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THE PARTY OF LENIN -- THE FIGHTING VANGUARD OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE

In a few days the 24th CPSU Congress will begin. On 30 March this all-union forum of Soviet Communists will begin its work, which will occupy the center of attention not only of our country's toilers but of the entire world as well. Created by the great Lenin, history's first ruling Marxist-Leninist party will report to Communists, to the entire Soviet people and to brother peoples on the results of the 5-year period following the 23rd Congress and will open up new horizons for the building of communism in the Soviet Union.

The party and people have come to the 24th CPSU Congress with a great sense of fulfilled patriotic and international duty, in a state of monolithic solidarity. Our Leninist party, a fighting vanguard, the leading and guiding force of society, armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, is confidently leading the multimillion toiler masses along the path of building communism and is successfully carrying out its role of organizer and leader of the entire Soviet people. Under party leadership the Soviet people has achieved outstanding success in the Eighth Five-Year Plan, success which pleases and inspires all progressive mankind.

The Directives of the 23rd CPSU Congress have been successfully fulfilled in the major socioeconomic indices of the Eighth Five-Year Plan. One more great step forward has been taken on the path of building the material and technological base of communism, strengthening of the economic and defense might of the Soviet state, improvement of toiler material and cultural living standards. The entire world once again is clearly shown the wisdom of our party's Leninist general line and the mighty creative energy of the Soviet people.

This most recent five-year plan has confirmed the correctness of the approach to management of the national economy worked out by the CPSU. The new system of economic management has created more favorable conditions for efficient development of the nation's enormous productive resources, for rapid improvement of living standards and fuller utilization of the advantages of the socialist system. During this period the Soviet economy has grown at a rapid rate and more effectively than in the preceding five-year plan. As is emphasized in the Draft Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress on the 1971-1975 Five-Year Soviet Economic Development Plan, 1970 national income exceeded the 1965 level by 41 percent, while its average annual growth was greater than in 1961-1965. Industrial output volume rose 50 percent. The nation's economic potential grew, while the economy's fixed productive resources increased by 50 percent during the 5 years. It is characteristic that those branches of industry which provide the technological progress of the entire economy and directly

satisfy the vital needs of the population are developing at a priority pace, as was specified at the 23rd Congress.

This great success has been achieved first and foremost thanks to the steady growth of social labor productivity. The economic reform greatly promoted major economic achievement. The results of the five-year plan indicate that party, soviet and economic organizations are worthily accomplishing one of the most important tasks -- persistent implementation of the party-elaborated principles of economic policy, which call for a combination of centralized branch management with a broadening of the powers of the union republics, amplification of the role of economic methods in management of the economy, radical improvement of planning, broadening of economic independence and initiative of enterprise work forces, and an increase in their material incentive to improve the results of their labor. Also notable is the fact that today the overwhelming majority of industrial enterprises are operating on the new system of planning and economic incentive; the reform is now being adopted in the construction industry as well.

Thanks to measures which have been elaborated by the party and which are being steadily implemented, good results have been achieved in the nation's agriculture. Implementing the resolutions of the July (1970) Central Committee Plenum, our rural toilers, with the assistance of the entire people, have produced a further upswing in production, strengthening the economy of our kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Farm output: volume rose 8.7 percent in 1970, a year which included the biggest grain and cotton harvest in the history of Soviet agriculture. The grain procurement plan was overfulfilled. Larger quantities of basic livestock products were purchased by the state than targeted by the plan. Kolkhoz gross income rose 12 percent over 1969.

This past five-year plan has confirmed the correctness of the party-specified means of increasing farm production. The method followed is consistent intensification of agriculture on a solid basis of mechanization, electrification and increasing use of chemicals in farm production, as well as extensive land reclamation and improvement in zones with unfavorable natural conditions. Appreciable success has been achieved in all specified areas of effort. For example, conversion of sovkhozes to full cost accounting has had a favorable effect. In 1970 approximately 5000 sovkhozes, or almost 35 percent of the total, operated under the new conditions of planning and economic incentive. These sovkhozes overfulfilled the profit plans. Our sovkhozes as a whole ended the year with a profit in excess of 3 billion rubles.

The resolution of the 23rd CPSU Congress on the Central Committee Report underscored the importance of securing in the forthcoming five-year plan a

further improvement in Soviet living standards. The results of the five-year plan in this area once again confirm the fact that the party is unswervingly following the well-known tenet of Marxist-Leninist theory that steady improvement in living standards is an objective economic necessity parallel with development of the productive forces of socialism and creation of the material and technological base of communism. The party is maintaining a steady course toward increasing wages of blue-collar and white-collar workers, kolkhoz farmer income from the communal farm operation, improvement of the guaranteed wage system on kolkhozes, an increase in cash payments and benefits from social funds, further improvement of pension security for blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and kolkhoz farmers, and substantial improvement of services and cultural facilities both for people residing in the city and in rural areas.

"Everything for man, for the benefit of man!" This party program slogan has been vividly embodied in the results of the five-year plan, in the results of its final year. For example, average monthly earnings of blue-collar and white-collar workers, with the addition of cash payments and benefits from social consumption funds, rose substantially last year, while kolkhoz farmer earnings also rose. Housing construction is continuing on a large scale. In the period 1966-1970 a total of 518 million square meters of housing was built in this country, which made it possible to improve housing conditions for almost 55 million Soviet citizens. Much has been done in the area of trade, services and cultural facilities.

The 23rd CPSU Congress noted that under conditions whereby our nation is building communism on a broad front, increasing importance is acquired by comprehensive education of the new man and further development of public education, culture and science. Past years are remarkable by their major success in this area as well. As of the end of 1970 approximately 79 million persons were enrolled in various types of education in this country; 49.4 million persons were enrolled in general-curriculum schools, 4.6 million at higher educational institutions, 4.4 million at secondary technical schools and other secondary specialized schools, and 2.4 million at trade schools.

Improvement in the overall cultural level and technical knowledgeability of toilers is inseparably linked with further development of our higher and secondary specialized schools. In conformity with the instructions of the 23rd CPSU Congress, these schools have accomplished their principal mission -- they have improved the quality of specialist training across the board, and on a large scale. In 1970 alone 1.7 million young specialists who had graduated from higher and secondary specialized schools were channeled into the economy, this group included 630 000 with higher education and more than 1,030,000 with secondary specialized education; the

number of persons graduating from higher educational institutions and secondary technical schools rose by 80,000 or 5 percent over the 1969 figure.

Increasingly high demands are being imposed on specialists. Party policy has proceeded and does proceed from the position that Soviet specialists of any area of specialization should be armed with Marxist-Leninist theory, should possess knowledge at the level of the latest scientific and technological advances, should possess requisite economic training and have the ability competently to solve problems of scientific and technological progress, scientific organization of labor and production management.

The CPSU is making fuller use of the press, radio, television, film, and all other mass media in forming a Marxist-Leninist ideological outlook and in the political and cultural development of all Soviet citizens.

Soviet science has made a great contribution toward solving current problems of development of social production. Achievements in the area of the basic sciences have made it possible successfully to solve many scientific and technical problems in industry, agriculture and in other branches. High-productivity machinery complexes and new industrial processes have been developed and are being successfully employed. In 1970 alone approximately 3000 new models of machinery and equipment were designed, as well as approximately 1000 new types of instrument. Series production was initiated on approximately 1500 new items boasting improved efficiency and performance. Considerable effort has been expended in the interest of technological progress by the scientific and technical community, by efficiency innovators and inventors. Approximately 3.4 million inventions and efficiency innovation proposals, which will generate approximately 3 billion rubles in annual savings, have been adopted for utilization in the Soviet economy.

New and outstanding achievements in the Soviet space program constitute convincing evidence of the high level of development of science and technology in this country. The ranks of scientific workers are growing. As of the end of last year they totaled approximately 930,000, more than 240,000 of whom have doctorates or candidate's degrees. The party and its Central Committee are focusing the efforts of our scientists on further solution to vital scientific problems of the present day, on all-out acceleration of scientific and technological progress, on more rapid adoption of the results of scientific research in the economy, and on achieving a high rate of labor productivity growth.

The Soviet people and its fighting men are well aware that the successful building of communism in the USSR is of enormous international significance. Massive development increases the economic, political and defense strength

of the entire socialist system and promotes the spread and consolidation of socialist ideas throughout the world. The CPSU and all Soviet citizens view the building of communism in the USSR and comprehensive improvement of the Soviet socialist society as their basic contribution toward the world revolutionary process, toward the struggle of all peoples against imperialism, for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

The CPSU, the entire Soviet people and its fighting men are fully aware of the fact that the world revolutionary process and the heroic liberation struggle of peoples are encountering growing resistance on the part of imperialism and reaction.

Aggressive imperialist circles, under the aegis of American and other wealthy elements, have stepped up their subversive activities against peace and social progress. Class hatred so blinds some imperialist bosses that they, ignoring the lessons of history, are rattling their sabers increasingly loudly and are openly fomenting war in various parts of the world. The continuing U.S. aggression in Indochina, escalated military operations in Cambodia and Laos, bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, U.S. support of aggression by Israeli extremists in the Near East, as well as provocations mounted against the developing nations of Africa and progressive regimes in Latin America are producing tension in international relations and are cause for great concern on the part of the peoples of the world, since such "world policeman" actions are fraught with the danger of further "escalation" of the threat of war. In Europe West German revenge-seekers are aggravating the situation together with U.S. NATO generals, while in the East the situation is being aggravated by restive Japanese militarism.

Recent events indicate that there exists a unique division of labor among the Anglo-American imperialists. The United States is running things in Asia, while in Africa Britain is beginning to operate more actively. The "East of Suez" policy is being galvanized by establishment of a "bridge" across the Indian Ocean, one of the piers of which will be the island of Diego Garcia, where it is planned to build an Anglo-American naval base.

The U.S. imperialists are increasing the nation's military potential. The U.S. House of Representatives approved military appropriations for the 1971 fiscal year totaling 71.2 billion dollars. It is believed that in 1972 military appropriations may exceed 80 billion dollars, which will naturally lead to a new arms race. Even the U.S. press admits that the Pentagon is quantitatively and qualitatively revamping its arsenal. An extremely important place in the area of military preparations is occupied by measures to strengthen the network of U.S. army, naval and air force bases. Hundreds of outposts of the American war machine, bristling with the most advanced military hardware, are scattered throughout the world.

Japan alone contains more than 120 bases and other U.S. military facilities. Deployed at these bases is modern military hardware designed primarily for waging a nuclear missile war. It is no secret that the missiles at these bases are aimed against the socialist nations, the Soviet Union in particular, as well as against other peace-loving countries.

The aggressive policies of imperialism are being opposed by the ever-stronger unity of action by the leading forces of the world revolutionary process -- the world socialist system and the international worker and national liberation movement. The struggle by the CPSU and the Marxist-Leninist parties of other countries to strengthen the unity of the socialist commonwealth and of all forces of the liberation movement is producing positive results. The socialist nations are expanding cooperation and mutual assistance; their joint struggle against the intrigues of imperialism and its ideological apologists is becoming increasingly effective. The defensive Warsaw Pact constitutes an effective instrument for preserving the peace.

The prestige of Soviet foreign policy, a policy of peace and security of peoples, is growing in the international arena. Its basic aims and specific program were defined by resolutions of the 23rd CPSU Congress, which proclaimed as one of our principal tasks "consistent defense of the principle of peaceful coexistence of nations with a different social system as well as decisive resistance to the aggressive forces of imperialism and the protection of mankind from another world war." As is attested by the entire period between the 23rd and 24th Congresses, the effect of socialist foreign policy on international relations is becoming increasingly evident, as the position of socialism becomes stronger. Ensuring the national interests and security of the Soviet Union as well as favorable international conditions for building communism, our foreign policy plays an important role in curtailing the export of counterrevolution by the imperialist powers and in eliminating the threat of a thermonuclear world war. The Soviet Union offers firm resistance to the aggressive intrigues of imperialist forces, from whatever quarter they may come. Vivid evidence of this is the all-out assistance by the USSR to the Vietnamese people in its heroic struggle against the American imperialists. An important place in the struggle against imperialism is also occupied by efforts by our country directed at supporting the just cause of the peoples of the Arab nations which have been subjected to attack by the Israeli aggressors.

The complexity of the struggle against imperialism and its aggressive aspirations dictates the necessity of purposeful, coordinated actions by all progressive, antiimperialist forces. In order to force upon imperialism a policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet state is utilizing all channels of political, diplomatic and ideological struggle and all

essential means at the disposal of the world's first socialist nation. A love of peace and a preparedness to offer appropriate resistance to aggression coalesce in our policy.

In the period between the 23rd and 24th Congresses, the party and Soviet government have carried out important measures in the area of military organizational development, which have led to a significant strengthening of the entire system of national defense. Under conditions whereby the aggressive forces of imperialism have proceeded to intensify international tension and to fan the flames of local war, the CPSU is making every effort to mobilize the Soviet people and its Armed Forces to a state of constant readiness to defend the socialist homeland and is increasing vigilance toward any and all actions taken by imperialism. Our army, air force and navy possess all the requisite means reliably to ensure the inviolability and security of our country and the entire socialist community. As was emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev, we have built strategic forces which constitute a reliable means of restraining any aggressor. We shall respond to all attempts, from any quarter, to secure military superiority over the USSR with an appropriate increase in our own military strength, adequate to guarantee our defense.

The Soviet people and its fighting men take pride in the fact that our country approaches the 24th CPSU Congress possessing a first-class industry and powerful defenses. The might of the USSR and the entire socialist community, which is growing year by year, persuasively demonstrates the superiority of socialism over capitalism. This is evident not only in the economic, political, ideological and scientific-technological areas, but also in the area of the military. Socialism has armed peace-loving peoples with powerful material means of restraining warmongers.

Mighty bearers of these means are the Soviet Armed Forces -- the Soviet Army and Navy, whose brilliant victories over the enemy have on numerous occasions enhanced the fighting fame of our socialist homeland and have confirmed its heroic invincibility. Shoulder to shoulder with them stand the brother armed forces of the nations of the socialist community, unified by common interests and goals in the struggle against the imperialist aggressors, welded together by solid bonds of proletarian internationalism and Marxist-Leninist ideology. The solidarity, the growing unity and steadily increasing strength of the socialist nations constitute the most reliable guarantee of peace and security of peoples.

At the present time the Soviet Armed Forces, just as the nation as a whole, are reporting to the party the results of socialist competition in honor of the 24th Congress. The Soviet people and its fighting men, giving enthusiastic approval of CPSU domestic and foreign policy, accept this policy as a banner of struggle for continued success in the building of

communism. This latter is the most important, most characteristic, most typical thing in our lives, for it attests to the total dedication of Soviet citizens to the cause of the Leninist party, the cause of communism. Herein lies rooted the greatest guarantee of fulfillment by the Soviet people and its fighting men of the directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan, which the party congress will ratify.

On the threshold of the 24th CPSU Congress the army and navy are more thoroughly analyzing existing capability and reserves in all areas of performance. We possess all the requisite conditions for securing a new upsurge of military theoretical and technical thought, as the party demands, for further development of military science and the art of warfare. First and foremost it is necessary even more persistently to master Marxist-Leninist theory and to study the Leninist ideological legacy in the area of the military. Particularly valuable in this respect is the experience of the Lenin Centennial Year, which was marked by many innovative discoveries and valuable publications, deeply revealing the inexhaustible wealth of the Lenin military theory legacy. While consolidating that which has been achieved, it is important to advance to new highs in the dissemination, study and innovative elaboration of current ideological and methodological problems in the area of military theory and history and in practical military affairs.

The party is instilling in military cadres a valuable sense of the new, a sense of great responsibility for the assigned task and is teaching them to approach military problems in an innovative manner, soberly to assess the potential enemy, vigilantly to watch his every step, and to achieve genuine scientific troop control on the basis of the achievements of scientific and technological progress. The CPSU inseparably links successful solution to these practical problems with party activities, with implementation of party policy in the military. It is precisely the party and its battle staff, the Central Committee, which give us models of political, theoretical and organizer efforts, examples of what should be achieved by a unity of theory and practice, and how Marxist-Leninist revolutionary science should be practically applied. For example, the party has thoroughly revealed the character and unique nature of the international conditions of present-day development of the USSR, the changes which are taking place in the balance of power between the two opposing social systems, and has promptly assessed trends in the development of military affairs and its link with the scientific and technological revolution and organizer effort. An intelligent combining of efforts in the military with the peaceful, productive activities of the people has secured a growth in the defense capability of the Soviet state which is greater than that which it possessed in the past. As is well known, this has radically altered the military strategic situation in the world in favor of socialism.

In addition, the CPSU has armed us with a correct assessment of the wars of the contemporary era, which has constituted the foundation for creative elaboration of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and army, of Soviet military science, of the theory of military art and other problems of military affairs during the course of the military technological revolution.

The party's classic solution to contemporary military problems on the basis of Leninist doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland and the conquests of socialism serves our military cadres as a stimulus for the development of Soviet military theory. It is necessary first and foremost to assimilate all new elements which have been produced by collective party thinking on the entire complex of contemporary military organizational development, based on the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress and on advanced military know-how. Our theoretical scientific research and all military scientific efforts have been given an example of creative application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism for accomplishing the specific tasks of building communism and increasing the nation's defense capability. In Soviet military science, as in other areas of knowledge, new problems arise, the solution of which increases our prestige over bourgeois military theory and helps in a practical manner in shedding light on the foreseeable future, in full conformity with the conditions of the time and the demands of the international situation and rapid scientific and technological progress. Standing at full stature is the task of tireless unmasking of the military ideology of imperialism and the most vigorous struggle against bourgeois ideology. Military cadres must accomplish all these and other tasks innovatively, with inspiration, vigorously, aggressively, as we are taught by the Leninist party.

Party organizations constitute the combat detachments of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces. They play an enormous role in the life and activities of our entire military organism. Communists comprise that main nucleus of the army, air force and navy which maintains in a state of political activeness all routine and activities of units, naval ships, and subunits. They conduct daily party political, ideological and indoctrinational effort, which serves as an effective instrument by means of which the party exercises guidance of the troops and indoctrination of Soviet fighting men. All-out activation of this effort constitutes one of the typical features of pre-congress Armed Forces activities. Commanders, political officials, army and navy party organizations are ensuring implementation of party policy in the military, are solidly ranking Armed Forces personnel behind the party, are indoctrinating fighting men in a spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and total dedication to the socialist homeland, are actively assisting in strengthening the unity of army and people, are making an effort to strengthen military discipline, and are mobilizing fighting men to accomplish the tasks of combat and

political training, to master new weapons and other equipment and to achieve flawless performance of their military duty. Party organizations and political officials have always been and are now a reliable support of one-man commanders in accomplishing the tasks of increasing the combat readiness of units, naval ships and subunits.

Consistent execution of the instructions of the 23rd CPSU Congress on acceptance to party membership of persons who are capable of honorably warranting the privilege of party membership has been and remains one of the most important obligations of party officials and party organizations. This is concern for ideological and organizational strengthening of party organizations and further enhancement of their role and influence in the troops. Army and navy party organizations focus their principal attention on securing a high level of continuous troop combat readiness, excellent fulfillment of combat and political training target pledges made in honor of the 24th CPSU Congress, and on strengthening discipline, organization and Communist indoctrination of military personnel. All pre-congress party effort is subjected to the tasks of training highly-conscious, ideologically-convinced, disciplined fighting men who have a total mastery of their combat equipment and weapons, who flawlessly carry out their military duty and who are prepared to make a total effort, and to sacrifice their lives if necessary, in the nation's defense.

Further intensification of ideological-political work is an inseparable part of the overall process of raising the level of party scientific guidance of the task of building communism and strengthening the Soviet Armed Forces, which is extremely typical of CPSU activities between congresses. In the Armed Forces it is based on the system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers, general officers, and admirals in political training classes with enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers. Mass political agitation and lecture-type propaganda is being conducted on a large scale.

In ideological-political as well as all other efforts the party strictly follows the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and bears in mind the fact that one of the most important gains achieved by the Soviet government is consolidation of the peoples of the USSR in a single fraternal family. Unswervingly carrying out Leninist nationalities policy, the party and its organizations indoctrinate workers, peasants, intellectuals, army and navy personnel, all Soviet citizens in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and respect for the finest, progressive national traditions of the peoples of the USSR, in a spirit of friendship with the peoples of all brother socialist nations, with the toilers of the entire world, and wage a persistent struggle against all manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism.

In connection with the forthcoming 24th CPSU Congress and its resolutions, ideological effort will naturally receive a new impetus and will demand further improvement in the overall theoretical training of military cadres. A central position in this training will be occupied by study and clarification of the decisions of the party forum and mobilization of military personnel for implementation of these decisions. Here the principal task is to reveal more fully the results of the activities of party and people between congresses, to concentrate the attention of military cadres on a thorough study of development prospects, embodying the conclusions of the theory of scientific communism and Marxism-Leninism as a whole. In all our propaganda effort and in scientific research activities it is important consistently to carry out a party-class line, to achieve precision and clarity of ideological position and to step up the struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology, against all departures from Marxism-Leninism.

Soviet fighting men, just as all other Soviet citizens, are adding to the world historic achievements of their homeland. Standing guard over the peaceful labors of the builders of communism, they are doing everything to ensure that no intrigues by our enemies take us unawares. All Soviet Armed Forces personnel are solidly behind the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, are totally dedicated to the Soviet people and the cause of communism and are sacredly carrying out their patriotic and internationalist duty pertaining to armed defense of the socialist homeland and the entire socialist community.

Strengthening of the nation's economy and defense capability, improvement of socialist production relations and socialist democracy, as well as rapid growth in toiler creative initiative -- all these vivid features of the past 5-year period show the powerful organizing and guiding force of our Communist Party. Lenin always stressed that this is an invincible force. In particular, he spoke about it quite movingly exactly half a century ago, at the 10th Party Congress, which was held in March 1921. It was at a time when the country was about to make a historic shift from war to peace, from "war communism" to the New Economic Policy. The party specified this shift "at a moment which was of extraordinary importance for the fate of our revolution," "under unusually difficult conditions." Crushing pressure was being exerted by the "damned legacy of the past" -- "devastation, want, impoverishment"; "World capitalism has launched against us a nervous, hysterical campaign" (V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 43, pp 119, 120, 122). The petite bourgeoisie and anarchist elements, supported by foreign imperialist and White Russian emigré forces, assumed the most dangerous forms of manifestation in the form of the Kronshtadt counterrevolutionary insurrection, as well as actions by opposition elements and factionalists within the party. Considering the prospects for development of events, the great strategist of the

October Revolution pointed out the difficulties but at the same time stated quite firmly and confidently that the Bolsheviks were counting "on the solidarity of the vanguard of the proletariat" -- the party, that the party constituted the invincible "nucleus of world revolution," a party which "will stride forward to more and more decisive international victories!"

History has confirmed the correctness of Lenin's prediction. World historic victories have marked the path of the CPSU, of the entire Soviet people and its army at all stages in the life and activity of the Soviet state. Our party, true to the ideals and behests of Lenin, demonstrated in the Civil War, in the first peacetime five-year plans, in the stern years of the Great Patriotic War, and demonstrates today its solidarity, its fighting spirit, Bolshevik high-principledness and efficiency, its implacable attitude toward shortcomings and its willingness and ability to do everything necessary in order successfully to accomplish new and magnificent tasks

The mighty creative force of our party consists primarily in the fact that it has consolidated the entire people under the great banner of Lenin and is itself inseparable from the people. The CPSU is bound to the worker class, the kolkhoz peasantry, the intelligentsia, and to all toilers both directly and through their mass independent organizations, particularly the soviets, the trade unions, which boast a total membership of more than 90 million, and the 27-million member Komsomol. Enhancing the role of mass organizations, the party promotes a steady increase in the creative initiative of the masses; improving the leadership of these organizations and developing their independence of action, it is strengthening its own guiding influence. Vigorous activity by the more than 365,000 CPSU primary organizations is uniting the party even more solidly with the masses, is consolidating them even more strongly around the fighting vanguard of the great labor army.

A constant strengthening of the organic bonds between party and people is a logical pattern of development of Soviet society. The beneficent effect of this pattern was once again vividly revealed in the nationwide campaign for implementation of the resolutions of the 23rd CPSU Congress, the targets of the Eighth Five-Year Plan, and in nationwide socialist competition in honor of the 24th CPSU Congress. The patriotic deeds of urban and rural toilers as well as the fighting men of army and navy in the first months of 1971, the year of the 24th Congress, convincingly attest to the indestructible unity between party and Soviet people. In these patriotic deeds performed by millions of builders and defenders of communism is expressed a feeling of total confidence, respect and love by Soviet citizens for their party -- the mentor and collective political leader of the toiler masses.

A further widening and deepening of bonds between party and people is an essential condition for success in the struggle for communism. This point of the Program, which expresses an objective law, is taken into consideration by the party in all its activities. One vivid example of this is the fact that the CPSU has always considered it as its duty to take counsel with the toilers on the major items of party policy, to present these matters for nationwide popular discussion and to involve as many of the party-unaffiliated in party efforts as possible. At the present time the party is taking counsel with the Soviet people, discussing the draft Directives which will be considered by the 24th CPSU Congress in drafting targets for the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

The draft Directives of the 24th CPSU Congress specify the principal directions of the nation's economic development and targets for the new five-year plan. These targets are truly magnificent. The Ninth Five-Year Plan will be an important stage in the further advance of Soviet society toward communism, in building its material and technological base and in strengthening the nation's economic and defense might. "The principal task of the five-year plan," emphasizes the Central Committee draft, "is to secure a substantial rise in the people's material and cultural living standards on the basis of a high rate of development of socialist production, improved efficiency, scientific-technological progress and accelerated labor productivity growth."

Proceeding from the fundamental tasks of the new five-year plan, the party intends: to carry out a broad program of social measures; to accelerate the pace of scientific and technological progress and to ensure implementation of a unified technological policy; comprehensively to develop basic and applied scientific research and to adopt research results more rapidly in the economy; consistently to develop cooperation with the socialist nations and to make every effort to assist in strengthening the world socialist system.

The party attaches the greatest importance to a strengthening of the nation's economic might. The principal task of industry in the new five-year plan consists in expanding and perfecting the industrial base for development of the socialist economy. The plan calls for ensuring a high growth rate and proportional development for social production, particularly agriculture, light industry and the food industry, as well as a considerable increase in the efficiency of all branches of the economy. National income will rise by 37-40 percent during the 5-year period, whereby at least 80 percent of this increase will be achieved through improving labor productivity. Plans call for an elaborate system of measures securing a new and substantial improvement in Soviet living standards. Real per capita income will rise approximately 30 percent, average wages of blue-collar and white-collar workers will rise by 20-22 percent;

kolkhoz farmer earnings from the collective operation will be up an average of 30-35 percent. Plans call for another increase in the minimum wage. Social consumption funds will increase 40 percent.

Various branches of industry will reach amazing heights. It is planned to increase the production of electric power to 1030-1070 billion kilowatt hours, to increase oil production to 480-500 million tons, natural gas to 300-320 billion cubic meters, and steel production to 142-150 million tons. Oil refining industry output will be increased by 50 percent, with a 70 percent increase in chemicals and the petrochemical industry. Output will increase 70 percent in machine building and metalworking, and 120 percent in consumer goods.

The Communist Party and our entire people view the successful building of communism and the strengthening of the economic might and defense capability of our socialist homeland as their most important international duty. The Soviet Union will continue in the future comprehensively to improve and expand economic and scientific-technical ties with the socialist nations in the direction of further strengthening cooperation and consistent economic integration of the economies of the CEMA member nations. We shall develop stable trade and scientific-technical ties with the developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Economically-justified trade and scientific-technical ties with the industrially-developed capitalist nations will also undergo further expansion. Foreign trade volume will increase by 33-35 percent over the 5 years.

The draft Directives emphasize that implementation of the Ninth Five-Year Plan will be of great international significance.

The five-year plan will secure further growth in the defense might of the Soviet Union, which will make it possible even more reliably to defend the Soviet people and all the nations of the socialist community against the danger of imperialist aggression and will strengthen the position of peace-loving and liberation forces throughout the world.

Lenin, stressing the importance of the party Bolshevik congress, characterized it as the most responsible meeting of the party and Republic (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 43, page 50). Welcoming the 24th Party Congress, just such a meeting, the Soviet people and its fighting men honor their fighting vanguard -- the Leninist party, under whose guidance our homeland is advancing to new Communist heights.

INTERNATIONALIST INDOCTRINATION OF SOLDIERS IN THE ARMIES OF
WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Mar SU I. Yakubovskiy

The peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and their multi-national Armed Forces greet the 24th CPSU Congress in unified ranks, consolidated as never before behind the Communist Party and Soviet government. The inseparable alliance and friendship of the peoples of the USSR is a result of implementation of the Leninist nationalities policy and application of the principles of socialist patriotism and internationalism.

Fraternal unity and cooperation among peoples comprise one of the sources of the strength of each of the socialist nations and their community as a whole. Strengthening of the unity of the world socialist system on the basis of the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism constitutes an essential condition for the further success of all the socialist nations. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist parties of the other Warsaw Pact nations view international indoctrination of the builders and defenders of the new society as one of the most important aspects of their activities.

