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3 MARCH 1971

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda



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3 MARCH 1971
(VOL. XXII, NO. 9)

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FBIS TRENDS
3 MARCH 1971

C O N T E N T S

Topics and Events Given Major Attention i

NOTE: Foreign radio and press reactions to President Nixon's 1971 Report on U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's will be summarized in an FBIS Special Memorandum on 4 March. See also the Indochina and Middle East sections of this TRENDS.

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 FEBRUARY 1971

| <u>Moscow (3740 items)</u> | | | <u>Peking (3019 items)</u> | | |
|----------------------------|-------|------|----------------------------|-------|------|
| CPSU 24th Congress | (33%) | 19% | Indochina | (70%) | 47% |
| [Draft Directives | (28%) | 12%] | [Battle Reports | (6%) | 15%] |
| Indochina | (11%) | 11% | [Sihanouk Tour | (5%) | 14%] |
| [Soviet Government | (--) | 4%] | of PRC | | |
| Statement, 25 Feb. | | | Domestic Issues | (18%) | 34% |
| Soviet Armed Forces | (1%) | 8% | British Arms to | (--) | 2% |
| Anniversary | | | South Africa | | |
| China | (5%) | 5% | | | |
| Zionism & Soviet Jews | (4%) | 5% | | | |
| Middle East | (3%) | 3% | | | |
| [Soviet Government | (--) | 2%] | | | |
| Statement, 27 Feb. | | | | | |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's 25 February foreign policy report includes a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on 2 March which claims that he merely repeated old arguments about Vietnamization "which have been completely refuted by reality." Like routine propaganda reaction, the statement claims that the President uttered threats against the DRV and that "new military adventures" against the North are being planned. The charge of new "military adventures" also appears in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 3d--which protests "increasingly serious acts of war" against North Vietnam since the massive air strikes last November--and in foreign ministry spokesman's statements on 26 February and 3 March. The nature of the "military adventures" is left ambiguous, although the foreign ministry statement of the 3d does refer to the massing of troops near the DMZ as well as to increased air strikes and shellings.

Exultant Vietnamese communist propagandists continue to claim that "liberation" troops are devastating the allied forces engaged in the Laos operation. Some comment says that insurgent attacks in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam have foiled allied plans to launch another major operation in the tricountry border area. In addition to claiming that several South Vietnamese battalions have been wiped out, propagandists cite the alleged capture of scores of allied personnel, including U.S. pilots and officers of the ARVN's 3d Airborne Brigade.

Moscow's first official protest in the wake of the Laos operation came in a Soviet Government statement on 25 February which warns that the USSR "cannot remain indifferent to the new escalation," promises continued assistance, and warns pointedly that the DRV is "a member of the socialist family." It is unclear whether the timing of the belated statement on the day the President's foreign policy report was released is more than coincidence. The statement has been given heavy followup publicity, and there has been little comment of substance on the President's remarks on Indochina.

Peking comment on Indochina has not raised the question of China's security since the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which reacted to President Nixon's press conference on the 17th. But repetitions of the routine pledge of rear-area support include that by Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu at a 1 March Nanking rally for Sihanouk.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SCORES PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT

Hanoi media first carried reaction to the President's foreign policy report on the 26th, in a radio commentary broadcast at 0330 GMT. Two hours later VNA carried the statement by the DRV

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spokesman in Paris, which had been issued there the day before. The spokesman, claiming that the President tried "to make black white," singled out three "lies" by the President--"pretending" he wants a peaceful settlement, claiming that the DRV had expanded the war to all of Indochina, and insisting he wants negotiations while failing to respond to the PRG initiatives at the Paris conference and in fact "nurturing illusions of military victory."

The reaction for the most part glosses over the substance of the President's remarks on Indochina, instead taking the occasion to repeat the usual attack on the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization as tools to pursue neocolonialism. A VNA commentary on the 26th said that "Nixon's lengthy report did not offer any novelty; he tried by inflated rhetoric to cover up his extremely reactionary bellicose colonialist policy." And the initial Hanoi radio commentary said that "Nixon brazenly emphasized that the Indochina problem is a manifestation, a concrete example of his doctrine," adding that "while Nixon boastfully reiterated his theme that Vietnamization is a path which may lead to peace," it is in fact a plan of "having puppets die in place of Americans."

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement says that in the part of his report dealing with Indochina the President tried to prove that Vietnamization was "correct and successful"; that he tried to "justify" U.S. expansion of the war to Cambodia and Laos; and that he "also uttered threats of war against the DRV"--a claim also made in the routine comment.* The statement refers four separate times to "new military adventures against the DRV."

The DRV statement says the President "actually just repeated the old arguments that have been frequently reiterated since he came to power--arguments that have been completely refuted by reality." It then argues routinely that the purpose of Vietnamization is not to end the war or withdraw all U.S. troops and that the Nixon Doctrine "is merely an extremely insidious and cruel policy

* This is apparently an allusion to the President's statement that in the process of withdrawing U.S. troops under the Vietnamization policy if North Vietnam took or tried to take advantage of redeployments by building up its strength in the South and launching new attacks, "I have made clear on a dozen occasions that I would take strong and effective measures to prevent the enemy from jeopardizing our remaining forces."

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designed to use Indochinese to fight Indochinese in order to promote the Americans' neocolonialist interests." It claims that Vietnamization has "gradually failed and is faced with the danger of bankruptcy" and that it was in this "defeated situation" that troops were sent to invade Cambodia and Laos. It asserts that "obviously the Americans do not want to end the war through negotiations" as the President has stated but are prolonging and expanding the war.

The statement gives some prominence to domestic and world opposition to the Nixon policy. Declaring that partial troop withdrawal and "deceitful peace tricks" have not covered up the "warlike, aggressive nature" of the Nixon Administration, it says "this is why the Americans and world peoples, including some American politicians, have vehemently protested against" the Vietnamization policy. It adds that "the world's peoples, including the American people, demand" that an end be put to the aggression. The statement also says the President again "tried to plead" for his policy, "faced with the American people's crisis of confidence in the U.S. Administration and the profound indignation of world public opinion."

THE FRONT The President's report has not as yet prompted a high-level statement from the Front, whose statements frequently follow DRV statements by a day or two. The PRG spokesman in Paris did issue a statement on the 26th, carried by LPA the next day. Initial reaction came in a Liberation Radio commentary broadcast at 2300 GMT on the 25th-- a few hours before the first reaction in Hanoi media. The PRG Paris spokesman, like some Hanoi comment, takes issue with the President's declaration that the United States would not "let down its friends," the Saigon administration. The statement also scores the President for "flagrantly and cynically misconstruing" the present situation in Indochina and at the Paris conference, saying he "shamelessly alleged that Hanoi does not want to seriously negotiate, that Hanoi 'has made this war an Indochina conflict.'"

The Liberation Radio commentary says the President "repeated his threats toward the peoples in the Indochinese countries," but adds that "he can intimidate no one." An LPA commentary on the 27th says that the "gist" of the President's report is his emphasis on an intention to "broaden the conflict and increase American aid and air support to the Saigon and other aggressor forces in Indochina."

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DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS NEW "ADVENTURES" AGAINST NORTH

The 3 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement protesting "increasingly serious acts of war" against the North and charging U.S. plans for "new military adventures" against the DRV climaxes a steady barrage of such warnings in both routine and elite propaganda which began with the first rumors of the allied operation in Laos. The charge of "adventures" appeared in both Hanoi's 5 February foreign ministry statement and in the 10 February government statement. Like these earlier statements, the current one singles out the "massing" of troops near the DMZ as well as increased numbers of ships in the Tonkin Gulf, but it does not explicitly refer to the possibility of ground incursions. Routine propaganda both before and after the President's 17 February press conference had referred to remarks by President Thieu and Vice President Ky on a possible ARVN incursion.

It is not clear whether the issuance of the statement at the foreign ministry level may be related to U.S. announcements of recent concentrated air strikes against the North. Like the foreign ministry statement on the President's report, it is replete with direct references and appeals to public opinion. It begins by declaring that over the past few months "the Nixon Administration has not ceased to intensify its increasingly serious acts of war against the DRV," and it says "public opinion has vehemently protested against the extremely barbarous U.S. air strikes on several populated areas of the DRV on 21 and 22 November." It concludes by expressing the conviction that "the world and American people will struggle more vigorously" and demand that the United States end its encroachments on DRV sovereignty and any "new military adventures." Echoing propaganda after the November air strikes, it observes that the United States has "violated its pledge" to stop the bombing of the DRV completely and unconditionally.

