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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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5 APRIL 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 27 MARCH - 2 APRIL 1972

Moscow (2742 items)

AUCCTU 15th Congress	(47%)	13%
[Brezhnev Speech	(26%)	8%]
CPSU 24th Congress	(--)	12%
Anniversary		
China	(4%)	5%
Middle East	(5%)	4%
Venus 8 Launching	(--)	4%
Indochina	(7%)	3%
[Paris Talks	(--)	1%]
Suspension		
Finnish CP Congress	(--)	2%
Polish Elections	(0.1%)	2%

Peking (1392 items)

Domestic Issues	(31%)	34%
[Hsieh Yu-chih's	(--)	5%]
Death		
Indochina	(35%)	30%
[Paris Talks	(--)	12%]
Suspension		
[FUNK Anniversary	(23%)	8%]
[POW Week in U.S.	(--)	5%]
[DRV National	(--)	3%]
Assembly Session		
Maltese Prime Minister	(--)	4%
in PRC		
Egyptian Government	(3%)	3%
Delegation in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi and Front media waited until 3 April to acknowledge the massive scope of the communist offensive below the demilitarized zone (DMZ) which began on 30 March. Reviewing the first five days of the "big offensive," the media claimed that 6,500 allied troops had been put out of action. Editorials published in the Hanoi press on 4 April acclaim "victories" in the fighting in Quang Tri and maintain that the communists are in a new advantageous position. Press articles in the papers on the 5th stress that the "disintegration" of Saigon's armed forces demonstrates failure of the Vietnamization policy.

A 5 April editorial in NHAN DAN assails the United States for brandishing the threat of "massive retaliatory air strikes" against the DRV in the face of the "powerful attacks" of the "People's Liberation Armed Forces." Recent U.S. air strikes have prompted a flurry of protests at the routine level of the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. And Hanoi claims to have downed two B-52's, one on 2 April and one on the 4th.

Hanoi and the Front have continued to assail the 23 March U.S. action in indefinitely suspending the weekly Paris session. Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his diplomatic report to the DRV National Assembly session, complained that barely two months after it had announced the "so-called" eight-point peace plan, the Nixon Administration "brazenly declared the indefinite suspension" of the Paris talks.

Peking issued a foreign ministry statement on 31 March denouncing the U.S. suspension of the Paris talks and containing the first official Chinese attack on the Nixon Administration by name since the President's trip. But while sharpening its criticism of the United States, Peking did not take the occasion to reaffirm its support for the Vietnam war effort. Peking's coverage of the communist offensive in Vietnam has consisted of NCNA reports on the "fierce attacks" launched by the communists and accounts of the 4 April Hanoi editorials.

Moscow continues to denounce the United States' suspension of its participation in the weekly Paris talks with minimal routine comment and, unlike Peking, has issued no official statement. Moscow has publicized the current communist offensive chiefly in news reports, with scant comment at the routine level.

DRV, FRONT HAIL ACHIEVEMENTS IN "BIG OFFENSIVE" SOUTH OF DMZ

Hanoi and Front media initially referred to the fighting in Quang Tri only in cryptic battle reports, beginning on 31 March, which

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noted that many positions were being attacked. The extent of the fighting was first acknowledged on 3 April in a lengthy report on the action since 30 March which labeled the attacks a "big offensive" and tallied alleged allied losses in the first five days. This report, carried in both Hanoi and Front media, claimed that nearly 5,500 allied troops were "wiped out" and more than 1,000 captured; it said 13 positions were razed, 45 aircraft shot down or destroyed, and 100 tanks or armored cars captured or destroyed.*

The 3 April report on the fighting noted that the offensive was launched against positions along Highways 9 and 1 and that it began with heavy artillery attacks, followed by "simultaneous and powerful assaults" on many positions by infantry and armored units. Five ARVN brigades, regiments, and armored squadrons were listed as having been put out of action or "decimated." Most notably, the report claimed that on 2 April "the bulk" of the 56th Regiment of the ARVN 3d Division, including the commander and deputy commander and many officers, "revolted and crossed over to the people."

The report on the fighting also said that there was a "people's uprising," that many militia units and all the popular defense forces defected, and that 100,000 people in "concentration camps"--presumably refugee camps--"rose up to seize control." A 4 April Front commentary, which describes the Quang Tri "victories" as "strategically significant," claims that the "uprising" of the people in the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area "has become a sharp offensive prong which caused the disintegration of the bulk of the enemy local military strength, including dozens of 'civil guard' companies and hundreds of 'popular defense' platoons." The commentary, carried by LPA and Liberation Radio, alleges that "tens of thousands" of people in Cam Lo and Gio Linh districts rose up simultaneously, surrounded enemy posts, smashed the enemy coercive machine," called on Saigon troops to revolt, and joined the PLAF.

* During the Lam Son 719 operation last year the communist tally of alleged allied troop losses topped 6,500 only after about a month of fighting. Total allied troop losses in the Lam Son operation in Laos and South Vietnam, according to the communist figures, amounted to almost 23,000 men. At the time of the nationwide Tet offensive in 1968, the communists claimed to have "wiped out" 50,000 allied troops in the first six days of attacks.

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NHAN DAN's 4 April editorial hails achievements in the fighting in South Vietnam and echoes recent Hanoi discussions of the military situation* in its optimistic assertion that "the balance of forces has now changed; we are strong while the enemy is weak. We have the initiative while he is on the defensive. We are on the upswing while he is declining." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 4th suggests the attacks to date are an opening stage of an offensive when it praises the "great, initial victories" on the Tri-Thien battlefield.

IMPACT ON ARVN, Hanoi and Front propaganda uniformly portrays
VIETNAMIZATION the Quang Tri offensive as a major blow to
Vietnamization and claims that the fighting demonstrates the inability of the ARVN to perform as the backbone of Vietnamization. Sarcastically alluding to President Nixon's 24 March press conference, the 4 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial--as carried by VNA--asserts that the South Vietnamese lines "have not only 'bent,' as Nixon has had the foresight to predict; they have, in fact, been broken through and smashed by chunks." Hanoi radio reported the editorial as claiming that the ARVN 3d Division was "routed," and the VNA press review--but no other available version--says the editorial also observes that the ARVN is "disintegrating even faster than it did in southern Laos last year."

The alleged defection of the 3d Division's 56th Regiment is highlighted throughout Hanoi and Front comment on the fighting and is characterized in the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial as "unprecedented." The "disintegration" of the ARVN is discussed in 5 April articles in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, with the army paper again stressing the significance of the 56th Regiment's "antiwar action" and explaining that although such actions have occurred in the past, there has never been one involving so many officers and men. The example of the 56th Regiment is also cited in a 4 April appeal for defections, issued by the Tri-Thien front PLAF command and broadcast by

* Claims that the communists' military position had improved were made by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and other leaders in speeches at the 20-25 March meeting of the DRV National Assembly, and this theme was the focus of a 24 March article by the military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor) which stressed the importance of using the regular forces to launch major attacks. See the 29 March TRENDS, pages 8-11.

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Liberation Radio, which claims that "compatriots and patriotic troops in all places are rising and coordinating with the liberation armed forces in annihilating the enemy and liberating the country."

Several commentaries recall the PRG's 10-point statement of policies toward elements associated with the Saigon government, released on 25 January, which reiterated the communists' long-standing policy of welcoming defectors.* The 5 April NHAN DAN commentary on the ARVN reaffirms many of the points in the PRG's statement and maintains that these policies have "exerted a deep and broad influence on the majority of the Saigon army men and all strata of our people in the South." It claims that, as a result, some 70,000 military personnel have deserted in Nam Bo (the southern part of South Vietnam) and some 40,000 in central Trung Bo (the northern portion of the country.) In urging further defections, NHAN DAN stresses the unity of interests among Vietnamese, even asserting that the "majority" of people in the Saigon army and administration are "men of conscience" who "know more clearly than anyone the U.S.-Thieu clique's barbarous crimes and the rottenness of its barbarous regime." This line was anticipated last December in a speech on the NFLSV anniversary by Front Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who maintained that "among the Vietnamese people, except for a handful of warlike and dictatorial people in the Thieu clique, everything can be discussed and settled on the basis of national concord, so that the war may soon be ended and peace restored"

HANOI PROTESTS AIR STRIKES OVER DRV, CLAIMS TWO B-52'S DOWNED

Recent U.S. strikes in the demilitarized zone have been protested in a series of statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. But judging from the VNA account, the attacks were not mentioned in the 5 April NHAN DAN editorial, which decried the notion that U.S. bombing of the North might be renewed in retaliation for the communist offensive in South Vietnam. The editorial, which also dismissed as "an illusion" the possibility that air power can "stall the march" of the "resistance," came on the heels of a 4 April Hanoi report citing Western press speculation about retaliatory air strikes.

* The 10-point statement is discussed in the 2 February TRENDS, pages 21-23.

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The latest of the foreign ministry spokesman's protests, on 4 April, charged that on 2-3 April U.S. planes struck "a number of populated areas in Vinh Linh special zone" and that U.S. warships shelled several villages "north of the 17th parallel." The statement reiterated the claim, first made in a Hanoi radio broadcast on 2 April, that a B-52 had been downed over Vinh Linh that day. On the 5th Hanoi claimed that another B-52 had been downed the preceding day over the same area. These, along with three planes said to be downed on 1 April over Vinh Linh, brought Hanoi's tally of U.S. planes downed over the North to 3,451. VNA on the 5th also carried a detailed account of the alleged 2 April B-52 downing, describing the use of radar to track the plane and of missiles to shoot it down.*

The 4 April foreign ministry spokesman's protest used somewhat stronger language than other recent protests when it said that the Vietnamese people "are determined to punish the U.S. imperialists properly" and "crush all their military adventures." The spokesman added that the foreign ministry "sternly condemns these grave acts" and "resolutely demands that the United States immediately and definitely stop all acts of encroachment on DRV sovereignty and security."

