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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

26 AUG 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

26 August 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 24)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 17 - 23 AUGUST 1970

Moscow (3757 items)

|                            |        |      |
|----------------------------|--------|------|
| Warsaw Pact Meeting        | (--)   | 8%   |
| China                      | (5%)   | 6%   |
| DPRK Anniversary           | (4%)   | 6%   |
| Indochina                  | (5%)   | 5%   |
| Nerve Gas Dumping          | (2%)   | 4%   |
| Hungarian Anni-<br>versary | (0.1%) | 3%   |
| Romanian Anni-<br>versary  | (0.1%) | 3%   |
| Middle East                | (4%)   | 3%   |
| USSR-FRG Treaty            | (11%)  | 1.5% |

Peking (2514 items)

|                           |       |      |
|---------------------------|-------|------|
| Domestic Issues           | (26%) | 28%  |
| Indochina                 | (22%) | 27%  |
| [Cambodia                 | (19%) | 20%] |
| [Vietnam                  | (3%)  | 7%]  |
| Middle East               | (11%) | 7%   |
| Romanian Anni-<br>versary | (--)  | 4%   |
| DPRK Anni-<br>versary     | (--)  | 3%   |

These statistics are based on the voice commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi and Front comment on Vice President Agnew's Asian trip assails particularly the Vice President's reported remarks in Guam on 23 August promising that the United States would assist the Lon Nol regime and mentioning the possibility of a reintroduction of U.S. troops into Cambodia. While Vietnamese communist and Soviet media promptly reported the start of the trip on 22 August, there is no Peking reaction to date.

The new 40-million-dollar program of U.S. arms aid to the Cambodian Government, announced in detail by the State Department on 24 August, comes under attack from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow. Hanoi attacks the program in comment decrying an Administration policy--reported by AP on the 22d--authorizing U.S. air strikes in Cambodia without geographical restriction when U.S. troops in Vietnam are thought to be threatened. U.S. air support for Cambodian Government troops draws further protests, including a 22 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement.

Vietnamese communist battle reports take note of the recent fighting near Phnom Penh, with a 22 August VNA item stating that Cambodian "liberation forces" attacked and captured the village of Prek Tameak on the 19th.

North and South Vietnamese communist delegates at the 20 August session of the Paris talks responded to statements by Ambassador Bruce at the two previous sessions and reiterated demands that the United States alter its policies before the talks can progress toward a political solution. DRV delegation head Xuan Thuy is reported by VNA on 23 August to have left Hanoi for Paris on the 19th.

Official Pathet Lao protests against the alleged introduction of Saigon troops into Laotian territory on 9 August are endorsed in PRG and DRV foreign ministry spokesman's statements. Peking reports the statements but does not comment on its own authority. Routine-level Moscow propaganda reports the NLHS complaint as well as the State Department spokesman's statement that the intrusion could have taken place.

## VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ASSAIL VICE PRESIDENT'S ASIAN TRIP

A 22 August QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary reports the start of Vice President Agnew's Asian trip that day and typically charges that his visits to Asian allies are aimed at promoting a U.S.

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policy of prolonging the war. Hanoi radio, in a 24 August domestic service report, reacts to statements reportedly made by the Vice President during his stopover in Guam on the 23d, en route to Seoul. The radio describes as "brazen" and "arrogant" remarks to the effect that the United States will do its best to assist the Lon Nol government and will send its forces back into Cambodia if necessary to protect U.S. troops in South Vietnam.

The same remarks are also cited in a Hanoi radio commentary later on the 24th which, like the earlier report, takes note of White House comment on the Vice President's statements. The commentary declares that "Agnew's open warlike statements were immediately endorsed by the White House spokesman, "who stated that they "were only a restatement of Washington's official stand." Claiming that the Administration has "poured oil" on the "fire" of the U.S. antiwar movement with "these furious and stupid statements," the commentary goes on to document Administration "isolation" by citing the Senate's adoption on 20 and 21 August of amendments to restrict U.S. allowances for South Korean and Thai forces in South Vietnam and prohibit U.S. financing of GVN or Thai military operations in Cambodia or Laos.\*

FRONT A Liberation Radio commentary on 25 August similarly cites the Vice President's Guam remarks and calls them "indicative of Nixon's stubborn and warlike stand." The commentary views the trip as designed to "bolster the morale of the U.S. puppets," who are "extremely confused about the serious U.S. failures in Indochina" and are to be asked to provide more "cannonfodder" in pursuit of a U.S. scheme to use Asians to fight Asians. The "dark intention" of the trip is said to unmask the Administration's recent "deceitful peace maneuver" in naming Ambassador Bruce to head the U.S. Paris delegation--a move now "clearly" exposed as a gambit to appease U.S. public opinion while the war is still being pursued.

Agnew's trip, according to the commentary, comes at a time when the Nixon Administration is in a defeated position at home as well as on the Indochinese battlefield. "The fact that the U.S.

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\* Like other comment on the Agnew trip, the 24 August commentary notes that he will visit South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Vietnam. It adds that "there have also been reports that Agnew will make a quick visit to Phnom Penh to meet with the Lon Nol clique of hirelings."

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Senate within a short period of time recently passed two bills demanding a curtailment of funds for mercenaries in South Vietnam from Thailand and South Korea and a curtailment of funds for military operations on the Cambodian and Laotian battlefields constitutes convincing proof that Nixon is seriously defeated," the commentary alleges.

#### HANOI ON U.S. AIR STRIKES IN CAMBODIA, AID TO PHNOM PENH

The use of U.S. air power in Cambodia is decried in a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 22d, publicized the same day by VNA and Hanoi radio. Like the 15 August PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, the DRV statement endorses the 11 August statement by the Sihanouk government spokesman, publicized by the FUNK radio on the 13th, which condemned U.S. air strikes in Cambodia. The DRV statement ridicules the Nixon Administration's presentation of the air strikes as aimed at protecting American troops in South Vietnam, charging that U.S. aircraft in fact destroy civilian areas, commit "numerous crimes" against the civilian population, and "directly support the Lon Nol reactionary troops against the Cambodian patriotic armed forces."

A 25 August Hanoi radio broadcast cites AP as reporting on the 22d that the Administration has authorized U.S. air strikes in Cambodia without geographical restriction if U.S. military commanders believe allied troops in Vietnam are threatened. Ridiculing the notion that U.S. air strikes are designed to protect U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, the radio asserts that "in truth the bombings and strafing by U.S. planes in Cambodia have been aimed at supporting the Lon Nol troops' operations." The report says the air strikes in support of the Lon Nol government and the Administration's plans to provide it with 40 million dollars' worth of military aid mean that regardless of the troop withdrawal from Cambodia on 30 June, the United States has "intensified its aggression in a dangerous manner."

#### MOSCOW SCORES AGNEW TRIP, U.S. AID AND ESCALATION IN CAMBODIA

Routine-level Moscow press and radio comment says Vice President Agnew intends on his trip to assure the U.S. allies that the United States is not going to pull out of Asia and to demonstrate U.S. support for their regimes. Forecasting that Agnew will try

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to enlist further allied participation in the U.S. "military adventure" in Indochina, commentators note that his tour follows the U.S. decision to give military aid to the Lon Nol regime. The trip, Moscow concludes, is an attempt to realize Nixon's "Guam doctrine" of making "Asians kill Asians."

Commentators remark that the purpose of the Vice President's tour is obvious from the nature of the capitals he is visiting. An IZVESTIYA article on the 24th takes brief note of the speculation that he will also make an unpublicized visit to Cambodia, and a brief Moscow English-language newscast on the 25th says he will visit Phnom Penh to discuss a step-up in "Washington's interference in Indochina." The report recalls that on the 24th the U.S. State Department announced the granting of 40 million dollars' worth of military aid to the Lon Nol government for the coming fiscal year.

On the 21st TASS had promptly reported the State Department spokesman's announcement that an official agreement on U.S. military aid to the Lon Nol regime was signed in Phnom Penh and had noted Western press speculation about the scope and nature of the aid. On the 24th TASS reported that McCloskey announced that the assistance would amount to 40 million dollars and that it could be increased "depending on circumstances." The report cited "local political observers" as saying that decision "contradicts" previous disclaimers of U.S. intent to aid the Phnom Penh regime, including statements by President Nixon, but added that American aircraft subsequently began giving Phnom Penh troops "direct combat support" and that in Guam Vice President Agnew said the United States would "do everything necessary" to assist the Lon Nol government. TASS did not mention, however, that Agnew linked the situation in Cambodia to the security of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

A 25 August TASS commentary says that the decision to give the Lon Nol regime military aid follows "demagogic allegations" by the U.S. Government that it did not intend to render any assistance to Phnom Penh and was concerned only about the position of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. TASS cites the Washington POST comment that the aid agreement represents a 180-degree turn in policy statements on Cambodia. The commentary says U.S. intent to keep the Lon Nol government in power was made clear in Agnew's Guam statement that the United States would "do everything necessary" to aid the regime. Again TASS neglects to mention that Agnew linked the Cambodian situation

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to the security of U.S. troops in South Vietnam, but it does say "observers" are noting a new White House thesis that Vietnamization depends on the stability of the Cambodian regime. TASS comments that the United States is thus attempting to prepare the ground for keeping U.S. troops in South Vietnam "for an indefinite period" and also for "the possibility of a new use of its ground forces" in Cambodia.