The current statement goes beyond the foreign ministry and government statements since the November air strikes in pointedly noting that U.S. actions constitute "an impudent challenge to socialist countries." This assertion has appeared in some other recent propaganda, however, including remarks by Defense Minister Giap at a reception marking Soviet Armed Forces Day on 23 February. The statement says the Nixon Administration "is wrong" in "entertaining the illusion of being able to intimidate the Vietnamese people." It goes on in a later passage to declare that "every cynical scheme of the U.S. imperialists against the DRV" will certainly be defeated by the strength and solidarity

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of the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples "given the strong support and assistance of the socialist countries and the peace- and justice-loving peoples and governments of the world."

DRV, PRG COMMENT The flurry of comment during the past week on U.S. action against the DRV has included editorials in NHAN DAN on the 26th and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 27th which point to recent U.S. bombings from Vinh Linh to Nghe An, the entry of U.S. ships into DRV territorial waters, and the use of U.S. artillery below the 17th parallel to fire on villages in Vinh Linh. Both editorials--stressing preparedness against any U.S. "war adventures or escalation acts"--also note the President's 17 February remark confirming the unrestricted use of U.S. air power in Indochina.

The NHAN DAN editorial alleges that the Nixon Administration also "impudently threatened that if it were defeated in Laos it would not rule out the possibility of attacking the northern part of our country." It goes on to stress that "we must always be vigilant" and particularly draws attention to the need to strengthen air defense activities, mentioning such things as alarms, shelters and trenches, firefighting and first aid teams, and first aid stations.

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, like the 3 March foreign ministry statement, goes on to charge that the allies are deploying more troops in the area of the DMZ and that U.S. ships have regularly operated in the Tonkin Gulf. Calling upon the people to sharpen their vigilance, the paper notes that "intensive efforts" have been made to strengthen the people's air defense and the protection of public order and security.

President Thieu's remark at Pleiku that a march to the North was just a matter of time is ridiculed in a 26 February Hanoi radio broadcast, which echoes previous propaganda on "threats" by Thieu and Ky in claiming that he "once more served as loudspeaker number one for his U.S. masters." It asserts that "the brazen, threatening words" will "certainly be unable to shake the iron-like determination" of the 31 million compatriots in North and South Vietnam.

Comment from the South includes an LPA commentary on the 27th which says, uniquely, that "there were days on which some 50 enemy aircraft bombed and strafed for hours places in North Vietnam, causing odious crimes against our countrymen there." (To date

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this is the closest Vietnamese communist propaganda comes to referring to stepped-up U.S. strikes in the DRV on the weekend of the 20th and 21st, announced by the U.S. command on the 23d.)* Like Hanoi propaganda, the commentary mentions the President's remarks on unlimited U.S. air power in Indochina and claims that he also said he would not rule out an attack against North Vietnam if the United States were defeated in Laos.

A 2 March Liberation Radio commentary notes Ky's and Thieu's threats to invade the North and, arguing that the Saigon "clique" only represents the Nixon Administration, charges that despite all the "serious defeats" and public condemnations the Administration has "not yet renounced its evil, aggressive designs against Vietnam and has unceasingly intensified and expanded the war," along with intensified attacks and threats against the DRV.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ISSUES SERIES OF PROTESTS

U.S. actions against North Vietnam are scored in a series of three foreign ministry spokesman's protests issued on 26 February and 1 and 3 March. The protests of the 26th and 3d additionally refer to U.S. "plots" to carry out new military adventures against the DRV.

PROTEST AGAINST NAVAL ACTIVITIES Scoring U.S. naval actions, the protest on the 26th charges that since the beginning of 1971, "along with stepping up air raids over several populated areas in North Vietnam," the United States "has intensified the use of its navy to carry out activities against the DRV." It claims that many U.S. ships "of various types have continuously operated in the Gulf of Tonkin, many of them intruding into the DRV's territorial waters conducting reconnaissance and encircling, threatening, and firing at the Vietnamese people's boats navigating along the coast, thus causing losses in manpower and property to the people."

Calling these actions "brazen acts of war . . . grossly encroaching on the DRV's sovereignty and security and violating all elementary norms of international law," the protest says they

* See the TRENDS of 24 February, page 10.

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are "part of the U.S. scheme of gradually intensifying air and naval activities and preparing for new military adventures against the DRV."

PROTESTS ON The spokesman's statement on 1 March makes the
AIR STRIKES more familiar charge of U.S. bombing strikes
 against the DRV. It says that from 22 to
28 February, the United States "sent many aircraft to drop
demolition and steel pellet bombs and fired rockets on a number
of populated areas in Quang Binh Province and Vinh Linh area,
causing big losses in lives and property to the local
inhabitants."

The spokesman's protest on the 3d charges that on the
preceding two days the United States "bombed and strafed a
number of populated areas in Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces
and the Vinh Linh area." It claims that "upholding their
vigilance and combat-readiness, the people and army of these
localities shot down two U.S. jet planes on the spot." The
statement also says "it is clear that along with the war
escalation in Laos, the United States is intensively stepping
up its war activities and plotting to carry out new military
adventures against the DRV."

Earlier on the 3d, Hanoi announced that two planes had been downed
in Quang Binh Province, bringing Hanoi's total of U.S. planes
downed over the DRV to 3,375. The broadcast alleged that U.S.
planes had bombed and strafed a number of populated areas in
Quang Binh Province.

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COMMUNISTS CLAIM MASSIVE ALLIED LOSSES IN LAOS OPERATION

The Hanoi press currently highlights alleged insurgent achievements throughout Indochina in the month of February. Thus, a commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 2 March claims that 10 battalions have been wiped out and 10 others "heavily decimated" and that more than 300 U.S. aircraft have been downed or destroyed and nearly 750 vehicles destroyed or seriously damaged, about half of them tanks and armored cars. Successes in Laos continue to be given the most attention, and an editorial in NHAN DAN on 1 March claims that allied forces in the Laos operation have lost half of their helicopters and more than half of their armored force. Another editorial in the party paper on the 2d also alleges that the insurgents have "annihilated" one-fifth of the troops of the allies' "most important and elite forces."

A VNA commentary on 2 March, listing alleged gains throughout Indochina in February, specifies that insurgent forces in southern Laos annihilated or captured nearly 4,000 enemy troops, including six entire battalions, one multibattalion unit, and one brigade headquarters. Previous communist reports had claimed a total of 2,500 allied casualties through 20 February; thus the new figure of 4,000 through the 28th would imply a claim that some 1,500 were put out of action during the last week of February. The VNA report also alleges that in February the Laotians shot down 207 aircraft and destroyed 107 military vehicles, more than half of them tanks and armored cars.

VNA also tallies alleged allied losses in Quang Tri, crediting the PLAF "on the Khe Sanh front" with putting out of combat nearly 1,700 soldiers, including nearly 1,000 Americans. Earlier communist reports indicated that a total of 1,500 troops, nearly 900 of them American, were put out of action in the first three weeks of February. VNA says that the PLAF also wrecked more than 200 military vehicles, including 72 tanks and armored cars, and downed 69 aircraft.

ATTACKS ON AIRBORNE UNITS
TO THE NORTH OF HIGHWAY 9

A 25 February VNA report claims that the Lao "liberation army" that day "completely wiped out" the GVN's 3d Airborne battalion in its position on Hill 456--designated by the allies as Hill 31. Recalling Hanoi's claim that the 6th Airborne battalion was put out of action on the 13th, VNA observes that the 3d Airborne Brigade has thus lost two of its battalions. VNA says the attackers captured 120 allied troops, including many officers, and seized all the weapons. Commentaries in the Hanoi

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press on 26 February appraise the fighting on Hill 31, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN alleging that the engagement resulted in the largest number of prisoners and largest quantity of weapons captured in the past two weeks of fighting on Highway 9. NHAN DAN recalls previous alleged allied losses north of Highway 9 and says that four out of the six allied battalions deployed on the northern flank of the operation have been "annihilated."

