was not an easy problem to solve, but he thought that a workable solution would be found.

GENERAL VANDENBERG noted that a third difficulty which was under active consideration was the relationship of C.I.G. to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

A fourth and most serious difficulty enumerated by General Vandenberg was the relationship of N.I.A. to the Atomic Energy Commission. He pointed out that the Atomic Energy Act created an independent agency which had the authority to engage in extremely important intelligence activities without coordination by the N.I.A. Furthermore, it was rumored that the Commission would conduct a foreign intelligence operation which would involve a grave danger of conflict with similar C.I.G. operations.

SECRET

- 2 -

NIA 7th Meeting

SECRET

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he thought the President would do the best he can to turn atomic energy intelligence activities over to the N.I.A. The President, however, does not want to act until the Atomic Energy Commission is appointed. Admiral Leahy thinks that this matter will be arranged, but cannot say definitely at this time.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that a fifth difficulty was the procurement of key Army and Naval personnel for C.I.G. He said that the present C.I.G. ceiling for Naval officers was 13, and that a request for an increase to 65 was under consideration in the Navy Department but had not been confirmed. He stated that any assistance in this matter which Secretary Forrestal might render would be extremely helpful.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL agreed to look into the present status of this request.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then explained that Army and Naval officers assigned to C.I.G. were fearful that they might lose their normal opportunities for promotion. He felt that a few key promotions in C.I.G. at this time would be of the greatest value in improving morale. He therefore requested that the Secretaries of War and the Navy press for the promotion of certain C.I.G. personnel.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then presented a chart showing the time required for processing a typical C.I.G. field officer to be from four to six months. He explained that this was intended to indicate one of the reasons for what might seem to be delay in establishing field operations such as in Latin America. He assured the N.I.A. that every attempt was being made to reduce the length of time involved in this processing.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that he would prefer to see this work done carefully rather than too hurriedly.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Noted the report of C.I.G. activities by General Vandenberg.

SECRET

- 3 -

NIA 7th Meeting

S E C R E T

COPY NO. _____

N.I.A. 8th Meeting

(SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 214,
Department of State Building,
on Wednesday, 16 October 1946, at 11:15 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in the Chair
 Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
 Personal Representative of the President
 General Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
 Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Under Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
 Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
 Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
 Assistant Secretary of State Donald Russell
 Mr. John D. Hickerson, Department of State
 Mr. Dean Rusk, War Department
 Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
 Colonel William H. Harris, CIG
 Mr. Edward R. Saunders, CIG

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, N.I.A.

MORI/CDF

SECRET
NIA 8th Meeting

S E C R E T1. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1948

SECRETARY ACHESON said that he had received a recommendation by the CIG Budget Review Board that the NIA approve and sign an authorization to the Director of Central Intelligence to submit a budget of specified amount for the fiscal year 1948. He said that General Vandenberg had been asked to talk to the NIA about this recommendation.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that he did not think the NIA wanted a detailed discussion of this proposed budget, but he had brought men along who could explain any point the NIA questioned.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked how much money the CIG planned to spend during the current fiscal year.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated the amount now available to CIG for the conduct of present operations. He explained that many of the CIG personnel, were now being paid by the participating departments rather than by CIG. In 1948 it was proposed that CIG would reimburse the departments for any personnel assigned to CIG. He felt that this was proper since CIG would be submitting a separate budget for 1948.

SECRETARY ACHESON asked whether this meant that the proposed budget was not based upon the present Presidential directive establishing NIA and CIG.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that the proposed budget was based on the present Presidential directive. He said that it was designed to cover CIG activities which would grow out of existing NIA directives. He explained that it was visualized that this budget would necessarily be larger than normal during the period of training and establishment of overseas operations. Once personnel had been established in overseas posts, expenses would only be required to take care of normal turnover of personnel. It was contemplated, therefore, that this might be the highest budget CIG would have to submit.

SECRETARY PATTERSON asked for an explanation of the breakdown of vouchered and unvouchered funds.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that this contemplated using vouchered funds for domestic activities and unvouchered funds for all foreign activities. He said they used this basis for vouchered funds in an effort to approximate the basis used by other Government departments. He said that he would like to keep unvouchered funds to a minimum necessary to safeguard security.

SECRETARY ACHESON asked what the proposed budget would be if personnel were not assigned from departments on a reimbursable basis.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he was unable to estimate such a figure since he did not know how many CIG personnel would be service personnel or others assigned from departments. He explained that this budget was based on the total personnel required, including any service personnel at their comparable civilian grades and salaries. He said that if NIA so desired, he would attempt to make another guess, but explained that it would be very difficult to arrive at a more accurate estimate at this time.