**BOMBING** On 24 August TASS briefly reported U.S. press dispatches indicating that U.S. bombing is carried out in "all areas" of Cambodia, with planes flying some 80 missions daily. TASS cited the Washington POST as reporting that the United States has adopted a policy of bombing the enemy "wherever he is located." Moscow has not been heard to comment on these reports so far.

**SENATE OPPOSITION** Senate opposition to escalation in Cambodia is noted by Moscow commentators. On the 22d TASS reported statements by Senators Fulbright and Mansfield expressing concern that the new aid agreement will mean an increase in the number of U.S. military personnel in Cambodia. On the same day TASS reported the Senate passage of Fulbright's amendment to the defense procurement bill proscribing the financing of Saigon and Thai troops to fight in Cambodia and Laos; TASS commented that it was passed on the eve of Vice President Agnew's visits to the main suppliers of "cannon fodder."

A 23 August PRAVDA article on the amendment says its passage attested to growing fear in the United States that the Administration is becoming increasingly deeply involved in the Indochina war. PRAVDA comments that although Assistant Secretary of State Green claimed that Washington has not committed itself to supporting the Lon Nol regime, Senators Fulbright and Church regard the new agreement to aid Lon Nol as constituting an "escalation of the intervention."

An earlier PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov, on the 20th, takes Vice President Agnew to task for his 17 August speech attacking those senators who support the Hatfield-McGovern amendment proposing a halt to the financing of operations in Southeast Asia by the end of 1970 and withdrawal of all U.S. troops by the middle of 1971. Zhukov says Agnew's statement that the amendment would place the entire burden of fighting on Saigon troops which are not yet ready to assume it reveals the true

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nature of Vietnamization. Agnew, Zhukov adds, is creating what Senator McGovern called a "climate of fear" in the Senate in response to rising protest within the United States.

#### PEKING CRITICIZES AID AGREEMENT, IGNORES AGNEW TRIP

Peking first acknowledged the State Department announcement on the agreement to provide 40 million dollars' worth of military aid to Phnom Penh in a 25 August NCNA commentary which says it exposes continued U.S. aggression in Cambodia and expansion of aggression in Indochina. Although the Administration was "compelled" to "temporarily withdraw" its troops from Cambodia on 30 June, says NCNA, the United States has intensified its activities in Cambodia, extending bombing to "all parts" of the country.

The only available Peking mention of Vice President Agnew's trip is in publicity in Peking media on 24 August for a DPRK Foreign Ministry statement the day before denouncing stepped-up U.S. "war preparations" in Korea. The statement calls the Vice President's visit to South Korea a "dangerous war trip." There is no reference to the rest of the Vice President's itinerary.

#### PRG, DRV DELEGATES REJECT U.S. STATEMENTS AT PARIS SESSIONS

The VNA account of the 80th session of the Paris talks, on 20 August, acknowledges without comment Ambassador Bruce's absence from the session. VNA merely asserts that "both Pham Dang Lam and Philip Habib kept rehashing their old deceitful claims as at the previous sessions."

VNA and LPA carry similar accounts of PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien's statement, but Liberation Radio has not been heard to broadcast the text of his statement as it did his statements at the last two sessions. The accounts of Tien's remarks register his standard reiteration of the basic communist arguments regarding the PRG's "logical" and "reasonable" position, but they do not note his replies to several remarks by Ambassador Bruce during the previous two sessions. (Responding to Bruce's statement that both sides should look at each other's positions realistically, Tien asked rhetorically why the United States has not looked at the "realities" of the situation in South Vietnam. In reply to Bruce's statement advocating negotiated settlement that would take into account the legitimate concerns of

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both sides, Tien asked whether there is any more legitimate concern than the question of guaranteeing the genuine independence and freedom of the South Vietnamese people and immediately stopping the U.S. people's sacrifices for an "unjust" war. Answering Bruce's call for a narrowing of differences between the two sides, he declared that the United States "must not demand that the Vietnamese people 'make concessions' affecting their independence and freedom and insisted that it is the United States which must give up its "aggressive designs" in South Vietnam.)

The VNA account of DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's statement briefly notes his discussion of past and present U.S. "aggression" in Vietnam but does not include his reply to Ambassador Bruce's contention that Bruce's recommendation was aimed at "deliberately covering up" U.S. "crimes of aggression" and at blurring the distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, so as to enable the United States to propose a political solution which actually allows it to achieve its objects in South Vietnam. VNA does cite Vy's criticism of the Nixon Administration for "resorting to the habitual trick of alleging" that the communists are too rigid and want to humiliate the United States and force it to accept preconditions and surrender.

The VNA account also includes Vy's denunciation of the United States for "violent" B-52 raids in South Vietnam, violations of North Vietnamese security and sovereignty, and the use of U.S. planes and Saigon troops in Laos, but it omits his remark that these activities are taking place "while the U.S. delegate is holding apparently sweet and mild talks at this conference." While including Vy's call for the Nixon Administration to change its policy and respond seriously to the PRG's 10-point solution, VNA does not quote his ensuing comment that "emptily repeating fine words about 'goodwill' will not help the work of this conference."

XUAN THUY VNA reports on 23 August that Xuan Thuy left Hanoi for Paris on the 19th, seen off by "his special adviser" Le Duc Tho and by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, among others. Communist media have not announced the plans of the chief of the PRG Paris delegation, Mme. Binh-- also absent from the talks. Xuan Thuy was last in Paris on 8 May and Mme. Binh left there on 8 June.

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## CAMBODIAN FRONT CC MEETS, LEGITIMACY OF REGIME PRESSED

FUNK CENTRAL                   A 22 August "press communique" announcing  
COMMITTEE MEETING           that the FUNK Central Committee met on  
                                  20 and 21 August was carried by NCNA and  
VNA on the 24th. Issued by the FUNK Central Committee Secretariat,  
the communique says the meeting was held "at the seat of" the  
Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) and presided over by  
Penn Nouth, chairman of the FUNK Political Bureau and RGNU  
prime minister.

According to the communique, the central committee approved a  
report on the FUNK's military and political successes, including  
the claim that the national liberation army has "completely  
liberated more than two-thirds of the country, comprising over  
2,800,000 inhabitants." (The claim that more than two-thirds of  
the territory has been liberated appeared previously in a state-  
ment by RGNU minister Thiounn Mumm, carried by NCNA on 15 August,  
and in a 20 July RGNU statement on the anniversary of the 1954  
Geneva agreements.) The communique also says 23 governments and  
national liberation movements have recognized the RGNU.

The meeting approved proposals concerning "the enlargement of  
responsibilities of the leaders of internal resistance" in the  
Cambodian liberated areas, according to the communique. The  
central committee approved the nomination of Defense Minister  
Khieu Samphan to be concurrently vice prime minister--a nomina-  
tion first reported by NCNA on 19 August. Khieu Samphan is one  
of the three ministers claimed to be in the Cambodian "liberated  
zone."

The report adds that the nomination of "several vice ministers  
from the personages who are now fighting in Cambodia" were also  
approved, and it announces that "other ministries will by and by  
be transferred to the liberated zone." A number of "personalities  
now taking part in the anti-U.S. resistance at home" were also  
admitted to the central committee, according to the communique.  
Finally, the communique announces that the central committee  
established a "permanent secretariat" and a "secretariat of its  
political bureau."

DEATH SENTENCES ON           On 24 August NCNA carries a RGNU statement  
SIHANOUK FOLLOWERS           dated the 17th (the FUNK radio had carried  
                                  it on the 20th) rejecting death sentences  
passed on various FUNK and RGNU personalities and other members of  
Sihanouk's entourage by the "illegal tribunal" of the "Lon Nol-Sirik

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Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh clique." The statement recalls that Sihanouk had similarly been condemned to death earlier.\* It declares that no such "maneuvers" can weaken the will of the FUNK and that the fighting Khmer people will struggle until "final and complete victory". On 24 August NCNA carried a statement--dated the 18th--by Sihanouk's wife Monique denouncing her "illegal" condemnation and reserving the right to "lodge a complaint before the people's tribunal which will be set up after liberation."

EMBASSY           The takeover of the Cambodian embassy in Prague by  
IN PRAGUE        the second secretary on behalf of the FUNK continues  
                  to elicit official comment. A 20 August NCNA report  
says that a foreign ministry official in Peking received the  
Czechoslovak charge d'affaires and lodged a "serious verbal  
protest" against the Czechoslovak authorities' "unjustified  
obstruction of normal diplomatic contacts" between the Chinese  
and Cambodian embassies in Prague.

On 26 August NCNA carried another message, dated the 23d, from Sihanouk to President Svoboda demanding that the besieged embassy be supplied with electricity and telephone service and be allowed mail and food and recalling that he had sent a similar message last week. As in the earlier message, Sihanouk demands that the Czechoslovak Government clarify its position on recognition; he now proclaims that the Cambodian mission in Czechoslovakia as well as the missions "in other countries of socialist Europe and elsewhere" belong to the RGNU and FUNK and that the diplomats of the "traitorous regime" of Phnom Penh have no right to occupy them.

Prague has not mentioned the episode since 18 August, when CTK reported a Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry announcement that the laws of the host country were violated by the seizure and that Czechoslovak authorities had taken measures to ensure public order and security.

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\* Sihanouk's trial had been declared "illegal" in a 3 July RGNU statement. See the 8 July TRENDS, page 13.