On 27 February VNA belatedly claims that on the 25th, after "wiping out" the 3d Airborne battalion, the Laotian forces attacked the headquarters of the 3d Airborne Brigade and captured "the colonel commander of the brigade and all the officers of the headquarters, including many lieutenant colonels, majors, and company-grade officers." Press comment on the 28th includes a NHAN DAN article which claims the capture of "several hundred POW's" in the attack on Hill 31 as well as documents, weapons, and communications equipment of the brigade headquarters. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the same day maintains that the 3d Airborne Brigade "has basically lost its fighting strength" and says the brigade's "only remaining battalion is being besieged."

In hailing other alleged feats in Laos, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 28th also cites a 26 February attack on another--unnamed--GVN airborne unit in which 17 tanks were allegedly destroyed and 13 others captured.* On the 27th VNA had claimed that in this engagement, north of Ban Dong, a "prong" of 200 paratroopers had been put out of action. NHAN DAN's 1 March editorial also lauds this engagement and claims that the allied tactic of using armored vehicles has been defeated. It concludes that the fighters on Highway 9 have created conditions for "advancing toward crushing the enemy's aggressive operation."

ACTION SOUTH OF HIGHWAY 9 Communist media on 1 March hail the "annihilation" of the 2d battalion, 3d Regiment of the GVN's 1st Division in a battle south of Highway 9 on 27 February. According to the communist account, more than 300 South Vietnamese troops were killed or wounded, more than 40 others--including many officers--were captured, and all enemy weapons and other military equipment were seized. Propaganda,

* Neither this editorial nor other propaganda mentions the communist use of tanks in Laos.

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including an article in the 1 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, claims that this is the seventh South Vietnamese battalion put out of action by the Laotian fighters.

Battle reports on 2 March claim that on the preceding day another--unnamed--battalion of the 1st Division was "wiped out" at "peak 619," some five kilometers southwest of Phoi Ko Boc. Twenty South Vietnamese troops, including a number of officers, are alleged to have been captured, along with "all" weapons, three ammunition dumps, and food supply caches.

VANG PAO TROOPS Alleged allied efforts to coordinate the Laotian operation with Vientiane forces are brought up* in a 26 February Pathet Lao news agency report: It hails achievements of "regional forces and guerrillas" in Savannakhet Province on the 18th against a "key position of the U.S.-fostered 'special forces'" in the Huoi Mun area and on the 17th against an airstrip of the "Vang Pao bandits and commandos" in the same area. Linking the presence of these forces in the area to the GVN move into Laos, the report notes that "the said bandits and commandos, belonging to the 30th commando regiment of the Vang Pao 'special forces,' had been air-transported to the Muong Nong area, in southeast Savannakhet Province, to prepare the ground for the current aggressive operation of U.S. and Saigon troops in southern Laos, but meeting with fierce and repeated attacks of the Lao patriots, they were later transferred from Muong Nong to Huoi Mun."

A charge of collusion between Saigon and Vientiane is made in 3 March Hanoi broadcast which cites "Western sources" for the report that a South Vietnamese military delegation arrived in Vientiane on 1 March to talk with Prince Souvanna Phouma. Hanoi quotes UPI as reporting that the meeting with the Prince has given rise to rumors that the South Vietnamese are seeking Vientiane support for the allied operation in southern Laos or "are soliciting authorization to unleash military attacks everywhere in Laos." It warns that "the Vientiane authorities must . . . be held responsible for helping the Americans and their lackeys to intensify their aggression against Laos.

* Earlier communist claims to have engaged Laotian Government forces moving east on Highway 9 are reported in the 18 February TRENDS, page 2.

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DRV, PRG SAY ALLIED OBJECTIVES THWARTED, APPEAL TO ARVN

Vietnamese communist comment on the Laos operation insists that U.S. aims in the operation have been thwarted, particularly ridiculing Administration claims to have disrupted the communist supply lines. The propaganda says that while the allied intention was to strengthen GVN forces through the Laos operation, in fact ARVN units in Laos have disintegrated. Some comment also notes, and ridicules, the allied objective of forestalling any communist dry-season offensive. After detailing alleged insurgent achievements in Indochina during the past month, a Liberation Radio commentary on the 3d remarks: "It is crystal-clear that the Nixon clique has been unable to ward off our offensive."

Some propaganda claims that communist attacks have forced the allies to postpone a planned operation in the tricountry border area which was supposed to be launched in the wake of the major allied operations in Cambodia and Laos. Allegations about the aborted operation--in NHAN DAN editorials of 25 February and 2 March and in other comment--are made in the context of praise for South Vietnamese insurgent attacks, especially in the highlands area.

SUPPLY LINES, Administration statements about allied forces' FUEL PIPES disruption of communist supply lines in Laos are caustically derided in a 25 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article and a Liberation Radio commentary on the 26th, both pegged to remarks reportedly made by Presidential adviser Kissinger at a briefing for members of Congress on 23 February. Ridiculing his view that the operation was achieving its objective of "cutting the enemy's lifeline," the article in the army paper--reviewed by VNA and broadcast by Hanoi radio--compares the reported allied objectives at the start of the Laos campaign with the allies' present beleaguered position on the battlefield. It says the allies initially wished to destroy the enemy's troops and supplies, to disrupt his lifeline, to increase the independence and strength of the Saigon army, and to "completely strangle adversary forces operating in South Vietnam and Cambodia." The radio version of the article also includes the comment that "by openly belittling the objectives of this large-scale operation on behalf of the White House, Kissinger openly admitted both the U.S. failure and the Nixon clique's erroneous strategic considerations."

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The article also ridicules Kissinger for citing the cutting of enemy fuel lines to demonstrate that supply routes have been cut. It cites a South Vietnamese statement that enemy fuel lines are maintained in Tchepone and remarks that "thus Kissinger is 'skillful' because the U.S.-puppet have destroyed the fuel pipes without even reaching the locality."

Both the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article and the Liberation Radio commentary note Western news reports that the volume of war materiel transported by the adversary in the past two weeks has doubled. An allusion to communist efforts to keep supplies moving appears in a 25 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial which, in surveying the contributions of various types of Laotian and Quang Tri troops, says that "combatants of the engineering corps" have "cleared many roads" and "combatants of the transportation branch . . . have fought the enemy to advance and have cleared roads to drive ahead and bring goods to their destination, thus contributing to common victories." Other Hanoi propaganda on transportation in recent weeks has not directly mentioned Laos, but the allied air and ground strikes at the Ho Chi Minh trail seem to be the obvious reason for a spate of comment urging transportation workers to overcome extreme hardships and difficulties to move supplies through to the "frontline."

POW'S, PROSELYTING There are numerous appeals for troops to surrender. A Liberation Radio broadcast on 27 February, for example, appealing to ARVN troops to "return to the people's side," warns that "you are now standing on the brink of death." Liberation Radio claims that the Laos operation has failed and that "the U.S. aggressors are urging the Saigon troops to retreat from Ban Dong and the other positions to avoid being exterminated." It adds that the liberation forces on the southern Laos front "are tightening their stranglehold and pursuing the remnants of the enemy troops; all Saigon army units are now within the range of the PLAF artillery." This and other calls for surrender recall the "annihilation" of Ranger and Airborne battalions.

A Liberation Radio broadcast on the 27th, similarly claiming that the allies "have begun to retreat from a number of places along Highway 9," outlines procedures for proselyting and, among other things, instructs that POW's be sent "to the rear for interrogation in order to serve combat and enemy proselyting." There is some evidence of the use of South Vietnamese ralliers and POW's. A Pathet Lao news agency report on 28 February, in detailing the

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communist assault on Hill 31, notes that "mingled with the shots of the Lao liberation fighters was the broken voice of a rallied Saigon soldier calling on his fellows to stop resistance." And on 1 March Liberation Radio broadcast remarks by two prisoners allegedly captured on 19 February during the attack on Hill 500.

