

SECRET

[Redacted]

Handwritten marks: a circle with an arrow, initials 'M' and 'Te', and the number '76' in a circle.

25X1

4 March 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: C/NE/DDO/AIO
FROM: Chief/NESA/AI/M
SUBJECT: Memorandum on Libyan Trouble-making

1. Attached is the paper you requested cataloguing Libya's subversive and terrorist activities worldwide. We have organized it according to geographic areas and have included information that generally characterizes the scope and nature of Libyan activity.

25X1

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

Attachment: As stated

NESA M#83-10055

[Faded stamp]

[Redacted]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

LIBYAN ACTIVITY WORLDWIDE

Beginning about 1975, Libyan leader Qadhafi adopted a policy of subversive activity, coup plotting, and support for "national liberation movements" in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as support for terrorist groups in Western Europe.

25X1

-- His claims are grandiose; he not only wants to protect vital security interests and maximize Libyan influence abroad, but he believes he has a unique mission to restructure society worldwide on the Libyan model.

25X1

-- Qadhafi has been unscrupulous in promoting these aims, and a catalogue of offenses can be documented without difficulty: three unsuccessful coups against Sudan and ongoing attempts to unseat Nimeiri; three plots against Tunisia, the most recent being the Qafsah raid in January 1980; a coup attempt in Niger in 1976; intervention in Uganda in 1979; the occupation of Chad in 1980.

25X1

-- For all his activity, Qadhafi's policies have not been conspicuously successful. Much of the problem is Libyan ineptitude. The country lacks a foreign policy establishment of any competence or depth; such expertise as had been accumulated was largely frittered away when Qadhafi began transforming his embassies abroad into "people's bureaus" in September 1979.

25X1

-- Another factor contributing to Libya's lack of success is Qadhafi's personal direction of Libyan policy, which is consequently erratic, influenced by Qadhafi's need to

SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

seek the limelight, and occasionally more doctrinaire than realistic. Qadhafi's personal abrasiveness also alienates potential allies. [REDACTED]

25X1

-- Despite Libya's impressive arsenal and improved performance in Chad, Qadhafi has only limited ability to use his conventional military forces to achieve his sweeping political goals. [REDACTED]

25X1

-- To the extent that Qadhafi succeeds in influencing the behavior of his neighbors--and they do on occasion adopt policies they would prefer to avoid, out of fear--he is cashing in on his reputation for unscrupulousness and for virtually universal activity. His reputation for free spending is also an asset, although this is increasingly modified by his neighbors' realization that he frequently reneges on his promises. [REDACTED]

25X1

In Africa, Qadhafi's behavior has been somewhat more circumspect for the past year as a result of his expectation that he would assume that chairmanship of the OAU in 1982, and his desire not to antagonize his African colleagues. His loss of the chairmanship could result in an upsurge of Libyan subversive activity in Africa. So far, increased activity has concentrated primarily on Sudan and Chad. [REDACTED]

25X1

-- In Sudan, Qadhafi is continuing his concerted efforts to overthrow the Nimeiri regime. Libya is delivering supplies of increasingly advanced weapons to warring tribes in western Sudan in an effort to destabilize the government.

-2-
SECRET

SECRET

25X1

- [REDACTED]
- In Chad, Qadhafi has stepped up support to Chadian dissidents working for the overthrow of Habre. In mid-January 1983, 12 Libyan SU-22 ground attack fighters were deployed to the Aozou Strip (the northern portion of Chad, claimed and annexed by Libya); these aircraft could supply direct support to the rebels.
 - The presence of approximately 80 Libyan "advisers" in the Central African Republic has increased tensions in Central Africa. The Libyans have set up a military camp outside of Bangui, and may be assisting Chadian dissidents opposed to the Habre government. [REDACTED]
 - In Niger, a key Libyan target in West Africa, Libya is supporting Nigerien dissidents based in Benin, training other dissidents inside Libya, and encouraging rebellion by Tuareg nomads. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

- [REDACTED]
- Libya's main ally in West African subversion is Benin, where the Libyan People's Bureau numbers almost 100 people; it serves as a transit and recruiting point for West Africans going to and returning from Libya for

SECRET

25X1

25X1

-- The Libyans have attempted to increase their influence in Togo through the funding of so-called "Islamic" activities. An Islamic Cultural Center was opened in Lome in March 1982, and in December Qadhafi paid all the expenses for sub-Saharan delegates at an Islamic Conference designed to trumpet his own ideas. []

25X1

-- Libya has delivered tanks and armored cars to Ghana in an attempt to establish a "special relationship" there. []

25X1

-- Libya typically tries to exploit its Islamic connection in an effort to gain influence in Cameroon. In March 1982, security authorities there uncovered an effort to infiltrate the army and distribute a tract praising Qadhafi's "Islamic Legions." []

25X1

-- Somalia is a Libyan priority target. Libya and Ethiopia are cooperating to train and equip a 3,000 man anti-Siad Somali insurgent group, the Somali Salvation Front, operating out of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Libya is also training Somali dissidents at Sabha, inside Libya.

