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#16-70

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

22 APRIL 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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
22 April 1970  
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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 APRIL 1970

Moscow (3427 items)

Lenin Centenary	(35%)	55%
[Brezhnev Speeches:		
14 April	(--)	5%]
16 April	(--)	4.5%]
13 April	(--)	4%]
Middle East	(6%)	5%
May Day Slogans	(--)	4%
China	(4%)	3.5%
Indochina	(5%)	3%
[Vietnam	(2%)	2%]
Apollo 13	(--)	2%
SALT, Vienna	(--)	1%

Peking (3061 items)

Indochina	(23%)	42%
[Cambodia	(20%)	40%]
[Vietnam	(2%)	2%]
[Laos	(0.02%)	0.2%]
Domestic Issues	(11%)	20%
USSR	(2%)	9%
Chou En-lai in DPRK	(50%)	7%
Middle East	(1%)	3%
2d Anniversary of	(--)	3%
Mao Statement on		
U.S. Negroes		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

The Front's LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) is the first communist source to allude to Soviet UN representative Yakov Malik's recent remarks on a Geneva conference on Indochina: Reporting PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh's 20 April Paris press conference, LPA on the 21st quotes her as saying that "as far as I know, Mr. Malik held that a Geneva conference is not practical." TASS promptly carried an account of Malik's 16 April press conference at the United Nations; however, it ignored completely the exchange with reporters in which Malik reportedly said that the Southeast Asian situation is a matter for a new Geneva conference, not the United Nations. Hanoi's sensitivity on the issue seems reflected in VNA's excision of Mme. Binh's reference to Malik in its report of her press conference. However, VNA does report her assertion that France's 1 April proposal for a new international conference on Indochina "is not practical at this juncture"--a subject which Le Duc Tho had touched on in his 10 April remarks to reporters in Paris.

President Nixon's 20 April TV speech in which he announced that an additional 150,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam during the next year prompts the predictable complaints from communist media that more than 250,000 troops will remain in May 1971 and that the Administration is intent on prolonging and expanding the war.

The United States continues to be charged with having engineered the 18 March coup in Cambodia, but the Lon Nol regime is the main target of attack for its "massacres" of Vietnamese nationals. Vietnamese communist media continue to deny the presence of their armed forces in Cambodia, but there are continuing references to the solidarity of the Indochinese peoples in their struggles. And Truong Chinh, in his 21 April Lenin Day speech, referred cryptically to the formation of an Indochinese people's "united front."

Peking continues its voluminous attention to Cambodia--40 percent of its comment on all subjects during the past week. Moscow radio, on the other hand, devoted only meager attention to Cambodia in the past week, although a 20 April PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov expresses alarm over reports of possible U.S. military aid to the Lon Nol regime.

## PARIS TALKS: STRESS ON CAMBODIA, U.S. "INTERVENTION"

PRG DELEGATE PRG deputy delegation head Dinh Ba Thi reworked familiar ground at the 63d session on 16 April when he questioned the American attitude towards the two "basic" issues--an unconditional U.S. troop withdrawal, and willingness to

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respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination and to let them form a provisional coalition government.

Thi's usual attack on the Saigon Government included criticism of its "cooperation" with the Lon Nol regime in opposing the Cambodian people and terrorizing the Vietnamese nationals there. Thi also quoted extensively from the 13 April PRG Foreign Ministry statement denouncing the reported 9 April "bloody slaughter" of Vietnamese nationals in Prasaut, Svay Rieng Province. Alleging that the GVN in a 14 April communique tried to "justify" the massacres of Vietnamese, Thi said that this is no different from its past justification of the Son My and other "mass slaughters" perpetrated by the United States in South Vietnam.

In discussing U.S. policy, Thi said matter-of-factly that U.S. troops are continually "thrusting deep into Cambodia in order to give a hand" to the Lon Nol regime.

DRV DELEGATE      DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy discussed the broad Indochinese situation and U.S. alleged "intervention" since 1954, and the VNA account focuses on this rather than his remarks related more specifically to the current situation in Vietnam. Thus, VNA does not report his contention that American obstinacy on the troop withdrawal issue is demonstrated by continued adherence to the concept of a mutual troop withdrawal--a demand, he said, that the United States knows "will never be accepted" by the DRV-PRG side.

VNA points up Vy's declaration that the basic pattern of U.S. intervention is revealed in Vietnam where the United States has gone from "military aid to logistics and air support and then direct involvement of U.S. or satellite troops," that in Laos, the United States is "almost nearing the end of that path," but that the process has just been started "by the coup in Cambodia," and that the "coup makers" are trying to pave the way for "the next steps of U.S. aggression." Vy does not mention the Cambodian request for aid in this connection.

The VNA account also reports the DRV delegate's warning that the United States is courting failure not only in Vietnam but throughout Indochina by "playing with fire" and extending the war to the entire peninsula. His collective references to the actions against the Dak Pek position in South Vietnam and in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang area of Laos, and to the "resolute struggle" being waged in Cambodia under the banner of the National United Front of Kampuchea are also noted. And VNA goes on to quote him as saying that the

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extending of the war to all of Indochina is only making the three peoples more united and more resolved in their struggle against the common enemy until final victory.

**ALLIED SPEECHES** The VNA account routinely brushes off the statements of allied representatives Habib and Phong. According to VNA, Habib "rehashed old slanders" against the DRV and PRG on the Lao and Cambodian problems and with regard to the so-called POW and mutual troop withdrawal proposals. As for GVN representative Phong, he as usual continued to plead for the "acts of aggression of his master" and also continued his slanders against the PLAF.

The account routinely reports that communist representatives Vy and Thi in their additional remarks "severely criticized and rejected the U.S.-puppets' distortions and slanders."

#### ISSUE OF NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINA

Moscow propaganda has studiously avoided any reference to the series of remarks by Soviet UN delegate Malik referring to the French proposal of 1 April and a new Geneva conference. TASS had promptly carried a brief, factual report on the French cabinet statement, and on 10 April it reported Le Duc Tho's comment in Paris that a Vietnam settlement is the necessary basis of a settlement for all of Indochina.

Consistent with its failure to include Malik's remarks on Indochina in its report of his 16 April news conference, Moscow ignores the fact that the remarks were referred to by President Nixon in his 20 April TV speech. The only allusion to date to the President's reference comes in a 21 April Tirana domestic service commentary on the speech. It says that the President "sought the cooperation of the Soviet revisionists" to find a proper way to peace, and adds that this "is based on a statement made by Malik."

Communist media have also ignored the fact that the President wrote to the signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreements on 7 April--a fact which was revealed by Secretary Rogers' in his 18 April speech in New York and referred to by the President in his TV speech. Soviet media are not known to have directly acknowledged that President Nixon last month sent letters to the 1962 Geneva conference cochairmen. Thus, a 15 March summary of a Kosygin message to the President referred only to the President's 6 March public statement on Laos in which he expressed support for Souvanna Phouma's proposal for consultations among the 1962 Geneva agreements signatories. Neither is Moscow known to have acknowledged President Nixon's second letter to Kosygin sent on 21 March and announced by Secretary Rogers on the 23d.

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## HANOI, FRONT CONDEMN "MASSACRES" IN CAMBODIA

Reports of massacres of Vietnamese nationals in Cambodia prompt further official Vietnamese communist protests, with DRV and PRG Government statements on the 18th and 20th, respectively. There is also a flurry of comment in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, and reports of the holding of mass organization meetings, including one sponsored by the Fatherland Front in Hanoi on the 18th at which Gen. Chu Van Tan was the principal speaker. And LPA and VNA report PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh's press conference in Paris on the 20th "held to denounce the massacres."

The 18 April DRV Government statement was, according to the VNA release of the same day, publicized at a Hanoi press conference convened by the DRV Foreign Ministry. According to Hanoi radio, Ngo Dien, head of the Foreign Ministry's Department of Information and Press, read the statement in which the DRV "firmly demands" that the Cambodian authorities stop all massacres, terrorism and acts of discrimination against Vietnamese residents. The statement does not include the demand contained in the DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 12th asking compensation for the victims' families. The PRG Government statement, however, demands that Cambodian repression of Vietnamese nationals cease, arrested nationals be released, detention camps be abolished, compensation be affected, and the nationals' right of residence and a normal life be ensured. The PRG Foreign Ministry statement on the 13th had voiced all of these demands except the one on dissolution of detention camps.

The DRV Government statement says the reported massacres are aimed at covering up the nature of the "stooges" in Phnom Penh, opposing the Vietnamese people's struggle against the United States, and serving the U.S. scheme of war intensification and expansion. It specifically calls on the "fraternal socialist countries" and others to condemn the "Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique of fascists and racists." The PRG statement likewise includes a call on the socialist countries to condemn the Phnom Penh authorities.

The DRV Government statement says that Western correspondents revealed "only part of the truth" in their reports on the incidents in Prasaut on 9-10 April, in the Mekong River on 15 April, and in Takeo on the 16th. Concerning the river incident, the statement claims that "over 1,000" Vietnamese residents were secretly killed and their corpses thrown into the Mekong. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 19th alleges that "thousands" of Vietnamese were "liquidated," and a NHAN DAN commentary of the 17th calls the incident the "biggest massacre" of Vietnamese in Cambodia. On the

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21st LPA transmits a "massacre roundup" of alleged incidents since 12 March during the course of Phnom Penh's "campaign of terror" against and massacre of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia. According to the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial and a Hanoi broadcast on the 19th, Lon Nol himself called for a campaign to massacre the Vietnamese people in a broadcast over Phnom Penh radio on the 16th. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 17th says that Lon Nol also "slanderously" charged that the "Vietnamese people are expansionist imperialists," and it points to articles "ceaselessly" carried by the Phnom Penh press and radio aimed at stirring up racial hatred and calling on Cambodians to kill Vietnamese.