Earlier foreign ministry spokesman's statements--on 2 April, 31 March, and 24 March--also focused on alleged strikes in the DMZ but condemned them as "acts of war" and did not characterize them as "grave" as the protest on the 4th did. The 2 April protest condemned U.S. air and naval strikes on that day against "Vinh Tan and Vinh Giang villages inside the DMZ on DRV territory." The statement on 31 March denounced "recent acts of war of the U.S." from 27 to 30 March, charging that U.S. artillery south of the DMZ and warships off the coast had fired on several villages north of the 17th parallel. And the spokesman on the 24th charged that U.S. artillery south of the

* Hanoi has claimed to have downed B-52's on seven occasions prior to the current period, but this is the first time it has directly attributed a downing to the use of missiles. The last such alleged downing, on 17 March 1971, was said to have been the result of "multilevel and widespread antiaircraft fire." (See the TRENDS of 24 March 1971, page 12.) All of Hanoi's claims to have downed B-52's have been denied by U.S. spokesmen.

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DMZ had shelled Vinh Son, Vinh Thanh, and Vinh Giang villages "inside the DMZ on DRV territory." It also claimed that U.S. planes "attacked a number of places in Quang Binh Province on 23 March."

U.S. action against the North prompted comment from the military paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and from Hanoi radio in addition to the standard protests. A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on the 3d, setting the tone of the comment, charged that the U.S. "frenzied war acts" are intended to "pressure" the armed forces, "dampen" their fighting spirit, raise the "sagging morale" of the "mercenaries" in the South, and improve the battlefield situation to allow Vietnamization to proceed. Charging the "Nixon clique" with being as "stubborn and bellicose as ever," the paper also condemned the United States for "sabotaging the Paris conference" and said the "Nixon clique" is "clamoring for a massive retaliatory air strike" against the North. The commentary concluded with the stock warning that "the more stubbornly the Nixon clique expands the aggressive war and the more frenziedly it embarks on its military adventures, the more humiliating setbacks it will suffer, and finally it will be totally defeated."

Propaganda on the U.S. strikes uniformly praised the Vinh Linh people and armed forces for "heightening their vigilance" to fight well and be combat-ready, and an editorial in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 1 April was devoted to lauding the forces in the southern part of the DRV--the 4th Military Region--as the "steel net of the North." The editorial asserted that "the offensive position of our army and people is at present undergoing new developments" and added that "the 4th Military Region is bringing its strength to the service of the front and is also ready to defeat all the U.S. aggressors' acts of war."

AIR FORCE ANNIVERSARY The seventh anniversary of Vietnam People's Air Force (VPAF) Tradition Day was observed on 3 April in Hanoi radio broadcasts summarizing the VPAF's achievements and current activities. The anniversary comment recalled "the first feat of arms" of the VPAF, on 3 April 1965, when two U.S. planes were downed by MIG's over North Vietnam. The occasion has been noted over the years in a variety of ways. Editorials commemorated the event in 1966, 1968, 1969, and 1970.

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DRV FOREIGN MINISTER SCORES PARIS "SABOTAGE," LAUDS DIPLOMACY

Hanoi radio on 30 and 31 March broadcast in installments Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's diplomatic report at the second session of the DRV's Fourth National Assembly, held from 20 to 25 March. While the media reported that Premier Pham Van Dong delivered his political report to the session on the 20th,* the date of Trinh's report has never been specified. After assailing the U.S. Vietnamization policy, Trinh said that the United States "had remained very stubborn" at the Paris talks. In the course of reviewing communist initiatives for a peace settlement since the 8 May 1969 10-point proposal, he said cryptically that the diplomatic offensive was continued in 1971 when on 26 June the DRV "put forth its nine-point solution and on 1 July the PRG put forth its seven-point solution." In subsequently castigating the President for "unilaterally publicizing the contents" of private U.S.-DRV meetings, he did not directly acknowledge that the nine-point proposal was involved.

Trinh prefaced his reference to private U.S.-DRV meetings with a reiteration of Hanoi's line that the important thing is the substance of negotiations, not the forum, and that the DRV had acceded to the U.S. request for private meetings with the PRG's "complete agreement." The foreign minister claimed to see "more proof of the Nixon Administration's stubbornness and perfidy" in the scenario since 25 January. Condemning the revelations about the private talks, Trinh said that while the President announced the U.S. "so-called" eight-point peace plan, "barely two months later the Administration brazenly declared an indefinite suspension of the Paris talks." In language similar to that of the DRV Foreign Ministry statement of 28 March, he said "these acts undermine talks between the United States and the DRV" and added: "yet the President said he intended to move the talks off dead center."

At the same time that Hanoi was publicizing Trinh's speech, other DRV comment continued to castigate the U.S. delegation's announcement at the 23 March Paris session that it would agree to meet when there was an indication that serious negotiations could take place. The media reported that Xuan Thuy and Mme. Binh met separately with French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, on 30 and 31 March respectively. The VNA accounts of both meetings

* See the TRENDS of 29 March 1972, pages 5-7.

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cited the communist leaders as "condemning" the President's decision and reported Schumann as having expressed his regret at the suspension of the talks. The report on the meeting with Xuan Thuy--carried by VNA on the 31st--additionally quoted Schumann as saying that "current events continue to substantiate General de Gaulle's speech made in Phnom Penh [on 1 September 1966], and that is the reason why the French Government is pursuing and will pursue the application of the principles enunciated in that speech."

VNA and LPA on 5 April reported the proposals made the day before by both the DRV and PRG delegations in Paris that the 148th session be held on the 6th "at the usual time." Vietnamese communist media have not been heard to report that Ambassador Porter is in the United States for consultations.

TRINH ON BIG In his diplomatic report to the National
POWER RELATIONS Assembly, Trinh was critical of U.S. policy
 and the President in broad terms as well as
in the specific context of negotiations. Thus, he said that "all the deceptive statements and perfidious maneuvers of President Nixon cannot conceal the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism." And he repeated the stock line that "U.S. imperialism has been and remains the number one and most dangerous enemy of all nations." There was no indication that these remarks were made with the President's recent China visit in mind, and Trinh in fact seemed to profess satisfaction with the present situation. Declaring that "we are very glad to see that our international activities in 1971 achieved great results in every respect," he said:

The U.S. imperialists have tried to split the socialist countries and separate our country from them to escape their difficulties and serve Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine in Indochina. Although the international situation is complex, the socialist countries continued to support our people's policies, their objectives and their determination to fight, to support the PRG's seven-point solution and the two key problems that were clarified, and have given our people great, valuable, and effective military and economic assistance so that we can completely defeat the U.S. aggressors and restore and develop the economy of the socialist North.

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In a later passage Trinh did refer to the Nixon Administration's "perfidious" political activities and diplomatic maneuvers in order to carry out its scheme to weaken Indochinese solidarity and "to limit the support and assistance given by the socialist camp. . . ." He went on to declare that "our motto" is to persist in the line of independence and self-reliance of the party and state and "unceasingly strengthen solidarity with the Soviet Union, China and the other socialist countries. . . ."

While Trinh was circumspect about the relations among the big powers, Front propaganda as late as 31 March continued to quote, without attribution, from the Sino-U.S. communique and from the President's speeches in China.* Moreover, an article in the March issue of HOC TAP--which of course would have been written before Trinh's speech--paralleled earlier Hanoi press comment, beginning on 3 March, in its jibes at Sino-U.S. relations. Trinh's report now is similar in tone to his major article in the October issue of HOC TAP. The article had seemed to point up the fact that the DRV leaders had made a decision to end their vitriolic July-August propaganda diatribe against Peking. It contained pointed references to the "correct" nature of the DRV's diplomatic line, but it stressed that the continued aid and support from the "brotherly socialist countries" was a "heavy blow" at U.S. attempts "to sow discord between our country and the brotherly countries."

* An explicit mention of the President's China trip appeared in a 23 March Hanoi broadcast in English for American servicemen in South Vietnam. Presenting excerpts of a purported interview with a POW, Captain James Dickerson Cutter, the broadcast quoted Cutter as saying "I was hoping with the peace talks and with Nixon's--President Nixon's visit to China . . . possibly the war would be over." The only known explicit reference to the President's trip in Hanoi domestic media was in the November issue of a journal of the Propaganda and Training Department, THOI SU PHO THONG (CURRENT EVENTS.) Also in November, an English-language Front transmission had cited an American's reference to the visit.

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PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSAILS U.S. SUSPENSION OF PARIS TALKS

Reacting to the U.S. suspension of the Paris Vietnam talks, Peking issued a foreign ministry statement on 31 March containing the first official attack on the Nixon Administration by name since the President's China visit and questioning Washington's interest in a negotiated settlement. But while sharpening its criticism of the United States, Peking did not take the occasion to reaffirm its support for the Vietnam war effort as such.

The Chinese statement, seconding foreign ministry statements issued by the DRV and the PRG on 28 and 29 March respectively, represents the third official criticism of Washington's Indochina policies since the President's visit to Peking. On 16 March a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman seconded the Sihanouk government's condemnation of Saigon's military operation in Cambodia, and on the 10th a PRC Foreign Ministry statement supported a DRV denunciation of U.S. air strikes. The 31 March statement was accompanied on the same day by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, also pegged to suspension of the Paris talks. The question of a Vietnam settlement also figured in a Commentator article on the 30th and a companion NCNA report dated the 29th deriding the U.S. "National Week of Concern" for prisoners of war. Peking's most recent previous statement on a Vietnam settlement had been the 4 February PRC Government statement in support of the PRG's 2 February statement rejecting President Nixon's eight-point proposal and elaborating on its own seven-point plan.*

The current Chinese statement contains elements critical of Washington not present in the 10 and 16 March statements. Thus, it questions U.S. professions of interest in a peace settlement, complaining that although the United States has "tiresomely boasted" about its desire for a negotiated settlement, "its deeds are totally different from its words." The statement does not attack the President's eight-point proposal, as had a 19 February PRC Foreign Ministry statement denouncing U.S. air

* The latter plan, first announced on 1 July 1971, had been endorsed by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial three days later, Peking's first such prompt endorsement of a Vietnam peace proposal. Earlier Vietnamese initiatives had been acknowledged only belatedly by Peking, and the first Chinese endorsement of proposals dating back to May 1969 did not come until December 1970.

