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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

14 JULY 1971

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

14 JULY 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 28)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 5 - 11 JULY 1971

<u>Moscow (3080 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1059 items)</u>	
Mongolian Revolution, 50th Anniversary	(--)	14%	Domestic Issues (35%) 26%
[Kosygin Speeches	(--)	5%]	CCP 50th Anniversary (29%) 21%
USSR-DPRK Friendship Treaty, 10th Anniversary	(0.1%)	9%	[Foreign Greetings & Observances (14%) 12%]
Indochina [PRG Seven-Point Proposal	(7%) (2%)	5% (3%]	[Joint Editorial Article (13%) 7%]
China	(7%)	4%	PRC-DPRK Friendship Treaty, 10th Anniversary (--) 18%
Soyuz XI & Cosmonauts' Death	(23%)	3%	Indochina (7%) 11%
Soviet-French CP Talks	(--)	3%	[PRG Seven-Point Proposal (4%) 4%]
			Albanian Army Anniversary (--) 8%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist propaganda pressing for acceptance of the 1 July PRG peace proposal is highlighted by publicity for DRV Premier Pham Van Dong's remarks at a 9 July Mongolian embassy reception in Hanoi. Dong indicated the substance of the proposal only by indirection when he asked: Why does not the U.S. Administration take this opportunity to end the "aggression," withdraw all troops, and thereby bring the captured pilots home? And given professed U.S. support of self-determination, why does not the United States stop supporting the "bellicose, ruling group" headed by Nguyen Van Thieu? Dong, the communist delegates at Paris, and routine propaganda emphasize favorable worldwide reaction to the proposal. Castigating the Administration for failing to respond promptly, propagandists dismiss Ambassador Bruce's suggestion that talks could progress more fruitfully in a restricted session as a device to avoid a serious response.

PRC media have carried no further high-level comment on the proposal since the 4 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. However, VNA quoted Chou En-lai as expressing support for the proposal on the 4th when he met with the DRV delegation that negotiated an agreement on supplementary military aid from the PRC.

Moscow's endorsement of the PRG proposal expressed in the 5 July PRAVDA editorial is repeated in a statement by the USSR Central Council of Trade Unions which, according to TASS on the 13th, again asserts Soviet determination to give the Vietnamese people "all necessary assistance and support" in their struggle. Routine Soviet propaganda continues to contrast favorable reaction from the U.S. public with the Administration's failure to respond officially.

Alleged military achievements in various parts of South Vietnam during the first half of the year are reviewed in Hanoi and Liberation Front propaganda, including a series of NHAN DAN editorials published from 9 to 14 July. The editorial of the 14th claims that 151,000 allied troops were put out of action during the six-month period.

### DRV, PRG PRESS PEACE PLAN, REBUFF CALL FOR RESTRICTED TALKS

The communist delegates' statements at the 8 July session of the Paris talks amounted to a recapitulation of the substance of the PRG seven-point proposal of 1 July along with pleas for

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a positive U.S. response. Ambassador Bruce's suggestion that proposals of all sides could be more fruitfully explored in a restricted session on the 15th was dismissed in the VNA account and in subsequent propaganda as a "sinister trick" to avoid responding to the seven-point peace initiative.

As it has done on occasion in the past, the VNA account obscured the fact that the allied delegates spoke first. Thus, it summarized Mme. Binh's and Xuan Thuy's formal statements before dealing in two paragraphs with those of Ambassadors Bruce and Lam. Faced with a "warm" welcome from public opinion, VNA said, the Saigon representative had to pledge continued study of the PRG proposal, but in his speech he "only rehashed the absurd demands raised in Nixon's so-called five-point plan." The account thus obscured entirely such specific probing of the PRG proposal as Lam's question whether point one on U.S. withdrawal meant that the United States must discontinue all the aid it is currently giving the GVN. (PRG spokesman Duong Dinh Thao in his post-session briefing did specify that the question of armaments of the Saigon forces does not come under point one, but rather under point three which deals with the question of Vietnam armed forces in South Vietnam. As usual, the press briefings were not publicized in Vietnamese communist media.)

VNA said of Ambassador Bruce's formal statement that he "stubbornly refused" to set a deadline for the United States to withdraw its troops and to stop backing the "bellicose group" headed by Thieu, though he "had to recognize the goodwill" of the PRG proposal. VNA did not make clear that it was in his formal statement that Bruce proposed that the 15 July session be a restricted one in order to probe all proposals, rather implying that this suggestion came up in the give-and-take portion of the session: After reporting some of the rebuttal remarks by Mme. Binh and Xuan Thuy, the account said that "at this session the U.S. representative many times proposed restricted sessions, which is a sinister trick to avoid responding to the seven-point peace initiative. This also proves that the Nixon Administration is very afraid of public opinion." Thus, the VNA account only indirectly indicated Mme. Binh's and Xuan Thuy's rejection of a restricted session on the 15th. (The communist press spokesmen at the post-session briefings reported that in the rebuttal portion of the session, Mme. Binh and Thuy reiterated the standard line that the main question is the "content," not the "form" of the talks.)

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Ambassador Bruce's specific arguments for restricted sessions and his appeal for an end to use of the talks for propaganda purposes were ignored in the accounts of the sessions and in subsequent propaganda. A Commentator article in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 12th, as broadcast by Hanoi radio in Vietnamese to the South, says the U.S. delegate wanted to hold restricted sessions to "clarify" issues that in fact are already clear. Commentator prefaced this remark with the observation that "Bruce on 1 July said he would reply at the next session, but on the 8th he spoke evasively and did not directly discuss the issue." Typical of propaganda since the PRG proposal was introduced on the 1st, Commentator documents a claim of widespread favorable response by listing numerous U.S. Senators, including McGovern and Muskie, and such public figures as former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford. Liberation Radio commentaries on the 9th and 10th also assailed the call for restricted meetings. The broadcast on the 9th said that public opinion can clearly see the Nixon Administration's efforts to buy time through statements by Press Secretary Ziegler, Vice President Agnew, and Kissinger as well as Ambassador Bruce. Vietnamese communist media are not known to have mentioned Kissinger's stopover in Paris en route back from his Far East trip.

#### NO CHANGE IN COMMENT ON KY, GVN ELECTIONS SINCE PRG PROPOSAL

Hanoi propaganda on the South Vietnamese presidential elections has undergone no change in the wake of the 1 July PRG proposal, which focused its attack exclusively on Thieu by scoring "the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu" rather than the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" which had been the standard target in the past.\*

Hanoi and Liberation Front accounts of developments in South Vietnam related to the October elections continues routinely to direct most of their fire at Thieu and to cite Ky's attacks on him, but Ky also comes in for criticism. Thus, while the language of the PRG proposal raised questions

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\* Mme. Binh at the 24 June session of the Paris talks--a week before the introduction of the PRG proposal--referred to the "Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique" in a standard fashion, but Xuan Thuy cited the regime headed by Thieu.

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about the communist attitude toward Ky as a presidential contender, the propaganda has not portrayed him in a more favorable light than before. And a 4 July QUAN DOI NH'N DAN article, as reported by VNA, labeled Ky and Thieu "the two topmost servants of the U.S. aggressors." Communist media have not only failed to criticize the other presidential candidate, Duong Van Minh, but have linked him with anti-administration elements in the South which have been treated favorably in their propaganda.