DENIAL OF VC PRESENCE Continued Vietnamese communist sensitivity to charges of their military presence and reported armed activity in Cambodia is reflected in the numerous comments denouncing the massacres of Vietnamese nationals. For example, a Hanoi radio commentary on the 17th assails the Phnom Penh regime for "slandering Vietnam," and a QUAN GIAI PHONG commentary of the same day asserts that Phnom Penh has "spoken ill of and falsely accused the PLAF and PRG" in carrying out its "slandorous campaign" against the Vietnamese. On the 20th Liberation Radio carries the text of an LPA authorized statement dated the 19th which again rejects the "slander" that Vietnamese are "invading" Cambodia and committing "acts of Viet Cong aggression" there. It charges that Phnom Penh "fabricated" imaginary "Viet Cong attacks" to massacre Vietnamese nationals, and that meanwhile U.S. and GVN air, artillery, and infantry forces "brazenly" crossed the frontier and pushed "deep" inside Cambodia, where they "savagely killed the patriotic Khmer people who support" Prince Sihanouk.

#### CLAIMS OF "KHMER ARMED FORCES." "PROVISIONAL" COMMITTEES

There are continued references to military clashes between government troops and the "Khmer armed forces behind Samdech Norodom Sihanouk"--so labeled by LPA in a 20 April report.\* LPA, citing "reports from Cambodia," says that a government position in Kompong Cham Province was captured on the 11th by the pro-Sihanouk forces and that on the next day 200 government soldiers were "wiped out" when they were intercepted trying to reinforce the fallen position. VNA, for its part, on the 14th notes alleged instances of allied military incursions

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\* AFP publicizes a 16 April message sent to "certain press organs" in which Sihanouk said he is determined to fight against the present Cambodian regime "to the end or at least until my eventual death among the guerrillas whom I intend to join shortly."

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into Cambodia, saying that the "Khmer patriotic forces and people" in areas of Svay Rieng Province on 14 April and earlier on 4-5 April had intercepted the allied infantry and armored elements.

Liberation Front radio on the 21st carries what it says is an appeal issued on 5 April by the "armed forces of the Cambodian national united front." Introducing the text of the appeal, the radio says that "according to a report from Phnom Penh," the Cambodian people have paid "special attention" to the appeal, which was "widely disseminated" in Battambang, Kompong Speu, Kompong Cham, Kandal, Takeo, and Siem Reap provinces and "many other localities" throughout Cambodia. The appeal calls on government forces, police, youths, and students to join the struggle against the "traitorous clique," and it says that Cambodian "progressive patriots" are already united and are "hoisting high Samdech Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk's national united front flag and positively contributing to the struggle to smash the scheme of the U.S. imperialists and the coup d'etat-engineering clique led by Lon Nol and Sirik Matak."

"PROVISIONAL" LPA on the 20th says that on the 13th the population  
COMMITTEES in several areas of Kompong Cham Province held a large demonstration, arrested some of the local government authorities, and convened a meeting at which representatives of the local populace declared the abolition of the local government administration and the "establishment of the provisional committee of the National United Front of Kampuchea." Earlier, VNA on the 15th reported that people of Chi Pu locality in Svay Rieng Province "are setting up a provisional committee" of the Kampuchea Front. On the 11th and 12th Liberation Radio and VNA, respectively, reported that more than 3,000 inhabitants of Chantrea District, Svay Rieng Province held a meeting on 6 April and established the district provisional committee of the national united front.

Peking's NCNA picks up some of VNA's reports on the establishment of the provisional committees and on 21 April a Peking Cambodian-language broadcast carries a message from Sihanouk to the Khmer nation in which he announces that "the enlarged committee of the Front of the National Union of Kampuchea, as well as the government of national union, will be formed in the nearest future, when the representatives of all Khmer circles of the resistance inside and outside the country meet at a congress." Sihanouk adds that "people's resistance authorities have been created and will be successively created in the months to come."

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## TRUONG CHINH DISCUSSES INDOCHINA "FRONT" IN LENIN DAY SPEECH

Widespread DRV activities marking the 22 April centenary of Lenin's birth are highlighted by a 21 April meeting in Hanoi, attended by North Vietnamese Party (VWP) leaders and addressed by Politburo member Truong Chinh.\* Truong Chinh's speech, following introductory remarks by President Ton Duc Thang, was summarized by VNA in its English-language service; a translation of the full text of his remarks, broadcast by Hanoi radio in Vietnamese, is not yet available.

The VNA English-language account quotes Chinh as declaring that "the peoples of the three Indochinese countries, bound by traditional ties, are enhancing their solidarity, and have formed the Indochinese people's united front against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys to recover and safeguard the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos [and] ensure for each country the opportunity to develop along the path of its own choice." In the VNA version there is no elaboration of this specific reference to an Indochinese "united front"; but Chinh does say more generally that, since the United States wishes to divide the Indochinese people, they are "closing further their ranks" to wipe out a common enemy.

It is unclear whether Truong Chinh was, in fact, referring to the establishment of a new organization--an "Indochinese front." Hanoi's Vietnamese- and French-language accounts of his remarks, like the English version, fail to conclusively demonstrate that he was referring to an organization rather than to a moral or spiritual solidarity or unity among the Indochinese peoples. The tense of Truong Chinh's reference to the formation of a front is also not clear, and VNA's English- and French-language translations are at variance. The original Vietnamese is ambiguous

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\* In addition to Truong Chinh, VNA notes that those on the rostrum included Politburo members Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Hoang Van Hoan, alternate members Tran Quoc Hoan and Van Tien Dung, and party secretaries To Huu, Nguyen Van Tran, and Nguyen Con. Thus, Politburo member Pham Hung continues his unexplained absence. Le Duan and Le Duc Tho are both in Moscow for the anniversary celebrations there.

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as to tense, VNA's English translation reads "has been formed," and VNA's French translation clearly places the formation of the front in the future.\*

There is no other available Hanoi comment on Truong Chinh's reference to the formation of a front. General references to the existence of an unstructured front--not an organization--have appeared in earlier Hanoi propaganda: For example, the political report to the recent 19th conference of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Presidium, as reported in the 5 April NHAN DAN declared that "the Indochinese people's anti-U.S. front will surely be reinforced day by day."

Truong Chinh strongly denounces Cambodian treatment of Vietnamese nationals and charges, among other things, that the United States is "preparing to force Vietnamese nationals to return to South Vietnam to serve as cannon fodder." (A Hanoi domestic broadcast on 21 April claims that the GVN is terrorizing Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia and that it will seek to "draft them to serve the U.S. imperialists' Vietnamization-of-the-war scheme.") Truong Chinh goes on to voice an appeal to the governments and people of socialist countries and other countries to "adopt every form of struggle and take all necessary measures to help check in time" the Cambodian regime's "bloody hands and compel them to correctly observe international law regarding foreign residents."

#### WVP AND NFLSV DELEGATIONS IN MOSCOW FOR LENIN ANNIVERSARY

The North Vietnamese party delegation to the Lenin anniversary celebrations in Moscow, headed by First Secretary Le Duan, includes Politburo member Le Duc Tho as well as the DRV ambassador.\*\*

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\* The Hanoi radio Vietnamese-language broadcast of the text of the speech renders this portion as follows: " . . . da doan ket, cang tang cuong doan ket hon nua, thanh lap . . . ." The VNA French account of the same passage is: " . . . qui se sont unis, renforceront davantage leur solidarite en fondant . . . ."

\*\* VNA on the 18th reported Le Duan's departure for Moscow, without specifying when he left, and on the 19th noted that he arrived that afternoon in Moscow. Le Duc Tho left Paris for Moscow on the 10th, and Moscow radio, but not Hanoi, reported on the 11th that he was a member of the DRV delegation to the Lenin celebration.

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Speaking at a 21 April joint session of the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet, Le Duan predictably lauded Lenin's great contributions. Reiterating the standard DRV position, he urged "the establishment and strengthening of the solidarity and unity of the socialist countries and the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." The speech, broadcast live with a Russian translation by Moscow's domestic service, praises the "powerful support" given Vietnam by the international communist movement and specifically refers to "the invaluable aid" of the Soviet Union and the PRC. In routinely denouncing U.S. actions in Southeast Asia, Le Duan charges that the United States plans to expand the war to all of Indochina and warns that there is a "danger of encircling the socialist camp from the southeast."

Speaking at the joint session on the following day, the NFLSV's representative Ho Xuan Son, an NFLSV Central Committee Secretariat member, was more effusive than Le Duan in giving thanks for the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Unlike Le Duan, he made no specific reference to Chinese support. He said that "the CPSU, the Soviet Government, and the Soviet people, both in the past and at present, have unfalteringly expressed their sympathy and afforded their support and huge effective assistance to the Vietnamese people"; and he quoted past Soviet declarations of support--notably citing a statement by Brezhnev, in his November 1967 speech marking the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, that the Soviet Union is determined to render all-round aid and to support the Vietnamese and that the aid will continue "until the U.S. imperialists stop their shameful and criminal adventure and get out of Vietnam."

#### PEKING SUPPORTS CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S "STRUGGLE"

The bulk of Peking's continuing heavy propaganda attention to Cambodia is still comprised of Sihanouk statements, foreign statements supporting Sihanouk, and reportage--usually pegged to foreign sources--of developments in Cambodia. Among the Sihanouk statements is a 16 April letter to Chou En-lai, carried by NCNA on the 19th, condemning the Lon Nol clique for massacring Chinese as well as Vietnamese residents of Cambodia.

On its own authority, Peking carries several PEOPLE'S DAILY articles condemning the massacres of Vietnamese residents and praising the "victories" of the Cambodian and other Indochinese people in their "patriotic struggle against U.S. aggression." A Commentator article on 22 April supports the 18 April DRV Government statement on the massacres and asserts that the "Chinese people firmly support

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the just struggle of the peoples of Indochina" against U.S. imperialism and pledge to be the "powerful backing" for the people of Cambodia and the rest of Indochina. PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 16th, condemning the massacres, reasserts that in spite of the Cambodian rightist clique's "counterrevolutionary tactics," the Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Laotian people, who are "close comrades in arms and brothers" will unite ever more closely in their fight against U.S. imperialism and its lackey. Articles on the Cambodian people's struggle, on the 17th and 19th, similarly stress the unity of the three Indochinese people.

A Peking broadcast in Cambodian on 21 April carries a Sihanouk message "to the Khmer people" which stresses the improbability of Vietnamese communist invasion of Cambodian territory. Sihanouk also says cryptically that "in the next few weeks" signatures will be put once again "on a Khmer-Vietnamese-Laotian joint communique."\* He goes on to explain that this means that Vietnamese and Laotian "socialists" agree to formally recognize Cambodia's territorial integrity within its present frontiers.

