

20 OCT 1971

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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TRENDS

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
20 OCTOBER 1971
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 11 - 17 OCTOBER 1971

| <u>Moscow (2868 items)</u> | | | <u>Peking (1641 items)</u> | | |
|----------------------------------|--------|-----|--------------------------------------|-------|------|
| Egyptian President Sadat in USSR | (0.2%) | 9% | Domestic Issues | (34%) | 33% |
| Indochina | (21%) | 5% | Indochina | (8%) | 20% |
| [Podgorny in DRV | (20%) | 3%] | [Laos Independence Anniversary | (--) | 15%] |
| Planned Nixon Visit to USSR | (--) | 4% | [South Vietnam Elections | (3%) | 1%] |
| Kosygin in Morocco | (1%) | 3% | Haile Selassie in PRC | (17%) | 10% |
| China | (2%) | 3% | Romanian Industrial Exhibit in PRC | (--) | 3% |
| Coming Brezhnev Visit to France | (1%) | 2% | PRC-Burundi Relations Re-established | (--) | 2% |
| Lunokhod Mission Completed | (0.3%) | 2% | | | |

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist media have remained silent on the 12 October announcement that President Nixon will visit the Soviet Union in the latter part of May 1972. This silence was made the more pointed at the Paris talks on the 14th when both the DRV and PRG delegates attacked other remarks by the President at the 12 October press conference where he read the announcement. At the same time, Moscow has shown concern to reassure the DRV that its interests will not be prejudiced by the President's visit.

Premier Pham Van Dong, in an interview with the Italian communist organ L'UNITA publicized by VNA on the 18th, echoed earlier propaganda when he described President Podgorny's 3-8 October Hanoi visit as "a shining expression of the unshakable friendship which binds the DRV to the Soviet Union and the VWP to the CPSU." Dong also took the occasion to pledge again to continue working for the "restoration" of unity among the fraternal parties.

Ongoing attacks on the President's Vietnamization policy include an authoritative reiteration, in an article under the pseudonym "Cuu Long," of the claim that communist military victories earlier this year dealt a "fatal blow of strategic significance" to this policy. Publicized in Front as well as Hanoi media, the article, in evaluating the military situation, makes the unusually bald claim that the communist main forces "can now defeat the southern puppet army."

MOSCOW INSISTS NIXON VISIT WILL NOT PREJUDICE DRV'S INTERESTS

Against the background of Hanoi's vitriolic July-August anti-Chinese polemic and of Moscow's charge that Peking's invitation to President Nixon had eased the pressure for a U.S. response to the 1 July PRG peace proposal, Moscow propagandists now insist that the President's planned visit to the USSR next May will not affect Soviet support of the Vietnamese. An authoritative article in the 15 October PRAVDA by Vadim Nekrasov,* a deputy editor in charge of foreign affairs, argues the need for U.S.-Soviet detente on the basis of political realities and pragmatic mutual interests and says such a development would not be prejudicial to the national liberation movement and, particularly, to Hanoi's interests.

* The Nekrasov article and other Moscow comment is also discussed in this TRENDS under the heading "Nixon Trip to USSR."

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The Nekrasov article, entitled "The Demands of the Times"--widely broadcast by Moscow radio in foreign languages, including Vietnamese and Mandarin--says there are elements in U.S. policy which contradict the notion of an "era of negotiations"; but it states that such manifestations of aggressive policy as the war in Vietnam and support of Israeli "expansionist" policy "have received and will continue to receive a decisive rebuff." Nekrasov notes specifically that while "people" in Washington have started speaking of easing tensions and improving relations with the USSR, "people" in the U.S. capital also try to defend U.S. aggressive policy in Southeast Asia and keep silent about "the DRV and PRG peace initiatives." He goes on to assert that "it is obvious that any attempts to build political relations with the Soviet Union to the detriment of its fraternal relations with the DRV, with other socialist countries, to the detriment of its relations with its allies, and its commitments under treaties, will not be successful."

Without explicitly mentioning Podgorny's visit to Hanoi, Nekrasov says the Soviet Union's "consistent" support for the Vietnamese people against U.S. "aggression" was stressed again in "the recent Soviet-Vietnamese statement." Declaring that the United States must not expect to develop its relations with the Soviet Union at the expense of other socialist countries, Nekrasov sees as "obvious" the "bankruptcy" of hopes cherished by "certain circles" in the United States of weakening the position of the USSR and other socialist countries and of undermining the national liberation movement.

An article by Mikhaylov in IZVESTIYA on the 16th, mainly devoted to portraying "the tangible results" of Soviet foreign policy "initiatives" since the 24th CPSU Congress, insists--as Nekrasov does--that an essential ingredient of Soviet policy is support for the national liberation movement. Citing Podgorny's visit to Hanoi and the resulting aid agreements as evidence of unabated Soviet support for the DRV, Mikhaylov underlines the assurance that Moscow will continue to aid the Indochinese peoples in both "armed and peaceful labor." Mikhaylov reaffirms the standard line that the way out of the war for the United States is to withdraw its troops and give a "positive" answer to the PRG proposals.

On 12 October--the day the President's Moscow visit was announced--an editorial in the Soviet Defense Ministry organ RED STAR defended Brezhnev's detente policy as "internationalism"

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in action based on "firmness, consistency, flexibility, and realism." Although playing the stock theme of continued U.S. "pursuit of aggression" against liberation movements, the editorial echoed Podgorny's speech at a 4 October rally in Hanoi when, implying that the war is nearing a conclusion, it said "the outlines of future victory are clearly starting to emerge." Podgorny had said that "the liberation movement of the Indochinese peoples has been so successful that the future victory is already well in sight, and the day of victory is not far off."

