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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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18 FEB 1971

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
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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
18 FEBRUARY 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 7)

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
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C O R R E C T I O N

TO THE FBIS TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA OF 18 FEBRUARY 1971

Page 6, paragraph one under the heading "Hanoi Warns of Action Against DRV; Thuy Also Sees Threat to PRC," line 14 should read: x x x the President's press conference in remarking that "the U.S. evil design x x x.

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 8 - 14 FEBRUARY 1971

Moscow (3807 items)

Indochina	(17%)	16%
CPSU 24th Congress in March	(1%)	10%
Seabed Treaty	(--)	9%
Luna 17 & Lunakhod	(3%)	6%
China	(5%)	4%
Middle East	(1%)	3%
Polish Party Plenum	(0.1%)	1%
Apollo 14	(0.1%)	1%

Peking (3178 items)

Indochina	(47%)	64%
[Sihanouk in DRV	(--)	7%]
[PRC Government	(--)	5%]
Statement, 12 Feb.		
[DRV Economic	(--)	4%]
Delegation in PRC		
[PRC Foreign Ministry	(--)	3%]
Statement, 8 Feb.		
Domestic Issues	(20%)	15%
DPRK Army Day	(4%)	6%
PRC-Nigeria Relations	(--)	5%
Established		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Following the 10 February PRG and DRV Government statements protesting the launching of the allied operation in Laos, routine Hanoi and Front propaganda pictures repeated setbacks dealt the operation by attacks from the "Laotian patriotic armed forces." Hanoi's continued warnings that the United States may also take new action against the DRV are climaxed by Xuan Thuy's charge at the 18 February session that President Nixon's remarks at his press conference the day before "showed that the United States is leaving the door open for further acts of aggression against the DRV."

Xuan Thuy's statement was also striking for the unique assertion that China as well as the DRV is threatened by the operation in Laos, the U.S. buildup near the DMZ, air strikes against the DRV, and an increased number of carriers in the Tonkin Gulf. While Thuy's remark may simply be a response to the charge in the PRC Government statement of the 12th that the Laos incursion is "a grave menace to China," it is notable for being the first North Vietnamese reference to the PRC's security interests and for its timing in the wake of the President's reiteration of U.S. assurances that there is no threat to China.

The PRC Government statement on the 12th has been followed by extensive Peking propaganda, including reports of widespread rallies reaffirming support for the Indochinese. But while the statement links the PRC's security to military developments in Indochina for the first time in recent years, it does not indicate any change in Peking's response: The statement and supporting propaganda pledge in standard terms to provide "rear area" support and express confidence that the Indochinese can cope with the situation themselves.

Moscow continues to react with caution to the Laotian developments and has not issued a formal protest against the allied action in Laos. The first Soviet reaction to the President's press conference is a highly selective TASS report which says his replies confirmed that the United States was indeed the organizer of the intrusion into Laos. TASS also says the President "made direct threats" against the DRV, but it does not elaborate on the "threats" and ignores the President's replies to questions speculating on a possible ARVN incursion into the DRV.

## COMMUNISTS CLAIM SUCCESS IN SOUTHERN LAOS, QUANG TRI PROVINCE

LAOS Vietnamese and Laotian communist media claim repeated successes for the "Laotian patriotic armed forces" following the 8 February launching of the South Vietnamese operation Lam Son 719

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into the southern Laotian province of Savannakhet. The propaganda lists downings of allied aircraft, the "decimation" of landing troops, and ambushes of ARVN columns. According to a 14 February communique (labeled No. 1) of the command of the Lao "liberation army," carried by Lao and Vietnamese media that day, the insurgents in Savannakhet reportedly "put out of action" more than 1,500 U.S. and Saigon troops, including two battalions and five companies; shot down 89 aircraft, mostly helicopters; and destroyed more than 50 vehicles, half of them tanks and armored cars.

The communique refers to specific actions only on the 10th and 13th, claiming, for example, that 42 helicopters were downed on the 10th. Allied aircraft losses in the Laos operation were reportedly brought to 92 on the 14th, according to a 16 February VNA report which claimed, among other things, that more than 100 Saigon paratroopers were wiped out and a helicopter and three tanks destroyed when "the enemy was moving from Ban Dong to Chaki . . . in an attempt to loosen the patriots' encirclement." The same VNA report describes action against Laotian Government forces at the western end of Highway 9, claiming that on the 11th a battalion of the Vientiane army's mobile regiment "was virtually annihilated, with some 200 troops killed or wounded" when they "pushed out from Savannakhet town" and "tried to recapture Phalane."

Saigon's claims that the ARVN had taken up positions in the town of Tchepone on 10 February were directly denied in an article in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 15th. Ridiculing Western press reports that troops were in the town and repairing air strips, the Hanoi paper said that on the contrary, "after a week of armed incursion into Laos, the Saigon and U.S. troops are still pinned down in the border area and are being fiercely intercepted at Ban Dong."

QUANG TRI Hanoi and Front media also report attacks in the South Vietnamese province of Quang Tri against allied forces supporting the Laotian operation. Daily reports cite attacks on allied positions near the border and on convoys along Highway 9, as well as the shelling of the operations headquarters of the I Corps area in Dong Ha.

Propaganda on the 15th included statistics on attacks from 30 January to 14 February against allied forces massing along Highway 9 to move into Laos. The communists claim to have killed

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or wounded more than 600 U.S. and Saigon troops, shot down or destroyed 26 aircraft on the ground, and destroyed or damaged 95 military vehicles, including 38 tanks.

## DRV ARMY PAPER, FRONT RADIO DESCRIBE ALLIED SETBACKS IN LAOS

HANOI Following the 10 February DRV Government statement, the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN becomes the major vehicle for Hanoi comment on the operations in Laos, with an editorial on the 11th and articles on the 12th, 14th, 15th, and 16th. There is no known comment in NHAN DAN on the action in Laos, although the party paper discussed Cambodian action in an editorial on the 13th. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, endorsing the government statement, hailed alleged insurgent achievements throughout Indochina and went on to single out action along Highway 9. It claimed, among other things, that "a whole string of enemy logistics and fire bases, link-up points, and headquarters" along Highway 9 from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh have been assaulted by artillery or infantry, causing "a sharp increase in U.S. casualties" and having "the effect of a pair of pincers on the enemy both from behind and in front."

In its article on the 12th the army paper stressed the importance of downing and destroying allied planes and military vehicles, noting that in southern Laos and northern South Vietnam there are "few lines of communications" and "the large enemy force must rely on aircraft, vehicles, and artillery to serve their combat requirements to transport troops and supplies, to bring in reinforcements, and to clear territory." The article held that the attacks on planes and vehicles will weaken the allies and force them to thin out to protect communications lines, creating "an opportunity for our armed forces to destroy the enemy troops in big chunks."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 14th praised the "Laotian liberation armed forces" for their attacks on South Vietnamese troops, noting that the GVN forces in Laos are its "most seasoned mobile and strategic reserve forces" and that "to attack and frighten them is tantamount to shaking the entire system of the puppet armed forces and to accelerating their decline and disintegration."

On the 16th the army paper claimed that the allied move into Laos has met "great obstacles" in its first phase and cited

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comment from AFP that the allies were surprised by the strength of enemy ground fire and that their troops had progressed at a snail's pace. Also on the 16th, Hanoi broadcast excerpts of what appears to be the same AFP dispatch, noting low morale among U.S. pilots flying into Laos and reporting that South Vietnamese troops have refused to land in Laos. The AFP dispatch, dated the 14th, reported that there had been no vehicles moving down Highway 9 since the 10th.

THE FRONT Liberation Radio commentaries maintain that the allied operation in Laos was undertaken because of the allies' defeated position and that it will surely fail. The radio particularly praises anti-aircraft efforts in Quang Tri and Laos. In a broadcast on the 11th, it also alleged that allied morale has been depressed by difficulties in supply, weather, and terrain and by high losses in aircraft which are essential to movement and supply. Asserting that the situation has caused "the U.S.-puppet ringleaders" to admit that "their operation has progressed very slowly," the radio said that "the traitor Nguyen Cao Ky vociferously warned that this operation must be urgent throughout" and must be definitive "if it is not to be another Dien Bien Phu battle."

Several Liberation Radio commentaries appeal to South Vietnamese troops to revolt or desert rather than be sent on operations into Laos or Cambodia. A commentary on the 11th, for example, stressed alleged ARVN losses in the Laos campaign and charged that President Nixon has "covered up or distorted the facts by claiming that the operation in southern Laos has met no resistance in order to deceive the Saigon puppet troops and have them die in place of the Americans." Like other Front comment, the broadcast decried the rationale for the Laos operation as aimed at protecting the lives of American servicemen and aiding Vietnamization. A Front radio broadcast on the 13th, commenting in a similar vein, claimed that "a great number of puppet troops sent to Laos refused to advance, so that the puppet commanders in Saigon complained" of the slow progress of the operation.

An LPA commentary on the 16th noted that the operation is also "allegedly" aimed at "cutting off the supply line of the liberation forces" but did not specify that the "forces" are Vietnamese. Available Liberation Radio comment does not raise the question of supply lines.