SECRET
NIA 8th Meeting

- 1 -

S E C R E T

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that this budget was bound to be nothing more than a guess.

SECRETARY ACHESON believed that the budget people would raise the point that the reimbursable feature in this budget would undoubtedly create some duplication between CIG and the departmental budgets.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that this point had already been discussed with the Bureau of the Budget.

ADMIRAL LEAHY questioned the size of the estimate for Personnel and Administration.

COLONEL HARRIS granted that this figure might look large, but explained that it was designed to furnish support for all CIG activities at home and abroad. He said that CIG had used the experience of the Joint Logistics Plans Committee and the Army Service Forces, which indicated that 25% for support was the best planning figure. This proposed budget was based on the assumption that CIG would not depend on the departments for any supplies or support. Therefore, the CIG figure was actually less than the normal 25% planning figure. Of this, a large proportion would be engaged in communications work alone. In addition, all supplies and services for all CIG offices are included in the figures shown for Personnel and Administration.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed the belief that many of the functions enumerated were now being performed by existing agencies who might be able to handle CIG requirements more economically.

COLONEL HARRIS said that this procedure would be questionable since it would jeopardize security in the purchase and shipment of supplies. He also noted that the actual number of personnel engaged in normal procurement, supplies, personnel, and medical activities was actually very small for the size of the organization.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then expressed the feeling that the budget for Research and Evaluation looked rather large.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked how many people OSS had engaged in similar activities.

MR. RUSSELL said that OSS had at one time about 1,400 engaged in research. He explained, however, that the State Department had taken over the remainder of that organization and, therefore, State's research personnel should be added to the CIG figure if they were to be compared with OSS.

COLONEL HARRIS noted that OSS had not attempted to cover Latin America or General MacArthur's theater, as CIG would do. He also explained that the departments had asked CIG to investigate taking over the Washington Document Center. CIG had also been asked to establish an information center. He said that the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS had been used only because it was considered the best norm for estimating purposes, except that CIG would cover much more territory in their activities.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked what the Washington Document Center was.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that this unit was exploiting documents from Japan for certain intelligence purposes. He explained that it was not a permanent unit, but will probably complete its work in about a year and a half.

SECRET
NIA 8th Meeting

SECRET

MR. RUSSELL noted that if the CIG budget was based on the former OSS Research and Analysis Branch, this would create complications, since the State Department has already asked for funds for the successor to that Branch.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that CIG had not used OSS as a basis in order to establish a similar or duplicative unit. CIG had only used OSS as an example of the research personnel required to cover certain areas of the world. He explained that CIG required this research personnel to put together the finished intelligence from the departments plus information collected by CIG itself, and to give all this material a national slant. He noted that even when CIG receives finished intelligence from the departments, CIG still has to analyze it and find out whether it is pointed up from a national point of view. Each agency normally prepares intelligence from its own departmental viewpoint. There must, therefore, always be in CIG a research unit which looks at the intelligence from the viewpoint of all departments rather than any one. He assured NIA that CIG was not going to do the same research done by the departments, but rather would cover marginal areas and fill gaps not covered by any department.

MR. EDDY stated that originally the figure for CIG Research and Evaluation had struck him as being rather large. Further examination indicated that CIG was being asked to do research on large areas which no department can do. He thought that CIG might well have to build up its research organization to the size indicated in the budget.

GENERAL VANDENBERG assured the NIA that CIG had no intent to infringe upon the fields of primary interest to the departments. He noted that both he and the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board were watching that point very carefully.

MR. RUSSELL asked if CIG could not call its office something other than Research and Evaluation. He explained that this name was so similar to that used by the State Department that it might cause difficulty in obtaining appropriations since it would appear to involve duplication.

GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed that he would change the name of the CIG office.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked what objection the NIA would have to authorizing the Director of Central Intelligence to proceed to attempt to obtain the proposed budget. He thought that if this amount could be obtained it could certainly be used judiciously in furnishing intelligence services. If there was a possibility of obtaining this amount, he thought General Vandenberg should at least try to get it. If the budget should be cut, it would then be necessary to cut the cloth to fit the reduced amount.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked what Congressional committee General Vandenberg had appeared before.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that he had always appeared before the Appropriations Committee.

COLONEL HARRIS explained that the plan was to hide the CIG budget in the various departmental budgets. Then at an agreed time, as arranged by the Bureau of the Budget, General Vandenberg would appear before the Appropriations Committees to justify the CIG budget as a unit.

SECRET

NIA 8th Meeting

- 3 -

S E C R E T

COLONEL HARRIS, in answer to a question by Secretary Forrestal, said that only two individuals in the Bureau of the Budget saw the integrated CIG budget.

