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The USSR and Its Allies: A Global Presence



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An Intelligence Assessment

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GI 83-10292
December 1983

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [Redacted]
International Security Issues Division, Office of
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**The USSR and Its Allies:
A Global Presence**

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Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 23 December 1983
was used in this report.*

The USSR and its allies have established a presence in strategically important areas of the world in an attempt to extend their influence and concomitantly counter US and Western interests. At present:

- The Soviets—as prominent military suppliers to Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia, and the Yemens and with combat units in Afghanistan—maintain a presence near major sources of Western oil, vital shipping lanes, and strategic choke points, especially Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz.
- Warsaw Pact arms supply relationships with Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania—as well as the Pact arms and Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia—and Soviet and allied support of national liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa place the Soviets and its allies in an area that produces minerals considered of strategic importance to the West and near shipping lanes around the Cape of Good Hope.
- The Soviet and East European military and economic presence in North Africa—major arms agreements with the Libyans and Algerians and more than 50,000 technicians in Libya—places the Soviets and their allies near another vital shipping lane through the Mediterranean. In addition, Libyan support of insurgents threatens moderate governments in the region.
- Access to air and naval facilities in Vietnam provides operational support for the Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea and places the USSR near sea lanes used to supply oil to Japan and in a strategic position along China's southern border.
- In Latin America, the USSR along with Cuba and other allies maintains a presence with an arms supply effort to Nicaragua; arms agreements with Peru; and encouragement of insurgent activity in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
- And in Western Europe, the USSR and its East European allies not only maintain a presence through a large official contingent of diplomatic, commercial, and other representatives but also support—and in some cases direct—local Communist parties.

The USSR, without question, benefits from its presence and the presence of its allies in these regions. In some cases, influence is wielded directly; in others, the presence serves more as a visible reminder of Communist interest in the region and facilitates support for disinformation and other activities designed to influence public and official opinion. Moscow can reap benefits even if its presence or that of its East European and Cuban allies is minimal. For example, both Libya and North Korea act independently of Moscow, but their anti-West activities in support of leftist government and national liberation movements generally support Soviet objectives. Although Moscow cannot be tied directly to terrorist activities, it has derived marginal benefit from the actions of various terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East, insofar as the activities undermine moderate governments.

The effectiveness of Communist efforts to penetrate and influence countries, however, depends on a number of sociopolitical factors. These include local attitudes toward Communism, the strength and political attitudes of the military, the strength of local religions, the degree of stability in the society, and the prevailing attitudes of the country's leadership. To date, gains in influence have mostly involved exploiting local rivalries and keeping regions destabilized.

There are limits to the amount of influence a Soviet or allied presence allows. For example, despite its position as a major arms supplier to Syria and Iraq, the USSR has been unsuccessful in defusing Syrian battles with the PLO or in directing Iraq on the conduct of the war with Iran. Also, the ability of the Soviets to exploit their position in areas near strategic materials or along sea lanes is constrained. Any move to interfere with access to petroleum supplies or international sea lanes would invite a strong Western response, and the structure of world mineral markets is such that the impact of Soviet-sponsored supply disruptions could be minimized by the use of stockpiled materials and substitution.

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The USSR and Its Allies: A Global Presence

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Presence Around the World

The USSR and its allies—primarily Eastern Europe and Cuba—use a variety of methods and programs to increase their presence and influence around the world (see map). Although their presence has increased in every region of the world, this has not always translated into increased influence. This paper examines how the Soviets and their allies try to use official presence and military, economic, and training programs to overtly and covertly influence the policies of other nations, as well as the constraints imposed by internal and external factors.

Official Presence. The official presence of the USSR and its allies abroad includes approximately 40,000 diplomats and trade, cultural, and news representatives: 17,000 from the USSR, 21,000 from Eastern Europe, and 1,600 from Cuba. Half of these representatives are posted to developed countries and half are stationed in the Third World. Overall there has been a more than 50-percent increase in their number during the last decade. In the Third World the distribution is fairly even among Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East/North Africa, and Asia.

Military Transfers. Together, the USSR and Eastern Europe make up the world's largest exporter of military hardware (aircraft, land armaments, ships, and missile equipment), providing weapons to more than 40 LDCs. Since the beginning of the program in 1955, military agreements totaling \$88 billion have been signed with non-Communist Third World countries—\$76 billion in the last decade. The USSR alone earns up to \$6 billion annually in hard currency from military sales. In addition, Cuba and North Korea have become increasingly important sources of military supplies and services, mainly to Middle Eastern and African states. The major buyers of Warsaw Pact arms in recent years have been Libya, Syria, Iraq, India, Algeria, and Ethiopia.

The rapid growth in Soviet and East European arms transfers precipitated a sharp increase in the number of Warsaw Pact military personnel assigned abroad,

mainly to train LDC armed forces and maintain Soviet weaponry. The number of Warsaw Pact military advisers in the Third World, now over 20,000, has doubled in the last 10 years with the majority stationed in the Middle East and North Africa. Cuba also has some 40,000 military advisers and troops, mostly in southern Africa. The Cubans are in the process of augmenting their troop strength in Angola while reducing that in Ethiopia. In Nicaragua the number of Cuban military/security advisers has reportedly continued to increase.