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strikes on the eve of the President's visit, but it chides the United States for having "refused to accept" the PRG's seven points and having "obstinately insisted upon its truculent terms which virtually demand that the Vietnamese people accept a compromise and surrender." The statement criticizes the United States for stepping up Vietnamization, a point omitted in the 10 March statement but appearing in the one of 19 February.

The statement makes Peking's first official attack on the Administration by name since the President's visit ~~when it~~ charges that "the Nixon Government" has "brazenly and unilaterally declared the indefinite suspension of the Paris talks, thus laying bare the falsehood of so-called readiness of the United States to hold 'serious' discussions." The statement concludes with demands that the United States "stop its war of aggression in all its forms," end the Vietnamization program, stop "sabotaging" the Paris talks, and "honestly accept" the PRG's seven points and elaboration of its "two key points." But though the Chinese statement expresses "resolute support" for the 28 and 29 March Vietnamese communist statements--citing them as reiterating the communists' stand on a Vietnam settlement and expressing a determination to pursue the war until complete victory--it offers no explicit Chinese pledge of support for the war effort. Peking's other recent statements on Vietnam, including the 4 February government statement on the peace proposals as well as statements pegged to military actions, have reaffirmed Chinese support for the war. The 4 February statement, like the one on 31 March, said the United States has sought to gain at the conference table what it could not achieve on the battlefield, but the earlier statement had gone on to reiterate Peking's commitment to the war effort in forceful terms, calling this "an unshakable established policy" and "an unshirkable internationalist duty."

The 31 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, unlike the foreign ministry statement, did not name the Nixon Administration in attacking "U.S. imperialism" for its "truculent and unreasonable move" of suspending the Paris talks. Charging that the United States has resorted to "various devices" in the talks to reject the communist side's "reasonable proposals" and has tried to hinder the talks while pressing Vietnamization and stepping up the bombing, Commentator concluded by supporting the PRG's seven points and elaboration as "the correct way to solve the Vietnam question."

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The 30 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the U.S. week of concern for POW's derided the observance as a "trick" to deceive world opinion and dampen the antiwar protest at home. Asserting that the POW question is "only part of the Vietnam question," Commentator said that the "correct way to solve the Vietnam question, the POW question included," is the PRG's seven points and elaboration. If the U.S. Government really wants to settle the Vietnam conflict, according to Commentator, it must conduct "serious negotiations" with the PRG and DRV and "give serious consideration to and accept the reasonable and logical proposals" of the PRG.

The companion NCNA report of the POW week, unlike the Commentator article, mentioned the President and members of the Administration by name and made a rare reference to the U.S. presidential elections--a subject on which the Chinese have been silent. NCNA scorned the observance of the week as a "sheer political fraud" designed to delude the public, adding that this cannot enlist "popular support for Nixon in the coming presidential elections."

PEKING REPORTS "FIERCE ATTACKS" LAUNCHED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Apart from a brief reference to the first day of attacks in an NCNA dispatch on 1 April, Peking's coverage of the communist offensive in South Vietnam has consisted of an NCNA report on the 4th and pickups of Vietnamese communist comment and reportage on the same day. The 4 April NCNA report said the PLAF had launched "fierce attacks" in Quang Tri Province and "badly battered" the enemy, compelling him to "retreat helter-skelter." NCNA noted that the United States conducted "wanton bombings" in support of the Saigon troops and threatened retaliatory air strikes against the DRV. The report cited the Western press as having described the current offensive as the "supreme test" of the Vietnamization policy.

Also on the 4th, NCNA carried an account of the NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on the offensive and disseminated a detailed report of the fighting through the 3d based on LPA. The report ended by noting that the fighting "is still going on." NCNA also carried a brief report attributed to VNA on the alleged downing of a B-52 in the Vinh Linh area.

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USSR ROUTINELY NOTES PARIS TALKS SUSPENSION, MILITARY ACTIONS

Minimal, routine Moscow comment continues to denounce the United States' suspension of its participation in the weekly Paris talks and to claim that the action demonstrates U.S. intent to seek a "military solution" in Indochina. Commentaries assailing the suspension in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on 29 March were restricted mainly to citations of critical foreign press reactions and highlighted the "week of concern for POW's" observed in the United States in connection with the suspension at Paris. PRAVDA briefly played the theme of Sino-U.S. collusion when it observed that the U.S. act of "sabotage" was undertaken soon after President Nixon's visit to the PRC. On the 30th TASS mentioned that Ambassador Porter had left Paris for "consultations" at home.

TASS as usual promptly summarized the DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on the suspension, issued respectively on 28 and 29 March. But unlike Peking, Moscow did not issue an official statement of its own. While it has not been Moscow's normal past practice to issue official statements on developments relating to the Paris talks, the USSR did issue a government statement on the PRG's 2 February elaboration.* Some kind of authoritative Moscow response to the U.S. move in Paris might have been expected in that the DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 28th included an appeal to the governments and peoples in the "fraternal socialist countries, peace- and justice-loving countries, the American and world people" to "condemn the sabotage of the Paris talks." This passage was notably absent from TASS' 28 March summary of the DRV statement, published in PRAVDA on the 30th.

* Moscow's official support of the 2 February PRG statement--denouncing President Nixon's eight-point peace plan and "elaborating" on its own seven-point proposal--came belatedly in the 11 February Soviet Government statement. Moscow endorsed the PRG's seven-point proposal, announced by Mme. Binh at the 1 July Paris session, with only a PRAVDA editorial on the 5th. The Soviet Government statement came at a time when there were indications of strain in Soviet-DRV relations. The day it reported the statement, TASS also reported that Kosygin had received the DRV ambassador for talks in an atmosphere of friendship and "comradely frankness," a characterization reflecting failure to achieve an accord. The TASS report appeared in PRAVDA the next day, but Hanoi media never reported the meeting.

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Moscow's failure to issue a supporting statement was made more conspicuous by TASS' acknowledgment, in a 31 March report of French Foreign Minister Schumann's meeting with Mma. Binh, that Schumann had promised French help in getting the talks resumed. And VNA implicitly recognized the absence of Soviet official reaction when it noted, in the 5 April press review, that the DRV press reported protests raised against "Nixon's sabotage of the Paris conference" by the "public" in the Soviet Union, Poland, and Bulgaria.

COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM Moscow media began citing VNA reports of heavy fighting in the northern provinces of South Vietnam as early as 31 March.

By 2 April, the media were picturing an "onslaught" by the "patriots." TASS reported on the 4th that a "large-scale offensive" by the "patriots," mainly in the northern provinces, had caused "panic" among the Saigon troops, adding that Thieu had gone to the front to "boost the morale of his troops" and that the United States had intensified air strikes on the "liberated areas" of South Vietnam. Other Moscow reports have noted that the Saigon troops are getting support from American aircraft, including B-52's.

On 4 April TASS reported that President Nixon met with Secretaries Rogers and Laird and Admiral Moorer and that Kissinger called a meeting of the "Special Action Group." TASS did not acknowledge that the meetings were held to discuss the new communist offensive, merely saying that the participants "discussed the situation in Vietnam." TASS briefly quoted White House press spokesman Ziegler as saying that the United States "left open its options" as to the course of action it might follow. "Local observers," it said, link the "aggravation of the situation in Vietnam" with the U.S. "sabotage" of the Paris talks and with the escalation of the air raids in Indochina. A report from PRAVDA's Washington correspondent on the consultations among the U.S. officials, carried in the Moscow domestic service on 5 April, said it was felt in the U.S. capital that the "present major successes" of the South Vietnamese patriots had placed the Vietnamization plan "in real jeopardy." The correspondent said the decisions adopted during the high-level U.S. conferences had been kept secret, but he added that "the Washington press no longer mentions the scaling down of the war."

A Moscow radio commentary in English on 3 April did not mention the offensive in South Vietnam when it charged that the United States has embarked on a "new stage" in its air war against the

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DRV, using the "full strength of its bomber force" against the northern part of the DMZ and the southern provinces of the DRV. The commentary noted the use of B-52's, the convergence of four aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the dispatch of additional squadrons to American bases in South Vietnam. It cited "circles close to General Abrams' headquarters" as indicating that "it is planned to escalate the war even further." The commentator assessed this as an element in Washington's attempts to achieve a "military victory" in Vietnam, another element of which was the attempt to "torpedo" the Paris talks by refusing to take part in them.

SOVIET AID The issue of Soviet aid has not been highlighted in Moscow's comment on the current military action.* The only available explicit reference to Soviet aid in comment on the offensive in South Vietnam came in a 3 April commentary by Penchenko, widely broadcast in foreign languages, which said that the Indochinese peoples' struggle "is always supported by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community" and recalled that the participants in the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in Prague last January had confirmed their pledge to continue giving "all necessary aid" to the Indochinese peoples. The commentary asserted that "our people see it as the fulfillment of their internationalist duty." A 3 April Moscow commentary in English on the suspension of the Paris talks and intensified U.S. bombing--not mentioning the current offensive--noted in a similar vein that the Soviet people consider it "their internationalist duty" to help the Indochinese. And the 29 March IZVESTIYA article condemning U.S. suspension of participation in the Paris talks recalled Brezhnev's assertion, in his 20 March AUCCTU congress speech, that the USSR considers aid to the Indochinese peoples to be its "international duty."

* In remarks which may take an added significance in retrospect, in the light of recent developments, Podgorny declared in a speech at the 4 October 1971 rally during his Hanoi visit that "the modern arms and modern war materials in the skillful hands of the heroic combatants of the VPA, of the Vietnamese patriots, play an important role in delivering thunder blows at the aggressors." Podgorny declared in the same speech that "the liberation movement of the Indochinese peoples has been so successful that the future victory is already in sight, and the day of victory is not far off."

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TASS on the 3d briefly reported the downing of the B-52 claimed by Hanoi on 2 April, but Moscow omitted this claim from summaries of the 4 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement and there has been no Soviet comment on the alleged downing. When Hanoi claimed for the first time that it had downed a B-52, in September 1967, some Moscow comment had linked the exploit with Soviet air-defense assistance.

The matter of Soviet aid was raised in a brief 3 April Moscow domestic service report of the Hanoi observance of DRV Air Force Day, the anniversary of the day in 1965 when the first military aircraft manned by Vietnamese took off to intercept U.S. planes. Moscow radio's Hanoi correspondent reported that a DRV pilot, in an interview on the anniversary, praised the "Soviet-made MIG's" and expressed gratitude for Soviet solidarity. Over the years Moscow has periodically publicized its supply of military aircraft to the DRV and its training of DRV pilots.

