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The Yemens: A Handbook

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The Yemens: A Handbook

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This paper was prepared by [Redacted]
[Redacted] Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis, with a contribution from the Office
of Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations [Redacted]

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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**The Yemens:
A Handbook**

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Introduction

*Information available
as of 1 December 1983
was used in this report.*

North and South Yemen are among the poorest countries of the Arab world. Neither has significant military power, wealth, nor exportable resources nor manufactures of any consequence.

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The strategic location of the Yemens, however, gives them importance. They occupy the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula and overlook the southern end of the Red Sea-Suez Canal waterway. Soviet air and naval forces have access to facilities in Aden and are strategically placed to block the Bab el Mandeb, the 26-kilometer-wide entrance to the Red Sea.

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Both North and South Yemeni leaders have played upon their geographic importance to gain economic and military aid from the major powers and from the Arabian Peninsula states. Sanaa's goal has been to gain maximum aid by balancing competing foreign interests, while fending off external control. In Aden, a succession of more ideologically committed regimes has chosen to align the country with the USSR. The new pragmatic leadership, however, is moderating its policies in a bid for increased aid from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, and the West.

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Chronic internal instability has complicated the efforts of Aden and Sanaa to exploit East-West rivalries. Both regimes are products of revolutions of the 1960s—led in the North by Nasirist-inspired military officers and in the South by Marxists. Both have attempted to impose alien ideologies and institutions on deeply traditional Islamic societies. North Yemen is not one country, but three: the Shafii (Sunni Muslim) south and west coast, the Zaydi (Shia Muslim) north, and the Sanaa central region. No leader has simultaneously controlled all three areas. The Aden government, on the other hand, long ago consolidated control over its population, but the leadership remains beset by chronic infighting.

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Leadership changes have been frequent and violent. Three heads of state—two in the North and one in the South—have been assassinated or executed since 1976. South Yemen's President Hasani may have been the target in 1982 of several assassination attempts, which probably were instigated by former President Isma'il from his exile in Moscow.

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Prospects are for continued instability over the near term. North Yemen's economy by mid-1983 was in a state of near collapse, detracting from the government's success in repressing the National Democratic Front insurgency. In the South, Hasani's curtailment of support for insurgencies in North Yemen and Oman to induce moderate Arab aid for Aden's straitened economy still does not sit well with regime hardliners.

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Aden's Policies

A succession of South Yemeni leaders, proud of their revolutionary credentials and hardened in the struggle for independence against British forces, has sought to export their revolution throughout the Arabian Peninsula. In 1969 South Yemeni regulars attacked Saudi border positions and in 1972 and 1979 fought brief and successful wars with North Yemen. Aden has provided aid and bases for the insurgents of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the National Democratic Front in North Yemen, as well as for a variety of international terrorist groups. [redacted]

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While less alarming, other initiatives by Aden have tended to be abrasive. Aden aligns itself with the radical Arabs on Arab-Israeli issues, supports Marxist Ethiopia on the Eritrean issue, and spearheaded the formation of the Tripartite Alliance with Libya and Ethiopia in August 1981. [redacted]

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Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have sought periodically to induce Aden to moderate its policies in return for economic aid. This strategy backfired in 1978 when Riyadh's insistence on public pledges of moderation by then South Yemeni President Rubayyi Ali led to his overthrow by hardliners who believed his moves might lead to Aden's withdrawal from the radical camp. The Saudis now are proceeding more cautiously in attempting to gauge the depth of the South Yemeni leadership's commitment to moderation, which in part has resulted from disenchantment with Libya and the USSR over their unwillingness to provide the economic aid Aden believes it urgently needs. [redacted]

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Sanaa's Interests

The energies of North Yemen under President Salih and his predecessors have been fully engaged in an effort to gain legitimacy, to master the country's divergent political forces, and to avert economic collapse. In the tribal north, Sanaa's control does not extend much beyond the major cities and the country's main arteries. Its military forces are deployed principally in the south to contain the National Democratic Front's guerrilla forces and to block attempts at intervention on their behalf by South Yemen's Army. [redacted]

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North Yemen does not present a direct military or subversive threat to its Saudi and Omani neighbors as has the Aden regime. Nonetheless, North Yemen has historical claims to areas in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis fear that a strong, independent government in Sanaa might try to reassert those claims. In addition, Sanaa continues to hold over the Saudis the threat of closer cooperation with the USSR and tries to exploit Saudi fears to get more aid. The Saudis are concerned that Soviet involvement there might reach the level it has in South Yemen. North Yemen also has more than 600,000 migrant workers abroad—most in Saudi Arabia—and Riyadh views them as a potential source of unrest over the long term. [redacted]

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Foreign Influence

Moscow has moved strongly to build its influence in both Yemens. Although Aden has not acceded to Soviet requests for formal basing rights, the Soviets have overflight, bunkering, ship repair, and communications privileges. The Soviet Navy uses the waters around the island of Socotra for fleet anchorages and engages in military exercises nearby with South Yemen's naval forces. The armies of both Yemens depend heavily on Moscow for weaponry and military advisers. Despite the hostility between Sanaa and Aden, which at times has flared into open warfare, Moscow has not been forced to choose between the two as was the case in 1977 between Somalia and Ethiopia. [REDACTED]

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There are indications that Moscow is now pressing Aden for basing rights in South Yemen in return for easing payments on the debt Aden incurred in purchasing Soviet arms. Such bases would complement Soviet facilities in Ethiopia's Dahlak Archipelago and would give Soviet forces a good position in the strategic Bab el Mandeb. The Saudis, in particular, fear that the Soviet presence in the Yemens is aimed ultimately at Riyadh and the Gulf oilfields. [REDACTED]

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The Saudis and the other Gulf monarchies take the long-term threats from the Yemens seriously. Riyadh, eager to maintain a buffer against the radical regime in Aden, has in recent years made up at least a third of North Yemen's annual budget deficit and funds much of the regime's arms purchases. [REDACTED]

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At the same time, the Saudis have sought to prevent the emergence of a strong central government in Sanaa, to counter the influence of Moscow and native leftists within the regime, and to derail attempts at significant cooperation between the two Yemens. Riyadh funds a variety of rightwing political factions—tribal sheikhs, conservative military and government officials, and fundamentalist religious groups—to the detriment of North Yemen's President Salih. The Saudis, who have been instrumental in the rise to power of Sanaa's last three rulers, continue to search for a North Yemeni with acceptable conservative credentials to replace Salih. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Both Yemens resent interference in their affairs by foreign powers, but they cannot escape this, given their geographic importance and economic need. Sanaa has been the more skillful at playing off the interests of Moscow on the one hand and Riyadh and Washington on the other. Under the leadership of President Hasani, Aden now appears to be trying to follow a similar course. [REDACTED]

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Even with continuing help from both West and East, however, the Salih regime is unlikely soon to consolidate its power. Sanaa can hope, at best, to extend government influence gradually beyond the main population centers while holding in check leftist and Saudi-funded conservative political factions and whittling down the power of the tribes. This could come to naught, however, if the economy continues to weaken, possibly triggering another round of coup attempts. The downturn in Saudi oil revenues bodes ill for North Yemen, threatening cutbacks in Saudi subventions and in worker remittances. [redacted]

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Economic factors are also likely to be decisive in determining President Hasani's longevity in South Yemen. Without tangible benefits for South Yemen from his moderate course, his rivals on the left will press for a return to more activist policies and may seek to overthrow him. Neither Hasani nor a successor, however, is likely to seek to weaken Aden's association with the Soviets, whatever the pressures from Riyadh. South Yemen's military will continue to remain almost entirely dependent on the Communist countries for weaponry and military advisers. [redacted]

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Figure 1
The Strategic Location of the Yemens



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The Yemens: A Divided Heritage

Most Yemenis, both North and South, are conscious of a shared national identity based on state traditions that date back more than three millenia. A distinctive Yemeni cultural zone, centered on the highland region of the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula, includes all of present-day North Yemen and most of South Yemen and extends into the Asir and Jizan regions of neighboring Saudi Arabia.¹ Despite this common heritage, Yemeni society, like that of many highland peoples, has always been fragmented. A proud, fractious people who consider themselves the purest in descent of all Arabs, Yemenis are divided along regional, tribal, and class lines.

Islam, which was introduced in 628 AD, failed to bridge these divisions and, in fact, introduced fresh ones. In the ninth century, Shia Muslims reached the Yemen highlands from Persia and founded a theocratic state centered on the Sanaa region. The warlike Zaydis of the north, the principal Shia sect in the Yemens, have since dominated the much more numerous Shafiis (Sunni) who are located along the coasts and through the southern highlands.

The Zaydi Imamate

Under the leadership of Imams, who combined both religious and secular duties, the boundaries of the Zaydi state fluctuated widely, extending at times well to the north of the present North Yemeni-Saudi Arabian frontier, to Aden in the south, and eastward into the Dhofar region of Oman. As late as the 1950s, the Imamate government of North Yemen continued to assert its claim to Shafii territories under the protection of the British colonial government in Aden, sending its forces into repeated skirmishes with the British.

¹ The Hadhramis and other peoples of the eastern third of South Yemen have separate cultural and historical traditions. A number of tribes in the Al Mahrah district and on the island of Socotra speak Semitic languages that antedate the introduction of Arabic to South Arabia. Hadhramis traditionally have traveled widely throughout South Asia as traders and mercenary soldiers. Today many Hadhramis opposed to the Aden regime have resettled in Saudi Arabia.

The authority of the Imams was generally lightly felt, even when the Zaydi state was at its zenith. The tribes viewed the Imam's role as restricted to mediation of their quarrels and invariably resisted attempts by Sanaa to govern them. The Imamate throughout its history remained both inward looking and xenophobic with only the most rudimentary of governing institutions. Until the death of Imam Yahya in 1948, no foreign embassies were permitted in the Imamate and no emissaries were sent abroad.


Change and Revolution

Nineteenth-century colonialism, Ottoman Turkish in the north and British in the south, introduced changes to static Yemeni society, which were to culminate in revolution in the 1960s. But marked differences in the two colonial heritages profoundly influenced the separate directions the revolutions were to take.

The North. The Turks, who occupied Sanaa in 1872, attempted to introduce order and security and establish a rational bureaucratic administration. Ottoman rule, however, was violently resisted from the outset in an intermittently fought war of national liberation led by the Imams. The Turks withdrew in 1919, their material legacy limited to a few schools and hospitals. The Imamate, however, took from the Turks the concept of a standing army, under the command of professionally trained officers. A few Turks remained behind to found and staff a military academy whose graduates were to become the agents of modernism in Yemeni politics.

The war against Turkey profoundly altered the character of the Imamate. Trading on the new phenomenon of Yemeni nationalism, Imam Yahya and his son and successor, the even more despotic Imam Ahmad, sought to transform the Imamate into an absolute monarchy, a concept entirely alien to Zaydi precepts and anathema to the Shafii community and the emerging modernist element. A succession of conspiracies culminated in the revolt of the Nasirist-inspired Free Officers on 26 September 1962.

Figure 2



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The revolutionaries' base, however, was essentially urban in a country that was overwhelmingly rural. The tribesmen and their sheikhs—still the ultimate arbiters of Yemeni politics—remained attached to traditional values—the desire for arms and money, the preservation of their local autonomy, and loyalty to the Imam to whom they had sworn allegiance. []

The solution—a typically Yemeni compromise that denied outright victory to both sides—essentially placed the revolution in abeyance. The Imamate passed into history, while the republican government moved steadily to the right. To this day the traditional polycentric Yemeni political system continues to impede the development of a modern nation state. []

The Aden Colony. More than a century of British colonial domination led to a different and more decisive outcome in the south. In Aden a radical nationalist regime succeeded British rule in 1967, combining a successful drive for independence with a social revolution, and firmly asserted its control over the traditionally oriented rural population. []

The British seized the port of Aden in 1839 as a base to counter French and Ottoman operations in the Red Sea area. Its importance as a coaling station midway on the route to the Indian subcontinent grew with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. For the next 100 years, it was the only major urban center anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula, attracting a polyglot population of Westerners, Indians, and Yemenis. From a total of 20,000 in the mid-19th century, Aden's population by 1963 had grown to 225,000, a third of whom were natives of North Yemen. []

From the first, Aden acted as an agent of social transformation. The growth of secular education, the establishment of bureaucracies on alien, egalitarian models, and the expansion of commerce and industry created many new political and social roles for which members of all Yemeni classes in the south competed on more or less equal terms. By the 1950s the Aden Trades Union Congress and its political extension, the People's Socialist Party, were spearheading a campaign for national independence and social reform. []

The Protectorates. Social change developed much more slowly in the petty sultanates that surrounded

Aden and extended to the east through the Hadhramaut. Rejecting the Imamate's claims to suzerainty, all had become British protectorates by the 1930s. After World War II, however, British administrators gradually introduced political reforms and services to the sultanates, which eroded the authority of the native rulers. British efforts to disarm the tribesmen forced them to turn from their traditional leaders to the Imamate for weapons. []

Dissidence and armed rebellion supported by arms and money from Sanaa and Egypt spread through Aden and the protectorates in the 1950s, fanned by Arab nationalist propaganda directed at the British and the native elites. Intent on reducing its commitments in the Gulf and on the Arabian Peninsula, Britain pledged in 1959 to prepare the protectorates and the Aden Colony for independence. The Federation of South Arabia was inaugurated in January 1963 with independence projected five years hence. []

Two rival nationalist factions disrupted the timetable. Between 1964 and 1967 the radical National Liberation Front (NLF) and the Nasirist-influenced Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) waged a bitter struggle against the British. In the face of rising violence, Britain abandoned its plans to establish a moderate regime upon departure and began withdrawing its troops from Aden in the fall of 1967. In November, London negotiated a transfer of power to the NLF as the dominant political force in the country. []