25X1

[]

-- In Uganda, the minister of internal affairs in July 1982 publicly denounced Libyan support to the dissident Ugandan Freedom Movement, and accused Libya of being its paymaster. []

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

SECRET

25X1

In the Middle East, Qadhafi continues to try to promote Arab unity and the diminution of Western influence, but his reliance on terrorism and subversion has alienated virtually all of his fellow Arabs. Two of his former allies in the Steadfastness Front, Algeria and the Palestine Liberation Organization, have now fallen away, though Qadhafi is trying to promote the formation of a rump front that would include only Libya, Syria, South Yemen, and Iran.

25X1

25X1




-- Libya is the second most important source--after Algeria--

-6-
SECRET

SECRET



25X1



-of financial, diplomatic, and military support for the Polisario Front guerrillas fighting against Morocco for an independent Western Sahara.

25X1



25X1



-- Despite its previous association with Libya in the Steadfastness Front, Algeria regards Qadhafi's expansionist aims in North Africa with considerable suspicion. Border disputes and rivalry for influence in Mauritania and within the Polisario Front perennially strain relations between the two. Libya's efforts to revive the Steadfastness Front have been largely ignored by Algeria since Qadhafi's boycott of the Fez summit in September, which Algeria attended.


25X1

25X1



-- Despite Qadhafi's visit to Tunisia in February 1982, which was supposed to effect a reconciliation between the two countries,

25X1



25X1

SECRET

25X1




Tunisia continues to view

25X1

Qadhafi with suspicion and hostility.

25X1



25X1



-- Since the late 1960s Libya has supplied money, arms, and training to a variety of Palestinian groups including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Struggle Front, and the Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Relations between Qadhafi and PLO leader Yasir Arafat have been strained since Qadhafi publicly blamed the Palestinians for surrendering to the Israelis in Lebanon, declaring that they should have committed suicide first. Libyan support of radical Palestinian groups is continuing, however.

25X1

25X1



SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

-- The Libyans are still committed to their goal of overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Husyan--one of their motives for supporting Iran in the Iran in the Iran-Iraq war.

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

-- There were bitter media battles between Libya and Saudi Arabia throughout 1982, particularly after Saudi religious scholars formally branded Qadhafi an unbeliever and a heretic in March.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Relations between the two countries eased somewhat following Libyan overtures to Saudi Arabia at the end of 1982; the Saudis did agree to replace their Ambassador in Tripoli, but have not lost their mistrust of Qadhafi's intentions.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

-- Qadhafi would like to engineer the overthrow of Sultan Qabus of Oman in retaliation for his support of the Camp David agreements and for giving the US access to Omani military facilities. Libya has on occasion provided

SECRET

25X1

limited military training and funds to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, based in South Yemen, and has publicly proclaimed his willingness to support it with money and arms.

25X1

-- Libya has been providing some financial and military support for factions of the South Yemeni-backed National Democratic Front, a collection of individuals and groups that has been building a military and political base in North Yemen in an effort to gain power there.

25X1

25X1

-- Relations between Libya and Iran had been strained following the 1978 disappearance of the Shia Imam Musa Sadr while visiting Libya, but improved when Tehran began to seek allies after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Libya was the first Arab state to support Iran's position in the war, and soon began providing modest amounts of military supplies to the Iranians and to Iraqi dissidents based in Iran. A memorandum of understanding for cooperation in political, cultural, and economic fields was signed between the two countries in December 1982.

25X1

-10-
SECRET

SECRET

25X1

-- In 1980, Qadhafi reportedly offered Afghan Foreign Minister Dost \$3 million for the construction of a mosque and an Islamic university. In February 1982, Afghan officials announced publicly that Libya had promised to finance several unspecified development projects in Afghanistan. Libya (with Syria and South Yemen) voted against the UN resolution demanding Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

25X1

-- There are an estimated 70,000 Pakistani professional, skilled, and unskilled workers, including military advisers, in Libya--perhaps as many as 100,000 if family members are included. In the fall of 1981, relations were strained over reports of some 3,000 Pakistani workers, initially recruited as security guards, who had been forced into Libyan military camps, trained in guerrilla warfare, and readied for shipment to Chad and other destinations; the Libyans agreed to return them to Pakistan when the story came out. Relations continue cool because of Libyan support, including training, for the anti-Pakistan "Al Zulfidar" terrorist organization, and because of Qadhafi's public criticism of Pakistan's domestic policies and the US-Pakistan relationship.

25X1

-11-
SECRET

SECRET




25X1

Libyan activity in Latin America is largely motivated by Qadhafi's desire to strike at the US by undercutting its interests in its historical sphere of influence. Efforts are still small-scale, and are focused on supplying Salvadoran insurgents and on the English-speaking Caribbean.

25X1

25X1





Libya gave Nicaragua a loan of \$100 million and is providing economic and military advice to the regime.