The Soviet military delegation led by Marshal Batitskiy which had paid a "friendship" visit to the DRV on the eve of the offensive, a visit well publicized by Hanoi, was virtually ignored in Moscow media. PRAVDA and RED STAR on 28 March published TASS' report, transmitted the previous day, which briefly cited the DRV Defense Ministry's announcement of the delegation's arrival in the DRV. Soviet media are not known to have reported the delegation's departure from Hanoi, reported by VNA on the 28th, but RED STAR on the 29th carried a summary of the NHAN DAN editorial greeting the delegation. Like Hanoi's other publicity for the visit, the editorial was couched in platitudes and generalities, essentially devoid of substance, and contained the usual expression of gratitude for Soviet economic and military aid.

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CEMA - EEC

BREZHNEV REMARKS ON COOPERATION DRAW CAUTIOUS FOLLOWUP

Brezhnev's watershed remarks in his trade union speech of 20 March on the Common Market as part of "the actually existing situation in Western Europe" have been followed up cautiously and in low key in the media of the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Routine-level Soviet radio commentaries have ignored the subject. But the importance of Brezhnev's remarks was pointed up for readers of PRAVDA in a 23 March article by the paper's senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov, reviewed by TASS but not broadcast by Radio Moscow. Hungary's Premier Fock indicated upon his return home from a trip to Moscow that the EEC and the Common Market had been among the subjects of his talks with Brezhnev, and the Prague agricultural daily expanded at some length on the desirability of expanded trade between members of the two economic groupings. Bucharest's predictably cautious reaction has conveyed obvious satisfaction at the Soviet leader's remarks.

ZHUKOV IN PRAVDA Zhukov's PRAVDA article expounded on "the need for developing economic relations on an equal footing between socialist and capitalist countries," picking up the thrust of Brezhnev's statement that "our relations with the participants" in the EEC will depend on the extent to which they, in turn, will "recognize the realities in the socialist part of Europe" and the interests of the CEMA member states in particular. Brezhnev added: "We are for equality in economic relations and against discrimination." Zhukov declared: The USSR's position on "mutually advantageous trade" between countries of opposing systems "remains unchanged," a point "mentioned" by Brezhnev in the trade union congress speech.

Zhukov was at some pains to portray the situation as one in which the Western economic partners are the petitioners and the CEMA countries are responsive and receptive, but firm in their resolve to uphold their interests. Thus the article devoted considerable space to development of an analogy between the situation in 1922, when financial crises allegedly forced the Western capitalist countries to negotiate for the first time with the Soviet Union, and the "dollar crisis" situation today which "is forcing the capitalists to make another 'dramatic review' of the restrictions on economic ties with the USSR and the other socialist countries." Such trade, Zhukov reiterated, must be on an equal basis, free of "discriminatory" practices.

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TASS ON BRANDT Brezhnev's 20 March remarks bore earmarks of an effort to reassure and encourage the Brandt-Scheel coalition in West Germany during the Bundestag debate over ratification of the FRG's Moscow and Warsaw treaties. Thus the Soviet leader prefaced his remarks on mutual recognition of realities with a denial of the charge--raised by Bonn opponents of ratification of the treaties--that Moscow's European policy was aimed at undermining the EEC. Predictably, Soviet media on the 21st gave prompt publicity to Brandt's reactive comment to the effect that the Common Market "must, for its part, take into account the interests of the CEMA member states"--a direct pickup of language used by Brezhnev.

BUDAPEST Hungary, which over the past year has evinced special interest in expanding its trade with Western Europe, seemed notably receptive to Brezhnev's remarks. The party daily NEPSZABADSAG, reviewing the Soviet leader's speech on 21 March, characterized his statements on the Common Market and CEMA as an admonition to the West to "abandon the policy of division and seek out openings for cooperation with the economic organization of the whole socialist community." Hungarian Premier Fock, in an airport statement on the 29th on his return from Moscow, noted that his talks with Brezhnev had dealt with "the joint interests of the socialist countries, CEMA, the EEC, and other questions." Budapest but not Moscow media reported this statement, and the formal joint communique on the talks did not mention economic relations.

PRAGUE The most detailed discussion in the media so far has come from Prague--in an article in the agricultural daily ZEMEDLSKE NOVINY of 30 March by Jan Celak, which carried forward the theme of Brezhnev's remarks without specifically mentioning his speech. Where the Soviet leader had carefully confined himself to broaching the possibility of relations between the "participants" and "members" of the two economic groupings, Celak saw prospects for the development of trade relations "of CEMA as a whole" as well as of Czechoslovakia in particular with the developed capitalist countries.

The CEMA countries' "main" trading partners, Celak said, were the European capitalist states "and the two great integrated economic groupings: the EEC and EFTA." He cited the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia as the leaders in trade with the capitalist countries, "while Polish trade with the capitalist countries grew somewhat more slowly, and Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania expanded" such trade relations "more rapidly." Celak viewed the possibilities for further trade development as limited

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only by such "remnants of the cold war" as trade embargoes and discriminatory customs barriers aimed at "isolating the socialist world," noting approvingly at the same time that "part of the EEC states have already eased important restrictions" on certain goods from the socialist countries.

The Bratislava PRAVDA on the 24th, in a commentary on the EEC session in Brussels, noted that Brezhnev's proposal had met with considerable response at that meeting. And on the 28th CTK reported Prof. Bedrich Svestka, chairman of the Czechoslovak Committee for European Security, as remarking in general terms at a Prague meeting that "when discussing the problems of economic cooperation in Europe, we will strive for 'rules of decent behavior' in international economic relations and equality in intra-European trade."

BUCHAREST Romanian media picked up Brezhnev's remarks with clear enthusiasm but predictable caution. There had been no public Bucharest acknowledgment of Romania's application to the EEC, three weeks prior to Brezhnev's speech, for special consideration as a developing country that could export goods to Common Market countries without paying duty. The party organ SCINTEIA on 26 March, noting world attention to Brezhnev's statement that the USSR was by no means ignoring the existence of the EEC in Europe, went on to endorse the notion that the EEC "is a European reality and must be taken into account in any realistic policy." Staying carefully within Brezhnev's terms of reference but injecting a characteristically Romanian flavor, the paper added that this

of course presupposes that the members of this group will take into account the interests of nonmember countries, that they will renounce restrictions and discriminatory practices in relations with other countries, and that they will create favorable conditions for extensive trade on an equal base and with respect for national sovereignty and mutual advantage among all nations on the European continent regardless of their sociopolitical systems.

In the same international chronicle, prefaced by the customary assurance of consistent Romanian concern for strengthening cooperation and friendship with the socialist states, SCINTEIA reported the U.S. visit of a delegation of the Romanian Economic Council led by Manea Manescu and its reception by President Nixon. The trip, the article said, was "in keeping with the requirements

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of progress in the present world detente" and in harmony with Romania's policy of developing "relations of cooperation in various fields with all the states of the world, regardless of social systems, based on equal rights and mutual advantage."

BACKGROUND ON CEMA'S POSITION Pronouncements by the CEMA summit meetings in the post-Khrushchev era have contained at the most only brief, general passages on the subject of trade relations with the capitalist countries. The voluminous, long-range integration program adopted by the 25th CEMA session in Bucharest in July 1971 included a brief statement to the effect that the CEMA countries, in line with peaceful coexistence, would "continue to develop economic, scientific, and technical ties with other countries, irrespective of their social and state systems," with special attention to such cooperation with the developing countries. The communique on that session stated that the CEMA member states would continue expanding economic and scientific-technical ties with the developing countries "and with the developed capitalist states."

The last top-level Soviet policy statement on the Common Market dates back to Khrushchev's article in the September 1962 issue of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, which stressed the need for economic integration of the socialist countries under CEMA to counter alleged invidious Western designs against the bloc. Khrushchev refrained from any suggestion of rapprochement between the EEC and CEMA, instead drawing on the communique of the June 1962 CEMA summit meeting in Moscow which proposed the formation of a worldwide international trade organization outside the two groupings. However, while granting the desirability of economic cooperation with the capitalist countries, Khrushchev emphasized that "the imperialists are particularly bent on pooling their forces," an aim which in his view had to be countered by integration of the socialist economies.

The June 1962 meeting's proposal was reiterated at the July 1963 CEMA summit--the last to be held before Khrushchev's downfall. The subject was dropped thereafter, and the CEMA summit meeting in 1966, the first in the post-Khrushchev period, said nothing at all about trade with the capitalist world.

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USSR - YUGOSLAVIA

MEDIA RETICENT ON GRECHKO VISIT TO BELGRADE

Judging by the reticence of Soviet and Yugoslav media, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's 27 March - 1 April visit to Yugoslavia appears to have achieved minimal results. TASS and TANJUG, in brief reports carried respectively in PRAVDA and in the Belgrade BORBA and POLITIKA, note merely that Grechko was received by Tito at Brioni and had "a friendly conversation" with him. In the pattern of earlier, cryptic reports on the Soviet delegation's activities, neither TASS nor TANJUG provide any hint of topics discussed at the meeting--which may have been purely ceremonial--or of Grechko's talks with Yugoslav military officials. Following the meeting with Tito, the Soviet delegation was feted at a reception hosted by Soviet Ambassador Stepakov and attended by Grechko's Yugoslav counterpart, Ljubicic, as well as by Marko Nikezic, Serbian party chief and League Presidium member.

A brief TANJUG report on Grechko's departure on 1 April states that the Soviet delegation visited Skopje and Dubrovnik in addition to Belgrade and inspected some units of the Yugoslav army. TASS reports the Soviet delegation's return to Moscow tersely: "USSR Defense Minister Grechko has returned from Belgrade to Moscow today. He was on an official visit of friendship to Yugoslavia."

The reticence on the part of both Soviet and Yugoslav media appears against the background of Western press speculation that the Soviet Union might use the visit to revive a request for the use of Yugoslav ports for its Mediterranean fleet and for overflight privileges--speculation the Yugoslavs seemed anxious to lay to rest. In a broadcast on the day Grechko arrived, Radio Zagreb's chief political commentator, Milika Sundic, vehemently denied that Grechko would make any demands for base privileges.

YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL HAILS OUTCOME OF ECONOMIC TALKS

Following the 27 March - 3 April Moscow session of the Soviet-Yugoslav committee for economic cooperation, TANJUG reported Yugoslav delegation head Mirjana Krstinic as hailing the "successful" outcome of the talks which she said had improved prospects for "long-term economic cooperation" between the two countries. The official communique on the committee session, signed by Krstinic and Soviet Deputy Premier Novikov, made no

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mention of Soviet credits for the Yugoslavs and generally avoided specifics. But Krstinic, in comments to Yugoslav correspondents in Moscow, said that "in the next three months Yugoslav and Soviet government delegations will draw up concrete proposals for mutual delivery of raw materials as well as for the development of credits for specific branches of the Yugoslav economy." But she added that such credits--for the machine-construction, power generation and supply, and ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy industries--would not go into effect "until after 1975."

In effect underscoring the redirection of Yugoslavia's trade toward the Soviet bloc in the past year, Krstinic said that trade between the two countries reached 600 million dollars in 1971, a 20-percent increase over 1970. She added optimistically that the two sides envisage a record total trade of four billion dollars during the 1971-75 period. In the area of industrial cooperation, she said the two sides agreed that such cooperation would begin with the building of several leather factories and one furniture factory by Yugoslav construction enterprises and would also include the construction of two hotels on the Black Sea. She made no mention of Soviet construction projects in Yugoslavia. According to an accord reached in principle, she said, there would be a 2.5-percent annual increase in the number of Soviet tourists traveling to Yugoslavia, bringing the total to 100,000 by 1975.

According to the official communique on the committee session, as reported by TASS and TANJUG, the two sides decided to establish a permanent commission for cooperation in machine-building and a number of unspecified "working groups" for economic branches. The communique also noted that the two sides examined a "broad field of problems in the sphere of trade expansion and economic cooperation." TASS reported that Premier Kosygin received Krstinic on the 3d and that their talks on "the further development of trade and economic cooperation passed in a warm and friendly atmosphere."

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ITALIAN CP CONGRESS

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OVERSHADOWED BY DOMESTIC POLITICS

The divisive undercurrents in the international communist movement were clearly overshadowed by domestic political concerns at the 13th Italian Communist Party (PCI) Congress, held in Milan 13-17 March.* Using the congress as a platform to launch their campaign for the 7-8 May parliamentary elections, called by President Leone on 28 February, the Italian communist leaders sought repeatedly to emphasize the PCI's readiness to enter into a coalition government of the left as a fully independent, responsible national party free of foreign control, capable of bringing about a "democratic change" in Italian politics. Led by newly elected General Secretary Berlinguer in his keynote address on the 13th, the PCI leaders sought to portray the party to the Italian electorate as a viable alternative to the "swing to the right." With that end in view, they endeavored to keep the congress focused on domestic politics and to mute contentious issues in the international movement.

This preoccupation with domestic concerns was reflected in the small number of foreign speakers at the congress. Only eight of some 50 foreign delegations were permitted to address the assemblage: Soviet Politburo member Grishin, the North Vietnam and NLFSV delegates, French CP Politburo member Billoux, East German Politburo member Axen, and the Yugoslav, Chilean, and Spanish communist parties' representatives.

While Berlinguer presented a guarded statement of PCI views on international issues, Soviet Politburo member Grishin weighed in with a strong attack on the Chinese. Other Soviet bloc representatives were more restrained on the China issue in their congress speeches, although the Bulgarian delegate strongly denounced the PRC leaders in a speech outside the congress hall.

* Materials on the congress, including texts of speeches by foreign as well as Italian delegates, are compiled in supplements to the Latin America and West Europe FBIS DAILY REPORT entitled "13th Italian Communist Party Congress," 3 April 1972 (No. 65, Supplement 9) and 6 April 1972 (No. 68, Supplement 11).

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BERLINGUER ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Where the 12th PCI Congress in February 1969 was dominated by the PCI's condemnation of the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the ex post facto Soviet justification in the guise of the "Brezhnev doctrine," Berlinguer's keynote address--published in L'UNITA on the 14th--set the pattern for the 13th congress by only briefly and cautiously broaching the PCI's positions on foreign affairs. Berlinguer used President Nixon's trip to Peking as an opening for discussing PCI relations with the Chinese, asserting that the visit was an "historically important defeat" for "U.S. imperialism" and that the United States was now "seeking a relationship based on negotiations." Pointing out that the Peking talks resulted in a recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence, Berlinguer repeated the PCI assessment of the Sino-U.S. talks as being "positive" not only for inter-state relations but also for the workers movement:

The fact that the Chinese comrades have again launched the principles formulated at the Bandung conference could objectively create certain conditions for a resumption of normal relations in the socialist world and in the international workers movement. This is a fundamental prerequisite for the unity of the anti-imperialist forces, in order to insure peace and also in order to give China the role which it deserves in international life. Events will show to what extent things will actually move in that direction.

Charging that President Nixon hopes to use "the division between the socialist countries, particularly that of the Sino-Soviet dispute," in the "interests" of the United States, Berlinguer went on to say that a "new situation" has developed in international life which in part explains the "torment of the socialist world and of the workers and liberation movement." The PCI's "critical thinking on the problems of socialism and the revolutionary struggle on an international scale," he said, are part of the reality that "socialism is not an abstract model but an historical process." He continued:

This is the reason why our judgments, even when they are of a critical nature, are never those of someone who remains outside the battle. This is the reason for our tenacious effort to contribute to the effort to overcome the divisions in the international communist movement by pursuing the line of unity in diversity--a line which stems from the complexity and vastness of tasks facing the revolutionary forces, the variety of their experiences, and hence the need for full independence.

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Returning to international issues at the conclusion of his report, Berlinguer again made a careful restatement of PCI views on relations with the international movement, reasserting the PCI stand on different roads to socialism and on the Czechoslovak invasion without directly repudiating the "Brezhnev doctrine":

Every one of our choices, every one of our prospects is born in the full independence of our party, tested in all-out battles and in all our political formulations. Our principled positions supporting the full independence of every communist party and every socialist state have been and remain clear. These are the positions which inspired our judgment of the Czechoslovak events in 1968 and subsequently. There are people who ask us, however, to prove our independence by breaking our solidarity with the socialist countries and the entire international workers and revolutionary movement. We do not pursue this path, and we never will.

Reiterating this point in categorical terms, Berlinguer said that "nothing good for the world could come from a deepening of the differences which separate the major socialist states; nothing good would come to our country from the reopening of a spiral of hostility toward the USSR and the European socialist states." And this statement in turn prefaced what could be read as an expression of a desire to reestablish relations with the CCP:

When our criticism is raised, it is the criticism of those who want to contribute positively to the development of socialism and the unity of the international workers and revolutionary movement. Our criticisms of a number of political and ideological positions of the Chinese comrades have sprung and continue to spring from this: explicit and firm criticisms, but never inspired by a desire for excommunication or separation.

The Chinese party had been invited to the PCI congress but did not reply to the invitation, according to Prague radio on 4 April. But the Albanian party publicly rejected an invitation and in a vitriolic ZERI I POPULLIT editorial condemned the "revisionist" PCI.* Chinese media have not publicized the Albanian rejection and have conspicuously ignored the PCI congress.

* See the TRENDS of 16 February, pages 48-49. See also FBIS Special Report No. 305 of 7 March, "Spanish Communists Reestablish Ties with Peking: Background and Ramifications," pages 12-13.

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Regarding PCI policy toward West Europe and the Common Market, Berlinguer asserted that the Italian communists are "also Europeanists" and made a special plea to the West European communist parties and workers organizations to "operate in such a way as to finally achieve continuous collaboration between the forces of the European working class; promote coordination of initiatives, and initiate a systematic quest for a new relationship with all forces of the left, particularly with the parties with which a considerable number of the workers of West Europe identify themselves." The Political Resolution approved by the congress, published in L'UNITA on the 18th, stated that a "democratic change" in the Italian government would mean "a commitment within the European Economic Community in order to democratize it, defend Italian national interests, and open it to cooperation with all countries, and action to overcome the opposing military bloc." French CP (PCF) Politburo member Billoux, in his congress speech as published in L'UNITA on the 16th, said cautiously only that both the PCI and the PCF "are aware of the need for concerted action by the communist parties in the European capitalist countries."

TREATMENT IN PRAVDA PRAVDA on 15 March carried a long summary of Berlinguer's report which revealed Soviet sensitivities on issues of the international movement by omission and distortion of his remarks. The account included Berlinguer's statement that the United States wants to use the Sino-Soviet split in its own interests but omitted his remarks on the PCI's critical stand toward other parties. PRAVDA quoted Berlinguer's remarks on the independence of the PCI and all communist parties and his statement that the PCI would never renounce its solidarity with the socialist countries. Notably, however, it excised Berlinguer's reference to the Czechoslovak events of 1968 and also omitted his statement about the need to prevent the reopening of hostility between the PCI and the socialist countries.

Accounts of Berlinguer's report, as of the congress in general, in the central press of Moscow's hardlining bloc allies were similarly incomplete and one-sided, without exception ignoring the thrust of his brief comments on the international movement. With the exception of Prague, none of the orthodox allies published any commentaries on the congress. Romanian and Yugoslav media, however, cited the passages on the autonomy of the PCI and its right to make "critical" judgments of other parties.

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CONFIDENTIAL The CPSU delegation at the 12th congress was again led by a Politburo member, Viktor Grishin, who spoke on the second day of the congress.* Following a brief review of Soviet foreign policy, Grishin launched into a denunciation of "right and 'left' opportunists and anti-party elements" and the "various opportunist elements" within the communist movement. Reiterating a current theme of the Soviet central press and journals, he said the CPSU "attaches great significance to the struggle to strengthen the ideological unity of the fraternal parties on a principled Marxist-Leninist basis and to coordinate efforts in the ideological sphere."