With the ruling elite of the sultanates discredited and in flight, the new regime soon consolidated its control throughout the country, helped by a civil service and army inherited from the British and the tradition of strong central government exercised from Aden. Through the next decade the leadership grew increasingly radical and turned its attention to exporting its revolution to its nearest neighbors, North Yemen and Oman. []

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The Myth of Unity

The myth that North Yemen and South Yemen are two parts of a single nation underlies relations between Sanaa and Aden. Unification as a central theme in the political rhetoric of both northerners and southerners draws strength from:

- The nationalism that developed in the late stages of the Imamate. The early republican government asserted the Imamate's claim to southern Yemen—seats in the national assembly were allocated to southern representatives, a cabinet post for Yemeni Unity Affairs was created, and refuge was provided for South Yemen liberation movements.
- Cooperation between revolutionary movements in North and South. The opponents of the Imams in the 1940s and 1950s used Aden as their base. Later, the guerrilla war against the British in Aden was directed from North Yemen. Many southerners joined radical northern republicans in the defense of Sanaa during the royalist siege in 1967-68.
- Migration from North to South. Northerners, mainly from Shafii areas, comprised as much as 35 percent of Aden's population before 1967. Former President Isma'il is a northerner and has been the strongest proponent of unity among South Yemeni leaders. [redacted]

Since its swing to the right in the late 1960s, the Sanaa government has paid mostly lip service to calls for unity, believing that merger between the two governments would be to Aden's advantage, given its centralized government and more effective security forces. Meanwhile, it has attempted to undermine the southern regime by giving support to opposition elements. Ex-FLOSY members, for example, have formed an important political faction in the North, which has frequently had representatives serving in Sanaa governments. [redacted]

The South, for its part, has provoked border conflicts and supported guerrilla action in the North to wrest political concessions from the Sanaa government. The South in particular has sought to force the North to accept unity of the Yemens and take radicals into its

government. In 1972 widespread border fighting ended only when the North agreed to the establishment of joint committees to negotiate a full merger of the Yemens. [redacted]

After North Yemeni President al-Hamdi's assassination in October 1977 by conservatives, relations between the two Yemens again deteriorated sharply. The assassination of Northern President al-Ghashmi by a South Yemeni agent in June 1978 probably was ordered by radicals to avenge Hamdi's death. National Democratic Front (NDF) guerrillas, recruited from dissident political factions opposed to the Sanaa regime, began infiltrating in mid-1978 into the North from bases on the South Yemeni side of the border. In February 1979 localized clashes between North and South regulars escalated into full-scale warfare with Aden holding the edge. [redacted]

Negotiations in Kuwait in March 1979 ended conventional military hostilities, with Sanaa forced to reaffirm its 1972 commitment to unity. Sanaa was also pressed to accept internal regime changes. Rightwingers were ousted from its government and replaced by northerners acceptable to Aden. [redacted]

The ouster of the radical 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il from the presidency and his replacement by Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, a relative moderate, led to changes in Aden's relations with Sanaa. Hasani apparently favors political action, including subversion, over conventional military strategy as the best way for the NDF to gain power in Sanaa. With the defeat of the NDF by government forces in the spring and summer of 1982, an agreement was reached with Sanaa providing for a pullback of regular forces along the frontier and curtailment of Aden's support for NDF conventional forces. Although there have been continuing tensions since then, both sides have exercised restraint and there has been no serious outbreak of fighting. [redacted]

Although neither Sanaa nor Aden appear to believe that unification is a realistic goal, both find gestures toward eventual unity politically useful. The Yemeni Council, set up in December 1981 during President

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Salih's visit to Aden, the first ever by a president of North Yemen, provides a framework for meetings of the two heads of state. It also provides for meetings of joint committees headed by the Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Education, and Development. Neither side appears to expect anything concrete from these sessions, but they act as a safety valve for the two countries. Meetings of the military committee have been useful in monitoring the disengagement of forces along the border.

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Geography

Location

The Yemens occupy the mountainous southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, their common border terminating in the west at the Bab el Mandeb (the Gate of Tears), the 26-kilometer-wide strait that links the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. With the exception of the port of Aden and its surrounding area, the Yemens have been among the least accessible regions of the Arabian Peninsula, although their coasts lie along one of the world's most heavily traveled water routes. Together they have an area of approximately 484,000 square kilometers (South Yemen: 287,500 square kilometers; North Yemen: 195,000 square kilometers), roughly about the size of Utah and Nevada combined. Measured from the Bab el Mandeb, they have a north-south extension of 379 kilometers and an east-west extension of 1,135 kilometers.

[REDACTED]

South Yemen claims and occupies the largely barren 3,100-square-kilometer island of Socotra and two nearby island groups. The Soviet Navy uses Socotra for military exercises and its sheltered waters for fleet anchorages. Aden has fortified Perim Island in the Bab el Mandeb, which it holds as the result of a plebiscite. Its claim to Kamaran Island farther north is disputed by Sanaa, which seized and garrisoned it during the fighting between North and South Yemen in 1972.

Borders

Much of the Yemens' frontier with Saudi Arabia to the north and Oman to the east has never been defined or remains in dispute. The northern border, which follows the crests of mountain ridges for approximately 320 kilometers inland from the Red Sea to the vicinity of Najran, is the only section that has been demarcated and accepted as an internationally recognized boundary. From Najran south and east to the Oman border, the frontier crosses the still largely unsurveyed western reaches of the Rub' al Khali (Empty Quarter). South Yemen's border with Oman is an administrative boundary laid down by the

British while they still held the South Arabian Protectorate. Aden is pressing Muscat to negotiate a final demarcation of the border.

[REDACTED]

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Many North Yemens still are unreconciled to the northern boundary, reluctantly accepted by Sanaa after its military defeat by the Saudis in 1934, and assert a national claim to the "lost" province of Asir, the Najran oasis, and the Jizan area. Territorial disputes in the Rub' al Khali also are likely to become heated if oil exploration being conducted by a US company in the borderlands results in significant finds. Sanaa, Aden, and Riyadh cite tribal allegiances to support territorial claims.

[REDACTED]

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Territorial claims were not at issue in the border clashes between North and South Yemen in 1972 and 1979. The present border was drawn by the British and Turks in 1914 to separate their colonial possessions.

[REDACTED]

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Topography

The Yemens are divided into four well-defined geographic regions—a narrow coastal plain; the mountainous interior; the crescent-shaped eastern escarpment, which gives way in the northeast to plains and the vast sand deserts of the Rub' al Khali; and in the east, the broad Hadhramaut tableland. The rugged terrain covering most of the two countries has favored the development of isolated communities, a factor that, perhaps more than any other, has been responsible for the fragmentation characterizing Yemeni society.

[REDACTED]


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The coastal plain is a southern extension of the Tihamah, the arid lowland that runs north along the coast of the Red Sea as far as the Saudi border with Jordan. In the Yemens, the Tihamah varies in width from 10 to 30 kilometers. Seven major wadis (intermittent streams), which flow from the central highlands, make limited agriculture possible. A similar

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Figure 3
Topography in the Yemens



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coastal lowland extends eastward along the Gulf of Aden as far as the Oman border, but it is much more narrow and, in places, interrupted by mountain spurs that reach to the sea, making cross-country travel difficult. Rising above the southern plain is the isolated volcanic crater around which the port community of Aden has grown.


The two great mountain systems that parallel the Arabian Peninsula's western and southern coasts come together in the Yemens, where they reach their highest elevations. Interior elevations average between 2,000 and 3,000 meters. Jabal an Nabi Sha'ayb, which overlooks Sanaa, is, at 3,760 meters,

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Farmsteads at Rawdah in the plains near Sanaa. Houses and towers are loopholed for defense. New homes rise on mounds built up from decaying mud brick buildings [redacted]

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the highest peak in the Arabian Peninsula. The widely separated towns and villages in the interior are linked only by a sparse network of mostly unsurfaced roads and tracks. Tortuous curves and steep grades make travel particularly dangerous on the Sanaa/Ta'izz Highway, the only major north-south surfaced road. [redacted]

Yemen's mountains are slowly uplifting as the entire Arabian Peninsula tilts eastward. The basin of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are actually major geologic fault systems with associated seismic activity. A major earthquake devastated the Dhamar region of North Yemen in December 1982, killing more than 20,000 persons and leaving 300,000 homeless. [redacted]

The interior escarpment is drained by extensive wadi systems that generally flow northeastward and ultimately disappear in the Rub' al Khali's sands. In the past this area supported a high civilization centered

on the ancient Ma'rib dam, which impounded the waters of the Wadi as Sudd. Planning for a new dam and major irrigation works in this potentially productive agricultural area has been held up by a lack of funds. [redacted]

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The southern coastal range decreases in the direction of the Hadhramaut, a broad and desolate tableland to the east, which is geographically and culturally distinct from the Yemens proper. The narrow Wadi Hadhramawt runs between steeply incised banks for more than 350 kilometers before turning south to the Arabian Sea. The relatively fertile upper and middle courses support a large farming population distributed in a string of villages and towns that line the base of the walls of the wadi. [redacted]

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Shibam, founded in the third century A.D., is a town of 10- to 12-story mud brick apartment houses below the walls of the Wadi Hadhramawt. Feuding among the some 1,500 tribal groups of the Hadhramaut was commonplace, even within towns, until the 1967 Revolution

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Climate

The climate of the Yemens has marked contrasts. Although much of the area is arid to semiarid through most of the year, precipitation at higher elevations is greater in the Yemens than anywhere else in the Arabian Peninsula. Wadi Hajar in South Yemen is the only sizable stream in the Peninsula that is perennial throughout its entire course.

In the arid interior plains rain usually falls in cloudbursts, but many areas may receive no precipitation for many years. In January and February the dry northeast monsoon brings desert aridity and lower temperatures to much of the rest of the Yemens.

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
The coastal lowlands are hot and rainless but have high humidity, a combination that can produce extremely high physiological stress. In summer, temperatures occasionally rise to over 55 degrees Celsius. Annual rainfall in the south of the Tihamah is only 75 mm, although it rises to 500 mm in the north.

The highlands have the most favorable climatic conditions found anywhere in the Arabian Peninsula. At altitudes between 2,000 and 3,000 meters, mean daily maximum temperatures in summer range between 22°C and 28°C and in winter are just above freezing. The rain-bearing southwest monsoon beats along the

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
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Figure 4
Precipitation in the Yemens



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


^a One inch equals 0.04 millimeter.

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Figure 5
Population Distribution in the Yemens



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
western and southern faces of the highlands from July to September and penetrates upland valleys as far as Asir. A shorter rainy season occurs in March and April. Annual accumulation ranges from 406 to 813 mm. Along the western slopes rainfall occurs year round. Moisture conditions are sufficient for dry farming and terrace agriculture in many highland locations. Mountain torrents are diverted for irrigation in the lower and more arid valleys. In general, precipitation decreases from south to north and from higher to lower elevations.

Human Resources

Population. North Yemen, with a population of roughly 6.5 million (including Yemeni emigre workers), is the most populous state of the Arabian Peninsula. Although South Yemen falls well behind Saudi Arabia (5.5-6 million), its population of 1.9 million is the third highest in the Peninsula. South Yemen's population is growing at an annual rate of about 1.9 percent; estimates for North Yemen are unreliable, ranging between 1.8 and 3.4 percent. Like most other


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Sanaa's skyline is dominated by the minarets of the capital's many mosques. Most construction is mud brick, although the lower stories of the homes of the elite are usually of cut stone



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The Central Bank is one of Sanaa's few modern structures




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countries with high fertility and mortality rates, both Yemens have young populations. Roughly half of all Yemenis are under 14 years old. Life expectancy in the North is about 42 years and in the South about 38 years.

North Yemen's population is overwhelmingly rural with probably less than 15 percent living in urban areas. Most of the population is distributed among

more than 50,000 farm villages and small towns with the densest concentrations in the relatively fertile central and southern highlands and along their western slopes. Sanaa (150,000 to 250,000), Ta'izz (90,000 to 100,000), and Al Hudaydah (85,000 to 90,000) are the only cities of any consequence. About 33 percent of South Yemen's population is urban. Aden (270,000) and Al Mukalla (80,000) are the main cities.

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A merchant shows the effects of qat intoxication. The workday ends for most North Yemeni males at noon when they visit the suq (market) to purchase supplies for the afternoon qat session

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The suq (market) is the center of most commercial and social activity in the Yemens. A vendor in Sanaa's old city sells imported second-hand suit jackets, which are worn by Yemeni males over the wrap-around skirt-like futah



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Yemeni males traditionally have migrated throughout the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf in search of employment. About 600,000 North Yemenis and 136,000 South Yemenis work in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms.

The sayyid class, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad and formed the hereditary religious aristocracy in the Imamate and the Protectorates, has lost its monopoly of political power. Only a few sayyids still hold influential posts in either regime.

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Social Structure. Yemeni society is hierarchically organized with clear distinctions between and within social classes. Endogamy is the rule, perpetuating these distinctions and giving them the force of caste boundaries. The right to bear arms and the manner in which they are displayed continue to be important indicators of social status in North Yemen.

Under the Imamate, the hereditary qadi class, ranked socially below the sayyids, provided cadres for the religious and legal establishments. It continues to be strongly represented in the bureaucracies in both North and South. North Yemen's late President al-Hamdi, for example, was helped to prominence by his qadi background.

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The revolutions of the 1960s have not blurred traditional class distinctions to any great extent, but they have broken the control by traditional elites of political and economic power. The professional military in both countries and the party in South Yemen have become channels enabling some persons of the lower, traditionally non-arms-bearing classes to rise to higher status.