25X1

25X1

25X1



-- Libya has been attempting to make inroads among radicals in the English-speaking Caribbean since 1979, recently concentrating on Granada, where Qadhafi has worked hard to cultivate the Bishop regime. The Libyans have reportedly offered Grenada a four million dollar loan, but Grenada has had difficulty persuading the Libyans to implement past promises of financial support. Libyan aid to the Grenadan government has thus far been slight, and

SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

included three fiberglass power boats equipped with radar for use in patrolling the coastline.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

-- [Redacted]

25X1

-- There are some indications that the Libyans regard Venezuela as a potential center of Libyan activity in Latin America.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

-- Qadhafi attempted to gain favor with Argentina by taking its side in the Falklands conflict. The Libyan media defended the Argentine position,

[Redacted]

25X1

Page Denied

SECRET

25X1

Libya's relations with West European governments reached a low point in 1980, when Libyan hit squads murdered ten Libyan dissidents in Rome, London, Bonn, Athens, Milan, and Manchester, England. When Qadhafi abandoned the policy, West European governments responded by seeking to maintain or improve their ties with Libya, arguing that isolation would drive Libya more firmly into the socialist camp.

25X1

-- Libya probably does not directly support West German terrorist organizations, but groups like the Red Army Faction and the Revolutionary Cells have received training and aid from Libyan-backed Palestinian groups.

25X1

-- A Danish newspaper reported in February 1982 that the Libyan diplomatic mission had sought to increase its political influence in Denmark in recent months, and that in cooperation with Denmark's Left Socialist Party, it had launched a campaign aimed at smearing the US and other NATO allies. Libya reportedly established a Danish-Libyan friendship association whose chairman, Danish author Arne Pettersen, was under indictment for espionage in connection with the expulsion of a Soviet embassy official accused of passing money to pro-Soviet groups.

25X1

-- Libyan activities in Greece are expanding. Qadhafi gave modest financial assistance to Prime Minister Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement and other leftist organizations, but official relations between

-15-
SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Greece and Libya have actually deteriorated since Papandreou took power, as a result of Qadhafi's attempts to dictate policy and to link economic aid to the removal of US military bases. [REDACTED]

25X1

-- Libyan influence in Malta had been expanding until June 1980, when Prime Minister Mintoff rebuffed Qadhafi's efforts to secure military facilities there and closed Libya's radio station in Malta. In August 1980, Libyan ships and aircraft forced the removal of a drilling rig commissioned by Malta to explore in disputed waters. Relations improved after a surprise visit by Qadhafi in March 1982 and an agreement to refer the boundary dispute to the International Court of Justice. Despite the ups and downs in relations, Libya has continued to use Malta as an outlet for anti-US propaganda. Its Libyan Arab Popular Office is putting out a series of anti-US publications, which it distributes free, and a Libyan-owned publishing company in Malta publishes anti-US English language books and a weekly newspaper and magazine. [REDACTED]

25X1

-- Libya has tried sporadically in recent years to use the economic ties that bind Italy and Libya to goad Rome into backing Libya's policies. In 1982, the Libyans put pressure on the Italian government by refusing to pay large debts owed to Italian firms until Italy agreed to purchase additional amounts of Libyan oil. [Libya has also tried to foment anti-NATO feeling in Sicily, and has

SECRET

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

There have been Libyan attempts to manipulate the Italian media by bribing newspapers to print interviews with Qadhafi and articles favorable to his regime. The Libyan news agency effectively controls a Rome-based private television station that frequently broadcasts pro-Libyan programs.

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

-- Libya is rumored to be involved with both Azorean and Madeiran separatist groups; Qadhafi has publicly labeled both archipelagos as "African" islands under Portuguese colonial occupation.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Libyan involvement in East Asia is small-scale, and largely limited to support for dissident Muslim groups. Following Qadhafi's trip to North Korea in November 1982, a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty was signed between the two countries which provided, among other things, for the exchange of military intelligence and specialists; bound each side to try to supply the other with any weapons it might lack; and committed each side to render military and material support to the other in the event of aggression--or even threat of aggression--by "imperialisms and their minions."

25X1

-- The Thai government is convinced that Libya is providing training and financial support to Muslim terrorist bandit groups operating along the Thai-Malaysian border.

According to the Thai colonel who is chairman of the Thai-Malaysian Border Cooperation office, aid from Libya and Syria to the terrorists passes through Indonesia and Malaysia as well as directly to Thailand.

25X1

-- The Libyan embassy in Malaysia finances overseas studies for Muslim secessionist students; there are rumors the students receive guerrilla training while abroad.


25X1

-- Libya had been the most important arms supplier and source of financial support for the southern Phillippines Moro National Liberation Front for years. In late 1979, however, the Filipino Minister of Labor visited Tripoli and concluded agreements providing for a substantial increase in the number of Filipino workers in Libya, as well as Filipino involvement in several important joint

SECRET



25X1

construction projects there. Since that time, the arms flow from Libya to the MNLF seems to have largely dried up--though some officials involved in carrying out the actual fighting remain suspicious. 

25X1

SECRET

25X1

NESA M#83-10055

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Libyan Trouble-making

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee
- 4 - CPAS/IMD/CB (No Further Dissem)
- 1 - C/PES
- 1 - D/NESA
- 2 - NESA/PS
- 1 - C/NESA/AI
- 2 - NESA/AI/M

DDI/NESA/AI/M/ [redacted] (4 Feb 83)

25X1