

██████████
8 JULY 1970

#2770

Approved For Release 7000087001 CIA-RDP85T00075R000100010001-1

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

DOESER

Confidential



TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

8 July 1970
(VOL. XXI, NO. 27)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

W A R N I N G

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

C O N T E N T S

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG Foreign Ministries on President's Cambodian Report . . .	1
Hanoi, Front Call Bruce Appointment to Paris "Appeasement" . . .	5
President's Remarks Prompt Only Routine Moscow Criticism . . .	6
PRC Publicizes Chou En-lai, Sihanouk Attacks on President . . .	8
Delegates at Paris Assail President's Report	10
Meetings of SEATO, Allied Foreign Ministers in Saigon Scored . .	11
New Conference Idea Ignored by Moscow, Rejected by Sihanouk . .	13
Sihanouk Government Calls Trial of Prince "Illegal"	13
Military Situation in Cambodia, Vietnam Discussed	14
Front Denies Allied Charge of 11 June Communist Massacre . . .	17
DRV Says U.S. Plane Downed, War Crimes Communiques Released . .	18

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Polemics Remain at Low Level; Kuznetsov Leaves Peking	19
---	----

MIDDLE EAST

Moscow Disputes U.S. View of Mideast Balance of Forces	22
USSR Skeptical, Cautious on U.S. Peace Initiative	24
NEW TIMES Discusses Arab Differences on Mideast Crisis	25

FRG AND SOVIET BLOC

IZVESTIYA Observer Responds to FRG Critics of Dialogue	27
Poland Presses Bonn on Recognition of Oder-Neisse Line	28

ROMANIA-USSR

New Treaty Registers Compromise on Contentious Issues	31
Maurer, Kosygin Remarks Mirror Respective Viewpoints	32
Bucharest Gives Kosygin Delegation Correct Reception	34

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Husak Assails Dubcek; Radio and Press Deny Impending Trial . .	36
--	----

(Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

C O N T E N T S (Continued)

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Peking Leadership Rankings: A Game of Chinese Checkers?	39
Broadcast Examines Party, Revolutionary Committee Relationship	40
Progress in Party Rebuilding Shown by Province (Table)	42

BURMA-PRC

Head of Resident Burmese CP Mission May Be Absent From Peking	43
---	----

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- i -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 29 JUNE - 5 JULY 1970

<u>Moscow (3690 items)</u>			<u>Peking (2667 items)</u>		
CPSU CC Plenum	(--)	8%	Indochina	(5%)	34%
[Brezhnev Report		3%]	[Nixon Statements		9%]
Middle East	(3%)	8%	[Sihanouk in DPRK		7%]
[Nasir in USSR	(--)	5%]	Korean War & Taiwan	(51%)	27%
China	(6%)	6%	Anniversaries		
Soyuz 9	(8%)	5%	Domestic Issues	(11%)	14%
Indochina	(6%)	5%	CCP 49th	(--)	12%
RSFSR SS Session	(--)	4%	Anniversary		
Warsaw Pact Foreign	(6%)	3%			
Ministers' Meeting					
in Budapest					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 30 June report on the U.S. operation in Cambodia and his 1 July television interview with journalists draw high-level Vietnamese communist reaction in the form of DRV and PRG foreign ministry statements and a VNA interview with DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. The propaganda uniformly claims that the President's remarks indicate that U.S. "aggression" will continue in Cambodia and all of Indochina and that he is still trying to win a military victory and to negotiate from a position of strength. The President's announcement in his TV interview of Ambassador Bruce's appointment as head of the Paris delegation is characterized as a move to appease public opinion.

Peking's reaction to the President's report includes Chou En-lai's remark--at a 5 July banquet welcoming Sihanouk back from his state visit to North Korea--that the United States' expansion of its "war of aggression" into Cambodia and its "deceptive" calls for a peaceful settlement are aimed at "hanging on" to all of Indochina.

Moscow offers no high-level comment on the President's statements; routine radio and press comment follows the Vietnamese communist line in scoring the U.S. policy of continued "aggression" in Cambodia and throughout Indochina. Kosygin, in brief remarks on Southeast Asia in his 7 July Bucharest speech, seemed to go beyond earlier elite statements in connecting the United States with the Cambodian coup. As rendered by TASS in English and Russian, Kosygin said that "preparing for an armed intrusion into the territory of Cambodia, the United States provoked there a coup d'etat and then started an aggression against that neutral country." The Soviet Government statement, which Kosygin read at his 4 May press conference, had said that after the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, the "link between the subversive activities of certain services of the United States and the coup d'etat in Phnom Penh" became more evident.

There is currently little Soviet criticism of China's Indochina policies. But a 3 July Mandarin-language commentary, in the course of a general attack, chides Peking for describing Soviet support of the DRV's position on a political solution as "collaboration" with the United States.

DRV, PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES ON PRESIDENT'S CAMBODIAN REPORT

HANOI Following prompt, routine radio and press comment on President Nixon's 30 June report on the Cambodian operation and his 1 July interview with TV correspondents,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 2 -

Hanoi on the 3d released a DRV Foreign Ministry statement* which says that on the occasion of the "forced" withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cambodia the President "again prattled about his good will for peace and boasted about illusory U.S. successes."

The statement, which makes no explicit reference either to the President's report or to his TV interview, says that "obviously" the Nixon Administration is still entertaining the "illusion" of a military victory and of negotiating from a position of strength. Like other comment, the statement charges that although the United States "has been forced" to withdraw troops, it continues to "wage aggression" against Cambodia by using ARVN and Thai troops, carrying out air strikes, stepping up military aid, and pressuring allies to supply arms and weapons to the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak regime. It also scores the United States for "stepping up" the war in Laos, prolonging the war in South Vietnam through Vietnamization, and "threatening" the DRV with air strikes "as during the first days" of this May.

Without elaboration, the statement says that "Washington has also left the door open" for the return of U.S. troops to Cambodia. The President's exchange with the TV journalists regarding a categorical assurance that troops would not be sent back to Cambodia is exploited in other propaganda. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 3d says President Nixon "refused to give a clearcut reply": it reports accurately that he said he has no plan for a return of the troops but would not like to be bound by a categorical statement, but it goes on to conclude that he "has left the door open to future U.S. armed aggression against Cambodia." A NHAN DAN commentary, as summarized by VNA on the 4th, says flatly that the President "obstinately refused to declare that the United States definitively would not commit troops to Cambodia again."

* The last previous Presidential pronouncement to evoke foreign ministry statements was the 20 April speech in which the President announced that an additional 150,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam during the next year. The President's 30 April speech announcing that U.S. as well as ARVN ground troops were being sent into Cambodia prompted statements from the DRV and the PRG at the government level. The President's 3 November 1969 speech outlining Vietnamization and troop-withdrawal policy also occasioned government statements.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 3 -

The foreign ministry statement refers to "illusory" U.S. successes but does not mention the specific mission of the U.S. operation in Cambodia. Most of the routine comment also similarly avoids details. But a 2 July VNA account of the President's report does quote it as referring to the "successful destruction of the enemy base area," and the initial 1 July Hanoi radio reaction to the report said that the President released statistics on "booty seized from the enemy."* NHAN DAN on the 4th says that the President merely gave out statistics and did not reply to "the two hard questions--what is the outcome of the Cambodian venture and has it helped shorten the war." The statement issued on 1 July in Paris by the DRV spokesman, carried by VNA on the 3d, says cryptically that the President "put the blame on the DRV and shamelessly charged it with extending the war to Cambodia."

The Paris spokesman's statement, like other propaganda including the NHAN DAN article, seeks to bolster claims of U.S. defeats by citing the 20 June communique from Sihanouk's "Defense Ministry" which VNA had released on the 29th. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of 3 July, broadcast by Hanoi radio that day, uniquely claims that the President had to withdraw U.S. troops and some Saigon troops out of Cambodia "in order to save the U.S.-puppets" from a "dangerous situation in South Vietnam."

While the foreign ministry statement deprecates the President's remarks on negotiations, it makes no reference to the Paris talks. On the other hand, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh responded in his 3 July interview to the VNA correspondent's request for comment on the President's 1 July statement by saying that he "only reiterated that stand the United States has adopted at the Paris conference for more than a year"--demanding mutual withdrawal and "using the Thieu administration to oppose the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination." This line is echoed in the routine comment, and the 3 July Hanoi radio commentary on the President's TV interview complained that "he would not establish a concrete timetable for a total U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam."

* See the TRENDS of 1 July, pages 1-2, for a discussion of Vietnamese communist vacillation on the matter of sanctuaries in Cambodia.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 4 -

THE FRONT The PRG Foreign Ministry statement of 3 July, unlike the DRV statement, refers explicitly to the President's 30 June report in charging that the United States is continuing its "aggression" in Cambodia. The PRG statement also differs from that of the DRV in the detail of its charges. The PRG says the President "shamelessly laid the responsibility for the expansion of the war into the whole of Indochina on the Vietnamese people." And it makes the unique charge that "on U.S. orders" the Thai, Cambodian and Saigon governments "have set up a joint military command in Phnom Penh." The statement says that the "U.S. satellites" in SEATO "are campaigning for an armed intervention against the patriotic movement of the Khmer people" and that the United States has "instigated the Djakarta conference's group to take perfidious moves aimed at covering up the U.S. aggressive acts in Cambodia, legalizing the Lon Nol-Matak clique and advertising for the Nixon Administration's peace hoax."