Leninist ideals of proletarian internationalism, which constitute the theoretical foundation for indoctrinating the soldiers of the allied armies in a spirit of brotherhood and fighting unity, have always been and will continue to be the banner and victorious weapon of the Warsaw Pact nations in the cause of common defense of the conquests of socialism.

I.

The Soviet Union has begun a new 5-year period in the building of communism in an atmosphere of great political and labor enthusiasm of the masses. The other socialist nations are steadily conquering new ground in the building of an advanced socialist society. Under the guidance of their Communist and labor parties, the brother peoples are successfully continuing the struggle to increase the efficiency of social production, to achieve a flourishing of science and culture, as well as improved toiler living standards. Their productive labors are marked by a further strengthening of the world socialist system, a strengthening of its influence on the fate of the modern world and by a steady increase in the international prestige, the economic and defense might of the socialist nations. History convincingly reaffirms the conclusion of the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties that socialism today is exerting an increasing influence on the entire course of revolutionary processes and that no power can turn back the development of contemporary human society on the path toward social progress.

The development of events in the international arena has also confirmed another conclusion drawn by this international Communist forum, that in spite of all the changes in the world, the aggressive nature of imperialism has remained unchanged. Its most militant detachments, U.S. imperialism in particular, which constitutes the center of international reaction and militarism, have not given up their hopes of casting socialism down from the heights of world influence and of reviving colonialism in new forms. The cutting edge of the aggressive policies of contemporary imperialism is aimed primarily at the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. This is attested by an intensification of aggressive intrigues and ideological sabotage by the American imperialists and their allies in various parts of the world, which are creating a serious threat to world peace and security.

U.S. ruling circles, contrary to the arguments of reason and the demands of all progressive mankind, continue to escalate the criminal war in Indochina, endeavoring with fire and sword to shatter the resistance of the peace-loving peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

In the Near East the Israeli aggressors, egged on by the world's reactionaries, are endeavoring to hold the occupied Arab lands and to frustrate a political settlement in this region.

World indignation is growing at the brazen actions of Zionist thugs in the United States and at anti-Soviet Zionist acts committed in several other Western nations and inspired by imperialist reactionaries.

Revenge-seeking and neo-Nazi elements in West Germany are stepping up their activities. They are attempting to prevent ratification of treaties between the USSR and the FRG as well as between the Polish People's Republic and the FRG, and are inciting demonstrations in West Berlin in order to delay a settlement of the West Berlin question, in an attempt to hinder an improvement in the political climate in Europe.

Washington and NATO spokesmen for the "from a position of strength" policy are urging on the arms race, are promoting further militarization, are endeavoring to strengthen and fortify aggressive military blocs, and are preparing to establish new military-political alliances and alignments.

A special place in the Pentagon's plans is assigned to an increase in the striking power of strategic nuclear forces. It is planned to increase offensive nuclear strength in the next few years by arming ICBMs as well as missiles fired from nuclear submarines with MIRV warheads. Work is progressing on the design of submarines to be armed with ICBMs. Construction of the Safeguard AEM system is proceeding on an expanding scale. At the same time a priority effort is under way to equip large units and units with advanced hardware for the conduct of military operations without the employment of nuclear weapons.

The U.S.-led NATO bloc still performs the role of principal instrument of imperialist aggression and adventures. At the present time the NATO member nations maintain more than 6.5 million men under arms. Since establishment of NATO, the number of divisions subordinate to NATO headquarters has increased from 12 to 64. The NATO European command has at its disposal approximately 4000 combat and auxiliary aircraft, approximately 8000 tanks and 300 warships. According to figures in the foreign press, more than 300,000 U.S. officers and men are stationed on the European continent. The U.S. command controls more than 7200 nuclear warheads in Western Europe.

At last December's NATO Council meeting, U.S. pressure succeeded in pushing through a decision to increase the military expenditures of the 10 Western European member nations during a 5-year period to 1 billion dollars, as well as to increase the size of the armed forces and to arm them with new equipment. A course toward increasing the nuclear missile potential has also been confirmed.

Under conditions of constant heightening of international tension by the imperialists, the Warsaw Pact nations are doing everything necessary continuously to strengthen their military and political alliance. A statement made by Lenin to the toilers of multinational Russia during the Civil War is holy writ for the peoples of the socialist nations: "... Faced by the enormous front of the imperialist powers, we who are struggling against imperialism constitute an alliance which demands firm military consolidation, and we view all attempts to disrupt this solidarity as a totally impermissible phenomenon, as betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism... We say: a unity of military forces is essential; departure from this unity is impermissible" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 40, pp 98-99).

For more than 15 years now the Warsaw Pact Organization, established as a counterweight to the aggressive imperialist NATO bloc, is successfully accomplishing important military-political tasks in the interests of defending socialism and constitutes a genuine bastion of peace and security of the peoples of Europe and the entire world. This fighting alliance, founded on the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism, constitutes a persuasive example of the ideological, economic and military-political unity of the socialist nations and of the growing combat alliance of their armed forces.

Of prime importance for development and strengthening of the alliance of brother socialist nations is the fact that leadership of these nations, their armed forces and the entire cause of defense is exercised by Marxist-Leninist Communist and worker parties. Herein lies the main source of the strength and invincibility of our allied armies, a guarantee of their

invincible might. The Marxist-Leninist parties present a united front in the international arena as well, carry out a coordinated foreign policy and are therefore making a great contribution to the effort at relaxing international tension. Of enormous importance in this effort are bilateral and multilateral meetings, consultations and conferences of party and government leaders of the socialist nations, where they collectively draft important documents on matters dealing with international relations.

Notable in this regard are the fruitful labors of the Political Consultative Committee, which heads the Warsaw Pact Organization. The general secretaries and first secretaries of the central committees of Communist and worker parties and heads of government take part in its meetings; ministers of foreign affairs, defense ministers, the Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, and others are invited to attend.

A declaration was adopted at the first meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, held in Prague in 1956, which proposed that the military blocs existing in Europe be disbanded; the Moscow conference (1958) proposed the signing of a nonaggression pact. The following conference, held in Moscow (1961), examined the question of settling the final business of World War II by concluding a peace treaty with both German states.

The Western powers, however, rejected these peaceful proposals of the socialist coalition and continued applying heat to the international situation, stepping up acts of provocation against the GDR and making plans for aggression against Cuba. In connection with this fact, a resolution was passed at the Moscow meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in 1962, which warned the imperialists that the peoples of the socialist nations were "fully resolved to defend their security in an adequate manner and to defend the peace with all means at their command."

An important landmark in the activities of the Warsaw Pact Organization was the 1965 Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. It sharply condemned aggressive NATO plans to establish multilateral nuclear forces and called for a nuclear arms freeze, the establishment of nuclear-free zones, as well as the holding of a European security conference.

The most elaborate constructive program for peace and security on the European continent was contained in the Declaration of the Bucharest Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (1966), which served as a basis for the Declaration of the Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist and Worker Parties (1967). At Bucharest the brother socialist nations also confirmed their position on the Vietnam question. They declared that they had been giving and would continue to give increasing moral, political and other assistance to the heroic Vietnamese people in its just struggle against the American interventionists.

In their appeal to all European nations the participants at the Budapest Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (1969) came forth with a new initiative in calling for a European security conference. They declared that the only realistic alternative to a dangerous division of the world into blocs and an arms race was general European cooperation. At that same conference important resolutions were passed, aimed at improving the structure of the Warsaw Pact military organization.

At last year's meetings of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow, and later in Berlin, new steps were taken toward relaxation of international tension. Important documents were ratified at the Berlin meeting which reaffirmed the willingness of the brother socialist nations to do everything necessary to strengthen the peace and security of peoples and to achieve early extinguishment of hot spots of aggression. The participants at the conference emphasized the great international importance of the treaty between the USSR and the FRG and the initialing of the treaty between Poland and West Germany. They also voiced support for the just demand of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic that the FRG formally acknowledge the Munich Agreement null and void at the very outset.

Party and government leaders of the allied socialist nations, utilizing the Political Consultative Committee, bilateral contacts and other vehicles, have always undertaken and are continuing to undertake active steps to prevent another world war. This just struggle is winning over more and more supporters year by year throughout the world. The firm and decisive position of the Warsaw Pact member nations has on numerous occasions had a sobering effect and is continuing to exert such an effect on the imperialist aggressors, compelling them to abandon their criminal schemes.

In recent years the Communist and worker parties and the governments of the brother Warsaw Pact member nations have accomplished an enormous task of strengthening the defensive fighting alliance and its joint armed forces.

The most modern and up-to-date defense industry has been created on the basis of successful development of socialist industry and extensive adoption in production of the latest scientific and technological advances in the allied nations, as well as close economic cooperation among these nations.

As a result of the constant concern of the Communist and worker parties as well as the governments of the allied nations, our brother armies now meet modern demands. Their ground forces, air forces, air defense troops and naval forces are armed with the most advanced combat equipment and weapons. The army and navy of the Soviet Union, with their nuclear missile punch, play the decisive role in ensuring the security of the socialist community.

The allied armies are genuinely popular armies, called upon to defend the vital interests of the toilers, the interests of socialism. They consist of highly-trained, politically-mature military cadres, capable of successfully leading the troops in both peace and war. The fighting men of these armies are truly proficient at their job, indoctrinated in a spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology and total dedication to the cause of socialism and communism.

A guarantee of the successful development and strengthening of the fighting alliance of the allied armies is their worker-peasant, socialist character, the existence of a large contingent of Communists and members of Communist youth organizations. The officer corps of these armies consists of representatives of the worker class, the toiling peasantry, and the popular intelligentsia. Many of them have combat experience and have graduated from the school of proletarian solidarity, battling shoulder to shoulder with Soviet fighting men against fascism. The overwhelming majority of officers are members of Communist and worker parties.

Military control entities have been established within the framework of the Warsaw Pact; these entities include representatives of all the allied armies. They work in an atmosphere of total mutual understanding, fraternal friendship, and constitute a graphic manifestation of socialist internationalism in the area of military cooperation among brother socialist nations.

A Committee of Defense Ministers has been established, which prepares joint recommendations and proposals on matters dealing with strengthening the defense capability of the allied nations. It plays an important role in the entire system of relationships among the allied armies and in strengthening the defense might of the socialist coalition.

The control entities of the Joint Armed Forces are operating smoothly: the Joint Command, the Military Council, Joint Headquarters, etc. A thorough understanding of their international duty by the officers and general officers of the allied armies staffing these bodies constitutes a distinctive feature of their fruitful activities.

One of the most important objective sources of the strength of the military cooperation of the socialist nations is the fact that all the joint activities of the Joint Command and national armed forces commands rest on a unity of Marxist-Leninist approach in assessing the phenomena of international affairs, a unity of views on military theory and a common understanding of the laws of war, the principles of military organizational development and military art.

Under conditions of today's complex international situation, with incessant intrigues perpetrated by reactionaries and world imperialism, the fighting men of the allied socialist nations, true to their patriotic and international duty, vigilantly stand guard over the conquests of socialism and are doing everything to achieve continuous improvement of combat readiness.

Today the Warsaw Pact armed forces constitute a powerful bastion of peace and security of peoples. "Our common achievement," stated L. I. Brezhnev at the 10th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, "is a substantial strengthening of the effectiveness of the allied armed forces. Large-scale military training exercises conducted in recent years have demonstrated the high degree of coordination and combat performance of the Warsaw Pact allied armies, and their ability to accomplish the most complex military missions has confirmed once again that our brotherhood in arms is a reliable means of restraining any aggressor."

The many years of activity of the Warsaw Pact Organization constitute a vivid confirmation of the vital strength of the ideas of proletarian internationalism which cement together the fighting alliance of the brother nations. The successes of socialism, the growing strength and solidarity of the Warsaw Pact nations and their armed forces evoke anger and hatred on the part of the imperialists. In order to undermine the unity and fighting alliance of our peoples and armies, they are utilizing the entire vast edifice of anti-Communist propaganda and are particularly counting on a revival of the bourgeois ideology of nationalism.

Therefore under present-day conditions particular importance is acquired by Marxist-Leninist theses on struggle against the bourgeois ideology, on class, international indoctrination of the masses, further strengthening of our military-political defense alliance, strengthening of the fraternal friendship and cooperation of the peoples and armies of the socialist nations, and consistent affirmation of the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism in the consciousness and actions of our fighting men of like mind.

The CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties of the Warsaw Pact nations are conducting a vigorous campaign aimed at forming in the toilers and military personnel a scientific philosophical outlook, political awareness, high morale, standards of Communist morality, socialist patriotism and internationalism. They proceed from the position that internationalist indoctrination constitutes an important part of Communist indoctrination and makes it possible more successfully to resolve practical problems in the area of economic, political, cultural and military cooperation as well as to overcome the difficulties impeding the building of socialism and communism.

II.

The writings of the founders of Marxism and the documents of the international Communist movement comprehensively substantiate an approach to proletarian internationalism as to international class unity and solidarity of the proletariat and all the toilers of the world in the struggle to destroy the capitalist system, to build socialism and communism as an ideology and policy implacably hostile to bourgeois nationalism, cosmopolitanism and racism.

The fundamental thesis of scientific communism that "the worker class is international in nature" (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch. [Works], Volume 22, page 420) evokes attacks by the enemies of international unity of toilers. Marx and Engels were forced to wage a particularly stubborn struggle against those who, betraying worker class solidarity, embraced chauvinism, sought to gloss over the class struggle and advocated ideas of unity with "their own" national bourgeoisie.

In a new historical era Lenin defended proletarian internationalism against the attacks of revisionists and opportunists, creatively developed Marxian ideas applicable to the new situation, and thus armed Communist parties with a powerful means of indoctrinating the toilers and transforming the world.

Lenin demonstrated that with the victory of socialism initially in one or several countries, the importance of international toiler solidarity not only does not diminish but on the contrary becomes even greater, since the resistance of the imperialist bourgeoisie and its defenders to the revolutionary movement becomes stronger. "Capital is an international force," wrote Lenin in 1919. "In order to defeat it, we need an international alliance of workers, their international brotherhood. We are opponents of national hatreds, national discord, national isolation. We are Internationalists" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 40, page 43).

At the same time the world proletariat exposed the slanderous fabrications of bourgeois nationalists and opportunists, who claimed that Marxists were totally indifferent to the fate of their country and had no concept of patriotism. In an article entitled "On the National Pride of the Great Russians" Lenin wrote that a feeling of national pride is not alien to conscious proletarians. They love their homeland and their language. They work primarily to liberate their people from violence, from the oppression of landlords and capitalists. The worker class is the bearer of genuine patriotism; it is a totally consistent class, since it fights not only for the freedom and happiness of its own people but also for the establishment of equal rights and brotherhood of all peoples.

Proletarian internationalism has passed through a number of stages in its historical development. In the first stage -- from its inception in the middle of the last century up to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution -- it was manifested in mutual assistance and support of various detachments of the worker class in their struggle against capitalism. Its most vivid expression was the battle of the Paris Communards in 1871, the centennial of which is being celebrated this March. Participants included representatives of other countries, who demonstrated by deeds their class solidarity with the heroes of the Paris Commune.

The second stage encompasses the period from the 1917 October Revolution to the victory of popular democracy in a number of countries and the establishment of a world socialist system. It is characterized by the creation, under the guidance of Lenin and the Communist Party, of the world's first multinational socialist state, the USSR, which constitutes an embodiment of the friendship and brotherhood of peoples. In this voluntary alliance of equal and sovereign republics, all relations between nations are permeated by a spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism.

The third, present stage, which began with the formation of a world socialist system, is distinguished by the fact that proletarian internationalism has risen to a new and higher level. Its social base has become substantially broadened -- the worker class is today joined by the broadest toiler strata,

Today the Leninist ideas of friendship of peoples, patriotism and internationalism have found vivid embodiment in cooperation among the brother socialist nations. This cooperation embraces economic, social, political and military areas of relations and is dictated by the objective laws of building socialism, by the common interests of the worker class and all toilers on a national and international scale, and in the struggle against imperialism and reaction.

The ideas of socialist internationalism form the basis of cooperation among allied armies and permeate all aspects of relationships within the Warsaw Pact Organization, the establishment of which initiated a new and qualitatively higher stage in military cooperation among the socialist nations and their armies.

Guiding the process of indoctrination of fighting men in the allied armies, the brother parties take into consideration domestic and external conditions, the dynamics of events in the international arena and the general and particular tasks proceeding from these conditions. Personnel are constantly explained their obligations regarding defense of the conquests of the people's government, strengthening of collective defense of the socialist nations and the fighting alliance of their armies. The Warsaw Pact member nations have emphasized time and again and do

emphasize in their documents and declarations that the defense of socialism in each country individually and in all the brother countries is their common cause, their highest international and patriotic duty.

Within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organization diversified forms of military cooperation have been elaborated, which promote the accomplishment of common tasks and the further strengthening of the allied armies.

The relationships among the brother armies are based on cooperation and mutual assistance. In their activities they remain aware of the enormous revolutionary and combat experience of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces. Soviet military science is quite logically viewed by them as a profound Marxist-Leninist theoretical synthesis of experience in the establishment and improvement of a socialist army under conditions of the total victory of socialism and the advanced building of communism. The brother armies have a slogan: "To learn from the Soviet Army means learning to win."

It is important to emphasize that all forms of military cooperation among allied armies, including consultation and discussion by the leaders on the elaboration of common views, and the execution of joint measures on the basis of plans drafted by the Joint Command, such as exercises, exchange of information, etc -- are all subordinated to a single goal -- strengthening of the brotherhood in arms and continuous improvement of the allied armed forces, their combat readiness and fighting efficiency.

In working with personnel, in their training and indoctrination commanders, political officials, party and youth organizations of the allied armies are guided by Leninist principles of international indoctrination of the masses, which have received further productive development in the activities of the brother Communist and worker parties.

These principles include: securement of a unity of the worker class and all toilers in the struggle for the triumph of Communist ideals; mutual political, moral and material support among the socialist nations; equal rights of all nationalities and ethnic groups as well as their genuine freedom and sovereignty; fulfillment by the peoples of each country of their international duty to the toilers of the entire world, that is the principle of doing "the maximum attainable in one country for the development, support and awakening of revolution in all countries" (V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 37, page 304).

Revealing the essence of proletarian internationalism, the founders of scientific communism pointed to its revolutionary nature and great practical effectiveness. Experience, noted Marx, has led to the conviction that the point should be an alliance of revolutionary peoples against counterrevolutionary forces; an alliance which is effected not on paper

but solely on the field of battle (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch., Volume 6, page 290). These and other Marxian theses which express the implacableness of the struggle against the exploiters are just as valid today as in the past.

International indoctrination of the fighting men of the brother armies is inseparable from patriotic indoctrination and is viewed in a dialectical relationship. Patriotism and internationalism are two forces which operate in a single direction. The interests of socialism demand a correct combination of all forces and their focusing on a single point.

Socialist patriotism signifies love of one's socialist homeland, people and nations. With the forming of the world socialist system, the patriotism of the citizens of a socialist society is embodied in dedication and loyalty both to their own homeland and to the entire community of socialist nations. Socialist patriotism and socialist internationalism organically include proletarian solidarity with the worker class and the toilers of all nations.

Organizing and guiding internationalist indoctrination of people and army, Marxist-Leninist parties are guided by Leninist theses on the correct combining of the national and international in the activities of proletarian parties and all detachments of the revolutionary movement. The worker class, fighting for its national rights and interests, stated Lenin, should not forget its obligation "to struggle against petty-nationalistic narrowness, reserve, isolation, for taking into account the whole and the universal, for subordination of the interests of the particular to the interests of the general" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 30, page 45).

This statement by Lenin is of unfading significance in organizing the internationalist indoctrination of fighting men. An organic combination of the international and national, internationalism and patriotism constitutes one of the most important prerequisites for successful cooperation among socialist nations in all areas.

Comprehension of the organic combination of patriotism and socialist internationalism focuses commanders, political officials and party organizations on more flexibly and effectively working toward the forming of patriotic feelings and international awareness in the personnel of the Warsaw Pact member armies.

All indoctrination of the personnel of brother armies, including indoctrination of socialist internationalism and patriotism, is based on a solid political, economic and ideological foundation. This has been noted time and again by party and government leaders in the socialist countries.

The international bonds linking the fighting men of the brother armies exert considerable influence on the forming of excellent moral-fighting qualities in personnel, an ability to engage in resolute action in a joint struggle against the common foe. The many years of experience of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the other socialist nations teaches that the combat alliance of fighting men of different nationalities constitutes one of those life-giving sources which nurture the courage and valor of the sons of different nationalities. Constant work by commanders and political workers, party and youth organizations connected with patriotic and internationalist indoctrination and strengthening of the fighting alliance is viewed in the brother armies as an honorable task.

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The means, forms and methods of internationalist indoctrination are perfected in the process of development of cooperation among the brother armies. Many of them have been drawn from the experience of the CPSU in internationalist indoctrination of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces.

During the Civil War years Lenin drafted directives on military unity of the Soviet republics. They stated that an essential condition for victory over world reaction and the White Guardists "is a unified command of all Red Army detachments and the strictest centralization in the command of all manpower and resources of the socialist republics." (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 38, page 400) The Leninist idea of military unity, implemented by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was one of the first forms of unification of the international efforts of a victorious people.

Today this idea has found further embodiment in the activities of Communist and worker parties pertaining to the establishment and consolidation of international armed forces within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

Indoctrination of Soviet citizens and Armed Forces personnel in a spirit of patriotism and proletarian internationalism always has been and still is one of the most important tasks of the CPSU. Its Program states: "The party will tirelessly indoctrinate Soviet citizens in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and will make every effort to assist in strengthening the international solidarity of the toilers. Developing the love of the Soviet people toward its homeland, the party proceeds from the position that with the forming of a world socialist system the patriotism of the citizens of the socialist society is embodied in dedication and loyalty to their homeland and to the entire community of socialist nations. Socialist patriotism and socialist internationalism organically encompass proletarian solidarity with the worker class and the toilers of all nations."

These principles also guide other ruling parties in the Warsaw Pact member nations. For example, Army Gen Heinz Hoffmann, GDR Minister of National Defense, stated the following in the Journal of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party, Einheit: "The deciding principle of our party's policy and its military policy is the state principle of socialist internationalism formalized in the Constitution of the GDR. In conformity with the Leninist thesis of the international character of socialist armed forces, the German People's Army from the very first day of its existence has been built and formed as a component part of the unified armed force of the Warsaw Pact nations."²

Inherent in the armies of the Warsaw Pact nations are common directions, forms and methods of indoctrinational effort, of course with certain peculiarities which are national in nature. Fundamental directions and principles of the effort to form in personnel internationalist views include explanation of the role and significance of internationalism in uniting the brother armies for defense of the nations of the socialist community against potential aggression; indoctrination of personnel in an internationalist spirit during the process of combat and political training; study of the forms and methods of this training, adoption of advanced know-how into practical training and indoctrination; study of the revolutionary past of the allied armies, propaganda of the heroic deeds of internationalist fighting men in the struggle against the exploiters in general and particularly during the civil war years in the USSR and during World War II, vivid demonstration of how the traditions of proletarian internationalism are continuing to grow today.

The forms and methods of internationalist indoctrination of fighting men are varied. This is promoted by the system of commander training, political classes and political information sessions, seminars for executive personnel of party and youth organizations, exchange of know-how on mastering combat equipment and weapons, and combat unity evenings. An important indoctrinational role is played by revolutionary and national holidays, get-togethers with veterans of the revolution, antifascists and internationalist fighting men; excursions to famous revolutionary and war sites and to enterprises; reflection of the achievements of building socialism and communism in verbal, printed and visual propaganda, etc.

The entire organization of internationalist indoctrination of fighting men demands a common effort, a unity of views and mutual coordination. The allied armies have gathered a wealth of experience in this respect. For example, the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the National People's Army of the GDR and the Chief of the Political Directorate of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany drafted a plan for 1971, for internationalist indoctrination of the men of the National People's Army of the GDR and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, which calls for a number of

joint measures in preparation for the 24th CPSU Congress and 25th anniversary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, an exchange of work information and know-how for secretaries of party and youth organizations, cultural and sports events, etc.

Interesting measures are organized by command and political entities of the Bulgarian People's Army jointly with the Soviet Red-Banner Black Sea Fleet and with the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Romania. The Carpathian Military District command takes part in joint measures with commanders and political entities of the Hungarian People's Army. Practical internationalist indoctrination includes get-togethers with veterans of the Great October Socialist Revolution, with Soviet soldier-liberators of the Hungarian people, joint rallies at memorials to Soviet fighting men, excursions to sites of battles fought by the Soviet Army, etc. The heroic traditions connected with the struggle of the toilers for establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and defense of the USSR as well as the heroic deeds of internationalist fighting men are extensively popularized.

In the allied countries and brother armies due attention is focused on strengthening the feeling of respect and love for the USSR and the Soviet Army. For example, in the Bulgarian People's Republic each citizen holds sacred the following statement by Georgiy Dimitrov: "There is not nor can there be any sensible Bulgarian who loves his homeland, who is not convinced that sincere friendship with the Soviet Union is just as essential for the national independence and prosperity of Bulgaria as are the sun and air for every living being."

In the German Democratic Republic young soldiers in the National People's Army swear the following oath: "I swear... to be always prepared, shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army and the armies of our allied socialist nations, to defend socialism against all enemies, giving my life if necessary to achieve victory..."

In all brother nations toilers and fighting men express sincere affection and love for the heroic Soviet people and its valiant Armed Forces, who have defended the conquests of the October Revolution in bitter battles against the shock forces of world imperialism and who have liberated many peoples from the yoke of German fascism and Japanese militarism.

In the USSR and the Soviet Armed Forces in turn the Communist Party constantly develops a deep sense of love and respect for the people of the brother nations on the part of Soviet toilers and fighting men.

Relations of genuine brotherhood and friendship have been established between Soviet soldiers, the civilian population and military personnel

of the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, where Soviet troops are temporarily stationed, in conformity with formal agreements. Our commanders, political officials, party and Komsomol organizations have amassed considerable experience in internationalist indoctrination and in strengthening class and fighting solidarity with the personnel of the armies of the socialist nations.

Such forms of indoctrinational effort are practiced as joint conduct of festive meetings and evening functions with the participation of representatives of the Soviet military and toilers, theoretical conferences and debates, "combat unity weeks," exchange of know-how in combat and political training, joint mass cultural and sports events, etc.

In 1970 alone the men of the Soviet Army and Navy held jointly with the toilers of the GDR and fighting men of the National People's Army approximately 32,000 different events, while more than 85,000 have been held in the last 5 years. These efforts reached a peak during the period of preparation for and celebration of the 50th anniversary of Soviet rule and of the Soviet Armed Forces, the 20th anniversary of the GDR, the Lenin Birth Centennial, and the 25th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. All this has left a deep impression in the consciousness both of Soviet fighting men and of the toilers and fighting men of the GDR.

A major effort toward international consolidation is also being conducted in the Central Group of Forces, stationed in fraternal Czechoslovakia. Here, as is well known, the enemies of socialism made a great effort to split the unity of the socialist nations and to poison the consciousness of the Czechs and Slovaks with the venom of nationalism and anti-Sovietism, but they suffered defeat. Today the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has embarked upon an extensive program to consolidate the country's political and economic affairs. Under these conditions a strengthening of ties of friendship between Soviet fighting men and the toilers and fighting men of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has assumed particular importance.

The commanders and political officials of the Central Group of Forces have drafted specific measures for international indoctrination of fighting men and strengthening of the combat alliance with the personnel of the Czechoslovak People's Army. Better organization of this effort was the subject of a detailed discussion held at seminars of military administrative personnel, secretaries of party and Komsomol committees, Marxist-Leninist training and political instruction group leaders, as well as at party and Komsomol meetings.

All specified measures have been and are being persistently implemented. Propaganda of the ideas of patriotism and internationalism occupies a

prominent place here in the activities of agitation and propaganda teams, lecturer groups, staff propagandists and the press. The newspaper Sovetskiy Soldat, for example, constantly publishes materials on Czechoslovakia's successes in building socialism, on the revolutionary traditions of the toilers of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and their friendship with the Soviet people, as well as on the deeds of Soviet fighting men and partisans during the liberation of Czechoslovakia from Nazi enslavement.

Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship museum-rooms have been established at officers' clubs and internationalist clubs in military units. Fighting alliance evenings are organized, as well as joint reader conferences, theory discussions and excursions for personnel of the Soviet Army and Czechoslovak People's Army to battle sites of the last war. All these events definitely promote a strengthening of friendship between our fighting men and the toilers and fighting men of Czechoslovakia.

The men of the groups of forces, maintaining friendly relations with the brother peoples, showing respect for their revolutionary past, national culture, ways and customs, and cooperating closely with their brothers in arms, are making a significant contribution toward strengthening the fighting alliance of the socialist nations. They are sacredly performing their international duty of defense of the forward lines of socialism.

Joint exercises, wargames and maneuvers are particularly important in practical internationalist indoctrination of the personnel of allied armies. We shall briefly describe several such exercises which constitute a school of internationalist training and indoctrination and a powerful military-political means mobilizing fighting men for the defense of the conquests of socialism.