While the propaganda routinely calls on the United States to stop supporting the Thieu regime and claims that Washington controls the South Vietnamese political situation, no comment in the media has gone as far as Le Duc Tho in his interview with New York TIMES correspondent Anthony Lewis on 6 July, when he suggested that the October elections would give President Nixon an opportunity to remove Thieu from office and thus help settle the war.

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**NEW SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT PROVIDES PRC MILITARY AID TO DRV**

On 4 July, the same day PEOPLE'S DAILY editorially endorsed the PRG's 1 July peace proposal, a protocol on a supplementary military aid grant from the PRC to the DRV was signed in Peking. This is the second instance this year in which a supplementary agreement was arranged, the first being on 15 February in the course of the allied incursion into southern Laos. The only previous supplementary agreement on record was signed on 25 May 1970 in the wake of the incursion into Cambodia. The annual aid agreement covering 1971 was signed on 6 October last year.

Unlike previous agreements, which embraced economic as well as military aid, the new one refers only to a grant of "military equipment and materials" and was signed by military officers--PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Yen Chung-chuan and the head of a DRV military delegation, Vice Defense Minister Tran Sam. In another departure from previous agreements, NCNA's announcement termed the accord a "gratuitous" supply of equipment. Previously Peking had not indicated that its aid was given free, while Hanoi's announcements have said it was "nonrefundable."

VNA waited four days before reporting the signing of the agreement, thus adding to the mystery surrounding the activities of the DRV military delegation. The first report on this delegation was a 9 June NCNA account of a banquet in Peking honoring both a VWP delegation led by Le Duc Tho and the military delegation headed by Tran Sam. NCNA noted that "the Vietnamese comrades" had stopped over on their way "for a visit abroad." An 11 June NCNA dispatch reported that the two delegations had departed that day "to visit Europe." Le Duc Tho's delegation attended the East German party congress, after which he continued on to Paris to resume his post as adviser to the DRV delegation at the Vietnam peace talks. Hanoi did not report the two delegations' stopover in Peking.

The next report on the military delegation was a 24 June NCNA dispatch noting that it had arrived in Peking that day "on a friendly visit to China upon invitation." NCNA did not indicate where the delegation had been in the interval, nor have there been any reports from other monitored sources. Subsequent NCNA reports told of the delegation's activities in the PRC, including a meeting with Chou En-lai and Huang Yung-sheng and a tour of the provinces, before its departure for home on 5 July after signing the aid agreement.

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The sequence of events indicates that the military delegation visited one or more European communist countries before returning to Peking for the official portion of its stay in the PRC, but its European tour received no publicity and no known agreements resulted except the one with the PRC. Hanoi's first report on the delegation's activities appeared on 8 July.

PRG PROPOSAL        VNA's 8 July report on the aid agreement included an account of Chou's meeting with the delegation. According to VNA, Chou expressed "warm and firm support" for the PRG's 1 July proposal at the Paris talks. NCNA's account merely reported that "a very cordial and friendly conversation" took place.

Since the 4 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, Peking has carried low-level propaganda supporting the PRG's proposal, but PRC media have carried no elite comment on a Vietnam peace settlement. None of the Chinese speakers at celebrations marking the PRC-DPRK treaty anniversary has mentioned the PRG proposal, though the head of the North Korean delegation in Peking for the anniversary voiced support for the PRG's peace plans.

#### MOSCOW CRITICIZES U.S. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO PRG PEACE PLAN

Routine-level Moscow comment censures the Nixon Administration for failing to give a "direct response" to the PRG peace plan and contrasts this with favorable reactions from world and U.S. public opinion.

A panelist in the weekly domestic service roundtable discussion on 11 July observed that while the proposal has received an unprecedentedly wide response in the United States--"among the most heterogeneous political circles, among Democrats and Republicans, and in various organs of the American press"--U.S. "official circles" merely demand clarifications without explaining what they want clarified. The panelist called Ambassador Bruce's suggestion of a closed session at Paris no more than a continuation of U.S. "delaying tactics." Reviewing the first point of the PRG plan, on troop withdrawal and the release of war prisoners, the roundtable participants commented that "President Nixon can no longer hide behind the prisoners" and that in fact answers have now been provided for "virtually all questions which the American side has raised for months at the Paris talks."

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Aleksey Leontyev, in a 10 July commentary broadcast in English to North America, cited Presidential adviser Kissinger as warning in Saigon that the PRG proposals are "unacceptable and full of traps." But nobody, Leontyev added, explains why they are unacceptable. He cited the Washington POST as saying the Administration's objection is that the peace plan does not promote America's "main goal" of maintaining the Saigon regime. In a RED STAR commentary on the 11th, Leontyev said the Administration does not dare to reject the PRG plan outright because such a course would only confirm its critics' charges that the Administration is incapable of showing flexibility.

Yet another commentary by Leontyev, broadcast to foreign audiences on the 11th, said it is clear that Washington "does not accept" the PRG proposals because they involve withdrawal of its support for the Saigon regime, establishment of a government of "national concord" in South Vietnam,\* and the holding of general elections. One of the roundtable panelists on the 11th, remarking that Kissinger was sent to Saigon to talk to politicians there, went on to make the unique statement that he visited Saigon to talk to the three presidential candidates and make a decision as to whether the United States should maintain Thieu in power. On the other hand, a domestic service commentary on the 11th said the real reason for Kissinger's visit to Saigon was no doubt to express support for Thieu. Although one of the "indispensable conditions" in the PRG plan is the removal of the Thieu administration, the commentary continued, Washington will not part with him; since he will fall if he is not propped up by American troops, this argument ran, it is clear that Washington is not even thinking about a complete troop withdrawal.

#### USSR CONTINUES COMMENT ON PENTAGON STUDY, ATTACKS PRC POLICY

Authoritative Moscow commentators continue to speculate about the publication of the Pentagon study on U.S. Vietnam policy. Ratiani in PRAVDA on 10 July and a series of commentaries by Zorin, broadcast in the Moscow domestic service between the

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\* Some Moscow commentators use the term "coalition government" in this context, while others follow the Vietnamese communists' lead and refer to a "government of national concord."

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8th and the 11th, repeated the conclusion that the episode reflects strife in top U.S. political and economic circles over continuation of the war. A LIFE ABROAD article by Yuriy Zhukov, summarized by TASS on 8 July, said the publication of the study has contributed to a decline in morale and growing antiwar sentiment among U.S. military officers and men.

Attacks on Peking's Indochina policies recur in comment on the Pentagon papers. On the 8th TASS carried PRAVDA's summary of an article in the Prague RUDE PRAVO by the paper's deputy chief editor charging that China's stance has encouraged the United States to escalate the war. As in prior comment, the article recalled that in January 1965, after the Tonkin Gulf incident and the first U.S. bombings of the DRV, Mao told Edgar Snow that China would fight only if it were attacked. RUDE PRAVO pointed again to President Johnson's March 1964 telegram, included in the Pentagon documents, which suggested that actions against the DRV would be more successful if taken after an expected deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The article noted that early in 1971, after the spread of aggression into Cambodia and Laos, Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese people "would not spare any sacrifice" to help the Indochinese people; yet it pointed out that shortly before, in December 1970, Mao had emphasized to Edgar Snow his desire for mutual respect between the American and Chinese peoples.