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## LAOS: FOLLOWUP OF NLHS PROTESTS AGAINST ALLEGED TROOP INCURSION

Pathet Lao propaganda has said little about the alleged 9 August entry of Saigon troops into Laotian territory since the publicity for protests made in Souphanouvong's 13 August letter to Souvanna Phouma and in a 15 August NLHS Central Committee statement. On 22 August the Pathet Lao news agency does briefly cite a 19 August AP report that South Vietnamese reconnaissance patrols were landed in Laotian territory by U.S. helicopters; it derides a statement by a U.S. military spokesman in Saigon denying knowledge of any such activity. Pathet Lao media do not, of course, mention Souvanna Phouma's 18 August message denying Souphanouvong's charge and urging that steps be taken to facilitate ICC investigation in Laos.

HANOI, FRONT The PRG and DRV support the NLHS protests with foreign ministry spokesman's statements released on 21 and 24 August respectively. The PRG statement says that the escalation caused by the dispatch of Saigon troops, following the entry of Thai troops into Laos, will create further tension in Indochina at a time when "contacts between the parties concerned in Laos are taking place with a view to settling the Laotian problem." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, carried in the Hanoi domestic service on 21 August, cites the AP report that Saigon troops were being airlifted into Laos by U.S. helicopters while the U.S. military spokesman in Saigon "falsely" denied knowledge of the activity.

PEKING NCNA reports Vietnamese and Pathet Lao propaganda on the alleged incursions into Laos, but Peking does not comment on its own authority. Peking has not mentioned the contacts between the Laotian princes, and NCNA's report of the PRG statement predictably omits its reference to the contacts. On 24 August NCNA carries a statement by the Political Bureau of Sihanouk's FUNK, supporting the Laotian struggle against U.S. "aggression," which asserts that the NLHS "has many times proposed peace negotiations between the interested Laotian parties to arrive at a political solution of the Laotian question" but does not mention the current contacts.

MOSCOW Moscow did not acknowledge the NLHS charge that Saigon troops invaded Laotian territory until 22 August. TASS on that date, reporting that State Department spokesman McCloskey at a press conference "did not rule out" the possibility that Saigon troops with the help of U.S. advisers and military support might enter Laos, recalled that in his

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13 August message Souphanouvong charged that such an intrusion took place on the 9th. A 23 August domestic service commentary similarly refers to the NLHS complaint. It says McCloskey subsequently remarked that such an operation "could well have taken place" as a "self-defense" move to ensure the safety of troops in South Vietnam.

A 23 August IZVESTIYA article says calls are increasing in Washington for an operation in Laos "on the lines of the American-Saigon incursion into Cambodia." To prepare for this, says IZVESTIYA, increasing numbers of "American intelligence groups" have been transferred to Laos from Thailand and South Vietnam and "units of the Saigon regime are being introduced into regions of lower and middle Laos," as charged by Souphanouvong on the 13th. IZVESTIYA comments that these actions, as well as the introduction of Thai troops and intensified bombing, are taking place at a time when contacts are being carried on in Laos on the subject of talks; it adds that by expanding aggression, Washington is preventing the people of Laos from settling their own affairs.

#### COMMENT ON FIGHTING IN MEKONG DELTA, "CHIEU HOI" PROGRAM

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of 22 August, broadcast by Hanoi radio the same day, hails recent exploits of the Ben Tre Province (GVN Kien Hoa) armed forces. Claiming that the provincial liberation forces "concertedly attacked nearly all enemy positions in the provincial and district capitals" on the night of 12-13 August, the paper comments that these attacks belie GVN claims about a battlefield lull in the area and about restoration of complete security in the delta. Together with the "victories" of other provincial liberation forces in the region, the commentary says, Ben Tre's achievements demonstrate the offensive impetus of the delta armed forces.

Rare attention to the GVN's Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program appears in an 18 August Liberation Radio commentary, which calls allied efforts to induce communist defections "deceitful, demagogic tricks" that "certainly cannot make our revolutionary cadres and combatants forsake their noble ideals." The commentary ridicules the goal, set forth in the current GVN pacification plan, of reaching 40,000 defectors this year but does not mention the mid-August allied report that there were more than 20,000 reported defectors so far in 1970, as compared with 28,500 in a comparable period last year.

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While calling for "vigilance" against allied military efforts, the commentary predicts the defeat of Chieu Hoi measures. It asks rhetorically how, when more Americans are withdrawn and the ARVN is spread thinner and bogged down in Cambodia, the allies can accelerate and develop the Chieu Hoi program. It forecasts that the people and their armed forces will "extensively" punish the "cruel" GVN officials and "regain mastership over the enemy's pacified zones" and that then the GVN "spies" and Chieu Hoi cadres will be "eliminated" or will flee.

#### VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS MARK AUGUST REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY

NORTH VIETNAM       The 19 August anniversary of the 1945 August Revolution is marked in standard fashion by NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on that day. Prior to the anniversary, Hanoi on 4 August released slogans to mark the 25th anniversary of the August Revolution and the 2 September founding of the DRV, as well as instructions on celebration of the two anniversaries.\* The media have since reported a flurry of emulation and production drives to greet the anniversaries.

The NHAN DAN editorial routinely hails the anniversary as a "great event" in Vietnamese history and notes that it brought independence and freedom to the country. "For these sacred rights," it says, "we are resolved to sweep our country clean of all the U.S. aggressors, to fight until all the U.S. troops quit and the puppet administration and army topple."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial observes that the Vietnamese people have fought for a quarter of a century, "winning extremely glorious victories," but it warns that revolutionary tasks remain "heavy" and that "there are still many difficulties and hardships in the days to come. We must be prepared to fight the U.S. aggressors for many more years, and we will still have to exert efforts for the next two or three decades to successfully perfect the building of socialism."

The editorial maintains that socialist construction in the North and the fight to liberate the South are "strategic tasks" in developing the Vietnamese revolution and "essential conditions" in discharging the Vietnamese people's obligations to the people of Laos and Cambodia. In discussing these tasks,

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\* See the TRENDS of 5 August, pages 13-15.

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it points to the importance of developing administrative power, which it calls the "sharpest tool for organizing the implementation of the party line and for defending and developing the fruits of the revolution." It urges the maintenance and consolidation of administrative power, along with "full development of the function of revolutionary power" to bring socialist construction to success and the anti-U.S. resistance to victory.

**SOUTH VIETNAM** The 19 August Revolution Day is the peg for numerous Liberation Front media commentaries on the 18th, 19th, and 20th reaffirming determination to strive for "total victory." A Liberation Radio commentary of the 18th is typical in asserting that "as an immediate goal, the southern armed forces and people are determined to rely on the strength of the entire country, to closely cooperate with the brotherly Cambodian and Laotian armed forces and people, to attack and rise up continuously, to annihilate and wear down a substantial part of the enemy potential and war equipment, to repel and smash his special pacification scheme, and to advance toward crushing the Nixon clique's Vietnamization-of-the-war program."

Other Liberation Radio comment pegged to the anniversary includes an appeal issued by several youths affiliated with the Vietnam Alliance and another appeal by the Hue NFLSV committee.

#### PREPARATIONS FOR FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF HO CHI MINH'S DEATH

On 24 August VNA released the text of a joint communique on observing the first anniversary of President Ho Chi Minh's death (3 September), issued by the Vietnam Worker's Party Central Committee, the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee Presidium. Suggesting that the 3 September date will not be officially marked in the future, the communique notes that "as in the past, from now on our party and people will take 19 May, Ho's birthday, as the official anniversary" of President Ho.

The communique states that this year 3 September "will be solemnly observed" by the sponsors of the joint communique. On that day, "at all levels from the central down, leading organs of the party and state and of mass organizations will meet to commemorate President Ho Chi Minh, to review one year's results of the implementation of his testament and take effective measures to fulfill better all immediate tasks."

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## DRV DELEGATION IN EAST EUROPE: A REVIEW OF THE TOUR

VNA reported on 14 August that the DRV National Assembly delegation headed by Hoang Van Hoan, Politburo member and vice chairman of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, had returned home the previous day, "concluding its friendship tour" of Bulgaria, East Germany, Albania, and Hungary. Shortly after its return, the delegation reported on its tour to a meeting of the Standing Committee convened on 18 and 19 August, according to VNA on the 21st.

DRV media carried only minimal coverage of the trip, which began on 23 June.\* On 11 June Hanoi first announced the projected trip to "several socialist countries" and on the 23d it announced the composition of the delegation, saying it would visit East Europe but not specifying the countries. The only discussion of the purpose of the visit came in a 24 June NHAN DAN editorial which noted the importance the DRV attaches to the "friendship, militant solidarity, and mutual support" between it and the socialist countries and claimed that the tour demonstrated Vietnamese resolve to strengthen solidarity and unity. Appreciation of socialist aid to the DRV and its importance were also highlighted.

The propaganda does not elucidate the reasons for the choice of countries visited. Hoang Van Hoan had been in Albania last December as head of a party-government delegation that went on to Hungary and Romania.\*\* The latter was not on the itinerary

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\* For initial coverage of the delegation's activities see the TRENDS of 24 June, page 10, and 1 July, pages 12-13.