Tribesmen occupy a middle social rung in North Yemen, although there are distinctions between tribal groups based on claims of "noble" origin. Within the tribes there is a high degree of egalitarianism. Although sheikhs tend to be selected by the tribesmen

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from dominant families, they maintain their positions only if successful as mediators within the tribe and as intermediaries between the tribes and the government. [redacted]

At the lower end of the social scale are tradesmen and tenant farmers, and lower still are the *akhdam*, most of whom are of African descent. Members of the *akhdam* class in North Yemen typically perform menial jobs such as sweeping streets. [redacted]

Religion. Although almost all Yemenis are Muslim, sectarian quarrels have been responsible for much of the fragmentation of Yemeni society. Most Yemenis are adherents of the two major branches of Islam—the orthodox Sunni and the heterodox Shia. The majority Shafii community, which takes its name from one of the four schools jurisprudence of Sunni Islam, constitutes at least half of the population in North Yemen and virtually all of the population in South Yemen. In North Yemen, Shafiis occupy the entire stretch of the Tihamah, the southern highlands, and the eastern borderlands. [redacted]

The Zaydis, adherents of a Shia sect, dominate the central and northern highlands, with Sanaa as their center, and extend to the north where they straddle the frontier with Saudi Arabia. Small Ismaili Shia communities are found in the Haraz region west of Sanaa and among the Yam tribes in the border area near Najran. About 1,000 Jews remain from the once 60,000-strong Yemeni Jewish community. Most Jews left en masse for Israel in 1948. [redacted]

Although Zaydis and Shafiis are conservative in religious matters, neither community displays the zealotry of contemporary Iranian Shiism or the dour puritanism of the Wahhabis (Sunni) of Saudi Arabia. Theologically, there is little distinction between the Yemeni sects. Zaydi teachings, in fact, are closer to Sunni dogma than those of any other Shia sect, and it is not uncommon for Zaydis and Shafiis to intermarry or worship in each other's mosques. [redacted]

Politically and economically, however, the communities remain deeply divided, and continuing tensions between the two have contributed to much of North Yemen's chronic political instability. The Shafiis,

generally more sophisticated and better educated, have resented their political domination by the more warlike Zaydis through much of Yemeni history. [redacted]

Notwithstanding sectarian feuding, Islamic practice is supported fully by the Sanaa government in both Zaydi and Shafii areas. The 1970 Constitution declared Islam to be the state religion and identified the sharia, the codification of the Islamic legal and moral system, as the source of all state laws. [redacted]

The South Yemeni Government, despite its avowed Marxism, has treated Islamic issues gingerly. Article 46 of the Constitution asserts that Islam is the religion of the state. South Yemen's social practices, however, are the least restrictive of any Arab country. Women, for example, are integrated into the urban work force, although in the countryside they generally remain veiled and are confined by custom to traditional roles. [redacted]

The Tribes. Tribalism permeates all facets of life in the Yemens. Sanaa has made only limited progress in extending its writ beyond the capital and other urban centers into Zaydi areas. Traditional sheikhly families continue to lead the Zaydi tribes, which function as virtually independent political, economic, and military entities. By contrast, the sheikhly class has been all but destroyed in South Yemen and has lost much of its power in Shafii areas of North Yemen. [redacted]

Most of the Zaydi tribes are grouped into two main confederations—the relatively tightly organized Hashid, whose paramount sheikhs in recent years have been supplied by the al-Ahmar family of the dominant Bani 'Usaymat tribe, and the more numerous but diffuse Bakil. Although acknowledging these allegiances, tribes join in concerted action only if they perceive their interests to be directly involved. Loyalties, whether to the government or to the sheikhs, however, are always subject to negotiation. [redacted]

To the extent possible, the Zaydi tribes organize their affairs independently of the government. Rough justice, often involving collective fines and punishment, is

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
Young Adeni women prefer Western dress. In North Yemen the veil is still de rigueur, even for textile workers



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Figure 6
Principal Tribes and Religious Divisions in the Yemens



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meted out according to 'urf, tribal customary law. In a society permeated by a heroic code, personal independence, warrior prowess, and loyalty to one's family, clan, and tribe are highly prized. Every tribesman wears a curved dagger, called the *jambiya*, as a symbol of manhood. Fighting within and between tribes is endemic, usually resulting from disputes over land, water, and honor. These quarrels for the most part involve a minimum of bloodletting followed by arbitration, usually by respected sheikhs of other tribes.

Out of ideological necessity, the government does not officially recognize tribal structures, but it quietly engages in mediation with tribal leaders; it can ill afford not to. The more powerful tribes can, in short order, mobilize thousands of men armed with Soviet AK-47 assault rifles. Arsenals of the major tribes also include crew-served weapons and even heavy artillery and tanks captured from the Egyptians during the civil war.


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Armed Saudi tribesmen mix with Yemenis in Sa 'dah, the "capital" of the northern tribes

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A sheikh and members of his entourage. Tribesmen pay the equivalent of \$1,600 for the Soviet AK-47, the weapon of choice for most North Yemenis

Tribalism today is not as strongly developed as formerly among the Shafii communities in North Yemen. The once powerful Akk confederacy of the Tihamah never recovered from its military defeat by the Imamate in 1929. The intrusion of Zaydi landholding clans and families has tended to break up Shafii tribal structures throughout the southern highlands. Shafii loyalties now are primarily focused on the village community. [redacted]

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Although the sheikhly class has effectively been destroyed in South Yemen, identification with a particular tribal group is still common, even within the government, party, and military. Members of the Dathinah tribe, for example, dominate the officer corps, having replaced the Aulaqi, who had been favored under the British. Today, many Aulaqi have joined anti-Aden exile groups in North Yemen and Saudi Arabia. [redacted]

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North Yemen

Economy

North Yemen's economy suffers from serious structural defects:

- Much of the population lives beyond effective government control.
- Communication and transportation are poorly developed.
- The economy is based largely on subsistence agriculture.
- Few commercially exploitable minerals have been found.

As a result, Sanaa has the worst trade imbalance in the world, with export earnings typically covering less than 1 percent of the import bill. [redacted]

Although substantial foreign exchange is received through worker remittances, these earnings have distorted more than benefited the economy. A labor shortage was created in the 1970s by the migration of about 600,000 Yemeni workers—about half the domestic labor force—attracted by the economic boom in neighboring countries. The worker exodus generated demand for foreign labor to replace the loss of Yemenis, pushed up wage scales, and contributed to a deterioration of the country's agricultural base. [redacted]

The migration also fostered the development of a black market. Increased purchasing power afforded by the wide distribution of worker remittances stimulated unbridled import growth. The government tried to profit from the burgeoning consumer demand by imposing customs duties on imports. This resulted in government dependence on remittances as the largest source of foreign exchange and the chief source of revenue. Not surprisingly, imposition of customs duties, coupled with the government's inability to control border areas, stimulated trade in smuggled goods and illegal currency transactions, according to the US Embassy. Black-market activity now siphons off substantial government revenues and denies it needed foreign exchange. [redacted]

Moreover, government hopes of channeling remittances into productive investment have been only

marginally fulfilled. Because of endemic political uncertainty, private investors have sought rapid returns from ventures in retail sales or production of light consumer goods and have shied away from investments involving long-term payoffs. The government, therefore, has had to carry the burden of financing both the country's infrastructure and the infant industrial sector. As a consequence, the Yemeni industrial base is not sufficiently developed to stem the consumer-led growth in imports. [redacted]

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Agriculture. North Yemen, with some of the most fertile land in the Arabian Peninsula, has the potential to become self-sufficient in food production. The agriculture sector, however, has performed poorly despite its importance to the economy. Although over 75 percent of the labor force is employed on the land, farming accounts for about 40 percent of GDP—down from 45 percent in 1975. Low farm incomes have contributed to emigration, which has left the sector with labor shortages. [redacted]

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North Yemen's farm output has virtually stagnated since the mid-1970s. The production of cotton—once North Yemen's main export commodity—plummeted from a peak of 27,000 tons in 1975 to 3,000 tons in 1980, mostly because of high production costs and the suspension of subsidized credits. North Yemen imports about 35 percent of its grain requirements, its largest agricultural import category. [redacted]

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Approximately 20 percent of North Yemen's land is arable. In the Tihama plain, farming depends on irrigation. Major crops are cotton, grain, tobacco, and olives. In the highlands, cereals, coffee, qat, and vegetables are grown using a labor-intensive system of terracing. Yields vary substantially from year to year depending on the rainfall [redacted]

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Table 1
North Yemen: Government Finances ^a

Million US \$

	1978/79	1979/80	1980	1981	1982 ^b
Revenues	783	714	826	1,066	1,190
Current ^c	483	614	678	729	856
Grants	300	100	148	337	334
Expenditures	992	1,116	1,527	1,569	1,900
Current	410	562	656	723	910
Capital	582	554	871	846	990
Deficit	-209	-402	-701	-503	-710
Financing of deficit	209	402	701	503	710
External ^d	123	117	451	205	265
Domestic ^e	86	285	250	298	445

^a Fiscal year. Fiscal year changed to coincide with calendar year in 1980. Previously, fiscal year was July-June.

^b Provisional.

^c Includes taxes and nontax sources.

^d Project and commodity loans, minus repayments.

^e Includes Central Bank, commercial banks, and statistical adjustment.

To boost agricultural productivity, the government began in 1981 to implement the second phase of an \$82 million rural development effort to upgrade roads, water supplies, and health services and to improve coordination of the government's activities in agriculture. The regime also has plans to revive the domestic textile industry. [redacted]

The government will not realize quick returns from its agricultural investments because of the long lead-times needed for most of these projects. Mechanization to offset labor outflows is hampered by the small size of individual land holdings—about 90 percent are less than 5 hectares—lack of adequate financing, insufficient infrastructure, and rugged terrain. A shortage of skilled administrators also impedes modernization. [redacted]

Industry. The industrial sector is not developed enough to slow the rapid rise in imports. In 1981 manufacturing accounted for only 14 percent of GDP and mining and quarrying for 1 percent. Together, these sectors employ less than 5 percent of the labor force. [redacted]

North Yemen's industry also does not have the diversity to make economic self-sufficiency a realistic goal. Food and beverage processing is the dominant activity followed by metal processing and the production of building materials and chemicals. As a result of the decline in cotton output, the two government-owned textile mills operate far below capacity. [redacted]

North Yemen's prospects for industrial development will remain severely limited, even if funding becomes available. Its raw materials endowment cannot support more than the expansion of the building materials industries. A shortage of all categories of labor, the resulting steep wages, and high costs of other inputs, such as electricity, work against industrial expansion. Other constraints include the small size of the domestic market and the lack of supporting infrastructure. [redacted]

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Mountain slopes are covered with terrace farms and gardens unsuited to mechanical cultivation. Many have been abandoned by owners who have gone abroad. Others have been given over to qat cultivation that requires less care and yields greater profits. Even on level ground, farm implements are often crude

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Mineral Resources. North Yemen has few known natural resources. Scientific surveying, however, has been limited. Salt mined at Salif and Al Luhayyah in the Tihamah has been in demand, principally in Japan, because of its exceptional purity. Iron is mined and smelted on a small scale at Jabal Nuqum near Sanaa.

pipeline constructed from Ma'rib through Sanaa to the port at Salif. A German subsidiary of Shell Oil discovered a promising offshore area in 1981, and drilling to ascertain the size of the reserves continued in 1982.

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A Yemeni subsidiary of a US company located several potential oil-bearing structures in 1982 near Ma'rib. If commercial quantities of crude are found, the exports will be delayed for at least three to five years until the fields are fully developed and a


Transportation and Communications. North Yemen's transportation sector is poorly developed. The country has no railroads and few all-weather highways. The major port at Al Hudaydah has berths with depths to

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Figure 7
Land Use and Economic Activity in the Yemens



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7.9 meters, but its use is limited by shoals. The government is planning new port facilities at Salif and major highway expansion, especially in the south. Only a few thousand telephones are in use, but France has agreed to help build a \$63 million telecommunications system.

Balance of Payments. North Yemen's balance of payments has deteriorated sharply since 1979. Worker remittances dropped from a peak of over \$1.1 billion in FY 1980 to an estimated \$900 million as emigre workers began to return home.

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Table 2
North Yemen: Balance of Payments, 1978-82^a

Million US \$

	1978-79	1979-80	1980	1981	1982 ^b
Trade balance	-1,247	-1,539	-1,902	1,737	-967
Exports (f.o.b.)	3	7	13	11	NEGL
Imports (f.o.b.)	1,250	1,546	1,915	1,748	967
Net services	-36	0	-21	-51	-78
Government ^c	58	135	106	32	NA
Private	-94	-135	-127	-83	NA
Unrequited transfers	1,145	1,211	1,232	1,126	778
Government receipts ^d	312	112	148	337	343
Private ^e	833	1,099	1,084	789	435
Receipts	1,243	1,360	1,341	988	574
Payments	-410	-261	-257	-199	-139
Current account	-138	-328	-691	-662	-267
Net capital	116	158	494	229	118
Drawing on loans	114	124	466	262	NA
Repayment of loans	-10	-7	-15	-58	NA
Investments	12	41	43	25	NA
Errors and omissions	182	24	49	103	21
Overall balance	160	-146	-148	-330	-128

^a Fiscal year. Fiscal year changed to coincide with calendar year in 1980. Previously, fiscal year was July-June.

^b First six months.

^c Consists mainly of investment income from official reserves.

^d Cash grants and value of commodity grants.

^e Primarily workers' remittances.