PHAM VAN DONG PLEDGES EFFORTS TO RESTORE COMMUNIST UNITY

In his 14 October interview with the Italian CP's L'UNITA, as carried by VNA English on the 18th,* Pham Van Dong responded to a question on the DRV's policy of unity within the socialist world by pledging again to carry out Ho Chi Minh's last will and testament. Observing that the DRV "has always pursued a policy of unity toward all the socialist countries," Dong asserted the resolve of the North Vietnamese to carry out the testament of "Comrade Ho Chi Minh, who wished that 'our party would do its best to contribute effectively to the restoration of unity among the fraternal parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism in a way consonant with the requirements of heart and reason.'" Dong's new pledge to work to restore unity among the fraternal parties comes in the wake of a similar remark by Le Duan at the 4 October rally welcoming Soviet President Podgorny. Le Duan's remarks constituted the first such high-level DRV pledge to work for the restoration of unity since last June--before the July-August anti-Chinese polemic in which Hanoi repeatedly charged that the Nixon Doctrine was aimed at splitting the socialist countries.**

Unlike Le Duan in his 4 October speech, Dong referred neither to the Soviet Union nor to the PRC in speaking of the restoration of fraternal unity. But in responding to L'UNITA's next question

* Pham Van Dong has had numerous interviews with both communist and noncommunist media in recent years, but DRV media normally have not carried them.

** See the TRENDS of 6 October 1971, pages 6-8.

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on the significance of Podgorny's recent visit to Hanoi, the Premier mentioned both countries' aid, in line with Hanoi's general posture of neutrality vis-a-vis its two big allies. Dong echoed other propaganda on Podgorny's visit when he called it "a shining expression of the unshakable friendship which binds the DRV to the Soviet Union and the VWP to the CPSU."

A 19 October TASS report of Dong's interview highlighted his remarks on Podgorny's visit and Soviet-DRV relations. Although TASS noted a number of the Premier's other remarks, it did not mention his reaffirmation of the DRV's intention to work for the restoration of communist unity.

DONG, PARIS DELEGATES ASSAIL U.S. VIETNAMIZATION POLICY

Pham Van Dong, asked in his L'UNITA interview about the President's "maneuvers" to elude a positive response to the PRG's seven points, said that the fact that they had been warmly welcomed by world public opinion--"particularly by the various political circles in Washington and Saigon which regard them as reasonable"--is "a considerable victory for our struggle on the diplomatic plane and in the international scene." He added cryptically that the "evasive maneuvers deployed by Mr. Nixon" to counter pressures from world opinion, particularly U.S. opinion, and to help him continue his Vietnamization policy "will only push him further into a blind alley" Dong said nothing about the substance of the PRG proposal in the interview, although in his 31 August National Day speech he had noted the "basic" points on U.S. withdrawal and cessation of U.S. support for the Thieu regime.

Both PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi and DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy at the Paris session on 14 October* used the President's remarks at his press conference on the 12th as a peg to attack Vietnamization. The delegates, of course, did not acknowledge that it was

* Thi was again substituting for PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, who is still in Vietnam; Vy was standing in for Xuan Thuy, who was absent for the third consecutive session. After his initial absence, it was said that he had influenza. VNA's service channel from Paris to Hanoi on 15 October carried an item reporting that he had "left Paris to rest for a short period of time in the GDR," but Hanoi media are not known to have reported this.

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at that press conference that the President announced his planned trip to Moscow. Their failure to do so was made the more pointed by Thi's reference to "Nixon's fallacy" that by Vietnamizing the war while negotiating, the United States has made significant progress which would enable it to end its involvement in South Vietnam "by the middle of next year." The President had in fact referred to progress on both tracks "by the time this meeting [with the Soviets] takes place." Apart from VNA's report of the Paris delegates' remarks, Hanoi media have carried no comment on the President's press conference, presumably because it was held to announce the Moscow trip; in a similar departure from normal practice, Hanoi had totally ignored the President's 4 August press conference at which he discussed his planned trip to China in addition to commenting on the Vietnam question. (TASS, perhaps in part in deference to Hanoi, said nothing about any of the President's remarks on Indochina in its 13 October account of his press conference announcing the Moscow trip.)

The VNA account of the Paris session says that Thi "also condemned Nixon for his overt intention to maintain for a long period the presence in South Vietnam of U.S. forces, including the Air Force, with the obvious aim of continuing the war and protecting the bellicose clique of Nguyen Van Thieu and carrying out neocolonialism." It is not made clear that Thi was alluding to the President's 12 October press conference in this regard. But DRV delegate Vy, according to VNA, "analyzed the contradictions" in the President's remarks "about his 'goodwill for peace'" at the 12 October press conference. Noting that the President said the United States was continuing to negotiate but would at the same time continue Vietnamization, Vy observed that "peace in Vietnam, as Mr. Nixon sees it, means to feverishly carry out" Vietnamization, to maintain the Thieu administration, prolong the U.S. military occupation, continue to use the Air Force and "in other words, to prolong indefinitely the war in South Vietnam and expand the war to the whole of Indochina." VNA reports that Vy took issue with the President's statement "that one of his key objectives is to bring home the POW's," arguing that this is a question of "an aftermath of war" and cannot be solved as long as the Nixon Administration refuses to withdraw U.S. troops completely and to end Vietnamization.

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VNA notes Thi's charge that U.S. representatives at more than 130 sessions in Paris have shown a consistently negative attitude toward every communist proposal, including the PRG's 1 July seven-point proposal. But VNA does not go on to report Thi's criticism of Ambassador Porter in the remark that "at recent sessions the U.S. neocolonialist position and its obstinacy to engage in negotiations from a position of strength have been exposed in a more overt manner, thus creating more difficulties and aggravating the deadlock of the conference."

As it has done on previous occasions, VNA obscures the fact that the allied delegates spoke first at the session on the 14th. VNA again ignores GVN delegate Lam's presentation and dismisses Ambassador Porter's remarks in one sentence: He "used brazen fallacies in an attempt to conceal the Nixon Administration's aggressive nature and shun a serious response to the PRG's seven-point peace plan."

