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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

DDI 2594-82
31 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Chairman, National Intelligence Council *HSP*

FROM : Acting National
Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : SNIE 12.6-82, Poland's Prospects Over the
Next 12 to 18 Months

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1. In view of the length of the key judgments and text of the Polish SNIE (12.6-82), I suggest you may wish to send NSPG members a copy with a cover letter listing the major findings in brief. A proposed cover letter is attached.

2. As anticipated in our first discussion, this SNIE was not an easy one to put together. The on-going nature of events, the variety of regional and functional inputs, as well as the hesitant nature in which contradictory judgments were expressed all made for a long and involved production process. I believe the final product justifies the efforts. Most of the credit for this accomplishment goes to (Assistant NIO for USSR-EE) who molded the original inputs into a unified whole, chaired most of the meetings, and finally took all views into account to produce a coherent estimate acceptable to the entire community.

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3. There was general agreement throughout the production process that the uppermost Soviet and Polish priority is on control, that the most likely political course for the next 12 to 18 months is continued or intensified repression, and that the economic situation and prospects are dismal. Community opinion gradually evolved and changed on one major point. When we began writing the SNIE, the community believed it quite possible that Polish authorities could still lose control of the situation and that the Soviets would then intervene militarily. In light of developments in Poland and SOVA analyses, the community now feels that there is little likelihood of such a development.

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4. In addition you should know that the SNIE conceals a number of continuing disagreements about the nature of the Jaruzelski regime and future behavior of the population. Because of the general consensus on the fundamental points highlighted in the preceding paragraph, I felt that it was better to produce an agreed text rather than one filled with footnotes--which would have been the case had we started accommodating any footnotes at all. For your own information, let me outline three broad areas of disagreement:

--Jaruzelski's relationship with the Soviets: DIA felt that he was a Soviet surrogate in Polish uniform whereas CIA and State analysts believed that he was first and foremost a Polish nationalist who may have accommodated the Soviets but who still retained a significant freedom of action. My own view is that, no matter what his own individual preferences, his fundamental tactic toward the Soviets has been preemptive surrender and that his imposition of martial law has so isolated him in the Polish body politic that he has made himself more dependent on the Soviets than ever.

--The governmental program: CIA and State representatives attached greater weight to Jaruzelski's public epousals of reform than do DIA analysts. I think that the priority on control rules out prospects for reforms in the short term.

--Possibility of resistance: DIA analysts saw the prospects for significant resistance as small whereas CIA analysts foresaw continued widespread passive resistance significant enough to affect future political developments. Here I agree with CIA.

5. In general, then, DIA representatives see Poland as being back in the Soviet fold whereas State and CIA representatives view both Jaruzelski and the population as still resisting that type of orthodoxy. Despite my almost completely negative feelings about Jaruzelski, I do think that both popular rejection of the regime (which was originally expressed almost entirely in work slowdowns but which is now coming out in increasingly frank public condemnations of martial law) and economic imperatives (need for at least Western trade, inability of the hard-pressed Soviets to offer acceptable substitutes) still leave open the possibility of a governmental policy change and a gradual return to societal dialogue. The prerequisites for this change are spelled out in the last paragraph of the key judgments which is reproduced verbatim in the proposed cover letter for your signature.

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6. I am also attaching a recent message from the US Ambassador to Poland, Francis Meehan. As you will see, his views closely parallel my own.



Attachments:

1. Proposed Cover Letter
2. Message from Ambassador Meehan
3. SNIE 12.6-82

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DDI 2594-82
31 March 1982
MEMO FOR: DCI
VIA : C/NIC
SUBJECT : SNIE 12.6-82: Poland's Prospects Over the
Next 12 to 18 Months

Distribution:

- 0 - DCI
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- 1 - ER (w/o SNIE 12.6-82)
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- 1 - C/NIC (w/o SNIE 12.6-82)
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- 1 - NIO/USSR-EE File
- 1 - DDI Registry (w/o SNIE 12.6-82)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

1. I am sending you this copy of a Special National Intelligence Estimate recently produced by the Intelligence Community on Poland's Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18 Months.

2. The take-off point for the SNIE is the imposition of martial law which so changed the country's political dynamics that a very broad assessment of the situation was necessary. In the process the SNIE became longer than we would have preferred. For that reason, let me highlight for you the SNIE's major findings:

--The primary Soviet and Polish regime priority is control.

--There is little prospect over the next year or so for political accommodation between the Jaruzelski regime and Polish society, although the regime may well approve certain cosmetic changes in martial law designed to secure a relaxation of Western sanctions. The likelihood is for continued or intensified repression.

--The chances that unorganized violence will occur in the coming months are very high. However, we think that the internal security forces are strong enough to keep any disturbances localized and prevent nationwide disorder--if necessary with the support of some reliable military units. Thus the likelihood of a Soviet military intervention is slight.

--The economic situation is still deteriorating, and it is problematic whether a disastrous further slide can be prevented. The key factor is a shortage of Western imports, which is exacerbated by the impact of Western sanctions.

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--Warsaw will be unable to make any significant principal payments on its \$27 billion dollar debt for the foreseeable future, and will not meet much of the \$2.5 billion dollars in interest due banks in 1982. The risk of default will continue to grow.

--In short, the West cannot expect its pressure to lead to serious political liberalization in Poland over the near term. The most we can hope for is that the combination of Soviet and Polish need for Western economic cooperation, steadfast Western rejection of business-as-usual, and continued passive resistance to the authorities by the Polish population will have some moderating influence on the regime and maintain the possibility of long-term compromise within Polish society.

William J. Casey

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