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## MEDIA CITE EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN ROLE IN LAOS OPERATION

Communist reports on the fighting in Laos have referred vaguely to action involving U.S. and Saigon forces, suggesting the presence of American ground forces in Laos. At least one report, a 12 February VNA account of fighting south of Highway 9 on the preceding day, specifically claimed that six American bodies were found "among the enemy corpses"\* but added no comment. On the other hand, comment was interjected in a 13 February VNA roundup of "evidence" in Western press reports of U.S. ground forces participating in Laotian operations: VNA went on to observe that "much breath has been wasted by both the White House and the Pentagon to deny the physical involvement of the United States in the brazen aggression in Laos."

A Hanoi radio Vietnamese-language broadcast to the South on the 15th ridiculed U.S. statements crediting the South Vietnamese with the initiative for the Laotian operation and denials that U.S. infantry or advisers are involved in the Laotian fighting. Like VNA, the radio pointed to Western news reports for evidence of U.S. involvement. It quoted UPI for the statement that the final decision to invade Laos was made by President Nixon and conveyed to President Thieu by Ambassador Berger on 3 February.

The question of the nature of the U.S. role has also been brought up in reports of Congressional criticism of the operation. For example, VNA on the 16th cited Senator Hart as charging the Administration with trying to obscure the role of American troops in Laos. Other critical remarks reported include those by Senators McGovern, Javits, and Percy.

## CAMBODIA: MAJOR ARVN LOSSES CLAIMED IN SINGLE WEEK

Insurgent "victories" in combat against the South Vietnamese sweep in the Cambodian provinces of Kompong Cham and Snoul are hailed on 17 February in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial and a NHAN DAN article. VNA's account of the editorial indicates that

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\* VNA claimed that the six American bodies were found following action in which a Laotian "liberation army" unit "repelled 10 attacks launched by Saigon puppet troops in the Phu Co Boc and Tam Luong areas (south of Highway 9), knocking out a ranger company."

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it reviews several engagements in which major losses were allegedly inflicted on the South Vietnamese. The army paper claims that in action against the ARVN during the week 4-11 February the Cambodian "liberation army" put out of action more than 1,800 Saigon troops, wiped out two battalions, "heavily decimated" five others, and "trounced three armored squadrons." In addition, it alleges, 150 military vehicles were destroyed, including more than 120 armored cars, and three aircraft were shot down in the Chup and Snoul rubber plantation areas.

The "brilliant victories" of the "Cambodian patriots" are held by QUAN DOI NHAN DAN to be a "timely and violent blow" to the allies "at the moment when they are committing a massive invasion in southern Laos." The editorial also claims that these "victories" in the Chup and Snoul areas "testify to a further enhancement" of the Cambodian forces' "capacity for fighting big battles."

#### HANOI WARNS OF ACTION AGAINST DRV; THUY ALSO SEES THREAT TO PRC

During the past two weeks, Hanoi elite and routine propaganda surrounding the operation in Laos has repeatedly warned of further U.S. "escalation," including new "military adventures" against the DRV. Such warnings were included in the 5 February DRV Foreign Ministry statement, in the DRV Government statement of the 10th, and in the statements at the Paris talks. But new dimensions were added to these warnings by DRV delegate Xuan Thuy at the Paris session on the 18th when he also referred to the PRC's security interests. According to the VNA account, he said that the President's remarks at his press conference on the 17th "showed that the United States is leaving the door open for further acts of aggression against North Vietnam." Judging from the VNA account, PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh did not mention the President's press conference remark that "the U.S. evil design to prepare for a new military adventure against the DRV" is shown by such actions as the incursion into Laos and the stepped-up bombing of "many places" in North Vietnam from 13 to 16 February.

VNA does not acknowledge Thuy's specific reference to Ky's and Thieu's remarks on an invasion of the North, but the account says Thuy pointed out that "one cannot but come to the conclusion that the United States will again stage the comedy of letting its

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agents take action while giving only 'concurrence and support.'" Hanoi reacted unusually promptly to the President's press conference--with a radio commentary at 0430 GMT on the 18th--but referred only vaguely to the President's "insolent arguments and threats against the North." However, Liberation Radio comment broadcast a half hour later charged that the President "threatened to bomb North Vietnam and added that he approved of the plan to use the Saigon puppet army in a new military adventure against North Vietnam." Earlier Hanoi broadcasts on the 12th, 13th, and 14th, however, had cited remarks by both Ky and Thieu as evidence of planned aggression against the North.

THREAT TO PRC Xuan Thuy's raising of the question of PRC security in the fashion that he did is unprecedented. The VNA account reports him as saying: "The current large-scale U.S. operation in Laos, together with the concentration of big ground forces close to the 17th parallel, repeated air raids between Vinh Linh and Nghe An in recent days, and the increased number of aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, are threatening the DRV and also the People's Republic of China. All this threatens to expand the war to new regions."

While Thuy's remark may be in part a response to the PRC Government statement which linked Chinese security to military developments in Indochina, it is notably different from propaganda in the 1965 period when DRV media, in responding to PRC statements, merely used the Chinese formula "aggression against Vietnam is aggression against China."\* Moreover, Thuy's remark goes beyond the PRC Government statement in describing the threat to China: The Chinese statement had said only that the incursion in Laos is a "grave menace to China." But Thuy lists the whole series of the U.S. "threatening" moves against the DRV. It also seems unlikely, if Hanoi were simply responding to the Chinese statement, that it would have waited six days. Thuy's remark seems

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\* Hanoi propaganda during 1965 for the most part merely echoed the Chinese stand. But a unique July 1965 article by DRV Gen. Nguyen Van Vinh not only advanced the idea of a threat to China but said the PRC would become directly involved in case of an invasion of the DRV. The article maintained that U.S. use of nuclear weapons would provoke a response in kind from North Vietnam's "socialist neighbors."

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notable not only for being the first North Vietnamese reference to China's security interests but for its timing in the wake of the President's reiteration of U.S. assurances that there is no threat to China.

DRV VIGILANCE Hanoi warnings of possible new adventurous acts have been accompanied by calls for vigilance reminiscent of those following the November massive U.S. air strikes against the DRV and the prisoner-rescue attempt at Son Tay. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 13th, broadcast in excerpts by Hanoi radio's domestic service, prefaces a call for a step-up in military tasks with a catalog of U.S. "provocations"--including the "Laos adventure," the consistent "sabotage" of the North, and the training of "U.S.-puppet paratroops, marines, commandos, and scouts for new military actions."

The editorial expresses resolve to "organize our firepower network" to destroy U.S. aircraft and commando ships and to "root out in time, encircle, and annihilate . . . clandestinely-infiltrated spy and commando groups before they carry out their evil actions." It warns that if "the Americans and their lackeys carry out the insane scheme of invading the North," the people of the DRV will develop "the invincible power of people's war and annihilate" all enemy troops. It also says "we are accelerating the task of maintaining security and order with a determination to prevent reactionary elements from engaging in disruptive activities."

A flurry of items in DRV media from the 7th to the 14th reported the combat-readiness of military forces in the North, mainly in the three southern provinces of Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, and Nghe An and in the Vinh Linh area.

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## DRV SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

Hanoi continues its routine protests against U.S. strikes in the northern part of the DMZ with DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements--currently one on 11 February and a second on the 16th. Alleged attacks by U.S. ships, aircraft, and artillery against "the seacoast of Quang Binh Province and the northern part of the DMZ" are protested by the spokesman on 11 February. The protest charges that "between the night of 10 February and the dawn of 11 February" U.S. ships violated DRV territorial waters and "fired at fishing boats of the population along the seacoast of Quang Binh Province, killing and wounding a number of civilians." It further charges that U.S. aircraft including B-52s bombed Huong Lap village and used artillery fire from the southern side of the DMZ against Vinh Son and Vinh Giang villages, also on the 10th. Echoing other recent protests, this one stresses that "these villages are north of the 17th parallel in the DMZ."

A second foreign ministry spokesman's protest, on the 16th,\* scores the United States for "sending aircraft to bomb and strafe Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces and the northern part of the DMZ." The statement says that from 13 to 16 February consecutively, U.S. aircraft "bombed and strafed a number of areas in Quang Binh and Nghe An provinces" and also Huong Lap village. Both protests "strongly denounced and sternly condemned these acts of war" by the United States and "firmly" demanded an end to all encroachments upon DRV sovereignty and security.

Hanoi radio on 18 February announces that the people and armed forces of Nghe An Province downed an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane--the first such claim since 6 December--bringing Hanoi's total of U.S. planes downed to 3,372.

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\* The charges in this protest probably correspond with the announcement by the U.S. Command in Saigon on the 17th of strikes in the DRV for three consecutive days. The strikes were said to be against anti-aircraft missile sites and for "protective reaction" reasons.

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## PEKING: INCURSION INTO LAOS "A GRAVE MENACE TO CHINA"

**GOVERNMENT STATEMENT** The PRC Government statement on the 12th--pegged to statements issued by Sihanouk jointly with the DRV President and with the Pathet Lao's Prince Souphanouvong after Sihanouk's recent trip to North Vietnam--for the first time in recent years links China's security to military developments in Indochina.\* Claiming that "U.S. imperialism's aggression against Laos is also a grave menace to China," the statement warns that "the Chinese people absolutely will not remain indifferent to it!" The 8 February foreign ministry statement had called the incursion into Laos "a grave provocation" not only against the Indochinese peoples but also against the Chinese and people of the whole world--a formulation also used in the PRC Government statement of 4 May 1970 protesting the incursion into Cambodia. But prior to the 12 February statement, Peking had not directly expressed concern over a threat to the PRC's security from the fighting in Indochina.