In 1965, for example, at the time of the 10th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, a large-scale field exercise code-named October Storm was held in the GDR, involving the participation of staffs and large units of the National People's Army of the GDR, the Czechoslovak People's Army, the Polish Army and the Soviet Army. That year it constituted the culmination stage in the training of the troops of the four brother armies and showed an improved level of training and combat readiness.

Another large-scale military exercise was the Vltava exercise, held in Czechoslovakia in 1966. The international solidarity and excellent combat skills of the men of the Hungarian People's Army, the National People's Army of the GDR, the Soviet Armed Forces and the Czechoslovak People's Army were again demonstrated at this exercise.

In the summer of the following year a successful operational exercise was held in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, involving three allied armies and

code-named Maneuver. That same year another large combined exercise, code-named Rhodope, was held in Bulgaria and on the Black Sea. It constituted a new contribution toward strengthening the fighting alliance of the Warsaw Pact armies, achieved thanks to the internationalist indoctrination and training of fighting men under conditions close to actual combat. This exercise, which involved the participation of ground troops and naval forces of Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union, was conducted under the slogan: "Under the banner of the Great October Revolution -- united in peace and war." This was a vivid demonstration of the international unity of the brother peoples and their armies on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

In the fall of 1969 the large combined Oder-Neisse exercise was held in Poland and on the Baltic Sea. It involved ground force, air force and naval units and large units, as well as air defense troops from the armies of the GDR, Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. The exercise demonstrated the increased combat might of our allied armies and their ability in an international formation to offer decisive resistance to any aggressor on the ground, on the sea and in the air.

Since the founding of the Warsaw Pact military organization many other large-scale joint exercises have been conducted by the allied armies. Last year the Brotherhood in Arms exercise was held in the German Democratic Republic and on the Baltic Sea. In its military-political significance, scope and results it was the most significant ever conducted by the Warsaw Pact nations.

Troops and staffs of all seven allied armies and forces from three navies took part in this exercise. This exercise, held during the Lenin Centennial Year, constituted a unique report submitted by the Joint Armed Forces to the Communist and worker parties, governments and peoples of the nations of the socialist community. The allied ground and naval forces successfully passed this examination. Fulfilling the behests of the great Lenin, they graphically demonstrated a high degree of combat readiness, the ability to defend with weapon in hand the sacred ideals and to implement the international brotherhood of peoples.

We should also mention such major maneuvers as the Dnieper (1967), Dvina, and Ocean (1970) games conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces. Large-scale army and navy exercises are conducted by the national commands of the other socialist nations. All promote patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of military personnel and in the final analysis improvement in the defensive strength of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Important in the holding of various types of joint exercises is the fact that during such exercises commanders and political officers, simultaneously

with the accomplishment of operational-tactical missions, accomplish tasks connected with internationalist indoctrination. Training and indoctrination of personnel, including internationalist, is an inseparable, dual process, for combat skill is forged out and polished and stable morale-psychological qualities are formed in military labor (on cruises, training flights and maneuvers in particular) Joint actions by the men of the brother armies are an effective means of bringing subunits, units and large units to a high degree of training, as well as consolidating a sense of collectivism, without which it is inconceivable to perform common missions in modern combat.

During the process of exercises considerable potential is revealed for further strengthening internationalist views and feelings, combat solidarity, firm comradely unity and preparedness for resolute joint actions in case of war. Closer contacts are established among the personnel of the units and warships of the various countries; attitudes of trust and confidence are strengthened, as is the unity of views on the tasks and goals of the effort to secure reliable defense of the conquests of socialism.

Exercises as a rule are accompanied by joint measures ensuring personal contact between military personnel and the local civilian population. For example, during the Brotherhood in Arms exercise Soviet Army personnel took part in 1500 different events conducted jointly with the fighting men of the brother nations and the local population. Particularly memorable were rallies and get-togethers for the purpose of exchanging information and know-how on mastering military occupational specialties, jointly-conducted political instruction classes, entertainment by army singing and dancing groups, amateur talent groups, etc.

On the eve of the exercise a mass rally was held in the city of Kottbus, attended by the people of the city and personnel of the brother armies. Speakers at the rally enthusiastically greeted representatives of the Socialist Unity Party and government of the GDR, representatives of the military delegations of the allied nations, and honored guests. Erich Honecker, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, emphasized in his speech at the rally that the joint exercises being conducted by the seven armies of the Warsaw Pact nations were once again demonstrating the solidarity of the armed forces of the socialist nations and their ability to provide reliable defense of the peace and productive labors of the peoples of the socialist community.

Many friendly get-togethers took place in the area where the exercise was held. A get-together between Socialist Unity Party Central Committee Politburo member Erich Muckenberger and other German comrades and the men of a Soviet Army guards tank unit was transformed into a vivid demonstration

of brotherly friendship between the peoples of the USSR and the GDR. Conveying to the Soviet tankers party greetings on behalf of the toilers of the district and wishing them success in the exercise, Comrade Mückenberger presented the guardsmen with a bust of Karl Marx as a gesture of friendship.

A get-together in one of our camps will long be remembered by the men of the brother armies. The Soviet fighting men greeted their honored guests warmly and cordially. They briefed them on the heroic traditions of their unit, acquainted them with our combat equipment and invited them to the Lenin room for a friendly conversation. The commanding officer of the large unit, Colonel Kolesnikov, passed out souvenirs to our fighting friends. The get-together ended with a concert put on by a Soviet military choral and dancing group.

During the exercise the men of the allied armies learned from each other's experience in combat and political training.

The participants in the Brotherhood in Arms exercise regularly received field issues of a joint newspaper which was published in seven languages. The newspaper discussed the performance of the top commanders and men, reported on get-togethers for the men of the Joint Armed Forces, on the hospitality of the civilian population in the GDR as well as on a rally held by the fighting men of the brother armies, at which those who had distinguished themselves at the exercise were awarded valuable gifts by GDR leaders.

Of great importance for improving the forms of international and patriotic indoctrination was the broad political and mass cultural effort in connection with celebration of the sesquicentennials of the birth of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. This effort promoted the ideological conditioning of the men of the Warsaw Pact armies.

The brother armies of the Warsaw Pact nations are genuinely popular armies. They vigilantly guard the socialist achievements of their peoples and the peoples of the socialist community, are indoctrinated in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, the revolutionary traditions of their parties and peoples, and in a spirit of total loyalty to the Communist cause.

Commanders, political officials and party organizations of the allied armies, constantly concerned with improving and developing the forms and methods of personnel indoctrination and training, innovatively and on a scientific basis accomplish the tasks assigned them by the parties and governments of the Warsaw Pact member nations.

Consistently implementing the principles of internationalism, broadening and perfecting military cooperation, the brother armies have achieved excellent results in improving their fighting efficiency and combat readiness. They do not rest on their laurels, however, following Lenin's behest "to work better today than yesterday, to advance further and attain more," they are persistently continuing to improve their combat readiness, to enhance their revolutionary vigilance, to develop their sense of international responsibility, and to strengthen the fighting alliance in every possible way

Under conditions of accelerating scientific and technological progress, the allied armies view as a most important task the efficient utilization of the latest achievements and discoveries for strengthening the defensive might of the military coalition of the socialist nations, the swift adoption of advanced know-how and the most effective methods of troop training and indoctrination, and improving troop control on the basis of extensive employment of means of automation.

The Warsaw Pact armed forces, tirelessly improving their fighting efficiency and combat readiness, broadening and perfecting military cooperation and coordination, are honorably carrying out their international duty.

* * *

The socialist system is increasingly fully revealing the advantages of its economic and sociopolitical organization. The socialist nations are achieving further development of their economy and culture as well as maximum successful realization of the results of the scientific and technological revolution, becoming even more consolidated and unified. "Life itself advances the demand of a closer economic and political drawing-together of the brother nations."³ The brother parties and governments are protecting their bonds of mutual cooperation and are seeking optimal utilization of the vast potential and resources offered by the socialist system.

The Warsaw Pact military organization is a component part of this cooperation. It possesses sophisticated hardware and trained command cadres who are dedicated to the cause of socialist internationalism and proletarian solidarity. It is our common obligation to continue strengthening the fighting alliance and to remember Lenin's statement about "triple vigilance, caution and tenacity" in the struggle against the imperialist predators, who are capable of any and all acts of provocation.

Lenin taught the toilers to be internationalists in class battles; he raised high the banner of internationalism and appealed for indoctrination of Communists and all toilers in a spirit of international solidarity; he provided answers to the most acute problems posed by life and pointed to the most effective

forms of struggle against imperialism, social and national oppression, for the victory of the socialist revolution and the triumph of communism.

Lenin emphasized that Marxism poses a question not only for explanation of the past but also for fearless prediction of the future and bold practical activity aimed at achieving the stated goal. Having entered the first year of the new five-year plans, the peoples of the nations of the socialist community are full of optimism. They are firmly convinced that the elaborated directives of the new five-year plans will be met and that the economic and defense might of the community will rise to an even higher level. One of the most important conditions ensuring successful development of the socialist nations is their fraternal mutual support and assistance, their unshakable loyalty to socialist internationalism.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pravda, 10 June 1962.
2. Einheit, No 12, 1970, page 527.
3. K 100-letiyu so dnva rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina. Tezisy TsK KPSS (The Vladimir Il'ich Lenin Birth Centennial. Central Committee CPSU Theses), Politizdat, 1970.

THE DEFENSE OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SOCIALISM -- A GENERAL
LAW OF THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM¹

(Military Problems in Theory of Scientific Communism)

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Surely and steadily gaining new ground in the building of communism, our party, the people and its fighting men are constantly concerned to ensure that the great edifice is reliably defended against all intrigues by the aggressive forces of imperialism.

The time which has passed since the 23rd CPSU Congress attests to the excellent results of the work done by the Communist Party in this area as in others.

In the area of military policy the party and state are inalterably guided by the Leninist doctrine of defense of the socialist homeland and the achievements of socialism. The fundamental theoretical content of this doctrine is comprehensive substantiation of the defense of socialism and its achievements as one of the general laws of the socialist revolution, the building of socialism and communism.

The Objective Necessity of Societal Development

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels are credited with scientific formulation and initial elaboration of the problem of defense of the new, Communist society. They organically included this problem in theory of the class struggle of the proletariat and its seizure of political power. Credit for development of an integral, well-balanced system of knowledge on the defense of socialism goes to V. I. Lenin and the Bolshevik party he established.

Marx and Engels explained the necessity for the proletariat to guard its conquests by the action of objective laws, and particularly by the law of employment of violence in the class struggle.

Synthesizing the experience of history, Marx established the following: violence is the midwife of every old society when it carries the new within its womb, that instrument by means of which a social movement blazes its trail and smashes hardened political forms. The founders of scientific communism viewed violence as a derivative of economic relations, as a means of achieving specific economic and political goals, and as an aggregate of employment of diversified forms of compulsion, including armed, military measures. They taught that military action by the proletariat against the class enemies is essential under certain conditions and not obligatory under others. "...When there is no reactionary violence against which

one must struggle," noted Friedrich Engels, "there can be no talk of any revolutionary violence..." (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch. [Works], Volume 33, page 419).

Long before the Paris Commune Marx and Engels pointed out that the armed terror of domestic and external counterrevolution will inevitably and logically compel the proletariat to defend its dictatorship, employing military means. The experience of the Paris Communards confirmed the correctness of this scientific prediction.

The history of the class antagonistic society demonstrates that the revolution and the new system engendered by it must defend themselves against hostile forces. This is one of the general laws governing historical development. Its classic formulation was provided by Lenin. Analyzing the experience of the past and the initial practical experience of the Great October Revolution, he came to the conclusion: "A revolution is worth something only if it knows how to defend itself, but it takes time for a revolution to learn to defend itself" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 37, pp 122-123).

This formula, consisting of two parts as it were, is of key significance for examining the defense of socialism and its conquests as a natural law, for it aims both at an approach to the problem as a whole and in the general direction of its study and elaboration.

In the first place Lenin's thesis accentuates the idea of the logical nature of self-defense of the revolution, that this process is precisely a general sociological law (inherent in every revolution).

Secondly, it stresses the exceptional importance of this law for the genesis and development of the revolution and the new system (only then will it be of value).

Thirdly, Lenin notes the most important condition for success of the revolution (if it is able, that is if it possesses a real capability of organizing and securing its defense).

Fourth and finally, Lenin focuses special attention on the complexities, difficulties and contradictions inherent in the tasks facing the revolution in the area of self-protection (it is not immediately learned).

Thus both the objective aspect of the phenomenon -- the necessity and difficulty of defense of the new system, and the subjective aspect -- the ability to defend itself, surmounting obstacles, are "captured" in concise form by Lenin's formula. Lenin's idea serves as a methodological foundation for elucidating the essential elements of the mechanism of effect of

this law and guides its investigation along the path of revelation of contradictions in the matter of defense and ways of resolving them.

Developing the Marxian view on employment by the proletariat of armed means of struggle as an objectively necessary response measure, Lenin emphasized that the problem of the defense of the revolution is even more critical in a situation where the prospect of its victory in a single, separate country is revealed. The victory of socialism initially in one or several countries and preservation of bourgeois or prebourgeois systems in all the others is a circumstance, he stated prior to the October Revolution, "which should produce not only friction but a direct endeavor by the bourgeoisie of the other nations to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist state" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 30, page 133). He also warned that internal counterrevolutionaries will not fail to attempt to overthrow the new regime by force of arms.

History has confirmed Lenin's prediction. Immediately following the victorious conclusion of the Great October Socialist Revolution, international imperialism organized an armed attack on the Soviet Republic. Military intervention by the imperialists of Germany, England, France, the United States, Japan and other capitalist nations merged with the campaigns of the White Guardist armies -- the armies of the internal Russian counterrevolution, which was operating in concert with the external counterrevolution. Armed defense of the worker-peasant state, the necessity of which was stated by Lenin, became a practical task of the day.

The terms "defense of the homeland" and "patriotic war" assumed new meaning with the birth of history's first toiler state.

Soon after the victory of the socialist revolution in this country Lenin explained that as of 25 October 1917 the Bolsheviks were for defense of the homeland, because from that day a split from imperialism had been demonstrated by deed in Russia (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 35, page 395). Describing the post-October position of the Bolsheviks in relation to defense of the homeland and patriotic war, Lenin again and again emphasized both the national and international aspects of this question: "We have been advocates of defense since 25 October 1917. We are for 'defense of the homeland,' but that patriotic war toward which we stride is a war for the socialist homeland, for socialism as the homeland, for the Soviet Republic as a detachment of the worldwide army of socialism" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 36, page 82).

Lenin and his followers elaborated and carried out consistent, rigorously scientific strategy and tactics connected with solving the historic problems of war, peace, the proletarian revolution and its defense, in an implacable struggle against bourgeois and reformist ideology and politics,

various kinds of rightist and "leftist" opportunists. Taking shelter under resounding phrases about "revolutionary journey," "resolute class international policy," "international revolutionary propaganda by word and deed," and "strengthening of the organic link with international socialism," the so-called "leftist Communists," for example, were attempting to force upon the just-born Soviet Republic a fatal course toward "revolutionary war." In actual fact, as Lenin stated, the "leftists" were helping the imperialists provoke the Russian Soviet Republic into patently disadvantageous combat and were helping the imperialists draw it into the trap (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 36, page 289). They also "substantiated" their adventurist course with a thesis on the inadmissibility of "defensism" and defense of the homeland, not wishing to see the fact that with the victory of the October Revolution the slogan of defense of the homeland, which was old in form, had acquired qualitatively new content. Sharply criticizing and exposing the "leftists" as windbags and spineless preachers of dangerous petit-bourgeois waverings, Vladimir Il'ich stated that to acknowledge defense of the homeland means to acknowledge the legitimacy and justice of war only from the viewpoint of the socialist proletariat and its struggle for its liberation, that precisely in the interest of "strengthening the bond" with international socialism it is mandatory to defend the socialist homeland. He who would pay little heed to the defense of a nation in which the proletariat has gained victory destroys the bond with international socialism. A serious attitude toward national defense is demanded of all. This means "to prepare thoroughly and rigorously to consider the balance of power" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 36, page 292).

Following the strategic and tactical line elaborated by Lenin, our Communist Party rejected the defeatist attitudes of the "leftist Communists" and Trotskyites, who denied the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country and claimed that preservation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the other conquests of the October Revolution is possible only under the condition of victory of the world socialist revolution, which should allegedly be encouraged and accelerated by means of a war with world imperialism.

Comprehensively developing the theory of armed defense of the socialist homeland during the years of foreign military intervention, civil war and thereafter, Lenin again and again turned the attention of party and people to the necessity of reliable self-defense of the proletarian revolution. For example, he stated at the 8th Party Congress (March 1919) that we could not exist without armed defense of the socialist republic.

Proceeding from the objective necessity of defense of the socialist homeland, Lenin defined the first commandment of Communist Party and Soviet

state policy -- be on guard, carefully preserve the nation's defense capability and the army's combat readiness.

Lenin's theses and conclusions on the necessity of defense of the socialist homeland, confirmed by all recent history and fully retaining its significance, have found further development in the program documents of the CPSU and the world Communist movement. At the present stage this is expressed first and foremost in a scientific analysis of the current balance of forces in the world arena, precise determination of the degree and character of the threat of war emanating from imperialism. As was noted at the 23rd CPSU Congress, the world balance of power is continuing to shift in favor of socialism, the labor and national liberation movement. The aggressive nature of imperialism, however, has remained unchanged. There is evidence of intensification of imperialist aggression and activation of reactionary forces. Intensification of the general crisis of capitalism and aggravation of its contradictions increase the adventurism of imperialism and its threat to peoples, to peace and social progress. Imperialism is attempting with increasing frequency to seek a way out through military provocations, various conspiracies and direct military interventions.²

Today the correctness of Lenin's determination of the deep-lying sources of aggression and unjust wars under conditions of the existence of capitalism in its imperialist stage is being confirmed time and again. The politics of imperialism, proceeding from its very nature, its economic essence, its fundamental traits as revealed by Lenin -- constitute a source of wars, acts of aggression and violence, encroachments on the freedom of nations. Imperialism is the guilty party in two world wars, for which mankind paid a price of 70 million lives. Imperialism has created an unprecedented war machine which devours colossal manpower and material resources. Imperialism is escalating the arms race and is threatening a thermonuclear world war, in which hundreds of millions of lives can be snuffed out and entire countries devastated.

The imperialists are persistently endeavoring to extricate themselves from their internal contradictions primarily at the expense of the socialist nations as well as the countries of the former colonial system of imperialism. Under conditions of a deepening general crisis of capitalism there is occurring a definite shift of the center of gravity of imperialist strategy in the world arena. The policies of imperialism are being determined to an ever-increasing degree by the class goals of common struggle against world socialism, national liberation revolutions and the labor movement.

As facts indicate, American imperialism is the main economic, political and military center of world reaction. It is the major military arsenal of world imperialism. The United States is the ringleader in the

imperialist military blocs, the actions of which aggravate international tension. U.S. imperialism initiated a criminal war against the Vietnamese people and is escalating its aggression in Indochina. The U.S. imperialists have committed numerous acts of aggression in Latin America, particularly against revolutionary Cuba. The United States encouraged the attack by the Israeli military on the Arab nations and supports the continuing Israeli aggression in the Near East; the United States gives total support to imperialism in the FRG and its aggressive revanchist aspirations.

A strengthening of the position of the USSR and the socialist community of nations is generating in the imperialist camp new surges of blind hatred, which is capable of impelling the "hawks" to undertake extremely rash actions.

These are the circumstances which intensify the present threat of imperialist military aggression against the USSR and the socialist nations as well as the danger of another world war. From this proceeds the vitally important necessity of further all-out strengthening of the defense capability of the Soviet Union and all the nations of the socialist commonwealth.

Bearing this pattern in mind, the 23rd CPSU Congress emphasized: "Under conditions whereby the aggressive forces of imperialism are heightening international tension and creating local wars, the CPSU will continue to increase the vigilance of the Soviet people and to strengthen the defense might of our homeland, so that the Soviet Armed Forces will be always prepared reliably to defend the achievements of socialism and to offer a devastating response to any imperialist aggressor."³

Basic Features of Defense of the Conquests of Socialism

Viewing defense of the revolution as a general sociological law, Marxism-Leninism at the same time has revealed the specific features of its manifestation under various concrete historical conditions, and particularly under conditions of dictatorship of the proletariat. A Leninist analysis of the specific features of defense of the socialist revolution and the socialist homeland is of fundamental significance for the strategy and tactics of Communist and worker parties. Investigation of the features of the defense of socialism involves such key questions as its essence, content, forms, and conditions of securement, that is, what is common to every socialist nation -- with all possible national shadings and particularities. At the same time these features reveal the deep-lying sources of the defensive strength of the socialist state.

Lenin stated that it is possible scientifically to analyze large-scale social processes and to elaborate a correct course only when the unique nature of a given era has been clarified, primarily from the standpoint of what class occupies the center of this era, defining its main content and main direction of development (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 26, page 142). The following most general specific traits (features) of this law or pattern are noted in light of these Leninist theses.

In the first place it is engendered by the era, which is characterized by a transition from an antagonistic to a nonantagonistic society, that is, by a social revolution of a qualitatively new type. The essence of defense of the latter also becomes radically different, and this is understandable. The need of protection, which is inherent in the natural world, and a specific policy with its "objective logic" (see V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 14, page 190) and subjective aspect are expressed primarily in that law that every revolution defends itself. This does not mean, however, that the essence of the phenomenon we are discussing is inalterable. Materialist dialectics demands that one see beneath externally similar phenomena their true essence and that one take into consideration the variability of this substance proper (see Lenin, Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 29, page 227). The fundamental question of revolution and the main content of policy is the question of power: its achievement, retention, consolidation and utilization. The socialist revolution and socialist system, resolving this problem in a totally different manner, engender a qualitatively new content of internal and external policy and change the essence and content of defense of revolutionary conquests. Defense of the socialist homeland consequently is engendered by a qualitatively new historical necessity of development of society and signifies a policy of higher, proletarian revolutionary nature.

This qualitatively new essence finds expression in specific content: defense of the socialist revolution and its conquests constitutes one of the most important factors in securing a transition of peoples to socialism and communism under conditions whereby international imperialism and domestic reaction (the latter in the stage of transition to socialism) do everything in their power to impede this historical process. Since imperialism and reaction endeavor to hinder the objective movement of history primarily by threat of employment of armed violence and employment of force, military countermeasures are of primary importance in the defense of socialism. The military aspect of defense of socialist gains is underscored by the Leninist concept of "armed defense."

It is quite obvious that the specific content of defense of the socialist and nonsocialist revolution is quite different. In spite of the historical progressiveness, for example, of the bourgeois revolution, its defense signified in the final analysis defense of an exploiter system. In

contrast to this, defense of the socialist revolution and its conquests embodies a sharply-expressed antiexploiter, namely antiimperialist orientation and is effected on behalf of the class interests of the toilers and of the toilers proper. Here lies rooted one of the most important objective sources of the high degree of defense capability of the socialist homeland and the socialist system. As regards a national-democratic revolution, its capability of self-defense increases as the country moves along a noacapist path and in connection with active support on the part of the socialist nations.

A multilevel phenomenon, defense of the socialist homeland involves many aspects of the nation's affairs and possesses diversified forms. The most common of these are two forms which correspond to two basic states of society. The peacetime state is comprehensive preparation of the nation and its army for an immediate and devastating repulsion of a hostile attack and resolute measures to frustrate attempts by imperialism and other reactionary forces, by military or other means, to attack the positions of socialism, to infringe upon the vital interests of the socialist system and to export counterrevolution. In the case of aggression defense of the socialist homeland assumes the form of direct armed conflict with the enemy, the form of a national war effort, in the course of which there occurs unification of efforts on the battle front and home front, mobilization of all the military, economic, political and spiritual resources of the nation (and the coalition of socialist nations) for the sake of total defeat of the aggressor.

In the second place, defense of the socialist homeland expresses the struggle of the most revolutionary class, headed by the most revolutionary party.

The worker class, whose duty is to put an end to all types and forms of oppression and possessing the highest degree of revolutionary consciousness and organization, under the guidance of the Marxist-Leninist party unites and leads the toiler masses in the struggle for the new system and its consolidation. The experience of the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations attests to the fact that it is precisely the worker class which constitutes the guiding force in building socialism, communism, and defense of revolutionary gains, that this constitutes an inexhaustible source of strength for the system which replaces capitalism.

The international worker class and its principal offspring, the world socialist system, stand at the center of the contemporary era, which predetermines further acceleration of historical progress and reliable defense of the revolutionary conquests of peoples.

Thirdly, defense of the socialist homeland and of the conquests of socialism is profoundly international in character. This feature, as is correctly emphasized in our literature, proceeds primarily from the international conditions of liberation of the worker class and other exploited and oppressed, as was stated by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and V. I. Lenin. The world's toilers and oppressed have a common class enemy -- imperialism and reaction. Every step taken toward strengthening the economic and defensive might of socialism assumes special international significance and wins the support of all revolutionary forces of the present day, for it corresponds to the vital interests of the toilers.

True to the behests of Lenin, the CPSU is firmly pursuing the principle of proletarian internationalism and is proceeding from the indivisibility of the international and national tasks of the socialist nations. This organic indivisibility and the fraternal international solidarity of toilers are graphically confirmed by half a century of experience acquired by the world socialist revolution.

The Soviet people and its Red Army, under the guidance of the Communist Party, headed by Lenin, defended the young Soviet Republic, and this constituted fulfillment of both patriotic and international duty. The defeat of the unified forces of world imperialism and the total defeat of internal counterrevolutionary elements was of enormous importance not only for the destiny of our nation but also for the liberation struggle of the toilers of the entire world: the worker-peasant state -- seat and bulwark of the world proletarian revolution -- had stood firm and gained victory.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was of world historic significance. Favorable conditions were created for the development and victory of socialist revolutions in the nations of Europe and Asia, and the forming of a world socialist system. The national liberation struggle of peoples grew in scale. The international forces of socialism and democracy became stronger, while the position of imperialism and reaction weakened.

The idea of proletarian internationalism found new and vivid embodiment in economic, political and defense cooperation among the sovereign socialist nations, based on the Warsaw Pact and bilateral treaties.

The international character of the defense of socialism, the strength, effectiveness and significance of cooperation and mutual assistance among the socialist nations in the area of the military are manifested first and foremost in vigorously exposing and impeding the plans and actions of the imperialist military clique and armed counterrevolutionary elements, aimed directly against the world socialist system. Unified efforts by the socialist nations, and particularly active countermeasures taken by the

Soviet Union, have frustrated imperialist attempts to destroy the popular democratic government in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, have prevented the restoration of capitalism in Hungary, have prevented effective action from being taken against revolutionary Cuba, and have nipped in the bud the "silent counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia.

In the armed struggle against socialism following World War II, world imperialism was counting most heavily on the U.S. intervention against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the entire Vietnamese people. The fact that a most powerful nation possessing vast military potential is today no closer but rather further from its stated war aims is primarily a result of the fact that the heroic Vietnamese people is being given powerful support by the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations in repelling the armed antisocialist and colonialist campaign mounted by imperialism.

Focusing particular attention on the international character of the task of protecting socialist conquests, the International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties (1969) pointed out that the defense of socialism is an international duty of Communists.

The brother Communist parties note the dedication of the CPSU to its international duty and the contribution of the Soviet people toward development of the world revolutionary process and toward strengthening the cause of peace and security of the peoples of this planet. Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party, said the following at the 1969 Communist forum: "We frequently stress that all parties in the international Communist movement and all nations of the world socialist system enjoy equal rights. This is indeed true, and it is a good thing. Recently, however, little has been said about the fact that although we enjoy equal rights, our responsibility and burdens are not equal. Even if one considers all proportions, we must state quite frankly that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, who enjoy equal rights with us and lay no claim to more, bear on their shoulders incalculably greater responsibility than any of us. Acting in a spirit of internationalism, unselfishly, they have made and are making greater sacrifices than anybody else in the interests of the cause of communism, freedom of peoples, prevention of another world war, and in the name of a happy future for mankind. A correct, high-principled attitude toward the Soviet Union constitutes the most important matter pertaining to our unity, internationalism, and consolidation of all anti-imperialist forces."⁴

The above-mentioned features of defense of the socialist homeland offer sufficient basis to stress a fourth specific feature of this pattern. This feature is a steady increase in the effectiveness of the action of this law.

Exerting an influence here are a comprehensive strengthening of socialism proper, an increase in the degree of its maturity as a world system, improvement of the material means of its defense, the growing enthusiasm of its builders and defenders, the dynamics of the world balance of power, and the correct policies of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

It is characteristic that while during the early years of Soviet rule the question was as follows, to use Lenin's words: it is merely a question of holding up under the onslaught of our armed enemies, to defend this socialist oasis, while today the question is quite different. Socialism is engaged in a historic offensive; the strength of its defense is guaranteed by the unified power of the socialist states; an all-out armed campaign against them would signify for imperialism an inevitable total defeat.