A 25 February QUAN DOI NHAN DAN "essay," broadcast in Vietnamese to the South on the 26th, stresses the psychological impact on allied forces of the capture of the 39th Ranger battalion position on Hill 500.* The essay links the "victory" on Hill 500 with the past Vietnamese victories at Phu Tram, Dong Khe,** and Dien Bien Phu, noting that these battles "contributed to creating a call for surrender that compelled the seasoned Legionnaires of the French colonialists and the then puppet troops to kneel and shout: 'Let us surrender immediately; otherwise all of us will be exterminated.'" While professing reluctance to draw a current analogy with the "great meaning" of these victories, the essay suggests that the victory on Hill 500 was similar in that it "echoed the clearest and most efficient command: 'Surrender and live; resist and die.'"

ANNOUNCEMENT ON USE OF U.S. "RESCUE TEAMS" IN LAOS ASSAILED

PRG, DRV The Administration's position that U.S. infantry teams can be sent into Laos to rescue downed pilots is scored in a 27 February statement by the PRG's Paris delegation spokesman. The statement, carried by VNA on the 28th, merely refers to remarks by "many" Administration spokesmen on 26 February. But a NHAN DAN commentary on the 28th quotes Defense Department spokesman Friedheim as saying on the 26th that "'small teams of infantrymen' would be sent into Laos and probably even North Vietnam to protect the lives of downed American pilots or their rescuers.'" NHAN DAN again claims

* Consistent with other comment, the essay credits the South Vietnamese PLAF with the capture of Hill 500, a position of the 39th Ranger battalion in fact located in Laos. Communist comment on the attack on Hill 500 is discussed in the 24 February TRENDS, page 4.

** This may be an allusion to the communist capture of the French outpost of Dong Khe during the September 1950 border campaign--the first major offensive against the French. It is not clear what the allusion to Phu Tram represents.

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that U.S. ground troops are already in Laos and charges that President Nixon is attempting to lift restrictions on such operations. It speculates that, "according to Friedheim's logic," rescue teams will be used first, then "other U.S. units of bigger size will cross into Laos to 'protect' the 'rescue teams,'" and finally, "if the trend holds, there will be before long a sizable force of U.S. combat troops in Laos described as 'rescue teams' by Washington but which in fact is an aggressor army."

Saying that the Pentagon spokesman did not rule out the possibility of using rescue teams in North Vietnam, NHAN DAN comments that this position is in line with Thieu's "shout for a northward march and with Nixon's 17 February statement that the United States might support an offensive" by Saigon against the North. The paper maintains that the United States is obviously "bent on preparing for extremely serious adventures in Indochina" and that "Nixon is contemplating the dispatch of U.S. combat troops to Laos and a ground attack on North Vietnam." A 2 March LFA commentary similarly scores statements on the use of rescue teams and says that "in the last few days the accelerated intensification of bombardments by U.S. aircraft, warships, and artillery against the DRV has exposed Nixon's wicked design of widening the war to the whole of Indochina."

Typical of other references to the possible use of U.S. ground forces in Laos, the 2 March NHAN DAN editorial charges that because of heavy allied losses, "the aggressors are scraping infantrymen and aircraft from other areas and sending them to the Highway 9 area" and "are making preparations to send U.S. troops into Laos."

NLHS A 2 March statement by an NLHS Central Committee spokesman also scores Friedheim's remarks on the use of U.S. rescue teams in Laos. The statement comments that the United States is thus revealing the presence of U.S. troops in the Laos operation "gradually" and preparing a pretext for bringing in "massive numbers of U.S. infantrymen." It claims that in the current operation in Laos the United States has, among other things, "deployed 10 battalions of U.S. armored troops and infantrymen" which, along with "some U.S. Green Beret elements disguised in Saigon puppet uniforms," coordinate with the Saigon troops and "directly commanded the operation." It also charges that "a large number" of U.S. infantrymen disguised in Vientiane "puppet" uniforms are present in various areas in southern Laos.

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FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN SCORES VIENTIANE ON DRV PRISONERS

In line with its consistent failure to acknowledge the DRV presence in Laos, Hanoi takes issue with the 27 February press conference in Vientiane at which North Vietnamese prisoners were presented by a Defense Ministry spokesman. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, carried in Hanoi media on 1 March, denounces the "concocted" story about North Vietnamese prisoners and "flatly rejects all these vile allegations and slanders" by Vientiane. This is the first time such a statement about prisoners has been made at this level; in the past Hanoi had occasionally used the vehicle of a VNA "authorized" statement to score the Vientiane press conferences at which North Vietnamese prisoners were exhibited. The most recent VNA statement was on 17 February 1970, and the last one before that was on 3 December 1968. An 8 April 1969 press conference was apparently ignored by Hanoi, which left it to the NLHS to issue the denial via the Pathet Lao news agency.

The current statement, while denouncing "concoctions" about North Vietnamese prisoners, does not address itself to the broader question of the presence of DRV troops in Laos. This is consistent with Hanoi's usual practice of denying "North Vietnamese aggression" in Laos and of charging Souvanna Phouma with "slandering the DRV" without explicitly addressing the question of a VPA troop presence in Laos. A NHAN DAN commentary carried by VNA on 3 March, which scores a statement by Souvanna Phouma seeking UN Secretary General U Thant's intervention in the war in Laos, similarly avoids the question of DRV troops in Laos but complains that Souvanna Phouma "frequently speaks ill of the DRV, charging her with 'aggression.'"

Explicit denials of the troop presence do appear occasionally, however. A 10 October 1970 NHAN DAN article scored President Nixon for stating that "North Vietnam has invaded South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." A 14 October 1969 DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denounced a white paper published by the Vientiane government which documented the "so-called presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos." The 17 February 1970 VNA authorized statement did not specifically deny the presence of DRV troops in Laos, although the one on 3 December 1968 denounced the "cooked-up story of the presence of the North Vietnamese army" as well as of North Vietnamese prisoners.

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DRAFTING Another DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement,
VIETNAMESE also carried in Hanoi media on 1 March, denounces
 Vientiane for "forcibly drafting" Vietnamese
residents of Laos and sending them for training. Scoring these
"persecutions and illegal arrests," the statement says they
prove that the "Vientiane authorities," in collusion with the
Saigon "puppet administration," are trying to serve the U.S.
"scheme" of intensifying the war by "pitting Indochinese against
Indochinese." It calls the drafting a "serious challenge" to
the Vietnamese people and the DRV Government which "undermines
the long-standing friendship between the Lao and Vietnamese
peoples."

USSR GOVERNMENT PROTESTS "INVASION" OF LAOS, "THREATS" TO DRV

Moscow's first official protest of the U.S.-supported ARVN move into Laos came in a sharp Soviet Government statement on 25 February--two-and-a-half weeks after President Thieu's announcement of the operation on the 8th. The statement "resolutely denounces" the incursion as "another criminal act of the United States" that violates international law and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos--elements that were also present in the 3 February TASS statement. Charging that by its actions the United States is "taking upon itself grave responsibility for new complications in the international situation," the statement goes on to say that they "cannot but affect Soviet-American relations."

Singling out President Nixon's press conference comment on the 17th that he did not rule out the renewed use of air power against the DRV, the statement comments: "Judging by everything, the U.S. leadership seeks to condition public opinion to the idea that the United States . . . acts in Indochina with impunity This is a dangerous delusion, fraught with the most serious consequences for the United States itself in the first place." The statement emphatically asserts the resolve of the Soviet Union "and other socialist states" to give the DRV help in repelling U.S. "aggression," warning pointedly in this context that the DRV is "a member of the socialist family." (A TASS English-language summary of the statement uses the term "socialist camp," but both the domestic service and PRAVDA use the word "family" [semya].) Saying that the Soviet Union "cannot remain

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indifferent to new escalation of the American aggression," the statement concludes with a promise "to continue giving all necessary aid to the fraternal DRV, to the patriots of Indochina."

The statement's formulation that the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent to new escalation" sharpens the warning in the two previous government statements reacting to U.S. actions in Indochina--the one on 16 December supporting the 10 December DRV joint party-government appeal and the one on 4 May on Cambodia, read by Kosygin--that the Soviet Government "will draw appropriate conclusions" from the new U.S. actions. The current formulation appeared in only one previous government statement on Indochina, on 30 June 1966, protesting the U.S. bombings near Hanoi and Haiphong. It said that no state, "no matter how far away from Vietnam it may lie" and "showing real and not pretended concern for the fate of the world," can be indifferent to the U.S. action.