A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on 11 July remarked on Peking's silence on the Pentagon documents, asserting--incorrectly--that the PRC has "not mentioned a single word" about them.\* The commentary charged that Peking was silent because the documents reveal the PRC's splittist activities and refusal to adopt united action with the USSR and other socialist countries--a course which fostered the launching and escalation of "U.S. aggression."

#### LAO PRINCES EXCHANGE FURTHER MESSAGES ON CEASE-FIRE

Souvanna Phouma's 5 July reply to Souphanouvong's revised peace proposal of 22 June was promptly attacked in Pathet Lao propaganda, including another message from Souphanouvong

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\* In fact, Peking briefly mentioned the documents in a 4 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the PRG peace proposals as well as in a 3 July NCNA report of Xuan Thuy's statement at the Paris session.

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dated 11 July. Souvanna Phouma mentioned neither U.S. bombing nor the DRV presence in his response to the 22 June NLHS proposal, which had called for a cease-fire "including" an American bombing halt to be followed by talks between the "concerned parties" held alternately in the Plain of Jars and Vientiane. Souvanna Phouma countered by suggesting 1) a cease-fire within a radius of 30 kilometers around the Plain of Jars airfield, 2) discussions in the Plain of Jars and Vientiane to reach a cease-fire throughout Lao territory, and 3) discussions of all outstanding Lao problems.

Souvanna Phouma's reply came under attack in a Pathet Lao radio "conversation" on 11 July. Declaring that the reply contains "nothing that can be agreed upon" and is no different from previous letters in which Souvanna Phouma had avoided mentioning a bombing halt, the broadcast declared that there cannot be talks while fighting continues and specifically rejected the idea of any negotiations prior to a cease-fire in all of Laos. In his message dated the same day as the broadcast, Souphanouvong expressed "regret" that Souvanna Phouma had proposed a cease-fire in the Plain of Jars "in order to reject" the realization of a cease-fire on the whole territory of Laos. "Given the situation in Laos," the Pathet Lao leader argued, "it is quite possible for the parties concerned to order an immediate cease-fire on the whole territory of Laos, as we did in 1961."

Noting that Souvanna Phouma's rejection of the NLHS proposal came at a time when the Americans and the Lao "ultrareactionaries" are conducting new attacks in the Plain of Jars and the Xieng Khouang region, Souphanouvong said these acts confirm the revelation in the Pentagon papers that the Americans have long sought to undermine the settlement in Laos and to expand the war there. A 14 July NLHS Central Committee statement on the attacks in the Plain of Jars charges more directly that Souvanna Phouma "rejected the reasonable proposal of the NLHS" under pressure from the United States.

Earlier, the Pathet Lao radio on 8 July had broadcast an interview in which Khamouane Boupha, commander of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces in Phong Saly Province, had said that if Souvanna Phouma rejected the new proposal "the struggle in towns, which is set to go off at any time, will undoubtedly explode" and confront Souvanna Phouma and the Vientiane administration with "new dangers."

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## SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

## BUCHAREST REACTS DEFIANTLY TO HUNGARIAN PUBLIC CENSURE

Romanian party chief Ceausescu used the occasion of a Bucharest party aktiv meeting on 9 July, called to discuss ways of instilling greater discipline in the masses, to warn against "nationalistic" agitation, "no matter whence it might come," aimed at stirring up Romania's national minorities. Ceausescu did not name his target, but he issued the warning on the same day the party organ SCINTEIA came out with an authoritative blast at tendentious Hungarian comment on the nationalities question and an admonition that "nobody from outside" can set himself up as arbiter of another's affairs.

Signed by Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Romanian Communist Party (RCP) secretary in charge of international party affairs and leading RCP ideologist,\* the SCINTEIA article also defiantly rejected Hungarian attacks on Romania's China policy that reflected Soviet disquiet in the wake of Ceausescu's Asian tour. The Romanian counterattack was responsive principally to a speech delivered before the Hungarian National Assembly on 24 June by Zoltan Komocsin, Niculescu-Mizil's counterpart in the Hungarian party (MSZMP) and a proxy spokesman for the Soviets in the past. In that public forum, Komocsin implied that the Romanians are letting themselves be used by the Chinese and charged that Bucharest's independent stance is hindering Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations. He also expressed a "vital interest" in the status of socialism among the Magyars in Transylvania, in remarks conveying overtones of a threat to disrupt the political situation in Romania by playing off the Hungarian national minority against the Romanian majority unless the Romanians take a more orthodox foreign policy line.

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\* A member of the RCP's Secretariat, Permanent Presidium, and Executive Committee, Niculescu-Mizil is a political advisor to Ceausescu in his capacity as RCP secretary responsible for international party affairs. In February 1968, he led the Romanian delegation's walkout at the Budapest consultative conference of communist parties when the conference refused to guarantee that no further attacks would be made on individual parties. He delivered a direct attack on the invasion of Czechoslovakia in a speech to the Italian Communist Party Congress in February 1969.

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Two days after the appearance of the Niculescu-Mizil article, an editorial article in the Hungarian government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP, remarking that the Hungarian public had taken note of the Romanian leaders' visit to Peking, repeated Komocsin's complaint that Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations were being complicated by foreign policy differences. The article added that "as far as the Chinese attitude is concerned, Hungary's public opinion denounces every form of anti-Soviet disposition, whether overt or indirect." It was on 13 July, two days after the MAGYAR HIRLAP article pursued Hungary's attack, that Romanian media belatedly released Ceausescu's 9 July remarks.

**KOMOCSIN'S SPEECH** Reflecting Hungary's role as Soviet surrogate in seeking to enforce discipline in the Soviet bloc, Komocsin's review of relations with the communist countries had given considerable attention to Romania as well as to Yugoslavia and the PRC. While noting that Hungarian-Romanian relations "have lately become more active" and that the "basis" of their relations is "identity of interests and aims," Komocsin added that the development of such bilateral cooperation "is made difficult by the differences which occur from time to time in the Hungarian and Romanian views and in the assessment of certain international issues." He called for "joint efforts" to overcome the difficulties.

Komocsin made clear the relevance of these remarks to Ceausescu's Peking visit in statements later in his speech on relations with the PRC. Repeating Budapest's standard line on its desire for "normalization" of such relations, he went on to remark pointedly that in this process "we do not undertake unprincipled concessions or flatter or praise that with which we do not agree," and "we cannot allow the international endeavors of the Hungarian People's Republic to be used by anyone for anti-Soviet pressures."

Komocsin's remarks on the matter of the Hungarian minority in Romania carried overtones of the Brezhnev doctrine: "We have a vital interest in seeing that the inhabitants of both Hungary and Romania--including the Hungarian nationalities living there--realize that the fate and future of our peoples are inseparable from socialism," and "it is only on the basis of a socialist development that our mutual problems, cooperation between our countries, and the strengthening of our relations can be solved."

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The Yugoslavs fared better than the Romanians in Komocsin's foreign policy review. The MSZMP secretary appeared to take the ideological differences with that country for granted and indicated that relations were developing successfully. He expressed hope that relations with Hungary's "southern neighbor, socialist Yugoslavia," would "as in the past, in the future also" not be hampered by the fact that certain international questions "are judged differently by the Yugoslav comrades than by us." He saw possibilities for successful development of relations with Belgrade, "since we see a similar endeavor by our Yugoslav neighbor" to overcome bilateral differences.