Today the Leninist concept of defense of the socialist homeland has acquired new content. With the advance of socialism beyond the bounds of a single country this concept has naturally extended to each and every socialist nation and has become enriched with the concept of defense of socialist homelands and the socialist community. At the same time development of the world revolutionary process has also made more substantial another concept introduced by Lenin following the October Revolution -- the concept of defense of the conquests of socialism (for a discussion on defense of the conquests of the socialist revolution and socialist gains see V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 37, pp 9, 24; Volume 44, page 300). The conquests of socialism constitute the total and final victory of the socialist system in the USSR as well as the political, economic and cultural achievements of the other nations of the world socialist system; to a certain degree it also constitutes the victories of the international labor movement and new conditions for class battles fought by the proletariat, which have become possible in large measure due to the existence and consolidation of a world socialist system; they also include the victories of the national liberation movement, again possible to an enormous degree due to the fact that there exists in the world such a powerful antiimperialist force as the USSR and the socialist community. The conquests of socialism also find expression in its substantial contribution toward the change in the world balance of power and the securing of new possible solutions to the most vital problem of the present day -- the problem of war and peace as well as other problems pertaining to the revolutionary transformation of society. The necessity to protect and defend all these achievements (directly and indirectly, by military and nonmilitary means) is expressed in the program documents of the Communist and worker parties by the term defense of the conquests of socialism.

Decisive Factor -- Party Guidance

A most important feature of defense of the socialist homeland and a decisive condition for securing reliable defense of the entire socialist community is a correct policy on the part of the ruling Marxist-Leninist parties.

It is precisely the Communist Party, due to its objective status within the system of political organization of the socialist society and its inherent inner qualities as the highest form of organization of the toilers, which is called upon to direct the building of socialism, communism, and consequently the defense activities of the nation and society. Stressing the organic link between creation and defense of the new system, the organizing and guiding role of the party in the area of the military, Lenin stated: "The experiment the Soviet government has performed in the area of military organizational development cannot be viewed as an isolated experiment. War encompasses all types of all areas of organizational development. The organizational development of our army was able to lead to successful results only because it was carried out in a spirit of overall Soviet organizational development, on the basis of the class relations which exert an influence in the area of any organizational development" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 40, pp 76-77). The essence of these relations, Lenin stated further, lies in the leadership of the proletariat, headed by its fighting vanguard, the Communist Party.

In 1919 the party Central Committee, on Lenin's initiative, passed a decree entitled "On War Ministry Policy." It stated that "the policies of the War Ministry, as those of all other ministries and establishments, shall be precisely based on the general directives issued by the party, in the person of its Central Committee and under its direct supervision."⁵

Securing a unity of general governmental and military organizational development, improvement of the army, the CPSU and the other parties of the socialist nations unswervingly proceed from the decisive significance of guidance by the Marxist-Leninist party and the activities of its organizations. For example, our Party Program states: "The foundation of military organizational development is Communist Party guidance of the Armed Forces, a strengthening of the role and influence of party organizations in the army and navy."⁶

The history of the Soviet Union graphically attests to the effectiveness of correct guidance of military affairs by the Marxist-Leninist party. Our people, under party guidance, was compelled to carry out the most difficult task -- to build a road to socialism and to be the first to establish its defense, under conditions of capitalist encirclement. This task was accomplished -- CPSU and Soviet government policy emerged triumphant.

During the years of foreign military intervention and civil war the party, headed by our great leader and military commander Lenin, acted as a dedicated defender of worker and peasant gains, and as organizer of a patriotic war against interventionists and White Guardists. Revolutionary Russia had withstood a difficult and most critical test.

During the period of the first five-year plans the nation's defense potential was enhanced, under party guidance. Defense industry potential increased, as did the size of the armed forces; armed forces weapons and equipment were becoming more sophisticated. Both army and navy were fully converted to a professional-cadre basis. In spite of all difficulties of both an objective and subjective character, the most important thing had been accomplished for repelling an aggressor. This was demonstrated by the outcome of the Great Patriotic War.

From the very outset of the war the CPSU performed as a militant, fighting party. In an emergency situation the party and Soviet people exerted enormous, truly heroic efforts in order to strengthen our army, to regear the economy to a war footing, and to transform the country into a unified military camp. A State Defense Committee, headed by the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee, Joseph Stalin, was established for the purpose of directing all efforts involved in organizing resistance to the enemy. Overcoming unbelievable difficulties, the party led the people and army to a great victory.

Following the war the CPSU and Soviet government, the entire people and army, aware of the threat of a new "crusade," have promptly and with a high degree of effectiveness accomplished vital defense tasks. Thanks to party efforts the U.S. nuclear arms monopoly was broken. Socialism acquired a powerful nuclear missile shield.

Marxist-Leninist party activities in the area of the military, as is indicated by the experience of history, achieve the stated objectives thanks to scientific determination and implementation of military policy. On the basis of innovative application of the theory and method of Marxism-Leninism, the theses and conclusions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and army, and military economics as a science and doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland, ruling Marxist-Leninist parties elaborate a military program and doctrine, develop socialist military science, and define the principles of military organizational development and the conduct of wars in defense of the socialist homeland and the achievements of socialism.

The military program formulates the most important goals of the defense activities of the Marxist-Leninist party, the socialist state and society and indicates the means of achieving these goals. The military program of

the proletarian revolution, elaborated by V. I. Lenin, has found further development in the USSR in the corresponding points of the CPSU Program and other party as well as government documents pertaining to problems of the defense of socialism, ensuring a firm peace and the security of peoples, prevention of another world war and elimination of war from the experience of society.

The military doctrine of the socialist state contains officially-adopted views on the character of a potential war, preparation of the country and army to repel military aggression, and securement of the enemy's defeat. Soviet military doctrine is a doctrine of armed defense of the Soviet socialist homeland and the conquests of socialism. Leninist ideas of total dedication to the homeland and party, constant preparedness and ability to defend the new system with weapon in hand -- these highly humanistic ideals permeate all aspects of Soviet military doctrine.

Soviet military science, constituting a system of developing military knowledge, studies from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism the laws and patterns of such a complex societal phenomenon as war and elaborates the principles of the state's defense activities in peacetime and in time of war. The CPSU, bearing in mind Lenin's instructions that it is impossible to build a modern army without science, has created all the requisite conditions for comprehensive development of Soviet military thought and successful mastery of military scientific knowledge by our cadres and the broad toiler masses.

Lenin and our party have scientifically substantiated the principles of building armed forces of a new type. These include building a military organization in the spirit of overall Soviet organizational development; its functioning on a basis of unity of army and people; party direction of all armed forces routine and combat activities; army organizational development on the basis of equality and friendship of the peoples of this nation and proletarian internationalism; the class character of army organizational development; its organization as a strictly-disciplined regular cadre army; centralism as the most expedient form of troop command and control; one-man command as the most important principle of Soviet Armed Forces organizational development; continuous and purposeful party political effort with personnel.

On the basis of revolutionary theory and practice Lenin and the party elaborated the major initial rules for directing war in defense of the socialist homeland. These rules, tested and proven in the crucible of civil war and the Great Patriotic War, consist in the following: a unity of political and military leadership with the predominant role of political leadership; monolithic unification of the guiding force of society -- the Communist Party and the entire people, development of conscious, productive

activity of the toiler masses with the aim of achieving victory in war; conformity between war aims and plans on the one hand and the realistic potential of the state; strict accounting of the correlation of forces -- friendly and hostile; principle of determining the basic constituent.⁷

Organizing and guiding defense effort, Marxist-Leninist parties proceed from the objectively existing close interaction of all the main, general laws governing the socialist revolution, the building of socialism and communism, from the fact that in order to ensure reliable defense of the socialist homeland it is necessary first and foremost to strengthen the economic, sociopolitical and spiritual foundations of society, the social and political system of socialism, to make maximum use of its decisive advantages, to bear in mind that party policy in the area of the military embraces a broad range of items, a substantial complex of interlinked problems. The most important include: securement of the material-technological base for national defense, war production, equipping of army and navy with modern weapons and materiel; determination of the main trends of armed forces development, training of military cadres, elaboration and implementation of the principles of indoctrination and training of personnel; preparation of the entire population for participation in defense of the homeland, military-patriotic indoctrination of people and army; conduct of measures to defend the conquests of socialism jointly with the brother nations.

In guiding military organizational development the Marxist-Leninist parties take into consideration the effect of an objective law -- the increased role of the party in directing and guiding the building of socialism and communism. In the area of the military this increase is dictated by a number of causes.

Never before has the danger of imperialist military attack threatened such serious consequences as today, in the age of nuclear missile weapons. Naturally under these conditions each ruling party and its organizations bear heightened responsibility for the fate of the socialist homeland and for ensuring its security. The significance of the organizing, directing and guiding activities of the CPSU and the brother Communist parties in the area of the military is increasing, since today the imperialist aggressors are faced not only by the USSR and its Armed Forces but also by the other socialist nations and their armies; consequently there is occurring an enlargement in the volume and comprehensiveness of efforts of joint defense of the interests of the socialist system and consolidation of the defensive alliance of the Warsaw Pact member nations, as well as in lending the requisite military support to the young, progressive nationally independent nations and assistance to peoples who have been subjected to aggression and who are battling imperialism for their national and political liberation as well as for social progress.

Armed defense of the achievements of socialism has become even more comprehensive, more complex. This inevitably enhances the role of leadership of the party, which is comprehensively organizing armed resistance to the aggressor.

Enhancement of the party's leadership role and the influence of party organizations in the army and navy is also dictated by the fact that the Armed Forces of the USSR and the other socialist nations have undergone profound qualitative changes and have been assigned considerably more complex missions.

Carrying out its leadership role and strengthening the influence of party organizations in the army and navy, the CPSU in recent years has made a number of decisions pertaining to specific areas of military organizational development, training and indoctrination of military cadres and improvement of party political work in the troops. As a result genuinely revolutionary changes have occurred in our Armed Forces. Their strength and combat readiness have grown immeasurably.

* * *

Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist homeland and the achievements of socialism have become a powerful material force. Supported by its steadily growing economic and defensive might, the world socialist system is containing imperialism and restricting its capability to export counterrevolution. Carrying out its international duty, the world socialist system is lending increasing aid to peoples which are struggling for their freedom and independence, is strengthening peace and international security. As long as the aggressive NATO bloc exists, the Warsaw Pact Organization will play an important role in ensuring the security of the socialist nations against military attack by the imperialist powers and in securing the peace.

The strength of the defense of socialism is rooted in the fact that it constitutes a qualitatively new pattern engendered by a new historical era and developing under conditions of the vital activities of a qualitatively new society, which possesses incalculably great potential for a victorious struggle against the forces and traditions of the old world. Armed defense of the conquests of socialism is a necessity which is perceived by the toiler masses. It is carefully taken into consideration by the ruling Marxist-Leninist party, whose correct policy and scientific guidance constitutes a decisive factor in transforming the potential of successfully building and reliably defending socialism into reality.

The CPSU has proceeded and does proceed from the position that matters of all-out strengthening of defense and consideration of defense as a primary task constitute one of the most important conclusions of modern history.

The brother Communist parties are surmounting difficulties in achieving continued success in defending the gains of socialism thanks to loyalty to the ideas and principles of Leninism. The Marxist-Leninist parties are stepping up the offensive struggle on the ideological front. They have proceeded and are proceeding from the necessity of resolutely exposing the ideology and policies of imperialist militarism and at the same time comprehensively revealing the bankruptcy and danger of petit-bourgeois nationalism, hegemonism and adventurism.

Lenin's precept pertaining to maintaining a high degree of vigilance in respect to the intrigues of imperialist aggressors and reactionaries, on increasing the combat readiness of nation and army is being faithfully observed by our party, by the entire Soviet people and its valiant Armed Forces. The 24th CPSU Congress will ratify the Directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan and will open up new prospects for strengthening our homeland's might.

FOOTNOTES

1. From the editors. This journal began publication of a series of materials on this topic with an article by Ye. Sulimov entitled "Military Problems in Theory of Scientific Communism," published in this year's January issue of Voyennaya Mysl'. This present article is devoted to the central problem -- defense of socialism and its achievements. The author discusses several aspects of the Leninist approach to this problem and stresses the decisive role of the ruling Marxist-Leninist party in organizing a strong national defense.
2. Materialy XXIII s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 23rd CPSU Congress), Politizdat, 1966, page 186.
3. Ibid., page 183.
4. Mezhdunarodnoye Soveshchaniye kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy. Dokumenty i materialy (International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties. Documents and Proceedings), Politizdat, 1970, page 152.
5. KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty. 1917-1968 (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents, 1917-1968), Voenizdat, 1969, page 35.
6. Materialy XXII s"yezda KPSS (Proceedings of the 22nd CPSU Congress), Gospolitizdat, 1962, page 405.
7. See Marksizm-Leninizm o voyne i armii (Marxism-Leninism on War and Army), Voenizdat, 1968; Voyennaya Mysl', No 3, 1970.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SEAS AND OCEANS IN COMBAT ACTIONS

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Throughout the history of mankind the role and significance of the seas and oceans as theaters of military operations have constantly changed. For example, during the period of sail-powered navies and at a certain stage in the development of steam-powered fleets, combat operations were conducted on the seas and oceans which comprised either the core of armed combat or its most important part. One can easily see this if one analyzes only a few of the wars during the last 350-400 years. In 1588, in the war between Spain, which was a major power at the time, and England, the English Fleet won a victory which proved to be the major cause of Spain's loss of its former might. Almost the same thing happened to Holland, which in the 17th century possessed a powerful navy which made it one of the great powers: after several lost naval engagements, during the course of the so-called Anglo-Dutch wars, Holland was compelled to admit its defeat and, just as Spain had done, to take the rank of a second-rate power.

Thanks to a powerful navy, France in the 17th century became an enormous colonial power: it occupied Canada, took vast territories in the Mississippi River Basin, a part of India and vast regions in Africa.

During the Seven Years War, which began in 1756 and which was designated as an imperialist war by V. I. Lenin (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 22, page 296), England, destroying France's naval forces in a number of engagements, succeeded in gaining supremacy on the high seas and seizing France's major overseas possessions -- North America and India.

Thus as a result of the largest-scale military events on the seas in the history of sail-powered navies, England (gradually gaining supremacy on the seas) took a leading position among the capitalist nations. Subsequently, following a number of victories over Napoleon's Navy, England consolidated its position as the number one naval power. Defeat of Napoleon's army by Russian troops eliminated the French threat to England, which greatly assisted England in elevating itself as a supreme naval power.

The role of naval warfare was also enormous in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the outcome of which was in fact decided as a result of the defeat of the Spanish Navy in the Caribbean and the Philippines: the Americans achieved supremacy on the high seas, isolating the enemy's overseas possessions and then easily seizing them.

Naval operations also had a great effect on the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. In his article "The Fall of Port Arthur" Lenin wrote: "The military blow was irreparable. The question of domination of the seas had been settled -- the major, root matter in question in this war" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 9, page 153).

In the two world wars naval actions assumed a new vastness of scale and were waged in practically all parts of the world ocean.¹ It is true that they played a smaller part than in past wars, since the principal events which determined the course and outcome of the war took place in the land theaters, and particularly on the Soviet-German Front, which was the major front in World War II.

Since the war the role and importance of the seas and oceans have become much greater. On the one hand this is due to the attained level of scientific and technological advances and the growth in productive resources, which have resulted in unprecedented potential and capability of penetration into the secrets of the world ocean and discovery of immense sources of natural wealth and inexhaustible reserves of food, energy and raw material resources. It is also connected with the new postwar world balance of power.

In order to judge the wealth contained in the world ocean, suffice it to cite the following statistics: more than 40 chemical elements have been discovered to date in seawater. More than 10 million tons of gold, approximately 4 billion tons of uranium, and 270 billion tons of heavy water lie hidden in the sea's waters. If these riches were to be gathered and evenly spread over the surface of the landmasses, they would form a layer more than 200 meters thick."²

More than 16 percent of the world's oil production is pumped from the sea and ocean floor. More than 400 oil and gas fields have been discovered to date within the bounds of the continental shelf.³ Minerals are being mined from the sea bed in Japan, England, Canada, Chile, and off the island of Newfoundland.

The ocean is rich in food resources: according to Academy of Sciences USSR figures, approximately 75 percent of the 40 billion rubles income obtained by mankind from the world ocean are generated by commercial fishing and the hunting of marine mammals.

It is not surprising that civilization arose on the shores of the seas and oceans. Transformation of many states into "great powers" was also connected with the potential of ocean utilization. Such great powers at various periods in history have been Spain, Portugal, Holland, Turkey, France, England, the United States -- all of them are maritime

nations. The USSR is a great maritime power: no other country in the world has such a long shoreline as the Soviet Union.

Today the problem of exploiting the resources of the world ocean has become a subject of discussion by international organizations." The need for international regulation of the process of exploiting the ocean floor is dictated not so much by the endeavor to coordinate measures and to elaborate rational forms of applying efforts in this area as by the endeavor to restrict the appetites of the imperialist states, and the United States in particular, in the seizure of "subsurface ocean territories" located beyond territorial waters, for utilization for military purposes. The following facts indicate the dimensions of these appetites. The U.S. Congress has on several occasions raised the question of the Americans moving eastward "without delay" with the objective in the next decade of seizing the ocean floor from the U.S. coast to the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, of seizing separate seamounts and shallow-water areas located hundreds of kilometers from the American coast. In addition, prominent American government leaders are "personally" implanting American flags on the ocean floor, with this act symbolizing the seizure of specific undersea territories, claiming them as U.S. territory.⁵ There have been some statements to the effect that it is high time to add another state to the union, this time an "undersea state."

The scale of effort being undertaken to exploit ocean resources is indicated by figures cited in the U.S. journal Foreign Affairs: in 1956 U.S. expenditures for oceanographic research totaled 25 million dollars, 448 million in 1968, and more than 900 million in 1970. An analogous growth in outlays for efforts in this area is observed in a number of other countries as well.

Thus under present-day conditions, when active exploitation of the world's ocean has begun, and utilization of the ocean's resources has become one of the most important international and national problems, the economic interest of all nations in this area is becoming sharply focused. In connection with this fact the problems of the ocean and its resources have entered the realm of world politics. Just as in the 19th century, when the question of division of the world's land areas was the crucial question, at the present time an equally crucial question is arising -- division of spheres of influence in the world ocean. The imperialist states are no longer limiting themselves to their own land territory and coastal waters; they are laying claims to the continental shelf and beyond, endeavoring to extend their national jurisdiction to these waters. The process of division of the ocean floor is becoming an increasingly vigorous and extensive practice, subordinating to itself certain areas of politics, economics, industry

and science. Here too there inevitably arise conflicts and crisis situations, these constant companions of finance capital which, to use Lenin's apt expression, afraid to be left behind in the mad scramble for as yet unapportioned parts of the world, is endeavoring to seize as much of the earth's territory as possible, with the view that this territory can constitute a source of raw materials.

Some nations, prospecting for and mining minerals on the continental shelf, are already raising the question of prohibition of free and unrestricted civilian and military navigation in waters above undersea extraction sites. This introduces radical changes to the status of international waters, which up to the present time has been quite an effective instrument for the regulation of the relations between sovereign nations whose interests come into contact in the "no-man's-land" of the world ocean.

We have presented in general terms the first, economic aspect of the problem of enhancing the role and significance of the seas and oceans under present-day conditions.

A second aspect of this problem, connected with the new, postwar world balance of power, is dictated by the establishment of a powerful coalition of the nations of the socialist commonwealth, and to a certain degree by the rapid pace of incipient disintegration of the colonial system.

As a result of the military defeat of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and militarist Japan, a third stage began in the general crisis of imperialism, accompanied by the unprecedented development of militarism. One of the manifestations of this, along with an unchecked arms race, was the establishment under U.S. sponsorship of aggressive military blocs, which include all the principal capitalist powers. Today these blocs are a specific form of military organization of the capitalist nations, established and directed against the socialist countries, and the USSR in particular.

Practically all member nations of aggressive military blocs are maritime nations, possessing large naval forces and occupying a very advantageous position on the world ocean.

The influence of aggressive blocs extends first and foremost to the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as the Mediterranean. The oceans are the fundamental link joining many countries which are members of NATO, SEATO, CENTO, etc.

All this enabled the navies of the members of NATO and other blocs, and the United States in particular, to utilize for their own purposes numerous foreign military bases and coastal regions in the eastern hemisphere, which constitute not only basing points for naval ships but also strongly fortified positions, advantageous build-up areas for rapid deployment of forces in those ocean areas which are most advantageous for the next aggressive action.⁶

The main economic lines of communication linking nations and coalitions run along the oceans; the oceans also contain those transport routes along which troops are carried into those areas where so-called local wars are waged.

The numerous naval bases scattered throughout the world ocean and placed at the disposal of the naval and air forces of the United States, NATO and various aggressive blocs, create unique, vast ocean areas for basing the naval forces of capitalist nations united by aggressive aspirations.

Therefore the current military-geographic situation makes it easier for the naval leaders of the imperialist nations to utilize practically the entire depth and frontage of the oceans, enables them to maneuver without any difficulty large naval forces between theaters for the conduct of combat operations or for a show of force. It helps the aggressors deploy powerful strategic task forces for participation in a nuclear war against the USSR and large multipurpose naval forces in many regions of the world ocean for the execution of police functions: duties connected with a unique "big stick" which ensures swift intervention in the domestic affairs of maritime nations, right up to naked military attack, as has occurred in Korea, Vietnam, Egypt, the Dominican Republic, and Panama.

It is typical that at the time of the fascist coup in Greece in 1967 ships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet were on maneuvers in the direct vicinity of the coast of Greece.

The decisive orientation on the part of the Anglo-American leaders and their satellites immediately following World War II toward extensive utilization of ocean theaters in the future predetermined the training of their armed forces, and their navies in particular, for war against the nations of the socialist commonwealth and for local wars, which have been waged almost continuously since that time.

The aggressive nature of the military-political blocs and their political-strategic links are now creating on the world's oceans and seas a generally favorable situation for the basing of the naval forces of imperialist states, their rapid deployment for the conduct of military operations, as well as for the establishment of various lines and zones in time of

pence. All this creates a rather tense situation, characterized first and foremost by a constant threat of a sneak attack from the sea.

The above is a general description of the military-political situation in the world ocean, defining its present role and significance.

Thus it is considered that under present-day conditions the oceans and seas are not only an area of conflict between the economic interests of the major powers but also major areas of armed struggle, in which the most varied missions in time of war can be accomplished. It is precisely for this reason that since the war leading naval powers have concentrated enormous efforts on further development of naval forces. In the first decade following the war development of military forces was restricted to insignificant evolutionary changes taking place within the framework of traditional trends in naval organizational development; there naturally did not arise the requisite material foundations for abrupt qualitative changes, and therefore they prepared and trained primarily for combat on sea lines of communication. In connection with this, U.S. and NATO naval leaders placed the main emphasis on ensuring the invulnerability of their sea lines of communication: navies were strengthened primarily by large and diversified ASW and AAW forces. Naval forces training had the same emphasis. For example, in 1955 17 out of 30 exercises conducted by the NATO member nations involved securing reliability and continuity of ocean transport. In 1956 and in the first half of 1957 these figures were 43 and 91 respectively.

Foreign publications attest that in the last several years there has begun a large-scale adoption of the latest types of weapons, electronic gear and computers, with efforts aimed at increasing the mobility, combat stability, increasing speed, range and unreplenished range of surface ships, and particularly of submarines. All this in the final analysis has made it possible to determine that the navy is a branch of the armed forces which has shown particularly extensive potential for arming various carrier vehicles with strategic weapons. The navy was the first and up to the present time is the only branch of the armed forces in which nuclear propulsion plants have been used on a large scale as principal power source.⁷

In the opinion of U.S., European and Asian military experts, profound, radical changes in naval armament, which has exerted decisive influence on change in the role of ocean theaters in warfare, are connected with such major events as the organization of carrier task forces with nuclear weapon carrying aircraft, and the development of undersea nuclear warhead missile systems consisting of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles and attendant devices.

Naval adoption of new weapons and strategic systems has introduced basic changes into the utilization of the naval forces of the great powers. They are now directed, as is constantly emphasized in the foreign press, when examining problems of naval organizational development and naval exercises, primarily against land targets of strategic importance. Therefore while in the past navies were employed against enemy naval forces, today they are assessed by naval experts in various countries as a powerful offensive force against land targets as well.

Thus it is believed that naval forces, which have sharply increased their combat capabilities, have become a major strategic factor, capable of directly engaging vitally important objectives located in the enemy's heartland, capable of exerting swift, direct and sometimes decisive influence on the course of war.

In connection with this the oceans and seas have lost their past traditional significance -- as solely the arena for the clash of naval forces of belligerent nations in battle along sea communications or in amphibious operations. They have become vast areas for the launching of naval ballistic missiles fired from submarines and aircraft taking off from the decks of attack carriers.

The principal objective of warfare at sea today is securement of an advantageous position for the launching of nuclear attacks from the sea against vitally important targets on enemy territory. Judging from foreign publications, it is planned to achieve this objective by means of task forces carrying strategic nuclear weapons, as well as by interdicting or weakening the actions of counterpart enemy forces.

The oceans have lost their former significance as protective barriers, which during the two world wars effectively separated the countries of the Western hemisphere from the devastation and destruction visited upon the nations of Europe.

In the past ocean frontiers carried only the threat of invasion, the possibility of which (depending in general on naval capabilities) was determined primarily by the correlation of ground forces, while today, following development of naval strategic weapons systems, they have become a threat to the territories of entire nations in a nuclear war, that is combat operations in the oceans and seas may comprise the most important segment of armed combat. In addition, in a modern nuclear war it will not be necessary, as is believed abroad, in many cases to capture hostile territory with ground troops in order to achieve strategic objectives in certain areas. At the same time one cannot imagine that in such a war it would be possible to be successful without launching powerful nuclear attacks with naval forces.

Therefore present-day navies, while retaining the strategic capability to support ground forces, as was the case in the two world wars, at the same time, in the opinion of military experts in many countries, have become transformed into a factor capable of directly and swiftly influencing the course of a war.

The role and significance of oceans and seas under present-day conditions have correspondingly changed.

Precisely in connection with this fact one is witnessing an increasing shift, in the United States, for example, in the direction of moving strategic nuclear potential into the area of naval actions. In an article entitled "The U.S. Should Shift Nuclear Deterrent Forces to Sea" we read: "...Last month Defense Secretary Laird declared that the ULMS naval missile system⁸ is the most preferable for future deterrent forces. The U.S. Secretary of Defense's former opinion that silo-type land missile sites are cheaper than launching vehicles at sea is incorrect. If one considers the cost of the rapid-obsolescence Atlas, Thor, Titan, Jupiter, and Minuteman missile systems, protection of these systems with the Sentinel ABM system, as well as the construction of hard underground launching sites, it turns out that their cost substantially exceeds the cost of analogous sea-based systems..."⁹

Commenting on Laird's statements, the magazine notes: "The greater the extent to which the United States enlarges and renovates its land-based offensive and defensive strategic systems, the more enemy missiles will be aimed at this country. It is late, but the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations can by his decision reorient strategy from the land to the sea."¹⁰

The imperialist nations, headed by the United States, have deployed powerful naval forces aimed against the socialist countries, with the principal strategic weapons system submarines armed with Polaris and Poseidon missiles; these will evidently be replaced by the ULMS system.

The immensely-increased offensive capabilities of naval forces and the desire on the part of bourgeois military leaders to achieve with their aid a preeminent position in the performance of strategic missions is the main criterion defining the role and significance of the seas and oceans in combat operations.

Of course this circumstance has found specific manifestation. In the United States, for example, it has evoked elaboration of so-called "ocean strategy," which essentially states that all future strategic systems should be naval, since this increases their mobility and invulnerability. As is noted in an American journal,¹¹ naval strategic systems contain two basic components -- offensive forces (the Polaris,

Poseidon, ULMS and SLMS systems) and defensive forces (the Submis system). In addition they include powerful ASW forces and forces to protect sea communications between the United States and its aggressive bloc allies.

One deduces from the statement in the above-mentioned journal that "the great naval powers," headed by the United States, intend to control all strategically important areas of the world ocean, depending on versatile "global ocean forces," maintaining constant readiness to launch a nuclear attack against the nations of the socialist commonwealth. These naval forces will also be utilized "as a naval police force to be used for the purpose of putting down revolutions, providing a continuous show of force, intervening in the domestic and foreign affairs of certain countries, and even conducting combat operations "on a local scale."

The apologists of U.S. "ocean strategy," stating the advantages of a naval strategic offensive system over a land system, as noted above, also argue the advantages of a naval defensive system over a land system. On this subject the journal writes: "Defense of the United States could be secured with considerably smaller outlays in comparison with expenditures for building a land system." In the opinion of some American experts, this would reduce expenditures severalfold. They believe that in addition a naval system would totally free the country from the threat of radioactive fallout, since hostile missiles would be destroyed above the ocean and not above or near the American continent.

"ABM missiles sited on board ships patrolling off hostile coasts could intercept and destroy enemy missiles soon after launch, that is before they approach the United States and deliver their cluster of warheads."

The journal further notes that "in connection with the effectiveness of the 'ocean strategy' and the economic savings obtained as a result of extensive utilization of the oceans, the U.S. military budget will be reduced by many billions of dollars..."

Champions of the "ocean strategy" pathetically exclaim: "The 'ocean strategy' fosters preservation of all the best we have had in the past..."

