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Soviet Fishing in Third World Waters: Continued Gains Unlikely

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An Intelligence Assessment

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SOV 84-10170X
October 1984

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An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division, SOVA

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Key Judgments

Information available as of 30 September 1984 was used in this report.

After having overexploited nearby fishing grounds in the 1950s and 1960s, the USSR greatly expanded operations in more distant waters—the open seas, Antarctica, and the coasts of less developed countries (LDCs)—for larger stocks. The Soviets also modernized and expanded their fishing fleet to more effectively harvest these high-yield fisheries. In the mid-1970s, when Moscow's success in Third World waters was threatened by the imposition of 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones by LDCs, the Kremlin launched a major effort to ensure continued access by negotiating bilateral fishing treaties and joint ventures.

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This policy, which offered the prospect of financial and technical aid to LDC fishing industries, initially paid off with dozens of agreements and joint ventures. Since 1980, however, the USSR's efforts to negotiate new agreements with LDCs and to increase its fish harvest in the Third World have faltered. Equatorial Guinea, for example, abrogated a treaty allowing exclusive Soviet access to its fishery zone, and Congo, Cape Verde, Seychelles, and Liberia brushed aside Soviet entreaties for fishing accords. As a result, the USSR's yields off African and Latin American coasts have risen only marginally, and most of the increase in Moscow's overseas catch has come from the northwest Pacific, off Japan.

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Moscow's interest in access to distant fishing areas has been fueled by the important role fish plays in the Soviet diet. As a source of animal-based protein, fish is a direct substitute for meat. Its importance, together with endemic problems in the livestock sector, is a strong incentive for economic planners to safeguard access to Third World fisheries.

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The USSR is the largest source of fisheries aid to the developing world, having extended at least $250 million since the mid-1950s. Although a significant part of the USSR's economic aid, this program has required the expenditure of little hard currency and has resulted in significant gains for Moscow—namely, fish for Soviet consumers and foreign exchange earnings. The Soviets have had more success in Africa than in Latin America and Asia, primarily because the newer African fishing industries badly need technical aid. The USSR has signed bilateral agreements with Angola, Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. Latin American nations generally have more established fishing industries, however, and have resisted Moscow's offers. The USSR has won access to the fishing zones of only Peru and Argentina, in addition to those of its two client states—Cuba and Nicaragua. Most Latin American nations fear

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commercial competition from the Soviet fishing fleet. Their political leaders and naval officials suspect the fleet's purposes, and several countries maintain patrols to counter Soviet encroachments into their zones. 25X1 25X1

Soviet fisheries aid probably was initially a net benefit to most LDCs because few could take advantage of the new, exclusive rights they had declared in the mid-1970s. As a result, Third World nations may view Soviet aid to their fishing industries as only a temporary expedient. They generally now believe that they are getting too little in return. Some African countries that accepted such aid have abrogated their bilateral fishing agreements or have turned to Western companies because of Soviet overfishing and failure to deliver the promised aid. 25X1

Despite these practices, most LDCs seem unwilling to let their resentment lead to a serious weakening of ties because fishing is a minor part of their relations with the USSR. Although Egypt and Somalia terminated their fishing accords when they broke diplomatic relations over broader issues, Moscow probably calculates that fishing problems will almost never cause relations to worsen seriously. 25X1

The USSR will continue to work toward maintaining and expanding fishing rights in the Third World, in part to further its campaign to improve the Soviet diet. While past improvements have been based mostly on increases in per capita consumption of livestock products, Soviet officials almost certainly count on maintaining (or possibly raising) fish consumption. As stocks in open-sea fisheries contiguous to 200-mile zones are depleted, the Soviets are almost certain to continue pushing for fishing rights inside LDCs' zones. Moscow may have additional success with West African nations—some of which, like Guinea, are vulnerable to its economic pressure. Despite offers of lucrative contracts, the Soviets are likely to continue encountering stiff resistance in Latin America. They will probably be more successful, however, in gaining access to port facilities there to support fishing operations in the southern oceans and off Antarctica. Nevertheless, on balance, the reluctance of many Latin American states and the desire of African nations to reduce their dependence on Moscow demonstrate the developing world's cautious view of Soviet aid to fisheries. This hesitation, reinforced by Soviet failure to fulfill earlier promises, probably will prevent Moscow from repeating the success it enjoyed in the 1970s. 25X1