REBUTTAL FROM Niculescu-Mizil's SCINTEIA article opened  
NICULESCU-MIZIL with a restatement of Romania's principles  
on the proper basis of relations between  
socialist countries--equal rights, national sovereignty, and  
noninterference. Before turning to Komocsin, he complained  
that the foreign affairs editor of the Hungarian party's  
NEPSZABADSAG had "distorted" the purposes of Ceausescu's  
recent trip to Peking in the course of a Budapest telecast  
on 30 June.\* Niculescu-Mizil went on to ask rhetorically:  
"What can better serve the interests of unity--contacts,  
principled, comradely discussions between party and state  
leaders . . . , or the practices of blaming, labelling, and  
invective which have always proved to be harmful?"

Proceeding to Komocsin's National Assembly speech, Niculescu-Mizil expressed "amazement" that the Hungarian party secretary should suggest that differences of principle between the two countries are adversely affecting their bilateral relations. He professed failure to understand how a Hungarian spokesman could make such allegations at a time when bilateral relations and cooperation have been expanding. "But irrespective of the reasons which motivated the raising of the problems," he added, the "overt assertion that differences of views should hamper bilateral relations is completely unwarranted from the theoretical point of view, profoundly harmful from the practical point of view . . . , and cannot be accepted in any form."

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\* The TV speech was not repeated in monitored Budapest radio broadcasts and is not available to FBIS.

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Niculescu-Mizil evinced particular concern over Komocsin's expression of Budapest's "vital interest" in the status of socialism among the Magyars in Transylvania,\* which the Romanians could read as an ominous linking of the class and nationalities questions. He warned that "nobody from outside can set himself up as judge or arbiter of the progress of socialism in one country or another, nor give marks and certificates." Taking an apparent swipe at such now deposed orthodox Moscow favorites as Rakosi, Novotny, and Gomulka, Niculescu-Mizil added: "As a matter of fact, it is known that there were cases when people with responsible positions excelled in teaching others lessons in socialism . . . but were not able to cope with the tasks of governing their own parties and people and, for this reason, registered lamentable political failures."

CEAUSESCU SPEECH      The 13 July AGERPRES summary of Ceausescu's remarks to the party aktiv (a full text in the same day's SCINTEIA is not yet available) cautiously avoided specific mention of Hungary in passages that seemed clearly responsive to Komocsin's linkage of the treatment of the Magyars in Transylvania to the interests of "socialism." Romania, AGERPRES quoted Ceausescu as saying, has been able to solve the nationalities question "in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist teaching, ensuring the full equality of rights . . . irrespective of nationality." He warned that "nothing and nobody in the world will be able to hamper and prejudice this unity." He added pointedly that "anybody trying to pursue a policy of national hatred pursues a policy against socialism and communism--and must be treated consequently as an enemy of our socialist nation."

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\* Transylvania, inhabited by both Hungarians and Romanians, was seized from Hungary by Romania in 1918, and in 1940 Germany and Italy forced on Romania the so-called Vienna Award granting most of the territory to Hungary. It was returned to Romania after World War II. While the issue continued to rankle, it has seldom been broached in Budapest or Bucharest propaganda. It has not surfaced directly in radio or press media since Ceausescu, in a 7 May 1966 speech on the RCP's 45th anniversary, recalled "the dictate of Vienna imposed on Romania in August 1940" under which "the northern part of Transylvania was stolen and delivered to fascist Hungary." A sanitized account of the speech in PRAVDA omitted this passage.

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Another passage seemed calculated to counter the possible impact on the Hungarians in Transylvania of Budapest's expression of interest in their "socialist" welfare: "We observe the rights of the nationalities and fight for ensuring their rights and wish to advance together toward socialism, and therefore we must admit no kind of attempted nationalistic, chauvinistic agitation, no matter whence it might come. It should be treated as an activity inimicable to the cause of socialism and communism."

Ceausescu also used the occasion to defend his recent visit to Peking and other Asian capitals as "an important contribution" to socialist unity and as part of Romania's policy of developing good relations with all the socialist countries. Maintaining his traditional balancing act in the Sino-Soviet dispute, he vaguely urged the party aktiv to make sure that "everybody understands our valuation of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the role of the Soviet Union . . . and our valuation of the revolution in China and the role of the PRC."

Turning to Soviet bloc relations, Ceausescu repeated the Romanian position that economic cooperation in CEMA should not affect national independence and sovereignty and should insure full equality among the socialist countries. Any problems that arise, he said, should be settled "in the spirit of free consent and in the interests of each socialist country."

#### BACKGROUND ON HUNGARY'S ROLE AS SOVIET SURROGATE

A growing emphasis in Hungarian propaganda in recent months on orthodox solidarity with the Warsaw Pact and in CEMA was exemplified by fulsome praise in Komocsin's National Assembly speech for "socialist economic integration" and in his failure to make any direct reference to Hungarian trade with capitalist countries--propagandized vigorously in the past in Budapest media as an important element of the Hungarian "economic reform." Kadar had favorably cited commercial agreements concluded with "Austria, Italy, France, the FRG, and other" capitalist countries in his 23 November 1970 report to the 10th MSZMP Congress. But in his 1 April 1971 speech to the 24th CPSU Congress, Kadar stressed rather that while Hungary's economic relations with the capitalist countries were "one point, the other is the fact, which must be accepted, that

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for us politics are tantamount to neither commercial relations nor a matter of give and take." He added: "We are committed ideologically and politically" to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and CEMA.

The Hungarian party--with Komocsin the key protagonist--played a key role in the preparation and fruition of the Moscow international party conference of June 1969. The main preparatory meeting for that conference, the 64-party "consultative" meeting in Budapest in February-March 1968, brought Komocsin into conflict with Niculescu-Mizil. Following the Romanian delegation's walkout from the Budapest gathering over the issue of open criticism of the Chinese, Komocsin defended open criticism of Peking in telling the gathering that while collective analysis of another party's policy was out of the question, "no party can prescribe for another what it can or cannot say . . . at fraternal party meetings."

Early this year, Moscow made special use of the Hungarians as spokesmen in its behalf to counter Peking's more flexible tactics in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Thus PRAVDA on 6 January reprinted substantial excerpts of a Varnai article in the 20 December NEPSZABADSAG, including Varnai's warning that an assessment of Peking's current foreign policy was essential because "some people" were inclined toward "far-reaching conclusions" on the basis of initial favorable developments. Also in January, Moscow broadcast to various communist countries, including Romania, an article by Komocsin in which the MSZMP secretary looked ahead to the forthcoming CPSU congress as an occasion for acknowledging Moscow's preeminent authority in the communist movement and invoked the 1969 conference in stressing the importance of a party's correct relationship with Moscow.

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## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

## SOVIET PRESS ASSAILS U.S. ARMS BUILDUP, ASKS "SERIOUS" TALKS

An article in the Soviet military paper RED STAR on 13 July, described by TASS as the first of "a series of items on the present stage of the strategic arms race in the United States," echoes the language of Brezhnev's April 1970 Kharkov speech in warning that any attempt to "ensure military superiority over the USSR" will be met with a "proper increase" in Soviet defense capabilities. . On the heels of Moscow's then ongoing propaganda attack on U.S. plans to move forward with the second phase of the Safeguard ABM system and the announcement of plans for the deployment of land-based MIRV's, Brezhnev had said on 14 April 1970 that "we shall answer any attempts by any party whatsoever to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union by making the required increase in our own military might to guarantee our defense." This warning, repeated with some frequency in routine propaganda in the early summer of 1970, has not since been voiced by any Soviet leader and has been largely absent from routine comment over the past year.