Thus there is reason to state that "the naval segment of strategy is being thrust forward as the most important and most promising segment of American overall strategy, particularly if one considers the assertion that "no one country can be a great land and sea power simultaneously." If one accepts this position as stated by the journal as an official expression of the views of U.S. military leaders, then the Pentagon is inevitably slated for reorientation to the so-called

ocean concept, not only as applied to strategic forces but evidently to a certain degree as well as regards "general purpose" forces.

In the "ocean strategy" it is not difficult to see the solid orientation of American theorists toward the necessity of gaining and holding supremacy on the seas, which is viewed by them as an essential condition for executing a great many missions in modern wars.

Therefore the development of forces capable of effectively fighting on the seas and oceans constitutes a major task for our socialist homeland. One constantly bears in mind all the specific features of the geographic position of our state as a major sea power, whose shores are washed by 12 seas within the realm of the Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific Ocean basins.

Constantly concerned with the defensive might of the Soviet state, the party and government comprehensively define the role of the seas and oceans under present-day conditions and in conformity with this are perfecting and developing all forces necessary for waging war.

FOOTNOTES

1. The total number of U.S., British, German, Japanese, and Italian capital ships, destroyers and submarines participating in World War II was 23 times the number of ships involved in the Russo-Japanese War; losses climbed 31-fold, while losses in merchant tonnage rose 520-fold; the number of major battles and operations at sea increased 11-fold.
2. Courier, UNESCO, No 150, page 9.
3. Continental shelf -- that portion of the floor of the world ocean ringing the landmasses.
4. In 1967 the U.N. General Assembly established a committee to examine matters connected with peaceful utilization of the ocean and sea floors. This committee contains representatives of 86 nations, including the USSR.
5. In October 1967 Florida's Governor Kirk stated to newsmen: "As far as the ocean floor is concerned, boundaries are irrelevant -- possession is 9 points of the law. That is the way the Spaniards did it. They simply said: 'This is mine,' and grabbed everything. The United States should do likewise" (Courier, UNESCO, No 150, page.8).

6. American statistics have computed that the United States presently operates 429 large and 2972 "small" military bases located in 30 foreign countries.
7. The air force has come closest to the navy in this area. Even now, however, after many years of practical use of nuclear reactors on board submarines and surface ships, the use of reactors as propulsion plants for aircraft is still in the early development stage.
8. A new missile system which will replace the Poseidon system. The magazine Naval Times, No 20, 1970, states that ULMS is a new long-range missile system. Nuclear submarines of new design will carry 24 missiles (in place of the present 16) with multiple warheads, with an effective range of 11,000-15,000 km. The magazine also notes that "Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development Frosch evaluates the ULMS system as the most viable naval offensive missile system, capable of launching long-range missiles from improved-design, quieter submarines. .
9. Navy Magazine, No 2, 1970.
10. Ibid.
11. This and subsequent statements are from the U.S. journal United States Naval Institute Proceedings, No 6, 1968.

THE ROLE OF CITIES IN ARMED COMBAT

Col G. Yefimov

The experience of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany attests to the fact that combat for the capture of and defense of cities was of an exceptionally intense and decisive character.

In contrast to Western Europe, where cities surrendered to the Germans with practically no resistance, the defense of many Soviet cities during the course of the war ran on for months, while the defense of Leningrad was in progress for 2 and a half years. On the initial days of the war against the Soviet Union the German Army was compelled to conduct intense fighting for frontier cities. The valiant defense on the part of the garrisons at Brest, Liyepaya, Mogilev and other cities slowed the German advance and immobilized substantial enemy forces.

Fanatically anti-Soviet writer Paul Carell assesses these first engagements on the Soviet-German Front in his book Hitler's War with Russia as follows: "They were able to destroy skillfully-camouflaged Russian machinegun nests in barricaded buildings only with the assistance of heavy guns, howitzers and mortars. Defense of the city (Liyepaya -- G. Ye.) was excellently organized. Each and every Soviet soldier had been well trained and fought bravely." Describing the fighting to take Mogilev, he is compelled to acknowledge that the German army was forced to pay a high price for this city, which was already behind the front lines. Four divisions of the German VII Corps were immobilized approximately 10 days by this operation and sustained heavy losses.

The small Brest garrison, skillfully utilizing the fortress's fortifications, continued resistance for quite some time against superior forces, inflicting losses in men and equipment on the enemy. Some groups at the Brest Fortress continued resistance up to 20 July.

On the first days of the war, however, many frontier cities were unable to make preparations to repel the aggression: the element of surprise in the attack had its effect. For example, from the first day of the war the 56th Rifle Division of the Third Army, which was defending on a frontage of 40 kilometers, was engaged on the approaches to Grodno. The division was unable to hold back the advance of three enemy infantry divisions and, retreating with continuous resistance, abandoned Grodno on 23 July. Obviously if the division's main efforts had been concentrated at the outset on defense of the city, substantial enemy forces would have been immobilized. Here is another example. On 24 June the commander of troops of the Western Front assigned responsibility for defense of the Slutsk fortified

area to the commander of the Fourth Army. The troops of this army, however, retreating along the dirt roads of the Poles'ye, did not succeed in taking a defensive position. The adversary, advancing along the highway, outstripped our units and captured Slutsk on 27 June. Partly to blame for this situation was the lack of prompt assignment of missions in advance and preparation of defense.

Bearing in mind the lessons of the first days of the war, on 29 June 1941 the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee issued a directive to party and Soviet organizations of oblasts in the area of the front. Tasks specified in this directive included specification of the necessity of defending our cities, towns and villages to the last man. As a result of this directive, the attitude toward organizing the defense of cities changed sharply. Planned preparations for protracted and stubborn defense were initiated wherever this was justified by the operational-strategic situation.

On the political plane, the successful defense of cities inspired confidence in the realistic possibility of victory and strengthened the morale of Soviet citizens on the battle front and on the home front. On the other hand, unsuccessful attacks and assaults on cities undermined the morale of the enemy and the German civilian population on the home front. From an operational-strategic standpoint defense of cities diverted enormous enemy forces for a long period of time and delayed the adversary's overall advance. The enemy sustained immense losses and expended great quantities of ammunition and fuel.

The contribution made by those participating in the defense of cities, particularly the hero-cities, to the overall defeat of Nazi Germany is convincingly attested by the duration of defensive battles and participation in these battles by dozens of German elite divisions, as well as the magnitude of German losses. The defense of Sevastopol', for example, lasted 250 days and prevented from being used elsewhere three German army corps totaling more than 10 divisions, 450 tanks, more than 2000 guns and mortars, and approximately 500 aircraft. In the fighting for Sevastopol' the Germans lost approximately 300,000 officers and men, while the German Eleventh Army became so weakened that after the city fell it was unable to take part for more than 2 months in the operations of the decisive period of the summer campaign of 1942.

We must note that the successful defense of cities by our troops in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War was conducted under exceptionally difficult conditions. The enemy possessed great superiority in both manpower and equipment, including a vast superiority in tanks and aircraft. Soviet troops were short of both weapons and ammunition. In many cases besieged garrisons were forced to fabricate weapons and manufacture

ammunition for themselves. The workers of Odessa, for example, supplied the troops during the siege with 1260 mortars, approximately 600 flame-throwers, and 250,000 hand grenades. They built armored trains and transformed tractors into tanks. During the defense of Sevastopol' the enterprises of the besieged city produced 2400 mortars and 114,000 mortar rounds, more than 300,000 hand grenades, 230,000 antipersonnel and anti-tank mines, and approximately 9000 aircraft bombs. Obviously the experience of producing in besieged cities simple arms, and particularly ammunition, merits the most serious attention under present-day conditions as well.

Large cities were of great importance not only in the defensive operations of the Soviet army. The war provided us with many examples whereby during the course of an offensive, engagements and battles to capture such cities as Breslau, Poznan, Budapest, Vienna, Konigsberg, Berlin and many others comprised an important and sometimes the main objective of front and army offensive operations.

In order to capture large cities it was necessary to plan and for an extended period of time to prepare for special offensive operations, involving the participation of several armies and even fronts. For example, the capture of Königsberg required the participation of three armies, while the main forces of three fronts took part in the Battle of Berlin. When adequate manpower and materiel were assigned, and thorough preparations were made for such operations, they usually were completed quickly and at low cost. On the other hand, wherever the requisite manpower and materiel was not assigned at the very outset, for various reasons, the capture of a city would drag on for a protracted period of time. For example, initially not possessing adequate manpower and materiel, Soviet troops fought stubbornly for an entire month to take Poznan, an important German strategic center of resistance on the road to Berlin. The enemy continued to hold Breslau in the deep rear of the First Ukrainian Front; the Breslau garrison did not surrender until the war was over.

Operations involving the defense and capture of large cities during the Great Patriotic War demonstrated that they possess a number of important specific features which require special training of troops, commanders and staffs. In preparing for such operations it was necessary to conduct special rehearsals and exercises, including with live fire, to employ organizational changes, forming temporary detachments and teams from various arms, and to furnish them with other weapons and combat equipment.

Today our troops possess adequate quantities of automatic weapons, grenade launchers, recoilless weapons, antitank guided missiles, rockets and other weapons for combat in built-up areas. Modern communications equipment ensures stable control, while highly-efficient heavy construction equipment

... assessed by line units and municipal construction organizations makes it possible extremely rapidly to transform a town or city into an impregnable fortress. Thus, in the conduct of combat operations employing conventional weapons, combat in built-up areas in the future may and evidently will play an even more important role than in the past. Foreign military theorists believe that with the employment of nuclear weapons cities may constitute important nuclear strike targets.

We shall now examine how the subject of our examination -- the modern city -- has changed in recent decades and in what direction it is developing, as well as what importance these changes may have on the conduct of combat operations connected with the defense and capture of modern cities.

First of all, in most of the nations of the world one notes an unprecedentedly high rate of growth in the size and number of cities, as well as the urban population, particularly in large industrial regions. Futurologists state in their predictions that 30 years hence 70-90 percent of the population will be urban, and if one takes into consideration that by this time the planet's population will double, reaching a figure of 6 billion; the urban population will consequently increase by at least 4-5.5-fold. These are, as it were, the prospects of the future. But even today we are witnesses to a growth and change of cities which is unparalleled in history. For example, Yu. Paletskis, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet USSR, states: "Purely externally Japan of 1969 is not that one-story nation which it was for the most part even as recently as 1960."¹ Building fever has now taken hold in the majority of other Asian nations, as well as those in the Americas and Europe. This process is developing with equal swiftness in Africa as well, where already today approximately 20 percent of the population is urban. The rapid growth of cities is a complex sociopolitical and economic process. In the capitalist world it is occurring spontaneously and in a practically uncontrolled manner.

From a military standpoint this problem is connected first and foremost with an increase in the area of many cities by double, triple and more, as well as with the establishment of new cities. The largest cities become surrounded by satellite cities, which gradually and inevitably merge into vast urban sprawls. Defensive and offensive combat within the bounds of such vast territory, extending dozens and even hundreds of kilometers and almost solidly occupied by housing, administrative, industrial and other buildings, frequently of substantial size, constitutes a new phenomenon in operational art. At any rate, World War II provides us with only one such example. This example involves the capture of Berlin. The experience of the Berlin Operation, however, as the final operation of the war, obviously can be utilized only for a few partial conclusions.

We can cite one more example -- capture of the Silesian Industrial Region by the troops of the First Ukrainian Front. The troops of the First Ukrainian Front, executing a deep envelopment of this region, deliberately allowed a substantial enemy force to withdraw from it. This created favorable conditions to destroy a large enemy force in the open field; Soviet troops occupied the Silesian Industrial Region quickly and without heavy casualties; they succeeded in preserving Silesian industry intact. The adversary, finding himself in a large operational trap, was forced to initiate the withdrawal of his force through a corridor deliberately left open by the Soviet troops.

The number and size of such regions will steadily increase in the future. Experts believe, for example, that as a result of the merging of a number of cities, as many as 45 million Europeans will in the near future be living in a single metropolitan area occupying a triangle between Brussels, Cologne and Amsterdam. We could give similar examples for other regions.

The increase in the number of cities and in the physical size of cities as well as the development of new large industrial regions will in a number of cases practically exclude the possibility of military envelopment or bypass. Consequently battles for the capture of cities will become a more frequent phenomenon, while the increase in the perimeter and area of cities will require the involvement of considerably more troops for organizing defense, capture or blockade of cities and industrial regions than was the case in the last war, although even then several divisions and even armies would normally be employed in such operations. All this leads to the conclusion that additional, more detailed study is essential in the area of theory of conduct of combat operations in large residential and industrial areas, taking into account changes in weapons and combat equipment and the features of modern cities, proceeding not only from their great size but also from the new layout of areas, districts and streets, the features of residential and industrial buildings, the development of underground structures and other elements of municipal facilities.

At first glance it is difficult to grasp the direct effect of these changes on the character of combat operations. It is essential to bear in mind, however, that any battle within a city, in contrast to combat under field conditions, usually breaks down into combat operations by small subunits to capture separate buildings and other structures. In spite of the fact that these combat operations are unified by a common plan, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to organize and continuously maintain coordination among individual operations in time and objective. In other words tactics in a built-up area become the major, determining element. Therefore the structural strength and height of buildings, the presence of basements, underground utilities lines, two or three-level road and street layouts, width of streets, size of squares and the layout of each city block or industrial complex all directly affect the character and success of subunit

combat and as a whole exert substantial influence on the conduct of the entire battle as a whole.

What are the basic differences between today's cities and the cities of World War II?

First of all one's attention is drawn by changes in layout. Streets have become considerably straighter and wider; the number and size of squares is increasing. Buildings are more clearly grouped into separate blocks or areas. Within blocks or areas buildings frequently vary in height and are arranged not in rows parallel to the streets, as was the case in the past, but stand at various angles to the street. New blocks or areas alternate with old ones. A very graphic picture of such a city was painted by Yu. Zhukov, who visited Bonn last year, "the countenance of which contains an incredible mixture of the 19th and 20th centuries. High-rise buildings jutting skyward contrast with even rows of small, sharp-gabled houses; broad expressways... flanked by cabbages cultivated in tiny family vegetable plots; an ultramodern trade center with double-decker streets and old-fashioned streetcars.-- this is the Bonn of today."²

In recent years the difference has become increasingly evident in city planning and layout. The downtown areas of new and rebuilding cities in the socialist nations as a rule contain the tallest modern buildings, alternating with large squares which are linked by broad boulevards. On the outskirts clusters of one and two-story structures are disappearing, and are being replaced by blocks of modern 5-9-12-story buildings.

Reconstruction of a number of cities in the capitalist nations is proceeding differently. Typical in the past was placement of the most fashionable residential and administrative buildings in the downtown area, which contained the wealthiest segment of society, with the poor living on the outskirts. Today the reverse tendency is becoming increasingly clear. The wealthy are fleeing from the inner city to the cleaner air of the outskirts, rebuilding the suburban belt in the process. The poor on the contrary migrate to the inner city. Thus the downtown sections of the cities, particularly industrial cities, "are becoming an enormous social ghetto, a refuge for poor blacks and whites, who cannot afford decent suburban housing."³ This process is the consequence of the steady and continuing effect of the economic laws of capitalism. It cannot be halted. Once initiated, it will continue to progress at an accelerating pace. Therefore the downtown area of many industrial cities in the capitalist nations is becoming a cluster of enormous tenement houses, decaying old buildings and industrial enterprises. The outskirts on the other hand are being transformed into attractive districts of single-family dwellings, parks, boulevards and plazas. The class composition of the cities is equally sharply delineated. All this naturally cannot help but exert a substantial effect on the organization of combat in modern cities.

The character of combat operations in urban areas will also be affected by the urban road network, which has changed substantially in recent decades. Bypass beltways have been built around the majority of large cities, while a network of radial and connecting expressways runs through the cities. All these expressways and freeways are designed to pass through a large volume of traffic at high speeds. Therefore the design of these systems includes a substantially wider roadway, large-radius curves, numerous pedestrian underpass crossings, viaducts and complex, two and three level interchanges. The freeway and expressway systems have literally transformed the appearance of modern cities and are continuing to grow, occupying an ever-increasing portion of the city's total area. In the United States, for example, at the present time up to 30 percent of the total area of large cities is occupied by freeways and expressways.

Intelligent utilization of all these features in combat in a built-up area gives undisputed advantages for maneuver, observation, siting of weapons and long-range direct fire. In connection with this it is possible to refine some views on the employment of arms, particularly tank troops, in combat within cities.

Industrial enterprises, rail interchange facilities, warehouses, dock facilities, airports and other facilities are built within cities and on their outskirts. All of these individually differ sharply in size and other features from analogous facilities of the recent past.

We must also note that while in the past cities grew essentially horizontally, today, and particularly in the near future, urban growth will inevitably involve an increase in the height of buildings and the construction of underground structures to contain various urban facilities. At the present time it is still difficult to state which of these tendencies will be given preference. At the present time the cities are growing both upward and downward. In the past the most typical buildings were from one to five stories, with buildings of nine to 12 stories a rarity, while underground utilities and facilities were practically nonexistent; today the backbone of most cities is comprised of buildings of from five to nine stories, plus high-rise monsters of from 12 to 36 stories and more, with the extensive utilization of underground structures for pedestrian crossings, vehicle underpasses, subway lines, storage facilities, parking garages, theaters, etc.

If we recall how much effort was required to capture separate industrial buildings in the Battle of Stalingrad or to take the Reichstag, one can easily imagine how difficult combat will be in the cities of the future. Much if not all will depend on the ability of commanders and special training and equipment of the troops. In view of this fact, it would

evidently be advisable to devote more attention to study of the experience of the war connected with combat involved in the defense and capture of large cities, to work on these problems in the process of troop combat training and to study them at military educational institutions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Izvestiya, 21 May 1969.
2. Pravda, 22 October 1970.
3. B. Strel'nikov: "Big Cities," Pravda, 29 April 1969.

FIFTEEN YEARS ON GUARD FOR THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF EAST GERMAN SOCIALISM

Maj Gen R. Menzel

On 18 January 1956 the Parliament of the German Democratic Republic passed a historic decision to establish a Ministry of National Defense and to create a National People's Army. This decision signaled the initiation of a most important period in building the system of defense of the GDR and its core -- socialist armed forces. The Ministry of National Defense and the headquarters of the military districts, air and naval forces went into operation on 1 March 1956. There began intensive forming of military large units and units, the establishment of military educational institutions and other military establishments. This day began to be celebrated in the German Democratic Republic as the birthday of a regular socialist National People's Army on German soil.

From the very first days of its existence the National People's Army has stood vigilant guard over the socialist achievements of the German Democratic Republic. For 15 years now the National People's Army, a constituent part of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact nations, has stood shoulder to shoulder with the mighty Soviet Army and the other brother armies, guarding the peace and security of the nations of the socialist community.

Creation of the National People's Army constitutes practical implementation of the military program of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, which is based on the Leninist doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland. This task, which is of vast historical importance, has been successfully accomplished by our party thanks to the inestimable material assistance and moral support on the part of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces. The Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, guiding organizational development of the regular army and navy of the GDR, has extensively and innovatively utilized the theoretical and practical experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in organizational development of the Soviet Army, in the military training and political indoctrination of its military personnel.

In November 1957 the SUP Central Committee Politburo carefully studied the decree of the October Plenum of the Central Committee CPSU (1957) entitled "On Improving Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" and drew appropriate conclusions applicable to the conditions of organizational development, combat training and political indoctrination of National People's Army personnel.

It was emphasized in the Politburo resolution that the strength of the army of the socialist state, which is armed with the most modern weapons and combat equipment, lies in consistently and unswervingly carrying out SUP policy, in maintaining a constant and close bond with the toiler people, and in constantly improving troop combat readiness and strengthening personnel discipline. It was also noted that ideological and moral-political indoctrination of all fighting men in a spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism constitutes a most important task of commanders, political officials and party organizations in the NPA.

These conclusions have formed the basis of further development of the National People's Army and People's Navy of the GDR. Their practical implementation has produced good results. The weapons and combat equipment furnished the NPA and navy of the GDR by the Soviet Army are in good hands. Our army and navy personnel have learned in the course of intensive daily combat and political training to handle these weapons and this equipment skillfully.

Today the NPA is a totally modern, totally motorized army. Its ground force large units and units are equipped with excellent tanks and other combat vehicles, artillery and mortars, the most advanced antitank weapons, operational-tactical and tactical missiles. Their firepower and striking power have increased immeasurably in recent years. They are now capable of conducting highly-mobile offensive operations, of executing hasty river-crossing operations and of establishing a solid defense.

The air force and air defense troops are equipped with all-weather supersonic fighter-interceptors, antiaircraft missiles, as well as modern electronic gear. In cooperation with the Soviet Army and the armies of the other brother nations they are reliably securing the air defenses of our republic.

The People's Navy of the GDR is equipped with modern guided missile and torpedo boats as well as ASW ships capable of successfully accomplishing the mission of defending our territorial waters and coastline.

The armed forces of the GDR include the border troops which, in coordination with all arms of the NPA and navy, provide solid defense of our land borders and territorial waters. Our valiant border guards serve under the difficult conditions of incessant acts of provocation and frantic psychological warfare being conducted against us by the powerful propaganda machine of the FRG and its NATO allies.

Our army and navy possess thoroughly-trained officer cadres, who have received and are receiving professional training at Soviet service academies and higher service schools, as well as at military educational

institutions in the GDR. All commanders of ground troops large units have graduated from service academies. Eighty-five percent of unit commanders, political and party workers have graduated from service academies or from higher military and military political schools. As a whole in the period 1970-1971 every third officer in the NPA will possess military or general higher education.

GDR party and government leaders focus special attention on improving methods of management and control of the national defense system in conformity with the demands of scientific and technological progress. The central entities of the Ministry of National Defense, staffs of the armed services and line unit staffs are working persistently to master socialist science of management on the basis of advances in cybernetics and the employment of electronic computers.

The SUP Central Committee and the government pay constant attention to the combat readiness of all command entities in the national defense system, demanding that they constantly improve their operations training and work to achieve precise coordination among the services under various situation conditions. Considerable attention is also devoted to elaboration and implementation of measures to strengthen the combat and mobilization readiness of the NPA and navy as well as the training of various reserve units.

The necessity of all-out strengthening of the GDR defense system and the combat efficiency of the National People's Army is dictated not only by the demands of the military technological revolution but also, and principally, by the increasing aggressiveness of world imperialism. The criminal war being waged by the American imperialists against the Vietnamese people, the attack by Israel on the Arab nations, acts of provocation against revolutionary Cuba, an attempt on the part of rightist anti-socialist elements to effect a counterrevolutionary coup in Czechoslovakia, intervention by Portuguese mercenaries against Bissau, ruffian outrages perpetrated by American Zionists around the premises of Soviet representations in the United States, anti-Soviet acts by West German neofascists in front of the Soviet embassy in Bonn, as well as shots fired in provocation at a Soviet sentry in West Berlin are all links in a common chain of imperialist policy, directed against the socialist nations and against peoples struggling for their national liberation. This is well understood by the toilers of the GDR, and the men of its armed forces are drawing appropriate conclusions.

An important role in improving the combat skills of the enlisted personnel, officers and staffs of our army and navy is played by joint exercises and maneuvers conducted by the Warsaw Pact joint armed forces. Since 1962 the National People's Army and People's Navy have been constant participants

in such exercises and maneuvers, held in the GDR and o rritory of
allied neighboring nations. The most important of the have been:
Baltic-Oder -- 1962; Quartet -- 1963; October Storm -- tava --
1966; Sumava -- 1968; Oder-Neisse -- 1969; and finally, largest-scale
Brotherhood in Arms maneuvers -- 1970.

At all these exercises and maneuvers the officers and men of the NPA to-
gether with their brothers in arms from the other socialist nations have
successfully accomplished the assigned missions. In the course of these
exercises they have elaborated a unity of views on the methods and forms of
conducting modern combat operations and have perfected methods of control-
ling allied forces in repelling potential aggression. These exercises and
maneuvers constituted a vivid demonstration of socialist internationalism
and the constantly strengthening combat alliance of the armies of the
brother nations.

A major event for the toilers of the German Democratic Republic was the
Brotherhood in Arms exercise, in which troops and staffs of all armies of
the Warsaw Pact nations participated. This exercise was directed by
Army Gen Heinz Hoffmann, Minister of National Defense of the GDR. During
the course of this exercise numerous friendly get-togethers were held
between the toilers of this Republic and the men of the brother armies,
get-togethers which developed into a genuine celebration of international
solidarity. At this exercise the officers and men of the NPA demonstrated
excellent field performance and consummate skill in carrying out combat
missions; together with the men of the other brother armies they received
high praise from the Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, Mar SU
I. I. Yakubovskiy. The success achieved by the NPA in mastering new
weapons and combat equipment and in the ability to conduct modern combat
operations has been possible thanks to the comprehensive assistance of the
Soviet Army -- the principal guiding force of the Warsaw Pact armies.

The results and military-political significance of the Brotherhood in Arms
exercise were reflected in the report by the Politburo of the SUP Central
Committee to the 14th Party Plenum in December 1970. It stated: "These
maneuvers were first and foremost a warning to those who have not yet
abandoned the idea of military machinations and acts of force. Our so-
cialist community of nations threatens nobody, and its Joint Armed Forces
desire to attack nobody. However, under the guidance of the Marxist-
Leninist parties, they are keeping a vigilant eye on all imperialist
intrigues and are constantly prepared to deal a devastating blow in the
defense of socialism and communism."

There are considerable grounds for such a warning. The opponents of peace-
ful cooperation in Europe have refused to cease their dangerous activities.
There has been stepped-up activity on the part of aggressive NATO circles,
as well as acts of provocation by revenge-seeking and militarist elements

in West Germany. The FRG continues to be the most active member of the aggressive NATO bloc. It fully supports the European policy and strategy of the U.S. leaders. In connection with forthcoming ratification of treaties concluded between the FRG and the Soviet Union, as well as between Poland and the FRG, a murky wave of anti-Communist hysteria has swept over West Germany. At the crest of this wave stand shameless neo-fascists and reactionary elements from the CDU/CSU which support them, actively joined by certain SDP leaders. They forbid the party rank and file to cooperate with the Communists under threat of expulsion from the party. For example, at the end of December 1970 Munich city SPD leaders expelled from the party 24 Social Democrats for joining with members of the West Berlin Socialist Unity Party in protest against a speech delivered in West Berlin by Christian Democrat Kiesinger.

Until recently the illegal meetings of FRG government bodies in West Berlin were conducted under the aegis of the CDU/CSU, while now the top leaders of the SDP amiably invite representatives of this party's organizations in the West German Länder to West Berlin, by this openly continuing the acts of provocation committed by the CDU/CSU leaders.

Everyone is aware that the West German generals have long been demanding that the Bundeswehr and its leaders be transformed into the main instrument of implementation of West German government domestic and foreign policy. Hopes for implementation of these demands are now placed on Social Democrat Defense Minister Schmidt.

The Stuttgart newspaper Christ und Welt stated the following: "The army can be assisted in acquiring sufficient authority of its own to carry out decisions best of all by a Social Democrat who in his political convictions is far from suspicion of creating a state within a state. It is within his power to transform the Bundeswehr leadership into an instrument with which the Federal Republic can more confidently face the international community than has been the case in the past."

In full conformity with this demand, a persistent campaign is being conducted at anti-Communist brainwashing of soldiers in the Bundeswehr and glorification of all those who were convicted at Nuremberg. The so-called "preservation of traditions" which is being carried out in the Bundeswehr constitutes the most important element of ideological and political indoctrination of military personnel in a spirit of constant readiness to act against the nations of the socialist community. This is not only being done in the Bundeswehr. Today all kinds of "alliances," "leagues," "associations," and "societies" are springing up in West Germany like mushrooms after a rain, organizations which unite under CDU/CSU aegis all revenge-seeking, anti-Soviet elements. Former members of the SS, prominent Nazis and famed German air aces from World War II are invited to their meetings.

All of the numerous Bundeswehr magazines are waging a shameless propaganda campaign of anticommunism and revanchism. This was quite convincingly indicated in a letter to West German Defense Minister Schmidt written by Holger Krull, a soldier in the 1st Airborne Battalion, stationed at Wittekind barracks in the city of Wildenshausen. He wrote: "Dear Sir! The Moscow and Warsaw treaties have yet to be ratified by the Bundestag. Political rightists of all hues are joining ranks behind Strauss and Bartzel to prevent ratification. You, Mister Minister, as a Social Democrat and member of government, should be interested in the fact that parallel with unification of rightists in the barracks of the Bundeswehr, encouragement is being given to attitudes against the peoples of the East and thus against the spirit and the letter of the Moscow Treaty. During the course of military training I have received, during and outside formal classes one could hear the following 'juicy remarks': 'We'll give that Russky a burst right in the gut' or 'When the Russky comes out, we'll let him have it.' I therefore appeal to you and expect you to take all possible measures to prevent this kind of hate campaign among our soldiers as well as all propaganda in the military directed against mutual understanding."