A 3 July Liberation Radio commentary on the President's report casts doubt on his statement that there will be neither advisers nor U.S. troops in Cambodia. The fact cannot be concealed, it says, that "there is the U.S. embassy staff--actually consisting of U.S. officers and CIA agents--in Phnom Penh" and that the United States will provide military aid to the Lon Nol army. The commentary adds that "of course" the U.S. embassy staff and military aid "are not as limited as Nixon said." Noting that ARVN troops continue to operate in Cambodia with U.S. air support, it also charges that this does not take into account the fact that a number of U.S.-ARVN units, "although withdrawn from Cambodia, have bivouacked in the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border area in order to be ready to reinforce and to create military pressure, as was clearly pointed out by Western opinion."

An LPA commentary on the 4th pegged to the President's TV interview, like Hanoi comment, castigates the President for calling for a mutual troop withdrawal. But it goes on additionally to acknowledge his references to U.S. proposals on a cease-fire and general elections under international supervision. It also ridicules the President's statement "that the Vietnamese people's demands for the total and unconditional U.S. withdrawal and the overthrow of the Saigon-puppet regime" are unacceptable. A Liberation Radio commentary, also on the 4th, echoes LPA but goes on to say

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1970

- 5 -

that "truthfully, whether or not the Americans will agree" to end the war and withdraw all U.S. and allied troops "will definitely not be determined by the Americans nor by their 'good will for peace,' but by the strength of the Vietnamese, American, and world peoples who are tightening their drive to knock out the U.S. aggressors."

HANOI, FRONT CALL BRUCE APPOINTMENT TO PARIS "APPEASEMENT"

Hanoi's first acknowledgment of the President's announcement that he was appointing Ambassador David Bruce to head the U.S. delegation in Paris appears in the 3 July radio commentary on the President's TV interview. The commentary says that the President tried to present the appointment "as an act of good will" but that it is in fact "aimed at nothing but appeasing public opinion--which has strongly criticized the Nixon Administration for having minimized the importance of the Paris talks--since he declared that the U.S. stand will not change." Hanoi, of course, does not acknowledge the President's remark that he hoped this act of good will would be reciprocated by a similar move by the DRV in attempting to find a peaceful solution.

Later on the 3d, VNA carried the interview with DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, who responded to a question on the Bruce appointment by saying that the President had refused to appoint a chief delegate since last November and that by doing so now he is "simply correcting an arrogant move." Trinh added that "if the United States intends to make use of this to cover its obdurate stand, surely nobody will fall dupe to it." When Trinh was asked if Xuan Thuy will return to Paris, he said only that "as usual, Minister Xuan Thuy has come back to Hanoi to report to the government on the work at the Paris conference." The NHAN DAN commentary of the 4th says that viewed against the President's "unchanged stand," Bruce's appointment cannot be viewed as a new factor beneficial to peace, nor has it in any way shown U.S. good will.

Front reaction to the appointment came on the 4th with an LPA "authorized" statement which says the appointment is "what the United States must do after the prolonged absence of a chief U.S. delegate." The LPA and Liberation Radio commentaries of the same day charge that the appointment is an attempt to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 6 -

soothe public opinion indignant over the spread of the war. The radio commentary says that "to add a sensational feature" to his TV interview, the President began by announcing the appointment. Observing that he "lavishly praised Bruce as America's most distinguished diplomat and as an ambassador who had served five Presidents," the broadcast charges that the President "tried to create the illusory impression" that the appointment would bring something new to the search for a peaceful solution to Vietnam. But the "gist" of the problem, it adds, is whether or not the United States agrees to change its stand, and in this respect the President "offered nothing new."

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS PROMPT ONLY ROUTINE MOSCOW CRITICISM

Routine-level Moscow comment on the President's report and TV interview claims that the withdrawal of troops from Cambodia is merely an effort to "deceive" world opinion and does not indicate a change in the U.S. policy of "interference" in that country. A Moscow domestic service commentary by Aleksey Leontyev on 2 July takes issue with the President's references to successes, citing Western press reports that the Cambodian partisans control a "far bigger part" of Cambodia than they did before the entry of U.S. troops and that the Lon Nol government is in a "more risky position" than before. He says that the "interventionists" accomplished none of their goals: they did not find the "headquarters of the liberation army of South Vietnam," they failed to "encircle and wipe out the patriotic forces," and they failed to show that U.S. intervention in Cambodia is now completed or to show that the United States wants peace in Indochina.

Other propaganda, including a Krichevskiy commentary broadcast in foreign languages from 2 to 4 July, says that troop withdrawal merely means a "new phase" in U.S. aggression in Cambodia, with the burden of the fighting shifted to allied troops while the United States continues bombings and provides military aid to the Lon Nol regime. A brief 2 July TASS and radio news report of the President's TV interview says he "gave no clearcut assurances" that the United States will not repeat the "invasion" of Cambodia under any circumstances, but Moscow commentators do not dwell in any detail on the exchange over the possibility of a renewed entry of U.S. troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 7 -

In a 4 July PRAVDA article Mayevskiy disputes the President's statement that the action in Cambodia was necessary to save American lives, maintaining that since air operations will continue and South Vietnamese troops remain, the war and therefore further losses will continue. He adds that the extension of the war in Southeast Asia may not only undermine the "timetable" for the withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam, but may even require the dispatch of new troops. South Vietnamese troops are already committing "terror" in Cambodia, he says, and the United States is pressing for a Thai invasion as well, with the Thai air force already conducting bombings in Cambodia.

A domestic service commentary by Zorin on 6 July takes issue with the President's position, in the TV interview, that the present war, though undeclared, is in accordance with the President's constitutional right to use his powers to protect American troops in military operations. Zorin argues that the "banditry" has lost its last semblance of legality with the repeal of the Tonkin resolution, leaving the President in an "awkward" position. The Mayevskiy article similarly contends that the repeal of the Tonkin resolution "confirmed" the illegality of the U.S. "invasion of Indochina."

Several commentators note that the President's 30 June report coincided with the Senate's passage of the Cooper-Church amendment. (TASS on 1 July, reporting the vote on the amendment, called it a "serious blow" to Administration policy in Southeast Asia but added that its "political and moral" importance tops its "practical consequences," since the bill might be revised in joint committee and would probably be vetoed by the President.) Mayevskiy in PRAVDA points to the coincidence as showing the deepening split in America, and brief 2 July TASS and radio reports of the TV interview note that the President was "critical" of the amendment and urged the House to introduce changes to "bring it to naught."

NEGOTIATIONS Moscow commentators, including Mayevskiy in PRAVDA and Krichevskiy, question the sincerity of the President's statements that he seeks a negotiated settlement, and like the Vietnamese communists they discount the significance of the Bruce appointment in view of alleged U.S. intransigence at Paris. A TASS report on 2 July cites a New York POST editorial as commenting that the President's TV interview "threw cold water" on

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 8 -

rumors that the Administration may agree to a coalition regime in Saigon and that in the face of this "letdown" the appointment of Ambassador Bruce "loses much of its impact." On 1 July, impugning the President's sincerity regarding a political settlement, TASS cites Western press comments on the President's "tough language" accusing Hanoi of belligerence and intransigence.

A Moscow broadcast in English to South Asia on the 8th, scoring the "American press" for starting a "new propaganda drive" to make readers believe President Nixon has undertaken a "peace offensive," says that the only proof the press can offer is the appointment of Ambassador Bruce. But the commentator remarks that this can "hardly change anything" at the Paris talks as long as Bruce has "obviously limited authority" in making policy; he concludes that the talk of peace initiatives and the appointment of the new Paris delegation head is nothing but a "show," lacking any "real readiness to make the necessary changes in policy."

PRC PUBLICIZES CHOU EN-LAI, SIHANOUK ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT

Peking's initial reaction to the President's statement took the form of pickups of Vietnamese communist comment, the first being NCNA's 2 July report of a VNA commentary that day. NCNA quoted it at length, including the charge that the Nixon Administration is attempting to negotiate from a position of strength and to use the Paris talks as a means to step up Vietnamization. Other NCNA pickups include that on the 6th of a NHAN DAN commentary of 4 July. It accurately quotes much of the article as transmitted by VNA but omits a passage referring to the appointment of a new chief U.S. delegate at Paris. The only Peking acknowledgment of the Bruce appointment appears in an NCNA report of Sihanouk's speech at the banquet hosted by Chou En-lai on 5 July.

Peking's first independent comment, carried by NCNA on 3 July, says the President's statements show up troop withdrawal as a "counterrevolutionary tactic" to cover war expansion and the "'peace talk' scheme." It notes that the President said that the United States will continue to give the Lon Nol clique military assistance, that the U.S. Air Force will continue "air interception," and that the United States will encourage third country efforts to "provide troops or supplies" to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 9 -

Cambodia. It also notes that South Vietnamese troops remain in Cambodia and that Thai troops will "soon be introduced." The commentary takes issue with the President's statements about "seeking real negotiations" to obtain a "settlement fair to both sides," routinely terming them "counterrevolutionary doubledealing tactics."

A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article takes a similar line the next day, saying troop withdrawal does not mean a slackening of aggression and calling the President's description of the withdrawal as an effort to seek peace "the greatest of lies." The action in Cambodia was a "disastrous defeat" despite the President's claims of victory, it says, with Cambodia's national liberation struggle intensifying, the "people's war." developing, and the Phnom Penh regime "moving closer to collapse."

Both the NCNA commentary and PEOPLE'S DAILY note in some detail the exchange in the TV interview on the question of a renewed troop incursion. NCNA cites the President as saying that "as commander in chief if again it becomes necessary to make such a decision, I will certainly exercise this power," and PEOPLE'S DAILY notes that he said he is "not willing to say" that U.S. ground units will not be sent to Cambodia again.