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Introduction

With the largest fishing fleet in the world, the USSR in recent years has placed second in total catch, with 13 percent of the world's total, while Japan has been first with 14 percent (figure 1). In 1982 the Soviet fishing fleet had 34 percent more vessels than Japan and was almost six times larger in total tonnage (figure 2). Increasingly, the fleet is composed of ships for transporting fish and large factory vessels with onboard refrigeration and equipment for all types of processing operations (figure 3). In 1982, 117 of the world's 131 factory vessels and carriers that exceeded 10,000 gross tons sailed under the Soviet flag. Even though the Soviets have an expanding fleet and plans for larger catches, however, the Soviet catch has leveled off at 9.5-10 million tons since 1975.

Moscow's interest in continued access to fishing areas around the world has been driven in large measure by the important role of fish in the USSR's food supply and the failure to expand output of close substitutes such as meat. Per capita consumption of fish—providing almost 10 percent of total protein—is higher than that in most industrialized countries. Moreover, because of Soviet agriculture's deep-seated problems and the very high cost of meat production, economic planners wish to maintain and, if possible, increase the use of fish as a substitute. They therefore view access to distant fishing grounds as a factor in improving the Soviet diet.[1] Large catches also provide important benefits to agriculture in the form of nonfood byproducts, such as feed and fertilizer.

This paper examines the trends that have affected Soviet fishing in the Third World since the mid-1970s, Moscow's efforts to gain access to the fisheries of less developed countries (LDCs), and the USSR's record in keeping its agreements once it has gained access. It also discusses reactions to Moscow's entreaties to Latin American and African nations for fishing cooperation, the impact on Soviet political relationships with LDCs, and the USSR's prospects for winning increased access to Third World fisheries.

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Figure 1
Catches of the 10 Most Important Fishing Countries, 1982[a]



[a] Nominal catches; includes crustaceans and mollusks but not cetaceans or seaweeds. The 1982 world total was 76.8 million metric tons.

Source: *1982 Yearbook of Fishery Statistics: Catches and Landings* (UN Food and Agriculture Organization: 1984), p. 80.

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Soviet Motivations for Expanding Access

In the early 1950s, when a limited cruising range confined Soviet fishing craft mainly to the USSR's coastal and inland waters, the annual catch stayed under 2 million metric tons, with 60 percent coming from inland and nearby waters. Following the overexploitation of these areas in the 1950s and 1960s, a

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[1] In 1982, per capita consumption of fish in the USSR was 18 kilograms (kg), while it was 7 kg in the United States. Under the Food Program announced in 1982, Soviet planners are devoting enormous resources to increasing production and consumption of livestock products and other high-quality foods. The government target is for fish consumption to reach 19 kg per capita by 1990. Although this is a smaller increase than that envisaged for meat consumption, economic planners almost certainly realize that meeting or, if possible, exceeding this goal would ensure improvement of the Soviet diet if, as we expect, they fall short in reaching the meat target.

Figure 2
Comparison of the Soviet Fishing Fleet With Other Major Fleets, 1976 and 1982[a]



[a] Includes fishing vessels, factory vessels, and fishing carriers.
[b] Excludes factory vessels and carriers in South Korea's fishing fleet in 1976 because data are unavailable.

Source: *1982 Review of Fisheries in OECD Member Countries* (OECD: Paris, 1983), pp. 21-22. This information, which OECD derives from Lloyd's Shipping Register, differs somewhat from the US Navy data cited in the inset "Soviet Long-Distance Fishing Capabilities." Nonetheless, we believe it accurately reflects the relationship among the world's fishing fleets.

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***Figure 3.** The Sivash, an Atlantic-class fish factory trawler, operated off the coast of Namibia during April 1984.*

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

Figure 4
Recent Soviet Fishing Grounds



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rapid expansion of the high-seas trawler fleet enabled Soviet fishermen to move to the North Atlantic and North Pacific Oceans. When the output target for fish outstripped even these supplies, the fleets headed farther afield, scouring the coasts of distant countries—primarily LDCs—the open seas, and Antarctica (figures 4 and 6).[2] Between 1950 and 1960, the share of the catch obtained from the open sea rose from 46 to 72 percent. In 1975 the Soviets caught roughly three-fifths of their total 10-million-ton harvest within 200 miles of foreign shores.