The Soviet people along with the democratic people of the world were reminded once again of fascist measures when an excavator operator on the Krasnyy Sovkhoz in the village of Dubskoye near Simferopol' unearthed a pile of human bones: the skeletons of 1480 men, women, including old people, and children. Killed by bullets fired into the temple and the back of the head, they irrefutably attested to the terrible crimes committed by the fascists. This deed was perpetrated during the night of 11 April 1944, 2 days before the liberation of Simferopol', when the German Seventeenth Army, under attack by the troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front, were hastily withdrawing toward Sevastopol'. The Nazi German troops committed similar crimes in other parts of the Eastern Front as well when, suffering a bitter defeat on the Kursk Salient, they retreated westward, murdering and burning everything in their path, with the Soviet Army in pursuit. The letter written by paratrooper Krull appears to be quite symbolic in connection with the tragic discovery on the Krasnyy Sovkhoz. The murder of Soviet citizens committed by the Nazis at Dubskoye more than 25 years ago and encouragement of the men at the Wittekind barracks to perpetrate like actions today eloquently indicate how the Bundeswehr is being trained and for what purpose.

The anti-Communist emphasis in political indoctrination of soldiers in the Bundeswehr and in the other imperialist armies is well known to us. Therefore we always bear in mind what was stated in the basic document of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Worker Parties: imperialism is not giving up the idea of war against socialism. Aggressiveness has been and remains a distinctive feature of imperialism and militarism -- its favorite weapon in the struggle against the forces of peace and progress. This

is why our party's Central Committee and the government of the GDR are constantly concerned to increase the combat readiness and fighting efficiency of the National People's Army and the People's Navy and are taking every step to achieve effective countermeasures against ideological sabotage and psychological attack by our class enemies.

At the same time principal attention in the ideological and political indoctrination of National People's Army and Navy personnel is focused on developing in them feelings of socialist internationalism, brotherhood and friendship toward the Soviet Army and the armies of the other Warsaw Pact nations. Fifteen years of existence of the Warsaw Pact has convinced the world that this is a deciding factor in ensuring peace and security in Europe, in preventing all types of imperialist acts of provocation and the creation of favorable international conditions for building socialism and communism.

We view our great friend and mentor, the Soviet Army, as a model of socialist armed forces. The Soviet Army is the army of the world's first socialist state, established by the Communist Party under the guidance of V. I. Lenin. It has withstood the most difficult military tests in struggle for the freedom and independence of its homeland and the liberation of peoples enslaved by the imperialist usurpers. The Soviet Army is the bearer of advanced military science and military art, the most progressive principles of training and indoctrination of fighting men. To learn from such an army, productively to apply its wealth of diversified experience in the area of military organizational development, development of military theory, troop training and indoctrination signifies for us practical implementation of the high principles of socialist internationalism and patriotism.

Celebration of the 15th anniversary of the NPA is taking place following world-historic events of 1970, which were celebrated by all progressive mankind -- the V. I. Lenin Birth Centennial and the 25th anniversary of the defeat of German fascism. For the men of our army and navy it was a year of study of the deathless writings of Vladimir Il'ich, ideological conditioning and growth of political maturity on the part of officers and men. The 25th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people and its glorious Armed Forces over German Nazism was celebrated by the toilers of the GDR as a signal date of their liberation by the Soviet Union from Nazism.

These historic events generated unusual enthusiasm in the workers, peasants, toiling intelligentsia and fighting men of our republic, as well as a new burst of energy and firm confidence in the victory of socialism on German soil.

This year another important date was celebrated -- the sesquicentennial of the birth of Friedrich Engels, one of the founders of scientific communism and the first military theorist of the international proletariat. This event was particularly enthusiastically celebrated in the Soviet Union, in the GDR and the other socialist nations. Extremely representative scientific conferences, symposiums, meetings, get-togethers and numerous articles stressed the permanent international character of the revolutionary teachings of Engels. The great military theory legacy of Friedrich Engels was further developed by Lenin into a balanced Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and army, on defense of the socialist homeland, which today guides all Communist and worker parties which adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

A mere month and a half separates the 15th anniversary of the NPA from another important date -- the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Unification on 22 April 1946 of the Communist and Social Democratic parties of Germany and the establishment of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany on Marxist-Leninist principles constituted the result of the logical development of the labor movement to unity on a revolutionary basis. This event signified the triumph of the fighting and revolutionary traditions of the German labor movement. The achieved unity of the worker class constituted the greatest achievement in the history of the German labor movement following proclamation of the Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. This was a historic victory by Marxism-Leninism over opportunism in Germany.

Historical conditions for establishing worker class unity were created as a result of the defeat of German fascism by the Soviet Army, which came to German soil as a liberation army, as an ally of the toilers. The worker class took advantage of this opportunity and created its own genuine Marxist-Leninist party.

The officers and men of the National People's Army are preparing to honor this great anniversary with high results in combat and political training and with even closer solidarity behind their party.

The toilers of the German Democratic Republic and the fighting men of its armed forces are enthusiastically awaiting the start of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The 24th CPSU Congress will be an important event for all the nations of the socialist community and their armies. CPSU congresses have been, are and will continue to be major landmarks on the road to a Communist tomorrow for all progressive men -- both for those who are building socialism and are defending past achievements jointly with the other socialist nations, and for those who under both legal and illegal conditions are waging a struggle for peace and progress.

This thought was very vividly expressed recently by Walter Ulbricht in his New Year's message to the people of the GDR: "Looking back," he said, "we see that the determining element in the foreground is the persistent struggle by the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community of nations for peace and security. Peace has been preserved in Europe thanks to the solidarity, strength and consistent peaceful policies of the socialist community of nations. We realize thereby that the brother Soviet Union, with its great experience and its enormous potential, is a guarantee of peace and security."

The toilers of the GDR, the officers and men of the NPA and navy are sincerely pleased at the victorious advance by the Soviet people on the path toward communism and at the strengthening of the might and international prestige of the Soviet Union. They listened attentively and with optimism to the 1971 New Year's address to the Soviet people by L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU: "The international position of the Soviet Union," stated Brezhnev, "is solid and its prestige throughout the world is greater than ever before. Soviet foreign policy, true to the Leninist principles of struggle for peace and socialism, has ensured favorable conditions for peaceful, productive labor in this country. It is directed toward strengthening and development of the world socialist system, consolidation of all antiimperialist forces, toward defense of the cause of freedom, independence and security of peoples, the cause of peace and progress throughout the world."

True to the principles of socialist internationalism and totally dedicated to its people and the Marxist-Leninist party, the National People's Army has stood guard for 15 years over the achievements of socialism in the GDR. Shoulder to shoulder with the glorious Soviet Armed Forces and the other brother armies, it is honorably carrying out its mission to defend the western borders of the nations of the socialist community and to preserve peace in Europe.

MILITARY-PEDAGOGICAL MASTERY

(Problems of Indoctrination and Development of Young Officers)

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The need for military-pedagogic skill is dictated by a number of circumstances. They include the increased importance of tasks of Communist and military indoctrination, amplification and increasing complexity of the problem of man and machine, an increase in demands on combat performance skill, social changes in army and navy personnel (a steady rise in the level of education, development of occupational-labor skills of inductees), implementation of the new universal military training law, etc.

Military pedagogic skill is an instrument of command cadres, whose activities fully determine the training and indoctrination of fighting men and the combat readiness of troops. And yet young officers, for the most part due to objective and in many cases subjective reasons as well, are inadequately prepared in a psychological-pedagogic respect to conduct teaching and indoctrination. We shall discuss the theoretical aspects, focusing the readers' attention on the nature, essence and structure of military pedagogic skills and ways of forming and perfecting them.

We are examining this matter in connection with an article by Col. A. Danchenko on the forming and development of military teaching abilities.¹ The author noted that military-pedagogic abilities are a prerequisite for achieving mastery in training and indoctrination. Their development, which takes place during the entire course of military service, in the process of working with subordinates, leads to the attainment of military-pedagogic mastery. The latter attests to the level of professional performance capability. Consequently, military-pedagogic skill -- the result of continuous hard work and teaching activity -- can and must be mastered.²

Military-pedagogic skill possesses its structure, which is defined as a unity of corresponding elements, their links and relationships. Elucidation of structure gives an idea of the components of skill and reveals their significance in teaching activities.

Military teaching activities differ from all others: officers accomplish complex and diversified tasks and individually perform a number of interrelated functions -- combat instructor and indoctrinator; they bear full responsibility for the results of training and indoctrination of their men, the combat readiness and fighting efficiency of units, naval ships, and subunits. Successful officer practical activity is impossible without

broad and deep knowledge. "The Soviet officer is inconceivable without knowledge of the most important achievements in the area of the social and military sciences, technology, culture and art, principles of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and the basics of party political effort in the army and navy."³

The military-pedagogic activities of officers of the various services and arms possess many common features. Therefore they require like knowledge (political, psychological-pedagogic, general military, and scientific). At the same time successful accomplishment of duties requires specific qualifications, the content and scope of which depends on the officer's military specialty and comprises one of the important aspects of his skill. A. S. Makarenko emphasized: "I have become convinced by experience that the problem is solved by skill based on ability, qualifications."⁴

In addition to knowledge, an officer's ability to teach presupposes skills and abilities. They can be divided into three groups: general pedagogic, indoctrinational, and didactic. Certain skills and abilities are required to an equal degree in both training and indoctrination; others are more applicable in training, while still others are more applicable in indoctrination. Of course all cannot be developed to an equal degree.

The role of the personal qualities of the military educator is also important. They include Communist conviction, high principles, discipline, absolute honesty and truthfulness, industry and modesty, simplicity and self-criticism, organization, efficiency, tactfulness, demandingness on oneself and one's subordinates, knowledge of one's specialty, etc. "The matter of the teacher's individual qualities," noted N. K. Krupskaya, "assumes primary importance."⁵

The officer's excellent ideological-political, moral and military qualities enable him to impose the strictest demands on his subordinates and to count on their fulfillment, to influence men in all situations, even the most complex. "The principal instrument, the most important condition for successful performance of one's duties and for influencing people," stated Mar SU A. A. Grechko at the All-Army Conference of Young Officers, "is the personal example. The results of an officer's effort are determined to a decisive degree by how well he knows his job, how he conducts himself, his attitude toward obeying orders and observing regulations."⁶

We shall briefly summarize the above. In order to become a genuine military educator, a mentor of one's subordinates, it is necessary to possess: a) knowledge (sociopolitical, general military, psychology and education science, special, general scientific); b) skills and abilities (general pedagogic, indoctrinational, didactic); c) the qualities of the officer-indoctrinator (ideological-political, military-moral, psychological-pedagogic).

An analysis of the teaching activities of officers, the tasks and content of training and indoctrination enable one to state that military pedagogic mastery is a system of special knowledge, skills and abilities which, in combination with Communist conviction, the moral and psychological-pedagogic qualities of the officer, make it possible most effectively to accomplish the tasks of teaching, indoctrinating and training subordinates for the successful conduct of combat operations.

* * *

The process of forming military-pedagogic mastery can be arbitrarily divided into several periods.

The first comprises training at the service school. It is characterized on the one hand by attainment of a fairly high level of development of ideological-political and moral qualities, as well as military skills, and on the other hand by a lack of pedagogic maturity. As a rule men fresh out of a service school possess insufficient knowledge of military education science and psychology and possess poorly-developed psychological-pedagogic qualities; they have mastered only certain teaching and indoctrinational skills and abilities.

The second period comprises the first 2 or 3 years of a lieutenant's service in a unit. His teaching skills are further consolidated and developed during this time. Young officers become excellent specialists; they develop the ability to work with their men and acquire the qualities of the leader-commander. Teaching abilities also are consolidated, which makes it possible to achieve better success in training and indoctrination efforts. On the whole their indoctrinational activities are not yet perfected, as they still make mistakes and perform random actions.

The third period in the growth of military-pedagogic mastery is an officer's subsequent service in a unit. With appropriate effort and work he becomes an expert teacher, possesses well-developed psychological-pedagogic qualities and skillfully accomplishes teaching tasks. In his work there are no random efforts; everything is subordinated to the fundamental teaching objective -- Communist indoctrination of military personnel and improvement of the combat readiness of the subunit and unit. Mastering a system of techniques, he applies them depending on the teaching situation, with the ability in each specific instance to select the most effective pedagogic measures. Inherent in him is the desire continuously to deepen and systematize knowledge, to analyze his own personal teaching experience and that of other officers, to apply the latest achievements of psychology and education theory and advanced practical know-how in working with his men.

Practical army and navy experience indicates that the process of forming military-pedagogic mastery does not proceed in a uniform manner, as a result of which officers attain mastery at different times. This is determined by many factors. Of course the officer's attitude toward his job is of primary significance. If he loves teaching and has a proper attitude toward it, actively taking part in the teaching and indoctrination process, assimilates and applies the teaching experience of his fellow officers, he will attain the objective faster.

The development of young officers is promoted by the attention of higher commanders and political workers, particularly during the first period of service, when they need such assistance. A warm reception and talks with the commanding officer and his deputy commander for political affairs have a beneficent effect on lieutenants: they instill self-confidence, develop the endeavor to complete the breaking-in process as quickly as possible and to master one's duties. Benevolence and daily help in teaching and indoctrination effort speed up the process of forming military-pedagogic mastery. The example of senior comrades possesses great emotional force, not to speak of the practical aspects. "The living example," emphasized Lenin, "has greater effect than any proclamations or conferences," (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 35, page 278). In his commanding officer the lieutenant sees a model for himself, endeavors to emulate him in his actions, frequently under his influence forms a style of conduct; service, pedagogic tactfulness, good speech habits, etc.

Party and Komsomol organizations should be very helpful to commanders and political workers, instilling in young lieutenants a sense of great responsibility for the task at hand and involving them in political indoctrination and mass cultural effort. Discussion at meetings of current problems of military educational science and the practical problems in the development of young officers is useful both to newcomers and veterans alike.

Careful observance of regulations leaves an indelible impression in young officers. "Daily routine and the attitudes which are formed in the unit, assuming specific forms, take solid root in one's daily life and serve the cause of indoctrination."⁷ Wherever regulations and daily routine are strictly observed, where the work day is well-regulated, better conditions exist for improving psychological-pedagogic knowledge and increasing military-pedagogic mastery.

Strict adherence to regulations depends on the demandingness of command personnel at all echelons. Demandingness is the basis of order; it together with explanatory effort ensures precise observance of and adherence to army and navy routine, in this manner influencing the forming of the individual. At the same time demandingness prompts young officers to seek new and better ways and techniques with the objective of pedagogic

influence on their subordinates, in order to increase their knowledge, skills and abilities.

The process of forming and improvement of military-pedagogic mastery takes place in the collective; the effectiveness of this process depends on the solidarity of the collective, the strength of unity of pedagogic views in the collective. The result is a faster development of responsibility for the business of the subunit and unit, a sense of belonging to the unit or ship, a feeling of affection for one's profession and pedagogic labor. Pedagogic slips are more noticeable in a collective united by common views, while assistance in overcoming difficulties is more effective and, most importantly, prompter.⁸

Thus the creation of favorable conditions for forming military-pedagogic mastery as well as purposeful effort in this area by commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations speed up the process of development of young officers as indoctrinators and combat mentors of their subordinates.

* * *

The forming of military-pedagogic mastery is of course inseparable from development of character, but development of character per se does not guarantee the attainment of mastery in military teaching activities. Of great importance in the course of forming and improving military-pedagogic mastery is the development of certain qualities, knowledge, skills and abilities as well as influence on those aspects of the mental makeup and character which play a decisive role in the growth of pedagogic mastery. In addition to development in young officers of ideological-political and military-moral qualities, it is necessary to deepen their knowledge of psychology and education science and to develop in them pedagogic skills and abilities.

It seems to us that the potential of service schools and academies in forming military-pedagogic mastery in students is far from exhausted. It would be expedient, for example, to have a military-pedagogic training plan which could comprise a component part of the plan for developing skills and abilities in party political work; young teacher groups, in which students can deepen their knowledge of psychology and education science and improve their teaching and indoctrinational skills. We believe that they would be happy to attend optional classes in order to study the principles of dissemination skills and techniques of public speaking. An imperative requirement is the introduction of a standard course on teaching methods. At the present time methodological training is handled by various departments. Frequently the time allocated for methods training is used for the study of other disciplines. As a result graduates possess

inadequate mastery of particular methods and lack solid knowledge and skills for teaching. In our opinion it is necessary to improve the preparation of students involving the study of theory of psychology and education science as well as development of practical skills and abilities. It is quite understandable that it is impossible to accomplish all tasks connected with forming military-pedagogic mastery at the military higher educational institution. This effort continues in the line units, where diverse forms, methods and means are employed. We shall examine some of these, as well as the psychological-pedagogic conditions under which they produce the best results.

Permanent lecture teams specializing in military education science and psychology operate in the line units. Experience indicates that continuing interest in lectures is maintained when they contain new material, present various points of view on the problem and promote the solving of pedagogic tasks facing the collective. And yet in many cases the efforts of the lecture teams are determined by purely subjective elements. A standard program, a definite work system can improve this program.

The successful performance of lecture teams depends on the lecturer selection process. Experience shows that not all lecturers satisfy the demands of the audience, for they do not possess sufficient knowledge in the area of military education science, psychology, and propaganda methods.

A broadening and deepening of knowledge of psychology and education science in young officers is promoted by the preparation of reviews and reports on literature read, psychological-pedagogic reports and summaries. A summary should contain an analysis of psychological-pedagogic factors, phenomena, events, their evaluation, as well as suggestions aimed at improving training and indoctrination.

Young officers need assistance and guidance in writing reviews and reports on literature read. One can recommend that they focus on the following items: what psychological-pedagogic problem is posed in the work; the author's approach to solving the problem; correspondence between his point of view and the theses of military education science and psychology; who has written what on this topic and when; your opinion about the work; how and where these points can be applied in military pedagogic activities.

Elaboration of psychological-pedagogic efficiency reports on subordinates is a means of improving military-pedagogic knowledge and a means of achieving mastery of the method of studying people's individual features and traits.

Of great importance are question-and-answer evenings, which enrich young officers with new knowledge and teach them to analyze training and indoctrination activities and to utilize theoretical principles to accomplish

the practical tasks of training and indoctrination; at the same time they help commanders and political workers determine the pedagogic interests of the recent service school graduates, the level of their pedagogic preparation, as well as helping to improve teaching and indoctrination effort, to predict and prevent undesirable phenomena.

Growth of pedagogic maturity and development of common pedagogic views and convictions are promoted by conferences on problems of teaching and indoctrination. Interest in such conferences is heightened when young officers as well are assigned the presentation of a report. In such a case they more actively study education literature, more carefully analyze pedagogic phenomena and facts, consult with their comrades and critically evaluate their own teaching performance.

But no matter what forms and methods are employed in the unit or on board the naval ship, they cannot supplant independent study. "Without a certain amount of independent study," stated Lenin, "it is impossible to arrive at the truth in any serious matter..." (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 23, page 68).

Independent study produces positive results when it is well organized and supervised by commanding officers. It is useful to determine what young officers are reading and how. In order to give independent study appropriate direction, concentrating attention on the study of essential literature (it is impossible to read everything!); it is expedient to prepare recommended reading lists and to prepare selected lists of articles on various problems of teaching and indoctrination. It is important not only to increase responsibility for improving one's knowledge but also to generate interest in this effort, bearing in mind that only systematic work to improve oneself gradually is transformed into a need and produces the desired results. Unfortunately the libraries still contain little literature on military education science. An adequate quantity of materials should be published on this topic, and textbooks and lectures published at the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin should be sent to the libraries of military units and officers' clubs.

Theoretical knowledge must be converted into practical results in working with one's subordinates. The abilities and skills of young officers are improved only in the course of combat and political training. But an increase in the number of classes taught by them and political indoctrination measures carried out will not produce the desired result without proper supervision of senior personnel. Diversified forms of supervision and assistance are employed in practical army and navy activities. For example, during the period of preparation for classes the best results are achieved by instruction sessions, methods conferences, instructor methods, demonstrations and open classes, as well as the conduct of classes on the forthcoming topic by commanding officers.

It is quite understandable that each form of supervision and assistance possesses its own specific features, depending on the topic, curricular discipline (tactics, study of weapons and equipment, vehicle driving, flight training, gunnery practice, missile firing, etc).

The confines of this article permit us to discuss only briefly the most important element in examining these work forms. During the instruction class one specifies clear-cut principles and focuses special attention on demands pertaining to the content and methods of the forthcoming class, on the difficulties which may be encountered in conducting the class, as well as ways to overcome them. Instruction sessions greatly facilitate the work of young officers, give more focus to their activities, broaden their knowledge and speed up the process of forming skills and psychological-pedagogic qualities. Experienced commanders take into strict consideration the individual features of their lieutenants, give them greater independence and encourage innovation in those who have developed skills and abilities more rapidly.

Methods conferences accomplish their task when there is explanation of the "mechanism" of the forming of skills and abilities, when their practical significance is indicated and when rules are formulated on the basis of which the requisite qualities are developed. Methods summaries discussed at conferences are not always mandatory for experienced officers, but they do comprise an important impetus for young lieutenants. It is useful to assign the preparation of such a summary to several young officers on a single topic, with subsequent analysis. This broadens the officers' knowledge, develops pedagogic thinking and the ability to assess methodological devices, produces a concrete picture of skills and promotes their formation and development. Methodological elaboration should reflect the tasks of moral-political and psychological training and the ways to accomplish them, which strengthens the indoctrinational role of training.

The effectiveness of instructor methods classes (and of the other forms being discussed) depends on the preparation of the instructor and his ability to select the most expedient teaching methods. The commander's example promotes development in young officers of teaching techniques and good speaking habits. The most effective are those classes at which the instructor devotes special attention to practical demonstration, combining it with concise explanation, and has his men perform the role of instructors, promoting independence and innovativeness, analysis of the causes of shortcomings, etc.

Demonstration classes, demonstration lessons and mutual class visitation as well as classes conducted by higher commanders (on the basis of the combat training schedule) make it possible to study and disseminate

advanced know-how directly in the course of the training process and to adept it into practical troop activities. The most important thing here is observation, the ability to concentrate attention on that of which other officers have a poor mastery or which they are completely unable to do.

We should like to stress the role of verification and critique. The results of studies have shown that one must recommend a critique covering the following areas: organization of classes, implementation of didactic principles, teaching methods, manifestation of skills and abilities, psychological-pedagogic qualities and qualities of the commander-engineer, teaching techniques, public speaking ability, psychological state of the instructor and his men. This approach makes it possible to assess a class from different aspects, to bring out the positive and to reveal shortcomings.

Consolidation and growth of teaching skills in young officers take place in the process of independent conduct of classes in combat and political training. At this time it is advisable to follow the practice of multiple classes on one and the same topic in different training groups. The value of this practice consists in the fact that the officer is placed into a standard teaching situation, under the influence of which the components of military-pedagogic mastery are developed more rapidly. But such a practice cannot become the rule, for there is possible a decrease in sense of responsibility on the part of young officers for the results of training on their subordinates.

Training is interlinked with indoctrination of personnel. The psychological-pedagogic qualities developed in young officers during the course of combat and political training also promote the conduct of political indoctrination and mass cultural effort. They are not sufficient, however. This is due to the fact that indoctrination methodology possesses relative independence and demands specific components of military-political skills. In order to develop them it is necessary more extensively to involve young officers in active political indoctrination and mass cultural effort. A study of the experience of leading commanders and political workers indicates that attainment of this goal is promoted by the planning of special measures to be conducted by young officers on a subunit or unit scale.

This work requires different qualities of the young lieutenant. For example, can he speak to an audience without possessing propaganda skills?

Speaking to an audience (including as a political instruction group leader) requires ideological conditioning, officer moral and political qualities, the ability to convince and to change convictions, to prove and refute, knowledge of public speaking methods, appropriate public speaking habits,

teaching techniques, etc. Development of these structural components of military-pedagogic mastery is promoted by seminars, methodological consultation, and preliminary discussion of planned addresses. The latter is particularly important initially, when the newly-commissioned officers report to their first line assignment.

The pedagogic effect of the lecture and address depends in large measure on pedagogic technique (intonation, pace, diction, gestures, facial expression). An officer constantly works to improve his delivery: by talking with his fellow officers, by independent preparation (copying down apt expressions, proverbs and sayings, unfamiliar or little-known words, as well as more frequently-used words which are incorrectly stressed, etc). Improvement in public speaking is assisted by the tape recorder (the lecture is recorded, played back, and corrections inserted).

All this is necessary not for the sake of effect and to receive compliments, but rather for the daily, very complex work with subordinates.

In order skillfully to influence and fruitfully to indoctrinate their men, young officers must have knowledge of the individual features and characteristics of their subordinates. "Life itself teaches us," stated Mar SU A. A. Grechko at the All-Army Conference of Young Officers, "that it is impossible to be a good officer-indoctrinator without knowledge of and failing to take into consideration the features and traits of one's subordinates as well as the psychology of the military collective as a whole."

* * *

In conclusion we shall summarize the above. The forming of military-pedagogic mastery is a controlled process; it begins at service school and continues throughout one's career in the service. Military-pedagogic mastery is acquired in line units -- in the classroom, on marches, during training flights, at exercises, and in working with the men -- with a skilled combination of theoretical training and practical requirements. The level of skill depends first and foremost on the young officers themselves, on their work to improve their knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory as well as of psychology and education science, and their efforts to improve their teaching skills and abilities. Young officers need the assistance of commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations. Diversified forms, methods and means are used in combination for the forming and improvement of skills; specific psychological-pedagogic demands are observed, and continuous pedagogic supervision of the activities of young officers is exercised. The process of development of young officers as leaders and indoctrinators of their men is inseparable from the strictest adherence to regulations, the example of one's superiors in rank and position, the military collective and unity of pedagogic views in this collective.

FOOTNOTES

1. Voyennaya Mysl', No 11, 1970.
2. N. K. Krupskaya: Ob uchitele (On the Teacher), Izd-vo Akademii pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR, 1959, page 190.
3. Vysokoye prizvaniye. Vsearmeyskoye soveshchaniye mlodykh ofitserov, Noyabr' 1969 g. (High Calling. The November 1969 All-Army Conference of Young Officers), Voenizdat, 1970, page 18.
4. A. S. Makarenko: Soch. (Writings), Volume 5, Izd-vo Akademii pedagogicheskikh nauk RSFSR, 1951, page 231.
5. Krupskaya, op.cit., page 143.
6. Vysokoye prizvaniye..., op.cit., page 20.
7. M. I. Kalinin: O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge (Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty), Voenizdat, 1967, page 624.
8. The influence of the collective on the development of young officers will be demonstrated in a future article.

THE MILITARY EXPERIENCE OF THE PARIS COMMUNE

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One hundred years have passed since the events surrounding the Paris Commune, which constituted one of the most important stages in the heroic struggle of the international worker class for the victory of communism. For the first time an insurgent proletariat shattered the rule of the bourgeoisie and established its own rule. Although the Commune did not last long, it played an eminent role in societal development. The courageous deed of the toiler masses of Paris demonstrated to mankind a real potential to become free of the oppression of capital. "The cause of the Commune," wrote Lenin, "is the cause of social revolution, the cause of total political and economic liberation of the toilers, the cause of the world proletariat. In this sense it is deathless" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 20, page 222).

Among the many important problems faced by the Paris Commune was that of organizing the armed defense of its conquests. The Communards displayed great energy and innovativeness, initiating construction of a military organization of a new type. Their steadfastness and fearlessness in the face of the counterrevolutionary armies inspired succeeding generations of the worker class in their liberation struggle. The military experience of the Commune is an inseparable part of the revolutionary heritage of the proletariat. It served as one of the basic sources in elaboration of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and army as well as Leninist theory and practice of proletarian revolution.

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On the eve of the establishment of the Paris Commune the situation in France was characterized by a sharp aggravation of the class struggle. Since 1852 France had been under the rule of the emperor Napoleon III -- who expressed the interests of the wealthy industrial and financial bourgeoisie. His antipopular domestic policies generated strong toiler dissatisfaction. A wave of strikes spread. Sections of the First International were vigorously active, exerting increasing influence on the French worker class. In order to consolidate his position and to divert the attention of the toilers away from the revolutionary struggle, Napoleon III plunged France into a war with Prussia. But the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 failed to justify hopes. Serious defeats at the front intensified the general political crisis. A final straw was the catastrophic military defeat at Sedan, where the main forces of the French army, led by the ill-starred emperor, were encircled and captured. A revolution broke out in Paris on 4 September 1870. It swept away the rotten regime of the Second Empire. France was declared a republic.

The bourgeoisie took advantage of the people's victory. It formed its own government, which was bombastically called the government of national defense. In actual fact this government, which was proclaimed by General Trochu, an ardi-reactionary, pursued a policy of betrayal. Prussian troops advanced into the heartland of France almost without resistance, and soon were laying siege to Paris. Only the toilers of the capital offered resistance to the invaders. They heroically defended the city under difficult conditions. Their military force consisted of the National Guard, most of the battalions of which were formed of workers. Frightened by the growth of the revolutionary movement, on 28 January 1871 the government surrendered to the Prussians and signed an armistice agreement. "Forced to choose between national duty and class interests," wrote Marx, "the government of national defense did not waver for a single moment -- it became a government of national betrayal" (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch. [Works], Volume 17, pp 321-322).

But revolutionary Paris refused to put down its arms and submit to this disgraceful act of capitulation. On 18 March 1871 the government, now headed by Thiers, attempted to disarm the workers and to seize the cannon of the National Guard. This reactionary plot, however, failed. The insurgent proletariat of Paris halted the advance of the reactionaries, seized key government building and overthrew the bourgeois government. Thiers and his supporters fled to Versailles. Power passed to the Central Committee of the National Guard. The proletarian revolution was victorious. On 26 March elections to the Commune were held, and on 28 March 1871 the Paris Commune -- the first government of the worker class -- was officially proclaimed.