The RED STAR article, by Col. V. Kharich, is quoted by TASS as calling Defense Secretary Laird the chief spokesman for those in the United States who "shout hysterically" about an alleged Soviet menace and push a course of U.S. buildup of strategic armaments that is "incompatible with a constructive approach to a solution of the problems under discussion" at SALT and "seriously prejudices" the talks. Kharich concludes with the stock avowal that the USSR, for its part, believes strategic arms limitation will promote a relaxation of international tension and is in the interests of all the peoples of the world.

Low-volume comment on SALT over Radio Moscow and in the nonmilitary press continues to balance pledges of serious Soviet intent with warnings that the "military-industrial complex" in the United States is stepping up activities detrimental to the negotiations. An article by Y. Tomilin in the 9 July IZVESTIYA warns that the "military-industrial complex" is not giving up its efforts to "thwart the successfully developing dialogue." Tomilin assails the "aggressive statements" of Secretary Laird and concludes that

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"public figures such as Laird" have apparently forgotten that the existing world balance of strategic forces "condemns to failure any attempts to pursue a policy from a position of strength."

But Tomilin also points to the 20 May U.S.-Soviet agreement in Vienna outlining the locus of negotiations for the year as an important reason for "optimism" among observers at the start of the Helsinki round. The USSR, he says, has always favored "serious and honest talks by equal partners" in search of an agreement acceptable to both sides. Like the 7 July Viktorov article in PRAVDA on the eve of the opening of the Helsinki round, Tomilin notes that the 20 May agreement gives priority to an ABM accord but that attention will also be given to restricting strategic offensive armament. The USSR has declared, Tomilin observes, that it views the resolving of strategic arms limitation "in its entirety" as desirable.

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## MALTA

## MOSCOW APPROVES MINTOFF POLICIES, NOTES BRITISH, NATO CONCERN

A flurry of Moscow propoganda supports the "neutralist course" of the new Labor Party government in Malta, which took office 27 June, and depicts British, U.S., and other NATO circles as viewing Prime Minister Dom Mintoff's policies with anxiety. According to Soviet commentators, Malta is faced with increasing British and NATO pressure, blackmail, and threats following Mintoff's "perfectly legitimate and justified steps" to "defend the country's sovereignty": his demand for review of the 10-year defense and financial agreements with Britain, concluded in 1964 when the island obtained independence; his removal of the British Governor General; his declaring persona non grata Admiral Birindelli, commander of Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe; and his decision halting further U.S. Sixth Fleet visits to Malta pending "revision of general arrangements."

Soviet media play up the "feverish activity" in NATO capitals caused by Mintoff's actions, including secret NATO meetings on the "Malta crisis," discussion of the problem at a session of the West European Union Council, attacks on the Maltese Government in the British Parliament, and a "London-and-Washington-inspired" campaign against Malta ranging from blackmail to what TASS commentator Kornilov on 6 July called "direct military pressure."

Focusing on this NATO alarm at the developments endangering its use of the island as a naval base and "center of espionage activity," Moscow offers conflicting assessments of Malta's relationship with NATO. Thus some comment maintains that NATO use of the island is without legal foundation since Malta is not a member of and has no treaties with NATO, while other propoganda acknowledges some form of Maltese-NATO arrangements. Thus a panelist on the 4 July Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable cited the Mintoff Government as announcing that Malta "has no firm treaties" concerning the stationing of the NATO southern naval forces command on the island and "that it had only a temporary, limited treaty which is now losing effect." TASS on 1 July remarked that since 1953, with British consent, the NATO southern naval forces command had been headquartered on the island. NEW TIMES on 4 June, prior to the recent Maltese elections, had noted that the Maltese Government concluded an "agreement" with NATO in 1965 on the "establishment

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of 'special relations' legalizing the presence of NATO headquarters" on the island; NEW TIMES added that "the agreement signed with NATO in 1968" increased the possibility of Malta being used in NATO interests. With regard to the Sixth Fleet, TASS in its 1 July dispatch reported the Maltese Government as declaring that visits by Sixth Fleet units do not accord with the country's interests, and that there is no agreement or understanding between Malta and the United States which would entitle the Sixth Fleet to use Maltese waters.\*

TASS on 12 July reported that, in an interview with IZVESTIYA correspondent Kobysh, Maltese Information Minister Naudi declared that Malta's goal is to get rid of the NATO headquarters and British war bases on the island, to establish Malta's neutral status, and to develop equal relations with all countries. The minister recalled, TASS said, that Malta had addressed a statement to the Security Council informing it that the defense agreement with Britain had "lost its validity," and that if British threats continued Malta would appeal to the United Nations for aid.

USSR-MALTA RELATIONS      A Moscow domestic service commentary by Levin on 7 July responded to "irritation" among a number of Western countries regarding the visit to Malta by Soviet Ambassador to Britain Smirnovskiy, also accredited to Malta. It is "perfectly natural," and "normal practice," for ministers of a new government to meet with representatives of other states, Levin declared, yet "bourgeois information agencies" are trying to "cast a shadow" on Soviet foreign policy. The reason for this, the commentator explained, is that the Maltese Government's current actions, following years of British superiority in the island, have "put the NATO leaders in a state of mental unbalance."

While Moscow since the Maltese elections has not been heard to mention the question of a Soviet base, NEW TIMES (No. 23, 4 June), just prior to the elections, referred to a "fable concocted" by Western powers about Soviet plans with regard to Malta, citing the London TIMES as writing about fears the Russians would find a permanent base for their Mediterranean fleet in Malta. Charging

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\* PRAVDA in November 1968 had recalled that in 1966 the United States obtained permission to use the island as a repair base for the Sixth Fleet.

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that "these vicious lies" aimed at distorting Soviet foreign policy and spoiling Soviet-Maltese relations, NEW TIMES declared there was "not a grain of truth" in the claim that the USSR "plans to build a military base in Malta," and it added that Mintoff had written the TIMES refuting the paper's insinuations. Similarly, NEW TIMES last fall (No. 45, 7 November) took note of a Swiss report of Soviet plans for a naval and air base in Malta, and again reported that Mintoff had written a "fitting rebuff." This shows, NEW TIMES said, that there are "quite a few sober-minded people in Malta" who know that claims that the Soviet Union "is interested in acquiring a base on the island are absolutely groundless." NEW TIMES went on to recall the Soviet Government proposal to turn the Mediterranean into a nuclear-free zone and to close all foreign bases there, and asserted that the USSR has no intention of imperiling Malta's security.

Moscow had announced recognition of Malta on its independence in September 1964 and Soviet willingness to establish diplomatic relations with it, and IZVESTIYA interviewed then Prime Minister Borg Olivier in late December 1967 in connection with the establishment of Maltese-Soviet diplomatic relations. Meager propaganda attention to Malta since its independence has dealt with NATO efforts to keep Malta a stronghold of the alliance and to circumscribe its independence.

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## COSMONAUT DEATHS

### USSR REPORTS ON CAUSE OF TRAGEDY, FORECASTS MORE FLIGHTS

The 11 July report of the Soviet commission investigating the cause of the deaths of the three-man crew of Soyuz 11 has been widely publicized in Moscow media, with no elaboration of the report's terse disclosure that the tragedy was caused by depressurization resulting from a "loss of the ship's sealing." According to the report, a study is continuing to determine the probable causes of the seal failure, which occurred some 30 minutes before the craft's soft-landing early on 30 June.