The USSR's freedom to operate in distant fishing areas was threatened in the last half of the 1970s, when most littoral states established 200-nautical-mile fishing zones to prevent overfishing by the major maritime powers. In view of an increase in per capita fish consumption in the USSR from 12.5 kilograms (kg) in 1965 to 18.5 kg in 1976 and the stagnation in meat output, the loss of these fisheries would have set back efforts to improve the Soviet diet. In response, Moscow searched for underexploited fisheries outside these zones, claimed a 200-mile zone of its own, and stepped up its campaign to persuade LDCs to sign additional fishing agreements. The heavy concentration of fish in LDC coastal areas—as much as two-thirds of global stocks, according to one open-source estimate—explains why Moscow began offering aid to the fishing industries of LDCs in return for renewed access to their fisheries.

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Limitations on Soviet fishing in the coastal waters of developed countries also may have pushed the Kremlin to explore opportunities in the Third World. After the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and New Zealand severely restricted Soviet fishing rights within their 200-mile coastal waters.[3] A European

[2] As the fishing fleet moved closer to Third World nations, it began operating in fisheries located both in what later became (circa 1975) their "exclusive economic zones" and in the open sea. Comprehensive data on catches by the USSR and other countries inside these 200-mile zones are unavailable; figure 6 shows quantities of fish caught both in these zones and in the open sea.

[3] On 25 July 1984 the United States partially lifted this sanction by granting the Soviets an annual fishing allocation of about 50,000 tons, much smaller than the earlier 400,000- to 500,000-ton allotment.

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Soviet Long-Distance Fishing Capabilities

Because of modernization and expansion, the Soviet fishing fleet has gained a range that enables it to reach the prime high-yield fisheries of the developing world. US Navy data on the size of the fleet currently show 3,626 vessels, including high-seas trawlers, factory ships, refrigerated cargo ships, and research vessels and service craft (for example, tankers and tugs). (The number of vessels in 1982 shown in figure 2—4,064—is based on Lloyd's Shipping Register rather than on US Navy data.) The Soviets have purchased modern trawlers and fishing equipment from Western Europe, Japan, Poland, and East Germany. For example, East Germany, according to an Izvestiya *report, is scheduled to deliver 58 trawlers for catching and processing fish in 1984, and it has built 1,200 fishing boats for the Soviets over the past 35 years.*

The USSR's oceanographic research fleet—about a third of which is devoted to fisheries research—also has become larger and more sophisticated. This fleet helps locate the most fertile fishing grounds. Yields also have risen with the use of electronic fish-finding equipment and other efficient techniques.

Community decision to protect fish resources by limiting catches by foreign fleets also affected Moscow's ability to exploit European fisheries.

Having expanded activities in Third World fishing grounds in the 1960s, the Soviets under the new bilateral agreements pushed for permission to build ports and other facilities, such as fish-processing plants and refrigerated storage. Many African and Latin American countries—among them Angola, Nicaragua, and Peru—have granted Moscow such privileges. The need to supply, repair, and recrew the Soviet fishing fleet has intensified as its range has increased by thousands of miles (see inset, "Soviet Long-Distance Fishing Capabilities"). The acquisition of facilities for maintaining and repairing ships and the right to transfer fishing crews—especially in Peru and Argentina—have been particularly important to support operations on the high seas and in Antarctica. The USSR also needs to service the many oceanographic vessels engaged in fisheries research.

Figure 5
Soviet Fish Exports, 1965-83



Source: Official Soviet trade data.

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Moscow's Approaches to LDC Fisheries

Moscow is the largest source of fisheries aid to the developing world, having extended at least $250 million since the mid-1950s. Although a significant part of the USSR's economic aid, this program has required the expenditure of little hard currency and has resulted in significant gains for Moscow—namely, fish for Soviet consumers and foreign exchange earnings. In 1983, fish exports to hard currency customers reached their highest level—$169 million (figure 5).