Chou En-lai, at the 5 June banquet for Sihanouk, charged the President with "telling a hypocritical lie" when he said that the U.S. troops had successfully fulfilled their combat missions in Cambodia and that "all" had withdrawn. He called the troop withdrawal announcement a "trick of political deception" aimed at perpetuating the occupation of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia so as to "hang on to the whole of Indochina." Like Vietnamese communist propaganda, he cited Sihanouk's 30 June statement that the troop withdrawal does not solve the problem of war in Cambodia and Indochina and his demand for total, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. and allied troops. Chou also briefly cited the 3 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement's expression of the Indochinese people's resolve to fight until "final victory."

Sihanouk, in his banquet speech, branded as "cynicism" the statement in the President's 30 June report that the Southeast Asian people should determine their own future without

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 10 -

outside interference, commenting that it is only the United States that violates the Geneva agreements. The troop withdrawal is only a "trick," Sihanouk said, since the United States is escalating "air intervention" and sending in "mercenaries" and arms to help Lon Nol. He also asserted that in his TV interview the President said American forces would remain in South Vietnam long enough to "compel the patriotic Vietnamese to accept a negotiated solution."

DELEGATES AT PARIS ASSAIL PRESIDENT'S REPORT

Consistent with recent practice, Vietnamese communist media give only cursory accounts of the 73d session of the Paris talks on 2 July. According to VNA, the PRG and DRV delegates "severely denounced" the President's 30 June report as "another piece of deception" justifying U.S. "aggression" against Cambodia and covering up the United States' failure in "its scheme" to expand the war to all of Indochina.

Both the LPA and VNA accounts note that PRG delegation deputy chief Dinh Ba Thi said the United States was "compelled" to withdraw its ground forces by failure and the pressure of world opinion. And both accounts note his argument that the war in essence remains an American one, since the U.S. air force "keeps on openly attacking the whole territory of that country and spraying toxic chemicals and gases on Cambodia, continues to have Saigon puppet troops in Cambodia, and has sent Thai mercenaries to fight in place of American GI's." LPA notes that Thi presented "proof" of communist victories and the United States' failure to improve its position by the Cambodian action, but the account reports none of the detail of his remarks.

The VNA account briefly reports DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's comments that even though U.S. troops are withdrawn, the United States continues its "war of aggression" against Cambodia by using Saigon and "other mercenary" troops, finding ways to retain U.S. military advisers there, and sending U.S. aircraft to bomb. VNA ignores both delegates' charges that the President still claimed the right to send U.S. troops back to Cambodia "under the absurd pretext" of protecting U.S. troops in South Vietnam. It also omits Vy's charge that the President, "in order to justify the U.S. aggression in Cambodia and his extension of the war to the whole of Indochina," again resorted to "slander" accusing "the DRV of bringing the war to Cambodia and even of causing the 'downfall of Prince Sihanouk.'"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 11 -

VNA notes that Vy said the United States failed to achieve any of its objectives in entering Cambodia, but omits Vy's listing of the objectives--reducing U.S. casualties, ensuring the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam according to plan and carrying out Vietnamization as scheduled. VNA also deletes Vy's citation of the 20 June communique issued by Sihanouk's "Defense Ministry" and Sihanouk's 30 June statement as documentation of U.S. losses and defeats--odd omissions given the frequent references to both documents in other propaganda.

ALLIED SPEECHES Again obscuring the allied delegates' speeches, VNA says that GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong "again rehashed the same preposterous and arrogant allegations he had made in previous sessions." U.S. delegate Philip Habib, according to the account, "pleaded for the flagrant U.S. invasion in Cambodia and took up the peace hoax advanced by Nixon" in the 30 June report and the TV interview.

MEETINGS OF SEATO, ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SAIGON SCORED

HANOI A Hanoi broadcast on 6 July and a NHAN DAN article carried by VNA on the 7th refer to the 2-3 July SEATO Council meeting in Manila. (Earlier, on the 2d, Liberation Radio had linked the Manila meeting with the President's statements as demonstrating U.S. "aggressive" designs on Cambodia.) The Hanoi broadcast alleges that the SEATO meeting was held with the aim of "further attracting the U.S. satellites and lackeys to participate in the U.S. military adventure in Indochina." It complains that the SEATO communique "expressed sympathy" for the Lon Nol government's appeal for aid and "again insolently falsely accused North Vietnam of invading Cambodia." It further notes that the communique "called for support of the diplomatic efforts of the U.S.-puppets and lackeys at the so-called Djakarta conference on Cambodia" and hailed the "imaginary victories" of the allies in Cambodia.

NHAN DAN on the 7th lumps the SEATO conference and the Saigon meeting of the foreign ministers whose countries have troops in South Vietnam, charging that their purpose was to tie the United States' allies more closely to "the U.S. war chariot." The meetings, it said, show that the President is bent on realizing his doctrine of "making Asians fight Asians."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 12 -

Both NIAN DAN and the radio broadcast claim that the meetings met with failure. The broadcast says the appeals by Secretary Rogers and his "clique" for direct military intervention "were responded to perfunctorily." Stating that the Saigon and Thai "regimes" at the Manila and Saigon meetings "called on SEATO to bring its troops to Cambodia to replace U.S. troops," NIAN DAN cites Western press sources as saying the suggestion "was coolly received" and that "none of them, except South Vietnam and the United States, made a precise commitment concerning the aid which they agreed to give Cambodia."

MOSCOW Some of Moscow's comment on the President's statements also refers to the SEATO Council and Saigon foreign ministers' meetings, both attended by Secretary Roger . Commentators say both meetings discussed the widening of the war and the drawing in of allied troops. A 4 July broadcast in English to North America notes that Thailand was the first to respond, dispatching aircraft to bomb Cambodia and declaring readiness to send troops. TASS on 2 July, commenting on the SEATO meeting, says the U.S. effort to draw Asian allies into the war is shown by President Nixon's 30 June statement that the United States will encourage and support efforts by other countries to aid the Phnom Penh regime "with troops and arms."

On 7 July TASS cites Western reports of Secretary Rogers' press conference in which he said that military assistance to Cambodia was discussed at his meeting in Saigon with Cambodian Foreign Minister Koun Wick. TASS comments that Rogers' statement "confirms" the United States' intention to continue intervening in Cambodia.

At the same time, Moscow commentators stress that the United States failed to obtain "collective action" from its SEATO allies, pointing to the allied states' reluctance to be drawn into Cambodia. A TASS report on 4 July, for example, says there were disagreements at the SEATO meeting on measures to be taken regarding Cambodia and that the allies were in no hurry to "pull the U.S. chestnuts out of the fire." A PRAVDA article reviewed by TASS on 8 July comments in a similar vein on the Saigon conference, asserting that the United States failed to obtain further troop contingents and that even Thailand said it had not yet taken a decision on the dispatch of more forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 13 -

PEKING Peking's comment on the President's statements does not mention the SEATO meeting or the troop contributors' conference, although both meetings are noted in other PRC comment which says the United States used them to carry out the Nixon doctrine of "using Asians against Asians." NCNA commentaries on 6 July say that Secretary Rogers had special talks with the Thais at the SEATO meeting on the question of supporting the Lon Nol clique and that the Saigon conference was held solely for the purpose of planning continued expansion of aggression in Indochina, Secretary Rogers expressing the hope that the allies would aid the Cambodian "clique."

NEW CONFERENCE IDEA IGNORED BY MOSCOW, REJECTED BY SIHANOUK

Moscow's continued avoidance of the issue of a new international conference on Indochina is pointed up by a brief Moscow radio report on 2 July of French President Pompidou's press conference that day. Moscow cites him as stressing that peace can be restored in Indochina only if the United States decides to withdraw its troops, but it does not acknowledge that he also said France's proposal "for broadly based talks on Indochina" would be "always valid."

Sihanouk's opposition to a new international conference is reiterated, and endorsed by Kim Il-song, in the joint communique released at the conclusion of Sihanouk's state visit on 2 July. It says the solution of the Cambodian problem "at present needs no new international conference" but rather requires strict U.S. observance of the Geneva agreements and the "immediate, unconditional, and total" withdrawal of troops from Indochina.

SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT CALLS TRIAL OF PRINCE "ILLEGAL"

The trial of Sihanouk in Phnom Penh is denounced as "illegal" in a 3 July statement by the Cambodian Royal Government of National Union, carried by NCNA on the 4th. The statement asserts that the government will bring the "traitors" in Phnom Penh to trial before a "people's tribunal" after final victory. It does not specify that one of the charges against Sihanouk was collusion with Vietnamese communist troops, merely noting that he was accused of colluding with "foreign elements" to leave Cambodian territory whenever their presence was discovered. Condemning U.S. "aggression" against Cambodia, it declares that "the Vietnamese people's patriotic forces have never attacked the Cambodian people." Peking supports the statement in a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article--carried by NCNA on the 7th. VNA summarizes the statement on the 6th.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

8 JULY 1970

- 14 -

MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, VIETNAM DISCUSSED

ACTION IN Hanoi media highlight the fighting in Kompong
CAMBODIA Cham Province, pegging comment to reports by
the FUNK information bureau. On the 4th, VNA
carries an announcement by the bureau that the Cambodian
National Liberation Armed Forces (CNLA) from 5 to 14 June
"wiped out" nearly 2,100 U.S.-South Vietnamese troops in
Kompong Cham. And VNA on the 5th cites the bureau for a
report that the CNLA in that province from 26 to 28 June
"wiped out" 1,350 enemy troops and destroyed nearly 70 tanks
or armored vehicles in attacks on the ARVN 318th combat
group and 5th and 18th armored regiments.