In characteristic fashion, Moscow had widely publicized the launching of the Soyuz craft on 6 June, its linkup the following day with the orbiting Salyut scientific station, and the continuing activities of cosmonauts Dobrovolskiy, Volkov, and Patsayev on board Salyut through the 29th. Propaganda treating the three cosmonauts' record stay in space stressed that everything was in order. And the TASS announcement on the 30th that the men were found dead in their seats stated that the unlinking operation from Salyut had "passed without a hitch and all systems were functioning normally." That initial TASS announcement said that the cause of the deaths was being investigated; later on the 30th, the domestic service reported that the party and government leadership had created a commission for the purpose.

Soviet spokesmen have indicated that more flights are in the offing despite the tragedy. Thus cosmonaut Maj. Gen. Shatalov, in a eulogy of the deceased crew members at their funeral on 2 July, declared that Soviet cosmonauts will "continue the cause of space exploration" in a worthy manner. And Academician B. Petrov stated in a 4 July PRAVDA article that "new flights into space and the creation of new inhabited orbital stations of the Salyut type" lie ahead. Like other spokesmen, Petrov acknowledged the dangers in the exploration of space: "It is never possible to exclude chance when very complicated equipment is being tested and mastered."

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Extensive Soviet followup propaganda on the deaths has featured wide play for the message of condolences from the Soviet leadership to the families of the cosmonauts as well as messages from abroad, including those from President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai.

THE PRC MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCES      Chou's message is the latest instance of Peking's willingness to observe the proprieties in bilateral state relations with Moscow.

Chou had also sent a message to Kosygin on 13 June 1970 expressing condolences regarding recent floods and earthquakes in the USSR. There had been no message on the death of Soviet cosmonaut Komarov in April 1967; an NCNA dispatch at that time had all but gloated over the accident, remarking that Moscow had played up the Komarov flight as a "great creative achievement" dedicated to the forthcoming 50th anniversary of the October Revolution.

The terse Chinese message on the three cosmonauts' death did not say anything about the Soyuz 11 flight, not even that the craft had been launched. There was no other Peking report on the event, apart from an NCNA report that Chinese officials had called on the Soviet embassy on 2 July to express condolences. The USSR's manned flights subsequent to that of Komarov in Soyuz 1 had not been reported in Peking media; but the flight prior to Soyuz 1--that of Leonov and Belyayev in Voskhod 2 in March 1965--had been given cursory but correct Peking propaganda attention.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## YEVTUSHENKO SPEECH ENLIVENS WRITERS UNION CONGRESS

Except for a controversial speech by Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, the USSR Writers Union Congress held from 29 June to 2 July was routinely uneventful. There was little criticism--even of an indirect sort--of liberal writers, Solzhenitsyn was not mentioned directly, and the stress on ideological correctness was relatively mild. What there was in the way of bitter attack was mostly directed at the conservative group of young Russophiles, who were criticized especially by liberals Konstantin Simonov and Yevtushenko. The new leadership elected at the close of the congress remained substantially as before.

The most noteworthy event at the congress was an impassioned speech by Yevtushenko implicitly criticizing the union's leaders, attacking the critics of the younger generation, and urging the older generation to surrender some of its monopoly on power (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July). Yevtushenko scored the older, conservative writers (who dominate the union) for citing the anti-Stalinist excesses of the Yevtushenko generation as an excuse for denying it influence. He argued that even though Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin's crimes had somewhat disoriented his generation, those who attempt to smear the whole generation as "morally unstable" and untrustworthy are "deeply wrong."

Casting aside "infantile blind faith" in the false values of the Stalin era, my generation--Yevtushenko said--has developed an "unshakeable" faith in the lasting, real values of the people and society and is pledged to do everything to prevent any recurrence of Stalinism. Nonetheless, he complained, this generation is still not trusted by its elders, who control all literary journals and "still think we are children and cannot be given adults' toys for fear we will break them because of inexperience." Yevtushenko himself had been judged unreliable to sit on the editorial board of a journal and was removed from YUNOST's board in mid-1969 along with his fellow young writer Vasilii Aksenov.

Despite his frequent nonconformity, Yevtushenko was indulged by the union's leaders not only by being selected as one of only 35 speakers in the discussion but also by being elected to the

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congress' governing secretariat. He had not been on any governing body at the last congress. He was not, however, elected to the 47-man secretariat of the board formed at the end of the congress.

No one mentioned Yevtushenko's complaints, although Boris Polevoy, speaking immediately after Yevtushenko, remarked that he, the editor of YUNOST ("Youth") was, "alas, very unyoung" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July).

The generation issue was, however, also raised by conservative Writers Union Secretary Sergey Sartakov, who noted that "many" view "with alarm" the "aging" of the union. He rationalized the phenomenon on grounds that people simply live longer today and asserted that there are no "contradictions" between young and old writers (LITERARY GAZETTE, 30 June).

**FEW HARDLINE STATEMENTS** The only hardline speech was delivered by conservative RFSR Writers Union Chairman S.V. Mikhalkov. In an apparent reference to Solzhenitsyn, he declared that any writer who separates himself from society unavoidably attracts the "unhealthy interest" of hostile elements abroad who "attempt to drag him into their camp" and sometimes succeed. Mikhalkov also attacked the "invention" and "savoring" of nonexistent difficulties and stated that "advocates of 'pure art' and an apolitical attitude in the final event themselves become the tool of politics, indeed, of a reactionary, shameless politics" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July).

The main report delivered by conservative Writers Union Secretary G.M. Markov was comparatively moderate. Although he indirectly attacked young dissidents such as Ginzburg and Galanskov, he virtually ignored the liberal-conservative controversies so much in evidence since the last congress in 1967. Unlike Mikhalkov he appeared to treat the liberal deviations as a thing of the past, noting that the "subjectivist attitude of some writers" toward controversial historical events (industrialization, collectivization, World War II) has been "mainly overcome" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 30 June).

Otherwise, conservative Nikolay Gribachev complained that in the recent past literature often overstressed the suffering during the war and collectivization, and Armenian Writers Union head Eduard Topchyan criticized the depiction of "isolated fact" as unavoidably leading to "distortion of the truth of life" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July).

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Liberal positions were represented by Kirgiz writer Chingiz Aytmatov, who criticized the "one-sided" attacks on liberal writer Vasil Bykov, as well as Yevtushenko, who argued that there should be no "forbidden themes" in literature (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July). Counterattacking, Yevtushenko criticized a recent novel and poem by unnamed neo-Stalinist writers for depicting youth as "spiritual currency speculators" and traitors.

**RUSSOPHILES ATTACKED** The main target of criticism at the congress was the coterie of young Russophiles grouped around the journal MOLODAYA GWARDIYA. Markov, in his main report, attacked some writers for "indiscriminately" adopting ideas from "figures of the past who were far from progressive" instead of studying the "heritage of revolutionary democrats, Marxist critics, and primarily Lenin . . . ." As a result, he continued, they could not "correctly explain the national characteristics of the great Russian literature" and its relations with other literatures, and the fruitless literary debate initiated by the Russophiles had degenerated into "name-calling," which is "completely intolerable in Soviet literature."