\*\* Hoang Van Hoan has made periodic trips abroad; in July-August 1965 he headed a similar delegation which visited the PRC, the DPRK, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union. Communist media reported that Hoan was in Peking in October, November, and December 1969, although the reason for his presence was not explained. From 1950 to 1957 he headed the DRV mission in Peking. (See FBIS SPECIAL REPORT No. 297, 10 February 1970, pages 5-6, for background on Hoang Van Hoan's activities abroad.)

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this time. While the delegates stopped over in both Peking and Moscow on their way to East Europe and on their return, they were greeted with fanfare only in the Chinese capital.

**DURATION OF VISITS** While enroute to Eastern Europe, the delegation stopped briefly in Peking (23-27 June) and Moscow (27-30 June). It visited Bulgaria from 30 June to 7 July, East Germany from 7 to 15 July, Albania from 15 to 22 July, and Hungary from 22 July to 4 August. The delegation's longer stay in Hungary was explained by Budapest media: A Budapest broadcast on 29 July reported that the delegation "will conclude its official talks in Hungary today," and the Budapest NEPSZABADSAG on 5 August, reporting the departure of the group, said that "after the conclusion of official negotiations they vacationed a few days and left Budapest on 4 August."

On its return to the DRV, the delegation again stopped over in Moscow (4-7 August) and Peking (9-13 August). There is no available information as to the delegation's whereabouts on the 8th. Both VNA and IZVESTIYA on the 9th reported that it left Moscow on the 7th. NCNA on the 9th noted its arrival in Peking that morning.

**COVERAGE IN HANOI MEDIA** Hanoi's coverage of the delegation's trip was negligible, limited mainly to reports of its activities--arrivals, departures, and receptions by the party first secretaries in each host country and by national assembly officials. VNA also briefly reported some of the speeches made during the tour, uniformly citing expressions of support or references to assistance by spokesmen of the host countries and statements of appreciation by Hoang Van Hoan. Coverage by the media of the host countries was markedly more extensive than Hanoi's, usually including daily reports on the delegation's activities and substantial accounts of addresses made by Hoan and East European officials.

**TREATMENT IN PEKING MEDIA** Peking reported the delegation's activities only in Albania, in a spate of NCNA items implicitly or directly scoring the role of the Soviet Union in Vietnam--polemics predictably ignored in VNA's coverage. The most explicit attack on Moscow came in an 18 July NCNA report on a mass rally held on the 16th at a factory where the secretary of the Tirana regional party committee charged that "the vicious scheme of the U.S. imperialists against the Vietnamese people has won the support of the Soviet revisionists."

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Other, less direct comment in this vein included NCNA's 22 July report of remarks by Politburo member Rita Marko at a reception for the delegation. According to NCNA, Marko denounced "modern revisionists" as "zealous collaborators" with "U.S.-led international reactionaries" and maintained that the "'peaceful solution' plot on the Vietnam question" was "jointly hatched by the imperialists and revisionists" and is doomed to fail.

TREATMENT IN MOSCOW MEDIA Moscow media carried brief reports on the delegation's activities in Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary. One of these reports, a 23 July TASS account of remarks at a dinner for the delegation by Gyula Kallai, president of the Hungarian National Assembly, contained some pointed comment. According to TASS, Kallai said that "the experience of the Vietnamese people shows that the anti-imperialist struggle may bring success only in cooperation with the Soviet Union, with all the socialist countries." He reportedly stressed that the USSR and the socialist countries, "together with all the peace-loving forces of the whole world, are making great efforts to avert imperialist aggressions and liquidate the hotbeds of tension in the interests of safeguarding the further progress of mankind." VNA ignored these remarks.

STOPOVERS IN PEKING, MOSCOW The treatment of the delegation during its stopovers in Peking and Moscow projected a picture of much warmer DRV relations with the Chinese than with the Soviets. On 23 June NCNA promptly reported the arrival of the group that day, "on its way to other countries." The report said the delegation was welcomed at the airport by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who gave a banquet in their honor that evening. Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, was also present at the airport.

In belatedly reporting the delegation's arrival in Peking, VNA and Hanoi radio reports on 29 June noted the delegates' welcome at the airport and the banquet, mentioning also that they attended the grand meeting in Peking marking the 20th anniversary of the Korean War and were guests of honor at a reception given by Chou En-lai for the visiting DPRK delegation. Both VNA and Hanoi radio reported that the delegation left Peking on the 27th. NCNA on the 27th, in reporting the delegation's departure that day, said the group was seen off by Wu Fa-hsien, deputy chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, as well as by Kuo Mo-jo and other members of the NPC Standing Committee.

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The Moscow stopover emerged as cool by contrast. TASS reported the arrival of the group on 27 June "en route to Sofia," saying that the delegation was met at the airport by Ivan Spiridonov, chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group and "other official personages." On the 30th, TASS reported its departure for Sofia, noting that while in Moscow the group "visited the USSR exhibition of national economy achievements, theaters, and the 533-meter-high Ostankino television tower." There is no available mention of talks or meetings held with Soviet officials there. Moscow mentioned on the 30th that the delegation was seen off by Spiridonov, Deputy Foreign Minister Firubin,\* and "other officials."

In a brief item on the delegation's stopover in Moscow, VNA on 2 July noted its arrival on 27 June "en route to a number of socialist countries in Eastern Europe." It specified that the delegation was welcomed at the airport not only by Spiridonov but also by Firubin and M.S. Kapitsa, head of the department for Southeast Asia of the USSR Foreign Ministry. The same item reported that the visitors left Moscow for Sofia on 30 June but did not mention who saw them off or cite any of their activities while in Moscow.

On its return to Hanoi the delegation again stopped in both Moscow and Peking, and again Peking gave more attention to the group than Moscow did. On 4 August Moscow radio reported the delegation's arrival that day, and on the 6th an IZVESTIYA report noted that it was met by Firubin, Y. Nasriddinova, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, and V.G. Vosotin, head of the International Relations Section of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. TASS reported on the 6th that the delegation visited the chairmen of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet, Y. Nasriddinova and A. Shitikov. During their talks, TASS said, members of the delegation "expressed gratitude to the Soviet people for their support and assistance." On the 9th, IZVESTIYA reported the group's departure two days earlier, not mentioning who saw them off.

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\* In the first part of July, Firubin made an unannounced and publicly unexplained trip to Hanoi. DRV media never acknowledged his visit, which occurred sometime between the 30 June Moscow appearance and his arrival in India reported by New Delhi on 12 July. Moscow's first acknowledgment of the DRV visit came in a brief TASS report from New Delhi on the 13th.

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VNA, in its only mention of the second Moscow stopover, reported on 9 August that on the 7th the delegation left Moscow, "where it stopped over on its way home after visiting a number of socialist countries" and was seen off by Y.S. Nasriddinova and "other high-ranking officials." VNA again made no mention of the delegation's activities in the Soviet capital.

Peking promptly reported the delegation's arrival in the PRC capital on 9 August, noting that "the Vietnamese comrades" were welcomed at the airport by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, along with Wu Fa-hsien, Kuo Mo-jo, and other members of the NPC Standing Committee. On the 11th Peking reported that Kang Sheng, vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, and Wu Fa-hsien held a banquet that evening "warmly welcoming" the delegation "on its way home via China." NCNA said the banquet was "permeated with an atmosphere of revolutionary friendship and fighting solidarity" between the people of China and Vietnam and that the "hosts and guests had a cordial conversation." They offered toasts "to the militant friendship sealed in blood" between the two peoples, NCNA reported, "to the brilliant victories" won by the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. On the 13th NCNA reported that the delegation left Peking for home that day after a sendoff by Wu Fa-hsien and Kuo Mo-jo.

VNA on 13 August reported the delegates' arrival in Peking on the 9th and the banquet held in their honor on the 11th. VNA said Kang Sheng "warmly greeted the brilliant victories" of the Indochinese people and reasserted that "as in the past, the Chinese people will in the future resolutely support" the struggle of the Vietnamese and three Indochinese peoples. Hoang Van Hoan, for his part, underlined the resolve of the Vietnamese people to carry out President Ho's testament by "persisting in and stepping up their fight till not a single U.S. aggressor remains" and to unite closely with Laos and Cambodia. VNA noted the delegation's departure from Peking on the 13th.

RETURN TO HANOI      The 14 August VNA report on the arrival of the Hoan delegation back in Hanoi noted that it was greeted at the airport by Truong Chinh, chairman of the National Assembly Standing Committee, who also was present when the group departed. Hanoi's 21 August report that Hoang Van Hoan addressed the 18-19 August Standing Committee meeting on the tour noted that the committee "greatly rejoiced at the splendid successes" of the visits which, it said, "contribute to the strengthening of the friendship and militant solidarity" between

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the DRV and fraternal countries. The Standing Committee, according to Hanoi reports, expressed thanks to Bulgaria, the GDR, Albania, and Hungary for their sympathy, support, and assistance. (Hoan similarly reported to the National Assembly Standing Committee following his 1965 tour of socialist countries.)

The support and assistance of the four East European countries was also noted in a 22 August NHAN DAN editorial on the trip which claimed, according to VNA, that the leaders of the host countries "reaffirmed their determination to increase their militant solidarity with and their support and assistance to the Vietnamese people." Hanoi media reported on 26 August that a "grand meeting" was held by the National Assembly Standing Committee on the 25th to "welcome the success" of the delegation's visits to East Europe. According to the radio and VNA, Truong Chinh made brief opening and closing remarks and Hoang Van Hoan gave a lengthy report on the tour. The VNA press review of the 26th says that NHAN DAN of that day carries the text of Hoan's report, not available at this writing.