The 26 to 28 June feats in the Piem Cheng and Chup areas of
the province are acclaimed in the 6 June issue of the army
paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN as "one of the greatest victories
recorded" by the Cambodians in the past two months. The
paper, as reported by VNA, comments that "by striking hard
at a multi-battalion unit of the Saigon army supported by
U.S. tanks, armored cars, aircraft, and infantry" the
"Cambodian armed forces and people" have proved their capability
of mounting repeated and big offensives over a long period of
time in an area where the enemy deploys large amounts of troops
and "war means." Hanoi radio comments along similar lines
in a Vietnamese-language broadcast to the South on the 6th.

CHIEN BINH, On 3 July Hanoi radio's domestic service
OTHER COMMENT broadcasts an article from the 1 July
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN attributed to "Chien Binh,"
the pseudonym often used on authoritative North Vietnamese
military commentaries.* Chien Binh claims that the United
States has failed in its "strategic objective" of turning
Cambodia into a military base and cites, among other things,

* A Hanoi broadcast on 2 July reported another article by Chien
Binh on the Cambodian "revolution" entitled "A Major Turning
Point in Cambodia's History," which appeared in the army paper
that day. The last known previous Chien Binh article, published
in the 1 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, also commented on military
action in Cambodia. Among other things, it ridiculed the
Administration's announced intention to capture the Viet Cong
headquarters, noting that the French had similarly attempted
unsuccessfully to seize Ho Chi Minh's "'government'" and that
U.S. efforts in 1966-67 to destroy the communist headquarters
in Tay Ninh had failed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 15 -

comment attributed to USIS that the "patriotic forces" in Cambodia have expanded their position from the narrow stretch of land they occupied on the border and now "occupy half the country and are in a position to seize the entire country." He asserts that the United States has been defeated in the first phase of its "war of aggression" in Cambodia, adding that "the inaugural phase plays a very important role, exerting a great influence upon the subsequent phase of the war."

Claiming that the Administration tried a blitzkrieg strategy, Chien Binh says that allied efforts to carry out a massive surprise attack failed and that the "Cambodian national liberation troops . . . took the initiative in attacking the U.S.-puppets right at the outset." Recounting various engagements to document this point, he says, for example, that the Americans "sustained heavy defeats in Mimot and Kratie," and that while U.S. troops were sent into the Fishhook area to attack Mimot, "Cambodian liberation troops cut off a series of strategic roads converging on Phnom Penh." Chien Binh adds that contrary to American boasts of "victories beyond expectations" and of driving the enemy out of its sanctuaries, "at the end of June the U.S. 11th Armored Regiment sustained heavy defeat in Mimot, six kilometers from the South Vietnam border, while the puppet troops were attacked in the Fishhook area."

Hanoi on 5 July broadcasts in its domestic service an article from the June issue of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, attributed to Le Trong Toan, which hails alleged successes of "numerous newly-created units of the Cambodian National Liberation Army and guerrilla and militia forces." The fiction of the Cambodian liberation forces is dropped briefly when the article, in enumerating allied "political setbacks," notes that "the U.S. imperialists failed in their 'operation aimed at annihilating the Viet Cong's general headquarters' in order to save the Vietnamization program." Claiming that recent events have created "favorable conditions for developing the Cambodian revolution," the article goes on to portray a drawnout struggle, noting that "the Cambodian people's recent victories have provided a firm basis for their protracted and arduous, yet inevitably victorious, struggle."

A 6 July Liberation Radio commentary claims that insurgent forces in South Vietnam took advantage of allied problems after the fall of Sihanouk and, in the first 20 days of April, put

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 16 -

out of action over 50,000 allied troops, destroyed nearly 50 percent of the remaining strategic hamlets and concentration centers, and "liberated many vast areas." It says that since late April, "after Nixon openly publicized his aggressive policy in Cambodia, the U.S. puppets have had further great shortcomings on the South Vietnamese battlefield because they have had to move a part of their fragile numerical strength and war means to a new battlefield." Later, pressing the point of the reduction of allied forces in South Vietnam, the commentary says that greater successes are certain since the allied position has been weakened by the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the extension of the war into Cambodia.

PLAF COMMAND COMMUNIQUE On 5 July Liberation Radio broadcasts the text of a communique from the PLAF command, dated 1 July, which enumerates communist achievements in South Vietnam and reviews "important events" in Indochina in the first six months of 1970, including the Pathet Lao success in recapturing territory and the development of the "Cambodian people's revolutionary movement." The communique claims that in South Vietnam during this period nearly 230,000 allies were killed, wounded, or captured; 4,200 planes downed or destroyed; 10,000 military vehicles destroyed; 250 war vessels sunk; and 1,500 artillery pieces and heavy mortars destroyed. It maintains that pacification has been frustrated by the complete or partial destruction of "the majority" of strategic hamlets. The communique says that the Administration's "war expansion policy" has "run into strong opposition in U.S. political circles," and that the opponents include "some members of the Nixon Administration and many of Nixon's advisers and diplomats."

NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 7 July peg editorial comment to the PLAF communique. The NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast by Hanoi domestic service, asserts that the allied move into Cambodia was a "serious strategic error," making their situation in South Vietnam "even more precarious."

GUERRILLA PROBLEMS A 2 July Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam praises the development of guerrilla warfare in the Quang Nam-Da Nang area but also frankly alludes to the need to overcome problems. It says that various echelons of the leadership in the area have educated the guerrillas to "clearly realize that to carry out revolution is to be on the offensive, and that only by launching attacks can victories be won." Acknowledging a problem in attitude,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 17 -

it adds that the "leading echelons have tried to overcome all rightist ideology, conservatism, and hesitancy, thanks to which everyone, especially cadres and the people's armed forces, is of the same mind, determined to struggle fiercely and protractedly." The leadership, according to the commentary, has also "made everyone understand thoroughly the particularly important strategic position of the guerrilla warfare against the U.S. aggressors' Vietnamization and pacification scheme." The commentary also notes that attention has been devoted to improving the cadre corps, especially at the lowest levels.

The existence of rightist thinking among insurgent forces in South Vietnam has been noted occasionally in communist comment. For example, an editorial in the southern party's journal TIEN PHONG, broadcast by Liberation Radio on 31 January, warned against "passive, rightist thoughts."

FRONT DENIES ALLIED CHARGE OF 11 JUNE COMMUNIST MASSACRE

A Hanoi broadcast on 6 July in Vietnamese to South Vietnam, quoting LPA, reports that on 30 June the Quang Nam Province NFLSV committee issued a statement responding to allied charges that a communist force on the night of 10-11 June massacred South Vietnamese civilians in the village of Phu Thanh, Que Son district, Quang Nam Province.

The statement maintains that the area of Phu Thanh village, south of Ba Reng bridge, is an allied stronghold and ARVN troop and personnel center. According to the NFLSV version, on the night of 10 June the Que Son district PLAF "attacked the Ba Reng stronghold and annihilated more than 130 of the enemy, including one civil guard and civil defense platoon, one pacification team, and nine or ten U.S. advisors." The statement rejects the charge that the PLAF opened fire on civilians and claims instead that U.S. forces killed more than 120 people-- "most of whom were old, women, or children of puppet soldiers"-- in a subsequent attack with artillery, air strikes, and infantry. The allies are accused of burning many houses and of killing GVN soldiers in the air and artillery attacks.

The statement seems to be indirectly responding to the allied charge that the communists killed civilians taking refuge in a bunker when it claims U.S. troops "wantonly opened fire on women, elderly persons, and children, and used mines to destroy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 18 -

one bunker, killing all 46 people who were in it." It maintains that U.S. forces "and their henchmen" have similarly in the past "annihilated surviving puppet soldiers with their families after a battle . . . in order to conceal their crimes and defeats."

DRV SAYS U.S. PLANE DOWNED, WAR CRIMES COMMUNIQUES RELEASED

VNA on 3 July claims that the armed forces in Thai Binh Province downed an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane that day, raising Hanoi's total of downed American planes to 3,354.

On the 4th, VNA reports a Vietnam War Crimes Commission communique, dated 1 July, which lists U.S. "war crimes" committed in both North and South Vietnam during the first half of 1970. The charges of U.S. "crimes" against the North include the usual tabulations of reconnaissance missions and sorties, and tactical and B-52 attacks. The communique selectively spells out alleged attacks on specific dates and areas, including the 1 May attack on Le Ninh state farm in Quang Binh Province. In addition it lists alleged artillery bombardments from south of the demilitarized zone and the 7th Fleet, and claims that U.S. ships patrolling the coast "jeopardized the normal life of coastal fishermen."

Reviewing alleged crimes in the South, the communique charges, in standard fashion, that the United States used both tactical and B-52 planes to "wantonly carpet-bomb" villages and "even" populous areas close to Saigon. It spells out the alleged U.S. use of gas bombs in January, toxic chemicals in February, and CS gas canisters in March. And it charges that "at U.S. bidding" the Saigon administration "cracked down" on religious sects, mistreated war invalids, and repressed students, the press, and members of parliament "having progressive tendencies."