INTERNATIONAL Peking does not acknowledge any of the current  
CONFERENCE Western comment regarding Soviet Ambassador Malik's remarks on a new Geneva conference, but on 17 April NCNA does carry a statement by the national secretariat of the New Zealand CP which calls on progressives to intensify their struggle against U.S. expansion of the war in Indochina and which scores Prime Minister Holyoake as serving U.S. imperialism by "calling for an international conference on Indochina."

#### LON NOL REQUEST FOR U.S. MILITARY AID SCORED

HANOI, Vietnamese communist comment on Premier Lon Nol's 14 April  
FRONT public request for arms from "any source" includes a Hanoi radio broadcast on the 15th which said the request reveals the regime's "ugly intention" to "suppress the patriotic struggle movement of the Khmer people." A NHAN DAN article of the 18th says that the request further demonstrates the Cambodian

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\* NCNA's brief report of the press conference the DRV Ambassador held in Peking on the 20th to publicize the 18 April DRV Government statement on the Cambodian massacres does not include his remarks, reported in the Western press, that Sihanouk, DRV and NFLSV leaders, and leaders of the Pathet Lao will hold a conference to coordinate strategy.

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Government's military "collusion" with the United States and the GVN, and it notes the State Department's announcement of the 16th that Cambodia had "formally" requested U.S. military aid. Citing Western press reports, NHAN DAN adds that an "agreement" has already been reached whereby the GVN would supply American arms to the Cambodians while the Lon Nol regime would assent to allied military incursions inside Cambodia. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 19th, as carried by Hanoi radio the same day, cites UPI for the report that the official request by Cambodia includes aircraft, helicopters, mines, tear gas grenades, barbed wire, etc. Like the NHAN DAN article, the army paper says that Saigon "has also agreed" to supply the Cambodian government with weapons and equipment.

A Liberation Radio English-language item beamed to U.S. servicemen on the 19th cites AFP for a report on Senator Mansfield's opposition to supplying U.S. arms to Cambodia as requested by Phnom Penh. Domestic U.S. opposition to military aid for Cambodia is also noted in a Hanoi radio report of the 21st which cites, in addition to Mansfield's remarks, critical statements by former Vice President Humphrey and Senator Goodell, and the Washington POST's editorial of the 19th. The same Hanoi broadcast also interprets remarks by Secretary Rogers in his speech in New York on the 18th as preparing public opinion for further "military intervention." Hanoi observes that the Secretary made "brazen slanders" in saying that North Vietnam is exerting military pressures on Laos and Cambodia and thus affecting the safety of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. And it sees his "threat" that the United States could not remain indifferent to this situation as part of the "familiar allegation" prior to U.S. intervention.

MOSCOW Yuriy Zhukov's 20 April PRAVDA article--the first substantial Moscow press comment on Cambodian developments since a 25 March Mayevskiy article in the same paper--expresses "alarm" over foreign press reports of possible U.S. aid to the Lon Nol regime which may lead to further U.S. military involvement. He cites the State Department's 16 April announcement that Lon Nol's request for military aid is "under consideration," as well as 17 April reports in the Washington POST and by UPI that "American officials cannot exclude the fact" that weapons aid may be accompanied by American advisers or observers, and that an American support group with electronic equipment near the Cambodian border is preparing for "new important events." Zhukov concludes that despite "hypocritical" statements by U.S. leaders on their desire to leave Indochina, the "Pentagon" is further fanning the flames of war.

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According to Zhukov, the "Pentagon" was dissatisfied with Sihanouk's observance of the provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements prohibiting Cambodia from pursuing an aggressive policy or allowing its territory to be used for such a policy. The coup, he says, was the handiwork of the CIA, and now the American command in South Vietnam considers that Cambodian neutrality is ended and is using South Vietnamese puppet troops and "their own Air Force and notorious 'advisers'" to "invade" Cambodia. Recalling specific instances of violations and commenting on the cruelty of the "punitive expeditions" of the Phnom Penh troops and their allies, he refers to various massacres but he does not indicate that the victims in many cases were the Vietnamese residents. Zhukov concludes that such reprisals will only strengthen the Cambodian people's will to fight and he cites AP for a report that the "insurgents, who have called themselves 'Sihanouk's new army,'" are now waging an offensive.

Earlier, TASS carried a flurry of items pegged to the Cambodian request for U.S. aid. A 17 April TASS report on State Department spokesman McCloskey's announcement that aid to Cambodia is "under consideration" comments that the United States wishes to take advantage of the Cambodian request for further deepening the military conflict in Southeast Asia. TASS reports that McCloskey reaffirmed the "right" of American forces in South Vietnam to cross neighboring frontiers in self-defense. A brief Moscow domestic service report of Secretary Rogers' 18 April remark that the United States "could not remain indifferent" to the situation in Cambodia cites UPI for the interpretation that this "apparently means that Washington is to comply with the Cambodian request for arms and military equipment." Secretary Rogers' statement is singled out in an IZVESTIYA article on the 21st which expresses concern over the danger of an extension of the war in Southeast Asia. The paper also cites the Washington POST for a report that the Pentagon is studying the possibility of sending certain allied troops presently in South Vietnam to Cambodia.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW: SISCO TOUR SHOWS "NO CHANGE" IN U.S. POLICY

Continuing low-key, relatively mild Soviet handling of Assistant Secretary Sisco's Middle East tour again portrays Arab indignation over the American "policy of support for the Israeli leaders" and concludes that the visits to the UAR, Israel, and Lebanon have demonstrated no change in U.S. policy. Moscow propagandists do seem to suggest some interest in the possibility of emendation of the U.S. proposals for a settlement, still deemed unacceptable to the Arabs, and in prospects for changes in Israel's position resulting from the Sisco visit. At the same time they point to Israeli satisfaction with "Washington's assertions regarding support" for the Israeli Government.

UAR, ISRAEL TASS commentator Tyssovskiy on the 16th found it "hard to object" to Sisco's statement in Cairo that the United States wants a just peace in the region, but went on to speculate on whether Sisco brought any new proposals "capable of breaking the deadlock" in the search for a peaceful settlement. While Sisco did declare that the United States supports the November 1967 Security Council resolution, Tyssovskiy said, the Arabs have rejected the United States' proposal for a solution because it presented a departure "in favor of Israel" from the points of the November resolution. As for Sisco's talks in Israel, the question of arms deliveries is not on the agenda, Tyssovskiy said, because President Nixon "left enough loopholes" in the statement on postponing deliveries of military materials. The key question, he added, is whether Washington "will feel like asking the Israeli leaders to implement in full measure" the Security Council resolution, and "the 'productivity' of Sisco's visit is 'directly dependent on the answer to this question.'"

Similarly, a Ryzhikov domestic service commentary on the 16th asserted that it was "only Washington's reluctance to use its authority" which allowed Israel to continue its "criminal" policy; the Israeli leaders presented Sisco with demands for arms and loans "in answer to his appeals for commonsense and concessions." Yefremov, in a domestic service commentary on the 17th which rejected the U.S. proposals, also wondered if "some amendments" had been made or if Washington "has decided at last to use its indisputable influence on Tel Aviv to take the presumptuous Israeli aggressors in hand." He cited Israeli officials' statements as indicating that this would not be the case; and he observed on the 18th that Sisco, departing from Tel Aviv, "emphasized that full sincerity and absolute mutual understanding" prevailed during his talks in Israel.

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An Arabic-language commentary on the 20th says the only disappointing thing Sisco found in Israel was an "unwillingness to act with sufficient flexibility and secrecy" in pursuit of Tel Aviv's unaltered goals. The broadcast concludes that there has been no change in the U.S. attitude, despite the effort of "U.S. propaganda" to give the Arabs the "false impression" the United States is trying to find a common language with the Arabs. Citing Nasir's statement to the Indian BLITZ that the United States "is endeavoring to impose on us direct negotiations" without any assurances concerning withdrawal, the commentary says this means Sisco's visit was a "complete failure."

JORDAN, Brief Moscow domestic service and TASS accounts link  
LEBANON the 15 April demonstrations in Jordan with the  
scheduled Sisco visit, portraying the U.S. Embassy as  
under heavy guard but giving little indication of the damage  
except in TASS' report of the burning of American cars. While  
Moscow has not identified the demonstrators, a broadcast in French  
to the Maghreb on the 15th called them "students and inhabitants"  
of Amman and said they "laid siege" to the embassy and the American  
cultural center, demanding that the United States stop supplying  
weapons to Israel and supporting Israeli policy; this account did  
not mention the Sisco visit.

Moscow has been inconsistent in its explanations of the deferred visit to Jordan: The domestic service on the 18th remarked that Jordan "refused to receive" Sisco, but TASS on the 16th reported the visit was "postponed for an indefinite period." On the 17th TASS said the visit was cancelled on the advice of Ambassador Symmes and noted without comment the Jordanian Government's request that the United States recall its ambassador. Reporting the demonstrations which "forced" Sisco to change his itinerary and refrain from visiting Jordan, Demchenko wrote in the 19 April IZVESTIYA that under pressure of these popular demonstrations, the Jordanian Government "suggested to Washington" that it recall its ambassador from Amman immediately. In the only other available Soviet comment on the recall, Moscow told Arab listeners on the 20th that the ambassador initiated new pressure on Jordan "to force it to sign a unilateral--surrender--agreement" with Israel; he was "declared persona non grata and expelled from the country."

A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 18th said that while Washington had long assured Jordan of its friendship, it had equivocated on the question of providing arms to Jordan, showed no desire to influence Israel to halt the raids on Jordan, and failed to fulfill the "economic duties which it took upon itself" with respect to that country.

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As for Sisco's brief visit to Lebanon on the 18th, TASS cites Lebanese press comment, particularly the communist daily AN-NIDA, as protesting the visit, and a domestic service report on the 19th notes that "differences were revealed" on settlement of the Middle East crisis in Sisco's talks with Lebanese officials.