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## M I D D L E   E A S T

## MOSCOW NOTES OPENING OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONTACTS UNDER JARRING

With the inception of Arab-Israeli contacts through Ambassador Jarring on 25 August, Soviet propagandists, who had been urging commencement of the talks and blaming Israel for the delay, now portray Israel as continuing to raise obstacles to a political settlement. Moscow points to Israeli statements about retention of captured Arab territory, pictures a "war psychosis" developing in Israel, is skeptical about any rifts in the "Israeli-American alliance," and underlines reports of agreement on delivery of further U.S. military equipment to Israel.

LEVEL, SITE            TASS on the 25th reports Jarring as officially  
OF CONTACTS            announcing that day that contacts "have been  
                              started" with the UAR, Jordan, and Israel.

Presumably referring to Jarring's 24 August news conference at which he announced that talks would begin the following day, TASS cites Jarring as stating that initial contacts will be made through the permanent representatives of the three countries at the United Nations. It does not report his expression of hope that at a later stage the discussions can be held at foreign-minister level.

A Moscow domestic service commentary by Kurov on the 24th contains the first--and thus far only--Soviet reference to Israel's designation on 23 August of Foreign Minister Eban as its representative to the talks and of Tekoah, its ambassador to the United Nations, as his stand-in. Moscow as yet has not been heard to mention Tekoah's departure for consultations in Israel following two sessions with Jarring on the 25th. Kurov said "some people" consider the appointment of Eban as a hindrance to the talks, since Cairo and Amman insist on the level of permanent representatives at the United Nations. He commented that there are still not strong grounds for optimism, citing in this connection statements by Eban to the effect that Israel will not consider returning all the occupied territories. Kurov also cited Prime Minister Meir's statement that it would not be surprising if firing began on the Suez Canal before the cease-fire expires--a remark noted by other Soviet propagandists.

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Kudryavtsev, in the 23 August commentators' roundtable in the Moscow domestic service, said it is difficult to forecast how events will develop in connection with a political settlement. He returned to the idea that if the Big Four "were to promote the reaching of such a settlement" it could become a fact. For Jarring's mission to be successful, he added, it is necessary to give him a "practical program of action, an agreed point of view on all aspects of the problem." But TASS on the 22d failed to mention the Big Four aspect in citing the Cairo AL-AHRAM as reporting the UAR had instructed its ambassador to the United Nations, az-Zayyat, to inform U Thant that Cairo insisted on holding the talks in New York because their purpose is to implement the Security Council resolution. A second reason for the New York venue given by AL-AHRAM, according to a MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY account, is that Jarring "resumed his mission in accordance with a decision by the Big Four, and during his contacts he should be within reach of Big Four representatives" for contacts regarding any obstacles to the talks. TASS did not mention this point.

KUDRYAVTSEV            Outlining the priorities of a settlement,  
ON SETTLEMENT        Kudryavtsev in the roundtable appeared to  
                         be following the order in the first operative  
paragraph of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967.\*  
He called first for an agreement, in which Jarring would assist,  
on a "stable and durable peace" in the area. Then comes the  
"most important period," the beginning of the "practical  
settlement" which means, according to Kudryavtsev, Israeli  
withdrawal in order to really start on the "political settle-  
ment." He defined the latter as agreement on "Israel's  
recognized and secure borders along the lines existing  
before 5 June 1967." Israel's "actual, legally recognized  
borders," Kudryavtsev said, remain those laid down by the  
UN General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947.

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\* Resolution 242 calls for the establishment of a just and lasting peace which should include the application of two principles: withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories of recent conflict, and termination of states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

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Both in the roundtable the previous week and in his article in the 19 August morning edition of IZVESTIYA, Kudryavtsev had complained that Israel wishes to put the cart before the horse---that is, "to achieve a political settlement and only afterwards to embark on withdrawal."

## USSR REJECTS CHARGES OF UAR CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS

Moscow again rejects Israel's continued charges of UAR cease-fire violations as unsubstantiated. Articles on the 23d by Vasilyev in RED STAR and Nekrasov in PRAVDA, noting Israel's fourth accusation against the UAR, countercharge that Israel is trying to hinder Jarring's mission. TASS on the 25th cites UAR National Guidance Minister Haykal, in a British television interview, as accusing Israel of violating the cease-fire agreement by building new fortifications and lines of communication to them. Haykal, TASS says, described as "groundless and unfounded" Israeli assertions that the UAR moves missiles in the Suez Canal zone.

Haykal's claim is picked up by Ryzhikov in a domestic service commentary on the 25th which asserts that the Israeli army is undertaking "military engineering work" in the Suez Canal zone, endangering the cease-fire agreement. Ryzhikov says reports of increasing activity of Israeli engineers have been coming from Egyptian army observation points in a number of places along the canal. He calls this "a direct violation of the cease-fire agreement, with all possible consequences, including those affecting the New York talks."

U.S. STATEMENT ON VIOLATIONS      Moscow only briefly acknowledges the substance of the 19 August State Department statement relating to Israeli charges of UAR violations of the cease-fire: TASS on the 20th reports the statement as saying there is certain evidence to show that surface-to-air missiles were moved forward to the Suez Canal zone after the cease-fire agreement took effect, but that U.S. data on the matter are not final. On the 19th, TASS had reported that Israeli Ambassador Rabin had met with Assistant Secretary Sisco on the 18th and had been told the United States could not arrive at the conclusion that the Egyptian side had made any cease-fire violations which could justify a further delay of the Jarring consultations. An Arabic-language commentary

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on the 20th, without referring to the U.S. statement, said Tel Aviv "asked the United States to take measures, but the United States cannot prove" the UAR's violation of the cease-fire.

Propagandists have subsequently referred to the State Department statement in passing: PRAVDA's Belyayev, in the commentator's roundtable program on the 23d, remarked that "even the State Department was forced to declare that this was not the moment for determining whether or not the Israeli side was right in making such accusations" against the UAR. Nekrasov, in PRAVDA the same day, cited the statement as "asserting, although with reservations, that there was 'some evidence' of violations of the temporary cease-fire conditions by Cairo." Nekrasov called this a "step backwards" by U.S. diplomacy. Like an Arabic-language commentary on the 21st, Nekrasov's article noted that the statement was viewed in the UAR as a "reflection of Zionist pressure" on the U.S. administration.

There is some effort to discount any notion of difficulties in U.S.-Israeli relations. A 20 August Moscow radio commentary in Arabic, observing that Israel's "hostile policy" results from the U.S. attitude and support, dismissed "the 'alleged crisis of confidence'" between Washington and Tel Aviv as an imaginary dispute. And Nekrasov referred to the "behind-the-scenes aspect of the game being played" by the United States and Israel; he asked how anyone could believe the Israeli press campaign about the worsening of U.S.-Israeli relations when Defense Secretary Laird stated on television that "planned supplies of military materials to Israel will be effected as previously."

U.S. MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL      Other comment also takes up the issue of U.S. arms deliveries to Israel, a topic that had been largely dormant in the past two weeks. TASS items point to American press reports that new consignments were promised to Israel "quite recently," and Moscow cites the deputy director of the Israeli foreign ministry, on a visit to the United States, as calling for new weapons, including Phantom aircraft, free of charge. Moscow radio's Cairo correspondent Rassadin, according to an Arabic-language broadcast on the 24th, said Cairo received "with concern" the news of a recent U.S.-Israeli agreement providing for the shipment of electronic equipment

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to Tel Aviv. The United States, Rassadin added, used "the pretext of the need to preserve the so-called balance of power" in the region, a "propaganda trick" employed in the past to justify the shipment of offensive weapons.

Ryzhikov's 25 August domestic service commentary points to Israel's increased military budget adopted "virtually simultaneously" with Jarring's announcement of the beginning of talks. Similarly, a foreign-language commentary by Soltan the same day claims that measures are being taken for Israel's militarization. Soltan cites increased Israeli taxation and reports of a new U.S. Israeli agreement, "concluded after the cease-fire," regarding the delivery to Tel Aviv of "most modern electronic military equipment as well as antiradar missiles and bombs with atomic warheads."

#### MOSCOW REGRETS ARAB OPPOSITION TO CAIRO "PEACE INITIATIVE"

While Moscow has made no further propaganda reference to Iraq's opposition to a political settlement since the 1 August PRAVDA comment on Baghdad's "negative" attitude, comment continues to reflect Soviet sensitivity to the question, with stress on the need for "united measures" by the Arabs and charges of U.S. and Israeli efforts to exploit Arab differences. A Trushin article in NEW TIMES No. 33, of 14 August, acknowledged regretfully that "most Palestinian leaders have opposed the Cairo peace initiative." Trushin made Moscow's first apparent reference to the UAR's suspension of broadcasts by some Palestinian organizations since Cairo announced this action on 28 July. The UAR Government, he said, had to prohibit some Palestinian organizations from using Cairo radio facilities since their broadcasts "began to abound in crude attacks against the UAR leadership and ceased to promote Arab unity." Like Petrov in LIFE ABROAD, signed to press 29 July, Trushin said the UAR leaders will have to devote much patience and effort to explaining the "real meaning" of Cairo's policy to the broad masses in the Arab East, for not all can yet distinguish between "genuine national liberation slogans and the demagoguery of the right and 'left' opportunists."