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Economic Programs. Warsaw Pact economic programs around the world are diverse, ranging from economic assistance to the LDCs to a growing commercial presence in the West. These programs have enabled Moscow and its allies to earn hard currency, tap LDC resources, acquire Western technology, and use commercial operations as a cover for covert activities.

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Like the military aid program, Communist economic assistance is directed toward the LDCs. Warsaw Pact economic and technical assistance—though smaller in value than the military program—has reached some 70 LDCs. Of the \$36 billion in credits and grants extended to the Third World since the program began, nearly two-thirds have been provided during the last decade. In addition, 40,000 Soviet civilian technicians work in Third World countries, along with 75,000 East Europeans and 20,000 Cubans—mostly in Africa and the Middle East. Ten years ago, there were fewer than 20,000 Soviet, Cuban, and East European technicians stationed in the Third World.

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The Soviets and East Europeans have also established a network of more than 400 companies in Western and Third World countries that, in addition to standard commercial activities, provide cover for intelligence officers, serve as conduits for covertly transferring funds to sympathetic domestic or international front groups, and facilitate illicit technology transfers.

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Figure 1
 USSR and Other Warsaw Pact Nations:
 Value of Military Agreements With
 Non-Communist LDCs, 1972-82





Figure 2
 USSR and Other Warsaw Pact Nations:
 Value of Economic Aid Agreements With
 Non-Communist LDCs, 1972-82



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Training Programs. Communist training programs for the Third World are even more broadly based than other efforts, reaching more than 100 countries. An increasing number of students, military personnel, and civilian technicians from LDCs are studying both at home and abroad under Communist tutelage. We estimate that there are now over 120,000 trainees from non-Communist countries studying in Communist countries, a threefold increase in the last 10 years. The number includes 85,000 academic students being trained in Soviet and East European schools and an estimated 27,000 students in Cuba. In addition, some 10,000 civilian personnel and military trainees attended training programs in the USSR and Eastern Europe last year.

Nearly half of the Third World students currently in the USSR come from Afghanistan, Jordan, Ethiopia, Madagascar, and Syria. Major recipients of East European scholarships include Greece, Nigeria, Iraq, and Mozambique, and a large share of the students in Cuba are from Sub-Saharan Africa and Nicaragua.

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Table 1
Increase in Presence of Soviets and
Their Allies in Non-Communist LDCs

Warsaw Pact and Cuban Personnel in LDCs	1972	1982	Change
Official presence	12,700	20,300	7,600
Military advisers and technicians *	9,860	61,180	51,320
Civilian technicians	17,600	138,950	121,350
LDC Personnel Trained in Warsaw Pact Countries (cumulative)	1955-72	1955-82	Change
Academic students	55,090	167,090	112,000
Military personnel	32,110	62,780	30,670
Technicians	23,070	63,820	40,750
Warsaw Pact Assistance Programs (billion US \$)	1954-72	1954-82	Change
Economic aid extended to LDCs	12.9	35.9	23.0
Economic aid drawn by LDCs	5.9	15.9	10.0
Military agreements with LDCs	11.6	87.8	76.2
Military deliveries to LDCs	9.2	63.8	54.6

* Includes Cuban troops.

Treaties. The Soviets and their allies also pursue opportunities to formalize their presence via treaties and agreements:

- The USSR now has friendship treaties with 12 Third World countries; eight of these have been signed since 1975. Most of the East European countries have signed similar treaties with these countries.
- Moscow has more than 80 civil aviation agreements in effect with Western and Third World countries, doubling Aeroflot's access in the last decade.
- Maritime agreements are in effect with more than 30 Western and Third World countries, compared to 10 in 1972

Influence and Activities

The expanding Communist presence around the world has allowed Moscow and its allies to influence the actions of other countries, to extend the Communist military capability, and to pursue economic gains


Exerting Influence. The USSR and its allies are well positioned in several countries either to overtly or covertly influence the internal political scene, as well as to influence the behavior of these countries in the international arena. On the overt side, training programs have provided opportunities to penetrate the political, military, and technical establishments of Third World countries by:

- Developing individuals whose future career paths may place them at the levers of power in their country.
- Creating a network of individuals who have a common training experience and who, in time, may permeate the elites and power structure of their countries.
- Providing—especially through the military training program—a means to place significant numbers of Communists in target LDCs.

A number of graduates from Communist training programs have already reached influential positions. For example, alumni include a member of the ruling Sandinista Directorate and several LDC cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and subcabinet directors. There are also alumni in the insurgency movements in El Salvador and South Africa, and some of the bureaucracies and professions in key LDCs have many graduates of Soviet universities. Although such graduates cannot be considered Soviet pawns, a number can be counted on to interpret events with a pro-Soviet twist.

The increased presence of Communist officials overseas has also facilitated covert influence operations, referred to by Moscow as active measures. These activities are, for the most part, carried out by the KGB or similar intelligence entities of allied countries. Some 25 to 30 percent of the Communist official

overseas presence is KGB or other intelligence personnel using a variety of covers. Journalistic cover is particularly prized by the KGB because it permits wider access than diplomatic cover.