GENERAL VANDENBERG explained that both of these men have been investigated for security by CIG.

SECRETARY PATTERSON asked what the final form of the CIG budget would be. He wondered whether it would appear anywhere as so many dollars for CIG activities.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that it would appear nowhere in that form.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said it was his understanding that it would be buried in the budgets of the various departments.

GENERAL VANDENBERG confirmed that this was the arrangement which had been worked out with the concurrence of the Bureau of the Budget.

SECRETARY ACHESON, in answer to a question by Admiral Leahy, said that this meeting had been called at his request. He had thought it would be wise, before approving a budget of this size, to have a clear idea as to why this action had been taken. He thought that the discussion had been very helpful in that regard.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that the important thing, as he was sure General Vandenberg realized, was that CIG should screen the use of its money, particularly its personnel, so that there would be no revulsion in the next Congress.

MR. RUSSELL then made a helpful suggestion as to the basis for estimating the proportion of vouchered and unvouchered funds.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved and signed a memorandum authorizing the Director of Central Intelligence to submit a budget of specified amount for the fiscal year 1948.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO. 18

N.I.A. 9th Meeting

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 214,
Department of State Building,
on Wednesday, 12 February 1947, at 11:00 a.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy,
Personal Representative of the President
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen
Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Department of State
Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. J. S. Earman, Acting Secretary

25X1

MORI/CDF

~~TOP SECRET~~
NIA 9th Meeting

- 1 -

Document No.
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS (S) C
Next Review Date:
Auth.: HA 73-3
Date: 26 Aug 91
By:

~~TOP SECRET~~

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING
TO FOREIGN ATOMIC ENERGY INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENTS
AND POTENTIALITIES

(N.I.A. 6)

Memo. 13/47

SECRETARY PATTERSON gave a brief report on the present status of N.I.A. 6. He stated that the Atomic Energy Commission desired to retain three people to go over information contained in the files to be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group. He said that these three people were to search these files for information pertaining to uranium deposits and such information was to be retained by the Commission. Secretary Patterson suggested that C.I.G. take up the matter of the transfer of the personnel with Mr. Lilienthal.

After some discussion,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Agreed to the transfer of the personnel mentioned in N.I.A. 6 and directed the Director of Central Intelligence to work out the details with Mr. Lilienthal.

(Transfer subsequently completed on 18 February 1947)

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

At Secretary Marshall's request, GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that his last report was rather comprehensive in pointing out the accomplishments of C.I.G. since its inception. However, this time he wished to report some of the difficulties encountered by C.I.G. He said that before taking up these difficulties he wished to point out a few accomplishments recently effected by C.I.G.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that when it was first agreed that the C.I.G. take over the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the South American field, there was some doubt as to whether C.I.G. could ably accomplish this assignment. He mentioned that he had received a letter from Ambassador Pauley which commended the smooth transfer of these activities accomplished by the C.I.G. representative attached to his staff. General Vandenberg also mentioned that Mr. Dawson of the State Department had also stated that the

~~TOP SECRET~~

NL 9th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

C.I.G.'s representatives who had replaced the F.B.I. personnel were of a particularly high type. General Vandenberg brought out the point that C.I.G. had a roving mission to check these newly assigned personnel in South America and their reports indicated that they were carrying out their functions in an exemplary manner.

GENERAL VANDENBERG then gave a brief report on 25X1



GENERAL VANDENBERG said that [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] prior to a 25X1

trip to South America, had consented to being briefed and seemed enthusiastic regarding the method of collaboration proposed by C.I.G. General Vandenberg went on to state that [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] had said he would be more than pleased to be briefed 25X1 by C.I.G. before any future trips that he might make and also that he would make available any of his employees whom C.I.G. might desire to brief prior to trips they might make.

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that C.I.G. was coordinating the exploitation of documents collected in the Far East and that plans are now being completed for similar exploitation of documents from Europe.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated he would now like to mention some of the principal difficulties being encountered by C.I.G. in its operations. He said that what he believed to be essential coordination to reduce duplication had been retarded by an uncertainty as to the directive authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. He said that the President specified that the Director of Central Intelligence shall "plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the departments as relate to the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission." (Paragraph 3 of President's letter of 22 January 1946, emphasis added)

GENERAL VANDENBERG further stated that the National Intelligence Authority specified that; "Recommendations approved by this Authority will where practicable govern the intelligence activities of the separate departments represented herein. The members of the Intelligence Advisory Board will each be responsible for insuring that approved recommendations are executed within their respective departments." (NIA Directive No. 1, par. 4)