Most of the USSR's bilateral fishing agreements call for the formation of joint ventures to develop the local fishing industry and exploit fish resources. The Soviets usually assume 49-percent ownership in the companies, which use ships leased or purchased from the USSR for fishing, conducting research, and training LDC personnel. Seventeen such companies effectively secure Soviet access to LDC fishing zones; sometimes the USSR has won exclusive rights, driving West European and Japanese firms from these markets. In addition, Moscow has promised in a number of bilateral agreements to supply research vessels and crews, to share data on fishery stocks, to host "partner

country" scientists aboard Soviet ships, to pay a fee (in cash or in kind) in return for fishing operations, and to extend loans and credits for constructing port and other facilities.

In general, agreements cover a wide spectrum of activities directly or indirectly related to fishing. For example, the USSR has:

- Transferred to Angola a fifth trawler and a fishing complex, including wharves and a processing factory.
- Turned over four fishing vessels for incorporation into Mozambique's fisheries fleet.
- Trained 1,000 Angolan seamen on Soviet vessels and 20 Mozambicans in the USSR.
- Committed itself to building a drydock and pier in Nicaragua to service the Soviets' Pacific fishing fleet and promised to pay Nicaragua a $200,000 annual rental fee, provide tuna fishing boats, and train about 100 Nicaraguans to use the equipment.

In such agreements, the developing country's main obligation is to grant Soviet trawlers access to its fishing zone and allow them a specified portion of the catch. The host government also may be required to supply anchoring and berthing facilities to Soviet fishing vessels, food and fuel, maintenance, repair, and fish-unloading services. Under some accords, the LDCs grant Moscow a permanent fisheries representative in the country and landing rights to Aeroflot for the transfer of fishing boat crews. Moscow's renewed access to LDC fisheries, which it achieved as a result of government-to-government agreements and joint ventures, has enabled it to maintain its annual global catches at about 10 million tons.

Africa. The USSR has only a limited economic involvement in Africa (apart from military aid), but much of the economic aid is devoted to the fishing industry largely to support its own import needs and to earn hard currency. Moscow has had six joint fishing ventures with African nations, as well as fishing agreements with Angola, Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, and Sierra Leone. The Soviets concentrate on the continent's fish resources along the Atlantic coast, location of the richest stocks. Hundreds of Soviet fishing vessels operate there. 25X1 25X1

Several West African states where fishing is of major importance to the economy have complained that Moscow fails to adhere to the terms of the bilateral agreements. These countries object not only to the depletion of their fishing stocks but also to Moscow's failure to provide the quantities of fish promised. 25X1

Complaints about overfishing have been made by Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, and Namibia. For example, the USSR regularly fails to remit the required 12 percent of its catch to Angola, and, according to a foreign press report, Soviet and Cuban fishing has driven out the local fishing industry. Likewise, 50 to 70 Soviet trawlers operate in Guinean waters when only 10 are legally entitled to be there. 25X1 25X1 25X1

Several African countries seized Soviet fishing trawlers for illegal operations; however, after Morocco did so in 1981, a Soviet minesweeper began to patrol West African waters to guard the fisheries fleet. The continued presence of this minesweeper has deterred Rabat from impounding any more Soviet trawlers. 25X1 25X1

Once it has access to LDC fisheries, Moscow frequently refuses promised financial and technical aid. The Somalis, before abrogating their bilateral agreement in 1977 for political reasons, were unhappy that almost all the income from their joint fishing venture went toward Soviet technicians' salaries and other administrative costs. Morocco and Guinea also have been disappointed with Moscow's failure to supply the vessels, training, and facilities as promised. 25X1

Like Somalia, other countries have translated their resentment of Soviet overfishing and stinginess into action by terminating accords and joint companies. In 1977, Mauritius canceled a seven-year-old agreement. 25X1

Mauritania followed suit the next year, and Equatorial Guinea ended a treaty allowing exclusive Soviet access to its fishery zone in the early 1980s. Other countries have spurned the USSR's offers for fisheries aid. In 1981 Congolese President Sassou, under pressure from his political advisers, signed a friendship treaty with the USSR that did not contain a fisheries protocol, which the Soviets desired. Cape Verde, Seychelles, and Liberia also have brushed aside Soviet entreaties for fishing accords.