The Commune was simultaneously a legislative and executive body. Its members comprised 10 committees. The highest agency was the Executive Committee, which was concerned with implementation of all decrees of the Commune and all enactments passed by other committees.¹ Effective 20 April its membership included the directors (delegates) of the other nine special committees. On 1 May it was replaced by the five-man Committee of Public Safety. The Paris Communards, having toppled the bourgeois governmental system, established a government which was unprecedented at the time -- a dictatorship of the proletariat. "Citizens!" stated the first proclamation of the Paris Commune on 29 March 1871. "Your Commune has been established. The election of 26 March sanctioned the victory of the revolution... You have just established bodies which will protect you against all encroachments. You are the masters of your own destiny."²

The priority tasks of the Paris Commune included establishment of armed forces capable of backing up the activities of the chosen representatives of the people connected with implementing a vast program of economic and social reforms. Having destroyed the bourgeois edifice of state, the

Communards also abolished its most important instrument -- the regular army, which was replaced by an armed populace. The first decree of the Commune, issued on 29 March, stated: "The Paris Commune decrees:

1. There shall be no more military recruiting.
2. No armed force other than the National Guard may be established or brought into Paris.
3. All citizens fit for military service shall become members of the National Guard."³

At the same time the Commune declared its intention to reorganize the National Guard applicable to the tasks of the new government. In an appeal to the populace dated 29 March, the Communards stated: "Immediate reorganization of the National Guard, henceforth the sole armed force in Paris."⁴ Practical implementation of this decision, however, was seriously impeded by a lack of experience in organizing armed forces of a proletarian state. Many members of the Commune had no idea of the difficulties involved in establishing a new army. Only when a grave danger hung over the Commune were steps taken to strengthen the combat capability of the National Guard.

A weak link in the army of the Paris Commune was the edifice of military command. This was no random deficiency but rather a consequence of the fact that the Commune was an incomplete and fragile dictatorship. A decree dated 29 March turned over control of the National Guard to the Military Committee, the functions of which were defined as follows: "This Committee shall deal with matters of discipline, armament, clothing and equipment of the National Guard. It shall draft decrees pertaining to the National Guard. Headquarters on the Place Vendôme shall be subordinate to this committee alone. It shall ensure, jointly with the Committee of Public Safety, the security of the Commune and shall maintain surveillance on activities at Versailles. This Committee shall replace the Ministry of War. The cannoneers of the Département Seine shall be under its command."⁵ The committee leaders (military delegates) included General Cluseret, Colonel [Rossel'], and the Jacobin Deléscluze.

The Commune's National Guard was controlled directly through the military delegate. The Central Committee of the National Guard continued to exist and considered itself independent of the Commune. The district subcommittees subordinate to it, the legion councils and battalion committees were quite influential. This seriously impeded troop control. On 6 April the Commune acknowledged: "...In the present crisis a unity of military command is an essential condition for the public good."⁶ That same day a decree was issued announcing dissolution of the district subcommittees. The powers of the legion councils and battalion committees were sharply

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curtailed. They were forbidden to interfere in command functions.⁷ On 4 May the Committee of Public Safety handed over to the military delegate the army high command and control of military operations. The National Guard Central Committee was assigned only management of various military administrative services, but under the supervision of the military delegate.⁸

Organizationally the National Guard consisted of battalions. They formed 20 legions on a territorial principle, corresponding to the number of districts in Paris. A legion contained from two to 25 battalions, which were manned, supplied and stationed in their own districts.⁹ Service in the National Guard was initially voluntary. Later, on 5 April, the Commune introduced compulsory military service for all citizens between the ages of 19 and 40. Military delegate Cluseret undertook an attempt to improve the organization of the National Guard by dividing it into field and garrison troops. Persons between 19 and 35 years of age were to serve in the field troops, which would conduct combat operations, while personnel between 35 and 40 years of age would serve in the garrison troops, which would provide rear services. But this reform was not completed, since the fact that it was based on an age rather than class principle encountered resistance on the part of many Commune members. It was believed that execution of this measure would result in excluding from the field troops the most stalwart and experienced representatives of the worker class, bearers of revolutionary traditions.

Rossel', who replaced Cluseret in May 1871 as military delegate of the Commune, attempted to create a field army by selecting the best National Guard battalions. It was planned to form eight regiments of 2000 men and five artillery pieces each. It was planned to organize the regiments into a maneuver corps of 16,000 men, 40 light and 12-16 heavy guns. New corps were subsequently to be established on the basis of this model. Implementation of the measures proposed by Rossel' could substantially improve organization of the Commune's army. But this required time. In addition, requisite explanatory effort was not conducted. The author of the reform was accused of "Bonapartism" and of an attempt to revive the system of the old regular army. His plan failed to receive support.

The infantry was the principal arm. There were only three squadrons of cavalry, as horses were in short supply. The Communards possessed considerable artillery, totaling 1740 cannon and mitrailleuses. In addition, the Commune's army included an engineer battalion, five armored trains, a river flotilla and a balloon detachment.¹⁰ Statistics on the total size of the National Guard are extremely contradictory. It is highly probable that the actual size of active Commune forces did not exceed 80 to 100 thousand men.¹¹

The command cadres of the Commune's army were primarily from the working class. A large group consisted of military specialists such as Cluacret, Rossel' and others. The officer corps included many political emigrés. A particularly prominent role among these latter was played by Yaroslav Dombrovskiy, Valeriy Vrublevskiy, and [Lya-Sesilia]. Considerable attention was devoted to strengthening discipline. The Commune approved vigorous steps taken by its generals, aimed at maintaining revolutionary order. It granted extensive powers to the military command. A disciplinary court was established in each battalion and a military court in each legion. Shortcomings of efforts in this area include an inability fully to combine disciplinary punishment with political indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of conscious observance of regulations and total obedience to all orders and commands of superiors.

At the expense of considerable effort the Paris Communards succeeded in creating an army which was a prototype of the armed forces of the socialist state. A major drawback was the fact that in creating this army the class principle of personnel selection was not fully implemented. The battalions in which the bourgeoisie was particularly strongly represented had poor combat efficiency. "Only the workers," wrote Lenin, "remained loyal to the Commune to the very end... Only the French proletarians supported their government fearlessly and tirelessly; they alone fought and died for it, that is for the cause of liberation of the worker class, for a better future for all toilers" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 20, pp 218-219).

* * *

The army of the Paris Commune was organized under the conditions of savage civil war. By this time valuable experience of armed uprisings by the worker class had been amassed and theoretically synthesized. Revolution and Counterrevolution in Germany by Friedrich Engels, was published at the beginning of the fifties; it consisted of a series of articles. This work was the first to advance the thesis that "insurrection is an art, just as war, just as other kinds of art" (Marks and Engel's: Soch., Volume 8, page 100).

The basic rules of insurrection were presented in this work in concise form. This facilitated the Communards' task of waging armed struggle against the counterrevolutionary troops. Unfortunately they failed to take into account much from the experience of the past, which led to serious consequences.

A serious demand for a victorious armed uprising was a resolute and bold offensive against the remnants of reactionary forces, with the objective of their total defeat. This is how the workers of Paris should have

proceeded after seizing power on 18 March 1871. But the Central Committee of the National Guard, which was now in a position of leadership over the insurgent people, failed to display the requisite resoluteness and an ability to take advantage of the favorable circumstances to exploit the success achieved. It failed to arrest the Thiers government, failed to detain the members of the bourgeois government bureaucracy, and failed to organize an immediate march on Versailles. One of the most important rules of insurrection had been violated. "The opportune moment was allowed to slip by due to excessive conscientiousness," noted Karl Marx. "They did not want to initiate a civil war, as if that monster Thiers had not already initiated a civil war through his attempt to disarm Paris!" (Marks and Engel's, *Soch.*, Volume 33, page 172). No less serious a mistake was the fact that the Central Committee of the National Guard, as Marx wrote, "surrendered its powers prematurely, in order to step back in favor of the Commune. Once again this was due to 'integrity' carried to an extreme!" (Volume 33, page 172).

The Thiers government took immediate advantage of the mistakes committed by the Communards. With Prussian assistance it substantially increased the size of its army. By 6 April it totaled 65,000 men, and 120,000 by the middle of May.¹² Paris was solidly blockaded by hostile forces and virtually cut off from the rest of the country. Countless spies and provocateurs were sent into the capital, spreading false rumors and disrupting the routine of the city. Having gained time and amassing the requisite manpower and materiel, the counterrevolutionary troops of the Thiers government began an attack on Paris on 2 April.

The military effort of the Paris Communards consisted of two basic stages. The first stage -- from 2 April to 21 May -- comprised a sustained battle on the approaches to Paris. The second stage ran from 21 through 28 May. This was history's famous "bloody week in May," when the Communards heroically fought on the barricades. At each stage the forms and methods of struggle were defined by the demands of the specific combat situation and those practical skills in warfare possessed by the National Guard command personnel and rank and file. Therefore the military art of the Paris Commune was born directly in the course of combat against the Versailles army.

The 2 April attack by the Versailles force was of a reconnaissance nature. The objective was to determine the capability of the Commune to fight, as well as to seize a favorable position on the northwestern approaches to Paris. The Communards successfully pushed back this first onslaught of the reactionaries. They displayed enormous enthusiasm, willingness to self-sacrifice and indomitable will to win. At the same time the military actions of 2 April revealed the total lack of concern on the part of the Commune Council as regards the defense of Paris, as well as the lack of any plan of action in case of an attack by the Versailles force.

The council was hoping for a peaceful outcome of events, did not believe that a serious offensive operation could be undertaken by Versailles and resolutely refused to take the initiative. It failed to provide reliable cover of the immediate approaches to Paris, neglected both agent and military reconnaissance activities, and possessed no ready reserve.

Parisian toiler masses reacted violently to the events of 2 April. Paris became increasingly agitated as the news of the Versailles attack spread. All the squares filled with an aroused populace. Everyone who had a weapon took to the streets with it, without awaiting special instructions. On popular demand the Commune Council decided to shift to an attack against the Versailles force. The plan of the National Guard command called for three detachments to be formed for the campaign: a Northern, a Central and a Southern detachment. They were under the command of Bergeret, [Ed] and Duval respectively. The Northern Detachment in turn was divided into two independent columns: a right column, under the command of [Flurans], and a left column, under the detachment commander Bergeret. The general plan of attack called for the main forces of the detachment to approach the outskirts of Versailles under cover of darkness from three different directions and to storm Versailles with a surprise assault at dawn.

If this plan had been carried out with precision and resoluteness, it could have led to victory, but problems arose at the very outset. Only the Flurans column and the Duval detachment moved out under cover of darkness. The remaining troops did not move out until 5 or 6 in the morning. There was no coordination among the detachments. The columns conducted no reconnaissance and moved slowly. The attack mounted by the National Guard on 3-4 April was a failure. The plan of attack was too complicated for the poorly-organized and loosely-controlled troops. Commune member [Arnu] correctly noted that the military leaders "wanted to wage a conventional, classic war," for which the command and troops were inadequately trained. The situation and the missions at hand demanded bold, resolute offensive operations by small detachments, in which it would have been easy to utilize the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Communards. "Conventional" forms of warfare were inappropriate.

Once again the initiative went over to Versailles. On 6 April the Versailles force resumed the attack. The Commune leaders returned to a defensive, waiting position. In the opinion of military delegate Cluseret, the attack by the Versailles force aimed at "frightening the populace," at compelling the Communards to waste their ammunition. "Our task," he stated, "consists in us, whose strength lies in realization of the righteousness of our cause, patiently awaiting the attack, limiting ourselves to defense."¹³ Cluseret believed only in the potential of barricade combat and intended to transform all of Paris into a giant redoubt, against which the Versailles army would wither away in the attempt to penetrate. A special barricade committee was set up for this purpose.

The Versailles command planned initially to capture the system of permanent fortifications defending the capital, followed by an assault on the city. Stubborn fighting on the approaches to Paris ran through all of April and the first 20 days of May. The most savage fighting occurred in the Western defense sector, which was under the command of Ya. Dombrovskiy, and in the Southern sector, which was under the command of V. Vrublevskiy. Great efforts were directed toward increasing the manufacture of arms and ammunition. A military invention committee was established. Workshops were humming with activity, fabricating small arms, mitrailleuses, cartridges and projectiles. In spite of their heroism and courage, the Communards were unable to hold the line at the permanent fortifications. On 21 May the Versailles force entered the city. The final stage of the fighting began.

Centralized direction of the defense of Paris was particularly necessary at this difficult moment, but it was lacking. When the Versailles force entered the city, military delegate Charles Delécluze and the Committee of Public Safety issued the following appeal to the populace and the National Guard:

"Citizens! Enough of militarism, enough of staff military with their chevrons and gold braid!

It is time for the people, for the bare-handed fighters! The hour of revolutionary war has sounded.

The people understands nothing of clever maneuvers but, with weapon in hand and the pavement underfoot, it fears no strategists of the monarchist school."¹⁴

This signified rejection of organized and purposeful armed struggle. Almost all the members of the Commune, leaving their posts, went around to the districts to construct barricades. [Lissagare], historian of the Commune, wrote: "The barricade constructed during those days in May was a pile of rocks and sand to the height of a man. Behind it occasionally stood a cannon or mitrailleuse and in the middle a red banner, the color of vengeance, secured by two paving stones. About 20 men behind these little fortifications would halt entire regiments."¹⁵

The resistance was particularly stubborn on Montmartre. Heroically defending Montmartre, the Communards at the same time committed a serious error: they failed to fortify the northern sector, as Karl Marx had recommended. "If only the Commune had heeded my warning!" Marx subsequently wrote. "I advised its members to fortify the north side of Montmartre -- the Prussian side, and they had the time to do this; I warned them that otherwise they would be caught in a trap..." (Marks and Engel's: Soch.,

Volume 33, page 191). This was indeed the case. From the north side the Communards received a surprise attack by a Versailles brigade which the Prussians allowed to pass through their position. This sealed the fate of Montmartre. But resistance continued around the Père-Lachaise cemetery and Belleville. On 28 May the last barricade of the Communards surrendered.

The proletarians of Paris were defeated. The Commune they had created fell under the onslaught of the counterrevolution. Revealing the reasons why the French worker class was unable to hold power in its hands, Lenin wrote that "at least two conditions are essential for a victorious social revolution: highly-developed productive resources and a prepared proletariat. But in 1871 both these conditions were lacking" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 20, page 219). The reasons for the defeat of the Commune include errors committed by its leaders in the area of the military. The Paris proletariat, as Lenin pointed out, was too magnanimous toward its enemies. "...It should have annihilated its enemies, but it attempted to exert moral influence on them; it ignored the significance of purely military actions in a civil war and instead of crowning its victory in Paris with a resolute offensive against Versailles, it lingered and gave the Versailles government time to gather its dark forces and to prepare for the bloody week in May" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 16, pp 452-453).

Approximately 100,000 Communards perished in the fighting against the Versailles force. They were the finest sons of the French worker class. But no matter how great the sacrifices of the Commune, they were not in vain. In spite of the tragic outcome, the selfless struggle of the Paris Communards was of immense significance in the history of the revolutionary movement. "The thunder of the Paris cannon," wrote Lenin, "awakened the deeply-slumbering, most backward strata of the proletariat and provided an impetus to strengthen revolutionary socialist propaganda. This is why the cause of the Commune did not die; it still lives in each of us" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 20, page 222).

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The founders of Marxism-Leninism and the Communists of all nations carefully examined the lessons of the Paris Commune, carefully studying its experience, including its experience at armed struggle. This effort was initiated by the ingenious work by Karl Marx entitled The Civil War in France. A new stage in the study of the history of the Commune was initiated with the publication of Lenin's Uroki Kommuny (Lessons of the Commune), Pamyati Kommuny (To the Memory of the Commune), Gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya (State and Revolution), and others. Lenin highly praised the revolutionary traditions of the French people and its armed struggle during the days of the Paris Commune. He relied on the experience of the Commune in elaborating the major points of revolutionary theory and in solving practical problems of the socialist revolution.

Throughout his entire revolutionary activities Lenin was constantly interested in the history of the Paris Commune and studied it thoroughly. On the eve of the first Russian revolution, in March 1904, he prepared three outlines of a lecture dedicated to the memory of the Commune (Leninskiy Sbornik [Lenin Collection], XXVI, pp 49-58). Later, at the beginning of 1905, Lenin drafted a detailed "schedule of readings on the Commune," which constituted an outline of a lecture he delivered on 5 (18) March 1905 in Geneva to a group of Russian political emigrés (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 9, pp 328-330). An analysis of these documents shows that Vladimir Il'ich had not only thoroughly studied Marx's book The Civil War in France but had also thoroughly studied a number of historical works. His lecture outlines contain factual data from a work by [Zh. Veyl'] entitled History of the Social Movement in France, 1852-1902, and by P. Lissagare entitled History of the 1871 Commune. For example, from the latter book he takes figures on the Commune's casualties (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 9, page 330). From excerpts taken from a book by Gabriel [Anoto] entitled Contemporary France, copied in the first half of March 1905, one can see that Lenin was particularly interested in the activities of the Thiers government in 1870-1871. These excerpts were also employed as material for a speech on the Paris Commune (Leninskiy Sbornik, XXVI, pp 59-60).

The first Russian revolution demanded that the party seek concrete methods of waging a struggle against the armed forces of the autocracy. Lenin conducted a vigorously active practical study of the historical experience of toiler uprisings, particularly the military experience of the Paris Commune. As is attested by N. K. Krupskaya, at that time Lenin read, alongside the writings of Marx and Engels, "many books on the art of warfare, pondering from all sides the technique and organization of armed insurrection."¹⁶ For example, he edited with great care a translation of the chapter on street fighting from the second volume of the memoirs of the Commune's General Klyuzere (Leninskiy Sbornik, XXVI, pp 355-365). This translation was published in the 23 (10) March 1905 edition of the newspaper Vpered under the heading "On Street Fighting (Advice by the General of the Commune)." The translation was prefaced by a biography of Cluseret written by Lenin (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 9, pp 347-348).

Lenin also turned to the historical legacy of the Paris Commune at a later date, during the period between the first and second Russian revolutions, particularly during preparations for the October storming of the Winter Palace. He subjected again and again to deep analysis the first experience of dictatorship of the proletariat. It is a well-known fact that his classic work Gosudarstvo i revolyutsiya (State and Revolution), written on the eve of the October Revolution, was substantially based on his study of the history of the Paris Commune, including its military history. For example, in excerpts copied from the book The Civil War in France, notes

which Lenin took while preparing to write his work, he particularly stressed Marx's point that the first decree of the Commune was abolishment of the regular army and its replacement with an armed populace (Leninskiy Sbornik, XIV, page 311).

Thoroughly studying and extensively disseminating among the workers of Russia the military combat experience of the Paris Communards, Lenin at the same time taught that in selecting given forms of struggle one should proceed from the actually prevailing conditions rather than blindly copying the examples of the past. "...Marxism," he wrote, "definitely demands a historical examination of the question of forms of struggle. To pose this question divorced from the specific historical circumstances means failure to understand the primer of dialectical materialism... To attempt to answer yes or no to the question of specific means of struggle without examining in detail the specific circumstances of the given movement at the given stage in its development means totally to abandon the soil of Marxism" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 14, page 2).

The conditions under which the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat developed differed substantially from those which prevailed in the 19th century, when the first armed uprisings of the proletariat in the nations of Western Europe occurred. The appearance of mass armies numbering in the millions and their equipment with modern arms and military hardware greatly increased the capabilities of the bourgeoisie in the struggle against the worker class. One could not count on success by employing the old barricades tactics which were typical of armed uprisings of the past. Barricades would not withstand an assault by well-armed regular troops. Lenin noted that "against artillery it would be stupidity to operate as a mob and to defend barricades with pistols" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 13, page 374). Barricade combat also became obsolete because it permitted only defensive actions, while the principal rule of insurrection as an art was the "desperately bold, resolutely committed attack" (Volume 13, page 374).

During the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907, Russia's worker class utilized much from the experience of the Paris Communards. Although the goals and tasks of this revolution and the revolution of the French workers were substantially different, the Russian proletariat, as Lenin noted, "should resort to the same method of combat which was initiated by the Paris Commune -- civil war" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 16, page 454). Lenin taught the worker class, recalling the lessons of the Commune, not to ignore peaceful means of struggle but at the same time never to forget that "under certain conditions class struggle merges into forms of armed combat and civil war," that "there are moments when the interests of the proletariat demand merciless annihilation of its enemies in open

combat" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 16, page 454). In his opinion this was first demonstrated by the French proletariat in the 1871 Commune and was brilliantly corroborated by the Russian proletariat in the December 1905 armed uprising.

The Bolshevik Party, however, preparing for an armed uprising in December 1905, took into consideration the altered situation conditions. In conformity with this they elaborated new methods of struggle. The combat organization of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party published on 11 December "Advice to Insurgent Workers," which contained instructions not to occupy fortified positions in any case, for "regular troops will always be able to capture them or simply destroy them with artillery." This appeal instructed the workers "not to operate in a mob but rather in small groups of three or four men each, which can swiftly attack and swiftly disappear."¹⁷ The insurgents employed this method with success. Thus the revolutionary innovativeness of the masses advanced a new tactic which was, to use Lenin's expression, a tactic of "partisan warfare," and a related new organization of the forces of the revolution in the form of small, mobile detachments. "The December struggle of 1905," wrote Lenin, "proved that armed rebellion can win under present-day conditions of military equipment and military organization" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 17, page 48).

Relying on the works of Marx and Engels, and studying the military experience and lessons of the Paris Commune and the December 1905 Moscow uprising, Lenin elaborated a well-formed doctrine on insurrection and thus made an outstanding contribution to Marxist theory. In pieces written on the eve of the October Revolution, such as "The Bolsheviks Must Seize Power," "The Crisis Has Become Critical," "Marxism and Rebellion," "Advice from a Bystander," and others, he formulated the main rules of insurrection as an art. Running through all of Lenin's writings of this period is the idea that once an uprising has been initiated, it is essential to act with the greatest boldness and resoluteness, that defense is the death of an armed uprising. The victory of the October 1917 Armed Uprising confirmed the correctness of this doctrine. "The Bolshevik Party, under Lenin's guidance, practically implemented the Marxist demand to treat insurrection as an art."¹⁸

The worker class of Russia continued the cause of the proletarians of Paris, who in 1871 first proved the vast potential of the revolutionary energy and revolutionary innovativeness of the masses. The experience of the Commune is inseparable from the experience of the October Revolution. Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution Lenin wrote: "A second world-historic step was taken in reference to the Paris Commune. The proletarian-peasant Soviet Republic has proven to be the world's first stable socialist republic" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 38, page 307).

Honoring the centennial of the establishment of the Paris Commune, the Soviet people and its Armed Forces honor the heroes of the Paris Commune and bow their heads in honor of their immortal deed. The glorious revolutionary proletarian traditions initiated by the Paris Communards have become fully embodied in the great deeds of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the brother socialist nations, who are building the magnificent edifice of socialism and communism under the guidance of their Communist and worker parties.

The revolutionary enthusiasm and fearlessness of the Paris Communards became a standard of conduct for the French Communists both in struggle with their class enemies and with the Nazi invaders for the freedom and independence of their homeland during World War II. The French Communist Party, states the greeting by the Central Committee CPSU to the Central Committee of the French Communist Party on the occasion of party's 50th anniversary, is "the legitimate successor to the revolutionary and democratic traditions of the French people, the continuer of the cause of the heroic Paris Commune."¹⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. Protokoly zasedaniy Parizhskoy Kommuny 1871 goda (Records of the Meetings of the 1871 Paris Commune), Volume 1, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1959, page 35.
2. Ibid., page 44.
3. Ibid., page 43.
4. Ibid., page 44.
5. Ibid., page 35.
6. Ibid., page 114.
7. Ibid., page 131.
8. Ibid., Volume 2, 1960, pp 123-124.
9. P. M. Kerzhentsev: Istoriya Parizhskoy Kommuny 1871 (History of the 1871 Paris Commune), Sotsekgiz, 1959, page 252.
10. S. N. Krasil'nikov: Boyevyye deystviya Parizhskoy Kommuny 1871 (Combat Operations of the 1871 Paris Commune), Voenizdat, 1935, pp 40-42.

11. Parizhskaya Kommuna 1871 g. (The 1871 Paris Commune), Volume II, Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1961, page 183.
12. Kerzhentsev, op.cit., page 244.
13. Ibid., page 252.
14. Protokoly..., op.cit., Volume 2, page 390.
15. P. Lissagare: Istoriya Kommuny 1871 goda (History of the 1871 Commune), Saint Petersburg, page 269.
16. N. K. Krupskaya: Vospominaniya o Lenine (Reminiscences of Lenin), Gospolitizdat, 1957, page 92.
17. Izvestiya Moskovskogo Soveta rabochikh deputatov, 11 December 1905.
18. K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina. Tezisy Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (The Vladimir Il'ich Lenin Birth Centennial. Theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Politizdat, 1970, page 17.
19. Pravda, 29 December 1970.

Translator's note: Names in brackets are transliterations.

WEST GERMANY: POLITICS AND THE BUNDESWEHR

Col O. Rubtsov

More than 20 years have passed since the establishment of the FRG; for more than 20 years the world has observed this state, where for many long years reactionary parties of big monopoly capital were in power, parties of industrial big shots and bosses of finance, parties of revanchism and militarism.

During all these years they pursued an openly antipopular domestic and aggressive foreign policy, seeking with the aid of revanchism, militarism and anticommunism to restore the German Reich to its 1937 boundaries. FRG ruling circles transformed the country into the principal NATO base and arsenal, while the Bundeswehr became the main striking force of this reactionary bloc in Europe. Through the efforts of reactionary NATO circles and with the aid and support of the United States, a focus of international tension was formed in the middle of Europe, creating a real threat to the peace and security of peoples.

An Intelligent Beginning

A policy of revenge-seeking and anticommunism as well as attempts to speak with the socialist nations in the language of "cold war" led to a situation whereby more and more people in West Germany became convinced of the failure and danger of the policies of the CDU/CSU, which resulted in higher prices and taxes, a rise in living costs caused by the country's militarization and an increase in military expenditures. Vivid evidence of this was toiler demonstrations, particularly in the summer and fall of 1969, for peace, against neofascism, militarism and revanchism, demonstrations which exerted decisive influence on the course and outcome of the West German legislature election campaign. The Bundestag elections held on 28 October 1969 resulted, as is well known, in a defeat for the reactionaries: the CDU/CSU parties were voted out of power, while the NDP did not win a single seat in the Bundestag, since it failed to receive the necessary 5 percent of the total votes cast, although more than 1.4 million voters chose the neo-Nazis. A new government coalition was formed of the Social Democrats and Free Democrats, whose platform contained certain realistic elements.

In view of the prevailing situation and the desire of certain segments of the population for peace, the Brandt-Scheel government was compelled to take a number of steps to reduce international tension in Europe. The biggest and most important step was the signing of a treaty with the Soviet Union on 12 August 1970 and with the Polish People's Republic on 7 December

1970, which attest to the fact that the government of the FRG agrees to recognize the situation in Europe as it actually stands, as well as existing borders, particularly the western border of the PPR along the Oder and Neisse rivers, and the border between the FRG and the GDR,

The government of the FRG acquiesced to these treaties not only under pressure by progressive elements in the FRG proper. This took place as a result of a consistent peaceful policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations as well as an increase in their prestige and respect throughout the world. Thus the most important factor compelling the West German leaders to revise past foreign policy and to sign these treaties was a further change in the world balance of power in favor of socialism.

It is not surprising that many political leaders in the FRG and in other NATO nations have been compelled to acknowledge that any attempt to redraw the map of Europe with the aid of military force would inevitably result in a total catastrophe for the West.

For example, in an interview with the U.S. news magazine Newsweek Chancellor Willy Brandt stated: "...No changes can be effected contrary to the will and might of the Soviet Union."¹ Minister without portfolio Egon Bahr was even franker: "Everyone should realize that these territories (that is the boundaries of the Nazi Reich -- O. P.) cannot be returned with the aid of force, except at the cost of Germany's destruction."²

In signing the treaty the government of the FRG of course pursues other goals as well. In the first place they hope with the aid of such major political moves to enhance the international prestige of the government and the FRG. In the second place, they hope to expand economic relations with the socialist nations, which is of interest to a segment of the West German industrial bourgeoisie as well as the worker class, engineers and technicians, and factory management, for whom economic cooperation promises an improved financial status and elimination of the threat of unemployment. Thirdly, ruling circles are dreaming of achieving so-called "infiltration" with the aid of expanded economic, cultural and commercial relations, that is penetration of the socialist nations by bourgeois ideology. They are counting on the treaty helping, to quote Willy Brandt, "make the borders of the socialist nations penetrable."

We are convinced that the treaties between the USSR and the FRG and between Poland and the FRG constitute a good basis for peaceful coexistence in Europe of nations with differing social systems. Of course they will play their full role only after ratification, but one can already see that they are exerting a positive influence on improving the political climate in Europe.