Specifically, Grishin denounced the "activity of the opportunist, particularly the present Chinese leadership" for its policy regarding the Sudan, the Indian subcontinent, and the United Nations, adding that this policy "is inflicting considerable harm not only on the interest of the Chinese people but also on the entire revolutionary movement" and that the "anti-Sovietism of the CP leaders is more than just a problem of Soviet-Chinese relations." Repeating the pro forma Soviet call for "normal and friendly" relations between the Soviet and Chinese peoples, he avowed the CPSU's determination to continue to struggle on the party level against the "distortion of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine by the Chinese leaders."

On CPSU-PCI relations, Grishin said they are "broadening to an ever increasing extent" and are based on "Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, and the principles of equality, independence, militant solidarity, and loyalty to our great common cause of liberating the toiling people." Notably absent from this formula was any mention of non-interference in other parties' internal affairs. The CPSU Central Committee message to the congress also made a plea for "greater ideological collaboration between fraternal parties."

Commenting on the PCI's domestic policy, Grishin avoided any specific endorsement of the PCI program for the coming elections--a program oriented toward "reformist" rather than revolutionary principles. He stated merely that the PCI "has achieved definite

* At the 12th PCI Congress in 1969 Moscow showed its displeasure with the PCI attitude on Czechoslovakia by sending for the first time a representative of lesser stature--CPSU Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev, head of the CPSU's department responsible for relations with nonruling communist parties.

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success in strengthening party ranks organizationally and ideologically and in the struggle against social democratic opportunism and leftist adventurism."

Requinguer in his closing address on the 17th publicly repudiated "false" speculation in the non-communist Italian press that Kriehin's speech constituted a "grave intervention in the independence of the PCI."

CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATE The delegate of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ) was the lowest ranking of the Soviet bloc representatives, Central Committee member Lucan. His lowly status reflected the discord which continues to aggravate relations between the PCI and the CPCZ on the issue of "normalization" in Czechoslovakia. Relations were exacerbated just prior to the congress with the arrest and expulsion of Italian journalists, including a PCI member, from Czechoslovakia and with the reports in the West of new arrests of supporters of the "Prague spring" by Czechoslovak security forces.

Lucan was not among the foreign party delegates who addressed the congress, but his message was published in L'UNITA along with the others not actually delivered at the congress. L'UNITA on the 16th prefaced the Czechoslovak message with a statement to the effect that the PCI principle of "internationalism" not only accepts "diversity, but even profound divergence and an approach which is for us a major issue" and that the PCI was therefore publishing the CPCZ delegate's verbatim text as an expression of his party's position. L'UNITA added: "We do not share these positions, but nevertheless we feel it only fair to inform the comrades of them." Lucan's message declared that the 14th CPCZ Congress of May 1971-- at which the PCI was prevented from formally presenting its message to the congress and had to disseminate it to the international press-- completed the "victory of the Marxist-Leninist forces over the right-wing opportunist revisionists." The message also rejected as unfounded the Western reports about the current arrests of former Dubcek supporters.

At a rally in Lodi on the 15th, reported by RIDE PRAVO, Lucan directly praised "the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union and our other nearest allies, who complied with the wishes and demands of the Czechoslovak communists and other citizens devoted to socialism." He reviewed at length the CPCZ line that by "crushing" the "counterrevolution and the revisionist forces" the CPCZ saved Czechoslovakia from being torn from the socialist

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community. L'UNITA did not report this speech or any of the others given by foreign representatives outside the congress hall.

In a post-congress interview reported in RUDE PRAVO on the 20th, Lucan stressed that his delegation had received a "cordial welcome" at the Lodi rally, noting that his speech was even interrupted by applause and shouts of "bravo." In pointing out that the "Italian public is insufficiently informed about what actually happened in Czechoslovakia," Lucan called for "more frequent personal contacts" between the PCI and the CPCZ to strengthen interparty relations.

OTHER SPEECHES Other foreign party delegates' speeches at the congress did not name China in discussing the division in the international movement and calling for unity among the parties. However, East Germany's Axen said the SED was "opposed to any splitting activities and resolutely combats anti-Sovietism in all its forms, whether it is carried by the West wind or the East wind," and Poland's Tejcma said his party would oppose "all factional and splitting trends." Outside the congress hall, at Cremona, Bulgarian candidate Politburo member Abadzhiev, in a speech reported by RABOTNICHESKO DELO on the 15th, bluntly attacked the Chinese leaders for their "improper attacks" on the CPSU and the USSR.

The speech of Romania's Pana, the Romanian Central Committee message to the congress, and a speech by Pana at a rally in Corneo all stressed support for the Italian party's efforts to build a "new unity" of "all" parties in the international communist movement.

Spanish CP (PCE) Politburo member Gallego, after expressing support for the PCI call for "a more systematic and better articulated arrangement" for maintaining relations between communist parties of Western Europe, went on to discuss the division in the international movement. Gallego declared it "essential to achieve unity of action among all the communist parties." Such unity "in our opinion," he continued, "requires recognition of diversity in unity and of the independence of each party." Acknowledging that there "are still difficulties" in achieving this unity, Gallego noted that the Moscow international communist conference of 1969 had recognized that "some of the divergencies within our movement may well persist for some time." These divergencies are not due "solely to errors on both sides," he said, but are a result of "objective conditions." He appealed to all parties to attempt to bring the parties closer to one another and "to seek the things

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we have in common." TASS on the 16th reported the Gallego speech but glossed over all his remarks on unity in the movement. However, the TASS publicity for a speech by a representative of the Carrillo leadership of the PCE was the first Soviet report in recent months on any activities of the party.

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CHINA

HSIEH FUNERAL SHEDS LITTLE LIGHT ON LEADERSHIP PICTURE

A 30 March NCNA announcement of the death and funeral of Hsieh Fu-chih, Politburo member and Peking municipal chief, indicates that the PRC leadership is still unsettled following Lin's purge. The rankings of leaders who attended the funeral, sent wreaths, or paid respects to the remains were apparently designed to pay homage to age rather than to power.

There has been no indication as to Hsieh's successor as minister of public security. Wu Te, who has acted as Peking chief during the past two years of Hsieh's illness, when Hsieh made only one public appearance, was identified as "acting chairman" of the Peking revolutionary committee at ceremonies for the visiting Maltese delegation on 2 April. Previously, in an apparent error, Wu had been accorded the title by NCNA, in its first account of President Nixon's arrival in Peking, but in all subsequent accounts he was identified as vice-chairman.

While Yao Wen-yuan and regional leaders Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien were not mentioned in connection with Chen I's funeral on 11 January, the Hsieh funeral account seems to make a point of mentioning all Politburo members who have not been purged. It may be presumed there was a felt need to present a picture of normality and collegiality. Mao's failure to appear in person for the Hsieh funeral--he did show up for Chen I's funeral--could reflect either the condition of his health or his personal relations with the deceased.

The most innovative change in the rankings is the prominence accorded Chu Te and Liu Po-cheng in ranking those who viewed the remains. In the Ch. I account they had been listed in their customary positions ahead of Li Hsien-nien but following Chang Chun-chiao. For Hsieh, however, Chu and Liu both followed Chou and preceded the active regular members of the Politburo. In Chu's case this could be explained as a factor of his state rank as NPC Standing Committee chairman; indeed the list of those who presented wreaths obviously took state rank into consideration, and Chu preceded Chou. But the viewing of Hsieh's remains was apparently done according to party rank, and those named were identified only as "leading comrades of the party Central Committee."

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The only other major shift in rank between the two funerals is the lessened prominence of Soong Ching-ling. The Hsieh funeral is the first occasion she has been listed with Tung P'ing since he assumed the office of "acting" PRC chairman rather than co-vice chairman, and she lost the precedence over him which she has always enjoyed.

While it seems inconceivable that new prominence for the ailing octogenarians in the leadership means they have been accorded any real power, the rise of Chu and Liu in Politburo rank does serve to diminish the standing of Chiang Ching, who has traditionally been listed after Politburo standing committee members. The change may reflect a shift of power in the Politburo, indicative of an impasse in which inactive members are assuming more prominent roles merely because they represent no long-range threat.

"REHABILITATED" CHAO TZU-YANG RETURNS TO PROVINCIAL BAILIWICK

On 11 March KGBA revealed that Chao Tzu-yang, previously a secretary on the Inner Mongolian party committee, appeared among Kwangtung leaders at a Canton ceremony marking the final performance of the Japanese Haguruma theater troupe in its tour of China. Chao was not identified in any specific position within the Kwangtung power structure, but was listed sixth after Kwangtung's four party secretaries and Jen Szu-chung, a political commissar of the Canton Military Region. The name of Huang Jung-hai, commander of the Kwangtung Military District, followed Chao's.

Prior to the cultural revolution, Chao was first secretary of the old Kwangtung party committee, and he also served as a secretary of the former Central-South Bureau headed by purged Tao Chu. Chao disappeared from public view in 1966 when Red Guard attacks portrayed him as a loyal lackey of Tao and charged him with mistakes in carrying out various rural work programs. His rehabilitation came to public notice last May when he made a surprise reappearance as one of the new regional party secretaries of Inner Mongolia.

Chao's move to Kwangtung occurred sometime after 15 January when he made his last public appearance in Inner Mongolia. Apparently he was in good standing just before he left; the Huhehot radio identified him as a secretary on the provincial party committee and reported that he had "made an important speech" at a regional meeting on agriculture.

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Chao's reassignment to his former bailiwick appears to be a spinoff of recently intensified media calls to provide suitable work for veteran cadres as part of the ideological campaign against Lin Biao and his followers. An unusually frank SHENSI DAILY commentator's article on 10 March, for example, linked the need to make greater use of veteran cadres with the campaign to overcome the harm to party unity done by "swindlers" who "spread the ultraleftist trend of striking at the cadres whenever possible and suspecting them when there is no cause so as to attain their unspeakable criminal objectives."