To mitigate the damage from Soviet overfishing and to avoid the results of broken promises of aid, some African countries have taken measures short of canceling their agreements. In 1983 Guinea-Bissau diverted part of the catch it had previously allocated to Moscow to a joint Bissauan/Portuguese fishing company and barred the Soviets from deepwater fishing once they filled their quota. In 1982, the Angolan regime discussed with Japanese, Scandinavian, Arab, and US companies initiatives intended to rehabilitate its fishing industry.

The Kremlin tried to coerce Guinea in 1983 into extending the bilateral fishing agreement by stopping fish deliveries to Conakry (which depends entirely on Soviet supplies) for several months. To reduce its dependence on Moscow, the Guinean Government subsequently sought Western fishing companies to replace the USSR and signed a three-year fishing agreement with the European Community. Nevertheless, in July 1984, the Guinean Government acceded to Soviet proposals to establish a fishing port on an island near Conakry, Under the proposal, Soviet trawlers would obtain fishing rights and the Guineans would receive fish-handling and -processing equipment, 10,000 tons of the catch per year, training of personnel, and financial compensation.

Latin America. The Kremlin's campaign to win fishing privileges has been as intense in Latin America as in Africa but far less successful. Moscow has won access to the 200-mile fishing zones of only Peru and Argentina—in addition to those of its client states, Cuba and Nicaragua. Chile permits the fishing fleet to use port facilities and to transfer boat crews but not to fish. In several countries, longstanding Soviet offers have met with strong resistance from well-organized domestic fishing interests in Argentina, Chile, and Peru have questioned whether Soviet trawlers engage in activities other than fishing.[4]

The Soviets' difficulty in winning Argentine approval of an agreement allowing fishing, particularly in the aftermath of the Falkland Islands crisis, illustrates their problems with obtaining agreements throughout the continent. As Moscow intermittently negotiated with Buenos Aires from 1973 to 1982, Argentina seized several Soviet fishing vessels that had crossed the 200-mile limit. A March 1980 agreement granted the USSR only the right to conduct fisheries research, not to fish. Argentine naval officers opposed even this agreement, and the Argentine Government insisted on having at least six of its nationals on board each research vessel. In the early 1980s, the Soviets tried to use their increased purchases of Argentine grain and meat as a lever to persuade Buenos Aires to grant Moscow access to its coastal fisheries. In April 1982 (when the Falklands war began) the Argentines finally signed a joint-venture agreement permitting fishing within the 200-mile zone. The owners of deep-sea fishing vessels in Argentina, however, have strongly opposed this protocol, claiming that Soviet overfishing depletes the nation's stocks and that Moscow's sales to third countries hurt Argentina's own fish exports.

Despite its ultimate success in Argentina, Moscow has not been able to persuade other South American states to sign similar accords. Moscow has not yet had a response from Colombia to its April 1984 request for a joint fishing enterprise. In several countries, political strains create almost insuperable obstacles to negotiating fishing rights. For example, the Soviets have been prohibited from fishing in Chilean territorial waters since 1973.

[4] With their sophisticated gear for sampling and analyzing the ocean environment, finding fish, and communicating, the Soviet fishing fleet's 3,600 vessels, particularly those outfitted for fishery research, could provide limited support for intelligence and military activities. Although the fishing fleet as a whole may not have an explicit intelligence collection mission, we believe individual ships report on targets of opportunity and are responsive to ad hoc tasking from Soviet military and intelligence organizations.

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Despite these difficulties, the USSR has enjoyed some success in Latin America. The Soviet fishing presence in Peru, for example, is substantial. According to the US Embassy, in 1980 about 10,000 Soviet fishermen, who worked in factory ships outside Peru's 200-mile zone, passed through the Lima airport for transfer to Moscow on Aeroflot; a Lima newspaper stated that the number of fishermen transiting in 1983 had increased to 30,000. Prior to 1983, Soviet vessels were excluded from Peru's 200-mile fishing zone but could enter Peruvian ports for maintenance. The fleet was granted the right to catch 180,000 tons of fish in Peruvian waters in a 1983 government decree requiring foreign fishermen to remit 30 percent of the catch to a Peruvian company. In a harsh criticism of this accord, a Peruvian television commentary claimed that Peru had received only $300 million worth of fish out of a total catch of $2.2 billion and urged renegotiation of the agreement.