#### MOSCOW AVOIDS ACKNOWLEDGING DIPLOMAT'S COMMENTS ON PALESTINE

Soviet media have kept silent on the 20 April remarks by the Soviet embassy press attache in Amman, reported by REUTERS to have declared Soviet support for struggles aimed at overthrowing "racist states" such as Israel and support for the creation of a democratic state in Palestine. According to REUTERS, Sukhotov declared that the USSR supported the creation of the state of Israel and backed the November 1947 General Assembly resolution calling for partition of Palestine and the creation of an Arab state, but now "the Soviet Union supports the creation of a democratic state in Palestine." REUTERS said he emphasized that the Soviet Union would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Palestinians.

According to a REUTERS dispatch from Moscow the same day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry press department's counsellor for Middle East affairs, Yuriy Viktorov, said Moscow did not have the text of the statement made in Amman but was convinced that the reports were based on a misunderstanding, since no representative of a Soviet embassy could make such a statement. Soviet policy in the Middle East remains unchanged, REUTERS quoted him as saying, and this "fully applies to the existence of the state of Israel."

A similar statement was credited to the Soviet charge d'affaires in Baghdad, Fedotov, by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY (INA) on 18 April. In remarks made--like Sukhotov's--on the occasion of the Lenin birth centenary, Fedotov stressed, according to INA, that the Soviet people support "the Palestine armed struggle against Zionism to liberate the occupied territory and establish a democratic Palestinian state to include Arabs and Jews, free of chauvinism."

**BACKGROUND** Soviet propaganda sporadically reaffirms the right of Israel to exist, underlining this right as one of the principles embodied in the November 1967 Security Council resolution. The last such affirmation at an official level was made by Foreign Ministry spokesman Zamyatin on 31 October last year. As reported by TASS, Zamyatin said the November resolution proceeds from the premise that all nations in the area are entitled

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to independent existence and development, and "this equally applies to Israel." Gromyko had made the same statement in his September UN General Assembly address.

More recently, a Radio Moscow foreign-language commentary by Tsoppil on 4 February declared: "No one denies that the people of Israel have the right to existence as a sovereign state. This is the legitimate right of all people. However, Israel has been converted from what is doubtless conceived as a national center for the Jewish people into a center of war--a country that has violated its neighbors' sovereignty and occupied their territory."

Moscow propaganda is not known to have endorsed the Palestine Liberation Organization's concept of a "democratic Palestinian state." Occasionally a Soviet commentator brings up the General Assembly resolution on the partition of Palestine, but without expressing any opinion about its applicability at the present. The only known Soviet suggestion for an Arab state in Palestine came in a broadcast of the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress in Yiddish on 14 August last year. This broadcast declared that "an Arab state in Palestine would be a real step toward a political solution of the Middle East problem" and said supporters of the idea point out that as a result of the 1967 war, Palestine "has been restored to the 1947 frontiers and therefore the creation of an Arab state in Palestine would not necessarily cause difficulties now." The creation of such a state, the broadcast added, "could bring lasting peace and security to Israel."

#### RELATIONS WITH PALESTINIANS

Like his colleague in Amman, the Soviet charge d'affaires in Baghdad reportedly referred to the recent Moscow visit of a Palestinian delegation led by Yasir Arafat. According to Arab media accounts, Sukhotov in Amman merely went on to make the usual nebulous Soviet affirmation of support for the struggle to "regain the Palestinian people's rights," while Fedotov was reported by INA to have stated that "Soviet support for the fedayeen organizations includes moral and material assistance." Baghdad radio--but again, not Soviet media--on 12 April cited an unidentified Soviet delegate to a Baghdad peace conference as saying, with respect to the Arafat delegation's visit, that "we have agreed to supply whatever is necessary for the struggle against imperialism, and to settle the conflict by political means."

In what may be a followup to the Arafat delegation's Soviet visit, a delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee--the host to Arafat's group--arrived on 10 April in Amman, where it met

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with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representatives and was honored at a PLO reception attended by Arafat. Moscow has given this visit minimal coverage.

Moscow had indirectly issued another of its infrequent criticisms of Palestinian "extremist" groups via an article in the 12 April KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA by a German journalist, Klaus-Dieter Kreber. Kreber says PLO members "vehemently reject" the methods of the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a "negligible extremist group" led by the "reactionary Lebanese politician" Habash, which "bears the entire responsibility" for aircraft hijackings and terrorist attacks on Israeli airline offices and embassies. By contrast the PLO, he adds, adheres to the principle of fighting only on the occupied territories where "partisan warfare is justified"--the line espoused by Moscow.

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## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

## USSR PLEDGES SERIOUS EFFORT AT VIENNA, QUESTIONS U.S. SINCERITY

Chief Soviet negotiator Semenov, in remarks made at the opening session of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in Vienna on the 16th, reflects the cautious optimism recurrent in Soviet propaganda in pledging a serious effort toward positive results. Like routine propaganda, Semenov's statement draws on Brezhnev's 14 April speech in Kharkov\* in declaring that the USSR would welcome a sensible agreement and "will do its utmost to ensure that these talks are successful." As quoted by TASS and in the Soviet press, Semenov observes that the tasks facing the negotiators "are by no means simple ones" and declares that good will is needed on the part of both sides. As he had done at the opening session of the Helsinki phase of the talks last November, he reaffirms Soviet adherence to a policy of peaceful coexistence and in pursuit of disarmament. He declares: "We approach from the same principled positions the limitation of the strategic arms race, in whose development aggressive imperialist circles are interested"--an allusion to the U.S. "military-industrial complex" which has come under constant fire in Soviet propaganda. Semenov's opening remarks in Helsinki had contained no such reference to the activities of "imperialist circles."

The report on the 16 April session carried in IZVESTIYA the following day notes briefly that U.S. chief negotiator Smith indicated that the "American side would make every effort to achieve agreement." A foreign-language commentary by Druzhinin on the 17th says President Nixon, in his message read by Smith, expressed the hope that agreement would be reached and adds that this hope is shared by the world. Druzhinin asks rhetorically, however, if U.S. public opinion "will be able to break the resistance of influential military-industrial consortiums and militarists who oppose progress in disarmament."

A 16 April domestic service commentary, noting that no one expects the talks to be easy, broaches the matter of a timetable for the negotiations. The commentary says that the U.S. press has carried statements to the effect that "the U.S. delegation expects" the Vienna round to last "about 10 weeks," to be followed by a recess until autumn with the next stage opening in Helsinki. Such a timetable "in principle," the commentary says, "can hardly arouse objection, since it would be unrealistic to expect a rapid solution of very complex problems."

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\* Brezhnev's 21 April Lenin centenary speech does not mention the Vienna talks, although the Soviet leader does pledge that the USSR will "continue our active efforts to halt the arms race, which is ruinous to the peoples, secure disarmament, and get outstanding issues between states settled on a reasonable foundation, by negotiations."

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Moscow continues routinely to attack the Administration's decision to move forward with deployment of the Safeguard ABM system and MIRV's "on the threshold" of the Vienna talks. In this context, various commentators recall Brezhnev's threat at Kharkov of countermeasures against attempts to gain military superiority over the USSR. A domestic service commentary by Ryzhikov on the 16th, for example, says that Brezhnev rebuffed those who favor conducting talks with the USSR from a "position of strength" when he said "we will reply with due increases in military power . . . to any attempts from any side to secure for itself military supremacy."

A 20 April TASS report notes briefly that Secretary Laird, in a speech in New York that day, "insisted that Congress approve the extension of the notorious Safeguard system and spoke in favor of the deployment of rockets with multiple nuclear warheads." Not unexpectedly, the report does not mention Laird's remarks on the USSR's recent buildup of its offensive strategic forces. Reporting Secretary Rogers' remarks to a group of West German radio and television correspondents, TASS on the 17th said he confirmed Washington's intention to extend Safeguard and to deploy MIRV's, "contending that they will not affect" SALT. Later on the 17th, a broadcast for British listeners reported the same remarks, observing that they "were far from constructive."

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Lenin centenary has provided the setting for another round in the contest between Moscow and Peking for ideological leadership of the communist movement. With a broad array of foreign leaders gathered before him in Moscow, Brezhnev accused the Chinese of undermining unity and of apostasy from the Leninist cause. Tailoring his remarks for his audience, which included delegates from such independent parties as the North Vietnamese and the Romanian, the Soviet party chief chose to emphasize a need for joint action against imperialism and to deplore the effects of the disruption of unity caused by the rift in the communist movement. He omitted mentioning the Sino-Soviet border dispute or the Peking talks, though he alluded to Chinese war preparations in observing that Peking's anti-Soviet campaign has lately been conducted on the ground of "an alleged threat from the Soviet Union."

The absent Chinese, reacting with characteristic virulence to the Kremlin's effort to legitimize its policies with the authority of the world movement, have trumpeted their defiance with a major attack on the Brezhnev leadership for having misappropriated Lenin's name in the interests of "social imperialism, social fascism, and social militarism." Peking's attack, a lengthy indictment of Soviet policies in the authoritative form of a joint editorial article, refers to last year's border clashes but does not mention the current talks.

There has been no announcement of the return to Moscow of the chief Soviet negotiator at the talks, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. Western press reports quote Soviet spokesmen as saying he is in Moscow for the centenary celebrations. Kuznetsov's temporary return to Moscow last December was reported in both Chinese and Soviet media.

## BREZHNEV DEPICTS CHINESE THREAT TO SOCIALIST COMMUNITY

Brezhnev's 21 April speech pits the "Chinese leadership" against the entire socialist community, placing blame for the deterioration of China's relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on the PRC's "nationalistic policy" and on "its rupture with the principles laid down by Lenin."

In the portion of the speech dealing with relations among socialist countries, Brezhnev views the China case as an aberration: "Regrettably, we sometimes get cases of cooperation between socialist countries being disrupted in a most serious manner." Sounding the familiar theme of joint action, his prescription for improvement of relations calls for "jointly following the road charted by Lenin" and "joint struggle" against imperialism. He promises that in the effort to restore good relations "we shall not be found wanting."

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In language more measured than that of his 14 April Kharkov speech in which he warned the Chinese against pressure tactics, Brezhnev does not mention the Peking talks or the Sino-Soviet border, focusing on the China question as a threat to communist unity. In referring to the anti-Soviet campaign in China and to the Chinese claim of a threat from the Soviet Union, he portrays Peking's activities as serving "the enemies of socialism."