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"CUU LONG" APPRAISES VIETNAMIZATION, STRENGTH OF MAIN FORCES

The article by the military commentator "Cuu Long,"* entitled "The U.S. Vietnamization Strategy Has Been and Will Certainly be Defeated," was carried in two installments on 17 and 18 October in both Hanoi and Front broadcasts and published in the North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. Cuu Long's article is reminiscent of comment following the Lam Son 719 operation which broke with the general propaganda pattern of recent years when it declared that a "military" victory is possible and seemed to argue for increased action by main-force units. The last such comment came in July and early August in reviews of the fighting in the first six months of the year.**

According to Liberation Radio's introduction, the Cuu Long article was written on the basis of a talk delivered by a PLAF command representative at a "congress of heroes and emulation combatants" of eastern Nam Bo and Saigon. Held from 20 to 23 September, the congress was first reported by Liberation Radio on 8 October and hailed in both Hanoi and Front comment, including editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 11 October. The PLAF command representative's talk was summarized in the 11 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, but it is not known to have been broadcast until Liberation Radio carried it in installments on 17, 18, and 19 October. The radio account was not translated in full because of poor reception. The available portion of the talk dealt in large part with individual heroic feats and the teachings of Ho Chi Minh.

Cuu Long repeats the claim, made in comment earlier this year, that Vietnamization "received a fatal blow of strategic significance in the 1970-71 dry season," and he maintains that the ARVN is "facing the danger of collapse" while the Indochinese "revolutionary forces" have never been in "better shape." He raises the threat of future large-scale attacks with the assertion that the dry season "not only created favorable conditions for our

* Cuu Long is a pseudonym periodically signed to authoritative commentaries on the war in South Vietnam. The last previous article bearing this signature was a lengthy discussion of ideological problems in the PLAF broadcast by Liberation Radio at the end of April this year. Prior to that, Hanoi and Front media in mid-April 1970 publicized an article attributed to Cuu Long on the allied Vietnamization program.

** See the 4 August TRENDS, pages 15-17.

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main forces to engage in large-scale operations but also opened the prospect that we will certainly annihilate the Saigon puppet main-force troops, thus completely defeating Nixon's Vietnamization strategy militarily."

Later in his article, Cuu Long states flatly that "our main-force army can now completely defeat the southern puppet army." As he has done in earlier articles,* Cuu Long claims that the ARVN was almost completely put out of action in 1965 prior to the intervention of U.S. troops. He goes on to draw a parallel between its condition then and its position following "disasters" in Lam Son 719 and Cambodia and questions the ability of "weakened" U.S. forces to again "save the puppet army." He predicts that "like a crippled person with no crutch, the puppet army will completely collapse when the full war burden falls on its head."

Cuu Long portrays Saigon as facing a dilemma since it allegedly has had to send main-force units to assist in pacification and has thereby reduced its ability "to concentrate mobile forces to form an outer protective shield" for pacification. This dilemma is also stressed in a 19 October QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 1970-71 dry season. As reported by VNA, the article in the army paper claims that the ARVN's strategic reserves are spread thin on the battlefield and that "an important part of it has to do the job normally done by local garrisons."

Both the Cuu Long article and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary claim that the allies have failed to achieve the major objective of pushing the PLAF main forces away from heavily populated areas and preventing them from launching attacks. Concern with allied efforts to force PLAF units out of their areas had seemed to be reflected at the September heroes' congress where determination to "maintain their footholds" was repeatedly cited as a primary characteristic of those honored at the meeting. As evidence that the allies have been "outmaneuvered," QUAN DOI NHAN DAN cites the communists' attacks on positions in northern Quang Tri, the

* Cuu Long's April 1970 article similarly referred to the threatened collapse of the South Vietnamese army in 1965; and a February 1967 article by Cuu Long, published in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, discussed problems created by the entry of U.S. forces into the war when the communists were on the verge of "completely defeating" the ARVN.

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highlands, and Cambodia, adding that the garrison in Krek, Cambodia, is "now under siege" and that the PLAF is "operating in force in Binh Long and Tay Ninh provinces" and "pumping big-gun fire into Gia Dinh and Saigon."

Touching on the situation in the cities, Cuu Long echoes other communist claims that the "struggle movement" in urban areas has been markedly stepped up in 1971. Going further to raise the possibility of an even greater urban struggle, Cuu Long asserts that "under certain conditions the struggle movement of compatriots in southern cities may develop into a broad revolutionary movement which, in coordination with other attacks, will contribute to overthrowing" the Saigon government.

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DRV SPOKESMAN SCORES U.S. STRIKES IN DMZ, NORTH VIETNAM

Hanoi on 9 and 16 October publicizes two more DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statements in the continuing series of complaints against U.S. air activity against the DRV. The spokesman's statement on the 16th charged that from 12 to 15 October U.S. aircraft including B-52's "repeatedly bombed" Huong Lap village while U.S. artillery "from the southern part of the demilitarized zone" shelled Vinh Giang and Vinh Son villages. The 9 October statement claimed that the same three villages were attacked on 4, 5, and 7 October and that Vinh Giang and Vinh Son were shelled by U.S. ships as well as by artillery. Both statements described the villages as being "north of the 17th parallel in the demilitarized zone."

The 16 October statement also claimed there were air strikes on populated areas of Quang Binh and Ha Tinh provinces on the 14th and 15th. And according to the statement on the 9th, U.S. aircraft "struck at a number of localities in the western part of Quang Binh Province" on 4 and 6 October. Both statements routinely demand an end to all U.S. encroachments on DRV sovereignty and security.

HANOI, FRONT NOTE "START" OF U.S. FALL ANTIWAR CAMPAIGN

Continuing Vietnamese communist attention to U.S. antiwar activity includes comment from both Hanoi and the Front on the "fall campaign." VNA on 15 October reports antiwar activities in Washington, New York, and Seattle on the 13th sponsored by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice and the National Peace Action Coalition. And comment from both Hanoi and the Front says these demonstrations marked the start of the antiwar fall campaign, which they both call "very significant."

Hanoi Radio in a commentary on the 18th asserts that despite the Administration's "maneuvers" and "deceitful allegations," the Vietnam problem will remain a burden to the United States as long as it refuses to withdraw all troops. Similarly, a Liberation Radio commentary on the 15th notes the importance of this campaign in light of the President's "tricks" to appease the American people's struggle. It describes the current offensive as a continuation of previous movements, and other propaganda recalls in passing the antiwar demonstrations last spring.