The Soviets have been more successful in Cuba, Nicaragua, and (before the US intervention) Grenada. In addition to providing access to logistic facilities that the Soviets need for their fleet, the fishing agreements constitute another—though minor—link binding these countries to the "socialist" community. Soviet-Cuban cooperation began with a Soviet loan to build a fishing port in Cuba; Havana partly repaid this loan by providing services to the Soviet fishing fleet. Under an accord signed with Managua in 1981, Moscow agreed to build a repair facility on Nicaragua's west coast to service the Soviet Pacific fishing fleet. This shipyard is much better located than the one in Peru that was formerly used because of its proximity to the Panama Canal and to tuna fishing grounds. In the summer of 1983, the Soviets also sent Nicaragua a drydock for fishing vessel repair, which they had removed from Angola. Moscow also used its relationship with Grenada to improve logistic support for its fishing fleet

Other Third World Areas. Although providing technical aid to many other Third World countries, the USSR depends considerably less on them as a source of fish. Soviet catches are negligible in waters off Asian, Middle Eastern, and Pacific LDCs.[5] Nonetheless, Moscow has approached some of these countries, primarily with offers of joint fishing ventures and technical aid. The USSR has made proposals to North and South Yemen, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, India, and Bangladesh to:

- Deliver fishing ships and factory vessels.
- Construct training centers, shipyards, hatcheries, cold storage facilities, and fish-processing plants.
- Conduct oceanographic surveys. 25X1

In 1976 when visiting the South Pacific island states of Tonga and Western Samoa, a Soviet delegation offered to build up their fledgling fishing industries by giving them a dockyard, a cannery, and a small fishing fleet in return for fishing rights. These governments eventually rejected Moscow's proposals, although they may have used them to try to obtain critically needed aid from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. 25X1 25X1

In other Third World countries where they have been more successful, the Soviets have engendered the same criticism as in Africa. 25X1

the South Yemen Government is unlikely to restrict operations by Soviet trawler captains, who are required only to declare the amount of fish caught. 25X1

Costs and Benefits of Soviet Involvement in LDC Fisheries

With the proliferation of 200-mile fishing zones in the Third World in the mid-1970s, Soviet involvement probably was initially a net benefit to developing countries. Few LDCs could take full advantage of their new, exclusive rights because they lacked the technical and scientific expertise and the equipment to fish outside of nearby shallow waters. For the many LDCs with small and aging fishing fleets and port facilities, inviting the USSR and other maritime 25X1 25X1

[5] As figure 6 indicates, however, Moscow relies more on fishing areas in the northwest Pacific Ocean—particularly those off the coast of Japan—than on any other maritime region. 25X1

powers to provide aid, even on a quid pro quo basis, was an attractive short-run option. They stood to gain as much as Moscow from increased catches. The Soviets' training of local fishermen, both on Soviet ships and in schools in the USSR, probably helped boost catches, thus benefiting LDCs suffering from shortages of domestically produced food and allowing others to occasionally sell the excess for foreign exchange. LDCs also received fees for Moscow's use of their fishing grounds, and local employment in the fishing industry, including fish processing and fleet maintenance, grew. [redacted]

The Soviets never lost sight of the benefits to be gained from giving aid to Third World fisheries. Moscow's primary objective—regaining access to rich fishing areas as 200-mile exclusive economic zones were being declared throughout the Third World—was to maintain an important source of protein for the Soviet population. The USSR has shipped to Soviet consumers a large share of its Third World catch. For example, current plans for a Soviet-Argentine fishing port call for the USSR to lend Argentina $160 million to be repaid within five years in fish exports worth an estimated $300 million, [redacted] Other benefits to Moscow include sales of fish to obtain foreign exchange and access to onshore facilities needed to service its large fishing fleet. [redacted]