Recent elite comment on the China question includes Shelest's portrayal--in a speech in Kiev on 17 April--of the Chinese leadership's splitting activities as not just anti-Soviet but anti-Leninist and therefore of concern to the entire socialist community. Branding advocates of nationalism "traitors to Leninism and the working people's class interests," Shelest says communists cannot tolerate any ideological deviations or wavering among their ranks and urges a decisive rebuff of the Chinese leaders' ideology and policies.

Foreign communist leaders' tributes to Lenin published in PRAVDA in anticipation of the centenary include a 20 April article by Mongolian party chief Tsedenbal which echoes Polish leader Gomulka's 31 March article in denouncing Peking for dividing the socialist camp and for posing a "great danger to the international communist movement." Tsedenbal reaffirms his party's alinement with Moscow in the struggle against the "Mao group's" nationalism, chauvinism, and anti-Sovietism.

**BROADCASTS TO CHINA** Direct attacks on Mao Tse-tung by name reappeared in Moscow's broadcasts to China during the weekend of 18-19 April, apparently signaling an end to the restraint under which the Chinese-language services have operated since early October 1969 when the agreement to hold the Peking border talks was reached. Although references to Mao and "Maoism" continued to appear in Mandarin reports on articles and speeches from other sources, Moscow's broadcasts to China for the past six months had refrained from originating direct attacks on Mao, instead using such circumlocutions as "the present Chinese leaders."

**OTHER SOVIET PROPAGANDA** TASS continues its periodic reportage on current events in China with a 16 April report--carried in the Moscow press the next day--chiding the Chinese for "big deals" being concluded at the current Canton trade fair with capitalist countries, particularly Japan, Hong Kong, and West Germany. Noting that some Japanese companies at the fair represent joint Japanese-American capital, TASS specifically cites Asahi-Dow as a subsidiary of a U.S. firm which makes napalm that is dropped on Vietnamese villages. TASS gives the knife a further twist by pointing to Chinese press emphasis on the theme that "trade cannot be divorced from policy."

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An article by "Ernst Henry" in LITERARY GAZETTE on 15 April once again evinces Moscow's uneasiness over contacts between the PRC and the United States. Henry considers the implications and prospects of an alliance between Peking and Washington, suggesting that any such Machiavellian maneuver by the Chinese would subject them to catastrophic results should war be precipitated with the Soviet Union. Addressing the Chinese with a warning to take sober stock of their position in the world, Henry states categorically that there is no third force between the socialist camp and the "imperialists." Among his allusions to a possible Sino-Soviet war is a passage which warns that on "its present path" the PRC can at best expect international isolation and--"in the most frightful circumstances"--be turned into "a source of cannonfodder for the imperialists."

Nourishing the sensitive issue of the condition and treatment of minority peoples in the Central Asian borderlands of China, a subject resurrected in a 7 April KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article and embellished the next day in a Tashkent radio commentary in Uighur,\* Alma Ata's KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on the 12th provides further details on the Chinese leaders' treatment of the non-Chinese nationalities in the PRC. Recalling the successful insurrection in the mid-1940's by the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities in Sinkiang against Chinese rule, the article also evokes the memory of the struggles--prior to the founding of the PRC--of the Tibetans and the Inner Mongolians for the right to self-determination.

The Alma Ata paper contrasts the original promises given by the Chinese communist leaders with their subsequent denial of the rights of self-determination and of statehood, commenting that as a result of mass resettlement policies there are many fewer Mongols than Chinese in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. It pictures a network of concentration camps throughout the national regions containing "many thousands" of Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs, Chuang, Dugan, and Kazakhs, and it names minority revolutionary leaders such as Ulanfu--once a major leader in the PRC--who are now being repressed by the Peking leaders' nationality policy. This repression, the article claims, is causing acute discontent and growing resistance on the part of the non-Chinese peoples, and anti-Maoist demonstrations "going as far as open armed clashes" are emerging in Sinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and elsewhere in China's national regions.

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\* See the TRENDS of 15 April 1970, page 16.

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## PEKING BLASTS BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP FOR BETRAYAL OF LENINISM

Peking has marked the Lenin centenary with a comprehensive restatement of its ideological case that contains the sharpest anti-Soviet attacks since agreement was reached last fall to hold talks. An authoritative joint editorial article in the 22 April PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY takes the occasion to level a scathing attack on the Brezhnev leadership for having betrayed Leninism and to urge the people of the world to struggle against "U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and all reaction." In these "fighting tasks," the article declares, lies the "tremendous significance" of the Chinese commemoration of Lenin's centenary.

As in the case of the October Revolution semicentennial celebrations in November 1967, when Peking mounted a massive counterpropaganda campaign to cloud the spectacle being staged in Moscow, the Chinese have again expressed their resentment toward Moscow's effort to rally the communist faithful under its banner in the name of a sacred event in the movement's history. Peking's current polemical effort to denigrate Moscow's credentials began with an NCNA commentary dated 16 April which seized on a blunder by the Soviet propaganda apparatus in order to mock the preparations for the Soviet celebrations.\* The NCNA commentary, evidently based on earlier Western press reports, gleefully took note of a passage in the CPSU "theses" on the centenary issued last December which attributed to Lenin views that in fact were those of one of his ideological opponents. To help spread this "scandal" that has gone "around the world," Radio Peking repeatedly carried the NCNA commentary in programs in Russian beamed to the USSR--prefaced by a Mao quotation about actions of fools. The commentary has also been widely broadcast in Radio Peking's other foreign services.

Peking has not mentioned the gathering of foreign communist leaders in Moscow. NCNA reported on the 20th, as TASS did, that the PRC charge d'affaires in Moscow laid a wreath that day at the Lenin mausoleum. Peking ignored the Lenin birth anniversary in the previous two years, apparently as a result of the effort to idolize Mao as the ultimate authority at a time when the CCP was being decimated during the cultural revolution.

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\* Peking may also have intended to express its scorn for the rumored nomination of V.I. Stepanov to be ambassador to the PRC. As the head of the CPSU Central Committee's propaganda apparatus at the time the blunder was committed, Stepanov might logically be held responsible for it.

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EDITORIAL     Symbolized by its introduction of the term "Brezhnevism,"  
ARTICLE       the 22 April article climaxes the sharpened attack on  
               Brezhnev personally that became particularly evident  
               after the international communist conference in Moscow last June--at  
               which Brezhnev played a prominent role as leader of the Soviet wing  
               of the communist movement and as spokesman for anti-Chinese forces.  
               As in the period of personal rivalry between Mao and Khrushchev, the  
               Chinese have again personalized the ideological vendetta by substituting  
               Brezhnev for Khrushchev: "Brezhnev is Khrushchev the Second," the  
               article states.

The tensions arising from the border conflict and the threat of war are evoked in a passage accusing the Brezhnev leadership of going further than Khrushchev in fostering militarism and engaging in nuclear threats. This passage contains Peking's first authoritative reference to last year's border clashes since the opening of talks in October, mentioning the Chenpao incidents and those along the Soviet border with Sinkiang. Evincing Chinese sensitivity over a possible Soviet attack, the article charges that the Soviets have threatened to "forestall the opponent" and have plotted to unleash a blitzkrieg. In another passage, dwelling on Moscow's traditional expansionist policies, the article claims that the "new tsars" seek to "occupy more Chinese territory." The article does not, however, mention the border talks or specifically charge that the Soviets are guilty of border provocations at the present time.

Though frustration over lack of progress at the Peking talks, as well as resentment over Soviet propaganda about Chinese war preparations, may have prompted inclusion of passages evocative of border tensions, the editorial article as a whole seems mainly to reflect Peking's felt need to press its ideological case against Moscow and to reassert the Maoist claim to leadership of the world revolutionary forces. This need was made clear at the time Peking announced agreement to hold talks, when it issued pronouncements which stressed measures to avert conflict along the border while insisting on pursuing its "irreconcilable" ideological rivalry with Moscow. Similarly, Peking's authoritative New Year's Day joint editorial took the occasion to reaffirm the Maoist line in the ideological struggle that has rent the communist movement.

The Lenin centenary article, with its peroration on "invincible Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" guiding the world revolutionary movement, represents another such effort to remind the communist movement--many of whose leaders have assembled in the very citadel of heresy--that Mao's China remains a standard bearer of the true faith while the Soviets have dishonored the name of their founder. In its claims in behalf of Mac's

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preeminence in the world movement, however, the article stops short of those advanced at the time of the October Revolution semicentennial. At that time Peking combined an attack on the Soviet leadership for having betrayed the revolution with the claim that Mao is now the supreme Marxist-Leninist mentor who has carried Marxism-Leninism to its "highest in the present era."

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## PARTY GATHERING ON LENIN DAY

The first gathering of leaders of communist parties in Moscow since the June 1969 international party conference served the Soviets as a new occasion to assert their claim to leadership of the world movement against the Chinese challenge\* and to offset the persisting discord generated by the Czechoslovak events with a new display of international party unity. Brezhnev used his speech to emphasize the need for "proletarian internationalism" and joint action against "imperialism," at once indicting the Chinese and defending the Soviet actions against Czechoslovakia, and to press the case for a militarily powerful Warsaw Pact alliance. The centenary served, at the same time, as an occasion for a reassertion of nationalist interests by the Yugoslavs and Romanians--in low key and surrounded by tributes to Lenin, but with little ambiguity--and the representation of some major West European parties served as tacit testimony to the unhealed wounds inflicted by the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

## FOREIGN REPRESENTATION REFLECTS STATE OF PARTY RELATIONS

As at the 50th October Revolution anniversary observance in Moscow in November 1967, most of the communist countries are represented by their top leaders at the Lenin centenary. Thus Ceausescu leads the Romanian delegation and party first secretary Le Duan the North Vietnamese, as at the 1967 jubilee. North Korea sent party Presidium and Secretariat member and President of the Supreme Assembly Choe Yong-kon, also as in 1967. Cuba's dispatch of a delegation led by President Dorticos registers the warming trend in Moscow-Havana relations; Dorticos, originally slated to lead Cuba's 1967 delegation, was replaced at the last minute by the health minister at a time of badly strained relations with the Soviets.

