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19 JAN 1972

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#3-72

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

Confidential

19 JANUARY 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 3)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 10 - 16 JANUARY 1972

Moscow (2753 items)

Indochina	(14%)	10%
China	(8%)	9%*
[U.S. Air Raids	(10%)	6%]
5th AAPSO Conference,	(--)	8%
Cairo		
[Brezhnev	(--)	3%]
Greetings		
European Security	(1%)	3%
Indian-Pakistani	(9%)	3%*
Conflict		
Middle East	(2%)	2%

Peking (1468 items)

Domestic Issues	(39%)	41%
Indochina	(19%)	18%
[U.S. Air Raids	(2%)	2%]
[Long Cheng	(--)	5%]
Battle		
Chen I Death	(--)	9%
PRC-Cyprus Diplomatic	(--)	5%
Relations		
Indian-Pakistani	(3%)	1%
Conflict		
Nixon-Sato Meeting	(--)	1%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the Indian-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are included in the figure on India-Pakistan and amount to 2% of total Moscow comment.

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INDOCHINA

President Nixon's 13 January announcement to reporters that 70,000 more U.S. troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam during the three-month period February through April prompted comment from Hanoi similar to that on his last two announcements, in November and April 1971. Press comment came on the 15th in a NHAN DAN Commentator article: It acknowledged that U.S. troops strength will be down to 69,000 by next May but argued that the war remains an American one since the United States continues to supply money, weapons, and air and naval forces. The notion of maintaining a residual force of U.S. troops in South Vietnam as long as the POW's have not been released is assailed in reaction to Secretary Laird's press conference, held immediately after the President's announcement, as well as in continued comment on the President's 2 January TV interview. Propagandists and the communist delegates at the Paris talks reiterate that the two basic points of the PRG's 1 July peace proposal provide the correct way to end the war and secure the release of prisoners.

Peking has not commented on the troop withdrawal announcement on its own authority but has reported Vietnamese communist criticism, including the NHAN DAN Commentator article. Routine Moscow comment echoes Hanoi in assailing the Vietnamization policy and the announced U.S. intention to maintain a residual force in South Vietnam.

Communist propaganda claims new advances in the fighting in Laos, particularly the alleged capture of Long Tieng on 12 January. The exploit was praised in a flurry of high-level propaganda including a Chou En-lai congratulatory message to Souphanouvong and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, as well as in editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. At the same time, the dispatch of Thai troops to Laos is condemned in authoritative propaganda, including an NLHS Central Committee statement supported by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article and a NHAN DAN editorial. Moscow, as usual, has reacted to the developments in Laos in a more limited fashion, with only routine-level press comment and reportage.

DRV, PRG DEPRECATE PRESIDENT'S TROOP WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Initial Vietnamese communist reaction to the President's announcement of the next phase of U.S. troop withdrawal came from Hanoi radio on the 14th, and the following day the media carried the NHAN DAN

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Commentator article and Front comment, including a statement from the PRG spokesman in Paris.* The initial Hanoi broadcast set the tone when it said that public pressure and setbacks in Indochina had forced the President to make the announcement and when it complained that he continues to refuse to set a deadline for the withdrawal of all troops.

A lengthy Hanoi radio commentary broadcast later on the 14th said that despite his response to public pressure, the President "is an inveterate U.S. imperialist and has refused for three years to withdraw all of the troops." It went on to say that adherence to the Vietnamization policy was shown by Secretary Laird's press conference following President Nixon's brief announcement, as well as in the President's 2 January TV interview.** It observed that Vietnamization is actually a way of establishing "a lackey pro-U.S. regime" and prolonging the war, though it claimed at the same time that Vietnamization is "meeting with more arduous trials" than ever before throughout Indochina.

The comment uniformly assails Secretary Laird's statement that the United States will maintain a presence in South Vietnam until the POW issue has been resolved, as well as his reiteration of the point that air power will continue to be used to protect U.S. troops. In connection with the latter point, the NHAN DAN Commentator article took issue with Laird's statement that the use of air power has decreased during the Nixon Administration.

* Hanoi has regularly responded to announcements of troop withdrawals with NHAN DAN Commentator articles, and prior to his 7 April 1971 announcement there had additionally been high-level official statements. Reaction to the President's 12 November announcement is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 November, pages 1-4, and 24 November, pages 9-10.

** The 7 January NHAN DAN article on the President's TV interview, which Hanoi radio in Mandarin attributed to "Commentator" (discussed in the 12 January TRENDS, pages 3-5), appeared in the press over the signature of Nguyen Huu Chinh. Chinh has frequently commented on U.S. affairs and on the President. His most recent previous article--on the foreign aid bill--is discussed in the 10 November 1971 TRENDS, pages 21-22.

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Commentator, in the course of condemning the Nixon Administration for "sabotaging" the Paris talks, claimed that "world public opinion" had condemned the United States for not attending the Paris sessions in December and for carrying out the sustained air strikes against the DRV. Commentator and the statement by the PRG spokesman in Paris again declared that the correct way to end the war and secure the release of American prisoners is the PRG's seven-point proposal, and both spelled out the demands in points one and two.

FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH'S
THANKS FOR SUPPORT

VNA on the 14th reported that DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh on 10 January had sent letters of thanks to the foreign ministers "of the fraternal socialist countries" and others who had condemned the massive U.S. air strikes against the DRV and voiced support for the Vietnamese people's struggle. (Trinh did not list the "fraternal" countries, but TASS on the 14th reported that Foreign Minister Gromyko had received a "letter of gratitude." Endorsement of DRV Foreign Ministry protests over the air strikes had in fact come at the level of government statements from the Soviet Union and some of its European allies, though Peking had issued its statement at the foreign ministry level.)

Presumably referring to the President's TV interview on the 2d, Trinh said that "of late the President has declared that U.S. involvement in Indochina will be ended, all U.S. troops withdrawn and the bombing of North Vietnam stopped only after the release of American prisoners." Trinh then went on to say routinely that the path to a peaceful settlement lies in the PRG proposals.

PARIS: U.S. "OBDURACY," SUPPORT OF THIEU SAID TO BLOCK PEACE

At the 13 January Paris session, the Vietnamese communists also routinely stressed the correctness of the PRG's peace initiative as the way to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict. And PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien* made a special effort to demonstrate that the Vietnamization policy and the maintenance of the GVN were blocking progress at the talks.

* Tien was again substituting for PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh, who has not been present since the 12 August session.

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DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy--substituting for Xuan Thuy--rebutted Ambassador Porter's contention at the previous session that President Nixon preferred a negotiated settlement. Vy said the President "has made it clear that from 25,000 to 30,000 U.S. troops will be stationed indefinitely in South Vietnam, and the bombing of North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia would also go on indefinitely"; he added that the President's declaration that Vietnamization would be continued means that the Thieu "clique" will be maintained in power to prolong and expand the war.

The VNA account of the session noted that Tien stressed that so long as the Nixon Administration refuses to withdraw all U.S. troops and "retains" the Thieu "clique," the South Vietnam problem will remain unsolved and the American militarymen "including those captured during the Vietnam war" cannot return to their families. The account also reflects the remarks of Nguyen Minh Vy, who spoke in more detail and repeated the elaborated demands of the FRG's 1 July proposal. VNA reports that Vy said a peaceful settlement requires that "the United States put an end to 'Vietnamization' of the war, withdraw all troops, advisers, military personnel, weapons, and war means as well as abolish bases in South Vietnam and stop all activities of the U.S. air and naval forces in both North and South Vietnam." VNA quotes Vy as saying further that the United States must respect South Vietnam's right to self-determination and "stop maintaining" the Thieu regime.

NY TIMES QUERIES
TO PHAM VAN DONG

Vietnamese communist media have not mentioned the New York TIMES' A. M. Rosenthal's communication to Pham Van Dong in which he asked whether Hanoi would negotiate on military withdrawal and the release of prisoners separately from questions pertaining to Vietnam's political future, and in which he posed a series of questions to Dong on the precise meaning of Hanoi's various demands regarding cessation of U.S. military involvement and support of Thieu. VNA's service channel to Paris on the 15th carried Rosenthal's questions along with a message from Ngo Dien, head of the DRV Foreign Ministry's information and press department. Ignoring Rosenthal's specific questions, Dien implied that point one, on U.S. withdrawal and prisoner release, could not be separated from point two on a political settlement in South Vietnam: Dien said that the President, by raising at the same time prisoner release and troop withdrawal "without renouncing all commitment to and support for the Thieu regime," does not aim at bringing the problem to a solution.

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ROUTINE MOSCOW PROPAGANDA ECHOES HANOI ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL

Moscow promptly reported that President Nixon had announced a further withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam but did not specify that the total during the next three months would amount to 70,000. The initial TASS report, on the 13th, set the tone when it pointed out that Secretary Laird at his press conference reiterated the U.S. intention to keep a residual force and to continue using its air force. TASS commented that this probably implies new bombing raids on the DRV and added that Laird's "clarification" of the President's remarks only confirmed the U.S. intention of continuing aggression in Southeast Asia and protracting the war in Vietnam. Moscow says Secretary Laird's remarks indicate that the United States intends to continue the aggression and to seek a "military solution" in Vietnam.

A Shakov commentary broadcast in English to South Asia on the 15th and a panelist in the Moscow domestic service roundtable discussion on the 16th both commented on the "division of roles" at the press conference, with the President acting as "peacemaker" while Laird's comments "obliterated all this peacemaking." The object, said the Moscow commentators, was to calm both doves and hawks, the doves being told about the reduction of forces and the hawks being assured that the United States is not thinking of a complete withdrawal and still intends to bring about a "military solution" in Vietnam.

