

26 APRIL 1972

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

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26 APRIL 1972  
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 17)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 17 - 23 APRIL 1972

<u>Moscow (3049 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1558 items)</u>	
Indochina	(13%) 20%	Domestic Issues	(26%) 31%
[Strikes on DRV & Escalation of War]	(9%) 17%	Indochina	(25%) 24%
[Strikes on DRV]		[Strikes on DRV]	(17%) 20%
Lenin's Birth Anniversary	(-- ) 13%	UN Trade & Development Conference, Chile	(4%) 7%
Podgorny in Turkey	(11%) 6%	Peruvian President in PRC	(-- ) 6%
May Day Slogans	(1%) 5%	UN Discussion of Decolonization	(2%) 5%
FRG Treaties With Poland & USSR	(3%) 3%	Sierra Leone National Day	(-- ) 4%
China	(2%) 3%	Mauritanian Prime Minister in PRC	(8%) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

The progress of the communist offensive in South Vietnam was evaluated in Hanoi and Front comment following a roundup of alleged achievements during the initial weeks. An editorial in the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 20 April repeated the view that the elimination of "vital enemy forces" strikes a blow at Vietnamization and has changed the balance of forces. Following communist assaults on positions in the central highlands on the 24th, the PLAF command in the area called on its forces to pursue retreating ARVN troops and to attack positions in the provincial capital of Kontum.

Hanoi has continued to protest U.S. air strikes against the DRV at the routine level of statements by the foreign ministry spokesman, but the rhetoric is harsher and contents more detailed than in protests prior to the intensified bombing. Meetings held in Hanoi by various organizations indicate the importance placed on stepped-up vigilance and implementation of the 16 April party-government appeal issued in the wake of that day's strikes against Haiphong and Hanoi.

Moscow has continued to tread a careful line between the demands of its Vietnamese ally and considerations involving Soviet-U.S. relations. Kulakov, in the Lenin anniversary speech, made a stock promise of "necessary aid and support" and voiced pro forma criticism of the U.S. bombing without mentioning the Nixon Administration. Hanoi's concern over U.S.-USSR relations seemed evident in comment supporting Moscow's protest to the United States that four ships were damaged during the Haiphong bombing. While Moscow has ignored the U.S. reply, Hanoi took issue with the contention that the USSR shared responsibility and said the President was trying to force Moscow to stop aiding the DRV.

While reaffirming support for the war effort in marking the second anniversary of the Indochina summit conference, Peking has continued to show restraint and to avoid being provocative toward the United States. As it did last year, Peking marked the anniversary with a leaders' message and an editorial pledging Chinese backing as a "bounden internationalist duty." At the same time, it has shied away from elite comment on Vietnamese developments.

## OPENING WEEKS OF OFFENSIVE REVIEWED; RECENT FIGHTING HAILED

On 19 April LPA released a review of the communists' offensive in South Vietnam during its first two weeks--from 30 March to 15 April.

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The "PLAF and people" in the South were said to have killed, wounded, or captured nearly 30,000 troops during this period and to have "wiped out" five brigades, tactical groups, and regiments, 13 infantry battalions, three armored squadrons, and 10 artillery battalions. Several other units were said to have been "heavily decimated." In addition, the report claimed that the PLAF shot down or damaged on the ground more than 150 aircraft and destroyed or seized more than 1,000 military vehicles, including 300 armored vehicles. The report also alleged that "the people in many provinces and districts from Quang Tri to Ca Mau rose up, smashed the enemy's grip, destroyed 'strategic hamlets' and other concentration camps, seized control, and liberated many areas." The detailed review of fighting in various areas did not include the earlier spurious communist claim to have "liberated" An Loc, the provincial capital of Binh Long, on 15 April, but it did assert that the PLAF "surrounded, attacked, and wiped out enemy troops" there.

The roundup of initial "victories" in the South was welcomed in Front comment and by editorials in the Hanoi press on 20 April, all contending that the offensive, by destroying large allied forces, is changing the balance of forces in South Vietnam. The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial claimed that the PLAF's feats in destroying "the enemy's vital forces" represent "a very important victory and a very powerful blow to the backbone of the U.S. Vietnamization policy" and have "directly and in short time changed the balance of forces on the battlefield." It maintained that "the dream of the U.S.-puppet clique of thwarting and extensively pushing back the liberation forces and of fighting the war outside of the borders of South Vietnam has vanished," thus implying communist determination to sustain its attacks in South Vietnam. And, in a further suggestion that the offensive will be prolonged, it claimed that the revolutionary forces have widened the "liberated zone" and acquired "springboards from which to launch new offensives."

While expressing optimism about the favorable position of the communist forces, the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial did not forecast victory in the near future. It warned that "many difficulties and challenges" lie ahead, and it went on to explain: "Offensives are developing both powerfully and steadfastly and in accordance with the law of the resistance of our people which consists of fighting protractedly and more and more powerfully. This also corresponds to the guidelines of the strategy of the present revolutionary war, which has to go through many phases."

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Like QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, the NHAN DAN editorial on the 20th held that "the annihilation of a substantial part of the enemy potential and the destruction of a sizable amount of his war equipment" has caused the balance of forces to "continue to change in favor of our armed forces and people." It asserted that "the new victories prove that the armed forces and people in the South are standing in a new strategic position" and demonstrate the importance of "the correct political and military leadership, the correct assessment of the situation, and the firm grasp of the opportunity to annihilate the enemy."

ACTION IN KONTUM,  
BINH DINH PROVINCES

The 24 April communist assault in the central highlands of South Vietnam has drawn a predictable flurry of propaganda, including an order that day for further attacks from the central highlands PLAF command, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 25th, and a NHAN DAN editorial on the 26th. Communist accounts of the action said that the PLAF in Kontum Province attacked all the allied encampments along the "Dak To-Tan Canh defense perimeter" on the morning of the 24th. Hanoi and the Front claimed that in six hours of fighting the PLAF seized complete control of all the bases, headquarters, storage areas, airfields, and district capitals on a 30-kilometer stretch of the defense perimeter from northern Vo Dinh to Dak To district capital and from Dak Mot to Tan Canh town. The PLAF was credited with "wiping out" the forward command post of the 22d ARVN Division and with "destroying or disintegrating" the 42d and 47th regiments, the 9th Battalion of the 3d Airborne Brigade, and one battalion of the ARVN 41st Regiment. Initial accounts of the fighting did not mention the surrender of any specific ARVN units, although an LPA report alleged that many units surrendered and that many others on the defense perimeter along the mountain range "fled in disorder."

The order from the central highlands PLAF command, broadcast on the 25th, claimed that government troops in Kontum Province were in an "extremely critical situation" and "utterly confused." Urging further offensive action, the order called on the PLAF to pursue the enemy" and "prevent him from escaping the Kontum area," to "vigorously attack the enemy's bases in the provincial capital," and to cut allied supply lines and intercept "retreating troops." The order instructed regional militia and guerrilla forces to "actively appeal to the enemy's remnant troops who have strayed into the forest," and it called upon the ARVN officers and men to "rally to the liberation troops."

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The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial welcoming the communist successes in Kontum claimed that the PLAF had shaken the entire allied defense system in the highlands and "created a springboard for new attacks." "Victories" in the highlands in recent months were called "evidence of the close coordination among the various battlefields throughout the South." The editorial added that the fighting in this area had scattered and weakened Saigon's strategic mobile forces and "directly supports the offensives and uprisings by the armed forces in the delta and coastal areas . . . ."

Attention was focused on Kontum Province and the neighboring coastal province of Binh Dinh in a 25 April Hanoi radio commentary described as a "correspondent's notebook." It began by taking note of the geography of this "very important" area--stretching from the border to the coast, south of Quang Ngai and Quang Nam (GVN's Quang Tin) provinces. After reviewing the recent fighting in Kontum, the commentary recalled action in Binh Dinh from 9 to 19 April in which the revolutionary armed forces and people allegedly killed or captured nearly 3,800 troops, including nearly 2,000 regular troops, and "completely liberated" Hoai An district. Underlining the significance of this achievement, the radio commented: "Geographically, Hoai An district is a shield protecting the central area of Binh Dinh Province; therefore the defense was very heavy there. The loss of this area would lead to the loss of many townships, such as Bong Son, De Duc, and Tam Quan on Highway 1 and in the coastal area."

Calling attention to the fate of the 22d Division, the commentary repeated the claim that Kontum forces "exterminated or disintegrated" the division's 42d and 47th regiments as well as one battalion of its 41st Regiment. It also alleged that action in Binh Dinh "annihilated" the division's entire 40th Regiment and one battalion of its 41st Regiment. The radio observed that the 22d Division was thus "almost annihilated," with three of its regiments and two battalions of its fourth regiment "annihilated or disintegrated." It added that the 22d Division "now has only a small segment of the 41st Regiment and its rear headquarters that have not yet been attacked."

#### HANOI, FRONT DISCUSS GUERRILLAS' RELATIONSHIP TO MAIN FORCES

Most Vietnamese communist comment on the current offensive, stressing the importance of the destruction of large ARVN forces, has focused on the achievements of the communists' main force units but the role

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role of local forces has also been raised. For example, a 15 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial contended that the engagement of Saigon's main forces had left the rural areas "unguarded" and "weakened" and urged that local forces attack the pacification program and that the "local people's war keep pace with the development of the situation." A 24 April NHAN DAN commentary was also notable for its even-handed appraisal of the contribution of the different types of communist forces. Rather than repeating the standard claim that the destruction of Saigon's main forces is changing the situation on the battlefield, the NHAN DAN commentary asserted that "it is due to the vigorous and uniform activities of the regular units, regional troops, and guerrillas that the balance of forces between us and the enemy is constantly changing in our favor."

"CUU LONG" COMMENT  
ON GUERRILLA FORCES

Difficulties faced by the guerrillas in South Vietnam were frankly detailed in an article attributed to the South Vietnamese commentator "Cuu Long," broadcast in installments by Liberation Radio from 20 to 23 April.\* The article, entitled "Some Problems of Guerrilla Warfare in the Southern Rural Areas in the Phase of Struggle to Defeat the U.S. 'Vietnamization' Strategy," seems to be aimed at arousing guerrilla forces in the South which have been dormant in the face of pacification efforts and have lacked--until now--any substantial assistance from main force units. Cuu Long called on the guerrillas to take into account the general "favorable" situation when assessing their position in a certain locality; he provided detailed guidance on methods to step up activities and improve the situation in areas contested or controlled by the GVN; and he stressed the need to build guerrilla forces, labeling this "the present important and foremost requirement." His candid discussion noted many guerrilla shortcomings and acknowledged considerable difficulties faced by some forces "at a time when the enemy has already established

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\* Cuu Long is a pseudonym periodically signed to authoritative commentaries on the war in South Vietnam, particularly on the role of the southern guerrillas. The last previous Cuu Long article, publicized by both Haroi and Front media on 17 and 18 October 1971, is discussed in the 20 October TRENDS, pages 7-9. Unlike the current article, the one in October did not concentrate on the question of guerrilla activities and even flatly asserted that communist main-force units "can now completely defeat the southern puppet army."

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many posts with many troops and when his coercive machinery is actively working, whereas our forces have been pushed out of the localities, the masses have been swayed by the aggressors, and revolutionary bases have had to stay inactive or have been encircled or hunted."