The state of uneasy accommodation between Moscow and Belgrade is mirrored in Tito's contribution of an article to PRAVDA while sending Bakaric--a leading spokesman for the Yugoslavs' revisionist "self-management" brand of socialism--to represent him in Moscow. Tito had himself led the Yugoslav delegation to the observance in November 1967.

NONRULING PARTIES TASS on 21 April reports Podgorny as welcoming delegates from 66 nonruling communist parties, which would indicate a total of both ruling and nonruling parties roughly comparable to the some 75 which attended two and a half years ago. Again, as in 1967, there are a number of representatives from "national democratic parties," as well as from socialist parties and trade union

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\*Brezhnev's remarks on China are discussed in the Sino-Soviet Relations section of this TRENDS.

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organizations. In greeting the delegations in his opening speech, Podgorny accorded enhanced status to the NLSV and the Laotian NLHX by listing them just after the ruling communist parties, before his enumeration of the nonruling CP's. In November 1967, he had mentioned the NLSV (there was no reference to an NLHX group) at the end of the list of nonruling parties. The NLSV is represented by Secretariat member Ho Xuan Son and the NLHX by Central Committee member Nouthak Phonsavane at the present gathering.

Podgorny's greeting accords a regular alphabetical position among the nonruling communist parties to "the Socialist Unity Party of New Zealand," which Moscow is supporting in opposition to the pro-Peking New Zealand CP. At the 1967 gathering, the Socialist Unity Party of New Zealand was listed last among the nonruling CP's.

Among the West European parties, the French CP is represented by Politburo member Jacques Duclos, rather than deputy party leader Marchais, in lieu of the ailing Waldeck Rochet. The absence of top leaders of other West European CP's seems related to tensions over the Czechoslovak events. The Italian party's Longo, the British party's Gollan, the pro-Soviet Belgian party's Burnelle, and Austrian CP chairman Muhri had attended the November 1967 jubilee. This time the Italian, British, and Austrian parties are represented by Politburo figures Pajetta, Ramelson, and Fuernberg and the Belgian party by its deputy chairman, Terfve. By contrast, the Latin American and Middle Eastern CP's are for the most part represented by their top leaders.

The tiny maverick Reunion CP, represented by its chairman, Verges, in November 1967, this time sent Politburo member Panama. The Reunion party had been one of the more assertive dissenters from Soviet tutelage at the June 1969 international party conference.

#### BREZHNEV STRESSES INTERNATIONALIST UNITY AGAINST IMPERIALISM

The broad-brush treatment of foreign policy issues in Brezhnev's 21 April keynote speech leaves established formulas essentially intact. Thus the Soviet leader reaffirms adherence to a "Leninist" policy of peaceful coexistence and of support for general disarmament and negotiated settlement of disputes, assuring "realistically minded circles of the bourgeois countries" who recognize the principles of peaceful coexistence that they will find in the Soviet Union a partner in mutually advantageous cooperation.

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His discourse on world "imperialism" as the major threat, despite its current state of "decay," is built around an invocation of Lenin on the need for "close military cohesion" in the face of the "enormous front of the imperialist powers." In line with current propaganda pressure for a strong Warsaw Pact, he declares "we shall concentrate all our efforts to make the combat alliance of the socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact, still more powerful in order to strengthen the joint defense of the socialist states." And he adds that the joint might of the socialist countries shackles "the aggressive desires of the imperialists and creates a decisive obstacle in the path of the unleashing of a world rocket and nuclear war by the aggressors."

The speech treats Vietnam--briefly--in the context of the need for united anti-imperialist action. Thus Brezhnev cites it as a case in which the "joint might" of the socialist countries has blocked the path of "military adventures" against one of their number, and he traces the "failure of the American adventure" to "socialist solidarity and the broad aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries" as well as to the Vietnamese people's heroism and the existence of a Marxist-Leninist party. A defense of the intervention in Czechoslovakia follows the paragraph on Vietnam, recalling the socialist countries' joint action against imperialist efforts at "silent counterrevolution."

Other foreign policy issues are dealt with briefly and broadly. On the Middle East, Brezhnev says the aim of Israeli "aggression" and the policy of U.S. "imperialist circles" that support it is to eliminate the "progressive regimes" in the UAR, Syria, and a number of other Arab countries in order to permit monopoly exploitation of oil resources and other wealth of the Arab East. Brezhnev's remarks on disarmament are confined to a general statement on its desirability and concern for the "imperialist" policy of accumulating arms "capable of bringing death to hundreds of million of people." He ignores altogether such issues as U.S.-Soviet relations, European security, and the German problem.

**SOCIALIST RELATIONS** Brezhnev underscores the idea that observance of Marxist-Leninist "laws" and pursuit of "a foreign policy founded on principles of proletarian socialist internationalism" are basic features of socialism in keeping with Lenin's behests. At a time when imperialism is striving to poison the socialist system ideologically and to divide it, he says, "exceptional importance" attaches to the proposition in the June 1969 Moscow conference document that defense of socialism is an internationalist duty. Such a reminder has clear implications for Romania, conspicuously absent from the joint "defense of socialism" in Czechoslovakia and adhering to a neutralist posture in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

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In deference to his mixed audience, Brezhnev pays lip service to the concepts of differing roads to socialism and of "equality" and "respect for national sovereignty," but he makes clear the limited applicability of such concepts in Eastern Europe. His affirmation of them comes immediately after a defense of the intervention in Czechoslovakia. He recalls that it was "the resolute actions of the Czechs and Slovaks dedicated to the cause of socialism" and of the allied states "loyal to the principles of socialist internationalism" that "thwarted the enemies' dangerous plans directed against the common interests of socialism."

Brezhnev dwells in some detail on the increasing "imperialist" threat in arguing for tighter control over the Soviet bloc allies. In this context he quotes Lenin's warning: "Facing an enormous front of the imperialist powers, we who are fighting imperialism represent an alliance that requires close military cohesion, and we regard any attempt to violate this cohesion as a completely inadmissible phenomenon and a betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism." Remembering such words, Brezhnev adds, "we shall concentrate all our efforts to make the combat alliance of the Warsaw Pact still more powerful . . . ."

#### TITO, CEAUSESCU CHALLENGE DOGMATIC APPROACH TO LENINISM

Tito and Ceausescu both made their bows to communist unity on the Lenin centenary by contributing articles to PRAVDA, published on 18 and 19 April respectively, replete with lavish praise of Lenin's "creative" thought. But both in effect reassert their challenges to Soviet orthodoxy by emphasizing the success of their own roads to socialism and by reaffirming--carefully and in low key--their independent views.

Speaking at a Lenin observance in Bucharest on 17 April, however, Ceausescu sharpened his ideological line prior to his departure for the Moscow celebrations by more pointedly rejecting Moscow's view of proletarian internationalism and exaggeration of the "imperialist threat." His emphasis on the economic and political success of the flourishing Romanian model underscored the idea that his own brand of socialism is a legitimate heir of Lenin's thought. By portraying Lenin as a creative thinker who eschewed dogmatism, Ceausescu seemed both to defend Romania's flexible approach to Marxism-Leninism and to imply at the same time that the Soviets have become victims of their own doctrinal inflexibility.

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TITO ARTICLE Tito's PRAVDA article, which Radio Belgrade says was "requested" by the paper's editorial board, defers to the communist unity theme by playing up limited areas of ideological agreement between Belgrade and Moscow while playing down their considerable differences. Thus in passages warmly praising Lenin's revolutionary strategy and his views on the leading role of the working class, Tito manages to restate his own view of ideology as a "guide" rather than dogma and to interject a low-keyed rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine.

Emphasizing the "creative" character of Lenin's thought, he asserts that "Marxism-Leninism does not recognize ready-made prescriptions and formulas and does not tolerate dogmatism." Revolutionary theory, he adds, is developed and "even corrected on the basis of new scientific and theoretical knowledge and the experience gained in revolutionary practice." In effect rejecting any leading center of communism, Tito observes that Lenin's thought was "alien to the transformation of certain experiences acquired in the revolutionary movement of a country into absolute laws." The apparent allusion to the Brezhnev doctrine comes in an ensuing remark that although Lenin stressed the class approach to the nation, "he did not do it without recognizing the people's equality and their equal rights and sovereignty." Without these principles, Tito adds, "internationalism becomes a mere declaration . . . ."

At the same time, in a passage manifestly designed for Soviet consumption, Tito assures PRAVDA's readers that the Yugoslavs have "already resolutely resisted any attempt to endanger or to alter the working class' revolutionary powers as well as all anarchist ideas that the state should be abolished and the development of society should be abandoned to spontaneous movements." A sanitized account of the Tito article carried by TASS on 18 April emphasizes the latter statement and quotes Tito's comment on the creative nature of Marxism-Leninism being alien to "dogmatism"--a remark Soviet readers could interpret as a slap at the Chinese. TASS ignores the Yugoslav leader's rejection of any leading center, his view of ideology as a guide and not a law, and his interpretation of internationalism.

ARTICLE, SPEECH BY CEAUSESCU The Romanian leader's PRAVDA article, pointedly entitled "Socialism's Successes in Romania Are a Confirmation of the Correctness of Lenin's Ideas," applauds Soviet achievements but underlines the idea that the Romanian model of socialism and its independent international line are doing very well. Romania, Ceausescu asserts, is honoring Lenin by promoting "the supreme requirement," the material and spiritual development of its own people, and by developing international cooperation with "all" the socialist countries. In keeping with its title, the article puts considerable stress on the country's domestic success, "the uninterrupted progress of the economy" and increasing industrialization.

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As if to counter for Soviet readers the notion that Romania is not living up to its internationalist duties, Ceausescu declares that the RCP "holds high the banner of proletarian internationalism" and "puts a high value on Romanian-Soviet Friendship." But he reaffirms in effect that willingness to cooperate with Moscow does not require automatic alignment with the Soviets in any action they might take through the Warsaw Pact, repeating the formulation that Romania is willing to defend socialism "from any imperialist aggression." In his 17 April Bucharest speech he used the more familiar and more pointed Romanian formula which recalls that the Pact was set up to meet "any imperialist aggression in Europe"--an implicit reminder that it was not set up either to do combat with the Chinese or, as happened in August 1968, to invade another socialist country.