In addition, the USSR has reaped political and intelligence benefits from an expanded fishing presence in the Third World. The Kremlin has achieved additional access to LDC officials and has increased the number of in-country Soviet personnel by posting fishery representatives to LDC ministries. This influence could be used to affect negotiations for continued fishing access or the construction of permanent facilities. [redacted]

The USSR has failed to furnish promised levels of financial aid to Third World fishing industries. Often, technical aid accounts for only modest gains in local employment because the Soviets usually process most of the fish on self-contained factory ships anchored offshore. In many cases Moscow refuses to deliver the quantities of fish promised, and less frequently it has raised the price of that portion of the catch it sells back to LDCs. Furthermore, the Soviets show little concern for conservation in their Third World fishing activities. [redacted] 25X1

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Although offshore fishing often aggravates relationships with Third World countries, the economic benefits to Moscow probably far outweigh the political costs. LDC complaints about depletion of fish resources and low levels of aid generally do not affect ties because fishing is a minor part of the relationship. Third World nations seem unwilling to let these frustrations lead to diplomatic disputes, much less ruptures. Some LDCs have terminated fishing accords when they have broken diplomatic relations over broader issues—as Egypt did in the mid-1970s when Sadat expelled Soviet advisers and as Somalia did in 1977 when the Soviets tilted toward Ethiopia. But the USSR probably calculates that fishing problems will almost never be the sole cause of broken relations or even worsening political ties. [redacted] 25X1

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Those Third World nations willing to accept Soviet fishing in their waters usually are at a disadvantage when the USSR tries to negotiate entry. LDCs lack the economic resources that would persuade Moscow to negotiate with them on an equal basis. Unlike industrialized countries, especially Japan, LDCs do not manufacture modern vessels or equipment like electronic fish-finders. Although they have the same right as other countries to fish in the USSR's economic zone, LDCs cannot mount such long-distance operations. Even Soviet allies may find themselves at a disadvantage. [redacted] an agreement allowing North Korea to catch 200,000 tons of fish a year near the Soviet border is meaningless because P'yongyang lacks enough fishing boats and nets and cannot pay the required fee. [redacted] 25X1

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African countries have special problems because most cannot monitor or police Soviet fishing. Namibia, for example, has never been able to enforce its rights over the 200-mile exclusive zone it enacted in 1981 because it cannot effectively patrol its waters. Similarly, neither Zaire nor Sierra Leone, which has only one small patrol boat, can enforce fishing restrictions against foreign vessels. Latin American countries, on the other hand, generally are better equipped and seem quicker to defend their interests. Peru and Ecuador, for instance, were the first countries to declare exclusive fishing rights within 200 miles of their coasts. The long coastlines of several South American countries probably help explain their determination to protect their marine resources.

naval patrols appear to be more effective in enforcing fishing regulations than in Africa. Even though Latin American countries often monitor the locations of Soviet fishing vessels, neither they nor other LDCs keep track of the quantities of fish caught.

Prospects

As its fleet depletes stocks in one African coastal region after another, the USSR is likely to continue urging West African nations—some of which, like Guinea, are vulnerable to its economic pressure—to grant additional fishing privileges. Moscow almost certainly will take any opportunity to obtain fishing concessions from these countries. For example, Soviet officials promised in March 1984 that they would donate to Mauritius a 3,000-ton ship for ferrying cargo and passengers, but they implied that the transfer would depend on Mauritian approval of a bilateral fishing agreement (as well as Aeroflot landing rights and the establishment of a Novosti office).

Soviet diplomats may try to convince Western-leaning LDCs—which also want to maintain some links with the East—to permit Soviet trawlers to fish in their waters. Some African leaders who are disappointed with the level of Western aid may respond favorably. Others may do so because many West African fishing industries desperately need aid and many Western companies are reluctant to risk investing capital in them. In any event, the Soviet fleet probably will make frequent illegal forays into West African waters because few of these states have the power to enforce fishing restrictions or bans. Although several of these countries would be receptive to Western offers of patrol vessels, Moscow probably will continue to take advantage of their inability to defend their fish stocks.