Although Cuu Long did not discuss the current offensive, he raised the significant question of the relationships between "uprisings" and military action and between the guerrilla and main-force units. He explained that during the 1959-60 period the "concerted uprising" of the masses "relied mainly on political force and was supported by a small part of the armed units." By contrast, he continued, "in the present phase of defeating the U.S. 'Vietnamization of the war' strategy, the masses' uprisings rely on both the military and political forces with military force being used as leverage." He added that, therefore, "guerrilla warfare has developed and is developing the military strategic effects in close coordination with the conventional war of the main-force units." Later spelling out this coordination, Cuu Long declared:

When the enemy concentrates his regular forces in order to cope with our regular forces, the guerrillas deal them heavy blows from the rear and he must spread thin his forces. Because the enemy's mobile forces are scattered, our regular forces have more and more opportunities to make larger and larger troop concentrations and, as a result, have dealt, are dealing, and will certainly deal the U.S.-puppets heavy annihilating blows and will even more seriously panic them.

GIAP ON MASS UPRISINGS  
AND CONVENTIONAL WAR

The relationship between the "revolutionary masses" and the armed forces was discussed at length by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen

Giap in a four-part article published in installments in the monthly army magazine QUAN DOI NHAN DAN beginning in December.\* In the first two installments Giap analyzed at length Marxist-Leninist doctrine

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\* The first three installments appeared in the December, January, and February issues of the military journal; the March issue of the journal is not yet available. The first and second installments also were published in the January and February issues of the party journal HOC TAP. However, the March issue of HOC TAP did not carry the third installment.

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and Vietnam's historical experience to define, and defend, the importance of the role of regular armed forces--an issue of added significance in view of the commitment of communist main forces in the current offensive in South Vietnam. The third section, only recently available, seemed to offer even more pointed lessons for the current period. Discussing the role of mass uprisings and attacks by main-force units from 1930 until 1954 Giap strongly suggested that in a war such as the one in South Vietnam today the regular army plays the decisive role and uprisings of the people cannot occur without the army's support.

Giap defined the differences between mass uprisings and revolutionary war by contrasting the experience of the Vietnamese in their 1945 uprising against the Japanese and their later resistance war against the French. Stressing the limitations on mass uprisings, he indicated that they are only successful--as in 1945--when the adversary lacks the capacity or will to oppose them with military force. Uprisings differ from a war, Giap observed, which involves fighting between two armies. Spelling out this distinction, Giap asserted: "We can say that if in the August Revolution [1945] the main strength was the masses' political organizations and their broad armed forces, in the people's war against the French imperialists the main strength was the people's armed forces that relied on the political force of the all-people great solidarity bloc and that had coordinated political forces."\* He added: "Generally speaking, a revolt is an uprising by the masses but war is combat between two armies."

Giap's discussion of the war against the French suggests some parallels with the current war in Vietnam. For example, in describing France's policies after unsuccessful offensives in 1947 he stressed French attempts to "use Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese," although he did not go so far as to label it "Vietnamization." His review of the 1950 military campaign in the border areas brings to mind some aspects of the current communist claims regarding the offensive in the South. Giap noted that in the border campaign

for the first time, with a larger organization and improved weapons and equipment, our armed forces

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\* Giap's analysis of these two periods bears some resemblance to Cuu Long's discussion of the differences between the 1959-60 uprising--relying on political forces--and the current period when uprisings require the "leverage" of the military forces.

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launched a big military campaign in which we destroyed an important part of the enemy's seasoned mobile forces. We pierced through his defensive lines in the border area, liberated a vast area, and constructed roads to communicate with socialist countries. The people's war developed from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare.

Giap noted that subsequently the main-force troops launched large-scale operations, political and armed struggles and uprisings occurred in many areas, guerrilla warfare made new progress and was coordinated with conventional war, and--in late 1953 and early 1954--a "large-scale strategic counter-offensive" was launched in many areas of strategic importance. Finally, he noted, victories at Dien Bien Phu and elsewhere dealt "decisive blows to the enemy's aggressive spirit."

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### U.S. STRIKES AT DRV PROTESTED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN

Three DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protests--issued on 20, 22, and 24 April--denounce sustained U.S. strikes against North Vietnam. The armed forces of Quang Binh are praised for the downing of the 3,500th U.S. plane on the 20th, and Hanoi claims a total of 3,510 as of the 24th.

+ The spokesman's protest on 20 April charged that on the 19th and 20th U.S. planes and ships made "continual bombardments on Vinh City, Dong Hoi--the chief town of Quang Binh Province--the provincial capital of Ha Tinh and many townships, hospitals, schools and economic establishments" in Vinh Linh area and in Quang Binh, Ha Tinh and Nghe An provinces, "perpetrating many more savage crimes" against the Vietnamese people. It said that the armed forces and people of the localities "meted out due punishment" to the United States by downing eight planes and "wiping out many air pirates." Earlier on the 20th, a Hanoi radio report in noting U.S. bombing and strafing in the three provinces that day said that in response to the party-government appeal the people had downed five planes--two in Quang Binh, including the 3,500th, two in Nghe An and one in Ha Tinh. Three of the eight planes claimed in the spokesman's protest had been reported downed earlier by a Hanoi radio report on the 19th.

+ The protest of the 22d denounced "savage bombings" conducted the previous day against populated areas of Thanh Hoa, Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces and Vinh Linh. It noted that the bombing of a "number of villages" in Thanh Hoa by U.S. planes including B-52's was "of particular gravity." It claimed that three U.S. planes were downed, "wiping out a number of U.S. pilots." These downings had also been claimed earlier in a Hanoi radio report of the 21st.

+ The spokesman's protest on the 24th "severely condemned" U.S. attacks against Thanh Hoa, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh. It charged that on 22-23 April, U.S. planes and ships "struck many populated areas" in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area, and that on the 24th U.S. planes including B-52's "indiscriminately bombed Thanh Hoa provincial capital and the surrounding areas." The protest claimed that three planes were downed, including one B-52, and one ship was "set ablaze." (Hanoi radio on the 23d reported two planes downed in Quang Binh and a ship "set ablaze" by the forces in

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Ha Tinh. VNA on the 24th said that the B-52 was downed by the people's armed forces in Thanh Hoa "while counterattacking U.S. aircraft which were making wanton raids on populated areas in the province." It said this was the second B-52 downed in Thanh Hoa and the sixth in North Vietnam since 1 April.)

All three spokesman's protests, like those of 13, 15, and 19 April,\* were more strident in tone than is usual at the spokesman's level. All called the strikes an "insolent challenge" to world and U.S. public opinion, and all three, like the protest of the 13th and the government statement of the 11th, charged that the acts of "war escalation" violate the "commitment of the U.S. Government to cease completely and unconditionally all bombardments against North Vietnam." The most outspoken of the three, the protest on the 22d, echoed the 13 April statement in calling the new bombings "a new and extremely serious war escalation step and another crime of the Nixon Administration against the Vietnamese people." It claimed that by continuing to make "indiscriminate attacks on populated areas with a view to massacring the civilian population, the U.S. aggressors have further revealed their barbarous and inhuman nature." (A VNA report on the 22d said that 66 civilians were killed and 67 wounded--"mostly children, women and old persons"--in the raids, which also caused loss of livestock and the destruction of over 230 houses. Hanoi media on the 25th claimed 164 casualties, with 75 persons killed.) None of the current protests repeated the charge that the raids were "wrecking" the 1954 Geneva agreements, although the spokesman on the 20th said they "constituted a brutal flouting to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and the fundamental principles of international law."

**3,500TH PLANE** The downing of the 3,500th plane over Quang Binh on the 20th prompted a congratulatory letter from President Ton Duc Thang to the armed forces and people of the province on the 22d as well as press and radio comment. President Ton Duc Thang acclaimed the feat of arms by the Quang Binh forces,\*\* and scored the U.S. raids against Hanoi and

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\* See the TRENDS of 19 April 1972, pages 4-7.

\*\* Earlier Ton Duc Thang had sent a congratulatory letter on the downing of 10 planes on 6 April and on the downing of the 100th U.S. plane in the area of the Ham Rong bridge last December.

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Haiphong. He called on the "compatriots and combatants" to answer the 16 April party-government appeal and "raise high their iron will, sharpen their vigilance" and unite to carry out President Ho's teaching: "As long as even one aggressor remains in our country, we must fight until he is expelled."

In editorially hailing the downing QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 21st praised the armed services, listing such units as the antiaircraft and rocket, air force, navy, radar, signal corps, and engineer corps, as well as the self-defense and security police. The paper claimed that the downing signaled the United States' "heavy defeat." In strengthening the navy and air force, it added, the Nixon Administration "absolutely cannot intimidate our people, nor can it check the offensive of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people," and it pledged determination to fight and to carry out the party-government appeal.

Both QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and a radio commentary on the 20th emphasized North-South relations. The paper said that the North, "the big rear of the entire country, has all conditions for smashing all U.S. military adventures and enough ironlike determination to surmount all difficulties." It declared that "only when the rear area is stable will the front be strong and only when the front is strong will the rear be stable. Never has the strength of solidarity of our entire nation been as fully developed as it is now, and never have the North-South kith-and-kin sentiments prevailed in all regions of the country as they do now." The paper added that "we are determined to bring assistance to the frontline to help it fight the enemy and win great victories. No violence by the U.S. aggressors can check our people's advance."

A NHAN DAN editorial on the 21st called the downing a "very great victory" of "deep political and military significance." It said that Nixon had actually used more bombs than his predecessor and, "more savage still," had sent "hundreds" of U.S. planes, including B-52's, to "wantonly bomb the densely populated districts in Haiphong city--something Johnson dared not do. Many populated centers in and outside Hanoi were bombed or shelled." The party paper pointed out that since the President assumed office more than 250 planes had been downed over the North.

Hanoi radio on the 21st, atypically broadcast some general statistics on U.S. plane and ship losses. It said that between 5 August 1964 and 20 April 1972 the North had downed 3,504 U.S. planes, including

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12 B-52's; "annihilated and captured thousands of U.S. bandit pilots"; "sank or set ablaze 165 U.S.-puppet warships and ranger boats; and neatly annihilated scores of U.S.-puppet rangers and spies." It said that 47 types of planes made by 17 manufacturers have been downed over the North, and it listed the number of planes downed in each province.

#### DRV SCORES U.S. "THREATS," PRESSES PARTY-GOVERNMENT APPEAL

Both Hanoi and Front media scored remarks made by Secretaries Rogers and Laird before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 17 and 18 April, respectively. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 21st assailed the "warlike Nixon clique" for "brazenly making bellicose statements and threatening to further intensify its military adventures." The broadcast claimed that Laird "brazenly" said "massive" strikes against North Vietnam would continue and "many" U.S. ships would be sent to Vietnamese waters in the next two or three weeks and that he "threatened to use mines to attack and blockade the port of Haiphong." The commentary took Secretary Rogers to task for "making the odious colonialist argument" that U.S. air and naval strikes were designed to protect U.S. troops remaining in South Vietnam and for "slanderingly claiming that North Vietnam is invading South Vietnam."

On the 24th, a Liberation Radio commentary closely paralleled the Hanoi broadcast. And an LPA commentary on the same day again singled out Laird's "failure to rule out" the mining or blockade of Haiphong harbor.

Hanoi radio has continued to dramatize North Vietnam's determination to persist in the struggle by opening its major newscasts with a quotation from Ho Chi Minh's 17 July 1966 appeal: "Hanoi, Haiphong, and other cities and certain enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated; nothing is more precious than independence and freedom."