In an indirect reference to the Sino-Soviet dispute, Ceausescu calls in the PPAVEA article for "comradely discussions" to resolve disagreements in the communist movement and declares that the Romanian party, for its part, is doing its internationalist duty by "actively and widely developing relations with all the fraternal parties." In the speech at home he recalled Lenin's advice in 1922 "that divergencies between countries be analyzed and resolved in the spirit of understanding, through consideration and respect for the interests of each nation and all the peoples." Dramatizing Romania's nonpartisan stance, he in effect lectured both sides: "We believe the parties of the socialist countries can pay the greatest homage to the great Lenin's memory by acting firmly and consistently to overcome the misunderstandings affecting relations among these countries, and by struggling with perseverance and patience to strengthen the unity of the world socialist system . . . ." Lenin, Ceausescu remarked in another part of his address, always displayed "a civilized attitude of consideration and respect in his polemics."

A principal thrust of the 17 April speech, broadcast live by Radio Bucharest, was that Romania had not caved in to Soviet pressures for pursuit of an orthodox line. Ceausescu played the Lenin quotation game to argue for his own model of socialism and subtly to suggest some lessons for the Soviet Union, portraying Lenin as a creative thinker who "took account of changing economic and political reality" and as "an implacable adversary of dogmatic isolation" who adapted himself to "the requirements of life." The entire Leninist canon, Ceausescu said, "mirrors the author's concern constantly to confront his opinions and views with the changes that were taking place in reality . . . and to adapt them to the development of society and scientific knowledge."

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In effect disputing the Soviet argument that national interests of socialist countries are subordinate to the class interests of socialism, Ceausescu told his Romanian audience: "To oppose national interests to the cause of proletarian internationalism under some circumstances, or on the contrary to oppose internationalist solidarity to the national interests of the people, is to cause serious harm to the cause of socialism in one's own country as well as of socialism in general." He offered his own view that "internationalism means collaboration between peoples who are helping one another to be able to wage the struggle for socialism and communism in their respective countries more successfully."

Ceausescu challenged another Soviet view in arguing in his speech that though imperialism may still harm the revolutionary struggle, one should not "overestimate the forces of imperialism and minimize the forces of social progress." Such an attitude, he cautioned, can lead to "defeatist conclusions and inspire mistrust in the fighting ability of the anti-imperialist front."

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## BREZHNEV DOMINATES MEDIA IN LENIN ANNIVERSARY BUILDUP

During the week preceding the Lenin anniversary celebration, Brezhnev clearly dominated the central news media, with three nationally broadcast and televised speeches, followed by a fourth at the Moscow gathering on the 21st. Of significance also is the fact that only the Politburo's inner circle--Kosygin, Podgornyy and Kirilenko--shared the spotlight with Brezhnev and that Kosygin was accorded all the deference his No. 2 position entitled him to. Suslov, whose prominence has appeared to fade recently, failed to play any role during the week of final buildup, although he appeared with his fellow Politburo members at the meeting on the 21st.

Coverage of the presentation of national and Ukrainian republic awards to local areas and enterprises in connection with the Lenin anniversary shows that three status symbols--the space devoted to a leader's speech, pictures of him, and reporting of other activities during his local visit--appear to be carefully measured out according to hierarchical order.

Only four Politburo members were granted the privilege of presenting Orders of Lenin and delivering speeches: Brezhnev to the Kharkov Tractor Plant (13 April) and to Kharkov oblast (14 April), Kosygin to Kursk oblast (17 April), Podgornyy to Orenburg oblast (14 April), and Kirilenko to Armenia (14 April). Brezhnev, however, clearly towered above his colleagues, presenting two Orders of Lenin, and on 14, 15 and 17 April the press was filled with his lengthy speeches in Kharkov and Ulyanovsk, as well as with pictures of him and extensive coverage of his local activities. By contrast, the speeches of Kosygin, Podgornyy and Kirilenko were reduced to brief summaries, based on hierarchical order: PRAVDA devoted 228 lines to Kosygin's speech, 113 lines to Podgornyy's, and 91 lines to Kirilenko's. Radio Moscow's treatment was similar.

The presentations raise particular question about Suslov's status, since he ranks ahead of Kirilenko (usual ranking: Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgornyy, Suslov, Kirilenko). His failure to present an award suggests either serious illness or a significant political decline. Suslov's activities were not reported in the press from 25 March to 21 April.

Kosygin's treatment seems to belie rumors of his slippage. Not only did PRAVDA devote twice as many lines to Kosygin's speech as to Podgornyy's, but it also reported on his other activities in Kursk, including a political meeting with Kursk party leaders. Kosygin shares this distinction with Brezhnev, as the local activities of Podgornyy and Kirilenko were not reported in PRAVDA. In addition, Kosygin was clearly favored over Podgornyy and Kirilenko in that some of his substantive remarks were reported in PRAVDA, especially those on international affairs.

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The speeches of Podgornyy and Kirilenko were reduced to innocuous comments about the achievements of the local areas receiving the awards, and all their substantive remarks were reduced to one uninformative sentence: "N. V. Podgornyy in his speech spoke in detail about the tasks which face our people in the last year of the five-year plan and dwelt on questions of the international situation"; and "A. P. Kirilenko dwelt in detail on the tasks set before our people by the December plenum" (PRAVDA, 15 April).

KIRILENKO While no local versions of the Podgornyy and Kosygin speeches  
SPEECH are available, the live Yerevan radio version of Kirilenko's speech shows that he made several politically significant remarks, including a strong endorsement of the policy on Czechoslovakia ("Everyone can now see that the CPSU and Soviet government line after events in Czechoslovakia was fully justified"), a boost for Brezhnev ("the December Central Committee plenum and the speech by Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev are of the greatest importance and contain the basic directions for long-term economic and cultural construction"), and a statement that the Politburo will soon begin debating a draft of the new five-year plan.

The Armenian newspaper account, amounting to one and a half pages, cut out almost all Kirilenko's interesting statements--his three paragraphs on Czechoslovakia, his reference to Brezhnev heading the delegation to the Budapest celebrations of anniversary of Hungary's liberation, and his statement that the Politburo is about to begin debating the new draft plan--and altered his statement about the December plenum and updated that about the Vienna disarmament talks (KOMMUNIST, 15 April). On the other hand, the Armenian press gave Kirilenko's visit considerable coverage--despite Brezhnev's competing speeches. More space was devoted to Kirilenko's 14 April speech than to Brezhnev's, all pictures on 14 and 15 April were of Kirilenko, and only Kirilenko's activities were reported.

Brezhnev was cited by Kirilenko three times and by Kosygin at least twice. In Radio Moscow's 17 April recorded excerpts, Kosygin quoted from Brezhnev's 23d Party Congress report, and PRAVDA's 18 April summary states that Kosygin dwelt on problems of the economy raised at the December plenum and in Brezhnev's Kharkov speech.

SHELEPIN Shelepin, as trade union chief, delivered a ceremonial speech  
SPEECH on "V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Trade Unions" at a 16 April international trade union meeting on Lenin's birthday in Ulyanovsk. But even this appearance seemed perhaps intentionally overshadowed by Brezhnev, who gave a long speech at the opening of a Lenin memorial in Ulyanovsk on the same day. Reportage of Brezhnev's speech filled the press, along with pictures of Brezhnev and extensive reporting of his activities in Ulyanovsk. Shelepin's speech received short shrift: no central papers carried any excerpts from Shelepin's speech except PRAVDA (just six paragraphs), KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (11 paragraphs), and the trade union organ TRUD (22 paragraphs).

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UKRAINIAN LEADERS      The procedure in the Ukraine differed from Moscow's in two respects: First Secretary Shelest did not predominate so overwhelmingly, and each Ukrainian Politburo member presented one or two awards. Photos of Shelest presenting awards were published on 9 and 11 April, along with short excerpts from his speeches. During the period 8-12 April all Ukrainian Politburo members and candidate members (except candidate member F. Ovcharenko) fanned out to present Lenin jubilee awards, and the number of lines devoted to the top leaders' activities followed the Ukrainian hierarchical order: First Secretary Shelest (with twice as many as Shcherbitskiy), Premier Shcherbitskiy, President Lyashko, and Second Secretary Lutak. But RADYANSKA UKRAINA published no speech excerpts or photos of the leaders other than Shelest.

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## WEST GERMANY

## GDR MEDIA SEE NO POSITIVE BRANDT STEPS TOWARD KASSEL SUMMIT

East German propaganda treatment of FRG Chancellor Brandt, at the midpoint between the 19 March Erfurt summit with GDR Premier Stoph and the scheduled 21 May second summit at Kassel, continues to portray the Bonn government as the mere continuer of "revanchist" CDU/CSU policies and a regime totally lacking in any sincere intent to "accept reality." GDR media follow established lines in discussing Brandt's U.S. visit, in protesting Brandt's new visit to West Berlin, and in denouncing the rejection of GDR membership in the UN Economic Commission for Europe. Soviet media continue to replay East German protests, although softening the tone by selective reporting.

**BRANDT VISIT TO WASHINGTON:** An East Berlin radio commentary on 15 April, noting Brandt's statement to the Bundestag that day that he and President Nixon shared a "full conformity of views," declares that the West German Chancellor unquestionably "returned with the old concept" of U.S. global strategy based on halting and "rolling back, if possible" the "victorious course of socialism." This "old story" confirms, it adds, that no new orientation in Bonn policy is in sight.

A Moscow domestic service roundtable panelist on the 19th accuses President Nixon of offering a "not too favorable compliment" to Brandt in Washington which was not much to the liking of certain friends of Brandt. Panelist Polyanov points out that while President Nixon favorably compared the "common political aims" of Brandt and former Chancellor Adenauer, the Brandt coalition "has repeatedly attempted to create the impression that it is breaking with the discredited old policies of Konrad Adenauer." He adds that Bundestag debates on Brandt's U.S. visit evoked sharp clashes between the coalition and the CDU/CSU opposition, including "personal attacks on Brandt and his so-called Eastern policy" and "open expressions of revanchism" by CDU Bundestag leader Barzel.