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In the only reference to President Nixon's 12 October press conference--other than by the Paris delegates--on the 14th--Liberation Radio cites as psychological ploys the President's remark that there is a prospect for ending the U.S. combat role in mid-1972 and his new economic measures. The broadcast declares that "all of Nixon's deceptions cannot lead U.S. public opinion astray." It also scores the President for "purposefully dodging" the PRG's seven-point proposal.

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BROADCASTS CONTINUE TO AVOID ANY MENTION OF LIN PIAO

Lin Piao has not been mentioned in available radio broadcasts or NCNA reports during the past week. The last time he was mentioned in monitored provincial media was in a 8 October Kirin broadcast; except for foreign-originated messages and toasts he has not been mentioned in Peking broadcasts since 15 September. The continuing failure to mention Lin and the absence from public view of most active military leaders on the Politburo, including Huang Yung-sheng, Li Tso-peng, Wu Fa-hsien and the Nanking regional commander Hsu Shih-yu, make it clear that China's current crisis is related to problems in the military leadership.

On the basis of their behavior during the cultural revolution, Wu Fa-hsien and Li Tso-peng can be placed among the "leftists" on the political spectrum, Huang Yung-sheng and Hsu Shih-yu among the "moderates." Thus it seems unlikely that all would fall together as a single faction; after the struggle subsides, some may reappear. Yet media examination is beginning to suggest that another scenario is possible: since all were dependent on Lin for their positions, Lin's disappearance has somehow shifted the power balance in favor of civilian leadership, whether "radical" or "moderate" -- which would explain the continuing appearances of civilian Politburo members of various leanings.

The question of party control over the army has been an issue of discussion in the CCP since the formation of the Red Army. During the cultural revolution the slogan that the "party commands the gun" was given frequent lip-service as the army extended its control over all aspects of PRC life. Since the second plenary session of the Ninth Central Committee ending in September 1970 at which leftist civilian leader Chen Po-ta was apparently severely criticized and Kang Sheng suffered a considerable diminuation in power, there have been two campaigns which were aimed at insuring party control over the army.

During late January and February of this year a number of provinces broadcast rather general articles advocating party control of the army; these were issued during the spring festival period, a traditional time for comment on relations with the PLA, and the campaign soon died out. It reappeared in a major way only in the second traditional annual period for comment on army-civilian relations, around Army Day on 1 August.

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ARMY DAY The Army Day propaganda this year varied significantly from the cultural revolution era, with the joint editorial especially notable for diminishing the status of Lin as the leader currently in control of the PLA. For the first time since the beginning of the cultural revolution, the editorial contained no quotation from Lin, not even his injunction to study Mao. In addition the editorial depersonalized the control of the army by noting that the army places itself "under the party's absolute leadership, going where the party directs." For the first time since 1967, when radical leaders with power over the media used separate editorials in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY to urge closer control over the military, the editorial this year noted Mao's dictum "the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party."

The injunction probably reflected the near-completion of party rebuilding and the feeling of some that the PLA, no longer essential to the maintenance of order, could return to its previous role.

The Army Day editorial was complemented by an NCNA article on 31 July which sounded the theme that the army is infallible only so long as it follows Mao, that "whenever Chairman Mao's revolutionary line is interfered with, the army suffers losses." The featured losses included those caused by "left" deviations, both within the army and in incorrect civilian leadership of the army, and also by rightist deviations within the army.

This article did not, however, indicate that on local levels the army must look to its civilian party counterpart for guidance. Most of the provincial articles lauding party control during this period also carried few hints that a serious campaign to insure organizational control by the civilian party might be underway. For example, a 29 August Harbin broadcast was unusually frank in indicating that the party apparatus within the army was in a position to dominate the civilian party. The broadcast discussed problems experienced by the party branch of a PLA "support-the-left" team party branch in exercising control over its scattered members, many of whom "are assuming leading positions in party organizations" at various levels in the civil sphere. The article stated that controls had been tightened by various measures, including the addition of "the positions of full-time secretary and deputy secretary" to the PLA team's party organization.

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The Harbin broadcast suggests that an attempt to reassert party control, if its strengthened political PLA cadres, could find a number of allies within the army. (The reconstituted General Political Department is led by Li Te-sheng, one of the army leaders whose public appearances have continued unabated.) The number of articles advocating party control by county armed forces departments, which are under provincial command and have been most heavily involved in the civilian structure, may indicate strength in this area for revived party control, especially since most of these PLA cadres also hold civil party posts. On the other hand, if current arguments reflect such issues as allocations priorities, those in the PLA who depend on advanced weapons, such as the air force leaders and commanders at the field army level, might be more resistant to a reassertion of civil party authority.

CURRENT COMMENT Current broadcast items on the PLA's relationship to the party focus attention on county-level organization but may be applicable at higher levels as well. The sort of propaganda item now fairly common is exemplified by a Kwangsi radio broadcast on 12 October which quotes a county leader who is also a PLA leader as saying: "We have treated the local cadres' confidence in the PLA as capital for arrogance. We have not paid attention to asking for instructions from and reporting work to the local CCP committee."

Similarly, a Shansi broadcast on the 18th hails a county secretary PLA cadre for "taking the lead in heeding the party's discipline." The article lays down the principle that the "individual must obey the organization" and secretaries must follow the collective leadership. The secretary who is praised was once complacent and arrogant, it is said, but he has learned more recently that local cadres must be consulted.

ROLE OF MILITIA Dissension over the role of the militia may figure in the current infighting. There has been new emphasis on the importance of party control of the militia and on the role of the militia in case of war.

The most authoritative provincial voice on these themes was a 22 September report of a militia conference in Anhwei, home base of Li Te-sheng. The article not only laid down the general principle of civilian party control over the militia, but also the organizational injunction that militia work must be placed under the purview of specific members of the party committees at each level. To insure that the correct political line is observed in the militia, the committee is to select demobilized

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soldiers "who are young and able-bodied" to fill the holes in militia leadership ranks. In addition, the article praised "some" PLA units that had worked closely with the militia in military training activities.

Some PLA leaders may object --as did Peng Te-huai a number of years ago -- to any increased military training for the militia. Such opposition at a lower level was noted by Kansu radio on 30 September: "Some comrades have looked on the militia as an instrument for maintaining social order . . . and held that in time of war all the militia can do is carry stretchers." The article called for grasping militia work "as a measure for dealing with any possible sudden attack by imperialism," and demanded further study of the military role played by the militia during the revolutionary war.