A 16 January IZVESTIYA article by Babenko said that the President and Secretary Laird were trying to reassure public opinion and to "create the impression" that the Administration is inclined to adopt a more "prudent line" on the Indochina question. But the "Pentagon's hypocrisy" is obvious, said Babenko, withdrawing "a certain number" of troops on the one hand while on the other intensifying the bombings. Thus, he said, "American newspapers" declare that the announcement of the forthcoming "slight reduction" of U.S. troops does not mean an end of U.S. armed interference in Indochina.

A 14 January Moscow domestic service commentary cited UPI for the complaint that the President did not set a date for total troop withdrawal, adding that both the President and Laird "made excuses" for retaining armed forces in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The commentary did not mention POW's explicitly, but a report on the press conferences published in PRAVDA on 16 January quoted Laird as saying "we shall stay in Vietnam until the problem of

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the U.S. prisoners of war is resolved." The domestic service commentary said that Laird tried to convince the reporters that the United States would get out of Vietnam, but that he did not say when and failed to answer "direct questions" about the expansion of the conflict in Cambodia and Laos and the intensified air war. His statements on the "success" of Vietnamization, said the commentator, caused "laughter" among the reporters.

A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin to Southeast Asia on the 16th, commenting on the press conference, concluded that the threat of U.S. aggression in Vietnam is "still very serious" and took the occasion again to attack China's "double-faced policy" and "collusion" with the United States. The commentary repeated the line that the President's belief that Peking would not take any strong action encouraged him to carry out the bombings against the DRV.

PRC REPORTS HANOI, FRONT ATTACKS ON WITHDRAWAL, U.S. POLICIES

While offering authoritative comment on Laos, Peking has avoided direct comment on Vietnam as such since the 8 January NCNA report on President Nixon's 2 January TV interview. Peking has, however, continued to provide a forum for Vietnamese communist statements criticizing the Nixon Administration's Vietnam policies and calling attention to the Paris conference as the focus for negotiations on Vietnam. The President's 13 January announcement that 70,000 more troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam by 1 May was acknowledged in NCNA accounts of the NHAN DAN Commentator article and of a Liberation Radio commentary attacking the announcement.

Citing the NHAN DAN article as charging that the President was forced to reduce troop strength in order to placate public opinion but that the United States will continue its direct and indirect prosecution of the war, NCNA quoted Commentator's conclusion that this proves the "deceitfulness of Nixon's hocus-pocus about an early end to the war." NCNA also quoted NHAN DAN's denunciation of the President's "sabotage" of the Paris conference, along with the article's assertion that the way to end the war and secure the release of American prisoners is shown in the PRG's seven-point program.

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After having departed from its usual practice by reporting the 6 January Paris session, Peking has not reported the proceedings of the session on the 13th. However, on the 14th NCNA belatedly reported the 4 January statements by the DRV and PRG spokesmen at the Paris conference condemning President Nixon's remarks in his 2 January TV interview for using U.S. POW's as a "pretext" for escalating the war. NCNA cited their criticisms of the Nixon Administration for refusing to engage in "serious negotiations" at Paris and for opposing the seven-point proposal.

Other recent Peking pickups of Vietnamese comment similarly publicize the communists' negotiating position and cite the POW question in connection with the seven-point plan. A 15 January NCNA report of DRV Foreign Minister Trinh's letter of gratitude to "socialist countries" and others which condemned the U.S. air strikes noted Trinh's charge that the attacks "revealed more clearly the true features of the Nixon Administration" and "further laid bare its peace swindles." NCNA quoted Trinh's reference to the seven points as the basis for a peace settlement and repatriation of American prisoners. Unlike Moscow, Peking has not reported its specific receipt of a message.

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DRV SPOKESMAN PROTESTS U.S. AIR STRIKES, ATTACKS ON FISHERMEN

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman issued the second and third protests of the new year* against U.S. acts against the DRV: A statement on the 18th charged the United States with attacking two fishing boats and one on the 19th denounced U.S. attacks against Nghe An Province.

Giving sparse detail on the air strikes, the protest on the 19th charged that U.S. planes in "flight after flight today continuously attacked a heavily-populated area in Nghe An." It said that the armed forces and people in the province, "upholding their vigilance and fighting well, brought down two U.S. war planes and crippled a number of others." Earlier on the 19th, Hanoi media had reported the downing of two F-4's, bringing Hanoi's total of downed planes to 3,431. On the 16th, Hanoi had claimed that the people and armed forces of Quang Binh downed an unmanned reconnaissance plane on the previous day.

Using somewhat strong language for a spokesman-level protest the statement on the 19th said that "following their frenzied war escalation in the last days of December, this is an extremely serious war act of the U.S. imperialists, grossly encroaching upon the DRV's sovereignty and security, a new crime against the Vietnamese people." It called the action a "very insolent challenge" to world public opinion and said that it "has further exposed the very obdurate and bellicose aggressive nature of the Nixon Administration and its peace hoax." In more routine language it sternly denounced the "very serious war act" and demanded an end to all U.S. acts of encroachment upon the DRV's sovereignty and security.

ATTACKS ON FISHERMEN The foreign ministry protest on 18 January atypically charged the United States with attacking fishing boats. Occasional charges of U.S. harassment of North Vietnamese fishermen have been lodged in the periodic DRV War Crimes communiques. The protest "sternly condemned" the United States for sending "combat vessels to attack the people's fishing boats in Nghe An Province," and claimed that on the 16th, two boats belonging to the people of Dien Bich village, Dien Chau district, Nghe An, were sunk

* The first protest of 1972 was issued on 7 January. See the 12 January TRENDS, page 10.

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while "fishing off the Nghe An coast." It further charged that nine people were killed and seven wounded and that the wounded people were "detained and interrogated before being released."

The statement called the alleged action "a serious war act of the U.S. imperialists in international waters" and a "barbarous crime against the Vietnamese people." It added that the "piratic maritime act has trampled on all principles on freedom to move in international waters." The DRV Foreign Ministry, it said "severely condemns this crime" and "firmly demands that the United States immediately end all of its piratic sea acts against the DRV."

DRV, PRG STATEMENTS PROTEST RESETTLEMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE

The resettlement of some 1,300 South Vietnamese, which began on 5 January, from the northern province of Quang Tri to Phuoc Tuy Province prompts a flurry of derogatory Vietnamese communist propoganda highlighted by PRG and DRV Foreign Ministry statements on the 17th and 19th respectively. The foreign ministry protests do not spell out the details of the transfer, but earlier propoganda, including LPA on 12 January and NHAN DAN on the 14th, noted that 273 families totaling 1,363 persons have been flown to Phuoc Tuy Province. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 12th had said that according to Saigon and Western sources the relocation was to consist of four phases: the first began in December, the second will begin in February, the third in March, and the fourth in June.*

* A document made public by the War Crimes Committee in South Vietnam on 24 December--carried textually by LPA on 28 December--on allied crimes in the past three years of "rural pacification" included the passage that "recently, the U.S.-puppets began a major migration plan aimed at removing about two or three million people from the five northern provinces of South Vietnam to provinces in Nam Bo and southern Truong Bo." It said that they had been "forcing 2,000 families in 'strategic hamlets' of Gia An and Gio Son, Quang Tri to migrate to eastern Nam Bo. What they had done previously against separate hamlets, villages or relatively small areas is now applied to entire provinces." The resettlement plan was mentioned more briefly in earlier communique issued by the DRV War Crimes Commission, including that of 10 November.

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The PRG Foreign Ministry statement charged that "this wicked, cunning scheme and extremely ruthless act of the U.S. clique is aimed at averting total defeat" in Vietnamization and transforming the provinces just south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) into a "white zone so that the clique can carry out its destruction and perpetual division of Vietnam." It vitriolically assailed this "new heinous crime of Nixon and Thieu" as "more ruthless than those of fascist Hitler, who is cursed forever by mankind." The DRV Foreign Ministry statement, calling it the "biggest migration plan ever carried out," asserted that the aim of the resettlement was to turn the provinces south of the DMZ "into a free fire and bombing zone in an attempt to save Vietnamization" and to counter the popular movement in South Vietnam which is "seethingly opposing U.S. imperialism and the Nguyen Van Thieu warlike and dictatorial regime." And it claimed that the "mad and barbarous degree" of the relocation program "has laid bare the deceitful arguments" of the Nixon Administration in saying that the United States is ending its involvement in the war. Voicing full support for the PRG statement, it echoed that statement in "strongly denouncing and sternly condemning before public opinion at home and abroad the schemes and criminal acts of the U.S.-Thieu clique." But only the PRG statement voiced the conviction that world opinion "will promptly and severely condemn" the relocation plan and "adopt positive measures--together with the Vietnamese people--to stay the clique's bloodstained hands."

The resettlement also came under attack from the PRG delegate at the 13 January session of the Paris talks. Nguyen Van Tien, in the course of an attack on allied policy, especially pacification, said that "one of the most barbarous crimes" being committed by the U.S. and Saigon authorities is the current "deportation" of the population in the northern provinces aimed at "forcing over one million inhabitants" to leave their homes for the "concentration camps" in the South zones. And Hanoi media on the 15th reported that the acting head of the PRG special representation in Hanoi, Nguyen Phu Soai, at a press conference the previous day denouncing allied war "crimes" committed during the three years of Vietnamization, "attracted the journalists' special attention when he told of the U.S.-puppets criminal plan to force tens of thousands of our compatriots near the 17th parallel to go and live in concentration camps in Nam Bo."