Following the issuance of the party-government appeal on the 16th, Hanoi has publicized a series of meetings held to insure its implementation. An "extraordinary enlarged conference" of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central Committee presidium on the 18th, according to a radio report the following day, discussed the military situation in both North and South Vietnam, studied the joint appeal, and issued a resolution which was read by Hoang Quoc Viet. The resolution "sincerely thanked the governments and peoples of the

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brotherly socialist countries, the world people, and the American progressives for their support and assistance and called on friends throughout the world to act in time to check the extremely dangerous war escalation acts of the warlike Nixon clique and to more actively support and more strongly assist the Vietnamese people."

A statement issued by the National Assembly Reunification Committee at its "recent" meeting, according to a 19 April radio report, concluded by calling on "the people of fraternal socialist countries and the peace- and justice-loving people the world over to more powerfully support and assist the Vietnamese people's resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and to sternly condemn the U.S. imperialists' acts of intensification and expansion of the war." The party-government appeal had referred only to "support," although the DRV Government statement of the 11th had echoed earlier official statements in calling on the fraternal socialist and other countries "to extend even stronger support and assistance" to the Vietnamese.

Both the Front resolution and the statement by the reunification committee dealt with the importance domestically of heightening vigilance as well as continuing to step up production. The Front noted that it must step up its activities "to strengthen solidarity, unanimity, and coordination of action between political parties and organizations from the central to local levels" in response to the appeal. The Front resolution also said "we must motivate youths to actively join the army." A letter approved at a Hanoi trade unions meeting--to be sent to the party central committee and government--expressed the participants' resolve to "tighten our ranks around the party and government" and implement the appeal.

A 19 April NHAN DAN editorial said it is "necessary to make everyone realize the warlike Nixon clique's wicked military schemes and its crafty political and diplomatic tricks" and strive to heighten vigilance. NHAN DAN instructed "all party committee echelons" to "closely lead this phase of political activity while consolidating the basic propaganda and training organizations and the reporters network, properly using the press and broadcasting system, and carrying out the ideological task comprehensively and in time."

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CASUALTIES  
IN HAIPHONG

Hanoi media have demonstrated particular concern during the past week regarding the port of Haiphong, and it was not until the 25th that total casualties from the 16 April raids were announced. VNA reported a press conference at which Ha Van Lau, standing member of the DRV War Crimes Commission, claimed that 244 were killed and 513 wounded in Haiphong. Lau asserted that "civilians were the targets" of the raids and that despite measures to keep losses to a minimum, civilian casualties were high.

VNA on the 24th and Hanoi radio the next day reported that Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi visited the city recently, along with Materials Minister Phan Danh Tuyen and Deputy Minister of Communications and Transportation Trinh Ngoc Diep. According to the radio report, Le Thanh Nghi "conveyed the solicitous congratulations and regards" of the party central committee, the government, and "Uncle Ton" to the Haiphong armed forces and people. He was said to have visited the port as well as a number of enterprises, urban wards, and army and self-defense units. He reportedly reminded the Haiphong armed forces and people of such specific tasks as heightening vigilance, maintaining communications and transportation, "organizing and caring for the lives of compatriots and small children in areas to which they are evacuated," and "strictly punishing bad elements practicing speculation in goods or capitalizing on the situation to benefit themselves."

## CIVIL DEFENSE

Continuing concern about proper implementation of air and civil defense tasks was reflected in NHAN DAN editorials on 21 and 22 April, with the latter putting particular stress on evacuation tasks. It said that in areas where part of the population, especially the young and elderly, needs to be evacuated, "our compatriots" in response to the appeal "are ready to leave their localities in order to contribute to winning victories." It praised people in localities receiving the evacuees for "once again displaying the spirit of mutual love and assistance" and solidarity, and it stated that various organs and collectives had demonstrated responsibility in organizing the evacuation. But the editorial suggested that the evacuation was not proceeding as smoothly as desired when it called for proper organization and quick implementation both in areas dispersing evacuees and in those receiving them. And it reminded the population that the air defense tasks must also be carried out "intensively and adequately" in places where evacuees temporarily settle.

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The editorial indicated that other civil defense tasks have yet to be completed. It called for the "quick" building of sufficient shelters and trenches, "especially in cities, provincial and district capitals, and other important areas" and the organization of "alarm sounding" procedures, the administration of first aid to the wounded, and measures to overcome the effects of the bombing.

The 21 April NIAN DAN editorial hailing the downing of the 3,500th plane also discussed vigilance and civil defense in some detail. Repeating earlier reminders to the party committees and administrations at all echelons and state agencies that they have the duty to lead, it urged "precautionary and evasive measures" to protect the people from bombs, "moving state property to safe places, providing first aid for people injured by enemy bombs or by collapsing shelters, fighting fires, and so forth." Pointing to the "indiscriminate bombing" of Hanoi and Haiphong, the editorial said "we have become even more determined to fight and, at the same time, satisfactorily take precautionary and evasive measures against enemy raids and satisfactorily organize the dispersion of people in order to minimize most effectively the losses that may be caused by the enemy."

Both editorials underscored the importance of maintaining public order and security. The one on the 21st said that "by deploying combat-ready forces and intensifying the performance of patrol and guard duties, we will certainly be able to nab or annihilate all espionage and commando teams sent by the enemy to harass our rear base."

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## DRV COMMENT ON SOVIET SHIPS HITS U.S. "EFFORTS TO STOP AID"

In comment supporting the USSR's protest to the United States over the damage to four Soviet ships during the 16 April bombing of Haiphong, Hanoi has played up the U.S. reply to the Soviet protest, thus far unmentioned in Moscow media. Noting that the U.S. reply said the USSR must share the responsibility and emphasizing the role of Soviet military aid in the DRV's defense effort, Hanoi raised the charge that by bombing Haiphong President Nixon is trying to "force the USSR to stop aiding North Vietnam." With the President's forthcoming visit to the USSR evidently in mind, Hanoi also leveled the more generalized charge that the President is trying to "separate" Vietnam from the other socialist countries; the line that an objective of the Nixon Doctrine is to "split the socialist countries" has recurred sporadically in Hanoi propaganda since it was introduced during the period of polemics last summer following the announcement of the President's decision to visit Peking.

Hanoi supported the Soviet protest with a 19 April DRV Chamber of Commerce statement, a NHAN DAN article the following day, and a NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 23d. There has been no statement so far at the foreign ministry level such as has usually appeared in the past, an omission perhaps related to the fact that the Soviet protest was presented to the U.S. ambassador as an oral "statement" rather than as a formal diplomatic note.\*

The 23 April NHAN DAN Commentator article as broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service (VNA carried only a brief summary) cited the U.S. reply to the Soviet protest as warning that the USSR "must share the responsibility with the Vietnamese people for the attacks against the U.S.-puppets." It went on to quote several senators and Administration officials, including Secretary Rogers and Vice President Agnew, as stressing the role of Soviet military aid in the war and to recall Secretary Laird's "threat" regarding the possibility of mining or blockading Haiphong. These passages prefaced the allegation that by bombing Haiphong the President is trying to compel the USSR to stop helping the North Vietnamese.

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\* Moscow's reports of the protest called it a "statement" (zayavleniye) rather than a "note" (nota), the term used in past cases.

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Stressing that the Vietnamese people's successes "are linked to the very efficient aid of the fraternal socialist countries," Commentator asserted that the Americans' "vile maneuvers" to "separate the Vietnamese people from the other socialist countries" have "failed bitterly." The leaders of the other socialist countries, the article said, have pointed out many times that helping Vietnam is "a matter of principle and a noble international duty." Commentator observed that an 18 April PRAVDA article reaffirmed the Soviet pledge to continue to give the Vietnamese "necessary aid and support to repel aggression." He also recalled that the appeal of the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971 promised the DRV continued support and help in every way. (No article in the 18 April PRAVDA included the passage on aid and support which NHAN DAN cited, although a RED STAR article by Leontyev that day did include such a passage. Although Western press reports had said an 18 April RED STAR article had pledged continued assistance to the DRV "despite all U.S. warnings," no such passage has appeared in any available Soviet propaganda; a service message from VNA headquarters in Hanoi to VNA in Moscow on the 19th had asked "urgently" for the RED STAR article "which condemns the United States and supports Vietnam.")

The 20 April NHAN DAN article supporting the Soviet protest was also broadcast in Hanoi's domestic service and briefly summarized by VNA. It observed that the United States had chided the USSR for enabling the North Vietnamese to mount an "invasion of South Vietnam" but did not take issue with the U.S. reply on this point, merely noting that the Nixon Administration has said the Soviet Union shares responsibility because "the South Vietnamese armed forces and people" are attacking the U.S. and Saigon troops. NHAN DAN went on to complain that the United States arrogates to itself the right to send troops to Vietnam, supply weapons to the Saigon administration, and use aircraft and ships to attack the DRV, while contending that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are not entitled to aid "the Vietnamese people." The paper called this contention "an impudent provocation and an insolent threat to the socialist countries."

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VNA reported on 21 April that the DRV Minister of Communications and Transportation had visited Soviet, Polish, and GDR ships\* in Haiphong which had been damaged during the U.S. raid and noted that the captains promised to continue the supply of aid to the Vietnamese people. On the 22d VNA reported visits to the port by numerous diplomats, including envoys of both the USSR and the PRC. Hanoi radio in Mandarin on the 23d added that the Chinese Ministry of Communications delegation, currently visiting the DRV, was also in the group.

#### RESTRAINED MOSCOW COMMENT OFFERS LOW-KEY SUPPORT TO VIETNAMESE

Moscow has continued to comment cautiously on developments in Vietnam in the wake of the prompt but restrained 16 April TASS statement denouncing the U.S. bombings of Haiphong and Hanoi that day and the release on the 17th of the Soviet protest over the damage to Soviet ships in Haiphong. Moscow's comment reflects an effort to tread a careful line between the demands of its Vietnamese ally and considerations involving Soviet-U.S. relations in the period of preparation for the President's visit, and the balancing act was evident in Kulakov's Lenin anniversary speech. He routinely promised the "necessary aid and support" to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia who are fighting against "U.S. aggression," adding that the Soviet Union is following "principles of international solidarity." But he made only a muted, pro forma reference to the U.S. bombings of the DRV, making no direct reference to the Nixon Administration in condemning "the actions of the American brasshats in Vietnam and the new bombing."

Speaking of relations with capitalist countries, Kulakov insisted that the USSR seeks no agreements with them that would "weaken relations or damage the interests of other countries and peoples" and that it will not compromise its principles. He stressed the Soviet Union's policy of "firm rebuff to any

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\* East Berlin's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 21 April published a correspondent's report from Hanoi which said that a Polish freighter and a freighter "traveling under the British flag" were hit, as well as the Soviet and GDR ships. On the 19th Radio Warsaw had assured domestic listeners that no Polish ships were damaged during the raid. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND also repeated the claim that a Soviet officer was injured--a claim made previously in Hanoi media but not by Moscow.

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and all imperialist intrigues to exacerbate international tension," observing that these principles are the basis of Soviet relations with the United States--a passage perhaps intended, at least in part, as a reassurance to Hanoi and a warning to the United States that no "deals" on Indochina will be made during the talks with the President.\*

Moscow media's first acknowledgment of recent criticism of Soviet aid by U.S. officials came in the 23 April domestic service roundtable discussion when a panelist noted that Secretary Laird had criticized the Soviet role in assisting the Vietnamese. Saying "American circles" are spreading the story that the "liberation forces" would not be able to fight so successfully were it not for Soviet aid, the panelist quoted Secretary Laird as having stated that "the liberation forces receive some 80 percent of all their weapons and hardware from the Soviet Union." Ridiculing the significance of this statistic and avoiding reference to the current offensive in South Vietnam, the panelist asked rhetorically why Washington has "suddenly remembered this well-known fact."