The assertion that the Soviets will continue to give all necessary aid to the DRV and the "patriots of Indochina" seems to be responsive to the spread of the fighting and is consistent with other expressions of broadened Soviet support. Over the years, Soviet propaganda has promised aid to the DRV and the "South Vietnamese patriots," and on at least one recent occasion Brezhnev implied assistance to patriots in all of Indochina. In his 12 June 1970 election speech Brezhnev followed an expression of support for the "just principles and demands advanced by the patriotic forces of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos" with the assertion that "we shall render all the necessary assistance to those who are fighting for their freedom and independence."

EAST-WEST The statement that U.S. actions in Indochina
RELATIONS "cannot but affect Soviet-American relations
 too" goes farther than the 4 May government
statement. That statement did say, however, that the
actions in Cambodia "may further complicate the overall
international situation" and questioned whether it was
possible to talk seriously about the President's desire for
fruitful talks to solve urgent international problems at
a time when Washington was "crudely trampling on" the 1954
and 1962 Geneva agreements and is "undertaking more and new

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actions that undermine the mainstays of international security." In response to a question on the effect of the incursion into Cambodia on the Vienna SALT negotiations during the press conference that followed the reading of the statement, Kosygin said that the cavalier U.S. attitude toward international agreements and law "arouses watchfulness on our part, and one must say that these actions by the United States do not strengthen mutual trust."

In their election speeches in June 1970, all three top Soviet leaders expressed concern over the effect of U.S. "aggression" in general on U.S.-Soviet relations. Podgorny made the most negative assessment, saying that relations are "not developing" and "are practically in a kind of frozen state" because of the "aggressive course" of the United States.

Before May 1970, the Soviet leaders had refrained from explicitly assessing the effect of the Nixon Administration's Indochina policy on U.S.-Soviet relations, although they had made negative assessments during the Johnson Administration. The last such discussion publicized by Moscow was in Kosygin's 25 June 1967 UN press conference, when he said in response to a question on Soviet-U.S. relations: "I believe that the problem of the improvement of Soviet-American relations must be solved, first of all, by a cessation of U.S. aggression in Vietnam." The edited official Soviet "text" of the press conference, carried by TASS, rendered this passage in a more negative vein: "It is impossible to count on an improvement" of relations so long as aggression in Vietnam goes on.

FOLLOWUP The possibility that the release of the Soviet
TREATMENT statement on the 25th may have been timed in
 part to offset President Nixon's foreign policy
report is reinforced by Soviet media's followup treatment.
In addition to giving predictably wide publicity to the
statement, Soviet media have featured numerous reports and
roundups to portray a worldwide favorable reaction to it.
A Radio Moscow commentator on the 26th said the "progressive
world public warmly received the Soviet statement, appraising
it as an exceptionally timely document of immense international
significance." An article by Ilinskiy in IZVESTIYA on the 27th
similarly hailed the Soviet declaration as "the center of
attention of world public opinion." And a dispatch from
Hanoi published in PRAVDA on the 27th pointed out that "all
Hanoi papers frontpaged the declaration."

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On 2 and 3 March TASS reported meetings held throughout the USSR to support the government statement, presumably beginning a campaign like the one that followed the 3 February TASS statement.

Other Soviet comment on Indochina has hewed closely to the language of the government statement. An international review in PRAVDA on the 28th, according to TASS, denounces U.S. Indochina policy and repeats the Soviet statement's warning that "to think that the U.S. aggression will go unpunished is a dangerous illusion for the United States itself." It adds that the Soviet Union is ready to "continue giving all necessary aid to the DRV and Indochinese patriots."

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN
POLICY REPORT

In contrast to the portrayal of an enthusiastic world reaction to the Soviet statement, Soviet media depict President Nixon's foreign policy report as arousing widespread criticism but provide little original comment. A brief Radio Moscow account of the President's report on the 25th said it indicates that "the Republican Administration apparently does not intend to make any amendments to its foreign-political course, which, as before, is based on the Nixon doctrine." The radio added that "the American President continues to insist on his 'right' to organize armed intrusions into such neutral countries as Cambodia and Laos."

A panelist in Radio Moscow's weekly domestic service roundtable program on the 28th made the point that it is necessary to distinguish between the President's report "and what the United States is doing in Indochina." He added that "despite all the dodges, the President does not promise total withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam and Indochina; he once again puts forward his old theories, his old positions . . . on mutual withdrawal of troops." The discussion was notable for its emphasis on the intensified use of U.S. air power in Indochina. One of the panelists, observing that "rocket-carrying aircraft are really being used as artillery and are sweeping over the patriots' battle positions," added that "such large-scale use of air forces is really a new form of operations."

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A Washington-dated dispatch in PRAVDA on the 27th focused on adverse U.S. congressional reaction to the comments on Indochina in the President's foreign policy report. The dispatch also said the report has given new impetus to the antiwar movement in the United States.

A Radio Moscow broadcast to China on the 26th, noting that in the foreign policy report "Nixon emphasized that we are prepared to hold bilateral talks with Peking," added: "The United States is trying to make use of the nationalistic trends in the Chinese leadership's policy, play on the anti-Soviet nature of their foreign policy, and reap big profits from their policy of splitting the world revolutionary and national liberation movement."

Moscow's effort to play down the President's report is made the more apparent by a Zhukov article in PRAVDA on "Nixon's doctrine of Vietnamization" which--as summarized by TASS on 2 March--fails even to mention the report, commenting instead on a recent interview given by Herman Kahn to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT on plans to strengthen U.S. positions in Asia. Zhukov says it appears from Kahn's arguments that the United States plans only to reduce U.S. casualties through Vietnamization and does not plan on a withdrawal.

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PEKING COMMENT AVOIDS QUESTION OF CHINA'S SECURITY

Peking's comment on Indochina, still voluminous but on a declining level in the past week, avoids any mention of China's security--last raised in the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. Sihanouk's tour of China has occasioned another major leader's speech, this time at a Nanking rally on 1 March. Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu, Kiangsu chief and commander of the Nanking military region, lauded the "strong determination" of the three Indochinese peoples in "their war" against the United States and expressed Chinese determination to "fulfill the proletarian internationalist duty of the great rear area." Hsu also said current operations in Indochina show that the United States "is baring its teeth and blustering, but it is, in fact, a paper tiger which is outwardly strong but inwardly weak."

Like Chang Chun-chiao at a 22 February Shanghai rally for Sihanouk, Hsu did not refer to China's security interests in discussing current military developments in Indochina. And Hsu, in fact, did not go as far as Chang in associating Peking's interests with those of its Indochinese allies. Chang had termed recent actions in Indochina "a grave provocation" against the people of China and of the world as well as against the Indochinese--the formulation used in the PRC's 4 May 1970 statement on the incursion into Cambodia and in subsequent statements on Vietnam and Laos.

While Peking's current reticence on the subject of China's security may reflect high-level consultations or an optimistic assessment of recent military developments in Laos, it may simply be that having registered authoritative concern--in the 12 February government statement--over a threat to its security from operations in Laos, Peking is now waiting to see how the situation develops. The Commentator article on the 20th, like the 14 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial responding to earlier White House denials that the Laos operations pose a threat to China, was apparently designed to buttress the government statement's warning by challenging Washington's dismissal of the question of Chinese security.

Peking has not yet addressed itself to the President's discussion of Indochina in his State of the World Report.* In an apparent

* Peking has directly mentioned the report twice so far: An NCNA report on 25 February, denouncing the British decision to sell arms to South Africa, quoted the President's statement opposing any effort to isolate South Africa; and a 2 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on Korea derided the President's report for citing U.S. policy on Korea as exemplifying the Nixon doctrine.

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allusion to the report, a 28 February NCNA account of the military situation in southern Laos said the President "recently moaned that the United States and its Saigon running dogs would have 'more hard choices ahead' in Indochina." (The President's report says at one point that enemy intentions and capabilities in Indochina will pose "some hard choices" about the deployment of allied troops as the United States withdraws.)