At the same time, the value of imports has remained high—roughly \$1.7 billion—despite efforts to cut spending. The government has essentially abandoned the FY 1983 budget, and new restrictions have been placed on imports and hard currency transactions [redacted]

Foreign loans and grants apparently are declining from 1980-82 levels when North Yemen received \$300-400 million in official development assistance and military aid. Saudi Arabia, North Yemen's largest benefactor, has promised to maintain assistance at 1982 levels, however. Saudi Arabia will continue to provide only enough aid to ensure that the Salih regime does not fall victim to a leftist takeover. [redacted]

Revenue shortfalls have forced Sanaa to draw down its foreign exchange assets to cover its growing current account deficit, which in 1980-81 reached over \$480 million. Reserves fell to about \$500 million in February 1983 from a peak of \$1.4 billion in 1979 and are still dropping. [redacted]

Income and Prices. Per capita income in North Yemen is only about \$544 per year. Most of the population lives at a subsistence level in the agricultural sector. In the industrial sector, many businessmen ironically must rely on foreign workers. The

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Table 3
North Yemen: Foreign Loans, 1981

Million US \$

	Disbursed During 1981	Outstanding, End 1981		Total
		Disbursed	Undisbursed	
Total	262.0	1,100.9	599.2	1,700.1
Multilateral	47.5	209.0	183.0	392.0
Arab fund for economic and social development	28.2	87.1	46.1	133.2
International development association	16.2	115.8	111.5	227.3
OPEC special fund	2.9	5.7	9.3	15.0
Islamic development bank		0.2	5.9	6.1
International fund for agricultural development	0.2	0.2	10.2	10.4
Bilateral	214.5	891.9	416.2	1,308.1
USSR	66.7	362.7	62.5	425.2
Saudi Arabia	59.1	200.3	112.2	312.5
Iraq	5.0	81.4	39.2	120.6
China	5.0	81.4	39.2	120.6
Kuwait	5.0	46.1	43.7	89.8
Abu Dhabi	5.3	20.3	23.9	44.2
Japan	12.4	20.1	35.1	55.2
Netherlands	2.4	16.6	5.0	21.6
France	5.4	19.8		19.8
Other	0.2	5.5	23.9	29.4

domestic labor shortage is so acute that some firms had difficulty adhering to the government's requirement that 50 percent of a company's labor force be Yemeni. [redacted]

Foreign Exchange Controls. Since February 1973 the Central Bank has maintained a fixed exchange rate for the North Yemen riyal at 4.5 to 1 US dollar. This rate is applied to the value of all foreign assets and liabilities. For revenue purposes the exchange rate is 5 riyals to the dollar resulting in an effective customs duty of 11 percent. To curb imports of luxury goods, duties on these items have been increased; cars for example, are taxed 90 percent of their value. Import licenses otherwise are freely granted by the Ministry of Economy and Industry, but trade with Israel is prohibited. Exports have been free of customs duties since May 1981 but must be registered for statistical purposes. [redacted]

Politics

The Yemen Arab Republic is politically the least stable state on the Arabian Peninsula. Since its founding in 1962 its history has been a compendium of woes: civil war, two coups, two wars with South Yemen, and a major leftwing insurgency. These have been compounded by endemic tribal and sectarian feuding and by foreign meddling in North Yemen's internal politics, chiefly by Riyadh and Aden. [redacted]

Chronic political violence has inhibited the development of stable governing institutions. Assassinations since the 1962 revolution have included President Salih's two predecessors. Although the Salih regime, which came to power in 1978, has survived longer

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Table 4 *Million US \$*
North Yemen: External Debt Service

	Principal	Interest	Total
1976/77	4.3	2.1	6.4
1977/78	5.8	2.6	8.4
1978/79	9.8	3.8	13.6
1979/80	7.4	4.4	11.8
July-December 1980	10.8	3.9	14.7
1981	57.5	10.6	68.1
Scheduled			
1982	44.6	18.0	62.6
1983	53.6	21.0	74.6
1984	68.0	21.5	89.5
1985	72.1	21.9	94.0
1986	88.1	20.3	108.4

than any government since the revolution, its governing authority is not strongly felt much beyond the major urban centers of Sanaa, Ta'izz, and Al Hudaydah. [redacted]

The Legacy of the Septembrists. The proclamation of the Yemen Arab Republic in Sanaa by Nasirist-influenced military officers in September 1962 sparked an eight-year civil war between royalists supported by Saudi Arabia and republicans dependent on troops and administrators furnished by Egypt. The war ended in 1970 under the terms of a compact under which the Imam was exiled and royalists were absorbed into the republican government and military [redacted]

After four years of ineffective civilian government, Deputy Commander in Chief Ibrahim al-Hamdi seized power on 13 June 1974 with support from conservative elements and the Saudis. He suspended the Constitution, abolished many civilian institutions, and installed a Military Command Council with himself as chairman and Commander in Chief. [redacted]

When al-Hamdi moved against entrenched interests of the major tribal sheikhs, conservative elements, possibly with Saudi connivance, assassinated him on

Table 5 *Million US \$*
Official Foreign Assets ^a

1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 ^b
1,210	1,450	1,405	1,250	950	550	375

^a End of year.
^b Estimated.

11 October 1977 on the eve of a planned visit to Aden. His successor, the conservative Ahmad Husayn al-Ghashmi, who allegedly led the coup, was killed by a South Yemeni agent on 24 June 1978. [redacted]

Within a month of al-Ghashmi's death, 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih won the endorsement of the People's Constituent Assembly as president. His conservative credentials brought him Saudi backing, and his earlier

success in putting down a mutiny by leftist paratroops enabled him to pick up key support in the military. [redacted]

Government Organization. North Yemen's political institutions and government structure are weak, reflecting four violent changes of regime since 1961. Executive authority is concentrated almost exclusively in the hands of the President, whose decrees are law. He appoints the Vice President and the Prime Minister and often appoints those he wants to placate or co-opt to the largely ceremonial posts of Second Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister. Salih also has created an Advisory Council comprised of 15 notables [redacted]

The Prime Minister chairs the Cabinet and the Council of Ministers. He is responsible for daily administration of the government and coordination of economic development. Under al-Ghashmi and Salih, the prime ministers have been politically neutral technocrats. Since 1974, ministerial portfolios increasingly have been held by technocrats. [redacted]

The 149 members of the People's Constituent Assembly, established in February 1978 by al-Ghashmi and expanded under Salih, are all presidential appointees and do little more than rubberstamp the decisions of the executive. [redacted]

Salih has laid the groundwork for replacement of the assembly by a new People's Assembly with 80 elected and 20 appointed members who supposedly will be empowered to propose laws, approve or reject presidential initiatives, and draft a new constitution. Salih is almost certain to tightly circumscribe its powers if and when it is inaugurated. [redacted]

North Yemen is divided into 11 provinces, each headed by a presidentially appointed governor. The governor shares power with the province's military commander. Provinces have changed little since the time of the Imamate, which accounts in part for the wide disparity in size and population between provinces. [redacted]

Political and legal authorities at the subdistrict, village, and hamlet levels are locally chosen. Usually the sheikh of the most important tribe or clan in the region heads the subdistrict. [redacted]

More than 200 rural cooperatives, organized and operated on a voluntary basis, are engaged in building schools, health care facilities, access roads, and other local community projects. The government, recognizing their growing political and economic importance, assigns a Deputy Prime Minister to head the Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations. He coordinates Local Development Association activities and assists in securing government and foreign financing. Tribal sheikhs and local government officials reportedly dominate the Development Associations, although, in theory at least, they are to be run on a democratic basis. [redacted]

Political Constituencies. The major tribal sheikhs constitute a political elite whose power derives from the allegiance of thousands of armed tribesmen. They exert influence through tribal networks that honeycomb the government and the military. [redacted]

President Salih has successfully resisted pressure to return the sheikhs to the commanding position they held prior to al-Hamdi's presidency when sheikhly

families controlled six of the then 10 provincial governorships. Tribal and personal rivalries prevent the sheikhs from presenting a united front toward the government. Salih exploits this by dealing with the sheikhs individually. The regime's control of development funds for clinics, schools, and road projects popular with tribesmen also gives it important leverage over the sheikhs. [redacted]

Islamic fundamentalism, long dormant in North Yemen, has shown new strength in the 1980s, drawing adherents from across the social spectrum. Fundamentalist groups made gains in the municipal elections of 1982 and in contests for seats on rural Local Development Associations. Some groups have strong ties to similar movements in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Iran. The groups attack corruption in government and have called publicly for renewed emphasis on Islamic law, an economy based on Koranic principles, and renewed restrictions on women's activities. [redacted]

Saudi Arabia funds the Muslim Brotherhood in North Yemen and the Islamic Front and its paramilitary force, which has fought alongside the Army against the National Democratic Front (NDF) insurgents. By strengthening Salih's conservative opponents, Riyadh hopes to gain additional leverage over the President, but without causing his downfall. [redacted]

The regime has responded by stepping up surveillance of activists, launching occasional harassing arrests, and replacing known Muslim Brotherhood members in the school system. At the same time, the regime has sought to refurbish its Islamic credentials by tightening restrictions on foreigners and by increasing public executions and floggings for serious crimes. [redacted]

The Salih Regime. In the absence of a strong institutional framework, North Yemeni leaders maneuver by playing off the tribal groupings, leftist and rightist factions, and the modernist and traditionalist communities. Underrated by the Saudis and considered at best an interim President, Salih has proved adept at outmaneuvering and co-opting real and potential opponents. [redacted]

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Table 6
Identified Islamic Fundamentalist
Groups in North Yemen

Muslim Brotherhood

Egyptian origin.
 Follows Hasan al-Banna's principles.
 Egyptian professionals and Sudanese are foreign members.
 Largest group in North Yemen.
 Vocally anti-American.

Takfir Wa Hijra (Anathematization and Pilgrimage)

Egyptian origin.
 Extremist spinoff of Muslim Brotherhood.
 Small size.

"Leftist" Muslim Brothers

Blends Islamic fundamentalism, social justice rhetoric, and Marxist approach to politics.
 Some "leftist" academics visit North Yemen with government sponsorship.

Hizb Tahrir al Islamiyya (Islamic Liberation Party)

Palestinian and Syrian support.
 Extremist.
 Covert oriented.

Wahabis

Operate from network of religious institutes.
 Look to Saudi Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Bas for support.
 Have paramilitary organization.

Al Jihad (The Crusade)

Remnants of group that assassinated Anwar Sadat.
 Small size.

Al Tabligh (The Report)

Egyptian origin.
 Little known.

Al Jabha al Islamiyya (Islamic Front)

Paramilitary organization.
 Formed in 1979 to fight insurgents.
 Recruits Zaydi (Shia) tribesmen.
 Less active recently.

Khomeini Supporters

Small but active.
 Attracts Yemeni Shias who see revolution in Iran as triumph over alien, pro-Western regime.

[Redacted]

Like most Middle East strongmen, Salih has secured his position by concentrating power in the hands of a small group of trusted relatives—all members of the Sanhan tribe—and close tribal associates. A brother and a cousin command the countercoup forces of the 2nd Artillery and 1st Armored Brigades stationed near the capital. Another brother, a Deputy Minister of the Interior, commands the Central Security Forces and substitutes for the President when he is

abroad. An uncle, a sheikh of the Sanhan, handles all important dealings with North Yemen's tribes. These four and another brother advise Salih on policy matters. [Redacted]

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Salih's preoccupation with day-to-day survival has contributed to the near paralysis of the state in administrative and financial affairs. The foreign exchange reserves built up during the al-Hamdi era and the credit standing vital to carry out long-term developmental projects have been squandered by Salih in attempts to build political support [Redacted]

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Internal Security. Three organizations share responsibility for internal security—the National Security Organization, the Central Security Forces, and the National Organization for General Intelligence and Military Security. President Salih's relatives or close personal associates hold key posts in each organization. [Redacted]

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Founded in 1967 with British help, the 4,000-strong National Security Organization (NSO) is North Yemen's primary internal security organization. It conducts counterintelligence and provides for the protection of high-level personages as well as gathering and evaluating foreign intelligence. President Salih keeps a tight rein on the NSO through its director, a close confidant who also heads the Supreme Defense Council. The NSO administers the presidential bodyguard that is largely recruited from the Sanhan tribe. [Redacted]

The Interior Ministry's Central Security Forces (CSF) are organized along paramilitary lines and are primarily responsible for riot control and the protection of foreign embassies and officials. They also have taken part in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. The CSF has an approximate strength of 5,000 men armed with light and crew-served weapons and equipped with armored personnel carriers. They are headed by Deputy Interior Minister Muhammad Abdallah Salih, a full brother of the President. [Redacted]

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The National Organization for General Intelligence and Military Security (NOGIMS), reportedly set up in the late 1970s with Jordanian help, maintains

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security within the armed forces and collects military intelligence. Although nominally subordinate to Chief of Staff Bashiri, its chief, a member of the Sanhan tribe, reports directly to President Salih. A Jordanian military mission trains and advises NOGIMS. [redacted]

divisions, splitting non-Marxists from doctrinaire leftists and successfully encouraging defections through an amnesty program. [redacted]

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Opposition

The most serious challenge to the Salih regime has come from the South Yemen-backed NDF insurgency. The NDF was formed in 1976 as an umbrella organization of North Yemeni leftist groups and disaffected nationalists. Its goals are to eliminate Saudi influence in Sanaa, to replace North Yemen's tribally based society with an Arab socialist state, and to unite the Yemens, according to Front propaganda. It has successfully exploited Shafii resentment of Zaydi domination of the Sanaa government to build a power base in the south. Using this as leverage, the NDF has pressed Salih to give it several cabinet posts, including the Interior Ministry. [redacted]

The NDF's popular support also has declined. Although the Shafiis still resent the Sanaa government, many were alienated by the brutal repression that the NDF inflicted upon the towns and villages it controlled. The Shafiis for the moment appear reconciled to accepting the Sanaa government as the lesser of two evils. [redacted]

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Armed Forces

The armed forces and the internal security forces are the key to the survival of North Yemen's rulers. The Army is the single most cohesive group in the republic and is the principal means of political control over the population. Many military officers fill high-level government posts. [redacted]

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The NDF leadership is dominated by Marxists. It is headed by Sultan Ahmad Umar, born in North Yemen and a Marxist revolutionary with long-standing ties to South Yemeni radicals, including former President Isma'il. Some non-Marxist NDF leaders reportedly have close ties to Libya. [redacted]

Victories over the NDF in the spring of 1982, continuing weapons acquisition, and relatively liberal salaries and perquisites appear to have blunted criticism of the regime within the armed forces. Army political factions tend to be centrist; most radicals were purged before 1970 or have since defected to the NDF.