ATTENTION TO MINORITY GROUPS IN CHINA IS STEPPED UP

Evidence that the bureaucracy is making a new effort to improve communications with China's minority groups continues to accumulate. Such endeavors were more or less quiescent during the cultural revolution and for some time thereafter, and indeed there was considerable backsliding for several years during which restrictions were placed on radio broadcasting and newspaper publication. Last May, however, Radio Peking's domestic service inaugurated broadcasts in Uighur and Kazakh, and on 1 October the Kwangsi regional service began to carry programs in Chuang dialects for the most numerous of China's minority groups.

Now the Hulunpeierh and Chelimu meng (leagues) have instituted local broadcasts in Mongolian. These areas were detached from Inner Mongolia in 1969 and placed under the jurisdiction, respectively, of Heilungkiang and Kirin provinces. Since then, the meng radios, located at Hailar and Tongliao, have relayed the Mandarin service of their respective provincial radios; but up to now the substantial Mongolian populace of these areas has been supplied with its propaganda rations via relay by the local radios of the Inner Mongolia regional service in Mongolian.

This practice has probably been less than satisfactory, however. With Inner Mongolia's main radio service in Mandarin restricted for nearly two years to relays of Radio Peking, its Mongolian-language service has been permitted only to translate and

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rebroadcast items from the Radio Peking and NCNA file -- with a resultant scarcity of items explicitly about Mongolians. Now, starting this month, the Hailar and Tunghiao radios are going to be able to broadcast localized propaganda materials for their Mongolian listeners.

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NIXON TRIP TO USSR

MOSCOW STRESSES CONSISTENCY WITH USSR'S NEGOTIATIONS POLICY

The President's planned visit to Moscow next May is discussed on an authoritative level in articles by Nekrasov in PRAVDA and Mikhaylov in IZVESTIYA on 15 and 16 October, respectively. As in initial comment by TASS' Kornilov on the 14th, the articles depict Soviet policy as combining a quest for the negotiated settlement of international problems with maintenance of military strength. But the stress is clearly on the former, and both the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA articles assume a confident stance in reviewing recent Soviet foreign policy accomplishments. In an apparent division of tasks, it is left to the party organ to explicitly reassure Moscow's allies in the widely broadcast Nekrasov article that relations with the United States will not be developed at the expense of relations with the socialist countries, particularly the DRV.* There is no direct address in any Soviet comment on the trip to the question of the triangular relationship among Washington, Moscow, and Peking.**

Entitled "The Demands of the Times," Nekrasov's PRAVDA article takes note of recent developments in Soviet foreign policy, from the treaties with Egypt and India to the recent flurry of high-level Soviet contacts with other countries. Nekrasov, a PRAVDA deputy editor, goes on to present the invitation to the President as clearly justified in light of this documented evidence of the efficacy of a policy of negotiations. He asserts that the importance of the state of relations between the USSR and the United States in the international arena is "perfectly clear." He says it is apparent from the 12 October announcement that the agreement on the visit "was reached in

* See the Indochina section of today's TRENDS for a discussion of this aspect.

** While TASS initially reported the President's 12 October press conference in a single sentence on the same day, a later account on the 13th did note his observation that the trip to Moscow will be independent of the visit to Peking and that neither trip has the aim of exploiting Sino-Soviet differences.

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the course of an exchange of opinions over the past year," and he recalls the "positive results" which have created a proper atmosphere for the meeting--the Berlin accord and the two agreements achieved at the strategic arms limitation talks.

Nekrasov finds it a hopeful sign that "wide public circles in different countries, including the United States, even more strongly reject the policy of militarism and aggression," calling this "the spirit of the times" and adding that "every sane political leader cannot but take this into consideration." At the same time, he takes note of "zigzags" in U.S. foreign policy in recent years--phraseology used in Brezhnev's 30 March report to the CPSU Congress. Citing "aggressive manifestations" in Indochina and the Middle East, he affirms that "these manifestations will continue to receive a decisive rebuff." He concludes that a realistic basis for developing bilateral relations is "the sober regard for the processes taking place in the world and an understanding of the basic direction of the course of events."

The Mikhaylov article in IZVESTIYA, which Radio Moscow did not broadcast, emphasizes that in agreeing to a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting the Soviet Union was guided by principles set forth in the Central Committee report to the 24th CPSU Congress--including the pursuit of peaceful coexistence and the development of mutually advantageous ties. In reviewing recent foreign policy developments, the IZVESTIYA article cites the Berlin agreement as "graphic proof" that even the most complex problems which adversely affect international affairs can be resolved when there is "a common aspiration to do so and when the sides do not shun sensible compromises but take mutual interests into account." Like Nekrasov, Mikhaylov does not specify topics that may be discussed with the President, registering only the hope that the summit meeting will result in "mutually acceptable solutions." He makes the point earlier in the article that "serious preparatory work must precede" the talks. While Moscow comment on the trip avoids any discussion of agenda topics, TASS' 13 October account of President Nixon's press conference the preceding day did report that in answer to reporters' questions he said such matters as "the negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons, the Near East, and others" would be discussed.

Moscow media have not been heard to acknowledge Premier Kosygin's remarks to eight visiting U.S. governors on the 15th when, according to Western reports, he said the President's USSR visit will be aimed at improving U.S.-Soviet friendship, without which world

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peace "is difficult." Kosygin reportedly added that the best preparation for the visit would be the ending of the war in Vietnam and Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. The TASS account of this meeting simply said Kosygin discussed "questions of Soviet-American relations" with the governors. In an 18 October dinner speech in Ottawa on the first day of his visit to Canada, reported by TASS, Kosygin observed that the trips by Soviet leaders to other countries and "visits by foreign statesmen to the Soviet Union" serve to implement the USSR's peace-loving policy.