SHENSI DAILY claimed that as the result of "training by rotation" and "transfers to strengthen leadership" the "great majority of the former leading cadres at all levels have been liberated, united, and suitably employed." Criticizing the notion of "rather left than right" on the question of cadres, the article lashed out at those "swindlers" who "arbitrarily tampered with and distorted the five requirements put forward by Chairman Mao and formulated their own so-called 'three criteria'"--a rare direct reference to Lin's 1967 "three criteria" for training, selecting, and promoting cadres. The article faulted the "'three criteria'" (which called for cadres to follow Mao, keep in touch with the masses, and maintain revolutionary vigor) for containing nothing "about the attitude of being modest and prudent and the style of self-criticism." The cadre policy of these "swindlers" was "in fact a . . . policy of appointing friends only and . . . was determined by whether or not one was loyal to them."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CRACKDOWN ON YOUNG UKRAINIAN WRITERS MEETS RESISTANCE

Efforts by conservative leaders of the Ukrainian writers union to tighten controls on young writers have provoked objections that present-day youth are basically trustworthy though more critical than their elders of the established order. Writers union first deputy chairman Vasil Kozachenko and deputy chairman Yuriy Zbanatskiy have argued that young writers are politically immature and ideologically derelict and that admissions to the writers union should be governed by strict ideological criteria. Young writer Volodymyr Zabashtanskiy and former writers union deputy chairman Leonid Novichenko have protested against this distrustful attitude toward young writers and warned against highhanded treatment of them.

At a January meeting of the Kiev writers organization, Kiev chairman Zbanatskiy criticized some writers union members for being too indulgent toward young writers. He urged tightening of admissions and more indoctrination and complained about the "ideological indistinctness of certain works," citing as an example the emphasis on "non-class categories of conscience, general good, evil, and so on" in the new poems by the young writer Vitaliy Korotych (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 8 February).

On 20-21 March the Ukrainian writers union board met to hear Kozachenko report on work with young writers. In addition to attacking young writers for concentrating on "abstract non-class concepts," he complained that some authors "who have fully lost the sense of social responsibility for their work and even a feeling of Soviet patriotism, distribute in manuscript form their ideologically immature or mistaken writings rejected by publications" and that these sometimes are sent abroad and are used by "enemies" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 21 March). Asserting that "morally unstable and politically immature" young writers have been admitted to the union, he proposed that admissions into the writers union be based on a writer's ideological attitude and orthodox behavior. He asserted that young writers are poorly indoctrinated and are sometimes influenced by writers "who themselves can't find their way out of a paper bag" in their writings. He also proposed the placement of each young writer under the personal supervision of an older writer and the assignment of older writers, instead of young editors, to edit the works of new authors.

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On the eve of the plenum, however, LITERATURNA UKRAINA published an article by young writer Volodymyr Zabashtanskiy appealing for "a less superior attitude and less pedantic sermonizing in work with youth." Warning against underrating the "cultural, educational and political level of today's young literary generation," he declared that "we must remember" that this generation is markedly different from its predecessors. Today's generation reacts with "special spiritual resistance . . . to the slightest manifestation of untruth in life, injustice or unjustified criticism in literature and art" and has "an implacable attitude toward any hypocrisy" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 17 March).

Speaking at the plenum four days later, former writers union deputy chairman Leonid Novichenko backed Zabashtanskiy's protest and challenged Zbanatskiy's criticism of Korotych. (Korotych had been dropped from the union leadership at the May 1971 congress along with Novichenko.) Novichenko took exception to the Kiev writers meeting's criticism of Korotych's emphasis on "conscience" in his poems. He flatly rejected as "incorrect" the notion that "'conscience' is a 'supra-class' concept" (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 24 March). Declaring that questions of conscience are vital, he remarked that Zabashtanskiy "correctly wrote before the plenum" that "modern youth are very sensitive toward injustice and hypocrisy" Novichenko also ridiculed the notion that older writers had nothing to learn from younger writers and praised R. Lubkivskiy's plenum speech which had argued that old and young could learn from each other.

Despite these objections, the plenum adopted the proposals on tightening admissions, indoctrinating young writers, and creating a separate editorial board for beginning writers in the union's publishing house (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 24 March). A meeting of leaders of oblast writers organizations was convened after the plenum to hear writers union secretary Ivan Soldatenko discuss the implementation of these decisions and announce that all oblast organizations and certain writers would have to make reports to the union's presidium (LITERATURNA UKRAINA, 24 March).

The 41-year old Soldatenko will probably play a key role in the crackdown. A longtime Komsomol and agitprop official, he was admitted to the writers union in June 1970 at a meeting chaired by Zbanatskiy and was elected the union's organizational secretary at the May 1971 writers union congress, obviously to help veteran conservative leaders Kozachenko and Zbanatskiy establish control over the union. A former rayon Komsomol secretary in Kiev city, he rose to head of the Kiev city party committee's agitprop section by early 1970, and as such presumably worked closely with then Kiev writers organization chairman Kozachenko.

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AGRICULTURE MINISTRY SHIFTS HINT POSSIBLE REORGANIZATION

In recent weeks two of the nine deputy ministers have been transferred out of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture to other positions in the agricultural complex. PRAVDA on 21 March announced first deputy minister I.P. Volovchenko's appointment as RSFSR Minister of Sovkhozes. TRUD on 31 March identified deputy minister (for agricultural machinery) A.V. Kardapoltsev as deputy chairman of the USSR Agricultural Equipment Association. He was last identified as deputy minister in the 9 December 1971 RUPAL LIFE.

The shakeup is especially noteworthy because the ministry's leadership has undergone few changes since the 1965-66 post-Khrushchev reorganization, when V.V. Matskevich was recalled from exile to head the ministry which regained many of the powers lost under Khrushchev and acquired four new deputy ministers (including Kardapoltsev) as well. The only high-level changes since then have been deputy minister G.I. Vorobyev's transfer to chairman of the Committee on Forestry in 1970 and the addition of deputy ministers A.P. Chubarov and B.A. Runov in 1970-71.

Volovchenko was a Khrushchev protege, abruptly elevated from an obscure post as sovkhos director to USSR Agriculture Minister in March 1963 and demoted to first deputy minister soon after Khrushchev's fall in order to make way for Matskevich's reappointment as minister. Kardapoltsev, on the other hand, was ousted as deputy RSFSR agriculture minister by Khrushchev in 1961 and exiled to the provinces, only to return to Moscow after Khrushchev's fall when he became a deputy minister under Matskevich.

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

NORTH VIETNAM CONCLUDES SERIES OF ANNUAL AID AGREEMENTS

The conclusion on 16 March of a DRV-Romanian economic aid agreement for 1972 brought to a close a series of negotiations in Hanoi with delegations from East European countries which had begun last December. The dispatch of these delegations to the DRV to conclude the annual economic accords is consistent with the pattern set last fall, when the annual aid agreements with the PRC, USSR, and DPRK were for the first time concluded in Hanoi rather than in the capitals of the donor countries.*

There are three precedents for the signing of DRV-East European aid agreements in Hanoi--Bulgaria and Romania sent delegations there to conclude the 1971 agreements, and the Czechoslovaks signed an aid pact in Hanoi in 1966--but all other agreements with Moscow's East European allies in recent years have been negotiated and signed in the European capitals. The locations of the negotiations for DRV aid agreements with Albania, Cuba, and Mongolia have varied; however, in keeping with the new general pattern, agreements for 1972 were signed in Tirana last November and in Havana in December. Hanoi propaganda in January began referring to the Mongolian accord for 1972, but available propaganda has not indicated the circumstances of the negotiations.

The level of the East European delegations to Hanoi this winter varied. Hungary and Bulgaria--like China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea--sent official party-government delegations, which were hosted by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and received by First Secretary Le Duan. Lower-ranking economic delegations from the other countries were hosted by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi and received by Dong but not by Le Duan.** Despite the presence of

* The PRC, USSR, and DPRK agreements are discussed in the TRENDS of 29 September 1971, pages 1-2; 14 October, pages 4-6; and 3 November, pages 13-14. A Chinese trade agreement and aid protocols are discussed in the TRENDS of 8 December, pages 16-17, and supplementary USSR and PRC aid agreements for 1972 in the TRENDS of 5 January, pages 14-15, and 26 January, pages 8-9, respectively.

** Le Duan as well as Pham Van Dong had received the Romanian and Bulgarian economic delegations that negotiated the 1971 aid agreements, however.

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high-level Hungarian and Bulgarian delegations, all of the aid agreements were signed at the vice premier level, with Le Thanh Nghi signing for the DRV side. Nghi has usually concluded the annual accords, but Vice Premier Nguyen Con signed some of the pacts last year and various DRV leaders signed them in 1967.

In addition to the aid pacts, Hanoi concluded agreements with the Czechoslovak and Romanian economic delegations on the establishment of joint commissions for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. Such commissions had been set up with Moscow's other East European allies since 1969, and a similar commission with the Soviet Union was mentioned in the 7 October 1971 joint communique on Podgorny's visit to the DRV. The commissions are presumably designed to ensure more efficient utilization of aid. The Soviet Union as well as some of the East European countries had previously participated with the DRV in joint commissions on scientific and technical but not economic matters.

Only the Czechoslovak and Romanian delegations were reported to have stopped over in both Peking and Moscow. The Romanians stayed in Peking from 11 to 13 March, met with Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials, and were hosted at a banquet, while NCNA merely reported that the Czechoslovak group was met at the Peking airport by Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Yuan-hua. In Moscow, both the Czechoslovak and Romanian delegations were met at the airport by Soviet vice premiers. The Polish delegation stayed overnight in Moscow and met with a Soviet vice premier. There were no reports of any such stopovers by the other groups.

EAST GERMANY The GDR Government economic delegation, led by Vice Premier Gerhard Weiss, visited the DRV from 3 to 11 December, and aid agreements were signed on the 9th. As was the case last year, Hanoi's accounts of the agreements, but not East Berlin's, specified that they included military assistance. A trade accord and an agreement on assistance in building a professional school were also concluded during the visit.

In a 9 December account of the signing of the agreements and a report of the communique on the visit on the 12th, Hanoi noted that the accords covered the GDR's economic and military aid to Vietnam for 1972 as well as other documents on economic and technical cooperation. By contrast, ADN's reports on the signing of the accords and on the communique, published in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 11 and 13 December, omitted the explicit

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references to "military aid." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND did, however, report the communique's more general statement that the two sides had discussed aid for strengthening of the DRV's national defense--a formulation that has appeared in GDR media in past years.