A Hanoi-dated dispatch in PRAVDA on the 19th mentioned Soviet military aid in the course of a description of conditions in the DRV. The correspondent said that "proletarian socialist internationalism" is embodied in Soviet aid to Vietnam, economic and military as well as political and moral. He cited "Vietnamese friends" as saying that the main things which help them to fight successfully are "the fearlessness of the Vietnamese soldiers and Soviet weapons." Reporting a visit with an air-defense gunner,

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\* AFP reported on 24 April that the Soviet ambassador in France, Abrasimov, asserted at a press luncheon that the USSR would continue to aid the Vietnamese communists "regardless of the repercussions" on President Nixon's USSR visit. TASS' report of his remarks did not include the reference to Vietnam. On the 26th, VNA's Moscow office informed VNA in Hanoi that TASS denied having any report of a statement by Abrasimov "condemning the United States and supporting South Vietnam." VNA's Paris office informed VNA in Hanoi the same day, without specifying the source of the information, that Abrasimov had said "there was no possibility that his country would cut back military aid to North Vietnam as the United States desires."

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the correspondent quoted him as praising the "outstanding Soviet guns." An 18 April RED STAR article by Aleksey Leontyev, which repeated generalized pledges of continued Soviet assistance and support, had not mentioned specific Soviet military aid when it atypically discussed U.S. tactics of evading DRV air defenses. Leontyev cited the New York TIMES for a report that B-52's will be able to avoid significant losses over North Vietnam as a result of "the simultaneous use of electronic missile devices, support by fighter planes, and special tactics."

DAMAGE TO USSR SHIPS            Continued Moscow publicity for the 16 April incident in which Soviet ships were damaged during the U.S. raid on Haiphong took the form of reports of low-level protest meetings by Soviet seamen. As in its accounts of similar meetings held in connection with previous incidents involving damage to Soviet ships in DRV ports, Moscow quoted the seamen as pledging that despite the U.S. "crimes" they will continue to fulfill their "internationalist duty" and keep Soviet aid to the DRV flowing.

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## PEKING SUSTAINS RESTRAINT IN COMMEMORATING INDOCHINA SUMMIT

The second anniversary of the Indochina summit conference occasioned reaffirmations of Chinese support for the war effort, but Peking's continuing restraint has been pointed up by its reluctance to match the level of Hanoi's major pronouncements. Hanoi's 11 April government statement and 16 April party-government appeal in the wake of U.S. bombing attacks did not elicit Chinese responses in kind. Where Peking in the past has issued seconding statements and supported the previous DRV party-government appeal in December 1970 with a party-government statement of its own, this time it limited itself to editorial comment and remarks by Chou En-lai upon receiving the petitioning DRV and PRG envoys on 12 and 16 April. References to Vietnam in Chinese elite speeches have been conspicuously absent, as in Politburo member Yeh Chien-ying's 25 April speech marking a Korean army anniversary. Yeh limited his references to the United States to a Korean context and ignored Vietnam.

In addition to the virtually mandatory leaders' message and editorial on the Indochina summit conference, the Chinese also took the occasion of a major address to the UNCTAD session in Chile on the 20th to voice criticism of U.S. attacks on the DRV, including the 16 April raids on Hanoi and Haiphong, and to pledge "all-out support" to the fraternal Vietnamese. The Chinese delegation head, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Chou Hua-min, delivered his speech at a forum that has heard attacks on U.S. actions in Vietnam and in the third world generally from a variety of speakers quoted by NCNA.

Apart from an occasional dispatch from Hanoi describing war preparations in North Vietnam, Peking's coverage of military developments has largely consisted of pickups of Vietnamese communist accounts as well as reports of Vietnamese and other foreign comment critical of U.S. actions. Peking did not, however, report the DRV Paris delegation's disclosure on 20 April of its version of the 1968 negotiations on the bombing halt. Peking has been carrying frequent reports on antiwar demonstrations in the United States, but these have not mentioned direct attacks on the Nixon Administration. This time last year Peking's accounts were punctuated with references to the Administration's "hoaxes," "doubledealing," and "fascist suppression."

**SUMMIT ANNIVERSARY** Like last year, Peking marked the Indochina summit anniversary with a message on the 24th from Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to the Indochinese leaders and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 25th.

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There was no repeat of the banquet given last year by Prince Sihanouk, now in North Korea. Like last year, the Chinese called it their "bounden internationalist duty" to back their Indochinese allies. The message, repeating Chou's pledge to the DRV representative on the 12th, promised that the Chinese would "support and assist" the war effort, and the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 25th repeated one a week earlier (on the DRV appeal) in saying the PRC is the "reliable rear area" providing "powerful backing" for the Indochinese. The current communist offensive in South Vietnam was given no special attention, the editorial taking note of the "splendid victories" there in the course of a brief review of developments during the past year in Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam. In the only assessment of the significance of the offensive, the editorial limited itself to the claim that 30,000 enemy troops have been put out of action, "further frustrating" the Vietnamization program. Throughout the offensive the Chinese have taken a restrained view of its effects on the situation in South Vietnam.

The message referred only in general terms to "new military adventures" now being undertaken by the United States in Indochina, while the editorial more specifically mentioned the air attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong, including in this context an observation that even U.S. servicemen have denounced "the U.S. Government" for the bombings. Peking took care, however, to avoid last year's direct attacks on the Nixon Administration by name, which had included a charge of "counterrevolutionary dual tactics." The contrast between the situations at this time last year and now has also been reflected in Peking's failure in the wake of improved Sino-U.S. relations to acknowledge opposition to the Administration's policies by other U.S. political leaders. Last year's editorial on the Indochina summit anniversary had referred to "internal disputes within the U.S. ruling clique" over the Indochina war.

In what might be a reflection of strains stemming from Sino-U.S. developments in the past year, Peking this time did not repeat the claim made in the editorial last year that "fraternal friendship and militant unity" between the PRC and the Indochinese had become "further consolidated and developed over the past year." Both the message and editorial this year did, however, reassure Peking's allies that relations between the Chinese and Indochinese peoples are those of "close comrades-in-arms and brothers."

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PRC INVOLVEMENT Peking's cautious approach to Vietnamese military developments has been illustrated by the visit to the DRV of PRC Communications Minister Yang Chieh. Though the departure for the DRV on the day following the U.S. raids on Hanoi and Haiphong of an official having transport responsibilities would suggest that his visit is related to logistical support for the DRV, Chinese media have made no direct reference to an aid role in recounting Yang's "cordial and friendly" meetings with DRV officials, including Premier Dong on the 21st. Peking ignored Yang's tour--reported by VNA on the 23d--of an area in Haiphong bombed by U.S. aircraft. According to VNA, he attended a rally of sailors of two Chinese ships at the harbor where he "strongly condemned" the U.S. raids and voiced the sailors' resolve to support the war effort by "ensuring timely transport of aid to Vietnam."

Peking's low posture was also reflected in a PEOPLE'S DAILY article on the 20th attributed to a member of a PLA unit. Taking the line of the 10 April PRC Foreign Ministry statement in rebutting the U.S. argument that the communist offensive represents an invasion by the DRV in violation of the Geneva accords, the article insisted that "Vietnam is one country" and that it is "but reasonable for the Vietnamese people in both parts of the country to unite closely" and fight the enemy. This line had been used by Peking in the mid-60's to justify the DRV's role in the war as well as that of the Chinese, but both the foreign ministry statement on the 10th and the PEOPLE'S DAILY article made no mention of Chinese support.

In discussing the Geneva agreements, the article argued that the United States "has crudely trampled upon and sabotaged these agreements," but this seems to stop short of Peking's longstanding claim that the United States had "torn up" the agreements. In its comment justifying the DRV's role in the current offensive, Peking has avoided flatly claiming that the Geneva agreements no longer have any validity.

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## PARIS: AGREEMENT ON MEETING, DENIAL OF 1968 "UNDERSTANDING"

Vietnamese communist media repeatedly criticized the U.S. decision on 23 March to suspend the Paris talks until there can be "serious negotiations" and to publicize statements by the communist delegations calling for a resumption of the sessions. On 21 April VNA carried a DRV statement sent to the U.S. and Saigon delegations the day before, declaring that the 148th session, which normally would have been held on 30 March, should take place on 27 April. Referring to the "grave" escalation of U.S. air and naval attacks against the DRV, the statement cited the "wanton bombing of numerous populated areas" of Haiphong and Hanoi and "demanded" that the United States immediately stop the bombing of the DRV and attend the Paris conference as usual.

Both the DRV and PRG delegations in Paris reacted promptly on 26 April to the United States' announcement the night before of its agreement to resume the Paris talks on the 27th. Only the DRV statement has been publicized in Vietnamese communist media at this writing. It stated that after a month the United States "has to accept the resumption" of the talks "in face of the demand of the Vietnamese people, the American people and world public opinion." It said, however, that "we reject all fallacious allegations on the part of the United States on the so-called 'invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam,' 'violation of an understanding,' etc." and called upon the United States to honor the 1968 bombing halt commitment and seriously negotiate in Paris. (In making the announcement, White House press secretary Ziegler had said the first item of business must be the discussion of measures which will put an end to the flagrant North Vietnamese invasion of the South.)

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 26th drew attention to the "antiwar storm" in the United States, including "mounting opposition" in Congress and in political circles, claiming that this has "driven the Nixon Administration into an isolation it has never experienced before." The broadcast added that "indignant cries arose from everywhere, from socialist countries to nationalist and capitalist countries, condemning Nixon's extremely barbarous crimes." Asserting that world public opinion demanded an end to the war, an end to the bombing of the DRV, and a return to the Paris talks, the commentary said the Administration was driven into an "embarrassing, passive, isolated, and defeated position" and "forced to agree to participate" in the talks in order to

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manage public opinion. Warning that this did not mean the United States was ready to stop the war and achieve a negotiated settlement, it represented Ziegler as having said the Nixon Administration would continue to bomb North Vietnam--twisting Ziegler's recollection, in response to a question, of the President's promise to take whatever steps were necessary to help South Vietnam resist attack.

The commentary said it behooved "each of us to discern more clearly the warmongering nature, the wicked schemes, and the crafty tricks of the Nixon clique," to strengthen vigilance, and to be ready "to smash all the acts of military adventure and the frenzied war ambitions of the Nixon clique." It went on to cite portions of the 16 April party-government appeal dealing with protection of the DRV and civil defense.

DENIAL OF "UNDERSTANDING"                      On the 21st, VNA reported that Xuan Thuy had called a special press conference in Paris the day before to refute the story of "North Vietnam's violation of an understanding in 1968" which, he said, the Nixon Administration had been using "to justify its new, extremely serious escalation of the war against the DRV." Thuy's statement and an accompanying communique handed to newsmen acknowledged that private meetings as well as the Paris sessions were held in 1968, but both insisted that the U.S. bombing cessation in October was "unconditional" and that the DRV had rejected the U.S.-proposed conditions: restoration of the DMZ, no military buildup by either side, substantive talks with the participation of representatives of the Saigon administration, and no major attacks on Saigon, Hue, or Da Nang.

Thuy's statement referred to "the second period" of private meetings between 20 September and 30 October 1968 and cited specific meetings on 21 October and 24 October at which Ambassador Harriman allegedly agreed that the United States would not refer to the cessation as "unconditional." An appendix provided additional documentation and cited specific meetings in the "first period"--from 26 June--as well as the second. The Hanoi domestic radio broadcast the communique, and VNA's press review said the newspapers published it on the 22d along with Xuan Thuy's prepared statement. Only VNA English carried the more detailed appendix, and none of the media are known to have reported the question-and-answer portion of Xuan Thuy's press conference.