GENERAL VANDENBERG said that the National Intelligence Authority specified that: "The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby authorized and directed to act for this Authority in coordinating all federal foreign activities related to the national security to insure that the overall policies and objectives established by this Authority are properly implemented and executed," (NIA Directive No. 5, par. 3, emphasis added)

GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out that it was the feeling of the agencies (Intelligence Advisory Board) that the current interpretation of coordination was "by mutual agreement." This placed the Director of Central Intelligence only in the position of an executive secretary to the I.A.B. and that he did not believe this was what was contemplated by the N.I.A. General Vandenberg then pointed out that in some instances it

~~TOP SECRET~~

had taken six to eight months to get agreement on a paper. He stated that in order to rectify this he recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence be considered as having authority similar to that given to the Joint Research and Development Board - "The Joint Research and Development Board shall operate within its jurisdiction as an agency of the Secretaries of War and Navy and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Board so that its decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such." (JRDB 1/1, 6 June 1946, as amended 3 July 1946)

RECOMMEND
#1

GENERAL VANDENBERG suggested that as an alternative to the above recommendation that C.I.G. forward its implementing directives to the N.I.A. members for subsequent issuance from their offices. However, such a practice would be cumbersome and involve a great loss of time on the part of all concerned.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that the production of strategic and national policy intelligence had been hindered further by an uncertainty among the agencies as to its definition. In order to clarify this situation, C.I.G. had developed the following definition, which he requested the N.I.A. approve:- ("Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department.)"

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated it was his understanding that those persons who developed the plan for the creation of a Central Intelligence Group had in mind that the C.I.G. would replace the Joint Intelligence Committee. This, so far, had not taken place, nor had any working relationship been achieved;

~~TOP SECRET~~

further, that J.I.C. continues to have responsibilities paralleling those of C.I.G., and until this is resolved, complete coordination, effectiveness, and efficiency in the national intelligence mission can not be attained. General Vandenberg recommended that J.I.C. be abolished, and that C.I.G. provide the necessary intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said, however, he believed that some members of the J.C.S. had stated that if this were done, it would lower the original concept of a Central Intelligence Group. General Vandenberg said it was difficult for him, in appearing before appropriation committees, to defend C.I.G.'s request for funds since he was constantly confronted with the question as to the amount of overlap in intelligence. It was his understanding that one of the principal tasks expected of the Director of Central Intelligence was the reduction of such overlap to an absolute minimum.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated he would also like to point out that when C.I.G. went to the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments for information, there was constant friction as to whether J.I.C. or C.I.G. should have priority. In short, two agencies were asking for the same type of intelligence but requested in a slightly different manner. This duplication was unnecessary and occupied the time of personnel which should be engaged in more productive intelligence activities.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL then asked whether the question of dissolution of the J.I.C. and the assignment of its duties to C.I.G. had been taken up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL VANDENBERG answered that he believed it had through the I...B. members.

MR. EDDY stated that he thought that it was important now to abolish J.I.C. and to have all interdepartmental intelligence under the C.I.G.

~~TOP SECRET~~
NL 9th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~
After some discussion,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

a. Agreed that while they believed that the J.I.C. should be abolished and its functions assumed by C.I.G., they desired to withhold decision until such time as it had been discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Noted that Admiral Leahy would take up this matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At Secretary Marshall's request, GENERAL VANDENBERG then reread his first recommendation.

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that he saw no alternative to the N.I.A. approving this recommendation. He added, however, that a proviso should be inserted in the recommendation to allow any aggrieved agency to appeal to the N.I.A. through that agency's respective Secretary.

GENERAL VANDENBERG said it was realized that each agency has the inherent right to appeal through its respective Secretary any objection to a specific directive.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that he recommended approval, but that he was in agreement with Secretary Patterson's proviso.

SECRETARY PATTERSON raised the question as to whether General Vandenberg's recommendation would involve C.I.G. entering into the field of operational intelligence of the agencies.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that this was not the intent.

MR. EDDY asked, if authority was delegated by the N.I.A. to the Director of Central Intelligence that his directives shall be considered as emanating from them, would such authority be interpreted to allow the Director of Central Intelligence to draft personnel from other agencies to perform specific jobs.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that C.I.G. had no intention of interpreting this authority as indicated by Mr. Eddy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRETARY PATTERSON asked if C.I.G. was contemplating recommending that some of the intelligence manuals now published by the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments be discontinued.

GENERAL VANDENBERG stated he would like to have an opportunity to look over these publications before answering this question.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated he believed that the proviso to be added to General Vandenberg's recommendation under discussion should read along the following lines: "Provided in cases of objection to specific actions, any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."