The use of official presence to influence opinion was especially evident after the Soviet shutdown of the KAL airliner last summer. In addition to eliciting support from their allies, the Soviets used their presence in non-Communist countries to blunt US criticism of Soviet actions:

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
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Active measures, which are used by the Soviets and their allies to weaken opponents and advance their own interests, include:

- Supporting and guiding the activities of more than 70 nonruling Communist parties.
- Exploiting ties to international and local front groups.
- Penetrating and trying to manipulate mass movements, leftist parties, and labor and student organizations.
- Influencing foreign media through controlled journalists, misleading articles, and forgeries.
- Operating clandestine radio stations (currently involving the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba).
- Using agents of influence to manipulate private channels of communication and exploit unwitting contacts.

- To divert attention from Soviet involvement in the incident, the Soviet Embassy in Bangladesh issued press releases portraying the US Marine contingent in Lebanon as "mass killers" of Lebanese Muslims, according to the US Embassy there.



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Using these programs and measures, the USSR has had some success in garnering support for its position in international forums. For example:

- On controversial UN votes such as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow has been able to line up more than a dozen votes from its Third World clients.
- In a recent UN vote on chemical warfare, a major East-West issue, besides its hardcore supporters—such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Syria—Moscow had the support of several other Third World countries including Algeria, Tunisia, Guyana, and a number of Sub-Saharan African countries.

Although most countries reacted negatively to the Soviet shutdown, Moscow was able to gain some sympathy for its position. Western sanctions imposed on Aeroflot were somewhat muted because the Soviet Union still had access to its major international hubs (Cairo, Bombay, Karachi, Shannon, Havana, and Tripoli).

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In Western Europe a primary focus of Communist activity recently has been exploitation of the West European peace movement and the opposition to deployment of new US missiles in Europe. The Soviets perceive the peace movement as the most effective mass action since the end of World War II and have

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attempted to influence its development and evolution to fit their needs. In addition to urging the West European Communist parties to participate in the movement, they have used their allies—particularly East Germany—and embassy and Novosti press agency personnel to provide covert assistance to organizers of protest demonstrations:

- The West German and West Berlin Communist parties have made the most significant inroads into the movement, committing experienced workers, financial resources, and printing presses. They have taken key positions on coordinating committees of the peace movement and have handled the logistics for mass demonstrations. [redacted]

- Soviet personnel of the Novosti press agency in Bern recruited, organized, and financed "peace" demonstrators for rallies and meetings in Switzerland opposing US intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) deployment. [redacted]
- According to the French Government, some of the 47 Soviets expelled in April 1983 were linked to efforts to manipulate French public opinion through the peace movement, the press, and the Franco-Soviet Friendship Society. [redacted]

Military Activity. The expansion of the Communist military program has made a number of Third World countries dependent on the East for military support. In some cases, this dependency has provided the Soviets with access to military and naval facilities in key LDC regions:

- The Soviets are now the dominant supplier of military equipment to 35 Third World countries, twice the number of a decade ago. Most of these are

in the Middle East; at key locations in Sub-Saharan Africa; or represent politically important clients, such as India. The rapid growth in Soviet arms sales, especially of more advanced weapon systems, also has necessitated a similar increase in the number of military advisers and technicians abroad.

- Although the Soviet Navy minimizes its dependence on overseas facilities by relying heavily on auxiliary ships, access to port facilities or sheltered anchorage is a valuable peacetime convenience. The Soviet Navy has access to some military or commercial facilities in more than a dozen countries—Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, Guinea, Libya, Mozambique, South Yemen, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Vietnam—and occasionally conducts ports of call at a number of other countries—such as Seychelles, Mauritius, India, Algeria, Singapore, Nigeria, Kampuchea, and Benin. 25X1
- Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft—which a decade ago operated only out of Cuba, Egypt, and Somalia—now routinely fly out of Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and occasionally out of Syria and Libya. 25X1
- Soviet military transport aircraft are currently based in seven Third World countries covering four regions—Angola, Mozambique, and Madagascar in Africa; South Yemen and Syria in the Middle East; Afghanistan in South Asia; and Vietnam in East Asia. The aircraft in Syria are configured for electronics countermeasures (ECM). Ten years ago transports were based only in Egypt and Syria. 25X1


The military supply relationship is considered to be of primary importance in establishing influence because it not only creates dependence but also provides direct access to LDC power structures. A recent case of the Soviets' using this relationship with a Third World client to their advantage involved Algerian deliveries of Soviet-supplied weapons to Nicaragua in 1981 and 1982. [redacted] 25X1

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Figure 3
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Type, 1974-82

Hydrographic and space event support ships	Surface combatants ^a
Auxiliaries	General purpose submarines
Amphibious ships	SSBNS
Mine warfare ships	

Ship-days
60,000




^a The data for patrol combatants are included in surface combatant category.