Simonov criticized the differentiation of love of country into "urban and rural love" and setting these against each other, "as if one were better and one worse" (LITERARY GAZETTE, 7 July). Devoting almost all his speech to the subject, he attacked "historical insensitivity to other peoples and their history" and stated that for him, a Russian, "loving our Soviet land . . . means loving it all" and "not just my own, Russian, land . . . ." Conservative Nikolay Gribachev noted Simonov's discussion of history and cautioned against overlooking a class approach to history--a leading accusation against the Russophiles. Even Russophile sympathizers Mikhail Alekseyev and Vladimir Chivilikhin, who spoke at the congress, did not attempt to defend the group.

It was Yevtushenko, however, who brashly and directly ridiculed his conservative Russophile foes for their ideological deviation: "When you read the articles of some zealous defenders of the past, you are simply amazed at how these young people, born after the October Revolution, have borrowed their ideas from reactionary ideologists of the Slavophile school." After citing a young director's film idolizing prerevolutionary rural Russia and ignoring oppression by landowners, Yevtushenko declared that "one wishes to remind these young people that in Russia they used to sing not only 'God Save the Tsar' but also the 'Internationale' . . . ."

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**LEADERSHIP UNCHANGED** The new leadership elected by the congress reflected little change. The ailing first secretary, Konstantin Fedin, was moved to the new post of chairman of the board, while Georgiy Markov, long the real leader of the union, became first secretary. As before, moderates were represented in the new 47-man secretariat by A.T. Tvardovskiy, K.M. Simonov, L.M. Leonov, B.N. Polevoy, A.T. Honchar, and L.N. Novichenko, and conservatives by such men as Markov, S.V. Mikhalkov, N.M. Gribachev, A. Ye. Korneychuk, S.V. Sartakov, M.A. Sholokhov, and A.B. Chakovskiy. New Ukrainian Writers Union First Deputy Chairman Vasil Kozachenko was the only notable conservative added to the secretariat and young writer Robert Rozhdestvenskiy the only liberal. The confused situation in the Ukrainian union was reflected in the fact that deposed leaders Honchar and Novichenko were reelected to the USSR union secretariat, while the new Ukrainian leaders Yuriy Smolich and Kozachenko were added.

Moderates elected to the 225-member board but not its secretariat included Ch. Aytmatov, V.P. Katayev, V.K. Ketlinskaya, V.S. Rozov, and young poets A.A. Voznesenskiy and Yevtushenko, while V.P. Aksenov and V.V. Bykov were elected to the Auditing Commission. Such prominent conservatives as OKTYABR editor V.A. Kochetov and MOSKVA editor M.N. Alekseyev were also elected only to the board. Russophile leaders V.A. Soloukhin, S.V. Vikulov, P.L. Proskurin, V.D. Fedorov, and V.A. Chivilikhin, as well as their allies and occasional defenders M.N. Alekseyev, V.A. Zakrutkin, and A.A. Prokofyev, were also elected to the board. Although still not represented in the secretariat, the Russophiles gained some additional representation on the board, with Vikulov, Proskurin, and Chivilikhin as new board members.

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## SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

## GRIEVANCES AGAINST BOLIVIAN CP RESURFACE IN CUBAN REPORTS

Cuban reports on the 11-13 June Third National Congress of the Moscow-lining Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) publicized continuing discord within the PCB on the role of guerrilla warfare in revolutionary tactics and, by implication, resurfaced long-standing Cuban grievances against the PCB leadership. PRENSA LATINA distributed two reports from its La Paz correspondent which conveyed Cuban sympathy with a minority at the congress that had unsuccessfully sought the expulsion of two party leaders for betrayal of Che Guevara's ill-fated guerrillas in Bolivia in 1967.

At the same time, in keeping with Castro's evident desire not to exacerbate relations with the orthodox Latin American CP's in a period of good relations with Moscow, Cuban media refrained from commenting on the congress and PRENSA LATINA did not disseminate a third, tendentious account of the proceedings by its correspondent. Taken as a whole, the limited Cuban coverage reflected Castro's low-keyed current approach to the divisive issue of revolutionary strategy in Latin America while registering, in muted fashion, the special opprobrium that still attaches to the PCB in Havana as a consequence of its lukewarm support for Guevara.

No Cuban delegation was present at the congress, which was attended by delegations from Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. No Cuban greetings message was publicized. And in another apparent sign of Havana's unwillingness to associate itself with the Bolivian party, PRENSA LATINA in monitored transmissions did not distribute a report from its La Paz correspondent on a congress resolution "expressing solidarity with the Cuban revolution and calling on patriotic revolutionary Bolivians to demand the immediate reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba."

## BACKGROUND: THE AFTERMATH OF THE GUEVARA DEBACLE

As the first PCB congress to meet since Che Guevara's death in Bolivia in October 1967 (the Second National Congress took place in 1964), the Third Congress was bound to take up the question of the role of guerrilla tactics in light of the Guevara debacle, which had divided the Bolivian left and brought the PCB into acrimonious conflict with Castro.

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The Guevara venture had confronted the PCB, committed primarily to peaceful methods of struggle, with a dilemma compounded by the fact that the guerrilla band was led by a foreigner who refused to subordinate his movement to PCB guidance. To remain aloof from the movement would risk a breach with Castro, who had earlier broken with the Venezuelan CP over its dissociation from the guerrilla forces in Venezuela and had posited support for guerrilla warfare as the criterion for Cuban acceptance of a party's revolutionary credentials. To participate in the guerrilla campaign without controlling it, on the other hand, would be tantamount to relinquishing the party's claim to represent the revolutionary vanguard. Faced with this choice, the party opted for an equivocal course of lip service to the guerrillas short of a commitment to active support.

This stance enabled the PCB to disclaim responsibility for the guerrilla venture after it failed. It also, however, left the party open to charges by Castro that it must bear responsibility for Guevara's death and for the ensuing setbacks suffered by the remaining guerrillas by virtue of its failure to actively support them. Castro indicted the party in his introduction to the text of Guevara's field diary, released by Havana on 1 July 1968. Directing his fire particularly at Mario Monje, first secretary of the PCB at the time Guevara's forces were in the field,\* he charged that the PCB had "sabotaged" the guerrilla movement after Guevara had rejected Monje's "shameful, ridiculous, and unwarranted demands" to take over command for the guerrillas. Guevara, Castro said, was "not disposed . . . to hand over to an inexpert empty-brain of narrow chauvinist outlook the command of a guerrilla group designed to develop ultimately into a struggle of broad dimensions in South America."

Subsequently Havana media periodically publicized statements and communiques of the Bolivian Army of National Liberation (ELN), the guerrilla organization which after Guevara's death was taken over by ex-PCB members who had broken with the party over its lack of support for the guerrillas. And the PCB continued to be the target of Cuban invective.

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\* Monje resigned the post early in 1968 in the midst of the recriminations over the Guevara fiasco. He was replaced by Jorge Kalle Cueto.

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In September 1969, although Cuban-Soviet relations had markedly improved and Cuban attacks on the traditional Latin American communist parties had become a rarity, Cuban media used the death of "Inti" Peredo, a Bolivian survivor of Guevara's band, to recall the PCB leadership's "treason." An editorial eulogy of Peredo in GRANMA on 13 September highlighted his break with the "treacherous line imposed by the leadership of the PCB led by Mario Monje." GRANMA in effect bestowed Cuban blessings on schismatic activities in the party by declaring that Peredo's act "firmly paves the way for the Bolivian party rank and file."