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PHIB TUCNDB
19 JANUARY 1972**LAOS: COMMUNIST MEDIA HAIL ALLEGED CAPTURE OF LONG TIENG**

The alleged capture of the Long Tieng base in northern Laos on 12 January by communist troops is praised in a flurry of high-level Peking and Hanoi propaganda including a congratulatory message to Souphanouvong from Chou En-lai and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 13th, and NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on the 14th.

The Pathet Lao radio first reported the Long Tieng exploit on the 13th when it said that "the Xieng Khouang armed forces and people" had captured positions on surrounding peaks and finally "the airstrip and heart of Long Tieng" the day before. The radio said that on that day the "banner of the Xieng Khouang armed forces and people" flew over Long Tieng after the Vang Pao and Thai defenders "fled helter-skelter."

Souphanouvong, in a telegram commending the Xieng Khouang armed forces and people on the 14th, praised the "unprecedented victory," which he called "another severe setback" to the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine in Laos. But he warned that the United States continues to implement the Nixon Doctrine and plans to dispatch more Thai troops to Laos, and he called for heightened vigilance.

A Radio Pathet Lao commentary on the 14th asserted that the recapture of the Sam Thong-Long Tieng area was "indisputable, legal, and responsive to the aspiration of the Lao people." It repeated the claim made in Souphanouvong's 8 January letter to the Lao King that the "whole of Xieng Khouang Province" has been controlled by the NLHS and Patriotic Neutralist Forces since 1961 and that the Sam Thong-Long Tieng region was "illegally" captured by the United States and its "henchmen" after the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreements. This argument is also echoed in Vietnamese communist comment on the alleged fall of Long Tieng.

HANOI AND FRONT MEDIA The NHAN DAN editorial on the 14th also called the capture of Long Tieng a defeat of the Nixon Doctrine and said that the exploit underscores the Lao Liberation Armed Forces' "rapid growth and outstanding skill in engaging in coordinated combats." This victory, along with other victories in northern and southern Laos earlier in the year, said the editorial, proves that "the steadfast offensive position of the Lao revolution has become increasingly

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strong as the fight continues." The situation in Long Tieng, it added, "has caused deep confusion to U.S. and Lao circles in Vientiane, and creates a very difficult position for the Nixon Administration."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, also on the 14th, praised the battle as "a strategically significant defeat, militarily and politically, for the Americans and their lackeys," and called it "primarily a fatal blow to the Vang Pao rebel forces." The Xieng Khouang armed forces and people, it said, "not only recaptured an important area and a crucial operational area for consolidating the strategic Plain of Jars area, but also destroyed one of the Americans' biggest military bases in Laos, wrecked an important part of the Americans' and their lackeys' force deployment system, and created a new military situation that is favorable for the Lao people to develop their forces and their victories." The victory, it concluded, is a "serious setback for the Nixon Doctrine," and contributes to developing "the common strategically offensive position of the peoples of the three Indochinese countries."

A Hanoi domestic service commentary on the 16th brought up the question of DRV security in connection with Long Tieng when it said that the base was, among other things, a key point in the U.S. defense system in northern Laos and a springboard from which the enemy could launch nibbling attacks against the Plain of Jars and Xieng Khouang area and "threaten the northwestern part of the DRV."* It went on to say that the base fell under "the most violent attack ever made by the

* Some DRV comment on the December fighting in the Plain of Jars had also raised the question of a threat to the DRV. A 22 December NHAN DAN article said that the Lao "victories" in the Plain frustrated schemes by the "U.S. aggressors and their lackeys" to "occupy the liberated areas on Laotian territory bordering on the northern part of our country." DRV Defense Minister Giap, in an 18 December speech marking the anniversaries of Resistance Day and Army Day, had even more emphatically asserted that the United States was bringing in Thai troops to join the "special forces" and "rightist army" in Laos in attacking "the liberated zone and threatening North Vietnam." A 10 November statement by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman protesting intensified U.S. air operations in Laos stated that the increased use of U.S. air power was part of a scheme to widen the war in Laos and "directly threaten the security of the DRV."

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Lao Liberation Armed Forces" and that this is the "most serious setback for the U.S. strategic design on the Lao battlefield." Along with defeats on the Bolovens Plateau, the defeats in the Plain of Jara and Long Tieng "have violently shaken the entire defense system in Laos of the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen."

A Liberation Press Agency commentary on the 14th went so far as to claim that the U.S. defeats in the Plain of Jara-Muong Suoi and Sam Thong-Long Tieng areas, together with those sustained in South Vietnam and Cambodia, "created a turning point leading to the total collapse of the U.S. aggressors' design" in Laos and the rest of Indochina. The victories, it said, contribute to "a radical change of the battle array in the whole of Indochina."

PEKING Chou En-lai's congratulatory message to Souphanouvong* on the 15th called the Long Tieng "victory" another "heavy blow to the Nixon Doctrine," adding that it is "of great strategic significance and constitutes a new contribution to the three Indochinese peoples' war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation." He expressed the belief that "in the present excellent revolutionary situation in Indochina," the Lao people, uniting with the Vietnamese and Cambodian people, will win still greater victories.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article of the 15th praised the "spectacular" victory as a "telling blow" to U.S. imperialism, the Lao rightist forces, and Thai troops, and as a "significant contribution to the struggle of the three Indochinese people." The destruction of the Long Tieng base, it said, is "of great significance to the consolidation of the liberated area in upper Laos and the development of the war situation in the whole of Laos," and proves the "rapid growth and development" of the Lao Patriotic Armed Forces. The situation in all of Indochina is "excellent" now, it concluded.

MOSCOW Moscow's reaction is more limited and less authoritative, as customary, with only a 15 January PRAVDA article saying that the victory is "striking evidence of the upsurge" of

* Chou has not previously sent such a message on victories in northern Laos, although on 29 March 1971 a message from Mao, Lin, and Chou--addressed to the leaders of the NLHS, FUNK, NPLSV and PRG, and DRV--had congratulated them on recent battlefield victories, specifically during the Lam Son 719 campaign in southern Laos and South Vietnam.

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the Lao people's liberation struggle and a "grave blow" to American plans to "Vietnamize" the war in Indochina. PRAVDA alluded to the security interests of the DRV when it said that the Long Tieng base had been of significance for reconnaissance flights over Laos and the DRV and was the nerve center of the system for controlling American operations in "northern Indochina." The "fall" of Long Tieng, PRAVDA concluded, was the collapse of one of the military props of Washington's "far-reaching political plans, and not only in Laos. The military defeats of American imperialism undermine its political plans in Indochina."

THAI TROOPS High-level communist propaganda also excoriates the dispatch of Thai troops to Laos in implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, noting among other things that Thai troops took part in the battle of Long Tieng. An NLHS Central Committee statement of the 17th says that "many more Thai battalions" were sent to Long Tieng after late 1971 Bangkok consultations between Souvanna Phouma and Thanom Kittikachon and a visit to Bangkok by General Abrams in early January.

A 19 January NHAN DAN editorial supports the NLHS statement as well as a 15 January RGNU statement denouncing an alleged plan to send Thai troops to Cambodia. NHAN DAN warns that Thailand is making a mistake by allowing itself to be used by the United States now that the Nixon Doctrine is "on the verge of bankruptcy" and other U.S. allies have begun to "desert the sinking ship."

Peking also supports the NLHS and RGNU statements with another PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 18th. TASS reports the NLHS Central Committee statement on the Thai troops, but there is no Soviet comment.

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING DISCUSSES U.S. CHINA POLICY THROUGH PROXY COMMENT

While criticizing President Nixon's position on Indochina and giving extensive publicity to Vietnamese communist reaction, Peking has not reacted directly to the President's recent remarks regarding Taiwan and has not originated comment on the Nixon-Sato San Clemente talks. Washington's China policy has, however, been discussed in PRC media through the proxy of Albanian and North Korean comment on the President's 2 January TV interview and his meeting with Sato.

Peking's differentiated reactions reflect its concern to reassure Hanoi regarding the implications of the President's visit next month--particularly in calling attention to the Vietnamese communists' negotiating position and focusing on the Paris conference*--while approaching sensitive Sino-U.S. issues in a cautious and unprovocative manner. Thus, in an evident effort to keep the atmosphere for the Peking summit as propitious as possible, Peking has avoided direct assessments of the President's China policy, choosing to air such issues as Taiwan by means of selective accounts of comment from communist allies.

Peking's first acknowledgment of the President's remarks on China in his TV interview appeared in a 10 January NCNA account of an Albanian article of the previous day attacking the President's views across a wide range of issues. While toning down the editorial's harsh personal invective against the President, the NCNA account picked up the editorial's denunciation of the President's China policy, including the charge that he had reaffirmed "the notorious policy of hostility" toward the PRC and again demonstrated a stubborn intent to pursue a "two-Chinas policy." NCNA specifically cited the President's assurances of continuing political and defense ties with Taiwan as proof that the United States intends to prolong its "occupation" of Taiwan as a "military base for aggression" against the PRC. There was no reference to the President's comments on his forthcoming visit to China.

* See the Indochina section of the TRENDS.

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Peking on the 12th carried excerpts from a North Korean editorial of the previous day denouncing the Nixon-Sato meeting on 6-7 January, marking the first reference to the talks to appear in PRC media.* Though muting the editorial's charges that the United States and Japan are "intensifying" aggression in Asia, the Chinese account repeated Pyongyang's strictures against the Nixon doctrine, particularly the role allegedly being played by Japanese militarism, and quoted the editorial's attack on the "Nixon and Sato cliques" for maintaining treaty ties with Taiwan and persisting in efforts to keep the island independent of the mainland.