As early as 1968, a NHAN DAN article on the aid agreements reported that the GDR was providing military aid. But it was not until last year that Hanoi referred to military aid in its reporting of the negotiations. Thus VNA stated that the 1971 aid agreements--signed in East Berlin on 22 January of that year by Le Thanh Nghi--covered the GDR's "economic and military aid to Vietnam for 1971" as well as "economic, scientific, and technical cooperation." ADN's report on the accords merely referred to "material aid."

Available propaganda on the GDR delegation's stay in Hanoi in December did not report the convening of a meeting of the joint commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. But a 12 December ADN report on the delegation's return home noted that it had gone to Hanoi "for negotiations and to attend the third meeting" of the commission. The commission was established and held its first meeting when aid agreements for 1970 were signed in October 1969. The second meeting was held in January 1971 when the annual aid agreements were signed.

BULGARIA The Bulgarian-DRV aid agreements were signed at the conclusion of a 21-27 December "friendship visit" of a Bulgarian party-government delegation led by Politburo member and Premier Stanko Todorov. A separate Bulgarian trade delegation led by a vice minister of foreign trade visited Hanoi at the same time. According to the joint communique, reported both in DRV media and by Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, the agreements included a "protocol" on Bulgaria's "non-refund military aid" for 1972. A Hanoi radio report on the 27th, subsequently published in NHAN DAN, added that a "report on the first meeting of the Bulgaria-Vietnam commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation" was also signed. The radio report said that Vice Premiers Le Thanh Nghi and Mako Dakov signed the first three agreements and that the trade accord was signed by vice ministers of foreign trade.

The agreements for 1971 were also signed in Hanoi--on 6 November 1970 by a Bulgarian economic delegation headed by Pencho Kubadinski, Politburo member, vice premier, and minister of construction and

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architecture. DRV media said these agreements covered economic and military aid for 1971, long-term loans and trade, and the formation of the joint commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. Bulgarian press reports on the signing of the agreements for 1971 made no mention of military assistance, as had also been the case in the reporting of the 1970 agreements. Bulgarian media had referred to military aid on some previous occasions, however.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA A Czechoslovak Government economic delegation headed by Vice Premier Frantisek Hamouz visited the DRV from 7 to 15 January. VNA reported on the 14th that "agreements on Czechoslovakia's economic and military aid to Vietnam" for 1972 were signed by Hamouz and Le Thanh Nghi and on "goods exchange and payments" for 1972 by vice ministers of foreign trade. In addition, according to VNA, the two sides agreed to set up a commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The joint communique on the visit, reported by both Hanoi and Prague media, also noted that agreements on "economic and military aid" and trade were signed. Further details on the agreements were offered by Hamouz, in a Prague domestic service interview on 6 February after his return home. While acknowledging that the agreements included "war material," he added that the main supplies were to be machine tools, textile and woodworking machinery, and irrigation pumps.

Prague's references to military aid in the current agreement contrast with its usual silence on this aspect of assistance in past years, although Czechoslovak as well as DRV media referred to military aid in 1966 when the annual accord was signed in Hanoi. Neither side mentioned military assistance in 1967. Since then Hanoi has regularly cited military aid in reporting the agreements; Prague, by contrast, has with few exceptions referred only to "economic and technical assistance."

POLAND The Polish Government economic delegation, led by Vice Premier Wincenty Krasko, visited the DRV from 21 to 28 January, signing aid agreements on the 27th. VNA that day reported that Le Thanh Nghi and Krasko signed agreements on "economic, scientific, and technological cooperation" and that separate agreements on "Poland's military aid to Vietnam in 1972" and on "loans, goods exchange, and payments" for 1972 were signed by other officials. PAP's account of the signing, published in TRYBUNA LUDU on the 28th, made no mention of military assistance. Presumably because of Polish sensitivities on this question, the

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communiqués on the visit reported by both countries' news agencies on the 28th and subsequently published in the press--of--year regularly in the signing of an agreement on Poland's "very aided aid to the DRV. The communiqués also noted in general terms the delegation's acquisition of "concrete problems" related to aid, including assistance for strengthening the DRV's national defense.

Warsaw's reluctance to call attention to the military aspect of the aid agreement is in keeping with past practice, although in some past years Vice Premier Jaznoswicz, who usually signed on behalf of Poland, was quoted in Warsaw media as mentioning at signing ceremonies that the aid provides "defense help" or includes "military deliveries." Only Hanoi's account of last year's agreement, signed on 16 January 1971 by Le Thanh Nghi, mentioned that it covered military as well as economic aid and that a separate military aid protocol was signed.

Both Hanoi and Warsaw reported that this year's delegation attended the second meeting of the Polish-Vietnamese joint commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The commission was established at the time of the signing of the aid agreements in 1969, but its first meeting was not reported until last year.

HUNGARY The Hungarian party-government delegation, headed by Politburo member and Premier Jeno Fock, visited the DRV from 7 to 9 February for an "official friendship visit." On the 8th, VNA reported the signing of "agreements on Hungary's non-refund military aid to Vietnam, on long-term loans without interest to Vietnam, and on goods exchange and payments for 1972." It also reported that the minutes of the second conference of the Vietnam-Hungary commission for economic, technical, and scientific cooperation were signed by Le Thanh Nghi and Vice Premier Lajos Fehér; the Vietnam-Hungary commission had been set up at the time of the signing of last year's agreements, in January 1971, and held its first meeting at that time.

VNA's description of the agreements signed during the Fock delegation's visit was substantially repeated in the joint communique, reported by VNA on the 9th, and in Budapest reports of the signing of the agreements and the joint communique--published in NEPSZABADSAG on the 9th and 10th, respectively.

In various speeches and interviews, Hungarian spokesmen elaborated to some extent on the nature of Hungarian aid.

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Speaking in the DRV on 4 and 5 February, Fohar referred to "many-sided military cooperation" between the two countries and acknowledged that the Hungarians are sending "weapons" to the North Vietnamese. In a 22 February interview published in the Budapest MACVAB HIRIAF, Lajos Fohar noted that Hungarians give "priority treatment" to goods required by the DRV for enhancing its "defense potential," recalling that Hungary has been giving military aid to the DRV for eight years and, "since the conclusion of U.S. aggression, to the rest of the Indian-Chinese peoples as well." Under the latest agreement with Hanoi, he said, Hungary will deliver "weapons (increasing the effectiveness of its defense, ammunition, small arms, communications, medical, and other equipment)." He added that the DRV has "destroyed quite a few" U.S. planes with the help of "fire-control equipment and antiaircraft batteries delivered to us."

Elaborating on economic aid in the MACVAB HIRIAF interview, Fohar stressed Hungary's intentions to help restore the DRV's war-damaged economy. He recalled that in the past Hungary had sent the DRV "basic materials, semifinished products, consumer and industrial goods, and capital equipment by virtue of the long-term credit agreements." He also cited examples of past and future Hungarian economic aid to the DRV.

Budapest media have referred frequently to military aid in recent years, although they are not known to have done so in 1969. Last year's agreement, signed on 17 January 1971 when Le Thanh Nghi visited Budapest, was described by VNA as including "economic and military aid," interest-free long-term loans, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, and goods exchange. The Hungarian news agency did not provide this kind of detail, but military aid was acknowledged by Lajos Fohar at the signing ceremony when he promised "all reasonable military, economic, and diplomatic assistance."

DDMM:174 The Romanian-DRV agreements were signed on 16 March during the 15-17 March visit to the DRV of a Romanian Government economic delegation led by Vice Premier George Radulescu. Both Hanoi and Bucharest media reported that the agreements covered Romania's "economic and military aid to Vietnam for 1972, goods exchange and payments between the two countries for 1972, and the establishment of a commission for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation." The joint communique included a similar description of the agreements.

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Last year's accords were signed on 19 November 1970 during the visit to Hanoi of a Dominican Government economic delegation led by Radulescu. Both sides said those agreements covered non-refundable military aid and goods exchange and payments for 1971. VNA also noted that an agreement on loans for 1971 was signed, while a Bucharest report referred more generally to an "economic" agreement. Since 1967, both sides have acknowledged that the annual agreements include military as well as economic aid.

ALBANIA A DRV Government economic delegation led by Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Nghiem Ra Duc visited Albania from 27 to 24 November and signed agreements on the 22d which Tirana described as covering "gratuitous aid" to the DRV for 1972 and goods exchange and payments; VNA's similar description specified "economic" aid. The last annual aid agreement with Albania was signed in Hanoi in October 1970 by DRV Minister of the Premier's Office Tran Huu Duc and the Albanian ambassador. According to VNA, it provided for "non-refund economic aid" for 1971. The head of a DRV economic delegation visiting Tirana had signed an agreement on aid in November 1969, and the respective ambassadors signed in 1967 and 1968. Le Thanh Nghi signed the agreements in Tirana in 1966.

CUBA VNA reported on 2 January that "agreement on Cuba's economic aid to Vietnam for 1972" and "other documents on goods exchange and payments" were signed on 30 December in Havana by visiting DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Nguyen Chanh and the Cuban foreign trade minister. Last year's agreement on Cuba's "non-refund economic aid to Vietnam and a protocol on goods exchange" for 1971 was signed in Hanoi on 20 January 1971 by the DRV Minister of Foreign Trade and a visiting Cuban vice minister of foreign trade. Similar agreements had been signed alternately in Havana and Hanoi in previous years.

MONGOLIA On 3 January VNA reported that Politburo member and Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh received the Mongolian ambassador to thank the Mongolian Government for "the economic aid granted to the DRV in 1972," and on the same day VNA reported a NHAN DAN article thanking Mongolia for its "non-refund economic aid to Vietnam in 1972." There is no available report of when, where, or by whom the agreement was signed. Similar reports of Vietnamese gratitude were the only reports available in January 1971, although the assistance then was described as also including

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"military aid" Trade agreements were the only records specifically reported in 1969, 1968, and 1967, but in July 1968 NHAN DAN also praised a "letter on Mongolia's economic and military aid to Vietnam" reportedly brought from Premier Yedenbal by a Mongolian friendship delegation. Le Thanh Nghi visited Mongolia in 1966 and signed an agreement for "non-refundable material aid."

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