MR. EDDY stated he assumed that any directives, before being issued by C.I.G., would normally have had prior discussion by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

GENERAL VANDENBERG concurred.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved the recommendation that "The Director of Central Intelligence shall operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, and the necessary authority is hereby delegated by the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy to the Director of Central Intelligence so that his decisions, orders and directives shall be considered as emanating from them and shall have full force and effect as such, provided any aggrieved agency may have access to that agency's Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."

At Secretary Marshall's request, GENERAL VANDENBERG then repeated his recommended definition of "Strategic and national policy intelligence."

After some discussion, in which General Vandenberg pointed out the reason why an approved definition of this term

~~TOP SECRET~~
NIA 9th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

was needed,

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:

Approved the following definition: "Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department."

SECRETARY MARSHALL stated that in a recent conversation Congressman Taber was concerned from a security standpoint with reference to appropriations for intelligence activities. Secretary Marshall further stated that Mr. Taber had said that it appeared to him that too many people had to be consulted in considering such appropriations. Secretary Marshall went on to state that he believed the best way to maintain proper security was for the President or the Secretary of State to control these funds, and that a request should be made for a flat appropriation.

GENERAL VAIDENBERG stated he had appeared recently before a joint committee, which he was told before appearance would consist of four or five people. However, upon arrival he found there were actually twenty-two people present. He went on to state a subsequent meeting had been called and he would continue to be careful of the information presented. However, he agreed that security of intelligence operations could best be protected by funds which should be concealed and appropriated in a lump sum controlled by one person.

~~TOP SECRET~~
NIA 9th Meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

N.I.A. 10th Meeting

COPY NO. 19

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 5142
New State Department Building
on Thursday, 26 June 1947 at 10:30 A.M.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Secretary of State George C. Marshall,
in the Chair
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
Personal Representative of the President
Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter,
Director of Central Intelligence

ALSO PRESENT

Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen
Under Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan
Mr. William A. Eddy, Department of State
Major General S. J. Chamberlin USA
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis USN
Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge USN
Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. J. S. Earman, Secretary

MORI/CDF

Document No.
No Change in Class. <input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> C
Next Review Date:
Auth: NA 70-3
Date: 26 Aug 51
By:

25X1

NIA 10th Meeting

- 1 -

(1666)

~~TOP SECRET~~

209237
28

DISCUSSION OF THE AUTHORITY GRANTED THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY AT ITS
9TH MEETING TO ISSUE ORDERS AND DIRECTIVES

SECRETARY MARSHALL requested Admiral Hillenkoetter to explain the subject authority approved by the National Intelligence Authority at its last meeting.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER, after a brief explanation, stated that at the present time the Director of Central Intelligence did not need this authority and he felt that its rescission would create a better feeling with the member Intelligence Advisory Board agencies. However, he would be the first to request its reinstatement if ever needed.

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated he had no objection to the withdrawal of the authority provided it was no longer needed.

ADMIRAL LEAHY noted if the authority had not been used to date he did not see the necessity of its withdrawal.

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SULLIVAN asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if he thought the withdrawal of the authority in question would result in better cooperation between the member IAB agencies.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that in his opinion this was correct.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated the authority granted the Director of Central Intelligence to operate within his jurisdiction as the agent for the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and to issue directives in their names made the CIG appear as a gestapo and caused unnecessary friction.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN, upon being questioned by Secretary Patterson, stated he felt Admiral Hillenkoetter was correct in requesting the rescission of the authority.

SECRETARY MARSHALL asked whether the withdrawal of this authority would adversely affect the status of CIG and its relationship with the agencies.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that on the contrary he expected it would improve the relationship.

After further discussion,
 THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY:
 Agreed to withdraw the following authority
 delegated to the Director of Central
 Intelligence "The Director of Central
 Intelligence shall operate within his
 jurisdiction as an agent of the
 Secretaries of State, War and the Navy,
 and the necessary authority is hereby
 delegated by the Secretaries of State,
 War and the Navy to the Director of
 Central Intelligence so that his de-
 cisions, orders and directives shall
 be considered as emanating from them
 and shall have full force and effect
 as such, provided any aggrieved agency
 may have access to that agency's
 Secretary and through him to the N.I.A."

DISCUSSION OF UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY DIRECTED
 AT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER stated he had prepared a letter
 to the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments
 for the signature of the members of the NIA with reference to the
 recent numerous newspaper articles which stated that the Central
 Intelligence Group had usurped various departmental functions and
 forced established operating organizations out of the field.