Peking's avoidance of direct comment on the Nixon-Sato talks was pointed up by NCNA's account of a 16 January banquet welcoming visiting Japanese labor union representatives. While the Japanese speaker at the banquet was quoted as attacking the joint statement issued in San Clemente, the Chinese speaker, Wang Kuo-chuan, did not mention the talks. Wang made no comments on Sino-U.S. relations, restricting himself to attacks on the Sato government's policies on China and Taiwan. However, sensitive Sino-U.S. issues which Peking has been avoiding were reportedly discussed by the highest-ranking Chinese official in attendance, Keng Piao, head of the CCP's international liaison department. According to a Japanese press account, Keng discussed the President's visit, saying the Taiwan question will be a major subject and demanding that the United States withdraw its military forces from Taiwan. Keng was quoted as charging that the President is still plotting to create two Chinas. NCNA did not report Keng's remarks, noting simply that he and other Chinese officials had a conversation with the Japanese before the banquet began.

Peking's most recent authoritative formulation of its position on the Taiwan issue appeared in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 14 January hailing the establishment of diplomatic relations

* Reaction to the Nixon-Sato meeting is discussed in the Japan section of the TRENDS. Peking's coverage of the President's meetings with allied leaders prior to his Peking and Moscow trips has not followed a regular pattern. The Chinese ignored his sessions with Canada's Trudeau and the FRG's Brandt but commented on the meetings with French President Pompidou and British Prime Minister Heath. In the latter two cases Peking played up French and British opposition to American policies.

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with Cyprus. Calling the PRC Government "the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people"--Peking's optimum terms, to which Cyprus acceded in the recognition agreement--the editorial repeated Peking's claim to Taiwan and its objections to such formulas as "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," the status of Taiwan remains to be determined, and an independent Taiwan. These objections had also been registered in the New Year's Day joint editorial, which went on to demand the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan and to make the stock avowal of a determination to "liberate" the island. The editorial did not, however, convey a sense of urgency or threat, expressing confidence that "the day is bound to come" when Taiwan will be liberated.

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JAPAN

NIXON-SATO MEETING SEEN AS INCONCLUSIVE BY MOSCOW

Soviet commentators claim that the San Clemente talks between President Nixon and Premier Sato failed to resolve the important issues dividing the United States and Japan. Japan should move to develop new ties with other areas of the world, it is argued. Peking has not yet commented directly on the talks, although NCNA has reported some foreign criticism. The Japan Communist Party alleges that the communique revealed an intention to strengthen "the Japan-U.S. military alliance."

MOSCOW On 9 January, Radio Moscow told its Japanese audience that the Nixon-Sato talks failed to resolve "the serious differences of opinion between the United States and Japan." On the 8th, TASS reported that "the only tangible result is an exact date for the return of Okinawa seized by the United States 27 years ago." TASS said the Japanese press and public are increasingly demanding that the Japanese Government "reject the policy of following in the wake of the United States and insist on conducting an independent policy answering the country's national interests."

A reiterated argument is that Japan, facing a trade war with the United States, must develop new ties, and particularly economic ties, with other nations. A domestic service commentary on the 15th specifically affirmed that "economic collaboration with the USSR is useful and necessary for Japan."

PEKING On 13 January NCNA released, without comment, an 11 January NODUNG SINMUN commentary on the talks. Omitting those portions of the North Korean article which specifically attacked President Nixon by name, NCNA carried only the sections aimed primarily at Sato. It was asserted that the recent talks were arranged by "the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese militarists" in order to "strengthen their collusion along the aggressive line of the Nixon Doctrine." Sato was specifically denounced for "his insistence on maintaining the Japan-Chiang treaty" and "his ambition for territorial expansion over Taiwan," as well as for "continuing to push obdurately his ignominious policy of tailing after U.S. imperialism."

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The next day NCNA released an article from ZERI I POPULLIT, the Albanian CP organ, which portrayed the San Clemente joint statement as further evidence of "Washington-Tokyo collaboration for continued implementation of the imperialist counterrevolutionary policy in Asia." It was alleged that Japan's "special role in the Nixon Doctrine" has revealed "the open expansionist plans of Japanese militarism directed against the people of Asia, first of all against the Chinese people."

On 17 January NCNA reported a speech by Makoto Ichikawa, chairman of the general council of trade unions of Japan and head of a trade union delegation now in Peking. Ichikawa charged that "the Sato cabinet is becoming more and more isolated in Japan" and claimed that the "Japan-U.S. joint statement issued in San Clemente has aroused growing indignation among the broad masses of the Japanese people." He asserted that the "fraud of the agreement on the 'reversion' of Okinawa" will meet "with strong resistance from the one million Okinawan people."

JAPAN CP AKAHATA, reacting promptly to the talks, carried an 8 January statement by Koichiro Ueda, foreign policy committee chairman of the central committee of the JCP, who argued that the Sato-Nixon meeting was held "to work out uniformity of purpose on the common strategy in the post-Okinawa reversion agreement" and to "repave the route of the aggressive strengthening of the Japan-U.S. military alliance." The statement denounced the joint communique as a further indication that "Japan is to share the more important wing of the Nixon Doctrine," which is "nothing but a policy to let Asians fight against Asians under the hegemony of the U.S." The Sato Government was assailed for "subordinating" such "Japan-U.S. confrontations and contradictions as the yen-dollar issue and trade problems . . . to the Nixon Doctrine and the aggressive strengthening of the Japan-U.S. military alliance."

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CHINA

ECONOMIC PROPAGANDA CONTINUES TO REFLECT MODERATE LINE

PRC propagandists are continuing to advance "party policies" intended to promote balanced economic development while providing sufficient material incentive to assure increased production. While the thesis that local units must furnish their own funds for improvements and not rely on state aid is still being pressed, commentators also affirm repeatedly that individual incomes must rise in keeping with production and that the plowing of profits back into improvements has its limitations. As an article in HUPEH DAILY put it on 10 January, communes should increase collective funds, but "they should not accumulate too much all at once."

Some provinces are indicating opposition to these moderate policies. An INNER MONGOLIA DAILY editorial on 29 December which thrust strongly at "left opportunist" policies aimed at speeding the transition to communism criticized the idea of "going beyond a policy." The editorial indicates that some cadres have felt that it is all right to go to a higher stage if their units are ready, and that to retreat to a lower stage called for by party policy is "going backwards."

The cadres now being criticized strongly resemble those formerly praised for having resisted "Liuist" efforts to retreat to previous forms in the early 1960's. Cadres of the Tachai model brigade have frequently been lauded for resisting attempts to persuade them to retreat, and the frequent policy twists and turns of recent years may have convinced many cadres that their future careers may best be served by resisting any retreat until there is more leadership stability in the center.

Another aspect of the moderation evident now in Peking policies is the increased attention to consumer desires by commercial departments. On 5 December NCNA popularized a new type of neighborhood store which aided shopping convenience, and an article broadcast by Radio Peking on 6 January indicates further efforts to aid the consumer. The 6 January article, implicitly overturning cultural revolution shibboleths about stores stocking only "proletarian" goods, notes that workers and peasants "want

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not a few goods and services which have a touch of tradition." The article warns commercial departments that the sale of such goods, when requested by the people, should not be discontinued "under the pretext that the goods serve only a few bourgeois individuals." All such pretexts are "left in form but right in essence," and commercial workers must cease mouthing them.

During the cultural revolution commerce departments were warned not to stock goods that serve the bourgeoisie, but concentrate instead on necessities of life and goods required for production. Cultural revolution propaganda did, however, foreshadow current moves to aid shopping convenience by advocating longer hours of opening and special services for the ill and the aged.

MILITARY REGIONS PICK UP CALL TO LEARN FROM PEOPLE

All of China's military regions except the Peking and Sinkiang regions have issued circulars in line with the central State Council-Military Commission circular on 3 January. This is the circular that quoted Mao to the effect that the PLA must learn from the people as well as the people learning from the PLA. The new Mao directive, an expansion of the earlier injunction that the people learn from the army, was first surfaced in the joint New Year's Day editorial. Similar circulars from a number of provincial military districts have also been monitored, and it is possible that every such district has issued a circular.

None of the military regional or district proclamations monitored have failed to mention the need to learn from the people. Those issued prior to the release of the New Year's editorial did not, however, always phrase it exactly as in the Mao instruction.

Most provincial revolutionary committees have also issued circulars for the "support the army" activities. In line with previous practice, these are chiefly devoted to praise for the PLA's achievements and injunctions to organize aid for soldiers and their dependents. In general these circulars avoid all reference to the recent problems of the PLA and do not note that the PLA is now enjoined to learn from the people.

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Sinkiang, from whose military region no circular has been monitored, did declare that the PLA must look to the people, in a revolutionary committee directive broadcast on 2 January. The Sinkiang directive, issued in advance of the central circular and apparently based on the New Year's editorial, also called on the military to "respect local units."

SEVERAL PROVINCIAL PARTY CHIEFS STILL NOT APPEARING

Provincial turnouts for New Year's celebrations, "support the army" gatherings, and various plenums and other meetings have recently brought many of the provincial Chinese leaders back into public view. However a number of party secretaries, including five first secretaries, have made no appearances since Lin's apparent fall in mid-September. In two provinces, Kweichow and Kiangsi, no party secretaries have appeared during this period, judging by monitored broadcasts. The missing include Politburo members Hsu Shih-yu and Hsieh Fu-chih. The latter is known to be in very poor health, but his failure to send a wreath to Chen I's funeral seems to indicate political problems as well. In four other provinces the first secretary has made no appearances since October.