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Figure 4
Distant Deployments of Soviet
Naval Aircraft, 1976-82

Syria, IL-38 May and TU-16 Badger	Vietnam, TU-142 Bear F
Libya, IL-38 May	Vietnam, TU-95 Bear D
Ethiopia, IL-38 May	Angola, TU-95 Bear D
South Yemen, IL-38 May	Cuba, TU-95 Bear D

Aircraft-days in country
5,000



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example, access to air and naval facilities in South Yemen played a key part in Soviet support to Ethiopia—facilitating the deployment of Cuban troops as well as military equipment. Access to ship repair and support facilities in Syria has facilitated Mediterranean operations.

The increased access to military and naval facilities around the world has enabled Moscow to be more responsive to the needs of clients or potential clients and to increase its out-of-area naval presence. For

The deployment of reconnaissance and other aircraft to bases in the Middle East and Africa as well as Vietnam and Cuba has provided the Soviets with an improved capability to monitor US naval and shipping activity in key regions of the world. For example, US naval and shipping activities in the Arabian Sea and southern Red Sea are routinely monitored by Soviet naval reconnaissance flights out of Ethiopia and South Yemen. In other areas, the Soviets have significantly increased their monitoring capabilities in the North Atlantic (from Cuba) and in the South China Sea (from Vietnam). They also have repeatedly tried to regain access for reconnaissance flights from Guinea, which would further extend their capability to monitor US traffic in the Atlantic from Africa. [redacted]


Support to Insurgents and Terrorists. In addition to government-to-government military transfers, the USSR and its allies provide extensive support to revolutionary movements. The Soviets, East Germans, and Bulgarians provide arms, training, and advisers to groups such as the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the African National Congress (ANC), and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Libya has provided money, arms, and training to a variety of Palestinian groups—particularly the more radical elements—and has worked to subvert moderate regimes in the region. Cuba has trained revolutionaries from Africa and Latin America and is a major force behind the Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgents. It not only provides training, financing, and direction to the Salvadorans but is the chief source of weapons and other important supplies. Libya, Vietnam, North Korea, and the PLO have also provided direct or indirect support to insurgents in the Central America/Caribbean region. [redacted]

The Soviets, East Europeans, and Cubans tend to avoid direct involvement in terrorist operations but nevertheless provide haven, training, and other support to revolutionary groups that use violent tactics:

- Arms produced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary have turned up among terrorist supplies in Europe and the Middle East. Moreover, Western weapons originally purchased by KINTEX, a Bulgarian state-controlled import-export enterprise, have been discovered in the possession of Turkish terrorists, according to press reports.

KINTEX purchases arms from international markets and resells them for hard currency.

- East Germany continues to provide support to revolutionary terrorist groups, including permission to operate from its territory. [redacted]



Several of Moscow's more independent allies—including North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Iraq—have become directly involved in terrorist activities. North Korean terrorism has been aimed mainly against South Korea. Libya's participation in planning and executing terrorist operations has ebbed and flowed, although rarely has it ceased entirely. Qadhafi's most recent phase of terrorist activism took place from 1979 to 1981. Syria uses terrorism not only as a tool against Israel but also as a device to strengthen Syrian influence in the Middle East. Exploiting dissension in the Palestinian movement, Syria has supported radical elements in conducting terrorist operations against moderate Palestinians and neighboring Arab states. Iraq, on the other hand, has recently taken steps to reduce support of radical Palestinian groups. [redacted]

Although the USSR cannot be tied directly to terrorist activities conducted or supported by allies, it has done virtually nothing to discourage revolutionary or social violence, unless it has emanated from the right.

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In general, Moscow benefits politically from terrorism that serves to undermine Western interests or the stability of established regimes. [redacted]

first resident diplomatic mission arrived in that country. The Soviets first purchased Nicaraguan sugar in 1980, just after the current leftist regime came to power. [redacted]

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Economic Activity. Moscow considers economic aid a useful tool for expanding influence in the Third World, and its highly focused economic program has been influential. The USSR accounts for less than 3 percent of international aid flows to non-Communist LDCs, and only about \$1 billion of all Soviet economic assistance, totaling some \$23 billion for the 1954-82 period, has been grant aid—most of that going to Marxist clients, such as Afghanistan and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the USSR initially gained entry into Egypt, India, Syria, and a number of other countries through its economic program, and these ties endure even when other relationships wither. For example, in Egypt, although political relations have been cool since 1981, Soviet trade has recovered to about \$700 million a year, and more than 100 technicians are working on economic projects. In Morocco the USSR pledged \$2 billion in credits to exploit new phosphate deposits, and in Nigeria the USSR broke into the Western-dominated equipment market with \$1.2 billion in credits for a new steel mill. A Soviet technical force of more than 5,000 personnel is now working on the construction of the mill. [redacted]

Recently, Moscow has pressed for broad, long-term cooperation agreements with all of its major LDC clients to provide a firmer economic base for long-term planning by client countries, while increasing the USSR's assurance of a stable flow of raw materials—such as crude oil from Iran and Syria, natural gas from Afghanistan, bauxite from Guinea, and alumina from Turkey. [redacted]