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## HANOI, FRONT WELCOME AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO BOMBING OF DRV

Vietnamese communist media predictably have exploited criticism in the United States of the stepped-up bombings of the North and reports of recent student demonstrations. NHAN DAN carried an editorial on U.S. dissent on the 26th and an article on the 19th, while Hanoi and Liberation radio broadcast commentaries on the 25th and 26th, respectively. Hanoi radio on the 26th reported the letter sent on the 20th by PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh to U.S. Congressmen. Senator Fulbright's statement at the 17 April Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings at which Secretary Rogers testified was noted in detail by VNA. There have also been selective reports of critical remarks by other U.S. Congressmen, congressional protest letters to the President, and congressional resolutions condemning the escalation. Antiwar demonstrations from the 18th through the 22d were reported in VNA roundups on the 22d, 24th and 25th. As in the past, the media have also carried open letters to the American people from Vietnam solidarity groups.

The 26 April NHAN DAN editorial said the antiwar protests exhibited Americans' "stern condemnation of the 'Nixon Doctrine' and the whole policy of the U.S. President regarding Vietnam and Indochina." It said the American people realize that this "presidential war" is being conducted "in an even more sanguinary and more savage manner" than under Johnson. With "seething demonstrations and rallies erupting everywhere," the paper said, the President has discovered that the Vietnam issue has not been "defused." In an apparent reference to the President's trips to Peking and Moscow, the editorial said: "He was wrong when he pinned his hopes for a secure political posture on a few diplomatic ploys."

A NHAN DAN article on 19 April quoted White House and Pentagon spokesmen as saying that "Nixon himself had ordered the strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong" and that the strikes "would continue," thus "insuring the protection and safe withdrawal of U.S. forces." NHAN DAN drew from Senator Fulbright's remarks at the committee hearings and the give-and-take with Secretary Rogers. The paper quoted a spectator as shouting "That's a lie!" after Rogers said civilian targets in the North were not bombed. (DRV media did not mention Rogers' reference to Soviet aid to the North Vietnamese or Defense Secretary Laird's appearance before the committee.)

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The 26 April Liberation Radio commentary, picking up the same incident at the committee hearings, claimed that after Rogers said only military targets in the North were bombed, "a young man attending the meeting stood up and shouted: 'You're lying! You dropped bombs on populated areas.' He shouted, 'Victory belongs to the Vietnamese people,' as he was dragged from the room by police." The commentary asserted that with the election drawing near, President Nixon is "panic-stricken" because "his Vietnamization palace has been built on quicksand."

The Hanoi radio commentary on the 25th said Nixon's claims of success for Vietnamization and of an end to U.S. involvement in Vietnam "can deceive no one." The Vietnam question is again a campaign issue, it said, and "Nixon is under the pressure of a pair of pincers--the victory of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people and the struggle movement of the American people."

Hanoi and Front radios on the 25th carried reports that Mme. Binh and Nguyen Minh Vy spoke by telephone to over 50,000 American antiwar demonstrators in San Francisco on the 22d. On the 24th Liberation Radio reported that Mme. Binh had received Representatives Bella Abzug and Patsy Mink at the delegation's Paris residence on the 21st and hosted them at dinner. The representatives "expressed indignation" at the bombings, "particularly of Hanoi and Haiphong," according to the radio, and promised that they "would step up their activity in the U.S. Congress to demand" that all troops be withdrawn, the bombings halted, and the Paris negotiations resumed.

An open letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People was carried by VNA on the 20th.\* The letter, dated 18 April, hailed the so-called antiwar "spring offensive" and mentioned the folly of the present U.S. course of bombings in the North including the strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong. It said the South Vietnamese people are "rising up to seize control" and the renewed U.S. bombings "cannot save its stooges." The letter asserted that the socialist countries are "giving all-out assistance" to the Vietnamese people. And it concluded by calling for Americans to step up the struggle and stop the "acts of war escalation of the Nixon clique." On the 7th LPA had carried a letter of the same day from the South Vietnam People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People which urged Americans to "push ahead" with the antiwar struggle and wished antiwar activists "many great victories" in the "spring offensive."

\* The most recent open letters came during the so-called antiwar "fall offensive" in 1971. Earlier letters are discussed in the TRENDS, 21 April 1971, pages 4-5.



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## SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

## PEKING GIVES AMPLE, CORRECT COVERAGE OF SINO-U.S. CONTACTS

During the period of the current communist offensive in South Vietnam and U.S. bombing of the DRV, Peking has been providing correct, straightforward coverage of ongoing Sino-U.S. contacts as envisaged in the joint communique on President Nixon's visit in February. Thus, two days after Chou En-lai denounced U.S. raids on Hanoi and Haiphong on 16 April, NCNA announced that Senators Mansfield and Scott had arrived that day in Peking, and a dispatch datelined Washington on the 18th reported that President Nixon had received the Chinese table tennis team paying "a return visit" to the United States. Other NCNA coverage of the Mansfield-Scott visit included reports of a dinner for the senators on the 19th attended by NPC Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo and a meeting with Chou on the next day.

In its treatment of U.S. policies generally, Peking has initiated little authoritative criticism following the President's visit, apart from minimal reaction to Indochina developments\* and relatively mild attacks on the occasion of a Korean army anniversary. While on occasion taking Administration spokesmen to task in routine comment, Peking has avoided criticizing Washington on sensitive issues such as Taiwan and has scrupulously refrained from personal attacks on the President. In addition, Peking has not released a "serious warning" against U.S. encroachment on PRC territory since 24 December, the longest such gap since the buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam and one that is especially notable in embracing a period of large-scale U.S. naval and air activities near the PRC-claimed Paracels.

**BILATERAL CONTACTS** In its coverage Peking has carefully distinguished between contacts involving officials and those representing "people's diplomacy." Following the precedent set in its reportage on the President's visit, Peking has avoided any characterization of the atmosphere surrounding the White House reception of the table tennis team, the activities of Senators Mansfield and Scott, or even the exchange of musk oxen and pandas. In contrast, Peking's coverage of the Chinese table tennis team's

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\* See the Indochina section of the TRENDS.

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tour has portrayed a "warm welcome" given by the American people, a "friendly atmosphere" surrounding the matches, and has ignored the protest demonstrations or any signs of displeasanthness.

As in its report on the President's reception of the players, Peking has taken due note of the role of American officials during the team's visit, reporting John Scall's welcome "on behalf of the President of the United States" when the team arrived in the country and the presence of Secretary Rogers as well as Tricia Nixon Cox at a match in Maryland. A dispatch on the 21st, reporting a reception given by the PRC's UN representative Huang Hua, quoted him as saying "there exists a traditional profound friendship between the Chinese and American people" and that "we believe that with the joint efforts of the people of our two countries, this friendship will certainly further develop."

Peking's coverage was notable for the special attention it accorded to the presence of "Overseas Chinese" during the table tennis team's activities. Also noteworthy was Peking's failure to identify the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations other than to refer to "the host committee" and its chairman, Alexander Eckstein. This may reflect sensitivity to the very name of the organization or a reluctance to endorse the group as an agency of Sino-U.S. contacts.

Peking has not reported the presence of U.S. businessmen at the Canton fair this spring, but its comment at the opening of the event seemed designed to encourage economic ties with countries such as the United States. In an opening address on the 15th, fair director Chen Yu stressed that the Chinese "in no way reject developing trade with other countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit," and NCNA on the same day described the record number of businessmen at the fair, including those from countries "which have not yet established diplomatic relations" or "had no economic contacts with China."

TREATMENT OF U.S. Peking's restraint in its treatment of the United States has been reflected in its comment on subjects like Japan and Taiwan which formerly generated considerable anti-U.S. polemics. Thus Wang Kuo-chuan, speaking on 2 April on the occasion of a Japanese delegation's visit, made no mention of the United States while criticizing the Sato government's China policy; on 16 January he had

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embroidered similar remarks with the charge that Sato was "talking after U.S. imperialism" in a policy of hostility toward China and had promised Chinese support for the struggle against "U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism." Similarly, on the sensitive issue of Taiwan, Peking misstepped any criticism of the Administration in an 8 April NCNA report on a Taiwan independence rally held in Washington a week earlier. While noting that the independence movement had received backing from a U.S. congressman, the New York TIMES, and other American opinion leaders, NCNA did not charge official U.S. involvement in the movement. In contrast, NCNA's last report on such a rally, on 21 September, claimed that the U.S. Government had "stagemanaged" the affair in a "flagrant provocation" against the Chinese people. Reflecting a more optimistic mood now, NCNA's 8 April account emphasized popular opposition in the United States to the Taiwan independence movement, claiming that "no fallacies advocating an independent Taiwan can be approved by the people of all walks of life in the United States."

Apart from reports on antiwar demonstrations, Peking's coverage of internal American developments has consisted mainly of low-level reports on economic difficulties.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW MUTES DIFFERENCES WITH PEKING, CURBS POLEMICS

Moscow has curtailed its anti-China polemics in the wake of Brezhnev's 20 March restatement of Soviet interest in improving relations with the PRC and the simultaneous return of Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev to the Peking border talks. Apart from CPSU Secretary Katushev's article in KOMMUNIST No. 5 (signed to the press 30 March), no Soviet leader has made any public comment on China and the Soviet central press has not launched any comprehensive broadsides against Peking since Brezhnev's speech. In keeping with this restraint, CPSU Politburo member Kulakov made no direct mention of the Chinese in his Lenin Day address on 21 April, limiting himself to a generalized expression of opposition to "rightwing and leftwing revisionism, nationalism, and chauvinism."\* The Soviet press, however, has continued to publish articles calculated to discredit "Maoism" in the eyes of Soviet readers; and Moscow radio broadcasts to foreign audiences, particularly to the Chinese, have continued to make use of harsher propaganda lines designed to foment international and domestic opposition to Peking's policies.

Moscow's restraint seems designed to provide a propitious backdrop for the current Peking border talks--on which Moscow has yet to publicize a progress report--as well as to lay groundwork for placing the onus on the Chinese if the talks remain deadlocked. At the same time, with President Nixon's visit in the offing, Moscow may be seeking to mute Sino-Soviet acrimony out of a belief that the United States would try to capitalize on it to obtain leverage in the summit talks.

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\* Kulakov's temperate treatment of the Chinese accords with Katushev's 1971 Lenin anniversary speech in which he condemned all "revisionists" and "pseudorevolutionary" deviations from Marxism-Leninism. Katushev's remarks came in a similar period of calm, following the mid-April resumption of the Sino-Soviet border talks last year when Ilichev returned to Peking. During a period of heightened Sino-Soviet tensions in 1970, Brezhnev had used the occasion of Lenin Day to attack Peking for its "anti-Sovietism" and for "breaking with the principles bequeathed by Lenin."

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Concern to push Sino-Soviet differences into the background at this delicate stage of the triangular relationship seemed reflected in Moscow's failure to report the unproductive outcome of the annual Sino-Soviet navigation talks. NCNA made the announcement of the unfavorable outcome on 21 March, the day after Brezhnev called for an understanding with Peking. Apart from reporting Ilichev's return to Peking, the Soviets have been more reticent than in the past about developments in Sino-Soviet relations. Thus, it was only in broadcasts to the Chinese that Moscow this year reported the film show at the Soviet embassy in Peking to mark Lenin Day. According to a broadcast in Mandarin on 20 April, Ilichev and his Chinese counterpart as well as Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov attended the show. Similarly, it was only in broadcasts to the Chinese that Moscow reported the arrival in Peking early this month of a Soviet trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement for 1972. None of these events has been reported by Peking.