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South Yemen has long been the NDF's principal supporter, providing arms, advisers, training bases, and even regular troops posing as volunteers. Sultan Umar and other prominent NDF leaders are also members of the Central Committee of South Yemen's ruling party, the Yemen Socialist Party. The NDF also receives aid from Libya, Syria, Ethiopia, and at least indirectly from Cuba and the USSR. [redacted]

President Salih, however, tolerates some pro-Soviet officers, probably as a counter to Saudi influence within the military. Chief of Staff Bashiri, a confidant of Salih, is pro-Soviet, according to US Embassy officials. [redacted]

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In early 1982 the NDF appeared on the verge of gaining control over most of southern and south-central North Yemen. It had largely shifted to conventional warfare, using heavy weapons supplied by South Yemen. This provoked a strong military response from Sanaa, whose forces rolled the insurgents back in a series of counterattacks beginning in the spring of 1982. To avoid a more serious military confrontation with the North, South Yemen's President Hasani subsequently reduced support to the NDF. [redacted]

President Salih is Commander in Chief of the armed forces and acts as Defense Minister. He frequently bypasses the chain of command and issues orders directly to unit commanders. Movement orders for all units must be directly authorized by the President. [redacted]

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The Army commander also serves as chief of staff. Below him are deputy chiefs for military affairs, finance and logistics, and training. The deputy chief of staff for military affairs holds a particularly sensitive post and is responsible for planning operations, positioning units, and promulgating doctrine. [redacted]

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
Since the counteroffensive, President Salih has further weakened the NDF by exploiting its internal

North Yemen's armed forces have primitive logistic support, maintenance facilities, and command, control, and communications. Military personnel are generally illiterate and undernourished and are poorly trained and led. Nepotism, corruption, and bribery are widespread. [redacted]

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Figure 8
Counterinsurgency Successes in North Yemen



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North Yemen takes recruits at a tender age. Despite their scruffy appearance, Yemeni soldiers, when well led, are tough and resourceful fighters



North Yemeni mechanics mount US-made Vulcan AA cannon on Soviet APCs—an innovation that has been highly effective in infantry support

Nonetheless, the government's successes against the National Democratic Front indicate that, when well led, its forces are capable of effective action. This is especially true when the regime commits elements of Sanaa's best troops, the countercoup force, normally held in reserve near the capital.

Table 7
North Yemeni Ground Forces Equipment

Main battle tanks	673
M60	64
T-54/5	465
T-34	144
Tank transporters	18+
Artillery pieces over 100 mm	129
M101 100-mm howitzer	24
M102 105-mm howitzer	12
D-30 122-mm howitzer	48
M1931 122-mm field gun	30
M1937 152-mm field gun	3
M114 155-mm howitzer	12
Armored personnel carriers	418
M113	76
AML-M-3/VTT	140
BTR-60	62
BTR-40	40
BTR-152	100
Special armored vehicles	57
SU-85 AT gun 85 mm	25
SU-100 AT gun 100 mm	32

Army. The Army has an estimated active strength of at least 20,000 men; its organizational structure calls for 31,000. There are 11 combat brigades, four combat support brigades, and one airborne brigade. A North Yemeni brigade corresponds roughly in personnel strength to a US battalion of 800 to 900 men, although strength varies widely from one brigade to another. Two of the brigades are equipped with a mix of Soviet and US equipment, while the remainder are wholly Soviet equipped.

Until mid-1982 the bulk of the Army's strength was concentrated in or near the capital. The 7th Armored Brigade, considered by Western observers to be one of the better North Yemeni units, is usually stationed to the north at 'Amran to guard against a possible march by northern tribesmen on the capital.

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
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Figure 9
Ground Force Deployment in North Yemen



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Tribesmen armed with old Lee-Enfields on the march during the 1970s. The government still calls up tribal levies to back up regular troops, but now they are equipped with Soviet shoulder and crew-served weapons and ride to battle in Toyota station wagons



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North Yemini regular troops



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In mounting Sanaa's successful drive in 1982 against NDF insurgents, much of the Army was deployed to the south. The buildup has been maintained. Fortified positions have been constructed along the border with South Yemen to prevent resupply of the insurgents by Aden.

To supplement regular military forces the government on occasion calls up levies of tribal auxiliaries under the leadership of their sheikhs. The government also recruits and arms local tribal militias and charges them with holding areas cleared of insurgents.

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Table 8
North Yemen: Air Force

Unit	Type	Number
1 fighter squadron	F-5E/B	15
2 fighter squadrons	MIG-15	6
	MIG-17	22
	MIG-21 ^a	46
	SU-20/22	12
Total fighter aircraft		101
1 transport squadron	C-130	2
	C-47	2
	Skyvan	2
	AN-24	2
	AN-26	1
	F-27	2
Total transport aircraft		11
Rotary wing aircraft	UH-1H	5
	Augusta Bell 206	6
	Alouette III ^a	3
	MI-8/Hip	17
Total rotary wing		31
Total aircraft		143

^a Some aircraft still in crates.

Air Force. North Yemen's Air Force is short of equipment and personnel and depends on foreign sources for aircraft, ammunition, parts, and maintenance. It has a strength of 1,000, 49 of whom are pilots—34 reportedly are jet qualified. []

Air Force headquarters is located at Sanaa International Airport, much of which is given over to military use. The F-5 fighter program is operated there by the Saudis. In 1983 the Soviets expanded their presence at the base, causing the Saudis to threaten a major cutback or even a cancellation of their Air Force assistance programs. Most of the Soviet-administered programs are run from the airfield near Al Hudaydah. []

Table 9
North Yemen: Naval Forces

Unit	Type	Number
Total naval craft		16
Medium landing craft	T-4	2
Missile patrol boat	Osa-II	2
Minesweepers	Yevgenya	2
Patrol boats		6
	PO-2	1
	Zhuk-class	2
	Broadwords	3
Torpedo retriever	Poluchat class	1
Fast-attack craft	P-4 class	3

Navy. North Yemen's Navy, which is headquartered at Salif, is minuscule. It has 16 ships, only three of which are combatants, and an estimated personnel strength of about 950 men, including 400 marines. The ships—all supplied by the Soviets with the exception of three US-built patrol craft—are poorly maintained, and the crews are poorly trained. Naval officers, most of whom have had Soviet training, have shown little aptitude for even basic ship handling. []

Military Aid. The Soviet Union has provided the bulk of North Yemen's military assistance since 1956. Approximately 400 Soviet military advisers serve in North Yemen, and 1,200 to 1,500 North Yemeni personnel are enrolled in military courses in the USSR. Most Yemeni officers have had at least some training by Soviets. []

Saudi Arabia, the United States, Taiwan, Jordan, and Pakistan also provide advisers and/or technical assistance. Saudi advisers provide guidance on US-manufactured equipment, although the Yemenis resent their role and presence. A small Jordanian team conducts ground forces unit training and assists in equipment maintenance. Pakistan supplies about 50

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Table 10
North Yemen: 1979 Arms Agreements^a

USSR/Warsaw Pact	United States
60 MIG-21s	12 F-5s
14 SU-22s	32 M-60 tanks
18 MI-8 helicopters	50 M-113 APCs
400 T-55 tanks	12 howitzers, 105 mm
65 BTR-60PB APCs	12 howitzers, 155 mm
50 BRDM-2 ARCs	30 recoilless rifles, 106 mm
48 howitzers, 122 mm	1,569 Dragon missiles
50 rocket launchers, BM-21	302 Sidewinders
12 rocket launchers, FROG-6	264 TOW missiles
40 antiaircraft ZSU-23/4s, 23 mm	
69 antiaircraft M-1939s, 37 mm	
40 SA-2 (guideline) launchers	
200 SA-2 missiles	
2 Osa-II missile patrol boats	
36 Styx missiles	
2 Yevgenya minesweepers	
2 patrol boats, Zhuk-class	

^a Includes equipment not yet delivered. Does not include small arms or ammunition.

[Redacted]

technicians who maintain US-manufactured equipment. Approximately 100 Taiwanese technicians are assigned to maintenance duties with North Yemen's F-5 squadron. [Redacted]

Foreign Relations

North Yemen's foreign relations are shaped by its location as well as its political and economic weaknesses. Over the past 20 years, it has often been caught up in rivalries between regional states as well as between the superpowers. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were contenders during the 1960s, supporting opposing sides in the civil war, until Egypt's defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war forced Cairo to reduce its forces in North Yemen. Today, the Soviets—who regard North Yemen as a vantage from which they can exert pressure on the Saudis—seek to increase their influence in Sanaa at Riyadh's expense. [Redacted]

To maintain some measure of independence, recent Yemeni leaders have attempted to play off these contending powers. In the process, Sanaa has come to depend heavily on Saudi Arabia for economic assistance and the Soviet Union for military hardware. [Redacted]

Saudi Arabia. The Saudis regard North Yemen as a buffer against the Marxist regime in South Yemen. They also believe North Yemen could be a threat if a strong and independent regime were to emerge in Sanaa. The North Yemenis have not abandoned claims to territory seized by the Saudis in the 1930s, and the largely undemarcated frontier between the two nations is a potential source of conflict. Of more concern to Riyadh are the potential security problems posed by the more than 600,000 Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms. [Redacted]

Riyadh's policies are designed to maintain leverage over North Yemen's leaders. To enhance their influence, the Saudis provide \$400 million in direct government-to-government aid as well as private subsidies to northern tribal leaders, to President Salih and an assortment of other Yemeni politicians, and to groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The Saudis, in particular, regard their aid to the Zaydi tribes as a hedge against the emergence of a radical, leftist regime in Sanaa. [Redacted] official and private payments combined have amounted in recent years to as much as \$1 billion annually. [Redacted]

Direct Saudi Government financial aid varies in proportion to Riyadh's concern over security threats to Sanaa, particularly from South Yemen. Hence, the Saudis were more willing to help Sanaa in early 1982 at the height of the NDF offensive than they are now that this threat has receded. The Saudis also occasionally hint at cutbacks in their assistance in an effort to force Sanaa to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers in its armed forces. [Redacted]

The Saudis deeply distrust Salih and have searched for a candidate with acceptable conservative credentials whom they can back as a replacement. Yemenis, for their part, strongly resent Riyadh's heavyhanded

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
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Figure 10
North Yemen: Arms Sales by Suppliers^a

Percent



^a In current US dollars.

^b Information available as of July 1982.

[Redacted]

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meddling in their affairs. Salih, in fact, has won a measure of respect domestically by resisting Saudi pressures while exploiting Riyadh's security concerns to obtain the financial aid he needs to stay in power.

[Redacted]

Other Arab States. Sanaa seeks to remain on good terms with both conservative and radical Arab states to gain financial aid and political support. Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have provided substantial developmental assistance to keep Sanaa on a stable and moderate course. In 1981 Abu Dhabi's Arab Economic Development Fund loaned \$37.5 million, and in 1982 Kuwait loaned \$35 million. Kuwait also played an active role in mediating the withdrawal of South Yemeni forces from the North in 1979. [Redacted]

North Yemen remains grateful for Baghdad's help in ending the 1979 conflict with South Yemen. In return, Sanaa, in 1982 and 1983, sent regulars and volunteers to fight on Iraq's side against Iran. Sanaa made the gesture in the vain hope of obtaining at least some of Iraq's promised financial assistance of \$400 million. [Redacted]

Jordan organized and trained North Yemen's military intelligence and military security services. Almost all intelligence officers are graduates of Jordan's Bir al-Roman intelligence school. [Redacted]

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North Yemen views Egypt as a potential counterweight to South Yemen and Saudi Arabia and has quietly lobbied for Cairo's return to the Arab fold. On a more practical level, Egypt has been a source of military spare parts and munitions. It also provides approximately 13,000 schoolteachers to North Yemen. [Redacted]

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Palestinians. Sanaa extended full diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in January 1982, and the government is viscerally anti-Israel. Salih derives political capital from his largely symbolic support of the Palestinian cause, embellishing his revolutionary credentials by stressing the kinship of

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the Yemeni and Palestinian revolutions. Sanaa is suspicious of radical PLO factions that have close ties with Aden and supports the more conservative Yasir Arafat and Fatah. [redacted]

Soviet Union. North Yemen views Moscow as a counterweight to Saudi influence. Moscow seems content to slowly expand its military aid programs, hoping thereby to anchor its influence and ultimately to encourage the emergence of a sympathetic leftist regime in Sanaa. The Soviets probably also believe that an expanded presence in North as well as South Yemen will encourage other Arabian Peninsula states, in particular Saudi Arabia, to seek a political accommodation with Moscow. [redacted]

Diplomatic relations with the USSR date from 1928 but became close in the mid-1950s when Moscow provided North Yemen with its first modern military equipment. In late 1967, during the civil war, the USSR earned the gratitude of Yemeni republicans by mounting a massive airlift to help lift the royalist siege of Sanaa and by flying bombing missions against the royalists. [redacted]

After the civil war ended in 1970, relations with the USSR alternately warmed and cooled. They took a dramatic turn for the better in 1979 when Sanaa, unable to get all the arms it wanted from Saudi Arabia, accepted a \$750 million arms offer from Moscow. Moscow currently provides North Yemen with approximately 400 military and 100 to 200 civilian advisers. [redacted]