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For the USSR and Eastern Europe the technical services program has another advantage; it is one of their most profitable undertakings in LDCs. About two-thirds of the technical personnel work in Arab and other countries that pay hard currency for services. Cuba has also expanded its technical presence in the Third World as a quick and profitable way to increase its influence abroad. Cuba now has technical contingents in over 25 LDCs and has substantially increased its presence in Algeria and Libya, which pay premium prices for Cuban services. [redacted]

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Moscow apparently pursues political goals in some of its trade practices as well. For example, although the majority of Soviet sugar deals are transacted in normal commercial fashion, reflecting primarily supply-and-demand conditions of the sugar market, some seem to exhibit astute political timing by Moscow or a convergence of political and economic interests. During the past nine years, Soviet sugar purchases from Peru occurred only in 1975 and 1980, two years in which there was a change in Peru's government. The purchases may also have been linked with earlier Soviet arms sales to Peru. Zimbabwe is another case in point—the only recent Soviet sugar purchase occurred in 1980, the first year of independence. Having backed the losing faction in the civil war, Moscow apparently felt the need to make a goodwill gesture toward the Mugabe regime by trying to improve trade relations. The only Soviet sugar purchase from Guyana occurred in 1975, the same year that Moscow's

Commercial Activities. The 400 commercial companies established by the Soviets and East Europeans in the West and the LDCs during the past decade have proved valuable in providing the Communists access to markets and to Western technology. Many of those firms were commissioned to study local market conditions, sell equipment, and service products. Subsidiaries now not only provide exclusive marketing services to Communist enterprises but also:


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- Inform parent enterprises of competitive developments.
- Undertake ambitious advertising and promotional campaigns, such as hiring a New York firm to promote Aeroflot service to the United States.


- Maintain the infrastructure (warehouses, support facilities, dealer networks, and service centers) required for effective marketing and servicing of equipment abroad. For example, Emec Trading, Ltd., in Canada distributes and services Soviet turbines, generators, electrical equipment, and ships.
- Modify inappropriately styled or finished Soviet equipment or consumer durables for more demanding Western customers. The Belarus agricultural and automotive companies in Canada and Denmark and automotive distributors such as Scaldi-Volga in Belgium modify equipment for Western use.

Soviet and East European parent organizations support these enterprises both by direct capital contribution and supplier credits [redacted]

While these companies operate as commercial enterprises, they have frequently also been used for covert activities:



- Soviet firms have bought property near NATO Headquarters in Brussels, at the Strait of Gibraltar, and close to sensitive Norwegian military installations, thereby improving surveillance opportunities.
- Employees of Soviet firms in the Netherlands have been expelled from the country in well-publicized espionage cases, [redacted]



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The most flagrant example of illegal activity by a Communist firm involved a Polish company in the United States. POLAMCO—a subsidiary of a Polish Government corporation—is incorporated in Delaware and Illinois with a legitimate enterprise of trade in machine tools. In a well-publicized case, POLAMCO was shown to provide commercial cover for Polish intelligence officers in the United States. Marian Zacharski, a Polish intelligence officer under cover as a vice president of POLAMCO, recruited a radar specialist for the Hughes Aircraft Company who, during a three-year period, passed more than 20 classified reports on advanced US weapon systems to Zacharski in exchange for more than \$100,000. [redacted]

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An Assessment

Increased Communist presence and activity work to Moscow's advantage in key world regions. In the Middle East Soviet resupply of Syria following its defeat by Israel in June 1982, especially the delivery of Soviet-manned SA-5 surface-to-air and SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles, has helped to maintain Soviet political influence in the area. In Sub-Saharan Africa resupply now under way in Angola by the USSR and Cuba may help shore up Communist influence in that country and signal Moscow's steadfastness to other regional clients. In Latin America, especially in Central America and the Caribbean, Cuba and, to a lesser extent, the USSR and Eastern Europe have influence over the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and over the insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala through their steady supply of arms, training, and advice. In Western Europe—although they have not prevented the deployment of US INF missiles—the Communists have influenced the direction of the peace movement in their favor, at times complicating relations between the United States and its European allies. While the Soviets and East Europeans avoid direct involvement in terrorist activities, they generally serve Moscow's aim of undermining democratic societies; such gains, however, must be weighed against the damage that results from Western charges of Soviet complicity in terrorism. [redacted]

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Table 2
Communist Presence in Strategic Areas