MOSCOW'S ALLIES East German, Czechoslovak, Hungarian,
 Polish, and Bulgarian radio and press media continue to hail the agreement on the President's trip, for the most part following Moscow's lead. They characterize it as an agreement fully consistent with the USSR's "constructive" foreign policy, at the same time pointing to Soviet awareness of Washington's "aggressiveness and adventurism" as manifested by the war in Indochina and continuing support for Israel. In the words of an East Berlin domestic service commentary by Leuschner on the 17th, "without any illusions about the character of imperialism," the Soviet Union and its allies must probe every possibility of achieving political solutions of controversial issues.

Bulgarian Foreign Minister Bashev commented briefly on the trip announcement in his 13 October UNGA speech, calling it symptomatic of "the fresh winds . . . of reduction of tension and detente" which have recently developed in the international arena. Bashev's remarks represent the only comment on the trip from a high-level East European spokesman so far.

While the East European comment essentially parallels Moscow's, some East European commentators have continued to pursue angles Moscow could not or would not broach--speculating on the probable agenda, for example, and pointing to the timing of the planned visit on the eve of the U.S. presidential election campaign.* On the latter theme, for example, Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on the 14th said the trip "is already referred to as an 'election trip' by some Western commentators, that is, as a 'great trump card' for the U.S. presidential election"; the same day's Bratislava PRACA remarked on "the domestic policy significance of Nixon's trip, particularly at a time preceding the climax of the presidential election campaign."

* See the TRENDS of 14 October for earlier East European reaction.

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BUCHAREST HAILS AGREEMENT ON VISIT AS "POSITIVE STEP"

Romania registered its warm approval of the announcement of the President's Moscow visit in a 15 October SCINTEIA article by one of the paper's leading political commentators, Caplescu, entitled "A Positive Step in the Progress of Soviet-American Relations, a New Confirmation of the Universal Validity of the Method of Political Contacts." The same commentator had coauthored the 21 July SCINTEIA article in which Bucharest had welcomed the 15 July announcement of the President's planned visit to Peking.

Quoting from the President's 12 October press conference, Caplescu cites his remark that the Moscow and Peking visits are independent of each other and that neither is aimed at exploiting Sino-Soviet differences. Here Caplescu adds that the President "also stressed" that "despite differences of opinions with the countries to be visited, one must admit at the same time that today there is no alternative to negotiation"--lifting out of context a remark made by the President specifically in connection with U.S.-Soviet negotiation of differences at a time when further escalation of the arms race could not benefit either side.

Caplescu is careful to treat the Moscow visit in terms parallel to those he had used in July in regard to the projected Peking trip. He says the Romanian people view the agreement on the President's visit to the Soviet capital as "an act of political realism," much as the July article had viewed the decision on the Peking trip as "the first step toward giving up the unrealistic policy" the United States had pursued for more than 20 years toward China. The article also stresses that major world problems today cannot be solved without the participation of "the socialist countries," and "in this respect it is known that the Soviet Union is a big socialist state which . . . makes an outstanding contribution to strengthening the world socialist system, the forces of progress and peace." In a similar vein, the July article, citing the increasing number of countries establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC and voting for its admission to the United Nations, said "these facts prove the increasingly strong conviction that no effective settlement of any of the big problems facing mankind today could be conceived without the participation of the People's Republic of China."

Viewing the visit as part of the ongoing "comprehensive process of normalizing" international relations, Caplescu underscores a stock tenet of Romania's independent policy in adding that "each

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state, big or small, regardless of its potential, should make its own contribution" to solving "major" contemporary problems. Utilizing the opportunity to demonstrate agreement between Bucharest and the other East European countries on a major international development, the article notes that "from sources of the communist and workers' parties, the first released commentaries or taking of stands express positive appreciation concerning the importance of the announced visit" and of "the method of contacts" and peaceful coexistence.

PEKING NOTES THAT GROMYKO BROUGHT INVITATION TO WASHINGTON

While avoiding direct comment, Peking has reported the announcement on President Nixon's projected visit to Moscow in such a way as to contrast that development with its own invitation to the President. Peking's sole reference to the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, a report datelined 14 October and carried early on the 15th by the NCNA domestic service and the Peking domestic radio, cited the identical announcements by TASS and the President and briefly quoted from the President's press conference. The NCNA international service and Radio Peking's foreign services have not carried the report.

Peking's treatment of the Soviet-U.S. announcement, including its failure to report the development in its international services, reflects Chinese concern and distrust regarding relations between the two superpowers. The NCNA report omitted the final sentence of the TASS announcement indicating that the purpose of the Moscow summit meeting was to improve bilateral relations and strengthen world peace--a goal that might seem parallel to the purpose of the President's visit to Peking. NCNA's announcement on Peking's invitation to the President had said the projected Sino-U.S. meeting was intended to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides. NCNA selected one brief passage from the President's 12 October press conference, quoting him as saying that discussions on a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting had been taking place on and off--"not at my level"--until Foreign Minister Gromyko brought a formal invitation to Washington. An implicit contrast was thus drawn between Peking's invitation, extended to an American emissary dispatched to the PRC, and the Kremlin's invitation delivered by an envoy going to Washington from Moscow.

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In keeping with its general polemical restraint toward the Soviets, Peking has largely avoided the formerly prominent theme of Soviet-U.S. collusion in its ongoing comment. But the effort to contrast its relations with Washington and those between Moscow and Washington, evident in the report on the President's forthcoming meeting with the Kremlin leaders, was also reflected in Peking's response to a TASS-reported Japanese account of the first Kissinger mission to the PRC. Reacting sharply to claims in the account that Kissinger attempted economic bribery of the Chinese, an NCNA dispatch on 8 September sought to turn the accusation back on the Soviets by charging that they did not hesitate to "send important persons to capitalist countries . . . to beg obsequiously" for funds to build a truck plant, thereby obtaining equipment from the United States. The 8 September NCNA dispatch, like the 14 October report on the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, did not mention the President's projected visit to Peking. The latest reference to that visit in PRC media was the 20 October announcement of Kissinger's arrival in Peking that day for the purpose of making arrangements for the President's trip.