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An article on the editor's page of the same issue of NEW TIMES, also noting the refusal of "some of the Palestinian organizations" to support the UAR's policy, accused Israel and "certain U.S. quarters" of trying to exploit the "differences among the Arab states." And Glukhov, in the 19 August PRAVDA, charged that Israeli press articles laying claim to Arab territories "seek to provoke extremist elements in the Arab world, instigating them to oppose a peaceful settlement," and then hold the Arabs responsible for its failure.

Kudryavtsev warned against "leftwing" Palestinian groups in Jordan in a discussion, in the 23 August commentators' round-table, of the situation in that country. Commenting on "certain instability" in Jordan, he noted that the country has become the prime base for the activities of Palestinian organizations and the starting point for commando operations into the occupied territories. Following the cease-fire, Kudryavtsev said, Israel has been attempting to hold the Jordanian Government responsible for curbing this Palestinian activity, but King Hussein rejects this responsibility. Kudryavtsev pointed to increased activity in Jordan by both extreme rightwing forces with "Western or feudal" connections and ultra-leftwing Palestinian organizations, "some of them bordering on adventurism." The task of the "patriotic forces" in Jordan, he said, is to equally oppose the "pro-Western rightwing defeatists and the adventurist thrusts."

Turning to Syria's "interesting and significant position," Kudryavtsev pointed out that Syria does not violate the cease-fire agreement. And he noted, as Belyayev did in the 7 August NEW TIMES, that if a settlement is reached, Damascus will not hinder it.

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## WARSAW PACT MEETING

## PACT ENDORSES FRG-USSR TREATY, EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Warsaw Pact approval of the 12 August FRG-USSR treaty is formalized in a communique on the 20 August Moscow meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee.\* Released in Soviet media on the 21st. the Pact document calls the accord "a major step on the road toward relaxation of the tension and normalization of the situation in Europe" serving the development of state relations on the continent, a theme which has been prominent in bloc propaganda since the signing of the treaty.

The communique goes on to state that the participants in the meeting expressed their intention to take further steps toward the strengthening of European security, and in particular to take active measures for implementation "in the nearest future" of the proposal for an all-European conference. While noting that the meeting gave "principal attention" to the situation in Europe, the communique says "an exchange of opinions was also held on some other pressing international problems."

A substantial volume of followup Soviet comment on the meeting presses the call for a European security conference. The 22 August PRAVDA editorial, widely broadcast by Radio Moscow, says conditions for holding a conference have matured. The editorial declares that there are "no weighty reasons" to defer the convening of the conference and that "any 'reservations' and 'warnings' being expressed by certain circles" regarding the conference narrow the scope for developing cooperation on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

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\* The last meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee was held in Budapest on 17 March 1969. A meeting of party and state leaders "of fraternal countries" was held in Moscow 3-4 December 1969. Soviet propaganda on that gathering did not link it with the Warsaw Pact, although the seven countries listed as attending constitute the Pact's membership. Other bloc propaganda, however, did tie the December meeting to the Pact. A Prague commentary, for example, called it a "Warsaw Pact summit" and a Sofia broadcast referred to the conference "of the Warsaw Pact member countries in Moscow."

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A 24 August domestic service commentary echoes PRAVDA in observing that conditions for a conference are ripe and concludes that attempts to attach preconditions to its convening "by no means contribute to creating a healthy political climate in the world." On 21 August, a Krichevskiy commentary broadcast nearly 60 times to foreign audiences recalls the Warsaw Pact's initiative for a conference, observing that the Pact has made "concrete proposals" for an agenda and venue as well as participants and is "willing to discuss all proposals" which would expedite the convening of the conference.

The communique on the Moscow meeting does not bring up the matter of the agenda, and the bulk of the accompanying propaganda follows suit. However, a domestic service commentary on the 24th touches briefly on the major agenda items proposed at the 21-22 June Budapest meeting of Pact foreign ministers--rejection of the use of force, expansion of economic and other ties, and the creation of "permanent machinery for the practical elaboration and carrying out of agreed measures."\* On the 23d, NEW TIMES observer Kobryn noted in a domestic service commentary that Senator Mansfield has said "the presence of a 300,000-man U.S. army in West Europe is becoming an anachronism" in view of the Soviet-FRG treaty. The memorandum of the June Pact foreign ministers meeting in Budapest had suggested that "the reduction of foreign armed forces on the territory of European states" could be discussed in the permanent body "proposed to come into being at the European security conference" or "in other ways acceptable to the states concerned." The Kobryn commentary went on to attack those "forces" in Europe, notably the CDU, who oppose the withdrawal of American troops and those "overseas politicians" who are developing plans for replacing U.S. troops with "European mercenaries"--in effect plans for "Europeanization" in the pattern of "Vietnamization."

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\* For a review of the Budapest proposals for conference participants and agenda, see the TRENDS of 1 July 1970, pages 25-27.

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## NERVE GAS DUMPING

## MOSCOW WARNS OF WIDESPREAD DANGERS IN "CRIMINAL" OPERATION

The U.S. disposal of nerve gas off the Florida coast has evoked an increasing volume of Soviet propaganda attacks over the past three weeks.\* TASS dispatches as well as radio and press comment have highlighted U.S. domestic and foreign protests following the Pentagon's 30 July announcement that the gas, in missiles embedded in concrete, was to be shipped by rail to a North Carolina port for disposal at sea. Propaganda has charged that the rail shipment "jeopardized the life and health of the country's population" and that the dumping at sea on 18 August was "fraught with the danger of contamination of waters which belong to all mankind."\*\*

Moscow has reported the protests of various governments as well as of public figures including U Thant. A widely broadcast commentary by Tsoppi on the 12th charged that the United States "paid scant attention" to the concern of U Thant, who said that the dumping of the gas outside the continental shelf was a violation of the 1958 Geneva Convention as well as of the 1967 UN General Assembly resolution. TASS on the 20th reported that the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed, meeting in Geneva, passed a statement condemning the dumping operation.

The propaganda also draws on the protests of the Soviet scientific community, publicizing, among others, the remarks of the vice president of the Academy of Medical Sciences of

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\* In the week ending 23 August Radio Moscow devoted 165 commentary-length items to the nerve gas dumping, more than four percent of its total broadcast comment for the week. It had devoted 50 and 87 items to the operation in the two previous weeks.

\*\* Moscow also reported the 20 August scuttling off the U.S. east coast of a ship loaded with obsolete munitions. TASS on the 21st reported that the ship exploded when it struck the bottom. It went on to note that original plans called for its sinking closer to the coast, "in direct proximity to the underwater 'cemetery' of containers with mustard gas which were dumped in the ocean by the Pentagon three years ago."

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the USSR, V. Kovanov. In a PRAVDA interview summarized by TASS on the 19th, Kovanov pointed to the high degree of toxicity of the gas, which is "easily soluble" in water. In his words, as little as "one billionth of a gram of the gas may lead to the death of living organisms," resulting in an upset in the balance of nature and affecting man's capacity for work and "even his heredity." The same TASS item included remarks -- also made to a PRAVDA correspondent -- by Soviet oceanographer V. Stepanov, who expressed concern over the fact that the gas was dumped in the Gulf Stream. As a result, he said, "the whole of the North Atlantic may be polluted while deep currents can carry toxic agents to the south, to the shores of the Antarctic, and even further into the Indian and Pacific Oceans."

Routine propaganda on the "criminal" dumping operation gives wide play to the scientists' warnings about the toxicity of the nerve gas as well as possible consequences far beyond the immediate disposal area. The warnings about the pervasiveness of the danger are reminiscent of those contained in Soviet propaganda at the time of the Palomares and Greenland incidents -- in January 1966 and January 1968 -- when U.S. nuclear weapons were lost at sea. These incidents have been recalled in some of the current comment. A foreign-language broadcast on 5 August, for example, after declaring that U.S. assurances about the reliability and solidity of the concrete containers "are only intended to calm public opinion," said it is "not superfluous" to recall the Palomares and Greenland incidents.

Moscow predictably takes the occasion to assail the United States for use of defoliants and tear gas in Vietnam and for the stockpiling of chemical weapons overseas. On the latter score, a broadcast for Japanese audiences on the 21st said U.S. forces "have a stockpile of 15,000 tons of nerve gas and 'mustard gas' on Okinawa." It recalled the incident on that island last July when a leakage caused the hospitalization of 24 Americans. The Tsoppi commentary of the 12th, mentioned above, cited AP for the "assumption" that "the United States has stockpiles of chemical weapons not only on its territory but in about 30 foreign countries."

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GENEVA            Moscow promptly reported President Nixon's  
PROTOCOL        19 August message to the Senate urging ratifica-  
                  tion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the  
                  use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. But it takes  
                  him to task for his delay of "more than half a year" in  
                  submitting the message,\* is critical of his interpretation  
                  that the Protocol does not prohibit the use of defoliants  
                  and tear gas, and links the submission of the message at  
                  this time to the dumping of nerve gas in the Atlantic.