While it seems likely that some of the missing secretaries have been purged, there are many precedents for leaders dropping from sight only to reappear with status apparently unchanged. Others may return with lower status, as recently occurred in Chekiang, where secretary Chen Li-yun, missing since January of 1971 when the provincial party committee was formed, reappeared at a "support the army" rally according to the provincial radio on 7 January. Instead of being listed among party leaders, as he was at last year's rally when he followed the province chief, he was listed much further down among military district officers.

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PRC NUCLEAR TEST

USSR, EUROPEAN ALLIES STRESS RADIOACTIVITY; DRV IGNORES TEST

While Peking media have refrained from followup comment on the announcement of the PRC's 7 January nuclear test, in keeping with treatment of the last two test announcements in November 1971 and October 1969, Moscow has sustained its propaganda attention to the subject--chiefly through tendentious reporting, with stress on the effects of the radioactivity. Japanese reaction is highlighted in Soviet publicity for worldwide expressions of "indignation."

Moscow's orthodox East European allies have followed its lead. Romania, alone citing NCNA rather than the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission as the source of its initial report on the test, upheld Bucharest's neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict by editing an anti-Soviet passage out of the NCNA announcement.

DRV media still have not been heard to mention the Chinese test--the first one not to draw public North Vietnamese approbation.

SOVIET REACTION In reporting the Chinese test in advance of the NCNA announcement and citing the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission as the source, Moscow followed the precedent set at the time of the last test in November 1971.* Its normal previous practice had been to wait for the NCNA announcement, then to cite it briefly and with no followup to speak of. The 8 January TASS report on the latest test also followed the pattern of the initial TASS report in November in noting Japanese concern over the effects of radioactive fallout--the theme now pursued in the continuing Soviet accounts of world reaction.

Soviet media have publicized the formal protest by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and the coverage of Japanese reaction is typified by a 14 January TASS report that the Tokyo press "has sounded the alarm that 'ashes of death' are again swirling over Japan." TASS observer Kornilov on the 17th impugned Chou En-lai's assurances to Japanese businessmen in December that Chinese tests

* The November test is discussed in the TRENDS for 24 November 1971, pages 31-32.

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were "harmless" and "clean"; currently, Kornilov said, there are "danger signals in the Japanese press about increased radioactivity in a number of densely populated parts of the country."

The current propaganda serves further to buttress Moscow's allegations, prominent since the confrontation in the UN General Assembly in the fall, that the Chinese are vigorous opponents of disarmament bent on strengthening their own military capabilities. An IZVESTIYA dispatch carried by TASS on the 14th noted that UN Secretary General Waldheim had expressed regret over the detonation and had recalled UN resolutions urging cessation of all nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The same dispatch cited a Bulgarian press comment to the effect that the partial test-ban treaty, "which has already prevented the settling of strontium in our lungs and bones," is viewed by Peking as "a scrap of paper."

Soviet broadcasts to Chinese listeners have played up the dangers of radioactivity. A Radio Moscow commentary in Mandarin on the 10th said the latest test had "polluted the atmosphere with harmful radioactive substances which may be spread by the wind over a vast area" and which can "cause death or illness." Radio Peace and Progress observed in a Mandarin broadcast that medical experts, when discussing causes of "the increasing incidence of cancer and leukemia" in Asia, "often refer to the nuclear tests in China."

EAST EUROPE Illustrative of the East European propaganda in the same vein, East Berlin's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND followed up its 10 January report of the Japanese Foreign Ministry protest with a succession of reports on increased radioactivity in Japan and the indignation of the Japanese press and people. On the 12th NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reprinted a commentary from the 11 January PRAVDA by Igor Biryukov noting that the test took place at the time Peking had indicated its intention to attend the U.N.-sponsored international environmental conference to be held in Stockholm in June. Prague and Bratislava media, in reports on plans for the June conference, noted that Peking has accompanied its decision to send a delegation to Stockholm with a nuclear test that has "poisoned" the atmosphere.

All the Soviet bloc countries except Romania attributed initial reports of the Chinese test to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, not NCNA. The Bucharest domestic service and SCINTEIA on the 10th carried a virtual text of the 9 January NCNA announcement,

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minus the polemical sentence to the effect that the PRC conducts its tests to break the "nuclear monopoly" and "nuclear blackmail" of "the two superpowers."

ALBANIA Tirana media predictably publicized the text of the NCNA announcement, followed by press comment hailing the test. BASHKIMI on the 11th called it another blow at the "nuclear monopoly of the superpowers" and a further step in building up Chinese defense. ZERI I POPULLIT on the 15th defended the right of the PRC and "revolutionary forces everywhere" to possess nuclear weapons and assailed the "imperialist-revisionist" agreements on disarmament, aimed at "hindering the consolidation" of the PRC's defense capability. As reviewed by ATA on the 15th and picked up by NCNA the next day, however, this article did not specifically mention the latest test.

NORTH VIETNAM VNA and Hanoi radio have remained silent on the test. Unlike the first nine announced Chinese tests, the 10th one last November had not occasioned a congratulatory message from the DRV leadership; but Premier Pham Van Dong, in speeches in Peking on 20 and 23 November, had hailed the test and pointed to the PRC's rapid advances in the nuclear and space fields.

NORTH KOREA Pyongyang radio reported the Chinese test on the 10th, citing NCNA, but there has been no further monitored North Korean reference to it. Kim Il-sung had sent congratulatory messages to the Chinese leaders after each of the first three tests, after the September 1969 experiments, and after the detonation in November 1971.

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K O R E A

KIM IL-SONG CALLS FOR KOREAN PEACE PACT, POLITICAL TALKS

In an interview with journalists of the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI on 10 January, Kim Il-song stressed the need for a "peace agreement" between North and South Korea and called for North-South "political negotiations." Kim's formulations are phrased in such a way as to suggest greater flexibility on Korean unification, but his call for a peace pact and negotiations are not new and the peace pact proposal is made contingent on U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea. His effort to project a more flexible position may be intended to capitalize on the hopes aroused by the Red Cross talks and to contrast a conciliatory Pyongyang approach with ROK President Pak Chong-hui's 6 December declaration of a state of emergency.*

Pyongyang may also be seeking to adjust to the new atmosphere arising out of Sino-U.S. developments. Kim noted in the interview that the Seoul rulers seem frightened by "the rapid change of the internal and external situations to their disadvantage."** He added that the situation has changed from the time when the United States could determine affairs in Korea and elsewhere.

Both the Pyongyang domestic radio and the KCNA international service carried the Kim interview. North Korean media have not reported any other of the several recent interviews Kim has granted the Japanese press, including a 28 September ASAHI EVENING NEWS interview in which he suggested that Pyongyang might be willing to abrogate its treaties with Moscow and Peking in order to facilitate Korean reunification. It is possible that Pyongyang's release of the 10 January interview may have been

* High-level Pyongyang reaction to the ROK state of emergency is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 December, pages 18-22.

** In another section of the interview, Kim alluded to President Nixon's forthcoming Peking visit in observing that the President has been "compelled to go on a tour of mendicant diplomacy with his head lowered." In addition to Korean unification, the interview covered international questions, Pyongyang's independent line, and the six-year economic plan.

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In reaction to speculation aroused by the initial summary published in YOMIURI on the 11th to the effect that a peace pact could precede the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The Pyongyang domestic service broadcast the text of the interview on the 14th--the day a longer version appeared in YOMIURI--and KCNA disseminated the text on the next day.

PEACE PACT Both Pyongyang's text and the Japanese version quote Kim as saying that the North Korean program for peaceful reunification has not changed, recalling the April 1971 eight-point program, Kim's 6 August speech, and his New Year's address. Kim went on to assert:

In order to remove tension in Korea, it is necessary, first of all, to replace the Korean armistice agreement with a peace agreement between the North and South. We hold that a peace agreement should be concluded between the North and South [the YOMIURI version inserts here the phrase "in which each will declare that it will not attack the other"] and the armed forces of North and South Korea be cut drastically under the condition where the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops are withdrawn from South Korea.

This formulation may have prompted speculation over whether Pyongyang was offering a peace pact prior to a complete U.S. troop withdrawal. Past North Korean statements had asserted emphatically that "first of all" U.S. forces must be withdrawn before any further moves toward unification could be made. Calls for a "peace pact" or "nonaggression pact" between North and South Korea after the withdrawal of U.S. troops were a staple of Pyongyang propaganda for years. For example, a letter from the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Fatherland sent in the name of Kim Il-song to Byungcholl Koh in New York, reported by KCNA on 3 June 1970, reviewed North Korean proposals on reunification--including proposals for a peace pact--since the 1950's. A letter from this committee to Youngjeung Kim, president of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington, D.C., reported by KCNA on 1 February 1971, called for conclusion of a peace agreement after U.S. troop withdrawal, but the proposal then dropped out of available Pyongyang propaganda until a 7 December 1971 DPRK Foreign Ministry statement denouncing the ROK's declaration of a state of emergency.