Moscow's limited economic assistance is funneled into showy projects such as the Bajil cement plant, the Sanaa airport, Al Hudaydah port and airport facilities, and the "Revolution" Hospital in Sanaa. Approximately 750 civilian Yemenis are studying in the USSR. Many returnees are employed by the Information Ministry, which takes a decidedly pro-Soviet line. [redacted]

President Salih values Soviet aid but also views Moscow as a potential threat. He rebuffed Soviet offers to expand naval facilities. North Yemen also has begun isolating Soviet advisers in a central compound near Sanaa to facilitate monitoring and to limit unofficial contacts. [redacted]

China. North Yemenis have a high regard for the work of the 3,500-man Chinese economic assistance team, the largest foreign assistance mission in the country. Chinese aid is channeled through two Chinese-owned construction firms, which built the Sanaa textile mill, the Ta'izz hospital, and several major highways and redeveloped and expanded Sanaa airport and its access roads. Chinese personnel operate the hospital at Al Hudaydah. [redacted]

Western Europe. Sanaa looks to Western Europe for political support and economic assistance:

- In 1982 Bonn forgave a \$110 million loan, and Rome provided approximately \$60 million in grants and loans.
- Sanaa has encouraged the Italian firm AGIP to explore for oil off the Tihamah.
- Great Britain helped establish and train North Yemen's National Security Organization. [redacted]

US Interests

US interests in North Yemen center largely on containing the Soviet presence and potential threat to Saudi Arabia and the other oil-producing states of the Arabian Peninsula. The United States provides military and economic aid to the Sanaa government in close coordination with the Saudis, although its interests are not necessarily congruent with those of Riyadh. [redacted]

The North Yemenis, bitter at Saudi policies that undercut the Sanaa regime, would prefer to develop ties with the United States free of any Saudi connection. President Salih has long complained that most US assistance, such as the \$390 million arms package in 1979, is actually financed by the Saudis, giving Riyadh a veto over what North Yemen obtains from the United States. [redacted]

Salih probably believes that by seeking better relations with the United States he can also stimulate the Soviets to be more generous in providing assistance. Indeed, shortly after the US-North Yemeni agricultural deal was concluded in 1982, Moscow apparently agreed to reschedule an old debt. [redacted]

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The United States established diplomatic relations with the Imamate government of North Yemen in 1946. On 19 December 1962, three months after the officers' coup that overthrew the Imamate, Washington recognized the new Yemen Arab Republic. Less than five years later (6 June 1967), however, the Sanaa regime, angry at US support for Israel during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, severed relations with Washington. Full diplomatic ties were restored after a visit by the US Secretary of State to Sanaa in 1972.

[redacted]

US Embassy and AID personnel in North Yemen number under 100. The Department of Defense maintains a small Military Training Mission of just under 30, which is supplemented by training teams sent out from the United States on temporary duty.

A small number of US citizens are employed by the North Yemeni Government, and the Peace Corps has about 50 volunteers in the country. Medical services are provided by the American Baptist-operated hospital and clinic in Ta'izz. Approximately 1,850 nonofficial US citizens reportedly receive social security payments, although the actual number of US citizens living in North Yemen may be considerably higher. Most reside in the area east of Ibb, which traditionally has supplied emigrants to the Yemeni colony in the United States (50,000 to 60,000, concentrated mainly in Detroit and San Francisco).

US educational opportunities are eagerly sought after by Yemenis. Approximately 215 are currently studying in the United States, most with US Government funding. (US AID annually offers 60 scholarships for Yemenis to study in the United States.) The Fulbright Program provides for 13 Yemenis in US graduate schools as well as a US professor at Sanaa University and several field researchers. The Consortium for International Development, American University, and Eastern Michigan University provide US experts to staff development projects in North Yemen.

In 1980 and 1981 the US share of the North Yemen import/export market amounted to only about 2 percent in each category. In 1982, however, Washington extended \$63 million in credit to Sanaa for the purchase of agricultural commodities, which could increase US exports to North Yemen.

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No US or North Yemeni air carriers have regularly scheduled flights between the two countries. There is only one direct shipping connection per month between the United States and North Yemen, making US goods generally unattractive to North Yemeni importers.

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US investment in North Yemen is minimal and unlikely to increase so long as North Yemen remains financially unsound and the government cannot end its chronic budget deficits. A US oil company is exploring for oil in the Ma'rib-Al Jawf region. Opportunities for small ventures, especially in the import business, are available.

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South Yemen

Economy

South Yemen's narrow resource base, arid climate, and, more recently, a shortage of labor are major constraints to economic development. Aden, so far, has discovered no significant deposits of commercially exploitable minerals and only small quantities of crude oil. Less than 1 percent of the area is cultivable. Low productivity levels are the norm and result from such factors as inefficient management and inadequate equipment. South Yemen has a substantial fishing potential that could become an important economic asset. [redacted]

South Yemen has a centrally planned economy with an established bureaucracy to administer the system. Government ownership predominates, especially in industry and fishing. The Ministry of Planning has overall responsibility for implementing economic guidelines established within the framework of a five-year plan. Despite comprehensive government planning and control, the private sector plays an important role in the economy. Private enterprises, mostly in the domestic trade and transport sectors, account for roughly half the economy's output. [redacted]

Aden is pursuing a strategy of rapid economic growth. The Second Five-Year Plan (1981-85) sets an overly ambitious spending level of \$1.2 billion, more than double actual expenditures under the previous plan. The broad objectives of the plan include development of the agricultural and industrial sectors, which together would account for over 50 percent of total government spending. The plan also focuses on infrastructure spending, especially for housing, transportation, and electric power. The regime plans to expand the fishing sector by upgrading shore facilities, boats, and equipment. [redacted]

Several obstacles preclude plan fulfillment. Extensive flooding during March-April 1982 caused massive damage to the agricultural sector. As a result, Aden probably will have to scale back its development program to help cover repair costs that could reach about \$1 billion, according to unofficial estimates in

North Yemen. About one-third of the 410,000-person labor force is working abroad, mostly in the Arab Gulf states. Moreover, most are the more skilled workers, leaving behind a largely untrained work force. Partly because of the labor migration, South Yemen cannot build all of its planned projects. Real growth in 1983 probably will be only slightly better than last year's 3.5 percent as Aden adjusts its spending plans to compensate for these problems [redacted] 25X1

To augment the development process, the government is encouraging limited development of the private sector in some areas such as light industry. Although the five-year plan nominally deemphasizes the private sector, Aden passed a law in 1981 to provide incentives to private and foreign investors to participate in development projects—including tax exemptions, credit access, and exemption from some import duties. [redacted] 25X1

Agriculture. The agricultural sector, including fisheries, is the most important segment of the economy, providing work for nearly 45 percent of South Yemen's labor force. A well-developed water conservation system allows South Yemen to partly overcome its environmental handicaps. Nevertheless, agricultural output accounts for only about 13 percent of GNP, and, as a result, farm income is at the subsistence level. Moreover, domestic food production has not been able to keep pace with growing consumption, forcing the regime to import roughly two-thirds of its food requirements. [redacted] 25X1

Aden plans to continue investing in agriculture to boost food output. Since the mid-1970s the regime has spent over \$230 million on various agricultural schemes. During the current five-year plan, the government expects to start irrigation projects in the Nisab and Wadi Mirka areas and an agricultural project at Wadi Bayhan. Aden also has established an agricultural fund to provide economic assistance to farmers. [redacted] 25X1

Agricultural investments so far have not paid major dividends. Production has stagnated; for example, grain output has averaged about 95,000 tons annually since 1977 and probably will not exceed this level in the 1983/84 marketing year. Prospects for increased production are hindered by low regulated crop prices to farmers, poor maintenance of farm equipment, inefficient management of cooperative farms, and seasonal labor shortages. [redacted]

The state fishing industry is not doing well despite its sizable resource potential and infusions of government spending to modernize the fleet and shore facilities. Japanese companies, which have concessions to fish Aden's waters, and joint ventures with the USSR have accounted for most of the increase in the fishing catch in recent years. Fish exports account for about half of South Yemen's export earnings. To increase fish production among its state cooperatives, the government expects to complete a new fishing port at Nishtun in 1984 that will include processing and storage facilities. Inadequate storage has been a major constraint to higher fish catches. The government plans to begin construction on other ports and related facilities, including a drydock the USSR has agreed to build at Aden. [redacted]

Industry. The industrial sector is small, accounting for about 14 percent of GNP. The 170,000-barrel-per-day oil refinery at Aden makes by far the largest contribution to industrial output. Since 1982, Aden has processed crude oil from Iran, and additional oil is supplied by other countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the USSR. The refinery is undergoing a \$100 million expansion and modernization. Other industrial enterprises are small scale and concentrated in food processing, textiles, and minor consumer goods production [redacted]

South Yemen does not have an extensive infrastructure. Electric power capacity probably does not exceed 233 MW. Projects under way at Wadi Hadhramawt and Al Mansurah will add only about 50 MW to existing capacity. Several water supply projects also are under construction, including one for greater Aden that will cost about \$38 million. [redacted]

Mineral Resources. South Yemen must import all of its petroleum, which accounts for over 90 percent of total energy consumption. The Soviets have searched for oil in the South Yemen interior for 10 years with inconclusive results. In 1981 an Italian company discovered an offshore field that has shown promise. Brazil has also signed a concession agreement to explore for oil. [redacted]

No other mineral wealth is at present exploited. Production of salt from seawater in salt pans, once a major industry in Aden, has declined because of high costs and foreign competition. [redacted]

Transportation and Communications. South Yemen's transportation and communications links are not well developed. The country has about 5,300 km of roads, of which only about 15 percent are paved. Telex, telegraph, and cable communications exist, but telephone subscribers probably do not exceed 10,000. Under the five-year plan, about 3,000 km of highways are to be upgraded, and the number of telephone lines is to be doubled. [redacted]

Balance of Payments. South Yemen's current account deficit has increased considerably in recent years—from \$54 million in 1979 to approximately \$290 million in 1982. Imports have risen sharply because of Aden's needs for its development programs, the increased price of petroleum, and the government's efforts to raise living standards. Imports in 1982 reached an estimated \$820 million, almost double the 1979 level. Food purchases account for roughly one-third of imports; petroleum products, 23 percent; and machinery and transport equipment, 20 percent. Most of South Yemen's imports are from oil-exporting countries in the Persian Gulf and the industrialized West, especially Japan. [redacted]

Foreign exchange earnings fall far short of South Yemen's requirements. Merchandise exports, mostly fish products and cotton, are insignificant. Remittances from workers abroad have become the most

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Table 11
South Yemen: Economic Assistance

Million US \$

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
USSR	40	1	34		24		91			
Eastern Europe		11	5		6	3	6	38	15	
China	22		2			13	5			
Bilateral/West ^a	2	3	5	6	9	7	23	8	9	10
Multilateral ^b	4	5	17	14	21	30	32	54	62	85
OPEC bilateral		2	24	34	135	63	29	85	80	44
Total Communist	62	12	41	0	30	16	102	38	15	0
Total non-Communist	6	10	46	54	165	100	84	147	151	139
Total	68	22	87	54	195	116	186	185	166	139

^a Includes European Economic Community.^b Includes Arab states.

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important source of income since the liberalization of emigration laws in 1976. In 1982 worker remittances earned Aden approximately \$450 million. Nevertheless, this revenue has not been enough to offset the import bill. Prospects for increased earnings from workers abroad are not good as long as Aden's Arab neighbors continue to trim their own spending programs. [redacted]

South Yemen has had to rely heavily on foreign assistance to finance the current account deficit and its development programs. Aden receives financing from a variety of international organizations including the International Monetary Fund and the OPEC Special Fund. Bilateral loans come mainly from the Communist countries, especially the USSR, which is South Yemen's largest benefactor. Some of the Gulf states also provide financial assistance. Virtually all South Yemen's foreign exchange assets of about \$240 million consist of loans and grants. Aden's external debt as of the end of 1982 was about \$750 million. The regime has negotiated with its major bilateral creditors to reschedule some of its debt payments to at least 1985. [redacted]

Income and Prices. Per capita income in 1980 was \$442, making South Yemen one of the world's least developed countries. About two-thirds of the estimated 1.9 million population live in rural areas. Because of strict enforcement of price controls, the official rate of inflation runs about 5 to 8 percent annually. Aden subsidizes several commodities to keep prices low. Revenue shortages in 1982, however, forced the regime to raise some prices to reduce the subsidy bill. [redacted]

Foreign Exchange Controls. Aden maintains comprehensive controls on imports and worker income earned abroad. The government allocates foreign exchange for imports based on its estimates of requirements and on the availability of funds. Worker remittances must be exchanged at the central banking system for local currency. To encourage the inflow of remittances, the government permits private foreign exchange accounts and duty-free imports within specified limits. The South Yemeni currency is pegged to the US dollar at the rate of about \$2.90 to the dinar. [redacted]

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The triumvirate before the split. Hasani, Isma'il, and Rubayyi 'Ali sit before their portraits at a Politburo meeting in 1970. Rubayyi 'Ali was executed in 1978, and Isma'il took refuge in Moscow in 1980. Others among the party leaders shown above have since become casualties of Aden's fratricidal politics [redacted]

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Politics

The radical leaders of the National Liberation Front took power in Aden after the British withdrew in 1967. In contrast to the officer revolutionaries in Sanaa five years earlier, they had both the time and the means to consolidate their power:

- The country had a long tradition of effective central control.
- The British-trained military and civil service, perhaps the best in the Arabian Peninsula, passed virtually intact to the new government.
- The native ruling elite in the hinterland, the petty sheikhs and sultans who had formed the South Arabian Federation, immediately fled the country.