SOVIET COMMENT        In keeping with the general effort to discredit Peking by portraying it as a danger to world peace, TASS reported on 17 April that the quasi-official NOVOSTI press agency had issued a booklet entitled "What Peking Keeps Silent About." TASS said the booklet contains Mao quotations from various periods, including: "We excel in war and dictatorship." A NOVOSTI foreword to the booklet, TASS added, characterizes "Maoism as a great threat to the peoples of the world" and underscores the notion that the PRC leaders are now trying to erase from the Chinese people's memory the experience which demonstrates that "China's future depends on belonging to the world socialist system, a determined struggle against imperialism, and strict adherence to proletarian internationalism." A TASS commentary, summarized in PRAVDA on the 20th, said the NOVOSTI booklet demonstrates the "fantastic contradiction between the words and deeds of the Maoist leadership." In effect charging that Mao has abandoned anti-imperialism by his moves to improve relations with the United States, TASS singled out a Mao quotation from the booklet: "The situation is absolutely clear: if not a policy of alliance with the socialist states, then inevitably a policy of alliance with the imperialists, inevitably an alliance with imperialism." The TASS commentator added: "The latest events show that the Chinese leaders took the other road, the road of intensifying the anti-Soviet, antisocialist line of their foreign policy."

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Reviewing the Chinese cultural scene, an article in the weekly LITERARY GAZETTE on 19 April sought to put into perspective for Soviet readers reports that Peking is now allowing previously banned books to be published and previously banned plays to be performed. The paper traced this "partial restoration" to the "bankruptcy" of the Maoist cultural line and the leadership's pragmatic need to put art in the service of domestic and international policies. Observing that Peking's more flexible foreign policy has created the need for Chinese cultural exports, the paper commented sarcastically: "Peking can hold a cocktail party for police officials in New York but cannot organize an art exhibition there; and Chinese scholars do not attend international symposiums because they have nothing to report."

An article in PRAVDA by TASS commentator Kornilov on the 18th, noting that Peking has published economic data for the first time in 10 years, granted that "a certain stabilization" is evident in the Chinese economy but added: "It is being achieved through the same methods of military-administrative coercion." Kornilov went on to explain how "masses of people," including women, are being coerced into working on construction projects and in mines. He also said that the growth of the Chinese economy is being hindered by "complicated, contradictory, at times diametrically opposed phenomena and processes taking place in China and by the lack of a single viewpoint within the Peking leadership." Kornilov argued in conclusion that "whether they like it or not in Peking," the solution to economic problems is not possible on the basis of "Maoist dogmas," but only on the basis of the experience of the period when the "objective laws of socialist development" were observed.

BROADCASTS IN MANDARIN      Radio Moscow's Chinese audiences continue to be exposed to comment calculated to fan domestic unrest and to impugn the PRC leadership's socialist credentials. A 24 April broadcast cited reports of Chinese young people fleeing the country as evidence that the Chinese people have lost faith in China's future. Commenting that the recent purges in PRC military ranks reveal "deep differences among the Chinese leaders," the radio predicted that "increasing instability will continue to be a major factor in Chinese political life."

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Playing another familiar theme, a broadcast to China on the 19th took the Peking leadership to task for its failure to take "concerted action" with the other socialist countries in support of Vietnam. The broadcast added that Peking's present policy "is objectively betraying the principle of proletarian internationalism." Portraying Moscow as Hanoi's champion and Peking as its betrayer, a commentary broadcast in Mandarin over Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress on the 17th elaborated on types of Soviet military aid to the DRV and noted, atypically, that during the 16 April raids on Haiphong and Hanoi the Vietnamese forces downed 11 planes "with missiles and other antiaircraft weapons supplied by the Soviet Union."

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## LENIN DAY ADDRESS

### KULAKOV RECITES SET FORMULATIONS IN REVIEWING FOREIGN POLICY

Politburo member Viktor Kulakov, in the 21 April keynote address marking the anniversary of Lenin's birth, used standard formulations in a broad-brush treatment of foreign affairs. In the pattern of past speeches on the occasion, he portrayed current Soviet policy as the legacy of Lenin, repledged the USSR to support for the national liberation struggle--which "is built on a firm foundation, on principles laid down and formulated by Lenin"--and cited Moscow's support for the peoples of Indochina struggling against "U.S. imperialist aggression" and for the Arab peoples.

These observations were balanced with passages pointing up the USSR's struggle for the easing of tensions and its pursuit of the "Leninist" principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. Kulakov called observance of these principles "the only alternative to destructive warfare, which would threaten the fates of whole countries and peoples." Reviewing the state of the USSR's relations with the capitalist countries, he recited the familiar line that the USSR's foreign policy combines an active defense of peace with a readiness to deal a "firm rebuff to any and all imperialist intrigues to exacerbate international tension." He was careful to stipulate that the USSR is not seeking agreements that would weaken relations with other countries and peoples or damage their interests and "is not waiving its principles." Underscoring the latter point elsewhere in the speech, he said the CPSU "stresses that we live in conditions of unabated ideological warfare between socialism and capitalism."

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS      Kulakov touched only briefly on U.S.-Soviet relations, remarking in passing that the principles governing the USSR's relations with the capitalist countries generally apply to the relations between Moscow and Washington. He did not mention President Nixon's scheduled visit to the USSR. TASS reported on 25 April that presidential adviser Kissinger was in Moscow from 20 to 24 April conferring with Brezhnev and Gromyko on "important international problems" and bilateral matters preparatory to the President's visit.

No commentary has been devoted to the trip in the Moscow domestic service since 12 April, but routine-level comment anticipating the

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trip has continued to appear in broadcasts to North America and to other, scattered foreign audiences. A commentary for North American listeners on 23 April by V. Berezhev, chief editor of the monthly USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, concluded a review of bilateral relations by noting that the May visit "will be important in the Soviet program of contacts for carrying out" the USSR's peace program. Echoing Brezhnev's 20 March trade union congress speech, Berezhev described the USSR's attitude toward the talks as "businesslike and realistic." Most recently, a 25 April talk in the North American service by M. Federov, deputy editor-in-chief of NEW TIMES, similarly stressed the USSR's "businesslike" approach to the May summit.

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## WARSAW PACT

## ROMANIANS PARTICIPATE IN BLACK SEA NAVAL MANEUVERS

The participation of Romania in Warsaw Pact exercises for the first time since the fall of 1970 has been publicized in Moscow, Sofia, and Bucharest reports on the windup of maneuvers of the three countries' navies on the Black Sea from 18 to 23 April. The exercises coincided with a six-day visit to Romania by East German Defense Minister Hoffmann, who was received by Ceausescu. Romania's participation in these two Pact-related developments, coupled with its major publicity for the Hoffman visit, illustrates the balancing act it has performed since the peak of the Soviet bloc pressures last summer. The naval maneuvers also coincided with a 17-19 April visit to the Bulgarian capital by the GDR's Honecker, which concluded with a joint pledge, among other things, to strengthen the socialist countries' "close rallying around the Soviet Union" and the "defense might of the Warsaw Pact."

The Bucharest domestic service on the 23d and the party daily SCINTEIA the next day carried a report on the naval maneuvers that was identical to the one distributed by TASS. In standard terms, it said that "in accordance with the plan of the joint command, naval exercises of the Warsaw Treaty member countries were held in the Black Sea" during the period from 18 to 23 April. Participating were the Pact joint staff and "the headquarters and naval forces of Bulgaria, Romania, and the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR," under the direction of Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovskiy. The report said the exercises "contributed to a further improvement of unit teamwork of the command agencies of the navies of the Warsaw Treaty member states, the perfection of cooperation between them, and consolidation of the combat cooperation of the fraternal armies."

ROMANIAN ROLE IN PACT MANEUVERS      The Romanians have participated irregularly in Warsaw Pact exercises during the past 10 years. They took part twice in 1962--with Soviet and Hungarian troops in Hungary in April and with Soviet and Bulgarian troops on Romania's own territory in October. During the next seven years, they participated only twice--in September 1964 with Soviet and Bulgarian forces in Bulgaria and in August 1967, in the "Rhodope" maneuvers, with the same forces in Bulgaria. In March-April 1969, the "staffs" of the land, naval, and anti-aircraft forces of the same three countries held exercises again in Bulgaria, and their ground forces, with the addition of Hungary's, joined in maneuvers in the USSR in May of that year.

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Bucharest sent only token representation to the "Brotherhood-in-Arms" maneuvers in the GDR in October 1970, the first Pact exercises involving all the member countries. The voluminous Soviet bloc publicity for that event went out of its way to obscure the contrast between Romania's small contingent and the large forces from the other countries.

In August of last year, a military threat to Romania as well as to Yugoslavia was seen by Belgrade media in the "Opal 71" maneuvers of Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian troops in Hungary. The Yugoslavs also professed alarm over rumors that Warsaw Pact exercises involving the crossing of Romanian territory by Soviet troops would be held in the fall in Bulgaria. Apparently to quash such rumors, the Bulgarians in the fall gave extensive publicity to maneuvers involving only their own troops.

HOFFMANN VISIT Bucharest media carried only brief reports on the 17-22 April "friendship" visit to Romania by GDR Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann, saying nothing about the praise expressed--according to East German media--by both Hoffmann and Romanian Defense Minister Ionita for the strength of the Warsaw Pact. The East German news agency's report of a Bucharest Military Academy dinner on the 22d quoted Ionita as declaring that the Romanian armed forces, in addition to their devotion to their country, "are being educated in the spirit of the internationalist policy of the Romanian Communist Party and the development of close ties of fraternal cooperation with the armies of the Warsaw Pact states and"--the standard Romanian addition--"all socialist countries." He added, according to ADN, that Romania, "which is fulfilling its commitments, is willing to make its contribution to defending the Warsaw Pact states against any imperialist attack that might be unleashed in Europe." The report quoted Hoffmann as stressing the GDR's reliance on "the socialist military alliance" and "the peace-securing military power of socialism, especially the comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet army."

Accounts of the same speeches in Romanian media highlighted their support for European detente. SCINTEIA on the 23d recorded Ionita's expression of his country's support for "strengthening brotherly cooperation with the socialist states and anti-imperialist forces"--rendered "all" anti-imperialist forces in the AGERPRES version on the 22d. Hoffmann was quoted as pointing only to the GDR's successes in strengthening its own defenses, with no reference to reliance on the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet army.

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ADN's account of a reception for Hoffmann on the 17th reported his pointed declaration in a toast that the Soviet, GDR, Polish, and Czechoslovak armies "reliably guard the western border of socialism in Europe." Ionita was reported as only having registered support for recognition of the GDR by all states. The AGERPRES account of the reception merely reported that the two defense ministers proposed toasts to "the steady development" of their countries' friendly relations.

ADN reported on the 21st that Hoffmann had "cordial, comradely" talks that day with Ceausescu, a session also attended by Premier Maurer, Ionita, Foreign Minister Manescu, and GDR Ambassador Vonn. The leaders reportedly paid tribute to the friendship and cooperation between their two countries and armies.

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## WEST EUROPEAN CP'S

## BELGIAN, ITALIAN CP'S SHOW INTEREST IN TIES WITH PEKING

Materials now available in translation on the 13-17 March congress of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in Milan\* include a reiteration by the chairman of the Belgian Communist Party (PCB), Marc Drumaux, of prior expressions of interest in a reestablishment of contacts with the Chinese party. They also include a post-congress interview with Drumaux in the PCB organ LE DRAPEAU ROUGE which contains an explicit public statement of the Italian party's interest in renewed ties with Peking.