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The April 1971 eight-point program, which did not include the peace pact proposal, stressed that the first order of business was the withdrawal of U.S. troops, after which the armed forces of North and South Korea should be reduced to 100,000 or less, the ROK should abrogate its treaties with the United States and Japan, and other North-South steps be taken. In now reviving the peace pact proposal and seemingly downplaying the demand for U.S. troop withdrawal, Kim has assumed a more conciliatory approach and in effect invited the South Koreans to consider deepening contacts with the North in a time of a declining U.S. presence in Asia. This approach was foreshadowed in the 7 December foreign ministry statement, which said that the DPRK has consistently called for "concluding a peace agreement between North and South, reducing the armies and relaxing tension." In the next sentence the statement added that the DPRK will continue to exert efforts toward peaceful unification "after making all foreign troops withdraw from South Korea."

POLITICAL TALKS After calling for the peace pact, Kim went on in the interview to propose "North-South political negotiations," expressing readiness to "have negotiations with all political parties of South Korea including the Democratic Republican Party, the New Democratic Party, and the Nationalist Party." This appears to be an elaboration of Kim's offer in his 6 August speech last year to have talks with "all political parties including the Democratic Republican Party, public organizations, and individual personages." Adopting a conciliatory tone, Kim said in the interview that he was willing to contact anyone who, "though he committed crimes against the country and people, sincerely repents of his past doings." In his New Year's address Kim more specifically said that if the "South Korean rulers" renounce their "treachery" he would "not ask about their past but will peacefully settle the question of national reunification with them."

In the past, as in the eight-point program, Pyongyang had not gone beyond a vague proposal for a consultative meeting of "all" political parties and public organizations of the North and South to negotiate steps toward unification, and that proposal was qualified by an expression of North Korean willingness to talk only with "patriotic-minded new figures" who would come to power after the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the ouster of "traitor" Pak Chong-hui.

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SOUTH ASIA

MOSCOW DEPLORES U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN

Soviet comment has criticized U.S. naval activity in the Indian Ocean as a source of tension and an attempt to put pressure on the states in that area. Moscow has avoided, however, any discussion of great-power naval rivalry, a theme which Peking sounded in its reaction to the presence of a U.S. task force in the Indian Ocean. The TASS account of Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's year-end press conference noted that she "stressed that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace and that the Indian Government would exert every effort to achieve this," but Moscow has not further commented on the notion of a peace zone.

Articles in PRAVDA on 8 January and RED STAR on the 12th cited the documents released by Jack Anderson to deplore the Pentagon spokesman's announcement regarding U.S. Seventh Fleet patrols in the Indian Ocean. Citing the documents as revealing that an American task force had been deployed to the Bay of Bengal in order to exert pressure on the Indian Government, PRAVDA decried what it saw as a long-term policy of constant pressure on states in the region in the manner of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. RED STAR noted "ill-omened analogies" between events in the Bay of Bengal and the Tonkin Gulf in condemning U.S. military operations in the Indian Ocean as a source of dangerous tension. An 18 January IZVESTIYA article by Kudryavtsev introduced the factor of Sino-American relations in assessing the U.S. moves. These "new gambles," according to Kudryavtsev, are motivated by U.S. failures in Indochina and South Asia and by the "present direction of American-Chinese relations," which the commentator interprets as showing that the United States does not have to fear any steps by Peking in defense of national liberation movements in Asia.

NEW TIMES commentator D. Volskiy, writing in the weekly's second issue for 1972, took note of indications that Peking may seek to exploit India's nationality problems. Citing Chou En-lai's 16 December statement that "the fall of Dacca . . . will lead to endless strife," Volskiy observed that this was "in the nature of a directive to the appropriate Chinese services." According to Volskiy, the Chinese warning that India "will reap the bitter fruit which India itself has nurtured" means that "Peking evidently intends to speculate on internal national and religious differences in India and to encourage subversive activity there by extremist elements."

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PEKING IGNORES ANDERSON DOCUMENTS ON INDIAN-PAKISTANI WAR

Peking has remained silent about the documents released by Jack Anderson dealing with the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Reflecting sensitivity on the matter, Peking's reaction to one development related to the Anderson documents--State Department spokesman Bray's 11 January remarks about an international consortium to aid the Cambodian regime--avoided acknowledging the source of the disclosure. An NCNA account simply noted that Bray confirmed the news "after it was disclosed by the U.S. press."

Peking has fallen silent on developments in Bangladesh after previously having denounced the new regime as an Indian puppet. The Chinese have not reported the release of Mujibur Rahman by Pakistani President Bhutto and seem to be waiting for the dust to settle in Bangladesh before reacting further.

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PANAMA

CANAL ISSUE PROMPTS QUALIFIED CUBAN SUPPORT FOR TORRIJOS

Havana editorial comment and reportage marking the anniversary of the January 1964 riots in the Panama Canal Zone, an occasion virtually ignored by Cuba in recent years, registers a newly cordial view of the Panamanian Government and a revised assessment of Panamanian military leader Torrijos on grounds of his "anti-imperialist" struggle for recovery of Panamanian sovereignty over the Zone. The new line, which has been developing since September, is in keeping with other moves in the current evolution of Castro's foreign policy--his extended visit to Chile, his dabbling in personal diplomacy in Peru and Ecuador, and in general the greater flexibility that has marked his approach to relations with Latin American governments.

While Havana's new expressions of support for the Panamanian regime have until now been confined entirely to the canal issue, the Cuban party organ's editorial on the anniversary of the riots introduces references to "advances" in Panamanian domestic policy that accord with Castro's stated criteria for Cuban approval of Latin American regimes. Panama is still in a class apart from such countries as Chile and Peru (and Bolivia before the coup last August) in the Cuban view. But the manifestations of approval for the Torrijos' regime's actions square with Castro's declaration on 26 July that Cuba, seeking "the development of revolutionary processes" in Latin America, is favorably disposed toward governments "with their own independent criteria, . . . capable of defending their national interests, the resources of their countries, and of acting independently of Yankee imperialism."

On 2 December 1971, PRENSA LATINA cited the weekly BOHEMIA for the suggestion that Panama was "seriously studying the reestablishment of relations with Cuba" and added that "this is the first mention published in Cuba" of the possible resumption of Cuban-Panamanian relations. Official expressions of support for the Panamanian regime on the canal issue were put on record

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In two Cuban-Soviet communiques during the same period, in October and December, as well as in speeches by Castro and by Cuban Labor Minister Jorge Risquet.*

Except for the references in the joint communiques, Soviet propaganda attention to Panama and to the canal negotiations has been virtually nonexistent. The only available Soviet commentary since the 30 October communique, a 16 November domestic service commentary, praised the "firmness" of Torrijos' government and his consideration for "the will of the popular masses" in seeking the return of the Canal Zone, adding that the Panamanian position indicates "not only the strengthening of the progressive forces in the country, but also the anti-imperialist movement throughout the Latin American continent."

COMMUNIQUES,
CASTRO SPEECH

Along with standard references to the governments of Chile and Peru, Panama was the only other Latin American country mentioned in the 30 October Soviet-Cuban communique, issued at the conclusion of Kosygin's visit to Cuba. The same three countries--with the addition of Ecuador, prompted by Castro's early-December stopover in Guayaquil--were again singled out in the 29 December communique marking the conclusion of Cuban President Dorticos' visit to the Soviet Union. The October communique noted that both countries "expressed sympathy with the striving of the Panamanian people to exercise full sovereignty over the whole of their national territory." In a similar but milder reference to the Panamanian situation, the December communique noted simply that the Soviet and Cuban peoples "follow closely the struggle of the Panamanian people in defense of their sovereignty."

Denouncing those who were seeking to create tension in Cuban-Panamanian relations as a result of the Cuban capture of two Panamanian-flag ships in early December, Castro on 22 December spoke favorably of the "historic struggle" of the people of

* The last previous reference to Panama in Soviet-Cuban communiques had appeared in the one issued following Castro's visit to the Soviet Union in January 1964--the month in which the Canal Zone riots occurred. That communique condemned the bloodshed in the riots and the "encroachment on the sovereignty" of Panama by U.S. troops. It expressed support for the people of Panama in "their just demand" for sovereignty over the canal and "their right to a revision or their demand for abrogation" of the "unequal agreements" on the Canal Zone area.

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"this sister republic" in "demanding sovereignty over . . . their territory and the canal." Citing the "strong statements" by Panamanian leaders "demanding sovereignty of that strip of Panamanian territory," he declared that Cuba

has high esteem for the Panamanian people and has profound sympathy for their demands for sovereignty over the canal. We support the Panamanian people in their struggle. We support the Panamanian people's demands and we view their struggle with sympathy. We sympathize with the attitude of the Panamanian Government in demanding sovereignty over the canal.

Echoing Castro's declaration of support, Cuban Labor Minister Jorge Risquet, speaking on 2 January in Santiago, Chile, at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Chilean Communist Party, proclaimed that Cuba "supports the firm decision of the Panamanian people and the position of the government in the recovery of the nation's sovereignty over the Canal Zone, which has been under Yankee occupation since 1903."

REPORTS ON Led off by a 28 September GRANMA article accusing
NEGOTIATIONS U.S. legislators who oppose the return of the
Canal Zone to Panama of having a "colonialist soul," Cuban media have keyed a succession of commentaries and reports on Panama to the U.S.-Panamanian canal negotiations, with stress on Panama's efforts to regain sovereignty over its own territory. PRENSA LATINA interviews with Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack, distributed on 18 October and 13 January, portrayed Panama's position as "reasonable"--the return to Panama of all occupied territory in the Canal Zone in exchange for acceptance of a limited period of time during which the United States may continue dealing with interoceanic traffic--and depicted Tack as optimistic on prospects for an agreement. The 13 January interview quotes Tack as stating that Panama would be willing to place the canal problem before the UN Security Council, but only "as a last resort."