On 8 July LPA releases a communique from the South Vietnam War Crimes Commission which details alleged allied crimes in South Vietnam during the first half of 1970. The communique lists numerous alleged incidents to demonstrate charges that the allies have terrorized the people with sweeps to carry out pacification, looted and destroyed food stores, sprayed toxic chemicals and poison gases on heavily populated areas, and stepped up "the policy of fascist suppression" of the urban people.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 19 -

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

POLEMICS REMAIN AT LOW LEVEL; KUZNETSOV LEAVES PEKING

Moscow and Peking are in a period of relative polemical disengagement, with each side's propaganda kept at a low, unobtrusive level. The Soviet central press has all but totally ignored China since mid-June, while propaganda attacking Chinese policies has been confined largely to broadcasts beamed to the Chinese. Peking has limited itself to oblique attacks on Moscow and publicity for characteristic Albanian denunciations of Soviet policies.

According to a Peking dispatch of the Hungarian news agency MTI on 30 June, the chief Soviet negotiator at the Peking talks, Kuznetsov, returned to the Soviet Union that day because of illness. The dispatch noted that both Soviet and Chinese physicians had examined Kuznetsov, apparently in order to verify the medical reason for his departure. Neither Moscow nor Peking has carried the report or acknowledged his departure.

Also on 30 June, Peking announced that the 16th regular session of the joint commission for border river navigation would be held on 10 July in Heiho, on the PRC side of the Amur opposite Blagoveshchensk. The 15th session was held last year--for the first time since the abortive 1967 session--in Khabarovsk beginning on 18 June and ending on 8 August. There were signs last year that the Chinese decided to put aside territorial questions in order to achieve an accord on limited measures regarding navigation.

MOSCOW Broadcasts to the Chinese have followed standard lines in criticizing various aspects of Peking's domestic and foreign policies. The CCP's anniversary on 1 July occasioned attacks on deviationist Maoist policies, as in a Mandarin broadcast on the 4th claiming that Mao's personality cult now dominates the Chinese party. Another Mandarin broadcast, on the 3d, decried Peking's charges of Soviet collaboration with the United States on such issues as a Vietnam settlement and Germany, though for its only documentation it reached back to a Chinese attack last December on Moscow's talks with Bonn.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

-- 20 --

In addition to critical comment, stress has been placed on themes of past Soviet cooperation with the PRC. A commentary in Mandarin on the 3d, for example, recalled the signing of the treaty of alliance in 1950, and another on the 5th marked the anniversary of a Sino-Soviet cultural exchange agreement. In acknowledging the deterioration of relations, current comment has passed over the border conflict and blandly recited Soviet appeals for a restoration of good relations.

A vague reference to the China problem was included in PRAVDA's 26 June summary of a speech by Politburo member Kirilenko the previous day marking the Tatar ASSR anniversary. Kirilenko urged high vigilance and strengthened defense against both imperialism and "all hostile intrigues from wherever they originate." There has been no direct Soviet comment on China on an authoritative level since the election speeches by the top leaders on 10-12 June.

PEKING There were recurrent oblique attacks on the Soviets in speeches by the Chinese during ceremonies in late June marking the anniversary of the Korean War, as Peking stressed anti-U.S. themes of Asian revolutionary unity while suggesting that Moscow continues trafficking with the enemy. Subsequent comment has included faint echoes of the bombastic charges of Soviet collaboration with the United States which formerly issued from Peking. Thus Chou En-lai, speaking at a 5 July Peking banquet for Sihanouk, observed that "those who fear war and even more fear revolution will continue to render services" to the United States. Chou claimed that President Nixon wants to intimidate "certain countries" into helping him create "a Munich" in the Middle East, Indochina, and elsewhere.

In keeping with the low key in which Peking is treating Moscow, the PRC joint press editorial on the Chinese party anniversary avoided mentioning the Soviets by name in citing opposition to "U.S. imperialism" and "modern revisionism represented by social imperialism." Peking has, however, continued publicizing Albanian attacks on Moscow, as in an NCNA summary on 2 July of a ZERI I POPULLIT article on the CCP anniversary which denounced the "Moscow social imperialists" for seeking to encircle China in concert with the United States. But Peking failed to report a 24 June ZERI I POPULLIT article charging that Moscow has

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 21 -

collaborated with Washington in seeking a peaceful settlement in Indochina and the Middle East. The article discussed the visits to Moscow of U Thant and the three-nation mission from the Djakarta conference as evidence of Soviet conspiratorial intent.

Since the major ideological assault on Moscow's authority in Peking's joint editorial on the 22 April Lenin centenary, the Chinese have sought to portray a militant Asian united front-- implicitly excluding the Soviets--while taking care not to antagonize such independents as Hanoi and Pyongyang by renewing the fierce Sino-Soviet polemical rivalry.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 22 -

MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW DISPUTES U.S. VIEW OF MIDEAST BALANCE OF FORCES

In a low volume of propaganda reacting to President Nixon's 1 July television interview, Moscow focuses on the issue of the balance of power in the Middle East, again insisting that there is a difference between "giving arms to the aggressor" and arming the "victims of the aggression." TASS, in briefly reporting the President's remarks on the Middle East, merely noted that he acknowledged the potentially dangerous situation but that "under the pretext of observing the notorious balance of forces," he went on record "for a situation in which military superiority would be on the side of the Israeli aggressors." TASS also reported that the President declined to answer questions on the content of the "so-called political initiative mentioned by Secretary Rogers last week." Not until the 6th, in a foreign-language commentary by Tsoppi, did Moscow indirectly acknowledge the President's observations on the Soviet position in the Middle East.

Initial Moscow comment on the interview was typified by a Glazunov talk on the 3d, widely broadcast to foreign audiences, which said that President Nixon "spoke entirely about preserving the balance of power" in the area. Like other commentators, Glazunov noted reports that delivery of U.S. aircraft previously consigned to Israel would be speeded up; he also cited reports of U.S.-Israeli agreement on replacement of Israeli combat losses. Complaining that Israeli losses are not so great as to warrant such replacements, Glazunov said that what is involved is strengthening Israel's air force and shifting the balance of power in the Middle East. By giving the "Israeli extremists" more aid, Washington is driving them to more and more military adventures, he asserted, and the UAR and other Arab countries "cannot be expected to remain indifferent and passive before this kind of policy aimed at forcing them to surrender."

CHARGES OF AMERICAN
THREATS, BLACKMAIL

Relatedly, the Tsoppi commentary on the 6th takes up American press reports on recent statements by U.S. officials on the Middle East problem. Only a few days ago, Tsoppi says, there might have been a few people inclined to believe that the United States had embarked on the "path of reconciliation." But the "meaning and tone" of present "official statements by American

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 23 -

politicians and of American press articles," filled with "military threats and blackmail," lead to the conclusion that the United States is ready to "make a new dangerous stride toward escalating its intervention in the conflict on Israel's side." Tsoppi notes that the "United States declares" that the possibility of sending servicemen to Israel cannot be ruled out, that the United States is ready to "open the so-called defense umbrella" of the U.S. air force over Israel, and that it will not allow any disturbance of the present balance of power.

Pointing out that Israeli Prime Minister Meir congratulated the President for his "open and bellicose support" to Israel in his 1 July interview, Tsoppi adds that in trying to justify its increasing "complicity with Israel's aggression," the United States refers to the need to "slow Russian penetration in the Middle East, even threatening the risk of a clash between the two super-powers." The only answer to these threats, he concludes, is that the Arab countries have the same right to self-defense as all other states. He declares that the Soviet Union is working for peace and the sovereign existence of all people in this region-- a point made by other commentators--and for implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution, "now the only acceptable basis" for a political settlement.

Belyayev had complained, in an article in the 2 July PRAVDA, about "imperialist propagandist attempts" to shift the blame to others, but had added only that "some people in the West" were "falsely accusing the Soviet Union of a reluctance to agree on elimination of the dangerous crisis." Only full implementation of the Security Council resolution, with obligatory withdrawal of the Israeli forces, can lead to speedy restoration of peace, Belyayev said.

KOSYGIN SPEECH
IN BUCHAREST

Kosygin also referred to "blackmail and military threats" against the Arabs in a speech at a Soviet-Romanian friendship meeting in Bucharest on 7 July, broadcast live by Bucharest radio. Turning to the Middle East, he charged that the Israelis, "encouraged and supported by Washington," remain in the invaded Arab territories, continue to raid the neighboring Arab countries, and raise more and more obstacles to a Middle East settlement. "The calculations that they will be able to break the progressive development of the Arab peoples by blackmail and military threats" and deprive the Arabs of the opportunity to organize their own life are "shortsighted calculations doomed to failure," Kosygin said. He declared that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries "come out determinedly against the aggressive actions of imperialism," be

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

8 JULY 1970

- 24 -

they in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or in any other part of the world. And he pledged Moscow's solidarity, sympathy, and "efficient support" for peoples defending their honor, freedom, and independence.

RISKS TO AMERICAN MIDEAST INTERESTS Bychov in NEW TIMES on 3 July and Kudryavtsev in IZVESTIYA on 4 July both portray the United States as risking the loss of its standing in the Middle East by virtue of its support for Israel. The course of events in the Middle East, Kudryavtsev says, has "placed U.S. ruling circles in a difficult position," with military aid to Israel increasing anti-U.S. sentiment in the Arab countries and "threatening the United States with the final loss of its strategic and petroleum positions." As a consequence, Kudryavtsev adds, Washington has temporarily deferred the resolution of the question of new aircraft supplies to Israel and will gradually replace Israeli combat losses, which "essentially does not change matters."

A Demchenko article in the 3 July NEW TIMES notes that Arab leaders, meeting in June in Tripoli, Libya, exchanged opinions on measures to be undertaken should Washington agree to supply a new consignment of aircraft to Israel. Proposals introduced at the conference would strike a forcible blow against American interests in the region, Demchenko says, and he speculates that "this fairly weighty warning" had an effect on Secretary Rogers' 25 June press conference statement.