In August 1970, Cuban media cautiously withheld direct comment in support of revived guerrilla activity by the ELN, but they did publicize ELN documents which among other things derided the PCB for consorting with the "national bourgeoisie." In October, publicizing Bolivian statements skeptical or critical of the new regime of General Juan Torres, Havana gave heavy play to comment from the ELN.

Castro has sustained a cool but restrained wait-and-see attitude toward the Torres regime in recent months, and Cuban media this year have given negligible attention to Bolivian affairs. Describing "a qualitative change in the Latin American situation" in his 19 April speech on the Bay of Pigs anniversary, Castro saw Chile under Allende as firmly launched "on the path of revolution" and associated Peruvian Government moves with a developing "revolutionary process" in Peru; in Bolivia he portrayed a "profound radicalization" of the people but commented that "with regard to the leadership of that process, we have not expressed our views."

#### CUBAN COVERAGE OF THE CONGRESS

The two reports on the PCB congress which PRENSA LATINA distributed, both on 15 June, together conveyed a picture of the PCB as defaulting on its revolutionary obligations and endorsing positions congenial to the bourgeois establishment. They publicized the fact that the party was divided on the still rankling guerrilla warfare issue, with a minority dissenting from the prevailing position that assigned guerrilla tactics a subordinate role, and they did so in such a way as to reflect Cuban sympathy with the dissenters.

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The first, brief report led off by citing a PCB congress resolution warning the working class "that a fascist coup may be led by the right and some sectors of the armed forces" and calling for a strengthening of the people's "fighting unity." After reporting this more or less pro forma rhetoric, in harmony with Havana's own line on dangers of a coup from the right, the report went on in effect to impugn the PCB's revolutionary credentials by quoting a favorable appraisal of the congress by EL NACIONAL, "the official organ of the Juan Jose Torres government." The paper commented, according to PRENSA LATINA, that the congress had "arrived at conclusions which are in agreement with the country's political reality" and had "clearly and finally condemned the theory and practice of sporadic individual guerrilla uprisings."

PRENSA LATINA also cited the views of a columnist in EL DIARIO, "the newspaper with the largest circulation," to the effect that "finally the counterrevolutionaries of the Muscovite PCB have come to dominate." It quoted EL DIARIO's columnist as remarking that Jorge Kalle--a past target of Cuban attack, reelected PCB first secretary at the congress--continues "along with his retinue of professional lifetime leaders" to put off meeting the Bolivian people's desire for "liberation" on "the pretext of struggle against anti-Marxist positions." An ensuing direct anti-Soviet remark by the EL DIARIO columnist, cited in the original dispatch filed to Havana by PRENSA LATINA's man in La Paz, was edited out of the version PRENSA LATINA disseminated: "They continue to make the PCB a travel agency and a public relations agency for the Soviet Union. The communists of the Moscow line deserved better luck . . . ."

The other report disseminated by PRENSA LATINA publicized direct criticisms of Monje and Kalle at the congress. It highlighted a demand "made behind closed doors" by a former Bolivian guerrilla, Orlando Jimenez Bazan, that Kalle and Monje be expelled for "betraying" the Guevara guerrillas at Nancahuazu. Jimenez claimed, according to PRENSA LATINA, that he and other PCB members who had joined the Nancahuazu guerrillas had accepted in good faith assurances by Monje and Kalle that the PCB "was participating" in the guerrilla campaign and would "collaborate as much as necessary."

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But the correspondent said it was also learned that Monje told the congress the PCB had not been so committed "and that the PCB members who joined the guerrillas did so on their own." Although Jimenez' speech "was heavily applauded by part of the congress," PRENSA LATINA said, "the other part" was satisfied with Monje's report and rejected Jimenez' call for his and Kalle's expulsion from the party.

PRENSA LATINA stated that the congress approved a Central Committee report on guerrilla activity "which says, in essence, that guerrilla activity without popular support is not the most appropriate road to national liberation." It added, however, that the congress resolution "merely says" the congress approved the Central Committee report "on the problem of the guerrilla nucleus which arose in Nancahuazu in 1967 and entrusts to the new Central Committee elected by the Third Congress the final decision on its publication and utilization." PRENSA LATINA said that neither the press nor the delegates had received a copy of the Central Committee report.

#### WHAT PRENSA LATINA DID NOT DISTRIBUTE

A longer and more tendentious account filed to Havana by PRENSA LATINA's La Paz correspondent on 14 June, which the news agency declined to distribute, included the remark that "observers" regarded the congress outcome as "unexpected" because "delegates from all over the country had said earlier that this event would change the leadership of the PCB." In fact, the correspondent wrote, the delegates "tacitly expressed their support" of the former Central Committee by approving, among other congress documents, one "reaffirming their antiguerrilla line." He acknowledged "the distinction made by the PCB" in regard to guerrilla action--the rationale that the party "is not antiguerrilla because guerrilla activity is a method that can be used" in the revolutionary process according to the circumstances, but that such activity "must always be given impetus and be led by the working class."

The dispatch contained a number of thinly veiled swipes at the party leadership. Noting homage paid by PCB Central Committee member and mine workers' leader Simon Reyes to party members who had fallen in struggle, the dispatch observed that "he did not mention other PCB members who fell at Nancahuazu and Teoponte"--two sites of guerrilla defeats. It noted that the "controversial" Mario Monje

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was not named to the new Central Committee elected by the congress (he had resigned from the former Central Committee in January 1968 in the aftermath of the Guevara debacle), but it added that Monje, "who was involved in unimportant action during the 1967 guerrilla activity, is now at the head of the La Paz regional committee."

The correspondent cited Reyes' statement that the congress reaffirmed its "political line, that of reaching power through the struggle of the masses, rejecting the positions which according to the congress are contrary to Marxism-Leninism; he referred to the idea of guerrilla nuclei." The idea of "guerrilla nuclei," or the "theory of the revolutionary center," was the heart of the Castro-Guevara thesis behind the initiation of the guerrilla movement in Bolivia.

#### SOVIET COVERAGE OF THE CONGRESS

Moscow media covered the Bolivian congress in a brief 12 June TASS report and a La Paz-dated TASS dispatch in PRAVDA the next day which highlighted First Secretary Kalle's observation that the congress was taking place in "a new political atmosphere" resulting from Torres' assumption of power in October 1970. It noted Kalle's stress on the importance of the "anti-imperialist process taking place" in Bolivia and his advocacy of support for that process and establishment of an alliance "with those circles in the armed forces who uphold national sovereignty and serve the cause of democracy and freedom." With the recent Chilean experience undoubtedly an important influence, PRAVDA said, the PCB's draft program outlined "the immediate central task" as being "the amalgamation of all Bolivia's revolutionary forces into a single anti-imperialist popular front."

In Moscow media's only allusion to the contentious issue of guerrilla warfare, the PRAVDA dispatch said discussions at regional PCB conferences prior to the congress indicated that "the question of the forms and methods of the revolutionary struggle in Bolivia" would be "one of the most important points on the congress agenda." Moscow has consistently steered clear of polemical treatment of the guerrilla issue. It pays tribute to Guevara on appropriate occasions as a revolutionary hero, but it generally avoids bringing up his theories or practice of guerrilla warfare.

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