	Soviet Friendship Treaty	USSR Major Arms Supplier	Significant Economic Assistance	Soviet Access to Military/ Commercial Facilities	Strategic Interest
Middle East					
Iraq	X	X	X		Near major source of Western oil
North Yemen	X	X	X		Adjacent to Bab el Mandeb choke point
South Yemen	X	X	X	X	Adjacent to Bab el Mandeb choke point
Syria	X	X	X	X	Near major source of Western oil
Turkey			X		Eastern Mediterranean Sea
North Africa					
Algeria		X	X		Near shipping lanes through the Mediterranean
Libya		X		X	Near shipping lanes through the Mediterranean
Morocco			X		Adjacent to Strait of Gibraltar
Tunisia				X	Near shipping lanes through the Mediterranean
Sub-Saharan Africa					
Angola	X	X	X	X	Near shipping lanes and strategic minerals
Congo	X	X			Near shipping lanes and strategic minerals
Ethiopia	X	X	X	X	Major shipping lanes and Red Sea choke point
Guinea		X			Near shipping lanes in Atlantic Ocean
Madagascar		X	X	X	Indian Ocean shipping lanes
Mozambique	X	X	X	X	Near shipping lanes and strategic minerals
Seychelles		X			Indian Ocean shipping lanes
Tanzania		X			Strategic minerals
Zambia		X			Strategic minerals
Asia					
Afghanistan	X	X	X	X	Close to Strait of Hormuz
India	X	X	X		Indian Ocean
Vietnam	X	X	X	X	South China Sea shipping lanes
North Korea	X	X	X		Shipping lanes near Japan and South Korea
Latin America					
Cuba		X	X	X	Near the US and Panama Canal
Nicaragua		X	X		Near Panama Canal
Peru		X	X		Near shipping lanes and strategic minerals

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On balance, the Soviets have experienced more gains than setbacks in increasing their presence and are in a stronger position today to exert influence in key regions than a decade ago. Moreover, it is to Moscow's benefit to continue these activities if exploiting local tensions contributes to continued instability in specific regions, increasing the potential threat to Western interests. In this regard, Moscow succeeds in advancing a key aspect of its foreign policy—keeping Western interests uncertain and subject to disruption.

Although the Soviets and their allies have increased their presence in strategically important areas, their potential to exploit such positions is limited:

- Any move to disrupt petroleum supplies or to interfere with international sea lanes would invite a strong coordinated response from the West.
- Given the structure of the world mineral market, any short-term supply disruptions would have little impact because of reduced world demand resulting from the world economic slowdown, the availability of stockpiled materials, and the ability to substitute other materials.
- Despite progress in acquiring the use of naval and military facilities abroad, Moscow's ability to project power to distant areas is constrained by the lack of a network of bases comparable to that of the United States. Except in Communist countries, the Soviets have not yet secured any permanent basing rights.

In addition, internal political constraints in most LDCs limit Moscow's ability to translate presence into influence. The effectiveness of Communist efforts to penetrate and influence a country depends on a number of sociopolitical factors including local attitudes toward Communism; the strength and political attitudes of the military, often the major stabilizing force in developing countries; the strength of local religions (such as Islam in the Middle East and Catholicism in Latin America, both of which are anti-Communist); the degree of stability in the society; and the prevailing attitudes of the country's leadership. To date the Soviets have increased their aid and presence in nearly all regions of the world—with emphasis on

the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa—but their gains in influence have mainly resulted from exploiting local rivalries and keeping regions destabilized:

- In the Middle East, Syria and Iraq are two of Moscow's largest military clients, but both continue to operate largely independently of Soviet interests. Syria, in its battles with the PLO and its policies toward Israel, is influenced first by Pan-Arabist tendencies and second by Moscow's desires. Iraq, in its war with Iran, is demanding more Soviet weaponry while not adhering to Moscow's wishes regarding the conduct of the war. In Libya—also one of the largest recipients of Soviet arms—Moscow has little control over Qadhafi's Islamic policies.
- In Sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviets, with the help of Cuba, have established strong footholds in Angola and Ethiopia and have become predominant military suppliers to Mozambique and Zambia. In Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, however, rebel activity continues to threaten the stability of the regimes, while Zambia follows independent foreign policies.
- In South Asia, although Soviet-Indian relations have much improved, New Delhi still makes a point of restraining the number of in-country Soviet personnel. In the Indian Ocean, recent attempts by the Soviets to increase their influence in Mauritius have been unsuccessful.
- In Central America, Moscow is reluctant to openly support the Sandinistas in Nicaragua with weapons for fear of agitating the United States. Cuba and Bulgaria have been more directly involved in the military resupply effort, political proselytizing, and development of a Communist infrastructure. The recent US invasion of Grenada will probably temper Soviet and Cuban support of other revolutionary movements in the region, at least in the short term.

Indeed, the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan and incidents such as the shooting down of the KAL airliner last summer have made a number of leaders, particularly in the Third World, increasingly wary of Soviet motives and reluctant to sever ties to the West.

Appendix A

Statistics on Presence in Non-Communist Countries of Soviets and Their Allies

Table A-1
Latin America

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d		Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Maritime		Military	Academic and Technical	
Total	2,455	720	3,255	6,100	710	1,575			2,823	45	9,080	160,650
Argentina	280	80	..	55	NA	10	X	X	1,784	..	20	45,000
Belize	20	NEGL
Bolivia	205	60	..	80	..	15	30	..	105	300
Brazil	255	70	..	120	..	415	..	X	822	..	45	6,000
Chile	10	75	20,000
Colombia	135	35	..	70	5	10	28	..	2,390	12,000
Costa Rica	90	25	..	5	695	7,000
Dominica	NEGL	20	NEGL
Dominican Republic	NEGL	825	5,000
Ecuador	135	40	..	10	..	35	825	500
El Salvador	70	800
French West Indies	75	4,000
Grenada	NEGL	35	10	60	NEGL
Guatemala	NEGL	100	800
Guyana	190	60	5	25	..	5	110	NA
Haiti	NEGL	35	400
Honduras	NA	225	1,500
Jamaica	90	25	280	X	X	40	3,000