[redacted]

Infighting within the Marxist-oriented leadership, however, has occasionally unsettled the regime. The leadership was comprised of young, ambitious radicals hardened in the guerrilla war against the British and the rival nationalists of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). Disputes have centered around the degree to which internal political

and economic institutions are to be radicalized and the extent to which Aden is to become involved in supporting radical movements throughout the region. Differences are exacerbated by personal rivalries that often have roots in regional or tribal affiliations, alliances formed during the guerrilla struggle, and differing foreign patrons. [redacted]

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Party and Government. Under its 1970 Constitution—amended after Isma'il seized power in June 1978—South Yemen's Government and party structures closely follow the Soviet model. Authority rests with the Yemen Socialist Party, the country's only legal political party. Organized on Marxist-Leninist lines, it is an amalgam of Communists, Ba'thists, and Arab nationalists. The seven-man Politburo, headed by the party's secretary general, makes all important foreign and domestic policy decisions. The party's Central Committee, which meets only once or twice yearly, oversees the trade unions, people's militia, and women's and youth organizations. [redacted]

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Government authority and sovereignty, in theory at least, are vested in the Supreme People's Council, which alone has the power to pass laws. Its 111 members are elected for a five-year term. A Presidium of under 20 members, "elected" by the members of the Council, serves as its permanent organ. The Presidium's chairman serves as chief of state. The Council similarly elects the prime minister, approves the ministers he appoints, and chooses senior judges and the attorney general. [redacted]

The country is divided into six governorates, which are subdivided into directorates and districts. Administrative boundaries at each level are designed to break down traditional tribal and regional loyalties. Governors and directorate and district commissioners as well as the Local People's Councils are elected for terms of two and a half years and are subordinate to the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council. This system—which South Yemenis refer to as "democratic centralism"—extends the control of the central government to the most remote villages. Party cadres at the governorate and lower administrative levels provide ideological guidance and supervise and report on the activities of governmental bodies, popular organizations, industrial enterprises, and rural cooperatives and state farms. [redacted]

Internal Dynamics. President Hasani has proved to be particularly adept at expanding his network of supporters in the Politburo and Presidium and at lower levels. He has further consolidated his control by assuming the positions of President, Prime Minister, and party chief, the first South Yemeni leader to do so. He has also been careful to involve most of the top leaders in collective support for South Yemen's new moderate stance. [redacted]

Hasani's control, however, is by no means absolute. Two major figures, Defense Minister Salih Muslih Qasim and First Deputy Prime Minister Ali Antar, still have independent power bases. Qasim is the more dangerous. He is a shrewd and opportunistic politician with a strong following in the military and security services. Considered more of a nationalist than a Marxist, he is widely respected for his role in the struggle against the British and is supported strongly by Libya's Qadhafi. His position weakened in 1982,

however, when North Yemen's armed forces decisively defeated the National Liberation Front insurgents whom he had strongly backed. [redacted]

The Party and the Military. South Yemen's military will remain a strong institutional power center with an important behind-the-scenes role in politics. In 1969 President Rubayyi Ali and party Chairman Isma'il bought off active opposition from the then largely conservative, tribal-based military by appointing a relative moderate (current President al-Hasani) as Defense Minister. Isma'il's failure to win over the military after he took over the presidency in 1978 ultimately proved his undoing when the armed forces supported his ouster two years later. [redacted]

South Yemeni leaders have attempted—with mixed results—to subordinate the military to the ruling party. Party members, for example, hold key positions in the military and pass on all promotions. The armed forces are also subjected to heavy doses of political indoctrination. Nevertheless, the party has been unable to overcome strong personal and tribal loyalties. To offset the armed forces, therefore, the party created the paramilitary People's Militia in 1972. The militia provided most of the muscle behind Isma'il's successful coup. [redacted]

Internal Security. The Committee for State Security and the Ministry of the Interior share primary responsibility for South Yemen's internal security. Although the quality of personnel varies, they have earned a reputation as perhaps the most ruthless and efficient of any in the Arab world. Internal security organs are nominally government agencies but are supervised closely by the party. Many officers are party members, and networks of local volunteers are organized by the party to back up the regular services. About 70 East Germans provide security and police training for the security services. [redacted]

The Committee for State Security is modeled on the Soviet KGB, combining intelligence collection and analysis with internal and external security functions. The security functions are handled by the Committee's Revolutionary Security Service, which is charged

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with countering subversion, sabotage, and economic crimes and conducting covert operations abroad.

[redacted]

[redacted] Uniformed personnel provide security at the presidential palace and other key installations.

[redacted]

The Public Security Force, an organ of the Ministry of the Interior, is a more conventional police force with a reported strength of about 10,000. It has specialized riot police, customs, and port and airport security units. Overlapping jurisdictions reportedly have led to some friction with the Revolutionary Security Service. [redacted]

Opposition

The only organized opposition to the government comes from exile factions drawn from South Yemeni refugee colonies. The opposition, rent by ideological differences, is weak and divided. The National Grouping of Patriotic Forces in South Yemen, an umbrella organization founded in Baghdad in March 1980, attempts to coordinate the activities of the major dissident organizations under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Haytham, a former Prime Minister of South Yemen. [redacted]

With much of the opposition leadership living comfortably on stipends from the Saudis, Iraqis, and Egyptians, there is little incentive to undertake action against the Aden regime, although some of the groups have engaged in border forays. The Saudis and North Yemenis monitor opposition movements closely, sanctioning only those activities that accord with Riyadh's and Sanaa's current policies toward South Yemen. They are unlikely to dismantle the exile apparatuses unless there is a long-term shift by Aden away from its radical orientation. [redacted]

Saudi Arabia continues to support the paramilitary forces of several of the exile groups in camps in the vicinity of Sharura. They may have mustered several thousand men in the late 1970s, but their numbers probably are now much lower. Many of the members have been integrated into the Saudi economy and maintain only a part-time affiliation at best. The forces, however, apparently still conduct occasional exercises under Saudi auspices. [redacted]

Armed Forces

After independence in 1967, South Yemen transformed its largely British trained and equipped military into one modeled on its new Soviet patron. Over the past decade, Aden has purchased on easy credit terms approximately \$1.2 billion worth of military equipment from the USSR and its East European allies, including tanks, combat aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, and guided missile patrol boats. The Soviet military advisory presence in South Yemen climbed to about 1,000 in 1982. Over 1,000 South Yemeni military personnel have been trained in the USSR. About 500 Cuban advisers help train the People's Militia. [redacted]

South Yemen's forces are small but effective. They seem able to maintain internal security; conduct successful but limited attacks against North Yemen; and repel attacks by North Yemeni, Saudi, or Omani forces. The defensive capabilities of the armed forces are enhanced by the harsh border terrain that acts as a buffer against potential adversaries. [redacted]

The armed forces' military capabilities have been strengthened by combat experience gained during brief but intense clashes with North Yemen in February 1979. South Yemeni regulars serving as "volunteers" fought alongside National Democratic Front insurgents in North Yemen. Army and Air Force elements have assisted Ethiopian forces against Eritrean dissidents and Somali troops. A small South Yemeni contingent went to Syria in June 1981 and may have seen action against Israeli forces in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. [redacted]

South Yemen's small population base and lack of trained manpower are the main obstacles to the expansion of its military capabilities. Total military strength, including the 15,000-strong People's Militia, is roughly 40,000. In an effort to raise the regular military to its authorized strength of 24,000, South Yemen began conscripting young men for two years of service in 1977. Many evade the draft, however, and the government's recruiting efforts have become increasingly heavyhanded. This has hurt military morale, and a number of conscripts, uneducated and ill prepared for military life, have deserted. [redacted]

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Table 12
South Yemen: Soviet-Supplied
Military Equipment as of 30 April 1983^a

Type	Number
Tanks	
T-62	90
T-54/55	255
T-34	125
Armored personnel carriers	
BTR-40	30
BTR-60	85
BTR-152	190
BMP	125
Attack helicopters	
MI-24/Hind	12
MI-8/Hip	45
Surface-to-surface missiles	
Scud-B	6
FROG	40
Surface-to-air missiles	
SAM-2	96
Combat aircraft	
MIG-17	48
MIG-21	82
SU-20/22	29
Missile patrol boats	
Osa-II	8
Tank landing ships	
Ropucha	1

^a Includes major equipment items delivered since the late 1960s. Due to attrition and inventory phaseouts, some of the weapons may no longer be in the South Yemeni inventory. For example, DIA shows only 40 active MIG-21s.

Deficiencies in leadership also plague the armed forces. Lingering tribal rivalries and the involvement of high-ranking officers in politics have hurt the development of a professional officer corps. Competent officers often are passed over for promotion or purged because their political loyalties are suspect [redacted]

Army. The Army has about 22,000 troops organized into 10 infantry brigades, one mechanized brigade, several independent battalions, and support units.

Most of the infantry brigades have subordinate infantry and armor battalions and field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, and reconnaissance units. They also have engineering, signal, and transport elements. [redacted] 25X1

South Yemen is divided into three areas of military responsibility called Axis Commands, subordinate to General Headquarters in Aden. Each Axis Command directs at least two brigades. There is a close operational relationship between the brigades at Mukayris and Lawdar, and they may constitute a fourth Axis. [redacted] 25X1

Several units in the Aden area report directly to General Headquarters. The units include an artillery brigade, a heavy transport battalion, FROG-7 and Scud B surface-to-surface missile battalions, and a parachute battalion. [redacted] 25X1


The Army has more equipment than it can effectively absorb. Hence, over the past few years, it has emphasized integration of weapons over acquisition of more equipment. South Yemen has begun replacing BTR-152 armored personnel carriers in its infantry brigades with the more advanced BMP armored infantry fighting vehicle. It formed its first mechanized brigade, equipped with BMPs, in 1981. It has added tank battalions to most of its infantry brigades. [redacted] 25X1

Most unit training is at the company or battalion level. South Yemen conducted a mechanized infantry exercise and a large combined-arms exercise for the first time in late 1981. The combined-arms exercise simulated the defense of coastal areas against landings by US amphibious forces. South Yemen's Scud B surface-to-surface missile battalion has begun operational training after two years of familiarization on the equipment. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Air Force. South Yemen's Air Force is charged with a threefold mission—control of the country's airspace, tactical support of ground forces, and air transport of men and materiel to forward deployment areas. It has about 1,500 men and a pilot-to-aircraft ratio of less than 1:1. About 100 fighter pilots are jet qualified, [redacted] 25X1

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Figure 11
Major Military Deployment in South Yemen



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and most have trained in ground-controlled intercept, ground attack, and night flying. North Korean and Cuban pilots, used extensively in the past, may still fly some South Yemeni aircraft. Several of the transport aircraft apparently are crewed by Soviets.

The transport squadron plays an essential role in support of operations because of South Yemen's limited road network. Air ferry operations have been about the only way to move troops and supplies to otherwise inaccessible areas.

Navy. The Navy's main operating base is located at Aden, which has one of the finest natural deepwater harbors in the region. A smaller base is at Perim Island in the Bab el Mandeb, and naval patrol boats frequent the port of Al Mukalla in the Fifth Governorate for provisions, bunkering, and crew rest. The Navy is charged with monitoring traffic passing through the Bab el Mandeb and protecting South Yemen's 1,300-km coastline—a mission beyond its capabilities.

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Paramilitary Forces. The 15,000-strong People's Militia was formed in 1972 and consists of regulars and irregulars. The regulars receive the same training as Army personnel, but by Cuban rather than Soviet advisers. They then are sent to their home communities, where they form a small cadre to command and train irregulars. Most of the militia is composed of irregulars who function as a reserve for the regular armed forces. [redacted]

Two other paramilitary organizations, the People's Police and People's Forces, carry out internal security duties. The People's Police undergoes limited military training, and some units probably are equipped with light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and mortars. They are stationed at points along the country's borders and conduct anti-smuggling patrols. The People's Forces help patrol the borders and protect wells and government buildings. They generally employ villagers and are armed only with automatic rifles.

Foreign Relations

South Yemen regards itself as a member of the international socialist community and has long committed itself to a policy of supporting leftist revolutionary movements, maintaining solidarity with the Arab Steadfastness Front in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and opposing what it has labeled as reactionary Arab regimes and imperialist governments. Its still relatively young leaders, proud of their revolutionary credentials, have supported insurgencies in Oman and North Yemen and given aid and made training facilities available to a variety of international terrorist organizations. President Hasani, however, has sought to modify South Yemen's tactics—if not its policy objectives—in an effort to end South Yemen's isolation and induce Saudi Arabia and the oil sheikhdoms to provide urgently needed economic aid. [redacted]

Saudi Arabia. Relations between Riyadh and Aden have been strained, even after diplomatic ties were established in 1976. Saudi Arabia consistently has sought to induce Aden to cease propaganda attacks on the moderate Arabs, curtail support for insurgencies against Oman and North Yemen, and reduce the Soviet presence in South Yemen in exchange for financial aid. Riyadh has extended modest loans and established banking links, enabling remittances from

the large South Yemeni work force in Saudi Arabia to flow home easily. Further help probably will be modest in scope and depend on Aden's adherence to its present moderate course. [redacted]

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Oman. Until recently Aden gave strong support to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO). It supplied weapons and provided facilities for training of insurgents by personnel from Communist and radical Arab states. [redacted]

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In October 1982, as part of its campaign to ease tensions with the Saudis and the Gulf sheikhdoms, South Yemen signed a reconciliation agreement with Oman under Kuwaiti auspices. Both sides agreed to stop cross-border infiltration, end media campaigns against each other, and discuss border issues. PFLO fighters appear to be restricted to base camps, and some dependents have been repatriated. [redacted]

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Other Arab States. South Yemen has taken consistently hardline positions on Arab-Israeli issues but recently has made gestures toward the moderate Arabs in the hope of being rewarded with more financial assistance. President Hasani participated in the Fez summit in September 1982 and gave unexpected support to the position adopted by the moderate Arab delegations. South Yemen provided a small military unit to serve with Syrian units of the Arab Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon. Aden accepted approximately 2,000 of the Palestinian fighters evacuated from Beirut in August 1982, about half of whom were members of Fatah. [redacted]

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Tripartite Alliance. Aden broke ranks with the Arab states to support Ethiopia in its war with Somalia over the Ogaden region and sent troops and pilots to fight with Ethiopian forces. Aden also backs Ethiopia's campaign to suppress the Eritrean insurgency. [redacted]

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
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In August 1981 South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in Aden, which provides for political, economic, and military cooperation. The alliance was intended to counter increased US political and military support for Egypt

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Figure 12
Paramilitary Training Camps in South Yemen



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and Oman. Aden's relations with Libya, however, have cooled as a result of Tripoli's failure to provide promised economic aid. Libya also is disenchanted with Aden because of its withdrawal of support for insurgent forces in North Yemen.