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Moscow almost certainly will pursue its campaign for fishing rights in Latin America as vigorously as it does in Africa. The USSR will try to obtain additional long-term agreements because it needs ports to support fishing operations in the South Atlantic and South Pacific Oceans and off Antarctica. This need explains Moscow's recent overtures to obtain access to two ports in Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of Argentina. Soviet negotiators will court some Latin American governments by taking advantage of their desires for lucrative Soviet contracts

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Despite all of Moscow's efforts, most Latin American nations will continue to be wary of an expanded Soviet fishing presence in their waters. Countries like Chile will continue to restrict the USSR's fishing because of economic nationalism or political antipathy. Moscow also will face opposition from Latin American fishing interests and from naval and intelligence officials. Nicaragua, unlike other Latin American states, will remain receptive to Soviet overtures because of its desperate need for assistance.

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Overall, the Soviets are unlikely to repeat the successes they enjoyed in the mid-1970s when they negotiated agreements and joint ventures in dozens of LDCs. Should Moscow's access to Third World waters actually decline, it will try to buffer the negative impact on the size of its catch by intensifying the search for fish outside 200-mile exclusive zones, especially in the southern oceans and off Antarctica. The Kremlin also would redouble diplomatic efforts to boost quotas for catches off developed countries, especially Japan. As a result, economic planners could reasonably expect to soften the effect of any reduced access on their efforts to improve the Soviet diet. Similarly, the loss of fishing rights in several LDCs probably would not present Soviet planners with an insuperable problem in terms of hard currency earnings. Because sales of fish accounted for only $169 million in convertible currency in 1983 compared to about $15 billion earned from petroleum exports, a loss of access to some Third World fisheries probably would only minimally affect the balance of payments. 25X1

In our judgment, many nonaligned LDCs, including those in Africa, are apt to continue to consider fishing treaties with the USSR transitional. While Moscow will continue seeking permanent rights to help maintain its own fish supplies and to garner influence in the Third World, many LDCs probably will try to cut off Soviet aid after they have developed their own fishing capabilities. Some already have refused to negotiate new treaties and joint fishing companies, have canceled existing arrangements, and have demanded that agreements be limited in duration. The standoffish attitude of many Latin American states and the tendency of African nations to try to reduce their dependence on Moscow illustrate the Third World's cautious view of Soviet aid to fisheries. 25X1

Figure 6
Soviet Fish Catches by Geographic Area[a]



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

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Share of Fish Caught by Soviet Fleet, by Geographic Region

Percent

	1965	1970	1975	1980	1982
Soviet inland waters	16	12	10	8	8
East Asia	22	20	27	34	40
Africa	9	15	16	19	19
Europe	21	21	24	21	14
South America	0	6	0	6	6
Antarctica	0	0	0	5	6
North America	27	22	19	2	2
Other marine fishing areas	5	4	4	5	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Fishing areas located off:

Legend

- Soviet inland waters
- East Asia
- Africa
- Europe
- South America
- Antarctica
- North America
- Other marine fishing areas

[a] Comprehensive data are unavailable for catches by foreign fishing fleets within the 200-mile fishing zones of littoral states. Thus, this figure shows catches in areas contiguous to the continents, both within these zones and on the open sea.

[b] For 1980 and 1982, the amounts shown for Northwest Pacific also include less than 10,000 metric tons of fish caught in the West Central Pacific.

[c] For all five years, includes between 26,000 and 47,000 metric tons of fish caught in the West Indian Ocean.

[d] Includes 19,000 tons from the Southwest Atlantic in 1982 and 28,000 tons from the same area in 1980. In 1975, the USSR's only catches off South America were 9,000 tons from the Southwest Atlantic. The 421,000 metric tons caught in 1970 came from the Southwest Atlantic rather than the Southeast Pacific.

[e] During all five years, most of the catches off North America came from the Northwest Atlantic. Sizable quantities were caught in the Northeast Pacific, and much smaller amounts in the East Central Pacific and the West Central Atlantic.

[f] During all five years, almost all the fish caught in "other fishing areas" came from the Mediterranean and Black Seas. In 1975, 1980, and 1982, between 45,000 and 70,000 metric tons were caught in the Southwest Pacific.

Source: Various editions of the Food and Agriculture Organization's *Yearbook of Fishery Statistics*.

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