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**Table A-1
Latin America (continued)**

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d		Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Maritime		Military	Academic and Technical	
Mexico	320	100	..	305	X	X	40	..	195	30,000
Nicaragua	60	20	3,100	5,300	170	475	X		NA	NA	1,260	300
Panama	100	40	..	10	..	5			11	..	1,040	500
Paraguay	3,500
Peru	375	110	150	80	535	285	X		35	35	825	3,000
Suriname	40	10	NA	5	50
Uruguay	55	15	..	20	..	10			73	7,000
Venezuela	110	30	..	10	..	NA			20	10,000

Note: An ellipsis (.) indicates that we have no information and presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.

^a Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence.
^b Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.
^c Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983; a civil air agreement with Chile is currently suspended.
^d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party members do not include independent parties.



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Table A-2
Middle East and North Africa

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d		Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Mari-time		Military	Academic and Technical	
Total	5,810	1,585	13,350	99,110	32,690	6,455			6,953	4,240	29,865	73,600
Middle East	4,450	1,200	9,685	32,210	18,730	3,670			4,564	1,240	24,625	70,000
Abu Dhabi	15	NEGL
Bahrain	200	..
Cyprus	255	70	30	5	X		68	..	1,385	12,000
Egypt	550	150	..	260	55	385	X	X	719	..	510	500
Greece	300	80	..	15	75	NA	X	X	4,000	33,500
Iran	1,135	300	250	3,435	495	..	X		1,057	50	205	NA
Iraq	240	65	1,100	17,500	7,455	..	X	X	1,372	180	3,075	2,000
Israel	20	5	1,500
Jordan	175	50	35	1,330	225	..	X		125	..	7,765	500
Kuwait	155	40	..	1,000	260	..	X		25	NEGL
Lebanon	485	130	..	55	5	..	X		30	..	890	15,000
North Yemen	420	115	1,200	300	1,160	120	X		47	600	2,090	NEGL
Oman	NEGL
South Yemen	NA	NA	1,100	2,950	785	150	X		101	110	1,335	NA
Syria	305	85	6,000	3,550	8,185	350	X	X	703	300	3,135	5,000
Turkey	410	110	..	1,800	..	2,660	X		342	..	10	NEGL

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Table A-2
Middle East and North Africa (continued)

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d	Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d	
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Maritime				Military
North Africa	1,360	385	3,665	66,900	13,960	2,785			2,389	3,000	5,240	3,600
Algeria	280	90	1,515	11,790	3,405	630	X	X	246	460	2,525	500
Libya	175	50	2,150	52,400	10,505	..	X	X	1,859	2,540	660	NEGL
Mauritania	165	45	..	40	..	NEGL	X		260	..
Morocco	410	110	..	2,120	50	2,135	X	X	269	..	900	3,000
Tunisia	330	90	..	490	..	20	X		15	..	885	100
West Sahara	60	10	..

Note: An ellipsis (..) indicates that we have no information and presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.

^a Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence.

^b Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.

^c Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983.

^d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party members do not include independent parties.



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Table A-3
Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d		Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Mari- time		Military	Academic and Technical	
Total	5,975	1,645	37,925	25,635	4,295	3,665			1,055	525	34,780	5,000
Angola	200	60	30,000	9,550	445	480	X	X	89	125	1,775	..
Benin	90	25	60	75	5	5	X		405	..
Botswana	55	15	5	..	5	105	..
Burundi	215	60	30	55	35	NEGL	X		..	30	465	..
Cameroon	365	100	..	30	NA	..	X		19	..	130	..
Cape Verde	15	5	NA	35	65	5	X		..	NA	360	..
Central African Republic	10	5	..	20	X		515	..
Chad	20	5	X		85	..
Comoro Islands	30	..
Congo	120	30	810	420	10	NEGL	X		17	NA	1,900	..
Djibouti	20	5	X		25	..
Equatorial Guinea	165	45	NA	15	5	NEGL	X		240	..
Ethiopia	550	160	5,000	2,600	2,635	865	X	X	270	25	5,585	..
Gabon	55	15	..	15	..	NEGL			290	..
The Gambia	20	35	..
Ghana	265	50	..	75	NEGL	55	X	X	6	..	1,265	..
Guinea	265	70	65	870	130	25	X		60	20	740	..
Guinea-Bissau	100	30	115	305	20	15	X		495	..
Ivory Coast	10			98	..	575	..
Kenya	165	45	..	15	X		790	NEGL
Lesotho	NEGL	40	40	NEGL
Liberia	40	10	..	5	..	NEGL	X		110	..
Madagascar	255	80	NA	175	100	100	X		..	30	2,310	..
Malawi	25	..