The Chinese, still on record as supporting radical pro-Maoist splinter parties in Western Europe, exhibited new flexibility last fall in receiving a delegation of the Spanish Communist Party, which it had long spurned as "revisionist."\*\* But Peking has apparently not been anxious to move too fast in this direction, and the West European parties have been treading cautiously. The Italian CP publicized in its daily L'UNITA the October-November Peking visit of a Spanish party delegation led by Secretary General Santiago Carrillo but has been reticent about the PCI's own apparent overtures to Peking. A Prague broadcast in early April reported that the PCI had invited the Chinese to send a delegation to the Milan congress but that Peking declined to answer the invitation, which L'UNITA never acknowledged had been sent. The Spanish party delegate at the Milan congress reiterated his party's support for unity along with "diversity" among independent communist parties but did not recall Carrillo's trip to Peking.

THE BELGIAN PARTY      The PCB greetings message to the Italian congress, delivered by Drumaux and published in the PCI's L'UNITA on 15 March, sought to underscore the party's independent stance and struck a careful balance in defining the PCB's attitude toward the Soviet and Chinese parties.

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\* See the TRENDS of 5 April, pages 23-30, for a discussion of the congress in the context of the world communist movement.

\*\* For background on this development see FBIS Special Report No. 305 of 7 March 1972, "Spanish Communists Reestablish Ties With Peking: Background and Ramifications."

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While stressing the "solid bonds and the sincere friendship" which tie the PCB to the Soviet Union, the message also noted that "we have some criticisms to make and some questions to ask about the unsatisfactory level of development of socialist democracy and about the flaws that have emerged in relations among the socialist states." Then pointing out that "China's role cannot be overestimated" in the "positive changes" occurring on the international scene, the message repeated the PCB stand on the Chinese party: "Despite our differences with the CCP, we are hoping for a reestablishment of normal relations with it."

Drumaux had been on record for some time with a bid for relations with the CCP. Writing on the occasion of the Belgian party's 50th anniversary in the 3 September 1971 LE DRAPEAU ROUGE, he expressed the hope--which he said had been stated "on various occasions for a long time"--that "our relations with the CCP will be reestablished." Drumaux emphasized in the article that "there is no leading center" in the international communist movement and that the PCB "is autonomous and works out its own policy," adding that the aim of the communist movement should be to work for international unity "while respecting the principle of the autonomy of each party." At the same time, he came to Moscow's defense in decrying the "demagogic" line that "the destiny of the peoples is controlled by two 'superpowers,'" declaring that "the record is fundamentally positive when it comes to the Soviet Union." Expressing similar views on the independence of the PCB and all parties within the international movement, the speeches and final resolution of the 20th PCB Congress in March 1971 also went on record as declaring that there can be no "anti-Soviet communism." The congress made no public statement on the reestablishment of relations with the CCP.

A comparison of statements made by Drumaux at the June 1969 international communist conference in Moscow with his speech at the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971 and with his more recent statements reflects the PCB's evolution from a staunchly pro-Soviet party to one that now seeks balanced relations with both the Soviets and the Chinese, underscoring autonomy and independence:

+ At the 1969 conference Drumaux strongly criticized CCP policies which he said had sabotaged the policy of peaceful coexistence and abetted the formation of a splinter Belgian communist party (the "Marxist-Leninist" PCB) in 1963-65. Chinese policies, he said, were leading to "very grave and negative consequences."

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\* At the CPSU congress in April 1971, Drumaux echoed the main document of the 1969 congress, without attribution, in asserting there is "no leading center" in the world communist movement. Citing the stand adopted at the PCB congress in March 1971, he avowed at the same time that the Belgian party would combat any type of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. He made no mention of the Chinese at the Soviet party congress. But starting with his 50th anniversary article on 3 September 1971 in LE DRAPEAU ROUGE, Drumaux has couched all his subsequent public statements in terms of a balance between the CPSU and the CCP.

The PCB's approach was reflected in a joint communique on 16-18 February talks held with the CPSU in Moscow, a month before Drumaux repeated his call for relations with the Chinese at the Italian party congress. A five-man PCB delegation, led by Drumaux, met with CPSU Politburo member Pelshe and Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev, in charge of relations with nonruling parties. The communique denounced what it called "imperialist" splitting tactics, specifically decrying theories of "conflicts between superpowers" or "limited sovereignty." Without mentioning the Chinese, it asserted both parties' resolve to work for political and ideological unity within the international movement on the basis of the 1969 conference and to struggle against all forms of "right and 'left' revisionism and against anticommunism and anti-Sovietism." It was clear from the communique that the CPSU had been unsuccessful in obtaining an unequivocal Belgian denunciation of the CCP and the Maoist leadership. The document said that the talks "were held in a spirit of sincere friendship" and that both parties would continue to maintain their ties "based on the profound unity of views which united them," but it concluded on a note which betrayed their inability to reach full agreement: The two sides confirmed "the benefit of frank discussion of all problems that arise, including problems of the communist movement."

THE ITALIAN PARTY           Where Drumaux explicitly stated in his 24 March interview in LE DRAPEAU ROUGE that the Italian party "desires to reestablish relations with the CCP," PCI leader Berlinguer muted the question of PCI-CCP relations in his speech to the congress, which focused on the Italian domestic scene and the forthcoming 7 May national elections. But Berlinguer did make an indirect approach to the Chinese "comrades" at the congress when he stated that any PCI criticisms of the Chinese party's political and ideological positions were based on the principle of "explicit and firm criticisms, but never inspired by a desire for excommunication or separation."

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While L'UNITA failed to acknowledge that the CCP was invited to the Italian congress, the Czechoslovak weekly TVORBA, in a report summarized by Prague radio on 4 April, noted that the "CCP did not answer" the PCI's invitation and was among some 60 parties which had been invited but did not show up.

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## CHINA

### PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL OUTLINES MODERATE CADRE POLICY

Peking has given authoritative expression to its concern to speed the rehabilitation of the party apparatus and to implement a correct cadre policy in the wake of the purge of Lin Piao and top military leaders. A 24 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial argued in pointed terms that "the overwhelming majority of cadres and party members want unity and not division" and that they are "continuing to unite and oppose splitting under the revisionist line." While the precepts cited are familiar from the cultural revolution and other times, the editorial made the current context and policy trends clear in firmly calling for the rehabilitation of veteran cadres and asserting confidently that "one act of sabotage after another committed by class enemies at home and abroad" have been "smashed to pieces" by "our vast party, our vast country, and our vast number of people." The editorial also predicted that "we will be able to make the whole party, the whole army, and the people throughout the country closely unite as one" under the guidance of Mao's line.

Making use of an appropriate Mao quotation, the editorial buttressed its argument that most cadres "are good or comparatively good" and that "the target of attack must be narrowed and more people must be helped through education." In criticizing cadres who have made mistakes, the editorial explained, "we must proceed from a desire for unity, strive to help them correct their mistakes, and welcome the progress they make." Arguing that both veteran cadres and those who have emerged during the cultural revolution "represent the priceless wealth of the party," the editorial stated that as long as those who have made errors "realize their mistakes and are determined to correct them, we must trust them and give fuller play to their role." The editorial even reasoned that, just as those who have suffered from typhoid develop an immunity, "those who have made mistakes can work better than before" if they learn from their mistakes and develop an immunity. The party's desire to confer such an immunity would seem to underlie the editorial's exposition of cadre policy.

The call to provide suitable work for veteran cadres--a recurrent theme in the ongoing ideological campaign against Lin and his followers--was reiterated in an unusually frank Kunning radio commentary on 14 April complaining that several local county cadres who had corrected their past mistakes

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"had not been properly employed . . . due to the influence of the ultraleftist trend" pushed by "swindlers." Specifically asserting that "we must allow people to make mistakes and allow people to correct them," the broadcast observed pointedly that "those who want to squeeze out cadres whenever they make mistakes do not conform to Chairman Mao's cadre policy but to the factional cadre policy of swindlers like Liu Shao-chi." "We must," the broadcast insisted, "thoroughly repudiate it and purge its evil influence." The commentary then praised the county's party committee for carrying out a "reallocation of posts for cadres who had been improperly employed" and for absorbing many of them "into leadership groups at various levels."

The recently intensified campaign to provide appropriate work assignments for the experienced and skilled veteran cadres appears linked to a need to speed the return of many of the civil administrative responsibilities which the PLA inherited during the cultural revolution back to rehabilitated civilian cadres. While a complete withdrawal of the PLA from its civilian tasks is not being suggested now, a diminished PLA influence on party committees since Lin's purge last fall has been demanded by widespread injunctions to follow "unified leadership" rather than allow dominance by the (usually military) leading members of the committees.

Recent evidence of this development was contained in a Shantung provincial radio report on 20 April which revealed that soon after a local county party committee was established, some of the committee members "stressed only the importance of work of their own departments, while others individually handled matters of major importance before the party committee had collectively discussed them." After conducting a "penetrating criticism" of the "serious crimes of . . . swindlers" who "had undermined the centralized leadership and unity of the party and had split the party and army," members of the party committee strengthened centralized party leadership by pursuing a policy of "uniting all forces that can be united." As a result of this process some "individual cadres who have not yet recognized their mistakes" were declared in need of further testing and tempering while "more than 95 percent of the former leading cadres at county and commune levels have now been assigned suitable jobs." Recalling past civilian-military leadership tensions within the county's party committee, the article specifically noted that now the "three supports and two militaries" personnel

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and "armed cadres have consciously accepted the leadership of the county CCP committee and, on their own initiative, have reported to it on their work."

#### AGING, CRITICIZED PRC LEADERS ASSUME MORE ACTIVE ROLES

Several aging, and at one time discredited, Politburo members and former members have assumed more active roles recently, filling some of the holes made in the leadership by the purge of Lin Piao and his followers. Though this development may only be a temporary move pending resolution of leadership questions at a central committee plenum and the long-delayed session of the NPC, it is consistent with the ongoing campaign for rehabilitation of veteran cadres (discussed above). The reactivation of these leaders should also reduce the protocol burden resting on Chou En-lai and Li Hsien-nien, until now the only active vice premier. Both of the remaining vice premiers, Li Fu-chun and Nieh Jung-chun, have been inactive in recent years, but each was identified in the past week in his vice premier post.

Nieh Jung-chun appeared in the role of vice premier for the first time since February 1968 when he received a Canadian visitor on 21 April. Nieh was not re-elected to the Politburo at the ninth party congress in 1969, though he retained his central committee post and, like other military commission vice chairmen Chen I and Hsu Hsiang-chien, was listed in protocol rank immediately after Politburo members. He appeared only on ceremonial occasions and seemed to have no public duties.

NCNA identified Li Fu-chun as vice premier in noting those attending a special Peking performance by a Shanghai dance troupe which is to leave soon for Korea; he was listed immediately following Politburo members. Li was in charge of economic planning before the cultural revolution. Like Nieh, he was a close associate of Chou En-lai in the early stages of the Chinese communist movement. Li prospered for a time during the cultural revolution, but he apparently ran into difficulties before the ninth congress. Li was elected to the presidium of the congress and retained his membership on the central committee, but he was dropped from the Politburo. Unlike the old marshals, Li was given no special protocol rank in his infrequent appearances since then, though he was identified as vice premier during National Day festivities in 1970. The first indication that he might be regaining favor

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was in the NCNA account of Chen I's funeral on 11 January. A list of those paying respects to Chen at the hospital placed Li after Nieh and ahead of other ordinary central committee members. His status as reported on 24 April, ahead of Hsu and Nieh, implies a rapid jump in favor and seems to indicate that Li may again assume a position of authority and not just be a figurehead for protocol functions.