USSR SKEPTICAL, CAUTIOUS ON U.S. PEACE INITIATIVE

References to the U.S. political initiative announced by Secretary Rogers at his 25 June press conference continue to be skeptical but guarded. Consistent with past practice, Moscow media have been silent on the new Soviet suggestions for a Middle East settlement which, according to U.S. press accounts, were presented by Dobrynin at a meeting with Secretary Rogers on 2 June and at a meeting of the Big Four ambassadors in New York on the 24th.

A Tyssovskiy commentary broadcast in the domestic service on 1 July, like Belyayev's article in the 2 July PRAVDA, mentioned the U.S. initiative in the context of deliveries of U.S. planes to Israel; Belyayev referred to accelerated delivery of Phantoms previously sold to Israel, while Tyssovskiy asserted that Washington, intending to supply Israel with some of the additional planes Tel Aviv is requesting, at the same time "put

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 25 -

forward a number of balanced suggestions" for a solution to the crisis "in order to butter up the Arab states."

Bychov's article in NEW TIMES of 3 July mentions that Secretary Rogers said the U.S. proposals had been brought to the knowledge "of the sides directly involved and other interested states." One gets the impression, Bychov says, that through its peace initiative Washington does not so much attempt to promote a peaceful political settlement as to upset Arab unity, and he sees in the initiative a "characteristic" American tactic of trying to "create a semblance of some steps or other to meet the Arab countries midway." But he cautiously entertains the possibility that "certain of the proposals advanced by the United States do contain some constructive elements; naturally, they cannot be rejected a priori, without knowing their substance."

NEW TIMES DISCUSSES ARAB DIFFERENCES ON MIDEAST CRISIS

In an unusually forthright discussion of Arab differences on ways of settling the Middle East crisis, Demchenko says in the 3 July NEW TIMES that Secretary Rogers' statement "about some new American plan" and U.S. "deferment of a final decision" on Israel's request for more planes was greeted "extremely critically" in the Arab capitals. The American statement, Demchenko says, is appraised "as a more or less disguised formula for the realization of Israeli designs," and "people here" believe the United States is surreptitiously supplying weapons to Tel Aviv. He adds that Cairo observers see in the State Department demarche an attempt to "somehow check the collapse of U.S. prestige" in the Middle East.

Dealing with the meetings of Arab leaders in Tripoli, Libya, which ended on 22 June, Demchenko says the first question discussed--the coordination of Arab efforts in the struggle against the "Israeli aggression"--is "being complicated by the absence in the Arab world of a unified view of the present situation and of ways out of the crisis." He notes that the UAR is the Arab country suffering the most losses and is constantly trying to strengthen its armed forces, "a very costly process." Cairo, he adds, is an advocate of a political settlement, a position which "differs from the viewpoint of a number of Arab countries" that are skeptical about such a settlement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 26 -

The difference in political evaluations has extended to the military sphere as well, Demchenko says. During the Tripoli meeting, he points out, the Libyans and Iraqis presented plans for more complete mobilization of Arab resources against the "Israeli aggression"--proposals which are not contradictory, "but neither do they fully coincide." While granting that a final plan of action has not yet been formulated, Demchenko concludes that the Arab countries "have indeed come close to it."

Noting that the Tripoli meeting also discussed the recent conflict in Jordan between the Jordanian army and the resistance movements, Demchenko says the absence of a single line was "particularly painfully manifest" during these events, which placed "in a somewhat new plane the entire complex of the mutual relations between the Arab governments and the Palestinian resistance movement." He credits leaders of Fatah, "the most influential" Palestinian organization, along with several Arab countries, with measures to suppress the conflict. And he takes the occasion to direct one of Moscow's periodic swipes at an "extremist wing" of the Palestinian movement, "which has committed irresponsible deeds"--actions "objectively in keeping with Tel Aviv's designs." Demchenko concedes that "the history of the origin of this armed conflict is as yet not quite clear," but he places it against the background of a plot against the Palestinian movement prepared by "American intelligence and local reactionary forces" in Jordan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 27 -

FRG AND SOVIET BLOC

IZVESTIYA OBSERVER RESPONDS TO FRG CRITICS OF DIALOGUE

A 7 July IZVESTIYA article over the authoritative signature of Observer reasserts Moscow's hope that the talks with the FRG on a nonuse-of-force agreement, which began in December 1969, will come to a "successful end." Success can be achieved, the article adds, if both sides "keep to the norms and customs accepted in relations between governments."

The article directs a largely pro forma attack at CDU and GSU opponents of the continuing Moscow-Bonn dialogue and of Brandt's "Ostpolitik" generally. It singles out Kiesinger, Barzel, and Strauss, among others, charging that their views "leave no room for normalization of relations between the FRG and the socialist countries, even if in words they express readiness for this." The opponents of Ostpolitik, Observer says, have demanded that Brandt return to the policy of the previous government and that he "go back on" the statement that the FRG regards the GDR as a state.

With regard to the Bonn-Moscow dialogue, the article declares that the results of the work already done in the negotiations "are impossible to erase, and no one can hope that success can be achieved through the advancement of senseless demands inspired by reactionary circles." It rejects as "absurd lies" the assertions of unspecified persons that the USSR seeks, through a treaty with the FRG, to repeal treaties and agreements aimed at eradicating militarism and Nazism on German soil and wishes to repeal the rights and commitments stemming from those treaties and agreements.

Notably, the Observer article appears in the wake of the publication in the West German magazine QUICK on 30 June of the purported 10 points negotiated by State Secretary Bahr in Moscow with Foreign Minister Gromyko.* On one

* Hamburg's BILDZEITUNG on 1 July published the last six points of the purported agreement, having reported the first four on 12 June. Moscow is not known to have mentioned either BILDZEITUNG's or QUICK's disclosures.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 28 -

point at least, German reunification, it seems directly responsive to QUICK's criticism. The magazine had complained that the 10 points make no mention of German reunification. Graciously, Observer remarks that the position of the USSR on the question of the unification of the two German states is sufficiently well known. "There exist today," he says, "two independent sovereign German states, independent from one another. They have different social systems, and it is impossible to fuse them, particularly because of the fact that they do not wish this."

QUICK had said Bonn had forwarded to Moscow a draft unilateral statement to accompany a nonuse-of-force agreement holding open the possibility of a unified Germany, and it claimed that Gromyko had agreed to accept such a statement. Predictably, IZVESTIYA's Observer mentions no such loophole.

ANTICIPATION OF PEKING CRITICISM In apparent anticipation of further Chinese criticism of the FRG-Soviet talks, a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 3 July reached back to a 22 December 1969 PEOPLE'S DAILY article which "alleged without any basis" that the USSR in its negotiations with Bonn had embarked on a road allowing the FRG to annex the GDR and West Berlin. The commentary concluded that six months have passed and that the Soviet Government, "of course," has made "no deal with West Germany."

POLAND PRESSES BONN ON RECOGNITION OF ODER-NEISSE LINE

Polish propaganda surrounding the 20th anniversary, 6 July, of the signing of the Zgorzelec Treaty--which "finalized" the Oder-Neisse line as the border between Poland and the GDR--breaks no new ground on the matter of normalizing relations between Poland and West Germany. Premier Cyrankiewicz, in his keynote speech on the 5th in Zgorzelec, called the Oder-Neisse border one of the "realities" of postwar Europe. Referring to Gomulka's May 1969 proposal for negotiations with Bonn on the normalizing of relations, he observed that "it is understood that the point of departure for such normalization should be a final recognition" of the Oder-Neisse line by the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 29 -

FRG. As Gomulka had done in May 1969, Cyrankiewicz said the Zgorzelec Treaty could serve as a prototype for an accord with West Germany. That treaty's very existence, he added, has facilitated the negotiations with the FRG.

In his speech Cyrankiewicz did not go beyond this passing reference to the ongoing political talks between Bonn and Warsaw. But in an interview carried in the GDR's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 3d, he stated that Polish and West German delegations have been engaged since February in talks on an agreement on final recognition of the Oder-Neisse as the western border of Poland, and that the next round of talks is to take place in the second half of July. A 10 June communique on the end of the fourth round of talks--in Bonn 8-10 June--had also indicated that the next round would be held in the last half of July.

At Zgorzelec on the 5th, Cyrankiewicz said that recognition of the Oder-Neisse line by Bonn would represent an important step toward establishing a durable peace in Europe and would also be a factor in normalizing relations between the two German states. Implicitly endorsing Brandt's Ostpolitik, he took note of the "hullabaloo" raised by "reactionary forces" in the FRG over the beginning of Bonn's negotiations with Poland, the GDR, and the USSR. He expressed hope that the West German public will reject the "chauvinists' demagoguery," and he concluded that the Bonn government can help by recognizing the "realities" in Europe and successfully concluding its negotiations with its eastern neighbors.

ARTICLE IN At the level of routine propaganda, an article
POLITIYKA in the Warsaw weekly POLITIYKA, reviewed by
 PAP on 3 July, stressed that "more realistically
thinking forces" have gained the upper hand in the FRG and
declared that if Bonn will not yield to the pressure of the
"rightist-nationalistic opposition which is still demanding
that the German problem and the problem of frontiers be
left 'open,'" there will be "no obstacles to concluding a
treaty" between Poland and the FRG.