The statement does not, however, indicate a change in Peking's response to Indochinese developments. It pledges in standard terms that the Chinese provide "a powerful backing" as a rear area and that they will "take all effective measures to give all-out support and assistance" to the Indochinese peoples. Expressing confidence that the three peoples of Indochina will be able to cope with the situation, the statement claims that the latest meetings of their leaders will further mobilize the Indochinese peoples to "persevere in the protracted war of resistance."

A 14 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial following up the government statement addresses itself to Washington's denial that the Laos operation poses a threat to China. "The new war venture of U.S. imperialism in Laos definitely poses a grave threat to China," according to the editorial, which adds a warning that the Chinese "will never allow U.S. imperialism to expand at will the war in Laos and the whole of Indochina." This elaboration on the ques-

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\* In 1965, when the Chinese expressed concern that the Vietnam conflict might escalate into another Korea-type war, PRC statements declared that aggression against the DRV "means aggression against China" and warned that the war might spread to China. At that time Peking publicly offered to send volunteers to fight alongside the Vietnamese. This approach, with its more interventionist overtones, was abandoned in favor of an emphasis on self-reliant protracted warfare, though as late as 22 July 1966 Liu Shao-chi issued a statement saying aggression against Vietnam is aggression against China and threatening "joint blows" by the Vietnamese and the Chinese against the United States.

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tion of the PRC's security interest suggests that Peking's current reaction may be designed both to underscore its common interests with the Indochinese and to signal its concern over an expansion of the current operations in Laos that might threaten the PRC's borders.\*

Rallies beginning in Peking on the 14th and spreading to other major cities have dramatized the Chinese pledge to act as the rear base for the Indochinese. A recurrent refrain, first sounded by Li Hsien-nien at a 12 February banquet for the DRV economic delegation, expresses Chinese determination to "fulfill our internationalist duty as befitting the great rear area in support of the great front of the anti-U.S. struggle." Speakers at the rallies have been quoted as pledging various forms of "concrete action" in production to support the Indochinese. Thus, at a 15 February rally in Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province bordering Laos, it was proudly announced that the daily volume of cargo handled by the Kunming railway administration workers over the preceding few days exceeded that in January and that the workers expressed their determination "to work still harder and by deeds support the three peoples of Indochina in fighting to the end." Similarly, a Kunming radio report on rallies in counties bordering Laos and Vietnam quoted peasants as pledging to reap "a great bumper harvest" in agriculture as concrete action in support of the Indochinese. Atypically, the peasants were quoted as claiming that aggression against the Indochinese countries "is aggression against us." This formulation has also been heard in a Peking broadcast, but it has not been used in the central media. An NCPA account of the same Yunnan counties' rallies did not include this formulation.

The impression that Peking expects the actual fighting to be left to the Indochinese is reinforced by a statement at a Peking rally by a former participant in the Korean War expressing confidence that the three Indochinese peoples will also --like the Chinese in Korea--be able to defeat the United States. There has been no suggestion that Peking needed to offer more than political and material backing at present.

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\* It is worthy of note that a PRC Foreign Ministry statement on Laos on 26 March 1970 contained a warning that "the Chinese people absolutely will not sit idly by while U.S. imperialism acts wantonly in Laos." This threat, which appeared in Chinese statements on Vietnam in 1965, had not been raised in Peking's statements in recent years and has not been repeated since.

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Ballies had been held following the 13 December 1970 PRC party-government statement supporting Hanoi's party-government appeal of three days earlier. Ballies on a grander scale--officially termed unprecedented by Peking--were held to acclaim Mao's 20 May 1970 statement calling for worldwide opposition to the United States following the incursion into Cambodia.

**PLAF ANNIVERSARY** Peking has observed the 10th anniversary of the unification of the PLAF in the usual fashion, including a message from Lin Biao, a PRC Defense Ministry meeting on 13 February and a film reception on the 14th, and a reception given by the PRG ambassador. Lin's message, taking note of the "large-scale invasion" of Laos, routinely pledges that the PLA will give "all-out support" to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples and "will definitely not allow the U.S. aggressors to run amok in the area of Indochina." The message makes no mention of China's security.

Routine pledges of Chinese support, without any direct reference to the PRC's security interests, were also conveyed at the defense ministry meeting and the ambassador's reception by two Politburo members who are PLA deputy chiefs of staff. Li Tso-peng, speaking on the 13th, called the expansion of the war "a grave provocation" against not only the Indochinese countries but also the people of China and the world as a whole. Wu Fa-hsien on the 14th assured the Indochinese peoples that whatever difficulties you may encounter the Chinese people and the PLA will "go all out to support and assist you."

In the only reference to the PRC's security in comment on the anniversary, a LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on the 15th echoes the government statement's charge that recent developments in Indochina pose a grave menace to China. The editorial follows standard lines in offering rear area support by the PRC.

**NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS**

The PRC's official statements on recent developments in Indochina--the 4 and 8 February foreign ministry statements and the 12 February government statement--have failed to broach the question of a possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons, an evidently sensitive subject which figured in the stopping of presses to enlarge the 4 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article.\* The subject has been raised on the editorial level for the first time in the LIBERATION ARMY DAILY's 15 February editorial marking the PLAF unification anniversary. Like the Commentator article, the editorial cites the foreign press as saying the

\* See the TRENDS Supplementary Article of 10 February 1970, "PRC Discusses Possible U.S. Use of Nuclear Weapons."

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United States is contemplating the use of nuclear weapons in Indochina and warns that use of these weapons would provoke "revolutionary storms" of protest in the United States and elsewhere. The editorial was not disseminated internationally by HCNIA, though it has been broadcast by Radio Peking in foreign beams, including in Vietnamese and in English to North America.

In addition to other comment on the subject for domestic consumption, HCNIA's international service has disseminated reports from various foreign sources claiming that the United States is threatening to use nuclear arms in Indochina. HCNIA on the 14th quoted a disident U.S. soldiers' paper in the Philippines as having disclosed last October that the United States is storing nuclear weapons in the Philippines for use in Indochina.

#### PRC CONCLUDES "SUPPLEMENTARY" AID AGREEMENT WITH DRV

An agreement on "supplementary" economic and military aid from the PRC to the DRV in 1971 was signed on 15 February. This is the second known instance in which a supplementary agreement was arranged in addition to the annual accords, the first time being the agreement signed on 25 May 1970 in the wake of the incursion into Cambodia. The most recent annual accord was signed on 6 October 1970. As if to underscore Peking's policy of providing increased rear area backing in order for the North Vietnamese and their allies to hold their own in the long run, HCNIA's announcement on 15 February notes that the agreement is aimed at increasing the economic and defense strength of the Vietnamese in their "protracted" war against the United States--the quoted adjective having been added to similar wording in last October's announcement.

At a 12 February banquet welcoming the DRV economic delegation, headed by Le Thanh Nghi, Li Hsien-nien praised the Vietnamese for having "devised a series of strategy and tactics" in "protracted fighting." As in much of Peking's recent comment, Li not only took note of the fighting in southern Laos and eastern Cambodia but also warned that the United States "is plotting a surprise attack" on the DRV. Except for saying that China and the three countries of Indochina are close neighbors, he avoided any mention of the PRC's security in offering rear area support to the Indochinese.

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Le Thanh Nghi, having cited Peking's "stern warnings on several occasions" recently regarding U.S. intensification of the war in Indochina, held up the supplementary aid agreement as being of "very important significance" and "a heavy blow" at U.S. "war schemes," adding that the new aid constituted "a great encouragement to the army and civilians in the southern and northern parts of Vietnam."

#### SOVIET MEDIA CONTINUE TO REFLECT CAUTION ON EVENTS IN LAOS

Moscow still has not made any formal protest of the allied action in Laos. The first substantial Moscow press comment relating to the Soviet role in the 1962 Geneva accords on Laos since the launching of the allied operation on 8 February did not come until the 17th, in a PRAVDA article by Mayevskiy. Commenting on a report from Kyoto that the Japanese Government intends to urge Britain and the Soviet Union, as cochairmen of the 1962 conference, to try and restore peace in Laos, Mayevskiy, as reported by TASS, rejected any possible Japanese mediation role because of Tokyo's "support" for U.S. Indochina policy.

The Soviet news agency carried a brief summary of the 12 February Polish aide-memoire\* on events in Laos, but ignored the operative section of the memorandum calling on the Geneva conference cochairmen to use their influence to check "U.S. war escalation in Indochina." Moscow has yet to acknowledge Prince Souphanouvong's reported request on 12 February that the Geneva Conference cochairmen stop "aggressive" operations of U.S. and Saigon forces in Laos.

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\* The text of the Polish memorandum, published in the Warsaw press and transmitted in VNA's service channel from Moscow to Hanoi on the 12th, says that Poland as a signatory of the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos and an ICC member "has never spared any effort to contribute to the protection of Laos . . . by seeking peaceful solutions." Polish media are not known to have publicized such efforts. On 14 July 1970 PAP did briefly report that the chief Polish ICC delegate conferred with DRV leaders, but there was no acknowledgment of Western reports that month that the Polish Ambassador to Laos conferred with the King and Souvanna Phouma and then with the Polish ICC representative in Hanoi and that the ICC passed a resolution to encourage efforts for a negotiated settlement among the parties in Laos.