TASS on the 19th, for example, said that the President's appeal to the Senate was "specially timed for the sinking of the lethal gases in the Atlantic in order to tone down the growing protests in the United States and throughout the world against the exceedingly dangerous operation carried out by the Pentagon." A domestic service commentary on the 20th said that while the President announced "several months ago" that the United States would ratify the Geneva Protocol, it is only the pressure of world public protests over the dumping operation which has "made the White House hasten somewhat in this affair." Even so, the commentary continued, Washington reserves the right to use "so-called defoliants and tear gases because they were not known in 1925." A PRAVDA article reviewed by TASS on the 21st, noting the President's understanding of the scope of the Protocol, recalls that the UN General Assembly last December "emphasized" that defoliants and tear gas "were fully covered" by the 1925 Protocol.

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\* Moscow's reaction to President Nixon's announcement last November that he would ask the Senate to ratify the Geneva Protocol is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 November 1969, pages 23-24.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## PRAGUE "CELEBRATES" SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF AUGUST INVASION

Czechoslovak media hail the absence of major disturbances on the second anniversary of the August 1968 invasion as proof of what RUDE PRAVO on the 24th calls "the crushing defeat of the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia." In contrast to the invective last year against the "counterrevolutionary" riots which occurred in Prague and other cities on the first anniversary, the media this year feature reports of factory, militia, and party meetings "celebrating" the anniversary and conveying "gratitude" to the Soviets for their "internationalist aid" on 21 August 1968. The Prague domestic service on the 21st reports the award of honorary citizenship to Soviet troop commander Kozhanov by the Plzen city national committee "in recognition of the fraternal aid of the Soviet Union in the most difficult moments and of the prudent conduct of the Soviet troops."

The anniversary was preceded by heavily publicized joint Soviet-Czechoslovak troop exercises from 10 to 17 August in the Plzen-Karlovy Vary area of western Czechoslovakia, observed by the top CSSR leaders and culminating in parades in both cities addressed by President Svoboda. Smaller-scale and less publicized joint "command-staff" exercises of the two armies had been held 10-15 August 1969.

**MASS ARRESTS** In addition to tightening border security-- reported only by Western media--in anticipation of the anniversary, the Husak regime also carried out large-scale arrests, noted in reports in Prague media on the 24th which do not state whether the arrests were precautionary or responsive to actual hostile activity.

The Prague domestic service and CTK announced on the 24th that "these days" the public security service had "conducted an extensive raid aimed at criminal, antisocial elements," resulting in 6,217 arrests. Some 10 percent of those arrested were reportedly sentenced to jail terms--"mainly persons wanted by district and regional police headquarters." The police confiscated "263 illegally kept firearms," ammunition, and "explosives" during the action. A Bratislava domestic service report on the arrests, also on the 24th, added that "this time

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the wirepullers did not succeed in provoking demonstrations, riots, and acts of violence such as occurred last year" as the result of "counterrevolutionary and rightwing-opportunist" activities.

As in Czechoslovak media prior to the anniversary last year, there were also reports of arrests for printing and distribution of agitational leaflets. RUDE PRAVO's anniversary article on the 24th, by Oborsky, asserts that the "overwhelming majority" of citizens ignored a leaflet which appeared on the 20th urging everyone to stay off the streets between 1300 and 1400 hours on the anniversary as a gesture of "disapproval, resistance, and so on and so forth."

SOVIET MEDIA                 Moscow media publicized an anniversary  
ON ANNIVERSARY             meeting held in the Czechoslovak embassy  
                                  on the 21st, but generally played down the  
occasion. Last year PRAVDA carried blow-by-blow reports by  
its correspondents on Prague media's denunciations of the  
anniversary riots. Soviet commentaries this year for the most  
part recall the intervention only in passing in routine  
denunciations of alleged Western efforts to subvert Czechoslovakia.  
Radio Moscow devoted only one percent of its total output to  
Czechoslovakia during the week ending 23 August, in contrast  
to 12 percent in the comparable period in August 1969.

#### RUDE PRAVO ATTACKS DUBCEK, DEFENDS BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

While an article by hardlining RUDE PRAVO Chief Editor Moc in the paper on the 22d offered a renewed assurance of no "political trials," continued attacks on Alexander Dubcek, now expelled from the CPCZ, appear in the invasion anniversary propaganda. Thus the keynote editorial by Korinek in RUDE PRAVO on the 21st stressed that the invasion resulted from "the activity of the counterrevolutionary forces and the weakness of the then political leadership headed by Alexander Dubcek, which even increased the threat."

Leading up to this attack, the editorial went to unusual lengths to defend the timing of the intervention, based on the August 1968 Bratislava Declaration's stress on the "internationalist duty" to "defend socialist achievements." The move "was not premature," the paper insisted, but was made to "avert a tragedy, even at the risk of a lack of understanding at the very beginning from our side and from a section of the international communist movement."

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## ROMANIA

Greetings to Romania on the 23 August anniversary of its liberation from the Nazis were extended by Peking at a more exalted level this year than last and registered Moscow's recent more tolerant public stance toward its maverick ally. Bucharest plays up the Romanian party and people's own decisive role in securing their independence and building Romanian socialism, at the same time underscoring independent pursuit of good relations with all countries by publicizing greetings ranging the field from Brezhnev, Mao, and Tito to President Nixon and Haile Selassie.

## PEKING COURTS BUCHAREST ON ROMANIAN LIBERATION ANNIVERSARY

Peking media marked the 26th Romanian anniversary with greater publicity than it gave last year's major quinquennial. An anniversary message signed by Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai greets the Romanians at the party level for the first time since 1966. NCNA, which publicized the message on 22 August, had not carried last year's message, signed only by Chou and publicized only by the Romanian side.

The Chinese message is similar to last year's, however, in still withholding any acknowledgment that Romania is building socialism, in effect underscoring a Chinese view of Romania's merit as lying chiefly in its resistance to Soviet pressures and pursuit of an independent line in international affairs. The message lauds the Romanians for successes simply in "building and defending their motherland." The Chinese message in 1966, signed by all the top leaders, was the last to credit the Romanians with building socialism.

NCNA reports of Chinese participation in anniversary celebrations applaud Romanian self-reliance and resistance to outside pressures, with no reference to Romania's economy as socialist. An NCNA review of Romanian economic successes since the liberation says the country has carried out "economic construction by relying on domestic resources and the creative power of the people" and has "frustrated all foreign plots of intervention and domination." An NCNA account on the 21st of a Peking press conference held by the Romanian ambassador uses a similar formulation in saying that the diplomat recounted major achievements

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scored by the Romanian people "in the cause of the construction of their motherland and in the struggle against foreign intervention."

Accounts of a similar press conference by the Romanian ambassador last year, of a Romanian embassy reception, and of a parade in Bucharest had constituted NCNA's only coverage of the anniversary in 1969. There was no counterpart to the current review of Romanian economic achievements. This time, in addition, Peking described the "warm" welcome accorded the Romanian ambassador at a Chinese commune ceremony held to mark the anniversary, noting that the ambassador spoke "with satisfaction of the daily increasing friendship between the two countries" and that in reply the chairman of the commune revolutionary committee lauded the Romanian people for adhering to their policy of independence and for victories "in building and defending their motherland."

#### MOSCOW HAILS "FRATERNAL," "COMRADELY" TIES WITH ROMANIA

Moscow's warmer tone is reflected in the Soviet leadership's message of congratulations. The Brezhnev-Podgorny-Kosygin message, carried in PRAVDA on 23 August, describes Soviet-Romanian relations as marked by "fraternal friendship" and by efforts to promote "comradely cooperation," a step forward from last year's "friendly relations" and "cooperation."

Further, where the 1969 greetings recalled the injunction in the main document of the Moscow international party conference on the need to approach international problems from "class positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism," Moscow now instead cites the new Soviet-Romanian treaty as registering both sides' desire to extend friendly relations on the "basis of Marxism-Leninism" and to "strengthen the socialist states' international solidarity and joint efforts in building socialism and communism and consolidating peace and international security." Last year's message made no mention of the need to promote peace but warned the Romanians against "imperialist" attempts "to undermine the unity of the socialist community"--a theme absent from the current congratulations.

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An article in RED STAR on 23 August predictably plays up Moscow's role in Romania's liberation and Soviet aid during the post-liberation period. It asserts that "relying on the fraternal aid of the USSR and the other socialist countries, the Romanian people have achieved large successes" in industrialization and agriculture. It also recalls that the Romanians are presently allied to Moscow through CEMA, the Warsaw Pact, and the new bilateral treaty signed in July 1970. A Radio Moscow broadcast to Romania on the same day hails the new treaty as "a component part of the general system of alliance between countries in the Warsaw Pact."

#### BUCHAREST STRESSES INDEPENDENT ACHIEVEMENTS

While acknowledging the importance of the Soviet role in World War II and in Romania's liberation, Bucharest plays up the role of the Romanian party and people in attaining their own independence and building socialism. RCP Executive Committee member Pana, delivering the anniversary address in Bucharest on the 21st, as reported by AGERPRES, expressed gratitude to the Soviets for their part in the liberation as well as to "other countries" that made contributions. But he stated that Romania itself made "a significant contribution to the defeat of fascism" and pointed to the price the Romanian people had paid in blood to overthrow the Antonescu regime and attain their independence.