The article said it has become obvious that normalization of relations between the FRG and the countries of Eastern Europe demands recognition of the inviolability of frontiers and that the conclusion of an accord similar to the Zgorzelec Treaty "is the condition for the normalization of relations" between Bonn and Warsaw.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 30 -

TRADE MISSIONS PAP on the 6th briefly reported the arrival in Warsaw of a West German delegation to discuss "the matter of enlarging the competence of the West German trade mission in Warsaw and of the Polish mission in Cologne." A Hamburg DPA report the same day said that the purpose of the talks is to extend the jurisdiction of the trade missions "to cover consular activities as well."

GDR ON WEST GERMAN East German propaganda on the treaty RELATIONS WITH BLOC anniversary is characteristically less forthcoming toward Brandt and his Ostpolitik. Premier Stoph, in his speech at the 5 July ceremony, did not mention the Polish-West German negotiations or Brandt's policies, confining himself to reiteration of the demand that Bonn recognize the "finality and inviolability" of Poland's western frontier and repetition of the stereotyped charge that West German "revanchism" is threatening European peace and security.

Stoph also failed to treat the question of FRG-GDR relations. But Ulbricht, in a 2 July speech in Cottbus reported in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND the next day, noted that the GDR had submitted a draft treaty to Bonn on the establishment of equal relations on the basis of international law and stated that the GDR favors equal relations through the establishment of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

Ulbricht had also suggested an exchange of ambassadors in an earlier speech before the 13th plenum of the SED Central Committee, carried in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 16 June. That speech was more notable, however, for its endorsement of the USSR's talks with the FRG and for Ulbricht's expression of hope that a third round of talks between the heads of the FRG and GDR governments might follow the Erfurt and Kassel rounds. Ulbricht's call for a third round has not been followed up in available propaganda.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 31 -

ROMANIA - U S S R

NEW TREATY REGISTERS COMPROMISE ON CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

The new Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty signed in Bucharest on 7 July, available in full from Radio Moscow on the 8th, emerges as a compromise reflecting Bucharest's unique relationship with Moscow. The Soviets appear to have scored some political and propaganda points by broadening the Romanian commitment to mutual defense, in line with other Soviet bilateral treaties with East European states, while Bucharest has succeeded in keeping out of the treaty the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty as well as any commitment to economic "integration" under CEMA.

ARTICLE 8 The mutual defense clause, in Article 8 of the new treaty, reads: "In case one of the high contracting parties is subjected to an armed attack by any state or group of states, the other party, implementing the inalienable right to individual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, will immediately render it all-round assistance with all the means at its disposal, including military, essential to repulse armed attack."

The counterpart article in the 1948 Soviet-Romanian treaty had committed the contracting parties only to mutual military assistance in the event that either should "be involved in hostilities with a Germany which might seek to renew its policy of aggression, or with any other state which might have been associated with Germany in a policy of aggression"

TASS highlighted the new version in its summary of the Soviet-Romanian treaty on 7 July, quoting the operative passage in Article 8 in full.

Since the Warsaw Pact commits members of the alliance to military involvement only in the event of an armed attack "in Europe," Moscow has been revising its bilateral treaties to commit the individual Pact members to broader involvement. The USSR-Bulgarian pact of 12 May 1967 and the new USSR-Hungarian pact of 7 September 1967, as well as the new Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact of 6 May 1970, all remove the geographical confines, referring simply to "an armed attack by any state or group of states." The treaty with Romania is thus brought into line with the new stereotype.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 3? -

COMPROMISES IN
ROMANIA'S FAVOR

Where the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty for the first time committed the signatories to undertake "the necessary measures to defend the socialist gains" of the two countries, however, the Romanian pact with Moscow merely binds the two parties to take "measures to defend international peace and the security of people against encroachments by the aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction. . . ." And where the Soviet treaty with Czechoslovakia commits Prague to "socialist economic integration" within CEMA, the new pact with Romania makes no mention of "integration."

Article 1 is essentially identical to the counterpart in the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, committing the signatories, "in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism," to "continue to strengthen the eternal and inviolable friendship between the peoples of both countries" and develop cooperation "on the basis of fraternal aid, mutual advantage, respect for sovereignty and national independence, equality, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs." But the Soviet concept of "fraternal aid" is demonstrably flexible, and the demands of "socialist internationalism" are subject to varying interpretations.

MAURER, KOSYGIN REMARKS MIRROR RESPECTIVE VIEWPOINTS

In his address following the signing, broadcast live by Radio Bucharest, Maurer pointedly quoted the passage in Article 1 on cooperation on the basis of fraternal aid, mutual advantage, respect for sovereignty and independence, equality, and noninterference. He went on to offer assurances that Romania is ready to "cooperate" in CEMA and meet its obligations in the Warsaw Pact, while underlining the "defensive" character of the alliance.

Pledging to make active contribution to communist unity, and in effect defending Romania's good relations with Moscow's ideological enemies, Maurer emphasized that Bucharest believes "objective premises exist for developing close relations of friendship and collaboration among all the socialist countries."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 33 -

Kosygin interpreted the new treaty as stressing the importance of "internationalist solidarity of the socialist states" and played up the need for "vigilance" against the imperialist threat. He remarked that as the last international communist meeting pointed out, "the defense of socialism is the internationalist duty of all communists," thus reaching back to the June 1969 conference document--which Romania signed--for the formula absent from the new treaty.

As if to compensate for another element lacking in the treaty, Kosygin pointed out that economic integration "involves continuous deepening of the development of equal and mutually advantageous cooperation between the socialist countries." He went on to deny Western "slanders" to the effect that relations among socialist countries involve any limitations of sovereignty and "other such foolishness." Imperialism, he warned, is trying to exploit national differences and to break up the alliance of the socialist countries. But he added, again echoing a formula used in the June 1969 conference document, that Marxist-Leninists know that "correctly understood" national and international interests coincide.

EARLIER The respective vantage points of the contracting
SPEECHES parties had been expressed in Maurer's and Kosygin's
 remarks throughout the Soviet delegation's visit.

At airport ceremonies broadcast live by Bucharest radio and TV, Maurer cited the need for action against "the policy of imperialism and of diktat and interference in the affairs of other peoples and for the peaceful solution of international problems." Kosygin remarked that the new treaty would strengthen the fraternal alliance of the two countries, "closely connected with proletarian internationalism and socialism." He made a brief bow to "equality of rights" in declaring that "two decades of cooperation" had confirmed its existence.

At a reception for Kosygin on 6 July, Maurer expressed Romanian willingness to promote further bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union but reiterated that it must be based on principles of equality and noninterference. After reaffirming the fundamentals of Romanian foreign policy, he remarked that the development of bilateral cooperation between states must be based on respect for mutual interests and "on the observance of international law." Kosygin, stressing the need to use cooperation

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 34 -

among all socialist states to accelerate their collective advance, declared that the treaty would serve to "strengthen the solidarity of the states of all the socialist community and to develop their fraternal mutual assistance and close political, economic, and military cooperation."

BUCHAREST GIVES KOSYGIN DELEGATION CORRECT RECEPTION

Romania tendered a formally correct reception to Kosygin, substituting for Brezhnev as leader of the Soviet delegation because--according to the 4 July TASS announcement--of the latter's "catarrhal ailment." Ceausescu adhered rigidly to protocol, absenting himself from all the official ceremonies directly connected with the treaty signing and leaving them on a strict premier-to-premier basis, between Maurer and Kosygin. Ceausescu's signature on the treaty as Brezhnev's counterpart would have been dictated by protocol had the Soviet First Secretary been present; in Brezhnev's absence, the document was signed only by Premiers Maurer and Kosygin.* Ceausescu confined his contact with the visitors to a single reception--at party headquarters.

Radio Bucharest reported that Maurer greeted the Soviet delegation, which also included Suslov and Gromyko, upon their arrival at Bucharest airport on 6 July. Maurer was also the ranking Romanian at the talks between the two delegations, the reception for Kosygin on the 6th at the treaty signing, and a Soviet embassy reception on the 8th.

The Romanian news agency AGERPRES reported that Ceausescu gave a luncheon in honor of the Soviet delegation at party Central Committee headquarters on the 7th. It added that

* The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was signed on 6 May of this year by top party leaders Brezhnev and Husak as well as by Premiers Kosygin and Strougal. In September 1967 the Soviet-Hungarian treaty was signed by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev and Hungarian party First Secretary Kadar, with Kosygin and Fock signing at the premier level. The treaty with Bulgaria was signed in May 1967 by Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev and Deputy Premier Mazurov, with Zhivkov alone signing for Bulgaria as party First Secretary and Premier. Brezhnev and Kosygin signed the treaty with Poland on 8 April 1965 as counterparts, respectively, of Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 35 -

the luncheon passed "in a comradely atmosphere of warm friendship and that toasts were exchanged by Ceausescu and Kosygin. A TASS report of the meeting noted that "an extensive and useful exchange of views" took place prior to the luncheon.

In the backdrop of the Soviet visit was a frontpage Romanian press report the day before Kosygin's arrival on Ceausescu's "warm" talks with the visiting Italian CP deputy leader Berlinguer, who has been a vocal critic of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. There were also repeated Romanian reminders of the need for countries to refrain from interfering in each other's affairs. During a tour of the provinces prior to the Soviet delegation's arrival, Ceausescu had seemed to put unusual emphasis on the noninterference theme. In a speech in Arad on 2 July, broadcast by Radio Bucharest, he assured his audience the RCP is actively campaigning to insure that international relations are based on "respect for independence and national sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for the right of each people to determine their own fate without outside interference." Similarly, in remarks at Timisoara on the 3d, also broadcast by Radio Bucharest, Ceausescu emphasized that "it is necessary to put an end to the policy of force and diktat, to renounce the policy of threats and interference in internal affairs, to promote a policy of respect and collaboration that would insure that each nation could decide its own fate."

MANIFESTATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE Romanian media have continued to carry reports underscoring Bucharest's policy of good relations with "all" countries.

Radio Bucharest reported on 3 July that party Executive Committee member Bodnaras attended a luncheon at the Chinese embassy in honor of the delegation he had led to Peking in June. Peking's NCNA noted on the same day that Executive Committee member Voitec and Foreign Minister Manescu also were present and that the guests toasted Mao and Ceausescu. On the 4th, the Romanian press frontpaged Ceausescu's congratulations to President Nixon on U.S. independence Day, emphasizing hope that relations between the two countries "will witness a steady expansion."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 37 -

had led the party into "disruption such as it had not known since 1945," brought the country "to the brink of economic bankruptcy," and isolated it from the Soviet Union and its allies.

Dispensing with the euphemisms he had used before in repeated complaints about Dubcek's popularity, Husak said "imperialist propaganda" was "creating a legend about Alexander Dubcek" with a view to disrupting Czechoslovakia and the socialist camp. He prefaced this charge with an analogy to the driver who must lose his license after causing an accident; when a top leader brings "disaster" upon the party and state, he asked rhetorically, "are we to bow to him and honor him, and not call him to responsibility and expel him from his post?"

Where he had in the past made only obscure public remarks about difficulties the conservatives were giving him in his efforts to steer a moderate course, Husak now named names in insisting that there was "complete unity" in the top leadership on the matter of Dubcek's expulsion as well as on evaluation of the problems of "last year," the present, and the future. Denying that "I was outvoted by the conservatives," Husak declared that there are "no differences between my opinions and the opinions of Comrades Svoboda, Strougal, Bilak, Lenart, and other comrades in the leadership" and that "our course of action is common and united."

At the same time, Husak cautioned, "we have also learned from past years" that "differences within the leadership" help the enemies of socialism at home and abroad. He appeared to leave open the possibility of a further high-level house-cleaning in stressing concern for "principled unity," rather than "formal unity or just any unity."

Soviet broadcast media have so far been heard to carry only a brief report of Husak's speech, the Moscow domestic service late the same day noting only his stress on the USSR's important role in Czechoslovakia's socialist construction and his praise for the socialist system.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 38 -

FOLLOWUP COMMENT IN
CZECH, SLOVAK PRESS

RUDE PRAVO on the 7th echoes Husak's denial of "alleged 'disputes'" in the CPCZ leadership, and Bratislava PRAVDA the same day adds a further assurance that there will be no "show trial." In the most defensive terms used in this connection by Czechoslovak propaganda to date, the Slovak paper's editorial includes a peroration against "political" trials in Greece, the trial in absentia of Sihanouk, and "the recent pretentious political trial" of British Labour Party member William Owen.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

8 JULY 1970

- 39 -

PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PEKING LEADERSHIP RANKINGS: A GAME OF CHINESE CHECKERS?

Top Chinese leaders based in Peking continue to make numerous appearances at public functions honoring foreign dignitaries. NCNA seems more and more inclined to dispense with the practice of listing Politburo members in stroke order, but its latest listings do little to facilitate efforts to discern Politburo rank through the order in which leaders are named. The apparent decline in position of Peking city chief Hsieh Fu-chih, who has made no public appearances since March, is the only concrete indication of a leadership struggle which might be behind recent changes in the method of listing leaders, though this factor alone suffices to indicate that the shifts are not necessarily all without major political significance.

While the earliest change in relative positions was a seemingly temporary elevation of Air Force commissar Wu Fa-hsien over Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien for a period in May and June, the most obvious change has been renewed emphasis on taking state ranks into account at state functions. Since 19 June Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu has been listed ahead of Chou En-lai at certain state functions where he is apparently filling the role of acting chief of state. While this is clearly a ceremonial ranking, it does further underline the gulf between Chou and Lin Piao, who by strict protocol should rank even lower at state functions.

The listing of leaders according to the occasion was further expanded in a 5 July report of a banquet for Prince Sihanouk; here leaders were grouped under a system that seemed to combine state rank, party rank, and functional categories. Tung Pi-wu led the list, followed by Kang Sheng and Kuo Mo-jo in their capacity as vice chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress--the first time in recent years that Kuo has been ranked above Politburo members. The same list placed Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng above the cultural revolution triumvirate of Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan and Yeh Chun, marking the first time that Chiang has been ranked below another ordinary member of the Politburo in a nonstroke-order list since the ninth congress.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 40 -

On 6 July NCNA provided a new categorization in reporting a sports rally attended by Sihanouk and several Politburo members; Chiang was placed after Tung Pi-wu and Chou and ahead of Huang, while Kuo Mo-jo fell to his usual place following the Politburo. A difference in relative importance between categories of Politburo members may be inferred from another list in the same NCNA account; it cut off the namelist after Huang and Yeh Chun, leaving Li Hsien-shan and other members of the Politburo to be noted merely as "others."

BROADCAST EXAMINES PARTY, REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE RELATIONSHIP

A recent Radio Peking broadcast suggests that the formal, pre-cultural revolution separation between the CCP and the official governmental structure may in essence be revived, with rectified party committees forming a leadership core concerned chiefly with policy matters while revolutionary committees carry out daily governmental tasks. The separation of policy from operational functions, if it proved feasible, would insure the continued utility of revolutionary committees empowered to execute normal governmental decisions while the rebuilding of the party gradually proceeds.

The 19 June broadcast, dwelling in more detail than usual on the specific relationship between the party committee and the revolutionary committee at a local Peking factory, outlined a plan adopted by the factory which placed administrative and organizational work in the hands of the revolutionary committee, while the party committee remained in indirect control, above involvement in daily decisions. The broadcast noted that there had been complaints that principal members of the party committee, were "spending too much time at the higher level and too little time among basic-level units," because party members had taken on "too much responsibility" including "assuming the work of the revolutionary committee." Some party members, the broadcast said, incorrectly held that because the principal members of the party committee and of the revolutionary committee were one and the same, it made no difference which committee assumed responsibility for a particular task, so "the party committee handled almost everything." The party secretary was condemned because he "personally handled" family disputes, school problems, and even the "water temperature in bathhouses."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 41 -

These problems were corrected, the report claimed, after study with the aid of the factory's PLA propaganda team, and a new system was set up. Members of the party committee now avoid "holding too many duties concurrently" and spend 20 days a month at the basic level, working and conducting investigations on overall implementation of party policy. The party committee has also learned to "give play to the role of the revolutionary committee as an administrative organ," and fewer party committee meetings are now called.

Previously, "leading members were immersed in administrative affairs," but under the new system revolutionary committee members are given "due authority and power" to carry out their work and report to the party committee on the work situation at all times. This system, the broadcast said, removes party committee members from administrative affairs and allows them time to concentrate their efforts "on grasping the fundamentals and maintaining contact with reality, the masses, and labor."

Inherent in this system, as in the old one it resembles, is the risk that party members will become a bureaucratic elite-- notwithstanding the heightened emphasis on the old Maoist precept to mingle with the masses. Some fears on this score were implied in an article by the Hungan county party committee, broadcast by Wuhan radio on 2 July. The article warned that party members "are not allowed to misuse their party posts" and may not "have their speeches recorded at their own request," nor may "speeches of individual county party committee members be published."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 42 -

PROGRESS IN PARTY REBUILDING SHOWN BY PROVINCE

COUNTY CCP COMMITTEES PUBLICIZED	PROVINCIAL CCP CORE GROUPS MENTIONED
Heilungkiang (5)	Heilungkiang
Hupei (2)	<u>Hupei</u>
Kirin	Kirin
Kwangsi	<u>Kwangsi</u>
Kwangtung (5)	Kwangtung
<u>Shensi</u>	Shensi
Anhui	Inner Mongolia
Chekiang (3)	<u>Liaoning</u>
<u>Fukien</u>	Shansi
Hunan (8)	Shantung
Kansu	Tsinghai
<u>Kiangsi</u>	
Kiangsu (4)	

Numbers in parentheses indicate the number (more than one) of county committees publicized in monitored broadcasts. Heilungkiang and Kwangtung have in addition publicized one municipal CCP committee each. Recent additions to the list, during July, are underlined.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
8 JULY 1970

- 43 -

BURMA - PRC

HEAD OF RESIDENT BURMESE CP MISSION MAY BE ABSENT FROM PEKING

The possible absence from Peking of the head of the Communist Party of Burma's resident delegation in the PRC, Thakin Ba Thein Tin, is indicated in NCNA's 6 July report of the Peking rally in honor of Sihanouk. NCNA lists Thakin Pe Tint, "member of the delegation of the Central Committee of the CPB and member of its Central Committee," as the Burmese communist representative on the guest list but does not mention Ba Thein Tin, normally identified as attending ceremonies in Peking as "head of the delegation of the Central Committee of the CPB and vice chairman of the CPB Central Committee."

Ba Thein Tin was last reported by NCNA to have made a public appearance on 21 May. Recounting the Peking rally that day in honor of Mao's 20 May statement, NCNA reported the presence of both Ba Thein Tin and Pe Tint in their respective capacities as head and member of the delegation. More recently, however, in reporting the Peking rally on 25 June marking the 20th anniversary of the Korean War, NCNA simply noted the presence among the foreign guests of "the delegation of the Central Committee of the Burmese Communist Party."

CONFIDENTIAL