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated that the presidential letter
 establishing the NIA and the CIG was silent as to the operations of
 CIG and left this responsibility to the NIA.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated the President had no thoughts on
 the details of CIG operations, but at the time of the issuance of
 the letter of 22 January 1946 the President felt he was not receiving
 properly coordinated intelligence reports.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRETARY PATTERSON stated he had received several inquiries with reference to the recent unfavorable publicity of CIG clandestine activities. He said that while he had no reason to believe that CIG was not ably performing this activity, there might be some basis for these accusations and, therefore, he would like to hear any comment the other members of the NIA might have relative to replying to such inquiries.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated it was his opinion that clandestine operations were far less effective when operated by more than one agency. He further stated that such operations could not be any worse now than they were during the time he was in France prior to the late war.

SECRETARY PATTERSON noted that NIA had the authority to delegate conduct of clandestine operations within their respective agencies as they saw fit.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if Mr. Hoover was in sympathy with the present clandestine operations of CIG.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that he was.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that the NIA had to rely on the soundness of the organization to which the operation of clandestine activities was delegated and further he did not see how answers could be given to unfavorable publicity in this regard due to security reasons.

SECRETARY MARSHALL stated that it was his opinion if the operation of clandestine activities were, for example, centered in the War Department, the Navy Department would not agree, and conversely, if these activities were centered in the Navy Department the War Department would not agree. Therefore, they must be in a "neutral" agency.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL suggested that Admiral Hillenkoetter contact the leading newspaper publishers with reference to the printing of criticisms of CIG.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that this had already

been done.

After further discussion

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

Signed the letter to the House Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER gave a brief resume of the
following report:

"Atomic Energy Commission

"It will be recalled that at that last meeting
you approved the issuance of NIA Directive No. 9,
providing for the transfer from the Manhattan
Engineering District to the CIG of military
intelligence personnel and the centralization
in CIG of the coordinating responsibility for
collection, production, and dissemination of
intelligence pertaining to foreign atomic
energy developments. Immediately thereafter
informal working agreements were established,
and we have every reason to hope that a for-
mal agreement is imminent. Admiral Souers
is working with the AEC toward this goal.

"State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

"Running a close second to the Atomic Energy
Commission in importance as a customer of
CIG and, in my opinion, probably leading it
eventually on the basis of volume is the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

"SWNCC is the interdepartmental or national
policy group: CIG is the interdepartmental
or national intelligence group. National
policy should be built on national intelli-
gence. A most satisfactory formal liaison
has been established by CIG with the SWNCC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

secretariat. I plan personally discussing with Mr. Seltzman, the new Chairman of SWNCC, the manner in which CIG can further assist through the preparation of those intelligence reports and studies which the SWNCC committees should have, particularly right now, the Ad Hoc Committee for Economic Aid.

Handwritten notes:
Economic
1/1/60
||

"Joint Research and Development Board

"In implementation of established agreements between the Joint Research and Development Board and CIG, wherein CIG acts as the scientific intelligence facility of the Joint Research and Development Board, detailed working arrangements have been established, formulation of a National Scientific Intelligence Program has been initiated, and JRDB has started a flow of requests to CIG for scientific and technical intelligence. Consideration has been given by CIG in collaboration with the JRDB and the IAB agencies to scientific intelligence, and CIG has made continuing progress in meeting JRDB requirements. One weakness that has been disclosed by CIG coordination is the almost complete lack of fully qualified collectors of scientific intelligence.

(

)

"Joint Chiefs of Staff

"It will be recalled that the NIA has in the past discussed the CIG relationship to the JCS and the confusion and duplication which exists due to a lack of demarcation of duties between CIG and Joint Intelligence Committee of the JCS. To date almost all CIG planning has had to be adjusted to this continuing problem. I understand that the JIC is now considering a proposal which may resolve the

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

matter. I do not know its details. In fact I have no official way of knowing what takes place in JIC. I can only hope that at an early date the Director of Central Intelligence will be placed on the distribution list for JIC papers and will be invited to sit with the JIC, at least as an observer. Without some such close tie-in, there will continue to be a sad lack of coordination.