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The Mayevskiy article, after taking note of the Kyoto report, said that "the supposed peaceful initiative by Tokyo has an evident flaw, for it seems that they in Tokyo would like to mislead the public by ostentatious 'peaceableness'; but peaceableness is judged by deeds, but not by words." In this context Mayevskiy went on to say that "Japanese ruling circles actually supported the U.S. armed intervention in Cambodia and Laos," have put their bases at the disposal of the United States, and have expanded aid to Saigon.

Other Moscow comment has sought to fan Asian opposition to the Laotian move by stressing broad implications the allied action may have for all Asian states. IZVESTIYA's political commentator Kudryavtsev on the 11th cited the "invasions" of Laos and Cambodia as parts of a wider U.S. strategy "to strengthen U.S. domination in Asia through the use of Asians." In the light of these actions, he said, "it is not hard to see the meaning of the plans to divide the Indochina states and turn their southern parts into a U.S. springboard in Southeast Asia." Warning "independent Asian countries" not to presume that the interventions in Cambodia and Laos are merely linked to Vietnam, Kudryavtsev concluded that "these actions represent the utmost threat against the independence and sovereignty of all Asian states." Kudryavtsev made no reference to China or any other specific country in this context.

An article by Dmitriy Volskiy in NEW TIMES, as reviewed by Radio Moscow on the 11th, pressed the same theme in charging that "U.S. ruling circles are hatching plans for the division of the entire Indochina peninsula according to the Korean model." Volskiy said it is clear that "the United States plans to transform wide areas not only of South Vietnam and Cambodia, but also of Laos, into their own neocolonialist preserve." A lengthy discussion of Indochina during the Moscow's domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 14th concluded that "the Americans want to cut the whole of Indochina into two parts and to stifle the national liberation movement part by part." In this context, one of the participants remarked that "there has been nothing like it in the history of the Indochinese war."

Soviet media now also point to the possibility of new "provocations" against the DRV. IZVESTIYA on the 13th carried a Hanoi-dated dispatch by Vasilyev and Rusakov citing DRV press charges that "in concentrating large armed forces in the direct proximity of the 17th parallel and by systematically expanding the aggressive actions

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directly against the DRV, the American imperialists are creating a direct threat against the DRV's security and are heating up the situation in Southeast Asia even more."

Radio Moscow's military affairs commentator Leontyev on the 11th, also playing the theme that the United States is trying to cut Indochina in half, said another "aim" is to "seize the northern half of the peninsula as well--the DRV and northern Laos." Leontyev also interjected a reference to talk of using nuclear weapons.\* After noting Vice President Ky's remarks on the possibility of invading the DRV, he said: "It must be noted in particular that in the U.S. capital another variant is also discussed even more frequently--the utilization of tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina if the current escalation does not bring Washington desired results."

THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE      A highly selective 18 February TASS report on President Nixon's press conference of the 17th said his "replies confirmed that the U.S. Government was indeed the organizer of the armed intrusion in neutral Laos, which represents a new aggressive act of the United States in Indochina." TASS quoted the President as stating: "I do not intend to place any limitations of the use of American air power in that area." But it made no mention of Mr. Nixon's reported remark excluding the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina.

TASS said the President also "made direct threats against a sovereign state, the DRV, . . . and thus openly demonstrated to the world the U.S. Government's desire to force its imperialist plans on the Vietnamese people by force of arms." TASS did not elaborate on these "threats" and ignored the President's replies to questions speculating on a possible incursion of South Vietnamese forces into the DRV. The account also ignored the President's reported statement that the United States would make no more concessions at Paris, as well as his assurances to Communist China that the present operations there present no threat to the PRC.

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\* Routine-level Moscow comment has sporadically raised the possibility of use of nuclear weapons in the context of Indochina. For example, an article in NEW TIMES No. 24, 17 June 1970, speculated that General Westmoreland was the initiator of the Cambodian incursion and went on to describe him as belonging to the same "atomaniac general tribe as General MacArthur, who wanted to carry the Korean war into China and use nuclear weapons." The article went on to recall that Richard Nixon was among the senators who supported MacArthur's plans.

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**BROADCASTS TO CHINA** In contrast to the Soviet newspapers' avoidance of comment on the implications the Laotian incursion might have for China, Moscow's broadcasts in Chinese continue to depict the allied action as a threat to the PRC. A broadcast to China on the 11th, for example, stated that "the escalation of the aggression in Indochina is a serious threat to the Chinese people." The broadcast added that although "Washington 'guarantees' that the invasion of Laos will in no way make Peking uneasy and that China is under no threat, the raging flames of the war are spreading increasingly close to the borders of China."

"Peking leaders, however," the broadcast concluded, "still stick to their previous stand and have stubbornly refused to join in concerted action of the unified anti-imperialist forces." Another broadcast to China on the 11th said pointedly that the United States has expanded the war "right next to China" and quoted Vice President Ky to the effect that "we will not only attack the bases in Laos, but also will attack a part of the bases in North Vietnam."

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## SOUPHANOUVONG ASKS GENEVA COCHAIRMEN TO STOP AGGRESSION

In a 12 February message Souphanouvong appealed to the Geneva Conference cochairmen and the other conference members "to take effective measures and strong actions to make the U.S. and its henchmen stop immediately their aggressive operation." This appeal was similar in substance to the recent messages of 24 January and 1 and 5 February to the Geneva Conference cochairmen from Phoumi Vongvichit, the NLHS secretary general, who normally signs the protests. Souphanouvong noted with regret that the British Government "has acted in contravention of its position" by voicing approval of and encouragement for the invasion.

Souphanouvong's comment on the British position echoed an 11 February Pathet Lao news agency release reacting to the reported 8 February press conference remark by a British Foreign Office spokesman that the British Government viewed the South Vietnamese action in Laos as "fully understandable." Contending that this confirmed the British Government's "stand of tailing after the United States in the Lao problem," the news agency asserted that "the odious attitude" of the British Government "is another stain on its position of a cochairman of the 1961 and 1962 Geneva Conferences on Laos."

**PATHET LAO STATEMENTS** Souphanouvong's 16 February appeal to his countrymen to "inflict on the enemy the heaviest blows" and to turn southern Laos "into a graveyard for U.S. and satellite troops" is the latest in the continuing barrage of Pathet Lao propaganda responding to allied operations in Laos. While the brunt of Souphanouvong's attack was reserved for the "U.S. imperialists" for their "new and extremely serious step of war escalation against our country," he also claimed that "the Vientiane administration" had reaffirmed "its nature of a stooge of the United States" by its "feigned regret" at the invasion and its circulation of "many falsehoods to conceal the U.S. veritable aggression in Laos."

The peace efforts of the Lao Patriotic Front, said Souphanouvong, have been answered by the launching of "a massive attack against our country." And he appealed to the soldiers in the Vientiane army to refuse to serve as "cannonfodder" for the United States and to "turn your guns against the U.S. aggressors and the satellite troops and return to the people."

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Reacting to the Laotian Government communique declaring a state of emergency effective 12 February, the Pathet Lao released an "authorized" news agency statement on the 16th "flatly refuting" the "deceitful communique," and declaring that by issuing it "the Vientiane administration has more clearly revealed itself as a tool of the U.S. imperialists." Denouncing the communique for "slandering the DRV in an attempt to cover up the brazen U.S. aggression," the statement asserts that "the extremist ruling circles in Vientiane" will use the state of emergency "as a pretext for intensified persecution and repression of the population in the areas temporarily controlled by them."

A 17 February NLHS Central Committee statement, released by the Pathet Lao news agency on the 18th, denounces "the Thai reactionary administration for sending additional troops to invade Laos." It specifically charges the Nixon Administration with instructing the Thai Government on 16 February "to send to the Sam Thong-Long Cheng area two more Thai battalions" and claims that "many other Thai units" have been mustered at the Lao-Thailand border "ready to invade Laos when ordered."

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**SIHANOUK JOINT STATEMENTS WITH DRV, PATHET LAO RELEASED**

Sihanouk's 26 January-9 February visit to Hanoi, first publicized on its final day,\* was capped by a joint statement signed by Sihanouk and DRV President Ton Duc Thang, dated 8 February and carried by VNA and NCNA on the 10th. On the 11th and 12th, Hanoi, Peking, and the Pathet Lao released a joint statement from Sihanouk and NLHS Chairman Prince Souphanouvong, dated the 9th, which reveals that the two leaders met that day at "a certain place in the frontier region of Laos."

Both statements note that Sihanouk had talks with his counterparts "on problems concerning the joint struggle against U.S. aggression," adding that the talks were held in an atmosphere of "militant solidarity, fraternal friendship, and complete mutual trust" and that "complete identity of views" was reached. Both statements review charges of expanded U.S. aggression in the Indochinese countries, and both praise the victories and the unity and solidarity of the three Indochinese peoples since the Indochinese people's summit conference of April 1970. The statement with the DRV emphasizes the unity theme, referring to the solidarity of "the 50 million Indochinese people."

In documenting claims of gains by the "patriots" in Indochina, the statements allege that the Cambodian "liberated zone" embraces seven-tenths of the territory and six-tenths of the population of the country. (The PLAF Command's year-end review of achievements, broadcast on 2 January, had claimed for the first time that the Cambodian "patriots" controlled seven-tenths of the territory and four million people. The previous claim had been two-thirds of the land and three million people.) The statement with the Pathet Lao adds that the "liberated zone" of Laos has become "a continuous stretch of land covering two-thirds of Laos' territory and half her population."