Revanchists Seek Power

The signing of these treaties has aggravated the internal political struggle in West Germany. During the course of this struggle there is occurring a demarcation of the country's political forces, a process which is far from completed. Three major political factions have taken shape up to the present time.

Supporters of the treaty include the parties of the government coalition, a number of trade union and other political organizations, including the Association of West German Trade Unions, the German Peace Alliance Party, the Union of Young Socialists, youth organization, many women's organizations and a certain segment of the wealthy bourgeoisie who are endeavoring to establish economic cooperation with the USSR.

The Communists of West Germany are waging a consistent struggle for early ratification of these treaties.

Opponents of the treaty include the CDU, headed by K. Kiesinger and the CSU, headed by F. Strauss, the neo-Nazi NDP, headed by [A. Tadden], the revanchist "Heimat," traditional militarist unions, military concerns, and a considerable segment of armed forces command personnel.

The third faction (smaller and less influential) represents a "wait and see" attitude. These include individuals, political and public organizations which have not announced a definite stand on the treaties.

Recently there has been a considerable increase in subversive activities by imperialist reactionary elements, endeavoring at all costs to prevent ratification of the treaties and to return to "cold war" times.

The reactionaries have announced a "nationwide campaign" against the treaty. The rightist factions they have put together, from Kiesinger to Strauss, from Tadden to the leaders of reactionary unions, with the support of the Springer newspapers, have begun attacking the supporters of the treaty, accusing the government of every conceivable mortal sin. The tone of this sinister campaign has been set by the leader of the Bavarian ultrarightists, F. Strauss, and his CSU.

According to West German political commentator S. Hafner, Strauss and his followers stand "to the right" of the NDP. At the CSU Congress held in October 1970 Strauss cynically declared that his party intended to torpedo the Moscow treaty and to sweep the present government out of office. At their rallies reactionary circles openly advance past revanchist slogans, while their newspapers contain such headlines as "Germany's Second Surrender," "Germany Is Perishing," "Germany Is Being Destroyed,"

"Repudiation of 1937 Borders Is a Crime," etc. Neo-Nazi mass rallies have been held in Würzburg, Bonn and other cities.

The reactionaries are actively lobbying in the Bundestag, utilizing all means, including bribing legislators. It is a well-known fact that the government coalition had 254 votes in the Bundestag, as compared to the opposition's 242. The reactionaries succeeded in "enticing" to the CDU three deputies from the FDP (E. Mende, S. Zogelman, and G. Starke). Thus the SPD and FDP coalition now has only a 6-vote majority. Franz-Joseph Strauss attempted to bribe another deputy (K. Geldner), promising him 400,000 marks to defect to the CSU. Geldner, however, turned down the offer and exposed Strauss's machinations.

We should note that the reactionaries succeeded in "winning over" some seats in the Landtag elections. For example, in Bavaria (22 November 1970) the CSU received 124 of 204 seats, while in Hessen the CDU increased its number of seats from 26 to 46. This attests to the fact that the reactionaries are shifting to the offensive and are hatching plans for a bloodless coup in the legislature by gaining a majority. They are backed by the most influential West German monopolists, who are interested in the flourishing of the military-industrial complex.

The West German military-industrial concerns, which bear responsibility for World War II, are presently directing a campaign against a lessening of tension. Bundeswehr officers and general officers who at one time faithfully served Hitler stand in the front ranks of the opponents of the treaties with the USSR and Poland. They are quite satisfied with the past revanchist foreign policy course, which ensures an arms race and growth to the army. The U.S. imperialists are also attempting to hinder improvement in the international situation, utilizing NATO for this purpose.

The NATO military has launched vicious attacks against the socialist nations, appealing to the NATO member nations to "increase their contribution" toward stepping up military preparations. Both the assembly and the council have once again confirmed the fact that the NATO leaders continue to assign the FRG -- America's principal ally in Western Europe -- the role of NATO arsenal and bridgehead, while assigning to the Bundeswehr and American troops the role of spearhead of U.S. global strategy in Europe.

NATO Striking Power in Europe

The territory of the FRG, in the view of the NATO command, constitutes the principal bridgehead for the preparation of aggression against the Warsaw

Pact nations. The main NATO force in Europe -- its mailed fist -- is deployed in Germany.

A special role is assigned to the Bundeswehr in NATO plans. According to the London Institute of Strategic Studies, the FRG armed forces total 465,000 men, of which 328,000 are ground troops, with 101,000 men in the air force and 36,000 men in the navy.³

Just as the Reichswehr, the Bundeswehr is designed for rapid deployment. Certain conditions exist for this.

In the first place the ratio of command personnel to rank and file is very high -- almost one out of every three men is an officer or NCO. Even today the Bundeswehr has 5 times as many command personnel as the Reichswehr. In 1970 there were 176 general officers, 28 admirals, and approximately 30,000 officers serving in the Bundeswehr. In addition, the FRG has amassed a substantial number of trained reservists. First-category reserves total 1.5 million men. This number will increase to 4 million by the mid-eighties.

Secondly, the Bundeswehr is to a substantial degree a professional army: 49.5 percent of its personnel are professional mercenaries. In the near future professionals will comprise 52 percent of all armed forces personnel.⁴

Thirdly, another army is being established, the so-called Heimatschutz or home guard, made up of reservists residing no more than 25 km from their unit. In addition, each brigade contains one and each division two replacement battalions manned by reservists (a total of 57 battalions).

The West German newspaper Die Welt stated the following: "If the political leaders of the FRG request it, the Bundeswehr can swell to 1.2 million men overnight."⁵

Just as the Reichswehr, the Bundeswehr is designed primarily for offensive operations:

forward subunits of motorized infantry and panzer divisions are situated only 20-40 kilometers from the borders of the socialist countries;

at numerous exercises principal attention is focused on the conduct of offensive operations, many of which are organized in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the socialist nations;

the Bundeswehr command focuses particular attention on the development of offensive weapons, tanks in particular.

The Bundeswehr is larger in both manpower and arms than many armies of the NATO joint armed forces. In manpower it is double the size of U.S. forces in Europe and 8 times the size of British forces. At the present time approximately 60 percent of the men, almost half of the divisions and more than 50 percent of the tanks under the NATO command in Central Europe, and approximately 40 percent of NATO ground forces tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the FRG belong to the Bundeswehr.⁶

In the opinion of military experts in the GDR, the firepower of 12 West German divisions exceeds that of 50 World War II Wehrmacht divisions.

In an interview with the Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Bundeswehr Inspector General W. de Mesier boasted that "the Bundeswehr is superior to all Western armies in combat readiness" and that it could "stand up to the Soviet Army."

The Bundeswehr is strengthening its position in NATO, which is intensifying the aggressive orientation of this bloc. At the present time more than 1000 West German military personnel are working at various NATO administrative facilities and headquarters. Many important NATO posts are held by Bundeswehr representatives. For example, General [Yu. Benneke] commands NATO joint armed forces in Central Europe. Maj Gen K. Schnell, commander of the 6th Motorized Infantry Division, has been named Deputy Chief of Staff of NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe, while Lt Gen I. Steinhof, inspector of the Bundeswehr air force, has been named chairman of the NATO military committee. We should note that Benneke, Schnell, and Steinhof are former Hitler Wehrmacht officers.

In NATO's Northern Army Group West German contingents comprise 36 percent of total personnel, large units and staffs. In the Central Army Group every other enlisted man and one out of three officers is a German from the FRG. West German military personnel comprise 25 percent of personnel in the 2nd and 4th [OTAK]. Seventy percent of the ships and 50 percent of command posts in the NATO command naval formations in the Baltic Straits zone are Bundeswehr.

Military integration has essentially secured the Bundeswehr a leading position in NATO among the European nations. With the aid of NATO Bonn reactionaries hope to obtain nuclear weapons and to bind their bloc allies even more tightly to their war chariot.

The Bundeswehr command has adopted the U.S. strategy of "flexible reaction," supplemented by the concept of "forward lines." It consists essentially in maintaining armed forces directly along the borders of the socialist nations in a state of readiness for war, with the employment both of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

The West German printed media, particularly following the Israeli aggression against the Arab nations, discuss blitzkrieg in Europe with the employment of nuclear weapons. Bundeswehr leaders advocate lowering the "nuclear threshold" in a limited war as well as a certain independence in choice of weapons. The French newspaper La Tribune des Nations stated the following: "The Federal Republic... has forced upon NATO strategists its own viewpoint "on limited sneak attacks and on the possibility of swift employment of nuclear weapons."⁷

Their Political Face

The aggressive, anti-Communist character of the Bundeswehr is determined to a great extent by the fact that it is headed by former officers of Hitler's Wehrmacht, who loyally served Hitler and who took part in his predatory campaigns. The Bundeswehr inspector general, the inspectors of the services, corps and division commanders all served for years in the Wehrmacht, and many occupied responsible command and staff positions.

Indicative for a description of the generals is a social breakdown. The overwhelming majority are from wealthy bourgeois families, from the top-echelon bureaucracy of the Third Reich, or from families with generations of tradition of military service. Forty-one percent of generals come from old officer families, while one out of every five is the son of an entrepreneur.

Surveys conducted by West German sociologists have shown that almost half of all Bundeswehr officers and general officers come from areas which today belong to the socialist countries. They are the progeny of land-owners, factory owners and top-echelon bureaucrats and are particularly fanatical in their demands for return of their former properties which today are located on territory belonging to the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. As was stated by the newspaper Deutsche Nachrichten, spokesman of the NDP, the officers and general officers see in Franz-Joseph Strauss a man around whom should rally all those who want Germany to be militarily strong.

We shall note that approximately 40 percent of Bundeswehr personnel are so-called "Heimatvertriebene," while according to official statistics they do not exceed 24 percent of the overall population of West Germany. This cadre selection is not mere happenstance: those resettled from the East are the most reactionary segment of the population.

The majority of generals and admirals worked for an extended period under the supervision of war criminals Häusinger, Speidel, Ruge, Kamhuber and others. They were brought up under fascism; 38 Bundeswehr generals were awarded Nazi Germany's highest decoration, the Knight's Cross, while 160 actively collaborated with the Nazi Party.

Many Bundeswehr generals and admirals are in the front ranks of the West German reactionaries. They demand that the army exercise greater influence in Germany, its transformation into a "factor of order," the arming of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons and modern combat equipment, establishment of Prussian-Nazi discipline in the Bundeswehr, the spirit of a Hitler barracks. Some openly express their liking for the NDP.

The generals and officers have achieved enhancement of the role of the military in West Germany. The newspaper Die Welt writes that the Bundeswehr "functions as a political force, as a factor of stability."

The generals had a hand in the Bundestag passing the so-called "Emergency Laws," which grant the government the right to use the army to crush toiler demonstrations. Numerous military exercises involve working on techniques and methods of breaking up demonstrations with the aid of armored personnel carriers and tear gas, arresting "suspicious" persons and conducting interrogator.

The Bonn generals are the inspirers of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet propaganda in the Bundeswehr. Well suited to the generals and admirals is the officer corps, from the older veterans who served in the Wehrmacht, to the younger officers who began their military career in the Bundeswehr. All of them, in the opinion of the magazine Stern, have been infected "by the bacilli of aggressive thinking." The young officers "are burning with desire to get even with the Russians and the East," states the magazine.

Extremist elements in the army and navy are encouraging militarist attitudes and are indoctrinating the men in a spirit of vicious hatred toward the nations of the socialist camp and in a spirit of anticommunism. According to reports published in the West German press, many Bundeswehr officers are members of the NPD, regularly attend party meetings and offer moral and material support. Noncommissioned officers openly conduct anti-Communist, militarist propaganda.

All this cannot help but affect the political-morale state of personnel, the majority of whom are a compliant instrument in the hands of the command. For example, NCO [S. Trayza], describing the attitude of personnel, wrote: "Everybody in our company shares the same opinion: the GDR and the Communist regimes in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria can be removed only by force. The Bundeswehr... will play a decisive role in this."

It is not surprising that many military personnel, particularly command cadres, speak out against ratification of the treaties between the USSR and the FRG and Poland and the FRG. It is precisely for this reason that F. Weil, a former soldier in a reconnaissance battalion of the 3rd Panzer

Division, who had dreamed of an NCO career and who had been crammed full of ideas about revenge and anticommunism, in the night of 7 November 1970 wounded Soviet soldier I. Shcherbak, who was standing guard duty at the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin. Weil does not hesitate to admit that his aim was to "prevent ratification of the treaty between the USSR and the FRG." Various fascist literature was found at his apartment. We should note that it was precisely in this division, at the initiative of the deputy commander of the large unit, that special classes had at one time been introduced for study of the history of the National Socialist Party, recorded Hitler speeches had been played, and Nazi literature had been read.

As is well known, the opponents of ratification of these treaties are most active in Bavaria. According to reports in the press, they are supported primarily by 100,000 soldiers and 250,000 Bundeswehr reservists stationed in Bavaria, as well as by 280,000 active members of various traditional military organizations.

On the basis of surveys and studies conducted in the FRG one can conclude that the majority of Bundeswehr personnel, particularly command personnel, favor CDU/CSU policy. In the opinion of the magazine Spiegel, one out of every four "supports the NDP." It would be incorrect, however, to state that all Bundeswehr personnel are reactionaries. A certain segment of Bundeswehr personnel are being increasingly influenced by the antifascist movement which is gaining momentum in the FRG, by protests against nuclear arms for the Bundeswehr, by the movement supporting ratification of the treaties, and by the struggle of the German Communists.

Changing of the Guard

Social Democrat H. Schmidt has served for more than a year now as defense minister. Upon taking this post he stated, as is well known, that he would consistently carry out the policy of his predecessor, Schröder, and that "indoctrinational effort in the military will continue as before." Immediately after taking office, Schmidt began carrying out a number of important measures.

In conformity with a directive issued by the Minister of Defense on 6 April 1970, the ministry, General Headquarters, the headquarters of the services and individual large units are being reorganized. The ground forces and territorial troops have been merged; the army, air force and navy are being reorganized. As is noted in the foreign press, this reorganization aims at increasing the striking power of the West German large units and at improving the system of troop control in a combat situation. Officers and general officers have been given substantially broader powers. The inspectors of the services have been given command authority, more rigid training and indoctrination methods have been introduced, and soldiers must meet higher demands. Indoctrinational work with personnel is being increasingly

based on the militarist traditions of the past, focusing on anticommunism, just as in the past, with anticommunism permeating all military life and activities.

Military expenditures have reached record levels. They totaled 20.35 billion marks in 1970. This is 10 percent greater than the military expenditures of the previous administration. In 1971 the military budget will rise an additional 10.4 percent, totaling almost 22 billion marks.

By establishing an agency to deal with matters pertaining to weapons and supply under the Ministry of Defense, H. Schmidt has achieved more effective arming of the Bundeswehr. It is indicative that one of the top executives of the defense industry firm Thiessen-Nomson was appointed to the post of secretary of state for arms matters. This has strengthened the bond between the Bundeswehr generals and the monopolies as well as the power of the military-industrial complex. The Paris newspaper Tribune des Nations stated: "That which in the United States is called the military-industrial complex enjoys omnipotence in Bonn Germany."

In the period 1970-1975 the defense industry companies will receive the lion's share of the military budget. At the present time 700,000 persons are employed in West Germany's defense industry. This industry is fully capable of producing nuclear weapons. There is enough plutonium available, for example, to manufacture more than 280 20 kiloton nuclear bombs each year.

The reequipping of the Bundeswehr with Leopard tanks is continuing. West German divisions will receive an additional 2200 Marder armored personnel carriers, 1300 amphibious APCs, 400 helicopters, and hundreds of new mortars, guns and missiles.

Reequipping of the air force involves chiefly the addition of multipurpose aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Missile-armed warships are being built for the West German navy. It is planned to increase annual refresher training of reservists from 100 to 300 thousand men.

The Bundeswehr generals, military concerns and reactionary circles are demanding that the Bundeswehr be strengthened in all respects. The actions taken by Defense Minister Schmidt in this area are receiving the warm approval of aggressive elements, including the West German generals. "Schmidt is forging the Bundeswehr. He is the best blacksmith we have,"⁸ states General E. Middeldorf, author of the notorious book The Russian Campaign, in the magazine Stern. "We couldn't have a better man," agrees General W. de Mesier. According to the Springer newspaper Die Welt, Schmidt has become the most popular political figure in the FRG. The Bundeswehr generals call him "the best defense minister since the establishment of West Germany's armed forces."

The signing of the treaties between the USSR and the FRG as well as between Poland and the FRG constitutes an important international event. It opens up a new stage in relations between these nations. There lies ahead, however, a bitter struggle for ratification and implementation of the principles of these treaties. Ratification of these treaties will definitely hamper the activities of revanchist elements in the FRG, depriving them of a "legal basis," since the treaties proclaim the permanent nature of the borders and renunciation of all territorial claims.

Of course the treaties will not change the thinking of those who persistently dream of redrawing the map of Europe with the aid of a war machine. The FRG is an imperialist power and the main partner of the United States in the aggressive NATO bloc. World imperialism has not given up its hopes to utilize the FRG to heighten international tension.

A serious danger is also presented by the activities of reactionary elements in the FRG, particularly in the army and navy, activity which is promoted and encouraged by international reaction. One should not forget that German imperialism is a dangerous and crafty opponent, who possesses considerable experience in preparing for and waging wars. All these facts dictate the necessity on the one hand for a continuous and thorough study of the political and military processes taking place in West Germany and the Bundeswehr as well as a careful analysis of the distribution of class forces in West Germany, and on the other an all-out strengthening of our homeland's defensive might, an increase in army and navy combat readiness.

FOOTNOTES

1. Newsweek, 10 August 1970, page 15.
2. Interview over West German radio Nord- und Westdeutsche Rundfunk, 17 August 1970.
3. Military Balance 1969-1970, London, 1969.
4. Wehr und Wirtschaft, July-August, 1970.
5. Die Welt, 20 May 1970.
6. Die Einheit, No 7, 1969, page 827.
7. La Tribune des Nations, Paris, 7 November 1969.
8. A play on words -- Schmidt translates as blacksmith.

Translator's note: Names in brackets are transliterated.

WAR AND POLITICS¹

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Soviet historians are vigorously and productively continuing study of World War II and its principal component part, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Further investigation of various aspects of these events is dictated first and foremost by their close relationship with the present day.

It is not at all surprising that a new book by Doctor of Historical Science Col V. Sekistov entitled War and Politics has attracted reader attention. It has generated lively debate and has already been given a positive appraisal in the press.²

This book aims at discussing problems which are of extremely current interest.

On the basis of a general analysis of U.S. and British strategy in World War II and a concrete examination of military operations in Western Europe and the Mediterranean Theater in 1939-1945, the author seeks to reveal the influence of political aims on military strategy, the features of strategic planning and the character of combat operations, the reasons for sandbagging plans to open a second front in 1942-1943, to expose bourgeois falsifiers and to show changes in the strategic situation in the Mediterranean and European theaters under the influence of decisive victories by the Red Army (pp 23-24).

Principal attention is focused on a purposeful analysis of the influence of U.S. and British political aims in World War II on the planning and conduct of combat operations, the most complex problem. It is examined through the prism of the fundamental Leninist thesis that war constitutes a continuation of the policies of a certain class by other, violent means. "The methodological instructions of V. I. Lenin," the author stresses, "enable one to establish a logical continuation of anti-Soviet policy by U.S. and British ruling circles in various forms during the course of World War II, in spite of their participation in the anti-Hitler coalition together with the Soviet Union" (page 23). This idea serves as a guiding criterion in analyzing the events portrayed in the book's 6 chapters (I. The Munich Policy of the United States, Britain and France -- a Policy of Encouraging Nazi Germany to Attack the Soviet Union; II. The "Bizarre War" and the Passive-Defensive Strategy of Britain and France in Regard to Germany; III. U.S. and British Temporizing Policy and Peripheral Strategy; IV. U.S. and British Ruling Circles Sabotage the Opening of a Second Front in Europe; V. Development of U.S. and British Mediterranean Strategy; VI. The United States and Britain Open a Second Front in Order not to Be too Late in Penetrating Western Europe).

[Two pages (92-93) missing]

It follows from the above-cited documents that in the summer of 1942 Anglo-American political and military leaders realized that the USSR was in fact fighting alone against the Nazi war machine, did not believe that the USSR was capable of standing up under this onslaught, realized that defeat of the USSR would lead to an inevitable catastrophic situation for its allies, and yet nevertheless made a 1942 invasion of Western Europe dependent on the military "collapse or weakening" of the USSR.

This is a clear example of treachery on the part of the Western Allies toward the Soviet Union!

Only when it became obvious that the Soviet Union was capable of standing alone and defeating Nazi Germany, as well as liberating the peoples of Europe from the Nazi yoke, ruling circles in the United States and Britain, fearing a strengthening of the positions of socialism, invaded Western Europe in June 1944, opening a Second Front. Typical in this regard is the acknowledgement by prominent American journalist and historian H. Baldwin that the principal objective of the Allies' Normandy invasion was to limit the "postwar Soviet sphere of influence" (page 416).⁷

One question examined by the author which is of extremely current significance is the question of U.S. and British Mediterranean strategy. The landing of Anglo-American troops in North Africa, and later in Italy, as well as the political struggle between the United States and Britain reflected the colonialist, reactionary aspirations of these powers. A study of these events reveals the roots of the expansionist, antipopular actions of the imperialists in this region in the postwar years -- from interference in the internal affairs of Greece to Israeli aggression against the Arab nations, carried out with direct U.S. support.

Sekistov's book is of great cognitive significance, has been written with great political acumen and is completely up to date. It clearly reveals the decisive contribution of the USSR toward victory in World War II and exposes the bourgeois falsifiers of history.

The book's deficiencies pertain primarily to a one-sided assessment of the anti-Hitler coalition. In spite of anti-Soviet intent in U.S. and British policy and strategy during World War II, the anti-Hitler coalition constituted a great popular achievement, the result of a wise and flexible policy pursued by the Communist Party and Soviet government. "In spite of all intrigues by the imperialist reactionaries, the unity of the anti-Hitler coalition was preserved to the end of the war, which was of great importance in achieving victory over fascism" (page 480). Unfortunately, the author fails to trace the influence of this factor on U.S. and British policy and strategy during World War II.

It is possibly for this reason that the author failed to examine such an important matter as the focus of efforts by the Soviet Union and all peace-loving peoples on strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition, which frustrated and restricted the anti-Soviet effort on the part of reactionary circles in the United States and Great Britain.

Nor does the author offer a complete analysis of the interrelationship between U.S. and British policy and strategy in the period 1944-1945, following the opening of a second front. The author's statement that "the political aim of drawing out the war to the maximum possible extent remained in force" (page 447) contradicts his own assessment of the concrete strategic goals and plans of the Allies. He quite correctly emphasizes that the advance of the Soviet Army and the rapid growth of the Resistance Movement (particularly in France) impelled U.S. and British leaders to "speed up the course of military events" (page 442) and that the efforts of the Anglo-American Command were directed at "moving toward Berlin as directly and as fast as possible" (page 448). This contradiction is not mere happenstance. The author does not always succeed to a sufficient degree in revealing the dialectic of the relationship between politics and strategy. U.S. and British policy during the period of existence of the anti-Hitler coalition passed through certain stages and was characterized by an increase in anti-Soviet efforts. An important stage in this development was 1944, when the victorious advance of the Soviet Army compelled the Allies to hasten the opening of the Second Front and subsequent actions by Allied forces in the European Theater. The author sees confirmation of his idea (on the political intention of the Allies to draw out the war following the opening of a second front) in the slow rate of Allied advance in Western Europe and the unrealized capabilities of achieving decisive objectives in a number of operations. In our opinion this character of Allied military operations was dictated by a number of causes: by feeble attempts to negotiate a separate peace, by conflicts within the Allied camp, by deficiencies in art of warfare, by savage resistance on the part of the German troops in a number of cases, plus others.

It was appropriate in this connection to disclose in detail the basic features of the art of warfare of the Allies, the level of which did not correspond to the goals of reaching Berlin "by the straightest and fastest route." For example, one of the main principles of organization of penetration of the German defense in the offensive operations of army groups, conducted by the Allies in 1944, consisted in penetration being effected in the zone of only one army, operating on the main axis of advance. The other armies would shift to the offensive only when success was achieved in the penetrating army's zone. Only in the final months of the war in Western Europe did army groups conduct an offensive simultaneously along the entire front (operations of the 21st, 12th and 6th Army Groups in April-May 1945). However, as the author correctly points out, quoting [F. Pog'yu],

"the swift pursuit across Central Germany may delude persons who, studying this operation, attempt to draw from it valuable lessons for the future" (page 477). By this time the German Command had practically laid bare the Western Front, concentrating their principal efforts in the East in last-ditch efforts to halt the strategic offensive of the Soviet Army, which was in its final phase.

The book is supported by an extensive bibliography, particularly as regards foreign publications, some of which are examined for the first time. But one cannot excuse the absence of a survey of Soviet literature on this problem. It is a well-known fact that the origin of World War II and combat operations in foreign theaters (including Western Europe and the Mediterranean) are examined in a number of major monographs by Soviet military historians. One is hard put to explain why the author makes no mention of them, a fact which is certainly not in favor of this work.

A number of bourgeois sources are cited in the book without sufficient preliminary analysis. For example, the author cites the following thesis from the preface to the book Stalingrad to Berlin, published in 1968 by the U.S. Defense Department: "We cannot agree with the Russian claim that the Red Army was the chief architect of victory in World War II" (page 14), but fails to cite the first part of this thesis. And yet it is of substantial importance for exposing objectivism -- the most widespread method of falsifying the history of World War II in contemporary bourgeois literature. "The Soviet Union," one reads in the above-mentioned preface, "made a great contribution toward the defeat of Nazi Germany, but it does not follow from this, as the Russians claim, that the Red Army was the chief architect of victory in World War II..."⁸

Official U.S. historiography is powerless to deny the role of the Soviet Union in victory over the fascist aggressors. Bourgeois historians maneuver about and don the toga of "soothsayers of the truth." Making a few positive assessments in regard to the USSR, however, with the entire content of their studies they attempt to prove just the opposite and to assign the main credit for the defeat of the fascist-militarist bloc to the United States and Great Britain.

In certain cases bourgeois sources, which require detailed critical assessment, are treated by the author as absolutely reliable. For example, the composition of the German attack force in the Ardennes is taken from H. Cole's book The Ardennes, which is part of the official series "The U.S. Army in World War II." The author, referring to H. Cole, reports that this force totaled 970 tanks (page 456).

What does Cole actually state? He claims that the Germans had 970 tanks and assault guns in the attack echelon and 450 in reserve to exploit a

successful attack.⁹ Cole goes on to state that the Germans had at that time a total of 2567 tanks and assault guns on the Western Front, including 2168 in Army Group B and in the High Command Reserve, while there was a total of only 1500 on the Soviet-German Front.¹⁰ (We know from German figures¹¹ that there were approximately 3000 tanks and assault guns on the Soviet-German Front at that time -- O. R.). "Hitler," states Cole in summarizing his calculations, "deliberately weakened the Eastern Front... all the German armies on the Eastern Front possessed only two thirds of the number of tanks which were committed in the Ardennes."¹²

Cole's "juggling act" with numbers serves the purpose of playing down the decisive role of the Soviet-German Front, and it is imprudent indeed to quote his figures without comment. The scholarly approach demands that one figure the composition of the German force on the basis of official German figures, of the American force on the basis of American figures, etc. This rule is sometimes violated without adequate basis, which can lead to inaccuracies and errors.¹³

The reading of this book presents great difficulties due to the absence of diagrams, maps, a name and subject index, a list of operation code names and their deciphering, a bibliography and other attributes of a reference nature which are mandatory for such a scholarly work.

The above-mentioned shortcomings, however, do not diminish an overall favorable appraisal of Professor Sekistov's monograph, which is essentially the first comprehensive discussion of the complex and currently important problem of the interrelationship between war and politics, employing examples from the history of World War II.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. A. Sekistov: Voyna i politika (Voyenno-politicheskiy ocherk voyennvkh deystviy v Zapadnoy Yevrope i basseyne Sredizemnogo morya, 1939-1945) (War and Politics [A Military-Political Sketch of Military Operations in Western Europe and the Mediterranean, 1939-1945]), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970, 496 pages.
2. P. Zhilin: "War and Politics," Krasnaya Zvezda, 6 August 1970.
[Footnotes 3-5 missing]
6. Harrison: Cross-Channel Attack, page 12.

7. In this sense Operation Overlord was essentially a variant of the above-mentioned Operation Sledgehammer -- an Allied amphibious landing "in case of Germany's collapse."
8. E. Ziemke: Stalingrad to Berlin, Washington, GPO, 1968, page V.
9. H. Cole: The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, Washington, GPO, 1965, pp 71-72.
10. Ibid.
11. Hitlers Lagebesprechungen. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen (Hitler's Situation Briefings. Excerpts of Stenographic Notes of His Military Conferences), Stuttgart, 1962, page 970.
12. Cole, op.cit., page 675.
13. It would be unfair not to note that figures on the number of German tanks participating in the Ardennes Operation are extremely contradictory. This is due to a lack of documentary information, as a consequence of the extreme secrecy in which preparations for this operation were conducted.

Translator's note: Name in brackets transliterated.