"CIG Intelligence Program

"In our attempt to meet our responsibilities to the President, to yourselves as members of the NIA, and to such special organizations as I have mentioned above, CIG has, as its personnel and facilities have permitted, gradually developed an intelligence program which when fully activated will, I believe, accomplish what was intended in the President's originating letter of 22 January 1946. "We believe that no military or diplomatic planning can be successfully done except against a background of incontrovertible facts. These facts we call basic intelligence. In one degree or another these facts are needed by each of your departments. We are undertaking to coordinate the compilation of these facts, this basic intelligence, in handbooks to be called National Intelligence Surveys and to make them available in multiple copies to the departments. They will be loose-leaf so that they can be kept currently correct and so that they can be subdivided and

Handwritten notes in the right margin, possibly including the word "CIG" and some illegible scribbles.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

distributed for specialized use. They will contain data on foreign government organization, pertinent history, topography, population and manpower, climate, strategic areas, health, and sanitation, etc. In a form strictly limited to wartime military use, some basic intelligence was compiled by the JIC in the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. We are trying to obtain agreement that this JIC undertaking, which continues in a less active manner, be consolidated with our National Intelligence Surveys. It is my understanding that the JIC is supporting this proposal before the JCS.

"Situation Reports

"Another form of intelligence reference we call Situation Reports. These reports are to cover countries or areas, and those special international subjects not restricted to countries or areas. They are designed to contain a concise summary of the situation, its implications, and its possible or probable effect on our own national security. These reports will also be loose-leaf in form for ready revision. They will give military, naval, political, economic, and diplomatic coverage, and the facilities of the several agencies will be used to a maximum in their preparation.

"From time to time we hope to put out a composite overall analysis of the world situation, based on these separate Situation Reports.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Interagency Coordination of Production

"The line of demarcation between national intelligence and agency intelligence is not always clear. But we try consistently to limit our production efforts strictly to that national intelligence which is essential to national policy planners, leaving to the agencies that agency intelligence required for operational use of departmental officers.


"Further to avoid duplication, CIG has prepared and the IAB has unanimously approved a plan for the interagency coordination of the production of intelligence. The plan attempts to insure complete coverage and eliminate unproductive duplication. We are awaiting the comments of the JCS and the agency planners before submitting it to the NIA.

"Our big problem in the production field is the NIA requirement that the concurrence or comment of each IAB agency to each CIG intelligence report must be obtained, excepting current intelligence reports. I plan to review this situation personally with the IAB.

"Current Intelligence

"By NIA Directive No. 2, CIG is required to produce current intelligence for use of the President, the members of this Authority, and a few others. These are the Daily and Weekly Summaries. Personally, I feel that these summaries are pretty poor, and we are now endeavoring to make changes in them to increase their value. Any suggestions or ideas to make them better would be warmly received."

ILLEGIB



pleased with the contents of the daily summaries, and further he read these summaries every day even going so far as to read the cables attached to his copy.

UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY SULLIVAN stated he thought the information contained in the CIG Weekly Summary was excellently presented.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL stated that the veracity of the contents of the daily and weekly summaries should be without question. He further stated that he made this point since a portion of the information contained in a recent daily summary had not been correct.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER reaffirmed his position that there was great room for improvement.

"Collection Coordination

"Two NIA Directives have been issued affecting the collection of intelligence. One established a program for the overall coordination of collection activities. Recent field surveys by CIG officers indicate that in some posts abroad this directive has had a positive and beneficial effect. In others the generality of its terms has vitiated its force. A continuing study is being made by CIG, and suggestions for improvement will probably be made to the intelligence sections of your departments. With recent budget cuts, the Government's limited facilities must be employed to their maximum efficiency to protect the national security.

"The second Directive announced the current essentials and intelligence objectives of this Government as regards China. The purpose behind this Directive was to pool all agency requirements and allocate them in accordance with field representative capabilities, thus using manpower efficiently and avoiding duplication. Further National Intelligence Requirements are in preparation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

"CIG Collection

"In addition to coordinating agency facilities for collection, CIG maintains centrally, for the benefit of all, four operations.

"There is the Office of Special Operations
(Off the record remarks)

In the Office of Operations are the

1. Contact Branch
2. Documents Branch
3. Foreign Broadcasts Intelligence Branch

"The Contact Branch has continued to develop the exploitation of American organizations and individuals having a foreign intelligence potential. Interagency offices are now operating in New York, Washington, Chicago, and San Francisco. Intelligence classified by the agencies as important has been obtained from these contacts. In addition, a contact register is being developed listing future potential sources.