FUNK/RGNU        A joint FUNK/RGNU statement denouncing intensified  
PROTEST        U.S. intervention in Indochina, dated 7 February,  
                  was belatedly reported by NCNA on the 12th, after  
Sihanouk's return to Peking. It recalls the 20 January FUNK/RGNU  
statement protesting U.S. involvement in Cambodia and comments  
that it is now Laos' turn to be the object of expanded U.S.

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\* See the FBIS TRENDS of 10 February, page 17.

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aggression. Warning that it is "always possible" that the Nixon Administration may "expand its war of aggression into all countries" and "commit crimes against other peoples which aid the Indochinese countries and peoples," the statement says this would be a signal of "an all-round war in Southeast Asia, if not one of a new world war."

#### PLAF ANNIVERSARY: NFLSV, DRV PLEDGE STRUGGLE UNTIL VICTORY

FRONT COMMENT       The 10th anniversary of the unification of the South Vietnamese People's Liberation Armed Forces, on 15 February, was celebrated at a "grand meeting" in a "liberated area" on the 13th, according to Front media. The meeting was attended by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, who delivered opening remarks, and by PLAF Deputy Commander Mme. Nguyen Thi Dinh, who gave the main address. The same speakers addressed the anniversary meeting last year, but PLAF Commander Tran Nam Trung spoke at the meeting in 1969.

As she did in her speech last year, Mme. Dinh hailed "victories" achieved in the past, citing landmark engagements of the PLAF. She went on this time, however, to defend the decision to launch the 1968 Tet offensive as "absolutely correct and extremely clever and creative" and to observe gratuitously that the decision had been taken by the NFLSV Central Committee in late 1967. The speech included a conventional expression of confidence in the PLAF's line and a claim that the PLAF's "victories" have "step by step shaken the U.S. imperialists' will to aggression" and that "we are advancing toward completely smashing their aggressive design." She added: "We have brought the resistance . . . nearer than ever to final victory, and certainly we will win total victory."

Mme. Dinh also commented on the PLAF anniversary in an article first broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 5th and later carried by VNA and LPA and published in the Hanoi press on the 13th. The article discussed lessons to be derived from the PLAF's experiences, among other things stressing the importance of understanding and developing the military art and methods of fighting. It claimed that the PLAF had helped defeat Vietnamization by developing "their offensive art" in response to "concrete changes in the enemy's operation means and maneuvers on the front" and to the requirements of the war.

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The article also pointed up the importance of building the PLAF while fighting and choosing methods of fighting which would allow an increase in strength following a battle or campaign. Mme. Dinh maintained that men and materials must be saved during battles and that between battles the forces should be built up and trained. Her restatement of this conservative policy line endorsed the conventional communist line of recent years, as opposed to the view expressed in an unusual article last December attributed to PLAF Commander Tran Nam Trung.\* Trung's article dwelt on the role of "big units" to a degree unprecedented in the past two years and developed an argument for expanding their role in the war. Other anniversary propaganda, like Mme. Dinh's statements, hews to the conventional line and in no way echoes Trung.

HANOI The DRV marked the PLAF anniversary with leaders' messages, editorial comment, and a meeting on 12 February attended by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. Opening remarks at the meeting were made by VWP Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet, and the main speeches were delivered by acting head of the PRG representation Nguyen Phu Soai and North Vietnamese Central Committee member Col. Gen. Chu Van Tan. Last year Chu Van Tan was the highest-level DRV representative at the anniversary meeting.

The PRG speaker, Nguyen Phu Soai, routinely claimed that the PLAF is becoming more powerful and more victorious as it fights. It has "moved from annihilating puppet troops through small-scale combat to coordinating large-scale, medium-scale, and small-scale combat," he said, and has defeated U.S. strategies and tactics, "punished" seasoned units, and "confused and panicked the enemy." He maintained that "the PLAF will certainly overcome all hardships and fulfill the glorious, historic mission" entrusted to it.

Chu Van Tan promised that "directing our attention toward the kith-and-kin South, we pledge to our southern compatriots and comrades that, although having to undergo more sacrifices and hardships, the North resolves to endeavor to provide reinforcements to the frontline, to make its greatest contribution to the anti-U.S. national salvation undertaking, to actively emulate in socialist building, to strengthen its economic and national defense potentials, and to increasingly consolidate the northern rear in all aspects in order to fulfill the duty of the great rear toward the great front."

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\* The Tran Nam Trung article is discussed in a Supplementary Article in the TRENDS of 30 December 1970, pages S 1-3.

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Ton Duc Thang's message on the anniversary praised the PLAF and expressed confidence in final victory, and Giap's message promised: "We are resolved to stand shoulder to shoulder to fight, together with the people throughout the country, in order to completely defeat the U.S. aggressors and their flunkys, so as to bring the North and South under the same roof again." Last year Giap had reiterated the more general pledge that the army in the North would, together with the people, fulfill its obligation as the rear for the frontline.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW APPLAUDS UAR "INITIATIVE," DEPLORES ISRAELI STANCE

In a moderate volume of comment on Middle East developments, Moscow hails the "concrete and constructive" UAR proposal on reopening the Suez Canal. In the only Soviet comment thus far available on as-Sadat's interview in the 22 February NEWSWEEK, a foreign-language commentary on the 17th singles out some of the UAR President's pledges in response to a question on a possible peace treaty--a passage sharply truncated in Cairo's version of the interview.

There is no Soviet-originated comment on Ambassador Jarring's initiative in addressing memorandums to the UAR and Israel, submitted on 8 February, but Moscow takes note of Cairo's favorable response and Tel Aviv's unfavorable reaction. Soviet media have not been heard to mention Assistant Secretary of State Sisco's 14 February CBS interview, in which he remarked that Jarring is free to take as much initiative as he wishes; accordingly, Moscow has also ignored a UAR Foreign Ministry official's remark, reported by Cairo on the 15th, that Sisco's interview is being studied carefully because of its "positive factors." President Nixon's remarks on the Middle East at his 17 February press conference are not mentioned in TASS' 18 February account of the press conference.

**JARRING'S INITIATIVE** While Moscow has expressed no views of its own on Ambassador Jarring's initiative, a commentary in Arabic on 16 February reported U Thant as stating that Jarring was carrying out his task in accordance with authorization in the November 1967 Security Council resolution. The broadcast explained that U Thant made the statement because Israel and the United States were seeking to "distort the nature and significance" of Jarring's mediation, while the Arab countries were trying "in a practical and positive way to consolidate" Jarring's task. And TASS on the 17th noted French approval of Jarring's actions.

Moscow complains of Israel's "obstructive" stand as displayed both in its "cold reception" of Cairo's "peaceful initiative" and in its reaction to the Jarring memorandum. TASS on 15 February quoted UPI as saying

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Tel Aviv had turned down the memorandum on the pretext that Jarring is "allegedly to act only as a mediator," not as an arbitrator empowered to make proposals. On the 17th, TASS cited Cairo press reports which pictured Dayan as favoring rejection of the memorandum and Eban as advocating that it simply be disregarded. A brief Moscow domestic service item on the 18th interprets Eban's statement in the Knesset the previous day as a rejection of Jarring's proposal "about conditions for a peaceful settlement" and declares that Israel is continuing to torpedo the UAR's peace initiative and to impede the Jarring mission.

TASS on the 14th had attributed to the Cairo AL-ABRAM the view that Jarring's proposals are in strict conformity with Resolution 242. On the 17th TASS reported from New York that the UAR, in its reply to Jarring, said Cairo is "ready to guarantee the sovereignty of Israel" on condition that both sides recognize and observe the pre-5 June 1967 frontiers. A TASS dispatch from Cairo the same day said the Egyptian reply reaffirmed that the UAR's acceptance of Resolution 242 signifies its readiness to fully comply with the provisions of the resolution.

AS-SADAT INTERVIEW TASS briefly reported as-Sadat's NEWSWEEK interview on 15 February some six hours before Cairo released its own edited version of the UAR President's remarks as they appear in the 22 February issue of the magazine. Based on the NEWSWEEK version and datelined New York, TASS' report quoted as-Sadat as saying that the UAR initiative envisages reopening the Suez Canal for free navigation of all foreign ships, including Israeli, on the condition that Israel implement all its obligations under Resolution 242. (NEWSWEEK says that as-Sadat, asked if the Egyptian proposal includes free passage for Israeli ships, replied: "Yes, we have agreed to this in our memorandum to Ambassador Jarring. Free passage is clearly spelled out." In the Cairo version, as-Sadat merely says "freedom of navigation is clearly mentioned in the Security Council resolution," and the Cairo version adds--regarding Israel's obligations under Resolution 242--that Tel Aviv must live up to its "commitments regarding the rights of the Palestinian people.")

A second brief TASS report of the interview the next day, bearing a Cairo dateline and citing the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, may have been issued in part to take account of another Cairo emendation on the matter of "Palestinian rights." Thus TASS mentioned a remark by as-Sadat contained in the Cairo version of the interview, but not in NEWSWEEK's, that there must be an overall settlement for all territories occupied in 1967, not just Sinai, and that such a settlement "must also accommodate the Palestinian people's rights."