Havana radio on 20 October had reported a statement of "the Union of Panamanians in Cuba" which stressed that "the sovereignty of Panama cannot be negotiated" and warned the Panamanian people "to remain alert and prevent the insertion into any agreement of clauses which would deny them territorial integrity or sovereignty from ocean to ocean and border to border."

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THE 9 JANUARY ANNIVERSARY Marked with substantial Cuban comment for the first time in recent years, this year's anniversary of the 9 January 1964 riots occasioned a GRANMA editorial on the 8th, accompanied by a moderate volume of other comment and reportage on observances of the event. Stressing the Panamanian people's "demand for the return of sovereignty over the Canal Zone," the editorial declared that "Panama is not alone," that its demand for sovereignty "is supported by all progressive peoples and by all the socialist countries, including Cuba," and that the Cuban revolution "has offered and is offering its disinterested aid and militant solidarity to the anti-imperialist cause." Havana radio on the 11th reported a student rally in the Cuban capital "in support of the struggle waged by the people of Panama against the imperialist government of the United States and in favor of their independence and sovereignty over the Panama Canal."

NEW VIEW OF TORRIJOS The GRANMA editorial of the 8th illustrated the changed Cuban view of the Panamanian Government and of Panamanian military leader Torrijos. GRANMA observed that "events in this fraternal country" are characterized by some "social, educational, and agrarian advances, a positive and realistic international policy, and a demand for the return of sovereignty over the Canal Zone"-- the first Cuban comment to praise the regime for its domestic policies. It added that "the masses and government sectors increasingly support the nationalist movement led by" Torrijos and that "the struggle to regain possession of the Canal Zone is more than a slogan; it is the supreme expression of the freedom epitomized by the heroes of 9 January and emphasized by General Torrijos." The same view was conveyed in an 8 January Havana radio interview with a Panamanian student leader, who contended that "forces have emerged within the current Panamanian Government" and within the National Guard "which refuse to submit to the policy of the oligarchy and to imperialist interests" and which are waging "a patriotic struggle." A 31 December Havana radio commentary had noted that in the face of U.S. efforts "to make the government of Torrijos knuckle under," Torrijos "does not waste any opportunity to reaffirm his position" of "no concessions." It quoted Torrijos as saying that "all this will find us either standing up or dead, but never down on our knees before the United States."

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Cuban media had charged in the past that the CIA was involved in Torrijos' rise to power in a military coup on 11 October 1968. They viewed his military junta as yet another group of "gorillas in power," fully identified with U.S. interests, and saw the advent of his regime as presaging "greater Yankee meddling in Latin American politics." Havana asserted in 1968 that the "key" to the coup was that the United States "needed a certain atmosphere of tranquility to get the new canal treaties signed" and implied that Torrijos was handpicked by the United States to accomplish that goal. In December 1969 Havana radio commented that Torrijos, "following instructions from the United States, is prefabricating in Panama a 'representative democracy' which suits the interests of the imperialists."

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR ASSAILS U.S. MILITARY AID, "SECRET AGREEMENT" WITH ISRAEL

Low-key Soviet propaganda on the Middle East continues to assail the United States for the decision on further Phantom deliveries to Israel, and now seizes on the U.S. "admission" of "another secret agreement" with Israel, the November memorandum of understanding on the production in Israel of U.S.-designed military equipment. The American actions are uniformly characterized as confirming U.S. support of Israel's "expansionist policy" and constituting further obstacles to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Israel's recent incursions into Lebanon are cited by Shakhov in a foreign-language commentary on the 14th as one consequence of the U.S.-Israeli "military alliance," and a commentary in Arabic on the 15th claims that Tel Aviv, "encouraged by Washington," has started to carry out expansionist plans against southern Lebanon.

Comment takes passing note of Jarring's renewed efforts to find a political solution. Domestic service commentator Ryzhikov on the 13th, for example, observed that such efforts are "more than timely," and Demchenko said in the 19 January PRAVDA that there is a "realistic opportunity" for beginning to settle the crisis and Jarring's mission "may facilitate this task." Moscow does not raise the issue of any role by the Security Council permanent members other than to denounce Peking's refusal to participate with the other powers in seeking a settlement. There is no further publicity for the Soviet proposals for a Mideast settlement after a brief flurry of attention highlighted by Primakov's 5 January PRAVDA article, seemingly only an exercise to recall Moscow's past initiative and confirm its continuing validity.

U.S.-ISRAELI MEMORANDUM In addition to continuing complaints against further U.S. Phantom deliveries to Israel, Moscow promptly exploits the 14 January New York TIMES report, and State Department confirmation, of the 1 November signing of a U.S.-Israeli memorandum of understanding on the production in Israel of U.S.-designed defense equipment.*

* In November Moscow had picked up reports--emanating from an 11 November speech by Senator Dole--on the U.S.-Israeli memorandum, charging that it coincided with stepped-up military preparations by Israel.

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Reporting the TIMES story, TASS on the 14th also cited the State Department spokesman as saying the memorandum envisages the transfer of American technical data and technical expertise essential for the manufacture of a number of types of weapons. It said he "admitted" that the United States took this step in the interest of strengthening Israel's military potential. Observing that the State Department had confirmed resumption of U.S.-Israeli talks on additional aircraft to Tel Aviv, a Shakhov foreign-language commentary on the 14th asserted that "Nixon presented the matter as though he was reluctant, but was compelled under the pressure of public opinion" to permit new arms supplies to Israel. A Ryzhikov domestic service commentary on the 15th, declaring that the Administration has decided to provide Israel with its own base for the production of "heavy offensive weapons," warned that a decision of this sort could so anger Arab public opinion that the United States might lose what influence it still had in Cairo and other Arab capitals.

The TASS-reviewed Demchenko article in PRAVDA on the 19th, summing up the "new American-Israeli collusion," concluded that the United States has passed "from 'mediation' and 'quiet diplomacy' to overt help to Israel and stronger hostility" toward the Arabs. Political settlement, not "rearmament of the Israeli aggressor," is a guarantee for reestablishing peace, Demchenko declared.

Noting Egyptian reaction, TASS on the 18th reported the Egyptian Government spokesman's statement characterizing the U.S.-Israeli agreement as evidence of new U.S. hostility toward the Arabs. TASS cited the Egyptian statement as saying "this change in the U.S. Government policy" came after the secret agreement with Israel on manufacture of American arms in Israel "with no limitations being imposed on mutual commitments and responsibility." On the 19th TASS reported Egyptian President as-Sadat as telling an expanded meeting of the new Egyptian cabinet* the previous day that the U.S. decision "to establish a war industry" in Israel is a dangerous new step, and that the United States "has become one of the sides opposed to us."

* Moscow has given little attention to the formation of the new Egyptian "confrontation cabinet" announced on the 17th. Congratulations from Kosygin to new Prime Minister 'Aziz Sidqi and from Gromyko to new Foreign Minister Murad Ghalib were reported by TASS on the 18th.

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ROGERS' INTERVIEW Moscow failed to take note of Secretary Rogers' acknowledgment, in response to a question in his 5 January ABC interview, that the balance of forces in the Middle East has not shifted in the Egyptians' favor. The TASS account on the 6th said only that "without offering any weighty arguments," Secretary Rogers "justified" the U.S. decision to grant additional consignments of Phantoms to Israel. And an Arabic-language commentary on the 7th, touching on the Secretary's interview, also failed to mention his remark, citing him only as saying that the United States did not want to leave an impression with the Arabs that it was encouraging Israel to continue the aggression.

The omissions are the more noteworthy in view of TASS' treatment of Egyptian President as-Sadat's 13 January address to the nation in which he made repeated references to Rogers' remark; such Soviet evasiveness might reflect Egyptian arguments with Moscow on the issue of military supplies. Thus while as-Sadat attributed to Rogers the remark that the United States will supply Israel with more Phantoms even though the balance of power is in favor of Israel, TASS merely reported as-Sadat as saying that Secretary Rogers declared the United States would have delivered the planes to Israel "in any event."

AS-SADAT ADDRESS The TASS account of as-Sadat's address also ignored his statement that "continuous earnest negotiations" are taking place between Cairo and Moscow "at the highest level," and his subsequent stress that the "decision in this battle is our decision and not anybody else's." Nor did it mention his decision in December to postpone the battle because of the Indian-Pakistani conflict which "also became a battle between the major powers which actually affects our battle." Predictably, TASS did single out as-Sadat's reaffirmation of Egyptian acceptance of Resolution 242 and readiness to cooperate with Jarring in achieving a peaceful settlement. (In keeping with Moscow's continued portrayal of the Egyptians as seeking a political solution, TASS on the 7th cited AL-AHRAM chief editor Haykal as "replying to those calling for military action" by pointing out the importance of continued quests for a political settlement.)

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SOVIET PROPOSALS There is no subsequent publicity for the Soviet proposals on a Middle East settlement following the brief flurry of mentions in late December-early January, which seemingly only served to remind the public, both domestic and foreign, of this Soviet initiative after its long absence from view. Aspects of the plan were first briefly recounted in a Maslov domestic service commentary on 18 December; subsequently, Primakov discussed the plan in the domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 19th, a few days later in a foreign-language commentary, and, more fully, in the 5 January PRAVDA. Belyayev did make a passing reference to the Soviet plan in the commentators' roundtable on 9 January, but with no details. In this period, the only other available discussion of the substance of the proposals came in an article by Usvatov in NEW TIMES No. 52.