"The Documents Branch is continuing the work of the old Washington Document Center in the exploitation of captured documents from the Far East and is now absorbing the German Military Document Section and the Special Document Section of the War Department Intelligence Division. Some of these were joint British-Canadian-American projects. This presents a difficulty because of the lack of authority of CIG to maintain liaison with foreign governments, a difficulty which may require NIA resolution. As the backlog of these captured documents decreases, we hope to transfer the attention of our translators to the exploitation of current foreign periodicals.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

"The CIG, under State Department auspices, has recently reached reciprocal agreement in principle with the British Government. This provides for complete interchange of foreign broadcast monitoring material between the BBC monitoring service and our Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Branch. This reciprocal agreement is designed to obtain economical monitoring coverage by a division of the world into U. S. and U. K. zones of monitoring interest. The new arrangement provides for a transfer of our monitoring station in Cairo, an area which is rapidly becoming politically unstable, to the British Crown colony of Cyprus. The British will assume responsibility for our transmissions from Cyprus to London. In return for this concession, as well as for the continuation of the wartime arrangement whereby we receive the entire British monitoring product of BBC, CIG will transmit to London a selected file of our Far-Eastern and Latin-American monitoring product.

"Collection and Dissemination Coordination

"In addition to the above active collection efforts and to field coordination, CIG is devoting much time to the coordination of the collection efforts of the agencies here in Washington through clearing house arrangements and central reading panels.

"Other Problems

"The continued absence of legislation continues to hamper the soundest development of CIG in several directions, both within and without the Government.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

"I believe I should bring to your attention one serious problem. CIG is being called upon by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Research and Development Board, and others for scientific intelligence. CIG is unable fully to meet these requirements because of the general lack of properly qualified collectors of scientific intelligence. Some quarters have proposed the designation of scientific attaches to missions abroad. I have no present solution, but CIG is working closely with Dr. Vannevar Bush to obtain, as may be possible, qualified scientific collectors. Several plans, including one of obtaining scientists and then giving them a course of intelligence, are under discussion. This is admittedly a difficult and urgent problem but one on which we are working and which we hope to solve."

SECRETARY PATTERSON asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if the "CIG Section" in the Unification Bill was satisfactory to CIG.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that it was.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked Admiral Hillenkoetter if General Donovan was in agreement with the present organization of CIG.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that General Donovan, Mr. Cheston, his principal assistant in OSS, and Allen Dulles were in perfect agreement with the present organization of CIG, and further, that Mr. Cheston and Mr. Dulles had agreed to appear before the Committee in CIG's behalf. General Donovan had written a letter to the Committee in CIG's behalf since it was impossible for him to appear personally due to the fact that he was out of the country.

DISCUSSION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JCS, JIC AND THE CIG

As a result of that part of Admiral Hillenkoetter's report on the relationship between the JCS and CIG and the lack of demarcation of duties by the CIG and JIC, SECRETARY PATTERSON stated he thought there had been some previous discussion relative to the dissolution of JIC.

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER replied that this was correct and that the discussion had taken place at the last NIA meeting.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated it was his opinion that JIC should be abolished. However, JCS had under consideration a plan for collaboration between JCS and CIG.

SECRETARY PATTERSON asked General Chamberlin if the JIC at present served any useful function.

GENERAL CHAMBERLIN replied in the affirmative, and noted if JIC were abolished and its functions assumed by CIG it would thus make an outside civilian agency a party to projected war plans.

ADMIRAL LEAHY noted that as a possible solution to this problem intelligence information required by the JCS could be furnished by CIG to JIC, who, in turn, could put the information in the form desired by the JCS.

TRANSFER OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S MAP
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION AND STATE REPRESENT-
TATIVES SERVING WITH JISPB TO CIG

ADMIRAL HILLENKOETTER stated at the request of the State Department member of the Intelligence Advisory Board an investigation of CIG appropriations was made and it appears that CIG can carry these functions for the next fiscal year. The work and product of the subject organizations are of considerable importance to all the member agencies and it had been agreed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the State Department member of the IAB, subject to IAB and NIA approval, that CIG would take over these activities.

SECRETARY MARSHALL stated it would be appreciated if the NIA would approve the transfer of the above-mentioned activities to CIG. He noted that there was a total of 106 employees involved.

After some discussion,
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY
Agreed to the transfer of the State Department's Map Intelligence Division and that Department's representatives serving with the JISPB to the CIG and directed the Director of Central Intelligence to work out the details with the proper authorities in the State Department.

SECRETARY MARSHALL stated he was still troubled by the debates in Congress over the allotment of money for intelligence activities, and further it was his opinion that the allotment of funds for intelligence activities should be appropriated in a lump sum and controlled by one person.

SECRETARY MARSHALL went on to state that Congressman Taber was in agreement and during recent discussions on the appropriation of funds for intelligence activities Mr. Taber stated it was necessary for him to talk to twenty-six different people. Secretary Marshall said it was his belief that the tenor of the conversations of NIA members in appearing before Congressional Committees on the subject of appropriation of funds for intelligence purposes should be that "in order to get our money's worth" the amount of such appropriations must be kept secret and some one person had to be trusted in the disbursement of these funds.