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The second TASS account also picked up other points that had not been reported in the first one, essentially contained in both the NEWSWEEK and Cairo versions of the interview. It reported as-Sadat's definition of "partial withdrawal" from Suez as meaning evacuation beyond al-Arish on the Sinai Peninsula; and it noted his pledge that once this takes place, the UAR will guarantee freedom of international navigation through the Tiran Straits, will not object to the stationing of an international observer force at Sharm ash-Shaykh, and will prolong the cease-fire agreement.

Repeating these points, a Tsoppi foreign-language commentary on the 17th also publicizes part of as-Sadat's reply to the question of what the UAR would be prepared to put in a peace treaty. The fairly extensive passage appears in the NEWSWEEK version but is cut down to only two sentences in Cairo's. Without noting that as-Sadat was asked about a peace treaty, Tsoppi reports the UAR President as saying that if Israel withdraws from the territories in accordance with the Security Council resolution, the inviolability and political independence of all states in the area, including Israel, will be guaranteed, and "we solemnly pledge this." Tsoppi also takes note of as-Sadat's pledge on freedom of navigation, remarking that the UAR says that ships of all countries, including Israel, will be able to navigate freely through the Suez Canal and the Tiran Strait. He does not mention as-Sadat's concluding condition that for all of this to take place, there must be a just solution to the Palestinian problem. (In Cairo's version, as-Sadat replied to the question on a peace treaty by saying only that the Security Council resolution is clear and complete and that the Palestinian people's rights are the core of the problem.)

Tsoppi praises as-Sadat's statements in the interview as representing a concrete program for a political settlement and adds that the UAR President did not overlook any of the essential aspects of the Middle East crisis. An examination of the UAR position, Tsoppi says, leads to the conclusion that reestablishment of peace is "entirely feasible"; Israel and the United States must understand, he adds, that they cannot indefinitely thwart a political settlement.

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**BELYAYEV COMMENT** In a 9 February domestic service commentary, PRAVDA's Belyayev took Israel to task for urging peace before the withdrawal and border questions are solved.

Belyayev argued that peace will emerge in the process of normalization of relations, when it would be possible "not just to state but to insure" the right of each country in the Middle East, including Israel, to peace, independent existence, and territorial integrity. Charging Israel with using closure of the Suez Canal as a means of putting pressure on the UAR and with seeking for itself the right to use international waterways in the area, Belyayev said the UAR "long ago" stated its readiness to allow passage of Israeli ships through the Tiran Strait and the Suez Canal, provided Israel first withdraws its troops from all occupied Arab lands and solves the Palestinian refugee problem on a just basis. Elsewhere in the article, citing elements of Resolution 242, he commented that "it will be possible to do a lot for the solution of the complex problem" of the Palestinian refugees if all clauses of the resolution are implemented in good faith.

Arguing for adoption of the UAR suggestion regarding reopening of the canal as a first step toward implementation of Resolution 242, Belyayev complained of Mrs. Meir's "refusal to consider it seriously." He claimed that Israel's ambitions are supported by continuing U.S. military aid, and he stressed that there is no military solution for the Middle East crisis--"only a political solution."

Following Belyayev's relatively mild criticism of Israel, Moscow domestic service commentator Ryzhikov on the 10th, deploring Israel's unwillingness to give a positive answer to the UAR, noted that "there were quite a few" in the committee which drew up the Israeli reply "who favored a positive answer" to the Egyptian proposal. Both Belyayev and Ryzhikov underlined the losses sustained by many countries due to the canal closure. And Ryzhikov--referring to demands raised by the Persian Gulf members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the recent Teheran negotiations with the oil companies--offered the additional argument that the opening of the canal would also benefit those Western oil companies having no tanker fleets of their own. Funds available to the oil companies from reduced transport costs after the opening of Suez, he said, would enable them to satisfy the demands of the oil-exporting countries and still maintain their own profits at roughly the present level.

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## ARMS CONTROL

## KOSYGIN HAILS SEABED TREATY, URGES SALT AGREEMENT

Premier Kosygin, speaking at the 11 February signing in Moscow of the seabed arms control treaty, characterized conclusion of the treaty as "a positive act in international affairs" and "the first major step along the road of full demilitarization of the seabed." Keynoting themes echoed in Moscow's moderate volume of propaganda\* surrounding the treaty signing ceremonies, Kosygin viewed the seabed treaty as one of several steps in "the persistent struggle against the arms race" and specifically alluded to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT): "As stated more than once before, we would welcome an agreement in the field of limiting strategic armaments."

Immediately following this reference to SALT, Kosygin stressed that concluding international arms control agreements is "not an easy job," and he noted that "there were both difficulties and divergencies in the positions of the parties" to the seabed negotiations. But "experience shows," he said, that "a road to the reaching of an understanding can be found," and the Soviet Government "will stint no effort to find solutions to pressing problems connected with an end to the arms race and with disarmament." He also observed that experience demonstrates that "it is much more difficult to check the arms race where it is already underway than to prevent its development in new environments."

CENTRAL PRESS  
ON SEABED TREATY

Soviet central press comment on the treaty's significance stressed particularly Kosygin's points that it is but one step in a necessary series of arms control measures and that obstacles to agreement can be overcome if there is good will and realism on both sides. TASS commentator Kornilov on 10 February, calling the treaty "a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament," said

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\* Propaganda surrounding the seabed treaty signing accounted for about nine percent of Moscow's total radio propaganda last week. This volume is slightly larger than the seven percent devoted to the 1 July 1968 signing of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the six percent generated by the 27 January 1967 signing of the treaty banning nuclear weapons from earth orbits and outer space.

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that the world hopes that it "will be followed by other steps to find effective ways for limitation of the scope of the arms race," and he declared that the agreement "clearly shows that acting jointly in the interests of disarmament the states can overcome any obstacles." Similarly, a 13 February PRAVDA editorial, reported by TASS and on Moscow radio's domestic and international broadcasts, affirmed that "agreements can be reached if the necessary realism is displayed in the approach to solving problems concerning the interests of peace and security of all states."

Both the PRAVDA editorial and a 12 February IZVESTIYA article stressed that the USSR will continue to work for arms control measures, including specifically "liquidation of foreign military bases on other peoples' territories," the creation of nuclear-free zones, the ending of underground nuclear tests, and the banning of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons. Both said that the Soviet Union "would welcome an agreement on strategic armaments limitation." The IZVESTIYA article also made the point that "radical measures in disarmament, specifically nuclear disarmament, can be achieved only if all the nuclear powers take part in them."

SALT In the wake of the 3 February PRAVDA article on SALT and IZVESTIYA's 6 February dispatch from Washington criticizing U.S. delegation head Gerard Smith,\* a 10 February LITERARY GAZETTE article by NOVOSTI political commentator Gerasimov implied that the United States is two-faced with respect to the on-going SALT negotiations; characteristically, the blame is placed on the influence of the military-industrial complex on Washington. Taking a poke at "the Western press" for conducting "a broad and open discussion" about SALT although the talks are supposed to be "of a closed nature," Gerasimov disclaimed any intention of discussing "what constitutes the terms of reference" of the U.S. and Soviet delegations, preferring to examine the Western press comment on the talks.

Stressing the importance of the "self-evident principle of the identical security of the sides and the nonadmission of one-sided advantages," Gerasimov contended that while "officially the United States is for the talks and for an

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\* See the TRENDS of 10 February, pages 22-24, for a discussion of these departures from past Soviet propaganda practice on SALT.

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agreement," in fact "the opponents of an agreement frequently prevail there." He cited a number of acts of the Nixon Administration--the further development of the Safeguard ABM system, a return to the "from a position of strength" policy, a quest for strategic supremacy, and the "resurrection of the threat of planning for a first strike"--in an effort to show that the aim of the military-industrial complex is "to use the talks in order to justify the arms race." He said that recommendations by U.S. press organs and officials about "holding the talks 'from a position of strength'" were "clearly intended to ruin them." He concluded with the pro-forma statement that the Soviet Union would "welcome a reasonable agreement in the field of strategic arms limitation," emphasizing that "reasonable" means an agreement "which is not one-sided" and which "would meet the interests of all peoples."

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## POLAND - USSR

## PRICE ROLLOBACK FOLLOWS TALKS WITH STRIKERS; SOVIET AID CITED

Concern about the mood of the populace was registered in the Gierek regime's 15 February announcement of its decision to revoke the 13 December food price increases only hours after Premier Jaroszewicz and other leaders had returned from talks with the striking textile workers in Lodz, Poland's second largest city. In prior statements the regime had insisted that it was economically unfeasible to cancel the price rises. Now, announcing the party-government decision in a radio/TV speech on the evening of the 15th, Jaroszewicz said the move had proved possible "through utilization of fraternal aid granted by the Soviet Union" and in the light of prospects for increased pig and cattle production. Annulment of the December decision, he said, would be effective 1 March.

Jaroszewicz prefaced the announcement with discouraging remarks on the prospects for wage increases, indicating that the regime has been fighting a rearguard action on that issue as well. Echoing remarks he had made to the Lodz strikers on the 14th, he told the nationwide audience that "a further increase of the wage fund and social allowances . . . would not be possible now because this would lead to an unbalancing of the market and the economy." Jaroszewicz said the "daring step" of annulling the price increases must be compensated for by increased production efforts, and he called again for "calm and order and discipline." Appeals for discipline had pervaded regime statements during much of January but had largely disappeared from the propaganda during and following the visit by Gierek and Jaroszewicz to the coastal cities of Szczecin and Gdansk on 24-25 January.