Soviet Union. Since independence in 1967 South Yemen has looked to Moscow for protection and arms to offset its virtual isolation in the region. Aden gives strong support to Moscow's regional objectives,

switching its ties from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa after the Soviets were expelled from Somalia in 1977, endorsing Brezhnev's proposals for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement and for a "Zone of Peace" in the Indian Ocean, and backing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The close ties between the two countries were further strengthened in October 1979 with the signing of a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation.

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The Soviets value South Yemen primarily for its strategic location on the Bab el Mandeb and Saudi Arabia's southern flank. With the loss of their base at Berbera in Somalia, South Yemen's air and port facilities have become more important to the Soviets:



- The Soviets use South Yemeni port facilities to supplement logistic support for their Indian Ocean squadron.
- Ships of the squadron use anchorages off Socotra Island and have joined with South Yemeni forces in military maneuvers staged in response to US exercises in the area.

Despite these close ties, Aden has not granted formal basing rights to Moscow such as it enjoyed in Somalia and now holds in Ethiopia's Dahlak Archipelago in the lower Red Sea.

Strains in the Soviet-South Yemeni relationship began to appear in 1982. Moscow is suspicious of Hasani's intentions and particularly his overtures to the moderate Arabs and West Europeans. By fall 1983, however, public statements from both sides suggested that the strains had eased. Nonetheless, the Soviet position in South Yemen is not in jeopardy. Hasani and other South Yemeni leaders are still deeply concerned over US intentions and are reluctant to forgo Moscow's protection. However paltry, the Soviets and East Europeans still have provided about one-third of all aid received since 1974.

Other Communist Countries. Aden maintains close relations with the European Communist countries and with Cuba. Official delegations at all levels are regularly exchanged with these states and with Marxist regimes in Nicaragua and Vietnam. Hasani is also looking to China as a possible source of economic help and weapons.

Western Europe. Diplomatic relations have been established with Italy, Iceland, and West Germany and are under discussion with Norway. Great Britain upgraded its diplomatic mission in Aden to ambassadorial status in 1983. Paris funded the Aden International Airport modernization project and offers scholarships for study in France. A French warship made a port call in Aden in July 1983, the first in more than a decade.

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US Interests

US interests in South Yemen are few. South Yemen broke its ties with the United States in October 1969 as the Aden regime took a sharp turn leftward. Efforts to improve relations ceased with the outbreak of fighting between North and South Yemen in 1979. Visits by Americans have been infrequent. In 1982 several US business representatives visited Aden at official invitation. The British Embassy handles US interests.

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South Yemen is hostile to US regional initiatives and treats its public to a steady stream of anti-US rhetoric. Aden routinely portrays itself as directly threatened by US forces in the region. Operation "Radfan 81," the largest military exercise conducted by South Yemen, was mounted in mid-December 1981 in response to the earlier US-Omani "Operation Bright Star."

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Chronology

- 628 Yemen converts to Islam.
- 897 Zaydi Shia sect introduced in Yemens, becomes basis for theocratic rule.
- 1839 Aden captured by the British.
- 1872 Sanaa occupied by Ottoman Turks.
- 1919 Turks withdraw from North Yemen.
- 1928 Imamate government of North Yemen recognized by the USSR.
- 1934 Saudi Arabia defeats North Yemen in brief war; annexes Asir, Jizan, and Najran regions.
- 1946 North Yemeni Government recognized by the United States.
- September 1962 Imamate overthrown in military coup; Yemen Arab Republic proclaimed, and civil war begins.
- January 1963 Federation of South Arabia inaugurated by British in South Yemen.
- October 1963 National Liberation Front insurgency against British begins.
- March 1964 North Yemen signs five-year friendship treaty with the USSR (routinely renewed every five years).
- June 1967 North Yemen breaks relations with the United States over Arab-Israeli war.
- November 1967 British withdraw from Aden, and Southern Yemen People's Republic proclaimed.
- February 1968 Royalist siege of Sanaa lifted with Soviet aid.
- June 1969 South Yemen's President Qahtan ash-Shabi ousted in coup known as Corrective Revolution.
- October 1969 US Embassy in Aden closed.
- March 1970 Peace agreement reached in Saudi Arabia ends civil war in North Yemen.

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November 1970 South Yemen promulgates Constitution; changes country's name to People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

December 1970 North Yemen promulgates Constitution.

July 1972 North Yemen and the United States reestablish diplomatic ties.

June 1974 Lt. Col. Ibrahim al-Hamdi launches bloodless coup; declared President of North Yemen; suspends Constitution.

March 1976 Saudi Arabia and South Yemen establish diplomatic relations.

October 1977 Al-Hamdi assassinated; Ahmad Husayn al-Ghashmi appointed President of North Yemen.

June 1978 North Yemen's President al-Ghashmi assassinated by South Yemeni agent.

June 1978 South Yemen's President Salim Rubayyi Ali executed following two days of fighting in Aden.

July 1978 'Ali Abdallah Salih elected President of North Yemen with Saudi backing.

October 1978 South Yemen's United National Front renamed Yemen Socialist Party.

December 1978 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il becomes chairman of the Presidium of South Yemen's Supreme People's Council.

February 1979 Fighting breaks out between the two Yemens. Aden's forces temporarily occupy North Yemen territory.

March 1979 The United States approves \$390 million in arms for North Yemen.

March 1979 Summit meeting in Kuwait ends war between the two Yemens.

October 1979 South Yemen signs 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR.

November 1979 North Yemen's President Salih concludes arms deal with USSR, estimated at \$700 million.

April 1980 Isma'il ousted in bloodless coup in South Yemen; Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani becomes chief of state and secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party.

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- May 1980 Fighting between North Yemeni forces and National Democratic Front (NDF) insurgents intensifies.
- August 1981 South Yemen signs Tripartite Agreement with Libya and Ethiopia.
- April 1982 North Yemeni town of Juban falls to NDF in biggest government setback of guerrilla war.
- May-June 1982 Major North Yemeni counteroffensive pushes NDF insurgents back to stronghold in Jabal Murays adjacent to South Yemeni border. Salih declares amnesty for guerrillas.
- January 1983 Last NDF forces in Jabal Murays turn over control of area to government in Sanaa; NDF insurgency winds down.



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Statistical Summary

	North Yemen	South Yemen
Land		
Area	195,029 km ² , 20 percent arable	287,490 km ² , 1 percent arable
Limits of territorial waters (claimed)	12 nm, plus 6-nm "necessary supervision zone"	12 nm, plus 6-nm "necessary supervision zone"; 200-nm fishing and economic zone
Coastline	523 km	1,383 km
People		
Population ^a	6,500,000 (approximately)	1,930,000 (approximately), excluding Perim and Kamaran Islands for which no data are available (January 1981 estimate)
Average annual growth rate	2.3 percent	1.9 percent
Life expectancy at birth	42 years	38 years
Infant mortality rate	211 per 1,000	NA
Ethnic divisions	90 percent Yemeni Arabs, 10 percent Afro-Arab	Yemeni Arabs in west and Hadhrami Arabs in east; a few Indians, Somalis, and Europeans in Aden
Religion	100 percent Muslim divided into Zaydi (Shia) and Shafii (Sunni) sects, and a small Ismaili (Shia) community	100 percent Muslim, almost all Shafii Sunnis
Language	Arabic	Mostly Arabic; non-Arabic Semitic languages spoken in Al Mahrah area and on the island of Socotra; English commonly used foreign language in Aden
Literacy	15 percent (estimate)	10 percent (estimate), Aden 35 percent (estimate)
Labor force	1,400,000, approximately 50 percent of labor force is abroad	410,000, approximately one-third of labor force is abroad
Agricultural	75 percent	43.8 percent
Industrial and commercial	9 percent	28 percent
Services	16 percent	28 percent
Organized labor	None	None
Government		
Official name	Yemen Arab Republic	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
Capital	Sanaa	Aden; Madinat ash Sha'b, administrative capital
Political subdivisions	11 provinces	6 governorates
Type	Republic, military regime since June 1974	Republic, power centered in Marxist-oriented Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)
Legal system	Based on Islamic law (sharia) and local customary law ('urf); Constitution promulgated in December 1970, suspended June 1974; compulsory ICJ jurisdiction not accepted	Based on Islamic law for personal matters and English common law for commercial matters; Constitution promulgated in November 1970
Leaders	Col. Ali Abdallah Salih, President	Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council, YSP Secretary General, and Prime Minister
Suffrage	Universal	Universal
Political parties	None	Yemeni Socialist Party—coalition of National Front, Ba'th, and Communist Parties
Member of	Arab League, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, ILO, IMF, ITU, NAM, UN, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO	Arab League, FAO, G-77, GATT (de facto), IRBD, ICAO, IDA, ILO, IMF, ITU, NAM, UN, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO, WTO

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	North Yemen	South Yemen
Economy		
GNP	\$3,810 million (1981 estimate), GNP per capita \$544	\$853 million (1980 estimate) at market prices, GNP per capita \$442
GDP	\$2,800 million (1981 estimate)	\$570 million (1980)
Composition of GDP		
Agriculture	38 percent	13 percent (including fishing)
Industry	14 percent	14 percent (including refining)
Construction		13 percent
Transport		15 percent
Government services	48 percent	45 percent
Agriculture	Sorghum, millet, qat, cotton, coffee, fruits, and vegetables	Cereals, dates, qat, coffee, livestock, fish; cotton is main cash crop
Industries	Cotton textiles, aluminum products, small-scale production of leather goods, small-scale fishing	Refining of imported crude (Little Aden refinery), food processing, textiles, consumer goods
Electric power	134,900-kW capacity (1982), 295 million kWh produced (1982), 45 kWh per capita	233,200-kW capacity (1982), 511 million kWh produced, 255 kWh per capita
Exports	\$11 million (f.o.b. 1981 estimate); biscuits, confections, hides, coffee, cotton, qat	\$38 million excluding reexports
Imports	\$1,800 million (f.o.b. 1981); foodstuffs, chemicals, petroleum products, manufactured goods, machinery (North Yemen has world's worst export/import ratio)	\$820 million (1982); foodstuffs, livestock, manufactured goods, machinery, petroleum, feedstock
Major trading partners	China, South Yemen, USSR, Japan, United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia	North Yemen, East Africa, United Kingdom, Japan
Economic aid	\$400 million annually (approximately), Saudi Arabia principal donor	\$100-200 million annually, USSR largest benefactor
Budget		
Total revenues	\$1,066 million (1981)	\$495 million (1980)
Current expenditures	\$1,568 million (1981)	\$280 million (1980)
Expatriate remittances	\$789 million (1981)	\$450 million (1980)
Monetary conversion rate	1 riyal = US 22 cents	1 dinar = US \$2.90
Fiscal year	Calendar year	Calendar year
Communications		
Railroads	None	None
Highways	4,000 km, 1,000 km paved, 1,200 km gravel, 1,800 km earth tracks	5,311 km, 322 km paved, 290 km gravel, 4,699 km motorable track
Ports	1 major, Al Hudaydah; 2 minor, Mocha and Salif	1 major, Aden; 1 minor, Al Mukalla
Merchant marine	None	None
Pipelines	None	Refined products, 32 km
Civil air	9 major transport aircraft	14 major transport aircraft
Airfields	26 total, 14 usable; four with permanent-surface runways; four with runways 2,440 to 3,252 meters, seven with runways 1,220 to 2,439 meters	96 total, 42 usable; five with permanent-surface runways; nine with runways 2,440 to 3,659 meters, 18 with runways 1,220 to 2,439 meters
Telecommunications	Meager open-wire lines and low-power radio communications stations; 10,000 telephones (0.2 per 100 population); three AM, no FM, and five TV stations; one Indian Ocean satellite station; principal center Sanaa; secondary centers, Al Hudaydah and Ta'izz	Small system of open-wire, troposcatter multiconductor cable, and radio communications stations; only center Aden; estimated 10,000 telephones (0.6 per 100 population); one AM, no FM, and five TV stations

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	North Yemen	South Yemen
Defense forces		
Military manpower	Males 15 to 49, 1.2 million; 670,000 fit for service	Males 15 to 49, 400,000; 200,000 fit for service
Personnel	20,000 Army; 950 Navy; 1,000 Air Force, of which 34 are jet qualified	22,000 Army; 1,000 Navy; 1,500 Air Force, including 100 jet-qualified pilots; 15,000 People's Militia
Supply	Predominantly Soviet/Warsaw Pact with some US F-5 aircraft, M-60 tanks, and M-113 armored personnel carriers	Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Intelligence and security	National Security Organization; Central Security Forces; National Organization for General Intelligence and Military Security	Committee for State Security—internal security [redacted] Public Security Force—police functions

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
^a Including immigrant workers.

[redacted]

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Figure 13



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