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Table A-3
Sub-Saharan Africa (continued)

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d		Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Mari- time		Military	Academic and Technical	
Mali	280	75	150	520	50	30	X		..	160	750	..
Mauritius	65	20	X		220	..
Mozambique	160	50	1,500	3,300	240	205	X	X	70	NA	4,595	..
Niger	110	30	..	25	..	NEGL			175	..
Nigeria	655	180	10	5,955	120	1,595	X		385	..	4,355	500
Reunion	60	2,000
Rwanda	35	10	..	10	X		230	..
Sao Tome and Principe	NEGL	..	50	235	NEGL	50	..
Senegal	220	60	..	65	NA	..	X		350	1,000
Seychelles	175	50	10	25	10	..	X	X	20	..
Sierra Leone	85	25	10	35	NEGL	NEGL	X		13	..	415	..
Somalia	45	10	..	10	10	..	X		400	..
Sudan	165	45	..	25	5	55	X		13	..	1,670	1,500
Tanzania	160	45	NA	325	145	65	X		15	25	795	..
Togo	75	20	..	5	465	..
Uganda	135	35	..	40	NA	25	X		310	..
Upper Volta	110	30	..	5	..	NEGL	X		300	..
Zaire	90	25	..	280	X	X	315	..
Zambia	350	95	110	440	245	120	X		..	25	675	..
Zimbabwe	80	25	..	15	..	15			..	85	335	..

Note: An ellipsis (..) indicates that we have no information and presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.

^a Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence. Military technicians include Cuban troops in Africa.

^b Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.

^c Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983.

^d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party members do not include independent parties.

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Table A-4
East Asia and South Asia

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d		Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Mari- time		Military	Academic and Technical	
Total	6,035	1,625	2,350	7,175	8,665	3,030			5,414	185	14,590	174,500
East Asia	1,175	320	..	60	NEGL	210			658	..	25	200
Burma	275	75	..	20	NEGL	180	X		14
Indonesia	365	100	..	10	NA	..			74	NEGL
Malaysia	120	30	X		345	..	5	..
Philippines	160	45	..	25	..	30			29	..	20	200
South Korea
Thailand	255	70	..	5	X		196
South Asia	4,860	1,305	2,350	7,110	8,665	2,820			4,756	185	14,565	174,300
Afghanistan	415	115	2,000	3,900	2,230	1,105	X		953	150	10,910	15,000
Bangladesh	285	75	..	125	15	650	X		76	..	830	2,500
India	2,460	670	350	1,800	6,400	800	X	X	3,469	35	1,490	150,000
Maldives	30	..
Nepal	210	55	..	20	NEGL	NEGL			33	..	610	1,500
Pakistan	1,145	300	..	1,175	20	245	X	X	196	..	230	300
Sri Lanka	345	90	..	90	..	20	X	X	29	..	465	5,000

Note: An ellipsis (..) indicates that we have no information and presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.

^a Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence. Military technicians exclude Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

^b Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.

^c Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983; a civil air agreement with Indonesia is currently suspended.

^d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party members do not include independent parties.

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Table A-5
Developed Countries

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d		Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Mari- time		Military	Academic and Technical	
Total	15,515	4,330	95	..			47,896	..	560	827,900
Australia	210	60			722	1,500
Austria	1,335	360	X		1,669	..	10	25,000
Belgium	480	130	X	X	2,214	..	15	..
Canada	730	210	X		1,930	..	15	2,500
Denmark	415	115	X	X	502	..	25	9,000
Finland	1,475	410	NEGL	..	95	..	X	X	7,422	..	125	47,000
France	2,240	620	X	X	4,823	500,000
Iceland	220	60			145
Ireland	60	15			109	500
Italy	1,380	390	X		5,580	..	20	..
Japan	1,000	275	X		5,082	..	NA	..
Luxembourg	65	20	X		322	600
Netherlands	200	55	X	X	2,570	..	20	..
New Zealand	140	40			328	300
Norway	300	85	X	X	228	..	10	500
Portugal	265	75	X	X	124	..	75	187,000
Spain	425	155	X	X	449	..	50	..

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Table A-5
Developed Countries (continued)

Country	Warsaw Pact and Cuban Presence in LDCs (estimated number of persons) ^a				USSR/East European Aid Agreements ^b (million US \$)		Other Soviet Agreements ^c		Soviet Trade ^d (million US \$)	Students and Trainees Studying in Warsaw Pact Countries (est. number of persons) ^d		Pro-Soviet Communist Party Members ^d
	Official	Official: Of Which Intelligence	Military Technicians	Economic Technicians	Military	Economic	Civil Air	Mari- time		Military	Academic and Technical	
Sweden	550	150	X	X	1,041	..	70	..
Switzerland	1,500	410	X	..	1,330	5,000
United Kingdom	1,050	290	X	X	2,160	..	100	..
West Germany	1,475	405	X	..	9,146	..	25	49,000

Note: An ellipsis (.) indicates that we have no information and presume the value is zero. The term Eastern Europe refers only to Warsaw Pact nations. Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.

^a Presence figures are preliminary 1983 estimates. Estimates of the intelligence presence are a subset of the official presence.

^b Military and economic agreements are cumulative for 1978-82.

^c Civil air and maritime agreements are as of December 1983.

^d All other figures are 1982 estimates. Pro-Soviet Communist party members do not include independent parties such as the Italian Communist Party.



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
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