WARSAW COMMENT           The factor of Soviet aid was highlighted in  
ON SOVIET ROLE           a TRYBUNA LUDU commentary on the price  
                              rollback, reviewed by PAP on 17 February.  
The party daily said "the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union, which has given us a hand at the most difficult moments," had made the price decision possible; "Poland has got a credit." It went on to say that "this provides an answer to the question which many of us were putting: was it possible to take this decision earlier?" and to answer "No, it was not."

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An unattributed commentary in the Warsaw domestic service early on the 16th was more explicit in stating that the price roll-back had been considered "for a long time" and was planned for "a later time," but that "it was possible to speed it up by the earlier completion of the talks with the Soviet Union, which understood the difficult economic situation of our country and gave us aid by granting us long-term credits." This commentary noted candidly that "Poland has not had any economic reserves and continues to have none." It is "no secret," the broadcast added, "that productivity in Poland is one of the lowest among the European socialist countries"--25 percent lower than that of the GDR and USSR and nearly 50 percent lower than that of "the developed Western countries." Both commentaries echoed the call for "discipline."

TREATMENT IN SOVIET MEDIA TASS on the 16th omitted the reference to Soviet aid in an otherwise fairly full report of Jaroszewicz' radio/TV speech. But a 15 February TASS report of the Politburo/Council of Ministers Presidium meeting at which the price decision was taken did mention "the credit assistance obtained from the Soviet Union in recent days." The report of the meeting also noted that further wage increases were judged impossible.

Soviet media had carried extensive coverage of the 6-7 February eighth plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, which further downgraded Gomulka and other leaders, reviewed the causes of the December riots, and spelled out the new economic program. A fairly lengthy TASS report of Gierek's plenum report of the 7th, carried after a three-day delay in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, included most of the PZPR First Secretary's main points, with the notable exception of his enumeration of the totals of those killed and wounded in the coastal disturbances. There has been no monitored Soviet report of the 11-15 February strike of textile workers in Lodz.

LODZ STRIKE SITUATION PAP on the 17th reported a dispatch from Lodz in that day's government daily, ZYCIE WARSZAWY, stressing the "particular appreciation" for the price decision on the part of the Lodz textile workers--predominantly women--whose "family budgets were seriously affected by the December food price rises." The dispatch contained the first claim in official media that the Lodz strikers had gone back to work. It said that on Monday, the 15th, the strikers discussed the speeches made to them the

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previous day by Premier Jaroszewicz, trade union head Kruczek, and other leaders and that "in an overwhelming majority of factories it was realized that the time for discussion was over and it was high time to get down to honest work."

ZYCIE WARSZAWY reported that "at midnight on Monday" the machines at the Marchlewski factory resumed operation and that on Tuesday morning "intense work was going on in all the departments" of that factory, with a similar situation prevailing "in other Lodz works." But it noted that "a few groups" in the Obronców Pokoju works were still staying away from work on Tuesday afternoon. It pointed out that "their postulates are being considered by special commissions," adding that "these postulates cannot and should not cause work stoppages."

Although Western news sources reported that the Lodz strike began on the 11th, the Warsaw radio's report of the arrival of Jaroszewicz, Kruczek, Szydlak, and Tejchma in that city on the 14th said only that they were there for "a discussion of the current situation of the workers in the textile enterprises in Lodz." On the morning of the 15th PAP carried the first indication in Warsaw media that a strike was under way, reporting that the visiting leaders' meeting with the workers was "in connection with work stoppages that had occurred in several factories" in Lodz. The PAP report said Jaroszewicz admonished the Lodz workers: "Do not allow anybody to infringe upon and to weaken the link between the new party leadership and the working people, which is now growing stronger," and "do not allow anybody to disturb political and economic life, to weaken social discipline."

The Lodz strike has produced new political casualties. PAP reported late on the 16th that a meeting of the Lodz PZPR committee that day had "accepted the resignation of Jozef Spychalski from the position of first secretary" of that body and "recalled" two party committee secretaries from their posts.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## SHELEST FOE APPOINTED UKRAINIAN AGRICULTURE MINISTER

On 4 February RADYANSKA UKRAINA announced the appointment of P. L. Pogrebnyak as Ukrainian agriculture minister, succeeding P. Ye. Doroshenko, who is retiring on pension at 63. The appointment of Pogrebnyak, longtime Dnepropetrovsk agricultural supervisor and apparent protege of Ukrainian Premier V. V. Shcherbitskiy, appears to mark a defeat for Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest in a long struggle with the rival Dnepropetrovsk group over this post. This appointment follows on the heels of other apparent personnel setbacks for Shelest, such as the naming of Dnepropetrovsk city first secretary A. A. Ulanov as Ukrainian cadre chief in the fall of 1970 and the July 1970 appointment of outsider V. V. Fedorchuk to replace longtime KGB chief V. F. Nikitchenko, and it suggests that Shelest's power in the Ukraine is under challenge.

Pogrebnyak was deputy chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk oblast executive committee from at least mid-1966 until 1970, working under Dnepropetrovsk First Secretary A. F. Vatchenko and probably under Vatchenko's predecessor, present Ukrainian Premier Shcherbitskiy, and supervising the Dnepropetrovsk oblast agricultural administration. He was appointed Ukrainian first deputy agriculture minister in October 1970 shortly after Shelest had sharply criticized the Dnepropetrovsk agricultural leaders at the July 1970 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum.

The conflict over the post of agriculture minister appears to date back to the revelations of disastrous agricultural failures in early 1970. A 31 March 1970 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum heard Shcherbitskiy report on the "serious shortcomings" in livestock raising (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 1 April). Speakers at the plenum delivered "sharp criticism" of republic agricultural organs and their leadership methods, and the agriculture ministry officials were singled out for showing "little initiative and persistence" in tackling agricultural tasks. Significantly, these criticisms were published in RURAL LIFE on 3 April but not in the Ukrainian press. At the end of the plenum Chernigov First Secretary N. M. Borisenko was elected Central Committee agriculture secretary. After the plenum a new head of the Central Committee agriculture section was named (former deputy head V. I. Fedan--first identified on 13 May 1970).

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Agriculture Minister Doroshenko also appeared slated for removal, as indicated by his failure to be reelected to the Supreme Soviet in early June 1970. But Doroshenko's removal appears to have been delayed by a struggle over the naming of his successor. The Dnepropetrovsk group, headed by Premier Shcherbitskiy and oblast First Secretary Vatchenko, was presumably advancing Dnepropetrovsk deputy executive committee chairman Pogrebnyak. At the same time, they were successfully advancing Ulanov as a candidate to succeed Central Committee cadres chief V. M. Tsybulko, who was removed in April; Ulanov's appointment was made public in October--as was Pogrebnyak's appointment as first deputy agriculture minister.

Pogrebnyak's appointment was apparently delayed by revelations of shortcomings in his leadership of Dnepropetrovsk agriculture. RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 30 June carried an article attacking shortcomings in farms in Dnepropetrovsk's Nikopol rayon and criticizing Dnepropetrovsk oblast agricultural administration chief M. I. Pistunov, Pogrebnyak's subordinate, for downplaying the shortcomings. On 14 August RADYANSKA UKRAINA reported Dnepropetrovsk's response: in a noncommittal reply oblast agriculture secretary M. T. Ivakhnenko said in effect only that the obkom and agricultural administration had discussed the article.

The 30 June article served, nonetheless, as a basis for a sharp attack on the Dnepropetrovsk leadership by Shelest at the July Ukrainian Central Committee plenum. Describing the sorry record of Nikopol rayon farms, Shelest singled out the oblast leadership ("Can one call this effective, skilled and demanding leadership?") and described the agricultural situation in Dnepropetrovsk as "political failure in work" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 25 July--see FBIS TRENDS for 5 August 1970, pp 34-35). In reaction to Shelest's criticism, the Dnepropetrovsk agricultural administration was duly criticized at a Dnepropetrovsk obkom plenum (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 30 July).

But despite Shelest's attack, Pogrebnyak soon was advanced--although not to the rank of minister. He was first identified as a deputy minister on 23 October and then as first deputy minister on 30 October (RADYANSKA UKRAINA). His predecessor, M. V. Kuzmenko, was last identified as first deputy minister on 11 September (PRAVDA UKRAINY). Pogrebnyak's appointment as first deputy minister was clearly a compromise: Now, only three months later, he has replaced Doroshenko as minister, apparently over Shelest's opposition.

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## RUSSIAN NAMED AS SECOND SECRETARY OF ESTONIAN PARTY

An important Moscow cadre official has been named second secretary of the Estonian party organization. On 12 February PRAVDA announced the election of K. V. Lebedev, head of a sector of the Central Committee's party organizational work section, as Estonian second secretary. Lebedev replaces A. P. Vader, who is transferred to the post of chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Although Lebedev is of Russian nationality, he is no stranger to Estonian affairs. As head of the cadre section's sector for the Baltic and Belorussia, he has supervised Estonian activities for the past 10 years, regularly visiting the Baltic republics and often serving on the working presidiums of their party congresses.

Apart from its encroachment on Estonian First Secretary Kebin's close-knit Estonian group, Lebedev's appointment may affect Estonian nationality sensitivities. Unlike Latvia and Lithuania, which have had a steady stream of Russian second secretaries except for a brief period immediately after Stalin's death, Estonia has not had a Russian second secretary since 1953. Estonian national pride may well be ruffled by the sudden change in this situation. No recent revelation of shortcomings would account for the change; a change might more logically have occurred when, in January 1967, the CPSU Central Committee censured Estonia for serious mistakes in cadre work, but at that time no shift in the Estonian leadership resulted.