PUBLICITY FOR USSR STATEMENT In a striking albeit modest sign of Peking's willingness to accommodate Hanoi's sensitivities regarding the Sino-Soviet rivalry, NCNA on 27 February reports the Soviet Government statement on Laos issued two days earlier. The report--broadcast in Peking's Russian service and some other foreign languages, but not in the domestic service--quotes the statement as saying that the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent to the new escalation of the American aggression," but its promise of continuing aid is not mentioned. NCNA's account also omits the statement's reference to the DRV as a member of "the socialist family." Not surprisingly, NCNA quoted the statement's warning that U.S. actions "cannot but affect Soviet-American relations."

Peking's publicity for the Soviet statement reciprocates Moscow's reporting of recent Chinese pronouncements on Laos. There was similar reciprocity last November, when each side reported the other's statement on the invasion of Guinea. The effect is to submerge the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the interests of a show of unity in behalf of those--like the North Vietnamese--directly involved. Such a move accords with Peking's tendency in the past year or so to assume a markedly less intransigent stance in international affairs, including bilateral relations with Moscow, while accenting interests in common with the "medium-sized and small nations" defending their independence and sovereignty.

On 2 March NCNA rounded up bloc comment on the Laotian incursion, noting that government organs in the GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Mongolia had issued statements and Poland a memorandum condemning U.S. actions in Laos. Peking had reported the Albanian government statement on 12 February, and on 6 and 17 February carried press comment from Romania, which has not yet issued a government statement.

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FRONT SAYS THIEU WANTS TO ELIMINATE "BIG MINH" AS CANDIDATE

Front media again portray South Vietnamese political figure Gen. Duong Van Minh as an important opponent to the Thieu regime,* and suggest additionally that he is committed to peace and to independence from U.S. domination. Two LPA news items on 1 and 2 March, listing examples of opposition to the Laos operation among noncommunist elements in South Vietnam, quote General Minh as being critical of the operation; both items identify Minh as a member of "an opposition group." The report on the 1st says that Minh, speaking at a 27 February reception in Saigon, "condemned the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique who on orders from their U.S. masters had sent Saigon puppet troops to Laos as cannon fodder for the U.S. aggressors." According to LPA, Minh opposed "serving as a tool" for anybody and urged that "the army must serve peace."

Minh's potential role as a presidential candidate is raised in an article on the October GVN presidential elections broadcast by the Front radio in a series of five daily installments beginning on 16 February. The article is attributed to To Lien** and is said to have been published in the January issue of the magazine TIEN PHONG, organ of the People's Revolutionary Party. In an effort to discredit President Thieu, To Lien reviews his actions at the time of the September 1967 presidential elections. He charges, among other things, that Thieu used "crafty tricks" to eliminate the Au Truong Thanh and Duong Van Minh slates which "enjoyed greater prestige among the people."

Following a lengthy attack on Thieu's actions as president, To Lien directly deals with Duong Van Minh's potential role as a presidential candidate. He claims that Thieu is "very anxious to eliminate" Minh and that "Minh is Thieu's greatest fear." The article explains that, although Minh "has not declared that he is running, Thieu is afraid that Minh will be able to exert influence on various circles because Thieu plans to continue the war for another two or three years to 'eliminate' all communists." Reviewing alleged Thieu efforts to hamper Minh, the article adds: "The most brazen act was that Thieu repeatedly threatened: 'an immediate peace is a false peace. . . . Those who advocate an immediate peace are communist lackeys.'" In this same context, it deploras a reported Thieu statement, quoted from a 17 January AFP dispatch, that "'I will use violence to overthrow any leader who is ready to negotiate with the communists.'"

* Attention to Duong Van Minh in Vietnamese communist media was discussed in the 12 November 1970 TRENDS, pages 5 and 6.

** An article attributed to the same author, published in TIEN PHONG and broadcast by Liberation Radio on 15 November 1970, discussed the South Vietnamese economy.

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SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT'S PRESS AGENCY BEGINS TRANSMISSIONS

Development of the propaganda apparatus of the Cambodian FUNK and RGNU moved forward with the inauguration on 2 March of a daily radioteletype transmission in French by the INFORMATION AGENCY OF KAMPUCHEA (AKI). The new transmission was announced in a communique of the "AKI Secretariat," broadcast by the FUNK radio on 25 February and picked up by Hanoi's VNA the next day.

The first propaganda medium of Sihanouk's government was the "Voice of the FUNK," which began broadcasting on 1 August 1970 following an announcement carried in Hanoi media on 28 July. On 9 August the new FUNK radio announced that AKI would be established the following day. AKI-attributed items were subsequently publicized by VNA and in Liberation media.

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MIDDLE EAST

SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT PASSES POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

The Soviet Government statement issued on 27 February places heavy emphasis on political settlement (some 15 references) and focuses on the developments stemming from the Jarring talks, primarily "constructive" UAR initiatives, resulting in a "more favorable situation" in the past few weeks. The document highlights the 21 February Israeli cabinet statement rejecting full Israeli withdrawal, characterizing it as a negative "reply to Jarring," and it holds the United States responsible, with Israel, for this "obstructionist" step. The statement comes one day after Israel gave Jarring its reply--foreshadowed in the 21 February cabinet statement which Moscow is attacking--and a week before the 7 March expiration of the cease-fire, not mentioned in the statement.

In issuing a statement at this level, Moscow perhaps seeks to demonstrate concern over the fate of the Jarring mission and to provide impetus for its diplomatic activities--unacknowledged by Soviet media--to move up a scheduled Big Four Meeting and secure four-power intervention. The last formal Soviet statement on the Middle East, by the Soviet Foreign Ministry last October, had concluded by pledging that the USSR would promote a political settlement "in every way in the framework of bilateral meetings" and four-power consultations. The current statement, however, pledges only to "do everything" for peace.

Not since March 1968 has Moscow issued a statement on the Middle East at government level; that one was responsive to Israeli "military provocations" against the Arabs. Since then, formal statements have been issued by TASS, the Supreme Soviet, and the Foreign Ministry.

U.S. ROLE The current statement, criticizing Israel for its negative reply to Jarring, routinely charges that Israel counts on U.S. support, and accuses the United States of encouraging Israel's "aggressive policy." Making the stereotyped charge that Israel is the "shock tool of American imperialism," the statement claims that the United States pays lip service to a political settlement and recognizes in words the Arab states' "lawful interests," but supports Israel in deed. The document asserts that the United States shares responsibility

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with Israel for the situation now developing in the Middle East, for Israel's "latest obstructionist step" in refusing to withdraw, and "for all possible consequences of this."

The statement prescribes no course of action--there is no mention of possible Big Four or Security Council measures--but merely calls for "vigorous actions" by "all states interested in peace" to prevent Israel and its patrons from frustrating a political settlement. Claiming that Israel's plans are "doomed to failure," it declares that the Soviet Union will continue providing the Arab peoples the necessary political and material assistance in the struggle for liberation of the occupied lands.*

ARAB MOVES Stressing Arab initiatives since the resumption of the Jarring talks, the government statement observes that from the very outset the contacts "acquired the nature of a discussion of concrete undertakings." It praises the UAR's "clear and positive stand" and "constructive position," noting that the "Arab countries" agreed to continue the cease-fire and the UAR proposed opening the Suez Canal to international shipping if Israel would begin withdrawing troops from Sinai. It adds that in response to Jarring's 8 February approaches to both sides regarding "concrete commitments on two key questions"-- withdrawal and terms of peace--the UAR declared its readiness to conclude a peace agreement with Israel if Israel undertook to withdraw from all occupied territories and fulfill UN decisions on the Palestinian refugees.

The statement notes commitments the UAR is prepared to envisage in the peace treaty, including an end to the state of war and respect for each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence,** as well as recognition of the

* The Soviet Government statement in March 1968 had referred to U.S. support of Israeli actions, branded Israel as following the footsteps of "Hitlerite criminals," cautioned that Israel's policies "cannot go unpunished," and pledged that as long as Israel's leaders, with "support from outside," espoused annexation of Arab territories, the USSR would help the "victims of aggression."

** These points were included, according to a Petrov NEW TIMES article, in a clause on "mutually binding documents," in the Soviet proposals advanced at the end of 1968. NEW TIMES (Russian edition, 19 February) said the UAR had "fully endorsed" the proposals, which were "agreed upon between the Soviet and UAR governments."