Atypically, the English-language edition of NEW TIMES has Usvatov calling for Israeli withdrawal from "the sizeable part" of Arab territory captured in the six-day war. But the Russian-language edition of the weekly, however, calls routinely for withdrawal from "the extensive [obshirnikh] territories" seized by Israel. Moscow has not been known to hint at any territorial adjustment. Calls for withdrawal from "all" occupied territory have been common to elite statements and routine propaganda, although Moscow at times, without any apparent significance, simply urges withdrawal from occupied territories, in the manner of Security Council Resolution 242.

MOSCOW LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN AGAINST WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS

Moscow mounts a new anti-Zionist effort to counter the 28th World Zionist Congress which opened in Jerusalem on the 18th. But the campaign so far shows no sign of assuming the proportions of past anti-Zionist endeavors, such as those in May 1971 at the time of the trial of the Leningrad hijackers, in February 1971 during the Brussels conference on Soviet Jewry, or in March 1970 when Moscow incorporated an anti-Zionist campaign into its extensive protests against "criminal" Israeli actions following Israel's 12 February bombing of the UAR metal works at Abu Zabal.*

* The anti-Zionist material accounted for 4.6 percent of total broadcast comment during the peak week of publicity on each of these three occasions. The present campaign accounted for only 0.7 percent of total comment in the week ending 16 January. (See the TRENDS of 4, 11, 18, and 25 March 1970 for discussions of the anti-Zionist campaign at that time.)

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The current campaign was inaugurated on 13 January with a public meeting in Moscow which, as reported by TASS, adopted an open letter to the public of all countries protesting "Zionist crimes" and the "so-called" World Zionist Congress in Israel whose "chief motive force" is anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. Speeches by Soviet citizens at the meeting were summed up by TASS and some were later singled out for individual publicity by the agency. The open letter set the tone for letters to Moscow papers by Soviet citizens supporting the protest meeting, denouncing "Zionist slander" of the Soviet Union, and affirming the equal rights and productive lives of Soviet Jews. But while TASS reports letters in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, and SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, there are no indications that such letters have appeared in the major papers. PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and TRUD all carried protest letters from "citizens of Jewish nationality" during the March 1970 campaign, which extended for some four weeks and was highlighted by a Moscow press conference held by Soviet Jews.

Press attention to the congress is keynoted by a Bolshakov article in the 16 January PRAVDA assailing international Zionism for an "anti-Soviet campaign under the entirely false slogan of 'defending Soviet Jews' from the 'official anti-Semitism' which allegedly exists in the Soviet Union." Bolshakov denounces the "varied anti-Soviet measures" drawn up by Zionist organizations in a number of capitalist countries, including those of the "most active" organization, that of the American Zionists. He accuses the Zionists of trying to "complicate Soviet-American relations" and to create "anti-Soviet moods" in the United States and other capitalist countries. And he alleges that these actions "have the blessing of influential forces in U.S. ruling circles."

TASS press reviews on the 18th mention articles in other Moscow papers "exposing the anti-Soviet aims" of the World Zionist Congress. And TASS summarizes a Korneyev article in SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA on the 18th charging that international Zionism is not only a "reactionary racist-nationalistic ideology of the big Jewish bourgeoisie" but also an "interconnected system of super-monopolies." Korneyev claims that Zionism, military business, and "the imperialist military" in the capitalist countries act jointly in support of Israel's expansion, step up the arms race, and aggravate international tension.

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An IZVESTIYA article on 18th, as reviewed by TASS and in English-language broadcasts, linked the Scheuer affair -the expulsion of U.S. Representative Scheuer from the USSR on the 15th for alleged misconduct--with the Zionist congress. The paper claimed that Congressman Scheuer and Bell, members of a delegation visiting the USSR to study the education system, had "tried to collect slanderous information to send to Israel to the so-called World Zionist Congress."

Concurrently, Moscow continues to underline the disenchantment of Soviet Jews who emigrated to Israel and now desire to return. TASS on the 11th reviews a LITERATURNAYA GAZETA report that letters have been received by "competent Soviet organs" from over 1,500 Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality who had left for Israel, requesting permission to come back. While Soviet propaganda in recent months has guardedly and defensively acknowledged the fact of emigration to Israel, it insists that few Soviet Jewish citizens wish to leave and that the USSR cannot "supply Israel with soldiers."

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AAPS0 CONFERENCE

CAIRO GATHERING RESTRAINED IN STANCE TOWARD ABSENT CHINESE

The influence of the absent People's Republic of China was clearly in evidence at the long-delayed fifth conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), held in Cairo 10-13 January. Founded in 1957, AAPSO's last conference had been held in Winneba, Ghana, in May 1965 and was marked by bitter Sino-Soviet polemics.* The Cairo conference, against the background of Peking's newly emerging role in international affairs, was generally restrained.

Open attacks on the Chinese in Soviet comment on the gathering went beyond what was said on the conference floor or in the conference documents. Seeking in its propaganda to picture an essentially harmonious gathering of Afro-Asian nations, grateful for Soviet help and wary of the Chinese, Moscow glossed over the single most contentious issue--the question of admission of the new state of Bangladesh to AAPSO, which the conference decided to shelve for the time being in evident deference to Chinese sensibilities. Peking media so far have ignored the Cairo meeting.

BANGLADESH ISSUE In daily accounts of the conference proceedings, including summaries of the delegates' speeches, Moscow departed only once from its portrayal of a prevailing atmosphere of harmony when TASS on the 12th reported "a debate" in the organizational committee "on the question of admission of the Bangladesh delegation to AAPSO." TASS added that "proceeding from the interests of keeping the full unanimity of views of the member organizations on this matter, the committee recommended that the conference authorize the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat to finally decide within one or two months" on the admission of Bangladesh.

* In the wake of the 1965 conference, KWANGMING DAILY said that despite Soviet, Mongolian, and Indian opposition, the conferees had decided to hold "the fifth" AAPSO conference in Peking in 1967. Moscow media ignored this alleged decision and instead publicized Soviet support at Winneba for Cuba's proposal to hold the "next" conference in Havana with the participation of three continents. The "second Bandung" Afro-Asian conference, scheduled for November 1965 in Algiers, was postponed under the threat of a Chinese boycott if the USSR were invited.

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The Soviet accounts included no details of the deliberations that led up to the committee's decision against immediate admission of Bangladesh, which the Cairo MENA said resulted from a final vote in which the Soviet delegation was in the minority. Nor did Moscow mention that the Pakistani delegate walked out of the conference on the 11th, in protest against the presence of the Bangladesh delegate, despite strenuous efforts by the head of the Arab Republic of Egypt delegation to persuade him to stay. Predictably, Moscow also failed to mention the Bangladesh delegate's expressed hope, reported by MENA, that "through Afro-Asian efforts the Chinese leaders will change their stand regarding our country."

Moscow's pique over the failure of its efforts to get Bangladesh admitted to AAPSO may be mirrored in an article in the 18 January PRAVDA by the paper's Lagos correspondent Zenovich. Chinese propaganda, Zenovich says, "with its striving to please both nationalism and the leftist groups, disorients in some degree certain groups in the African liberation movement and sows discord" in this movement. As summarized in a TASS report, which does not mention the Cairo conference, the article remarks that "solidarity of Peking and Washington in the India-Pakistan conflict had a sobering effect on those in Africa who were taken in by the slogans of Maoist propaganda about Chinese support for liberation struggles."

ATTACKS ON PEKING Conference delegates lavishly praised the assistance given by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to national liberation movements but did not go beyond veiled references to "imperialist" efforts to split national liberation forces. Brezhnev's 9 January message of greetings to the conference similarly warned against "imperialist" efforts aimed at "splitting and weakening the unity of anti-imperialist forces," and the chief Soviet delegate, Armenian CP First Secretary Anton Kochinyan, confined himself to a plea for strengthening "solidarity among all the forces of the world revolutionary movement."

But comment on the conference in Moscow media was typified by Soltan's remark, in a talk first broadcast to Africa, that "the Peking leadership willingly helps" the imperialists, who "place their faith essentially on dissension and splitting" of the anti-imperialist forces. Soltan also mentioned "the Chinese leadership's treason" against the liberation struggle. The Moscow domestic service roundtable show on the 16th included a charge of "betrayal" against the Peking leadership, with an added thrust to the effect that "it is no coincidence that Mao Tse-tung and his group" are kindly regarded in imperialist capitals.

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A broadcast in Mandarin over the purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 11th claimed that "many delegates" of the "more than 70" Afro-Asian solidarity committees represented at Cairo were "indignant over the Chinese leaders' hostile stand toward the national liberation movements of the peoples of various countries."

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TOPIC IN BRIEF

GHANA COUP

Moscow media have been at pains to indicate a readiness for normal relations with the new military regime, headed by Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, which took over in Ghana in a bloodless coup on 13 January during the absence in England of Premier Busia. In a succession of factual reports of the government change, carried in Soviet media since early on the 13th, TASS on the 17th highlighted Col. Acheampong's statement to foreign diplomats that day that the new regime would adhere to "the principles of nonalignment and positive neutrality," combat "colonial domination," reject the "dialog" policy, and transfer power to a democratically elected government "as soon as circumstances permit." The day before, TASS had reported, also without comment, that the ruling National Redemption Council would govern by decrees which have the force of law.

Peking media have not so far mentioned the coup in Ghana, but the PRC's closest friend in Africa, Tanzania, has denounced it. The Dar es Salaam daily NATIONALIST commented on the 14th that the coup was merely one "imperialist master" taking over from another, adding that any regime which started off with a summary condemnation of the socialist program of former President Kwame Nkrumah was no good to Africa.

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