The 10-11 February Estonian reshuffle does not otherwise appear to have weakened Kebin. In addition to Vader's demotion, secretary L. N. Lentsman was demoted to trade union chairman and trade union chairman P. P. Neyerot was demoted to deputy chairman of the people's control committee (SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 11 February). Lentsman has long been in decline, however; he was demoted from second secretary to ideology secretary in January 1964 to make room for Vader. V. I. Vyalyas, who as Tallin first secretary has worked closely with Kebin for the last 10 years, was promoted to Central Committee secretary.

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## MOSCOW THEATER REPERTOIRES CLEANED UP FOR CPSU CONGRESS

In preparation for the 24th party congress scheduled to convene on 30 March, Moscow authorities are purging Moscow theaters and movie houses of ideologically unsuitable productions. This was made clear by a 6 February MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA article by A. K. Melnichenko, the Moscow executive committee's new deputy chairman for cultural affairs. He reported that the executive committee has adopted a decision "On Measures to Prepare the City for Holding the 24th CPSU Congress in Moscow" and that "the main attention is now being devoted to improving the repertoire of theaters, movie houses, and concert organizations."

"The current repertoire is being freed of outmoded and ideologically and artistically imperfect productions," Melnichenko declared, and "the main place in the repertoire . . . will be occupied by plays and concert programs reflecting the revolutionary transformation in the life of the Soviet people and telling of our contemporaries." Melnichenko also said that "patriotic plays of past years are being revived" while dramatists and composers are being helped to create suitable new works.

At a 2 February meeting of the Moscow executive committee on the progress of preparations for the congress, city cultural administration chief B.V. Pokarzhevskiy and film administration chief T.A. Lomasova criticized the tardiness of Moscow theaters in revising their March-April repertoire to include more works "about the labor victories of the Soviet people" (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 February). Also in preparation for the congress, a special public review commission has been viewing films currently playing in Moscow movie houses. The commission met on 4 February to discuss its findings with Melnichenko and other Moscow cultural officials and propose "measures to eliminate shortcomings in the work of movie houses" (MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 5 February).

## ECONOMIST REVIVES CONTROVERSIAL AGRICULTURAL ISSUES

Proposals for radical reforms in Soviet agricultural institutions and practices continue to be circulated publicly even though they clearly lack official sanction. For example, an article in the initial 1971 issue of ECONOMIC SERIES, a relatively new publication

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of the USSR Academy of Sciences, openly advocates the introduction of agricultural free marketing on a limited scale and the creation of a system of kolkhoz unions to manage the kolkhoz sector, despite the fact that such proposals have been either publicly repudiated at the highest levels in recent years or officially shelved after lengthy deliberation. The recurrence of such proposals attests to the intractability of the agricultural problem and the regime's unwillingness, or inability, to impose strict conformity in this sector of public discussion.

The article in question is entitled "Problems of Managing Kolkhoz Production" and is authored by Yu. I. Krasnopoyas, an infrequent contributor to economic journals. It focuses on ways and means of strengthening the administrative and economic viability of the kolkhoz system in general and individual farms in particular.

While paying lip service to the principles of centralized planning, Krasnopoyas revives a number of proposals on agricultural free marketing that were first raised after Khrushchev's ouster by economist V.G. Venzher and others and were later repudiated by such authoritative regime spokesmen as Politburo member D.S. Polyanskiy and Brezhnev's agricultural assistant V.A. Golikov. He proposes, first, that central procurement of agricultural products be restricted solely to those items needed for the supply of large industrial centers, foreign trade, and other general state requirements. The remaining needs of society, he argues, could be met by a "substantial" expansion of decentralized purchases of food-stuffs in the form of contractual agreements between individual farms, on the one hand, and state and cooperative agencies, on the other. Such agreements, he goes on, would be reached "under conditions (including prices) which would be advantageous both to kolkhozes and enterprises and organizations and, in the final analysis, society as a whole."

Krasnopoyas also proposes that the procurement quotas levied on individual farms be limited to only two or three products on which the farms are specializing. He charges that the current practice of levying procurement quotas of "up to 20 and more" products per farm restricts local initiative and "transforms planning into operational management." These proposals run directly counter to the prevailing trends in agricultural bureaucratization. Last year, for example, the machinery of state procurement was appreciably strengthened by the creation of new inspectorates for the supervision of farm procurement.

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Krasnopoyas also revives the issue of kolkhoz unions which the regime eventually shelved in 1969 after years of acrimonious debate. After briefly mentioning the kolkhoz councils created in that year and noting their "consultative" nature, he calls for the creation of a system of kolkhoz unions capable of exercising effective control over the kolkhoz sector and acting as an intermediary between farms and state agencies. In support of this proposal, he points to the lack of coordination among the numerous interkolkhoz associations that have sprouted in the countryside in recent years. And he goes on to argue that the "concentration of certain managerial functions" in kolkhoz unions is necessary for the effective implementation of tasks currently beyond the capability of individual farms. While conceding that the creation of such unions is a "lengthy, complex process," he appeals for support to party and government officials in areas where kolkhozes are the predominant form of agricultural organization.

This appeal is clearly aimed at mobilizing support outside the central agricultural bureaucracy--historically the main bulwark of opposition to the reform. Judging from the strengthened position of the agricultural bureaucracy in recent years, however, it would appear doubtful that this appeal will be any more successful than its forerunners.

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## CADRE RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN PERSISTS, WITH PLA INVOLVED

Highlighted by an article in RED FLAG (No. 2, 1971), the campaign of rectification for medium and higher-level cadres continues to assume primary importance in the media. As indicated in several previously released articles, one important target of the campaign is the arrogance displayed by some PLA cadres who have been fulfilling civilian functions. While the articles do not seem to preage a return to cultural revolution purges, they make it plain that even PLA cadres are subject to error and must undergo rectification--not merely criticism from fellow soldiers but from the masses and civilian cadres as well. This action may indicate that the PLA personnel who have assumed almost universal leadership in units from the county level on up are now being "civilianized," by being made subject to nonmilitary discipline.

The RED FLAG article, written by the revolutionary committee of the Anqing area in Anhwei and broadcast by Hefei radio on 10 February, does not directly state that the PLA is the primary target. It does, however, note that "some leading comrades" have been "obsessed with the idea that they had won victories--military victories during the war and new victories during the great cultural revolution." Such cadres were charged with feelings of superiority vis-a-vis other members of the leading groups and arrogance in their relations with them--clearly an indictment of some PLA leaders.

PLA failings were openly noted also, in the context of the general rectification movement, by a Nanking broadcast on 2 February telling of lessons learned in recent study classes run by the Kiangsu Military District. Cadres were warned that no matter what their past experience, if they did not understand the nature of the class struggle, they were likely to fall into the error of arrogance.

In struggling against "arrogance," the regime is certainly not sniping only at the PLA, but in view of army dominance of major posts some of the criticism must attach itself to PLA leaders. Most articles do not single out any group of cadres as most in need of rectification, and some of those that do concentrate their attention on new cadres. A Shansi broadcast on 2 February, for example, noted that some new cadres had become "arrogant and complacent" and that measures for their education must be part of the daily agenda of party organs.

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There seems to be some opposition to the notion that leaders must accept mass criticism. A 2 February SHIKIANG DAILY editorial accused some cadres of the fallacy that "we have reason to be arrogant." Warnings to cadres that they face a purge should they not quickly reform are infrequent, but in Shantung, site of serious leadership squabbling for several years, the provincial radio on 2 February firmly warned factionalists that they must "rein in their horses on the brink of the precipice."

AGRICULTURE AN ISSUE As in past ideological campaigns, the injunctions that cadres must properly digest Mao's Thought are seldom tied to specific problem areas. There are continuing signs, however, that agricultural policy is an issue leading to current discussion, and perhaps dissension, among cadres. A LANCHOW DAILY editorial of 2 February seemed to be responding to those who are arguing that overmuch attention is being paid to grain, to the detriment of other crops. The editorial made the customary gesture in favor of emphasizing grain, but went on to attack the opposing tendency of "ignoring a diversified economy." The tendency toward "one-sidedness" must be overcome, the editorial warned, and it stated that agriculture, forestry, and livestock breeding are interdependent and "none can be dispensed with."

A Hunan broadcast and HUNAN DAILY editorial on 10 February also warned of dangers on the agricultural front from cadres who misunderstand their assignments and go further in carrying out policies than the leadership intends. During both the leap-forward period and the cultural revolution, serious problems were apparently caused by local leaders who felt that they were riding the correct wave by going further than the center indicated in confiscating private plots and redistributing income. The Hunan editorial opposed the notion that "so long as the orientation is correct, don't worry about going a bit too far." Cadres who "carry out their own extremely harmful policy, . . . always thinking that they themselves are in the right," were warned that if they do not correct themselves they will "take a great fall."

The agricultural policy put forward for Hunan, in line with central pronouncements during the past couple of years, is relatively moderate: egalitarianism in wages is wrong, private plots and sideline occupations are permitted within strict rules, peasant incomes are to be increased, and the team is to remain the basic unit of production and cannot be forced to distribute income on a brigade basis.

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