Similarly, the anniversary article in SCINTEIA on the 23d credited Moscow with bearing "the brunt of the anti-Hitlerite war and smashing the Nazis" but stressed "the decisive role of the internal factor in the revolutionary transformation of Romanian society." It added, pointedly, that by emphasizing the importance of the "internal factor" the Romanians counter attempts by "some reactionary circles in capitalist countries to present people's rule in Romania, our revolutionary gains, as being brought from abroad." Romania's independence and socialist system, it said, "cannot be implanted, they are no gift," but are the results of "the sacrifices and struggles of the Romanian people." The paper buttressed this line by remarking that although favorable external conditions existed in other countries for other communist parties to take power,

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"as a consequence of the weakness or mistakes of the internal progressive forces, they could not obtain decisive successes in unfolding the revolutionary process" as the RCP did.

Projecting a picture of a country that earned its right to independence by its own efforts and its own blood, Romanian media at the same time underscore the regime's successful pursuit of its policy of good relations across the board. The AGERPRES review of SCINTEIA's "festive" anniversary issue leads off with a long list of people whose congratulatory telegrams are reprinted, starting with "L. Brezhnev, N. Podgorny, and A. Kosygin, Josip Broz Tito, Walter Ulbricht, Willi Stoph, Gerald Goetting and Professor Dr. h. c. Erich Correns, Haile Selassie, Judge Nii Amas Ollenu, Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, Janos Kadar, Pal Losonczi and Jenő Fock, Dr. h. c. Franz Jonas, Richard Nixon, Gustav W. Heinemann, Giuseppe Saragat, Ton Duc-thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong, Wladyslaw Gomulka . . . ."

On 25 August AGERPRES summarized anniversary tributes to Romania both by the leader of a Soviet-Romanian friendship delegation to the Bucharest celebrations and by an NCHA official who is leading a Chinese journalists' group in Bucharest. The Soviet accolade praised Romania's outstanding achievements in socialist construction, while Peking's representative lauded Romania's "determination to defend, under the leadership of the RCP, its national independence and sovereignty."

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## RURAL MEDICAL EFFORT IS LINKED TO WAR PREPAREDNESS

Vigorously waving the war-preparedness flag, RED FLAG No. 9 details the medical experience of a commune in Hunan province. Released by NCNA on 20 August, the report portrays an exemplary mass movement to improve rural medical facilities, without cost to the state, in order to make possible "aid to the wounded in time of war."

The commune's emphasis is on traditional Chinese curatives. A knowledge of basic first aid techniques, including acupuncture, is being widely disseminated, and the masses are urged to put medicinal herbs to full use by planting and gathering herbs and by revealing their "secret prescriptions." The rare admission is made that prior to the onset of a thoroughgoing campaign on the necessity for war-preparedness "some indigenous physicians and herb growers" refused to participate in the medical effort. Even today--it is implied--some families are still reluctant to open up their ancestral medicine chests for the good of all. One wise old peasant-herbalist, however, has "contributed everything in his possession," following a study session, including secret prescriptions for "mending broken bones."

The militia has been made the backbone of the commune's 1500-man medical force, 25 percent of the commune membership. The medical network includes herbal pharmacies in each of the eight production brigades and medical supply rooms in all 91 teams, with an herb-processing plant on the commune level. Arrangements have been made to facilitate the immediate linkage of all first aid and medical supply teams "when the enemy comes." While the article constantly emphasizes the benefits of the system in wartime and notes that all health workers, the militiamen, and some cadres are learning "war-time first aid techniques" for treating the wounded, the achievements of the system in peacetime are also noted. According to the report, the rate of illness in 1969 dropped more than 60 percent from 1968.

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This reversion to the war-preparations propaganda of last year does serve to rationalize the use of the militia as the mainstay of a rural health force, and it presumably aids in inducing mass cooperation as well. The first aid courses no doubt help to spread interest in and knowledge of health matters, even though the instructors are "barefoot doctors" who have often themselves received only a few weeks of medical training. While the report attributes marvelous curative powers to the local herbs and pictures peasants and cadres alike picking herbs on their rounds during the day, the emphasis on calling in secret formulas may be an indication that some herbs have not proved particularly useful. Surgical methods continue to be popularized in the commune to the extent that "medium" surgery can now be performed at the commune level and "light" surgery in the brigades.

#### GOOD SUMMER CROPS RESULT IN LOSS OF PEASANT INCENTIVE

Recent radio broadcasts have indicated that there are problems with peasant labor incentive following bumper summer crops in some areas. With starvation fended off for the coming year, some peasants seem to be less than enthusiastic about farming at a continued intensive pace merely to raise marginally the amount of grain stored or sold to the state. A Changsha broadcast on 19 August was among those verbalizing the problem, although it placed the blame on the traditional "handful of class enemies" for "making a great fuss" about the good early rice harvest. Misled by these rascals, it was said, "some of our comrades" have had their heads turned and "may do some things unfavorable to socialism."

Canton radio, also on 19 August, meets the problem head-on and, with not a hint of the Tachai spirit, admits that "in normal years, and whenever production increases, we should try our best to increase annually the individual income of the peasants." While the needs of the state and the commune for reserves must be the primary consideration, the reserves "should not be excessive." The desire to increase peasant income is not purely philanthropic, as indicated by the lament that if attention is paid only to state and collective interests "we will hamper the work of arousing to a maximum extent the socialist activism of the masses and directly affect the further consolidation and development of the

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collective economy." While previous harvest seasons have also witnessed an occasional genuflection to the need to raise peasant incomes, the Canton commentator goes unusually far in pointing out the direct relationship between the income and output.

#### PARTY SEEKS TO INCREASE CONTROLS OVER YOUNG PEOPLE

Although the connection is not explicitly drawn, the fourth anniversary of Mao's initial formal reception of the Red Guards in Peking (18 August 1966) is the occasion for propaganda calls to strengthen party leadership over youth by rebuilding the Young Communist League (YCL). The need to continue to send the former Red Guards to rural areas for physical labor is reiterated as well.

The propaganda outlines long-range plans to set up new League branches under the leadership and discipline of local party structures, which will share the task with basic-level revolutionary committees. The rebuilt YCL organizations are to serve, as they did before the cultural revolution, to control and train the youth and to select the most promising for membership in the CCP. Red Guard units, while scarcely resembling their cultural revolution predecessors, will continue to exist under the control of revolutionary committees and rebuilt party committees.

NCNA on 17 August released a RED FLAG "investigation report" which detailed how a brigade-level YCL branch was rebuilt by a local Shensi party branch. Arguing for stronger party control over young people through rebuilt League branches, the article condemned those who, failing to understand the importance of League rebuilding, declare "we are so busy with production that there is no time to consolidate the youth league." To correct these problems a leading group, made up of party members and "outstanding" League members, was set up under the leadership of the party branch. The masses, at the urging of the leading group, were able to "pardon" veteran League members, including those who had made "serious" mistakes in the past, and the new branch was formed. Party authority over the branch was strengthened by having the deputy secretary of the local party branch also hold the position of deputy secretary of the League branch.

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Overlapping leadership between rebuilt League organs and new party committees, as well as the restored power of senior cadres engaged in League reconstruction, was first spelled out in a 5 April Harbin radio report on the formation of the Hulin county YCL committee. Harbin portrayed the new county committee as being under the control of veteran party members, with the mission of preventing the youth "from departing from the leadership of the party and becoming independent."

Other provincial radios have recently increased attention to the YCL and portrayed it as active in organizing youth in party-led activities. Shanghai radio on 8 August reported on a local brigade-level League branch which conducts evening political classes under the leadership of the brigade's party branch. On 16 August Sian radio broadcast a SHENSI DAILY article which declared that party organizations at all levels must put the work of YCL building on their daily agenda. Party leaders "must attach high importance to this work," but in building the League "the area must not be too large" and "we must not be in too much of a hurry" lest the quality of the work drop off.

RED GUARD            While the YCL is to serve as an instrument for  
STATUS                youth training and control, recent media reports  
                         also point up the current, controlled status of  
the Red Guards. A 16 August Harbin broadcast condemned "class enemies" who spread the idea that "the Red Guard movement is out of date and should be abolished" in order to lure young people from the class struggle. Harbin party organizations and revolutionary committees have led criticism of the "absurd" idea that "the Red Guard movement is out of date and should be abolished." Red Guards in Harbin are to continue to criticize the educational system and perform "service activities" on Harbin's buses and street cars where they have successfully functioned as "orderlies serving the people." In the last three years Harbin has also sent some 135,000 Red Guards to rural areas, the report claimed.

Only Shanghai radio specifically noted the fourth anniversary of the formal founding of the Red Guards. On 18 August Shanghai reported that the Red Guard congress of middle schools held a meeting, attended by members of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee and 2,000 Red Guard representatives, to celebrate the anniversary. The report mentioned in passing

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that the Red Guards had scored achievements during the cultural revolution and then restated long-standing policies that the Red Guards must "go to the most hard-pressed regions" of the country to learn to perform manual labor and to develop friendly feelings "toward the working people." Last year too, Shanghai radio was the only source that explicitly observed the anniversary.

Another Shanghai radio broadcast on 18 August directly asked, "How will the Red Guards continue the revolution in the new situation?" The report then discussed how 20 Red Guards act as instructors in a local primary school "to guide the Little Red Soldiers," a youth group for primary school children. The Red Guards help the children write short comments criticizing "bourgeois ideas" so they can distinguish the difference between "fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds" and learn to "love physical labor." A Lanchow radio report on 8 August indicated that local Red Guard units, during their summer vacation, spent one month at a PLA farm where they learned "throwing hand grenades, aiming and bayoneting," although they were cautioned that their ultimate weapon was Mao's thought.

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