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right of each side to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Mentioning the UAR's position on navigation through the Suez Canal and the Tiran Strait, the statement adds that Cairo also expressed agreement with the idea of creating demilitarized zones on both sides of the border and stationing a UN peace-keeping force "in some areas"--two points described in followup comment as "particularly important."

It became obvious, the statement says, that the talks had approached a decisive stage: "It was enough for the Israeli Government to announce its readiness to assume a part of the commitments" concerning a political settlement, including that of withdrawal, and a genuine turn to peace would have taken place. But the 21 February Israeli cabinet statement gave a negative reply on withdrawal, the "question without which there can be no peace in the Middle East."

FOLLOWUP COMMENT The first followup comment to the government statement comes in the apparently unprecedented fashion of an amended rebroadcast of the regular commentators' roundtable broadcast by the domestic service every Sunday. The first rebroadcast of the 28 February roundtable carried the original version, but a second two hours later substituted a new Middle East section which highlighted, and quoted from, the government statement while incorporating some material from the earlier program. Over half of the variant version was later carried in foreign-language broadcasts, identified as a Tsoppi commentary. Tsoppi and other commentators outline the proposals along the lines of the government statement and cite its charge that the United States shares responsibility with Israel.

Domestic service commentaries on 1 March by Ryzhikov and Yefremov noted the formal statement's assertion that a favorable situation had been developing for a political settlement, and that it would have been sufficient for Israel to undertake "an appropriate share of obligations" for such a settlement, including withdrawal. Ryzhikov commented that "sober-minded politicians in the West" long ago realized that the balance of forces in the Middle East has finally changed against Israel, and they "do realize" that sooner or later Israel will have to withdraw. Yefremov, in a commentary on the 2d, said the myth of the Arabs' alleged intractability and bellicosity has been dispelled, and he praised the UAR's "completely practical proposals" which "take into consideration Israel's interests, too." Restoration of peace, he added, is hampered by the absence of any real arguments from Tel Aviv.

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BIG FOUR ROLE Soviet propaganda has tended to obacure Moscow's interest in a more active four-power role in promoting a settlement,* but it is made apparent in Petrov's article in NEW TIMES No. 8. Petrov attributed to the UAR's 15 January memorandum to Jarring a proposal that a political settlement be guaranteed by the four permanent members of the Security Council. (The memorandum, as published in the New York TIMES on 21 January, says that the Security Council may decide on necessary arrangements for providing security to all states in the area, including establishment of a UN peace-keeping force in which the Big Four would participate.)

In line with Moscow's failure to acknowledge the 5 February State Department announcement of U.S. readiness to discuss guarantees in Big Four consultations, Petrov remarked evasively that "according to the press, it has been agreed" to include the question of guarantees on the agenda of one of the next four-power meetings. Experience shows, Petrov added, that "despite attempts in the West to minimize the significance" of Big Four consultations, they can "contribute importantly" to a peaceful settlement, and the "UAR proposal concerning possible guarantees" could considerably enhance the role of such consultations.

ROMANIAN STATEMENT DEPLORES ISRAELI LACK OF RECEPTIVITY

Bucharest, which alone among Moscow's East European allies refused to break relations with Israel after the 1967 war and resisted branding Israel an aggressor, now expresses dissatisfaction with Tel Aviv's "stiff position." An authorized statement issued by the Romanian news agency AGERPRES on 2 March calls for implementation of the 1967 Security Council resolution and welcomes the UAR's initiative and efforts for a political settlement. The Romanian people cannot understand, the statement adds, "the Israeli Government's stiff position of stipulating conditions of a nature to prevent a negotiated settlement, of failing to show the necessary receptivity."

* According to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, AL-AHRAM on 2 March, reporting UAR Foreign Minister Riyad's meetings with the diplomatic representatives of the Big Four, said that "certain of these countries' representatives" proposed calling for a Security Council meeting, and the French and Soviet ambassadors proposed that the "major states" issue a strongly worded statement and adopt a unified stand demanding Israeli withdrawal.

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AGERPRES declares that no political settlement can be reached without Israeli withdrawal. This assertion is balanced by a call for recognition of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all states in the area, including Israel. In line with past Ceausescu statements, AGERPRES reiterates that the problem of the Palestinian people must be resolved in conformity with "its right to self-determination, with its lawful aspirations and national interests."

USSR HAS LITTLE COMMENT ON MIDEAST SECTION OF NIXON REPORT

Moscow's response to the Middle East portion of the President's State of the World Report has thus far been generally confined to carping remarks by commentators that the report reveals no change in Washington's pro-Israeli policy. The Soviet Government statement on the Middle East, issued two days after the President's report, does not explicitly refer to the message. A commentary in Arabic on the 28th does link a charge in the government statement with the President's report; quoting the statement's assertion that the United States recognizes Arab rights in words but supports Israel in deeds, the commentary says that "this was once more confirmed by Nixon's message to Congress."

In both the original and amended versions of the Middle East passage in the 28 February domestic service commentators' roundtable, panelists complain of the President's omissions, remarking that he made only passing reference to the Jarring mission--although it is the "most important means of reaching a peaceful settlement"--and paid scant attention to the UN decisions. In the roundtable as originally broadcast, the panelist goes on to say that the President, in effect, "appears as an advocate of Israel," placing the entire burden of reaching a settlement on direct talks "between the aggressor and the victims of aggression"--the "persistent leitmotif" of Israel's policy.

An Arabic-language commentary on 26 February, giving virtually no indication of the content of the report, asserted that every line indicated that U.S. policy in the Middle East remains unchanged. Singling out the President's "reference to the preservation of military balance in the Middle East," the commentary said this meant increased supply of weapons

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and loans to Israel, and could only be interpreted as demonstrating that Tel Aviv will remain the "tool of U.S. imperialism." It asked rhetorically how, in the light of the President's message, one could assess U.S. statements that Washington is putting pressure on Israel to reach a solution, and it concluded that America's "pro-Israel and openly anti-Arab course" is set out in the President's report.

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GERMANY AND BERLIN

GDR FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS CDU/CSU MEETING IN WEST BERLIN

In the first such protest at the level of a foreign ministry statement since 26 November 1970, East Germany protested well in advance, on 26 February, the meeting of CDU/CSU Bundestag and Landtag chairmen slated for 3-5 March in West Berlin. The November 1970 Foreign Ministry statement had reacted to a comparable CDU/CSU meeting. In the interval between the two, the GDR had used the format of the foreign ministry spokesman's statement to protest a succession of West German political activities in West Berlin, including a meeting of CDU/CSU functionaries at a lower level than that of the Bundestag-Landtag chairmen's gatherings.

In keeping with customary practice, GDR media are silent on the retaliatory autobahn traffic slowdown that began on 3 March--the fourth in the current series of slowdowns that began with the one responsive to the November CDU/CSU meeting. The 26 February Foreign Ministry statement had warned in the usual euphemistic terms of possible countermeasures against such "annexationist provocations" as the CDU/CSU meeting, declaring that "the unnecessary complications resulting from them must . . . have a detrimental effect" on the West Berliners and that "the responsibility for the consequences . . . will have to be borne by those who commit them and also by those who further them through benevolent condonement."

A brief TASS report of the GDR Foreign Ministry statement in the 28 February PRAVDA left out the allusions to countermeasures. And Moscow media have not mentioned the Soviet embassy statement to the Big Three in West Berlin on 26 February which--much like the GDR protest--placed the onus for any "undesirable consequences" of the CDU/CSU meeting on its "organizers" and their "protectors." Moscow had similarly failed to publicize the Soviet embassy's similar statement of 27 January in protest against plans for a January FDP meeting in West Berlin.

Buttressing the current GDR propaganda calls for direct negotiations between the GDR and the West Berlin government on problems affecting their relations, the GDR Foreign Ministry statement addressed an appeal to the West Berlin Senat to insure that the city "is not used for provocative actions against the GDR and other socialist countries." Routinely, it also warned that the continuation of

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Bonn's "annexationist policy" toward West Berlin "disturbs the efforts for understanding in the four-power negotiations [Verhandlungen]* on West Berlin." On 16 February, two days before the 15th session of the four-power ambassadorial talks, a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial had similarly registered the complaint that the "illegal" and "provocative" meetings of FRG state organs or political parties in West Berlin "seriously disturb the four-power talks on improving the situation in West Berlin."