**BRANDT VISIT TO BERLIN:** A GDR Foreign Ministry statement of 16 April, published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 17th, denounces both Chancellor Brandt and FRG President Heinemann for visiting West Berlin to perform "official functions" last week. The statement asserts that these visits, "only a few days" after Brandt's U.S. visit, indicate that the Brandt government, "in obvious agreement with U.S. President Nixon, systematically continues and further intensifies" the former CDU/CSU government's "illegal policy of interference in West Berlin." The statement says

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"Bonn's increased policy of interference" in West Berlin "is in blatant contrast" to West German declarations in favor of easing tension and reaching an understanding. It "emphatically protests" Bonn's "continuous presumptuous interference" in West Berlin affairs and "emphatically demands" that the FRG stop this interference.

A very brief TASS English service report on the GDR protest on the 17th omits all the polemical charges, including the reference to "obvious agreement" with President Nixon and the charge of intensified West German interference in West Berlin.

EEC REJECTION OF GDR ENTRY      A GDR Foreign Ministry statement carried by ADN on 16 April "categorically rejects" West German attempts to treat East Germany as "occupied territory" and the "act of discrimination" against the GDR embodied in the rejection of the GDR for membership in the UN Economic Commission for Europe at the EEC's 25th plenary meeting last week. The statement charges that Bonn was instrumental in denying the GDR an advance invitation to the EEC meeting and "stubbornly opposed" a vote on a Polish proposal to admit the GDR, recognizing that a vote "would clearly expose the contradiction" between Brandt's statements at Erfurt and Bonn's practical actions.

The Geneva EEC meeting, the statement declares, "clearly reveals again" the "great gulf" between the words and deeds of Brandt's government. The statement closes with a demand for the GDR's "full and equal membership" in the EEC.

FRG "INTERFERENCE" IN GDR AFFAIRS      GDR media continue to lay groundwork for blaming the FRG for a possible fiasco at the Kassel summit through various charges of FRG "provocative attempts at interference" in GDR affairs. There has been no special stress on the murder charges filed against GDR Premier Stoph and other leaders by "West German fascist Gerhard Frey," publisher of NATIONAL ZEITUNG. ADN on the 17th did point out that this paper published the Bonn prosecutor's reply to the charge, but East German media still suppress the fact that murder was involved. ADN recalled that the GDR on the 14th had called the charge a "grave provocation" and noted that Bonn had not commented on the charge as of the 17th.

ADN on the 20th reports a belated protest by "competent quarters" in the GDR against the FRG customs ordinance dating from 1 January 1970 which in effect treats shipments transiting the FRG to East Germany as FRG "internal" goods. The statement decries this "new, presumptuous instruction" arrogating authority over GDR

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customs functions to the FRG--proof that Bonn still "insists on the revanchist claim to sole representation." The GDR rejects "with utmost determination" these "renewed provocative attempts at interference in its affairs" and demands immediate rescission of the offensive ordinance.

#### POLISH COMMENTATORS DISPLAY GROWING DISTRUST OF BRANDT

Polish comment on prospects for the third round of Warsaw negotiations with West Germany, opening 22 April, evinces skepticism about FRG intentions and suggests that Chancellor Brandt has a growing credibility gap in Polish eyes.

PAP commentator Guz observes on the 20th--in the only communist commentary available so far on Brandt's lengthy 20 April interview with the West German DER SPIEGEL--that since Brandt himself used the interview to try to dispel fears that President Nixon opposed FRG recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier, the opposition lies elsewhere in "certain circles" in Bonn. Guz cites evidence to show that some Bonn leaders are trying to obstruct the path toward an FRG-Polish agreement on the eve of the talks. He notes statements by FRG press spokesman Ahlers as examples of "attempts to hamper negotiations" or "at least slow them down" by creating an "unfavorable psychological climate for continuation of the talks."

A TRYBUNA LUDU commentary on the 22d, summarized by PAP, reaffirms that the only issue for the FRG is "final recognition" of Poland's western frontier, a step the FRG "should and must make by itself," without reciprocal Polish concessions. TRYBUNA LUDU says "agreement on the frontier issue" is "simply impossible" because it is only a question of FRG recognition. If the FRG takes this "initial step," the paper says, then "further matters" could be discussed. It concludes that so far Poland has seen "a 'new Eastern policy' only in name"--a policy which seeks to "take advantage of the effective appearances of 'tendencies of reconciliation'" with "no progress" in practical terms.

Commenting on 18 April on the rejection of GDR membership by the UN Economic Commission for Europe at its 25th session last week, PAP commentator Guz declares that the FRG's role in "inspiring" rejection of Poland's initiative renders "highly questionable" both the reliability of Bonn's statements and Polish "confidence in its promises and declarations." Guz concludes: "One can hardly trust the partner in a dialog, and possibly in agreements, when he does not keep his promises in practice."

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## C U B A

## CASTRO IMPLIES NIXON, PENTAGON BEHIND NEW EXILE LANDING

Fidel Castro implies in a 19 April speech that President Nixon is to blame for the Cuban exile landing near Baracoa on 17 April, although he does not go so far as to state the charge directly. Castro's speech, delivered at the funeral of five men killed in action arising from the landing, was broadcast on the 20th by Havana domestic radio and television. Castro makes the general charge that President Nixon had assigned the Pentagon the task of "organizing and recruiting mercenaries for new aggressive plans" against Cuba. He describes the President as an "enthusiastic" supporter of the Bay of Pigs invasion which was foiled exactly nine years ago, and he warns the President "and the gang of criminals that make up the Pentagon and the CIA" that regardless of the means and methods used against the island, an even "more crushing defeat" than that inflicted at the Bay of Pigs is in store for them.

This is the first suggestion by Castro that President Nixon has been personally responsible for hostile armed actions against Cuba. Prior to the President's inauguration, however, in a 2 January 1969 speech, Castro said Mr. Nixon had "always" spoken in "threatening and very aggressive terms about Cuba." He added that such threats could not "intimidate" Cuba, and he forecast that Mr. Nixon would face "the bitter experience" of seeing the country overcome underdevelopment and "the blockade torn to shreds."

Both the current speech and a communique on the landing issued by Castro the same day allege that the infiltrators' purpose was to "obstruct" the sugar harvest. At a time when Cuba is falling progressively behind schedule in its effort to produce 10 million tons of sugar, the extensive Cuban publicity for the landing may thus stem in part from a desire to spur lagging labor productivity by highlighting alleged U.S.-sponsored efforts to sabotage the harvest. Havana announced the production of its 6 millionth ton of sugar on 16 April, 13 days later than promised by Castro in a 20 December speech in which he outlined the schedule for producing the 10 million tons. Cuban media have carried frequent reports on problems of labor absenteeism and general indiscipline in connection with the harvest. On the 17th the Cuban CP Revolutionary Orientation Commission issued a communique asking for maximum efforts to produce the remaining 4 million tons of sugar and declaring: "Our present enemy consists of low yields, breakdowns at the sugar mills, the early rains, the poor use of the workday, and the time we waste from now on."

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While AFP dispatches from Havana indicate that only a dozen men were involved in the landing near Baracoa, Castro not only took the unusual step of issuing a communique over his own signature on the action, but has been depicted in Havana media as being personally involved in the pursuit operations against the remnants of the invading group. In a speech last November Castro had warned of the possibility of counterrevolutionary infiltration attempts to interrupt the harvest and had promised that no one who participated in such ventures would leave Cuba alive. Now, in the 19 April speech, he states that the fugitives will either die fighting or be sentenced to execution by revolutionary courts.

SOVIET REACTION      TASS summarized Castro's speech and communique, and a TASS commentary on the 20th describes the incident as "another manifestation of the criminal anti-Cuban campaign pursued by American imperialism." Acknowledging that the United States has officially denied any knowledge of the incursion, TASS observes that Washington admits "its dirty deeds only when caught red-handed" and recalls the U.S. disclaimers at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

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## CPSU SLOGANS

## MAY DAY LIST REGISTERS FEW SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES

The CPSU Central Committee's slogans for May Day 1970, issued 16 April, contain few changes from the list issued for last year's October Revolution anniversary. The foreign affairs group reflects concern over spread of the Vietnam war to other Southeast Asian countries, upgrades the placement of the slogan on the Middle East, and takes tacit account of West German signing of the nonproliferation treaty. The domestic affairs group includes a few revisions mirroring current regime concerns over improving production discipline and construction efficiency.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS      There are again two slogans on Vietnam, the first saluting the Vietnamese people struggling against U.S. "aggression" and the second calling on peoples of the world to demand an end to the "aggression." The first is unchanged and the second takes recent developments into account by inserting a reference to U.S. "aggressive designs in Southeast Asia," where the previous version had called only for an end to the "aggressive war against the freedom-loving Vietnamese people." This slogan repeats the demand, introduced last October, that the United States withdraw its troops and those of its "satellites" from South Vietnam "immediately and unconditionally."

The slogan on the Middle East is moved up to a position immediately following the ones on Vietnam and ahead of slogans on West Germany and a European security system, which had preceded it in October. It retains the wording introduced last October, calling first for an end to "Israel's aggression" and "immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories," then for solidarity of the Soviet people with the peoples of Arab countries.

The slogan on West Germany deletes a call for a struggle against giving the "West German militarists" access to nuclear weapons--in effect recognizing the FRG's signing of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in November and anticipating FRG ratification of the treaty.

There is no change in the disarmament slogan highlighting a demand for a ban on nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons. This slogan dates from last October, following an absence of any slogan on disarmament since the long, elaborate slogan format was truncated in October 1967 by removal of most of the specifics from the group on foreign affairs.

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DOMESTIC AFFAIRS      There are predictable topical embellishments of a number of domestic affairs slogans with references to Lenin's historic significance, and new topical slogans refer to the impending USSR Supreme Soviet elections and to the heroism of the Soviet military in crushing German fascism--the latter evidently in connection with the 25th anniversary of Victory Day.

In the economic field there are added references to strengthening discipline and improving production techniques. A new slogan calls for more effective construction efforts in housebuilding as well as in industrial and public building construction.

"LONG LIVE COMMUNISM"      The optimistic slogan "Long live communism, the bright future of mankind!", introduced simultaneously with the short format in October 1967 and used as the concluding slogan in every list since then, is deleted from the current list and a similar reference is dropped from the greeting to communist and workers' parties. Where previously the parties were described as fighting for "the affirmation on earth of mankind's bright dream--communism," the current version has them fighting for "peace, democracy, national independence, and socialism."

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