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Talking Points for Presentation to SPC Jasons  
30 April 1983

### Air War in Lebanon

The air war in Lebanon once again revealed Israeli superiority in every critical category. Superior leadership, weapons systems, pilots and support personnel, complimented by close knit command and control and real-time intelligence, have and will remain the key to superior Israeli military operations.

Israel employed lessons learned from the 1973 war and from numerous skirmishes with Syrian aircraft over the past four years to defeat the Syrian air force so decisively last June.

-- In 1973, Israel lost 108 aircraft, 74% of which were lost to SAMs and AAA while conducting close-air support. Most of these losses occurred, however, in the first days of the war.

-- In Lebanon last year, only two Israeli attack aircraft were lost; [REDACTED]

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In the air war over Lebanon, the numbers of fighter aircraft involved were fairly balanced. Israeli success was due primarily to technologically superior weapons systems and well-trained aggressive aircrews.

-- The F-15 and F-16 mixture enjoyed advantages over the Syrian MIG-21s and MIG-23s in almost all areas of performance.

-- Israeli F-15s shot down 40 Syrian fighters while the F-16s accounted for 43.

-- Israeli fighters probably damaged an equal number of Syrian aircraft in air-to-air engagements [REDACTED]

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Ground Operations in LebanonHelicopter Warfare

Use of attack helicopters was seen as very important to both sides in Lebanon operations.

- Israeli's in particular see the need to field effective anti-helicopter weapons and to use their helicopter gunships more effectively in ground support operations.
- Syrians need more coordination between ground forces and gunships and better pilots.
- Out of 20 Syrian helicopters shot down--of which 12 were HOT-equipped Gazelles--5 were hit by F-15/16s, 1 by ground-launched TOW, 1 by a 105-mm tank round, and 13 by ground fire.
- Several downed by ground fire actually crashed because of pilot error; they flew into the ground trying to avoid Israeli fire.
- Israel lost 4 helicopters; 2 to ground fire, 1 to Israel ground fire, and 1 to pilot error.

Heliborne TOW proved to be very effective on the battlefield.

- Israel helicopters fired 137 TOW missiles during the conflict and scored 89 hits, for a kill rate of 72 percent.
- Syrian Gazelles firing HOT anti-tank missiles scored only about 10 hits for approximately 100 missiles fired.

Armored Warfare

Relative to Soviet tanks, Israeli tanks (M-60s, Centurions, Merkava) are superior in speed, agility, reliability, fire control, ammunition storage capacity, and crew protection.

- Soviet T-55/62s are difficult to operate because of the cramped space.
- Fuel and ammunition are vulnerable to burning when the tank is hit and an automatic extinguishing system sprays corrosive fluid on the crew.
- The T-62 is especially sensitive to burning when hit in the front because of fuel tanks.
- Both the T-66 and T-62 are difficult to steer and shift.

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- Crew seating is cramped and produces a punishing ride with high fatigue effects.

Israeli tank gunnery is far superior to Syrian gunnery and this remains the key factor in Israeli success.

- Israeli gunners regularly engage targets beyond 2,000 meters while on the move.
- Israeli accuracy and rate of fire is approximately triple that of the Syrians who do not fire except at close range and when stopped.
- Israelis destroyed 21 T-72s in Lebanon with ground-launched TOWs and 105-mm anti-tank rounds fired at the upper side of the turrets. Engagement occurred at close range (1,100-2,200 meters) from ambush.
- All T-72s experienced catastrophic explosions due to open storage of ammunition in the automatic loader system.

TOW proved to be one of the most versatile and effective anti-tank weapons.

- In 1973 the Arabs fired an estimated 6,000-8,000 AT-3 Sagers of which less than 1 percent hit their target. The same ratio applied in Lebanon.
- Israeli's used 105-mm Beehive rounds, artillery, and infantry fire to defeat the Syrian SAGGER teams.
- The RPG-7 was effective against tanks and APCs from close-in ambush positions but its effectiveness was neutralized to a large extent by add-on explosive armor. (REACTIVE ARMOR)

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Mobile Warfare

Soviet BMPs and BRDMs are no better armored or shaped than the US M-113.

- Soviet APCs are hard to operate, crew quarters are cramped, and crew fatigue is high.
- Rear-door fuel tanks on the BMP make it particularly vulnerable to burning when hit in the rear.
- APCs are most useful in transporting ammunition and infantry to forward areas. They should not be used as fighting vehicles because of their vulnerability to ATGM fire.

MG Tal emphasized that future Israeli APCs will have "modular armor" that can be bolted to the vehicle.

- This armor should protect against 60 percent of all ATGMs, all 14.5-mm weapons, and 20-mm fire from longer ranges.
- Reduced lethality can be accomplished by designing a ballistic curtain inside the vehicle to protect against fragmentation if the armor envelope is penetrated.
- The optimum design for an infantry carrier should include two machine guns and a rigid mortar fired from inside the vehicle.

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