PROTESTS AGAINST
OTHER FRG MEETINGS

The series of GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements had continued in the latter half of February. On the 15th the spokesman "most sharply protested" the SPD executive meeting held in West Berlin that day and "at the same time" the "official" activities of other West German political leaders and ministers, including Defense Minister Schmidt, CDU/CSU Bundestag Chairman Barzel, and Minister of the Interior Genscher. On the 23d, another statement by the spokesman "sharply protested" plans for an FDP federal executive meeting slated to be held in West Berlin on the 26th with the participation of Foreign Minister Scheel.

Chancellor Brandt's presence in West Berlin on 19 February did not occasion a spokesman's statement, but ADN reported on the 19th that he was there in his "official capacity" for an SPD electoral meeting and recalled that "similar political activities by official representatives of the FRG" had been the subject of protest by the GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman "only a short while ago."

STOPH PROPOSES NEGOTIATIONS WITH WEST BERLIN ON VISITS TO GDR

Following the publicity for GDR Premier Stoph's 4 February meeting with the chairman of the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW), Danelius, at which Stoph proposed the negotiation of direct agreements between the GDR and the West Berlin Senat and outlined a three-point agreement on transit traffic,** ADN on the 25th released a letter from

* A week earlier, both Moscow and East Berlin, in reporting the communique on the 18 February four-power ambassadorial meeting on Berlin, had failed to reflect the communique's reference to the talks as "negotiations"--the first use of the term in a communique on these meetings. See the 24 February TRENDS, page 30.

** See the TRENDS of 10 February 1971, pages 34-35.

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Stoph to West Berlin Mayor Schuetz suggesting that the GDR Government and the Senat begin negotiations on an agreement allowing West Berliners to visit East Berlin and the GDR. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND carried the letter on the 27th. TASS carried a brief account on the 26th, printed the next day in PRAVDA, devoid of any detail.

ADN's report of the Stoph-Danielius talks on the 4th had paid lip service to the "great importance" of the four-power ambassadorial talks but had nowhere acknowledged any connection between them and the proposed direct GDR-West Berlin negotiations. Stoph's letter to Schuetz now says that an "arrangement" on the issue of West Berliners visiting the GDR can be implemented, "as is understandable," if "arrangements on other questions concerning West Berlin, which are being discussed in the appropriate negotiations," come into force. But it specifies neither the four-power talks nor the meetings between East and West German State Secretaries Kohl and Bahr. GDR media have continued to report the Bahr-Kohl talks--most recently the sixth meeting on 17 February in Berlin and the seventh in Bonn on the 26th--with no detail and no comment.

Stoph's letter alludes, again indirectly, to the four-power negotiations in stating that if "the negotiations on all questions concerning West Berlin are not concluded by Easter," the GDR Government will study the question of allowing West Berliners "to visit the GDR before, during, and after Easter." He added: "This presupposes, of course, that the West Berlin authorities on their part will make efforts to keep the situation in the city free from unnecessary complications which would make such a study difficult."

DANELIUS-ABRASIMOV Soviet and GDR media had reported a
MEETING ON BERLIN meeting between Danielius and Soviet
 Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov on
23 February, the day before Stoph sent his letter to Schuetz. IZVESTIYA reported briefly and without detail on the 25th that they discussed problems connected with West Berlin. The 24 February NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, however, carried the text of an SEW statement on the meeting which reported Abrasimov as stating that the USSR and GDR "are developing constructive, concrete programs which establish the necessary basis for working out acceptable agreements on the West Berlin question"--a statement perhaps cited by

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the SEW to implicitly associate the USSR with Stoph's proposals. The SEW account of the meeting also noted that Abrasimov "stressed the importance of an improvement" in the West Berlin situation through agreements among the Big Four.

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND ON SCHUETZ REPLY Following brief ADN reports on 25 February that Mayor Schuetz was conferring with the Big Four and that he had responded to Stoph's letter, with no indication of the contents of his reply, ADN on 2 March released the text of a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary taking the mayor to task for "apparently" not wanting "to have anything to do with negotiations as proposed" by Stoph and--in effect--for rejecting the idea of GDR-Senat negotiations in parallel with the Big Four ambassadorial talks by insisting that Big Four agreement must precede such negotiations. Citing the passages in Stoph's letter which allude to the responsibility of the Big Four for West Berlin and point to a possibility for an agreement on Easter passes for West Berliners if there are no "unnecessary complications," the paper complained that Schuetz "makes negotiations on the normalization of relations between the GDR and West Berlin dependent on the agreement of the three Western occupying powers." The paper added: "This confirms the fact, which is known anyhow, that West Berlin is an occupied territory."

Noting that Schuetz in the past had expressed readiness to begin negotiations on improving West Berlin-GDR relations, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND blamed the "attitude" of the Big Three for "apparently" blocking any Senat-GDR negotiations. Asserting that the GDR has again proven its readiness to solve the West Berlin situation and declaring that "this readiness cannot and must not be a one-sided matter," the paper concluded that the GDR Government, "despite the West Berlin Senat's still unsatisfactory attitude," "is prepared, for humanitarian reasons, to conduct negotiations with the West Berlin Senat at the appropriate level."

DESIGNATION OF GDR NEGOTIATOR A meeting in East Berlin on 1 March between representatives of Mayor Schuetz and of the GDR Council of Ministers' office went unreported in GDR media. On 2 March, the day the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND criticism of Schuetz was publicized, ADN reported that "the GDR proposed to start negotiations with the West Berlin Senat" on the 4th in Berlin and that Stoph's office had so informed the Senat. ADN added that State Secretary Guenter Kohrt had been named to head the GDR delegation to such talks. TASS carried the ADN report.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

UKRAINE FIRST SECRETARY ASSAILS KIEV OBLAST LEADERSHIP

Political infighting among the Ukrainian leadership was again revealed at the party conference of Kiev oblast, the last and most important of the oblast conferences preceding the Ukrainian party congress. In his keynote address, Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest sharply criticized management of the oblast's affairs by proteges of Ukrainian President A. P. Lyashko, who has been Shelest's rival. Both the Kiev oblast first secretary, V. M. Tsybulko, who was reelected by the conference, and his predecessor, F. P. Golovchenko, who was demoted in April 1970, are associates of Lyashko.

Shelest's extensive comments on the work of the Kiev oblast party organization (published in summary version in the 20 February RADYANSKA UKRAINA) were almost entirely uncomplimentary in nature. He complained of failures to meet industrial production plans, to improve product quality despite much talk, to introduce new technology, to lead agriculture properly, and to provide services. He also demanded improvement in the obkom's operational leadership and its work with cadres.

In sharp contrast, Shelest's earlier speech at the Kharkov oblast conference--in the former bailiwick of his erstwhile patron Podgornyy--was replete with praise for the local organization. Shelest "highly rated" Kharkov's contribution and described Kharkov as "a brilliant symbol of the industrial might of the Ukraine and its revolutionary and labor glory" (RADYANSKA UKRAINA, 7 February). Moreover, Shelest's attack on the Kiev leadership appears to be most exceptional, when compared with others in the current series of oblast conferences nationwide: almost no other such conference--to judge by central and local media accounts--has had to listen to any serious criticism, and only one such conference, in Uzbekistan, has failed to reelect the oblast first secretary.

Shelest's attack may be more a sign of weakness than of strength, however; the two biggest delegations to the upcoming Ukrainian congress, those from the Donetsk and Kiev oblasts, will be headed by proteges of President Lyashko, while the third largest, Dnepropetrovsk, will be headed by

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Premier Shcherbitskiy's proteges. Shelest's attack may be designed to prevent the elevation of Tsybulko to candidate membership in the Ukrainian Politburo, a position usually occupied by the Kiev oblast first secretary. Shelest's attack on Kiev follows his apparently unsuccessful attack in mid-1970 on his Dnepropetrovsk rivals, two of whom were subsequently promoted to important republic posts, as Central Committee cadres chief and agriculture minister.

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