ALBANIAN COMMENT Comment from Peking's Albanian ally, while sparse thus far, has been characteristically more outspoken, describing the President's forthcoming visit to Moscow in terms of Soviet-U.S. collaboration in opposition to revolutionary forces. A Tirana broadcast on 14 October viewed the summit meeting as part of an effort by the two superpowers to establish world hegemony and to undermine the national liberation movement. Tirana's comment to date has not mentioned China in connection with the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. A vitriolic ZERI I POPULLIT editorial on 7 October, in the course of an attack on Podgorny's visit to the DRV, had made much of what it described as the anti-Chinese motives underlying Moscow's current diplomatic campaign.

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KOSYGIN IN CANADA

MOSCOW WAITS 18 HOURS BEFORE NOTING ATTACK ON KOSYGIN

Moscow media waited more than 18 hours to report the attack on Soviet Premier Kosygin as he walked with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau on the Parliamentary grounds just after they concluded their first round of talks on 18 October. Not until the afternoon of the 19th did Moscow radio, in a news item for the domestic audience, report that a "provocation was perpetrated" against Kosygin as he was leaving the Parliamentary building with Trudeau. In its reports on the Kosygin visit on the evening of the 18th, Moscow radio and TASS remained silent on the incident, which occurred just before 5 p.m. Moscow time. A dispatch from Ottawa read in Moscow radio's late evening international news roundup said typically that "Canadians express joy over the arrival . . . of the head of the Soviet Government."

Without identifying the attacker as a Hungarian refugee, the radio report on the 19th said that the man "broke through the guards . . . and tried to commit an act of hooliganism" and noted that the police were conducting an investigation. The report also said Trudeau had "expressed deep regret at what had happened," without specifying that the Canadian leader had made this public apology at a session of the House of Commons later in the afternoon during which he called the attack "a very humiliating event for Canadians" and expressed shame in the name of the Canadian Government and people.

At a dinner given by the Canadian hosts on the evening of the 18th, Kosygin expressed his "sincere appreciation for the hospitality accorded" his delegation and for the "friendly sentiments of the Canadians for the Soviet people." He added that the Soviet people "also entertain sentiments of sympathy for the people of Canada, a country of amicable and industrious people."

A PRAVDA report on Kosygin's visit by correspondents Mayevskiy and Geyvandov, summarized by TASS on the 19th, ignored the attack on the Soviet leader but did point out that the developing Soviet-Canadian relations "are not to the liking of some elements" in Canada which "stint no efforts in inventing 'problems' and hindering a development of these relations." The PRAVDA correspondents said "most Canadians

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understand well that these are people of the past who got stuck in the trenches of the Cold War." Apart from this single general reference to opposition to the Kosygin visit, Moscow media have remained silent on the numerous protest actions taken by various groups of Ukrainians, East European ethnic organizations, and Jews.

KOSYGIN: BILATERAL COOPERATION NOT AIMED AGAINST ANYONE

As at the time of Trudeau's May visit to the USSR, Soviet propaganda surrounding Kosygin's return visit has scrupulously avoided any effort to play off the developing Soviet-Canadian relationship against the United States. Moscow media have carried news reports of the difficulties arising between Washington and Ottawa over the scheduled Amchitka nuclear test and the U.S. 10-percent surcharge, and TASS reported Trudeau's comment at a press conference on 15 October that it was "possible that Canada would have to reorient its trade to other areas of the world." But contentious issues in U.S.-Canadian relations have been unmentioned in commentaries pegged to Kosygin's visit.

In his reply toast to Trudeau at the dinner on 18 October, the Soviet Premier declared pointedly that "Soviet-Canadian cooperation is not directed against anybody. It serves, and we want it to serve even more, the cause of international security. We have no concealed aims whatsoever." Regarding bilateral relations, according to TASS, Kosygin attached "great significance" to the protocol on political consultations signed during Trudeau's visit to the USSR.

TASS transmitted a virtual text of Trudeau's toast on the 18th in which the Canadian leader expressed his country's readiness to develop a "soundly based" friendship with the Soviet Union while at the same time continuing "the long relationship with its oldest friends," adding that "however uncertain may be the consequences from time to time of short-term events, the long run consists of a climate of understanding and cooperation."

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KOSYGIN TO VISIT CUBA; CASTRO TO VISIT CHILE ?

Both Moscow and Havana have announced that Soviet Premier Kosygin will pay "a friendly visit" to Cuba at the invitation of the Cuban Communist Party and Government. Moscow radio on the 19th said that the visit would take place "at the end of this month"; Havana's domestic service on the 20th noted that Kosygin would arrive on 26 October. Neither mentioned that he would be coming from Canada, where his official visit is scheduled to end on the 25th; neither specified the duration of his stay in Cuba.

The announcement of the evidently belatedly arranged visit comes less than a month after speculation that Brezhnev would visit Cuba in December. Prompted by Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda's remark on 21 September--in an interview in the Santiago ULTIMA HORA--that a long-rumored Castro visit to Chile "must take place before December, since Brezhnev's visit to Cuba has been announced for that date," the speculation was neither confirmed nor denied by Moscow or Havana, although Cuba media made at least one noncommittal reference to the "rumor."*

No top-level Soviet official has visited Cuba since Kosygin's 26-30 June 1967 stopover in Havana on his way home from a special emergency UNGA session and the Glassboro talks with President Johnson--at a time when Soviet-Cuban relations were relatively cool. That visit was not announced by Moscow until Kosygin's departure for Cuba from the United States, or by Cuba until his arrival in Havana.

Widespread speculation continues in Chilean media on the specific dates of Castro's anticipated visit to Chile, with most sources conjecturing that a brief Castro visit will be timed for the celebration of the first anniversary of Allende's Popular Unity government on 4 November. Citing "foreign ministry sources," the Chilean communist paper PURO CHILE said on the 19th that Castro "has directly informed President Allende" that his arrival will be "prior to celebrations marking the first year of the popular government." In an information dispatch to Havana on the 16th,

* Reported in the TRENDS of 29 September, page 46.

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PRENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondent advised his home office that Allende himself had told Chilean students, in impromptu remarks that day, that Castro would arrive in Chile "within a few weeks--sooner than you expect."