Recent leadership turnouts also have confirmed the re-emergence of Chu Te as an active, though not likely a powerful, member of the hierarchy. As chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Chu has a state protocol rank above Chou. His party rank, however, was lower; in NCNA's 11 January listing of those visiting Chen I's remains in the hospital, Chu followed Yeh Chien-ying and Chang Chun-chaio. At Hsieh Fu-chih's funeral on 30 March, Chu rose above not only Yeh and Chang but also above Chiang Ching to top the list of ordinary Politburo members. Chu's new status was confirmed by more recent appearances on 20 April at the funeral of Internal Affairs Minister Tseng Shan and at the 24 April performance of the Shanghai dance troupe. Because of his age (86), Chu is unlikely to be wielding any real power, though his recent prominence may indicate that he has been temporarily placed in one of Lin's former military posts, perhaps heading the party's military commission.

The return to prominence of many former PRC leaders, plus the public reappearance of lesser figures who were heavily criticized during the cultural revolution--such as former YCL chief Hu Yao-pang, who appeared at the 13 April funeral for a purged former minister--was in effect rationalized by an article broadcast by Radio Peking on 25 April. The article, by the Paoting Municipal Revolutionary Committee, ostensibly related Lu Hsun's struggles against hidden enemies in the 1930's, but the story clearly parallels Mao's struggle with Lin Piao. Making a strong attack on people who "had illicit relations with the enemy" and who carried out "vicious activities behind the back or inside of the revolutionary camp," the article raises the issue of innocent people who were attacked by "swindlers." In stating that when Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi, and other swindlers were blocked by someone they would "make a charge against him" and would "spread rumors to incriminate others," the article seems to open the way to pardon many leaders purged during the cultural revolution. While there have previously been admissions that local-level cadres had been unjustly attacked, this appears to be the first to raise the possibility that some high officials may also have been dismissed without cause.

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Like most attacks on Lin, the Paoting article is especially virulent against the left. The "fake Marxists and political swindlers" are said to have appeared as "vicious and dreadful extreme leftists," who sabotaged the Chinese revolution by proclaiming that when the revolution took place "all nonrevolutionaries will have to die." They thus caused people to "dread the revolution" by using "extremely leftist terms." Clearly the attack is aimed not only at Lin, but also at cultural revolution leftists, who led the charge against party cadres.

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## PRC AND UNCTAD

## PEKING PROCLAIMS ROLE AS DEVELOPING COUNTRY OF THIRD WORLD

Peking has seized on the third United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD III), convened in Santiago, Chile, on 13 April, to underline the PRC's status as a "developing" country and a self-conscious member of the "third world." Since its seating in the United Nations last fall, Peking has taken the opportunity of various bilateral and international forums to proclaim its alignment with the developing countries of the third world against the "imperialist and colonialist economic plunder and oppression" of the developed nations in general and "the one or two superpowers" in particular. The necessity of economic independence and self-reliance, control over a nation's own natural resources, and its right to exercise sovereignty over a self-delimited territorial sea are themes exploited by Peking to stress its solidarity with the third world.

**PEKING'S LINE** In his major UNCTAD address on the 20th, PRC delegation head Chou Hua-min placed Peking squarely on the side of the developing countries in pitting their interests against those of the two superpowers, whose "aggressive and expansionist policy" poses "a serious obstacle to the efforts of the developing countries to win complete independence and develop national economy as well as a stumbling block to the promotion of international trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit." Sounding what has become a favorite theme in Peking's campaign to identify its interests with the third world, Chou declared that "China is a developing country and belongs to the third world." He carefully qualified Peking's standard precepts on economic independence and self-reliance by explaining that these do not mean "self-sufficiency and seclusion" and do not exclude mutual assistance. He said that international trade "on the basis of equality and mutual benefit" is "conducive to the enhancement of a country's capacity of self-reliance and to the strengthening of friendship with the people of other countries." Economic cooperation between friendly countries, he pointed out, "is needed to further the development of an independent national economy," and he expressed the PRC's interest in expanding its trade with the nations of the third world as well as with "other countries." "Within the scope of its capabilities," Chou declared, "China provides some friendly countries with aid in various forms in accordance with the eight principles guiding its foreign aid, but it never regards such aid as unilateral alms."

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Chou also expressed Peking's line that "each country has the right to dispose of its natural resources with a view to developing its national economy and expanding its foreign trade," noting in particular that "all coastal countries are entitled to reasonably determine the limits of their territorial sea and jurisdiction and have the right to dispose of the natural resources in their coastal seas, seabed, and the subsoil thereof." Finally, Chou expressed support for the adoption of "special measures" in trade, aid, communications, technology, and other respects to help the "least developed countries" make faster progress.

COVERAGE OF UNCTAD Peking's coverage of UNCTAD III has portrayed the sessions as forums for attacks on the superpowers by delegates from the developing countries and has stressed the Peking delegation's off-hours meetings with third world delegations. Thus, NCNA on the 19th reported that during the 14-17 April sessions "imperialist and colonialist economic plunder and oppression were the target of denunciation by delegates from many developing countries"; it led off its report on the session of the 18th by noting that "the policy of aggression and plunder of the imperialists headed by the United States was vehemently attacked by delegates from a number of countries"; and NCNA reported that the meeting of the 20th "was marked by vehement attacks from delegates of medium-sized and small countries on the hegemony and power politics pursued by the two superpowers." Peking also emphasized its affinity with the developing countries in its treatment of speeches made at UNCTAD III. In contrast to the liberal coverage of addresses by third world delegations-- particularly their condemnations of economic exploitation by the developed nations, their demands for an integral role in international economic decision making, and their claims to rights over their own natural resources--Peking has virtually ignored the substance of comments by pro-Western and pro-Soviet delegations, noting only that delegates from those countries "also addressed the meeting." In the only exception to this practice to date, NCNA on the 19th quoted from the U.S. delegate's speech in order to decry it and also noted that the Japanese delegate "tried to cover up the revival of Japanese militarism with a torrent of larded words and described the inroads of Japanese monopoly capital in developing countries as 'aid.'"

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BACKGROUND: Since the seating of its representatives in the United Nations last fall, Peking has further developed its line of opposition to the superpowers by stressing its economic affinities with the third world. In his maiden address to the UNGA on 15 November, PRC delegation head Chiao Kuan-hua declared that "China is still an economically backward country as well as a developing country" and that "like the overwhelming majority of the Asian, African, and Latin American countries, China belongs to the third world." Asserting that "the independence of a country is incomplete without economic independence," Chiao affirmed the PRC's support for the developing countries' struggles to protect their resources and national interests and to oppose "economic plunder," citing in particular Latin American claims to a 200-mile territorial sea and the struggles of the petroleum-exporting countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

China's claim to being a "developing country" of "the third world" has been repeated on a number of occasions in connection with visits to China by delegations from third world countries. Thus, Chou En-lai sounded this theme in banquet speeches on 12 April honoring the visiting Mauritian prime minister and on 16 April welcoming a visiting Peruvian delegation. In both instances Chou hailed what he portrayed as a rising tide of the developing countries of the third world against the "power politics and hegemony practised by the superpowers." On the 12th he also repeated the line that "at no time, neither today nor ever in the future, will China be a superpower." On the 16th Chou expressed "particular admiration" for Peru's defense of its rights over its "200 nautical-mile territorial sea and its own resources," noting that this defense gives impetus to "the struggle of the small and medium-sized countries all over the world" against the hegemony of the superpowers.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## BREZHNEV AIDE DISPUTES ANTI-STALIN VIEW OF COLLECTIVIZATION

Apparently spurred by the persistence of negative interpretations of collectivization, Brezhnev's assistant for agriculture V. A. Golikov has co-authored with B. A. Abregov and F. M. Vaganov an article in the April QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY that whitewashes the sordid historical record and polemicizes with its unnamed critics. The article completely absolves the Central Committee and Stalin personally of any errors, attributing "all" distortions and excesses to direct violations of Central Committee instructions by local officials and denying "tendentious and subjective" assertions that the distortions "arose from the essence of the party's political line." Since no revisionist works on collectivization have appeared in the USSR since 1966, the article would appear to be aimed at samizdat histories like Roy Medvedev's history of the Stalin era, which was published abroad last year and which presented a detailed indictment of Stalin's criminal role in collectivization.

The authors of the article claim that some works on the inception of collectivization "unfortunately" express "mistaken observations" because of "insufficient knowledge of facts and documents or because of survivals of the subjectivism" prevalent in the "recent past." They assert that their interpretation is based on "a number of new documents" and on the "evaluations worked out by the authors of the [recently published] fourth volume of the 'History of the CPSU'." The latter work, according to a 19 April PRAVDA review, "convincingly refutes the slanderous fabrications of bourgeois falsifiers and revisionists who have in every possible way attempted to discredit the process of the socialist transformation of the countryside and to present it as a chain of mistakes."

Arguing in the same vein, the Golikov article counters arguments that material preconditions for collectivization did not exist in early 1930 and that the middle peasants opposed collectivization. Instead it maintains that the Central Committee carefully restricted collectivization and dekulakization to certain areas limited to those to be treated as kulaks to under three to five percent of the peasant population, and warned against administrative excesses and the application of anti-kulak measures to middle peasants. The authors claim that the Central Committee immediately took corrective

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action "with the first news of forced dekulakization." They point out that on 30 January 1930 Stalin and Molotov began sending telegrams to local leaders ordering a slowdown of collectivization and that when this proved insufficient, Stalin wrote his 2 March "Dizziness from Success" article. The authors conclude that the facts "convincingly" show "how and where errors arose during collectivization and how timely and decisively the Central Committee exposed them and helped party organizations eliminate them."

The Golikov article appears to be aimed at the body of revisionist historiography on collectivization that surfaced in the late Khrushchev era and was officially suppressed after his fall, only to reappear as samizdat in recent years. For example, Roy Medvedev's monumental samizdat history, published in the West under the title "Let History Judge," forcefully presses the revisionist case against Stalin. Medvedev denies that the material preconditions for full collectivization existed and that the middle peasants supported collectivization. He maintains that Stalin personally was responsible for the excesses since he himself forced the pace of collectivization and dekulakization on local and central officials in late 1929 and only wrote his notorious March 1930 article "at the demand of the Central Committee." Medvedev also criticized Vaganov and Central Committee science section head S. P. Trapeznikov for their apologetic works on collectivization in 1965-1966.

Trapeznikov, the chief theoretician on collectivization, and other conservatives began a crackdown on the Khrushchev era historiography in 1965 and 1966. Among those attacked in this campaign were such revisionist historians as N. I. Nemakov, V. P. Danilov, and V. S. Zaytsev, who directly blamed Stalin for the excesses of collectivization. Although their revisionist works are no longer published, their influence evidently continues to be felt. For example, as recently as 11 February an article in VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA sought to discredit Danilov and Medvedev by alleging that they were using library books stolen by A. A. Shokalskaya.

Golukov's article goes further in whitewashing the historical record than did Trapeznikov's 1963 and 1965 works on collectivization. According to a review of those works by P. N. Pospelov in the June 1966 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, Trapeznikov justified Stalin's acts but conceded that errors had been made by central as well as local officials, that the center did not react in time to the excesses, and that it began correcting them only after publication of the 15 March 1930 Central Committee decree.

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