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CPSU SLOGANS

SEMIANNUAL LIST REGISTERS FEW CHANGES FROM MAY DAY

The treatment of international affairs in this year's list of October Revolution anniversary slogans, released 18 October, is largely unchanged from the May Day list. The two slogans on Indochina are identical to the May Day versions. Word and phrase changes in three slogans reflect propaganda lines responsive to current international situations:

+ The penultimate slogan which in the May Day version hailed the USSR as the stronghold of "peace and friendship of the peoples" now describes it as the bastion of "the forces of peace and socialism," pointedly underscoring Moscow's claim to represent the genuine forces of socialism and peace in the face of the Chinese challenge. The slogan also takes on a more patriotic cast with a new reference to "our great motherland."

+ A slogan addressed to the peoples of European countries, calling for a struggle to achieve peace and cooperation in Europe, is reworded slightly to reflect the stepped-up Soviet propaganda drive for a European security conference in the wake of the four-power Berlin agreement. It now calls not just for a "stable peace" but for a "lasting stable peace," and a reference to "the people's security" is added to the goals. A word of caution against "intriguer of the forces of reaction and revanchism" is retained. The signing of the Berlin agreement prompts no direct reference to Germany.

+ The greeting to peoples of Arab countries, previously a call for "unity and cohesion in the struggle against imperialist aggression," now urges unity and cohesion of "all revolutionary and national democratic forces" in the Arab countries in the struggle against imperialism "and reaction." The new elements reflect Moscow's concern over recent developments in the Arab world that have operated to the detriment of communist and leftist forces--most notably Sudan's execution of communist leaders, Libyan strictures against communism, and the Egyptian trials of former regime officials. Soviet concern had been indicated in the communique on Ponomarev's July visit to Cairo in which both sides expressed the conviction that anticommunism damages Arab national interests and aspirations for "liberation."

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Moscow won an even more forceful statement from the Egyptians in the communique on as-Sadat's October visit, which expressed both sides' "strong condemnation" of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

The slogans concerned with domestic affairs are almost exactly like those of last May Day and last October, with no alterations of any significance.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CRITICISM OF VORONOV'S RURAL CONSTRUCTION POLICIES VOICED

At an All-Union rural construction conference in Kiev from 4 to 9 October, the RSFSR was singled out for criticism for its poor work in rural construction and its negative attitude toward the program to rebuild villages. The costly program to consolidate the Soviet Union's 700,000 villages into 110-120,000 was initiated in 1967; it has been promoted and supervised by USSR First Deputy Premier Polyanskiy.

The current criticism may reflect on the standing of Politburo member and former RSFSR Premier Voronov. Voronov's opposition to the village program was suggested previously by his delay in creating a separate RSFSR rural construction ministry which would guarantee construction resources for agriculture (the RSFSR was sharply attacked on this point by RURAL LIFE in 1965, 1966 and 1967), by his stress on local financing of rural construction rather than state financing, and by his November 1970 criticism of defects in the village reconstruction program. Voronov was removed as RSFSR premier in late July 1971, shortly after the ouster of his two top assistants in supervising rural construction: RSFSR First Deputy Premier for agriculture K. G. Pysin (retired in February) and RSFSR Deputy Premier for construction A. Ye. Biryukov (removed in May).

The attacks on the RSFSR, ignored in the initial accounts of the Kiev conference, were revealed in a lengthy 13 October RURAL LIFE article by RURAL LIFE construction editor P. B. Vaynshteyn. Vaynshteyn, hardly a neutral reporter, had been the most bitter assailant of the village reconstruction program's foes in 1967 and 1968 when opponents exposed defects in the program and brought about a slowdown in its implementation. In his current article, Vaynshteyn praises Belorussian officials (who developed the program's prototype in 1965-1967) and claims that RSFSR construction committee chairman D. Basilov and RSFSR rural construction deputy minister M. Pilipchuk were forced to concede shortcomings in the RSFSR's work at the conference.

Vaynshteyn reports that the RSFSR had planned poorly for many model villages, had delayed construction (instead of the planned 130 model farm villages only 64 were begun), and had failed to provide financing and material resources ("financing was not arranged properly--the RSFSR Agriculture Ministry entrusted it

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to local organs," and special material resources were not planned for construction of the model villages). "The impermissibility of such an attitude toward this important matter was stressed" at the conference, Vaynshteyn writes. Judging from Vaynshteyn's account, the RSFSR was the only area criticized at the conference.

A shift of the resource burden to local sources does indeed appear to have been encouraged by the RSFSR leaders. In an August 1966 speech Pysin stressed that "the most important source of financing of cultural and everyday life construction is internal reserves and local sources" (SOVIET RUSSIA, 17 August 1966). In a July 1969 speech on housing Voronov stressed the recent rise in rural income and urged that more local resources for rural construction be sought, since the state was already allotting "big sums" for such construction (SOVIET RUSSIA, 31 July 1969).

In contrast, Polyanskiy in a 10 June 1967 speech had called for a national effort to reconstruct Soviet villages, and in his October 1967 KOMMUNIST article he had appealed for "large efforts and significant funds" for rural construction and a speedup in the village reconstruction program. However, the program was slowed down in the latter part of 1968, after a July 1968 conference recognized defects in village plans and housing designs (RURAL LIFE, 2 July 1968) and a 12 September 1968 Central Committee decree criticized the program for ineffective use of funds and poor architectural and planning decisions (PRAVDA, 2 October 1968).

In an apparent attack on Polyanskiy's program, Voronov in a 24 November 1970 speech recalled the September 1968 Central Committee decree criticizing defects in the village reconstruction program and declared that these defects were far from eliminated even now (SOVIET RUSSIA, 25 November 1970). Now that Voronov has been demoted, his criticisms have been tacitly confirmed by a 26 August 1971 Central Committee decree on improving planning and construction of agricultural projects (published in the 21 September PRAVDA) and by the October Kiev conference. The purpose in calling the Kiev conference was to "bring about a basic change" in rural construction, according to the main speaker, Gosstroy Chairman I.T. Novikov, who admitted serious shortcomings, including poor use of investments ("expending huge funds, we receive slower and less return from them than we should receive"), unnecessarily rising construction costs, and defects in village construction plans and housing designs (RURAL LIFE, 5 October 1971).

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