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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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21 JUNE 1972


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TRENDS

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
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 25)

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W A R N I N G

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 12 - 18 JUNE 1972

Moscow (2872 items)

Gromyko in France	(--)	7%
Soviet-Iraqi Treaty	(1%)	5%
Ratification		
Nixon USSR Visit	(6%)	5%
Indochina	(10%)	4%
OAU Summit Conference,	(1%)	4%
Rabat		
Tito in USSR	(10%)	3%
90th Birth Anniversary	(--)	3%
of Bulgaria's		
Dimitrov		

Peking (1221 items)

Domestic Issues	(39%)	49%
Indochina	(25%)	14%
[PRC Foreign Ministry	(--)	4%]
Statement on U.S.		
Bombing of DRV		
[PRG 3d Anniversary	(19%)	3%
UN Environment Conference,	(6%)	12%
Stockholm		
OAU Summit Conference,	(--)	10%
Rabat		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Soviet President Podgornyy's 15-18 June "unofficial friendly" visit to Hanoi reflected persisting Soviet-DRV strains while apparently falling short of meeting Hanoi's need for reassurance following the Moscow summit. Having remained silent on the visit until after it was over, Moscow and Hanoi on the 19th released an announcement disclosing that "friendly" talks took place in an atmosphere of "frankness, friendship, and comradeship"--a formulation highlighting the divergence of interests and contrasting with the "unanimity" registered in the joint communique on Podgornyy's highly publicized visit to Hanoi last October. The Soviets promised continuing support for the war effort in routine terms and joined with their hosts in calling for a resumption of "constructive talks in Paris. Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and other DRV leaders participated in the talks, with Premier Pham Van Dong notably absent.

On the day of Podgornyy's departure from Hanoi, Le Duc Tho arrived home from the Dimitrov celebration in Bulgaria via Moscow and Peking. Tho was greeted only by low-level Soviet officials during his Moscow stopover, but in Peking he met with Chou En-lai and was feted by Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao. Tho left Peking the day before Dr. Kissinger's arrival there.

Hanoi used the occasion of the Dimitrov commemoration to underscore the importance of international communist unity and to press its polemic against the Nixon Administration's summitry. Speaking at the Sofia conference on the 13th, Le Duc Tho implicitly took issue with Moscow by insisting that peaceful coexistence should not obstruct communist unity in the face of U.S. "schemes." In an editorial marking the anniversary on the 18th and coinciding with Podgornyy's departure, the DRV army paper sharply expressed Hanoi's disquiet by portraying the President's travels as aimed at using "the venom of bourgeois nationalism to divide the revolutionary forces."

PODGORNY VIT TO HANOI REFLECTS SOVIET-DRV STRAINS

Podgornyy's 15-18 June "unofficial friendly" visit to Hanoi reflected persisting Soviet-DRV strains while occasioning routine reaffirmations of Soviet support for the war effort and a call for the Paris talks to resume. The visit was not acknowledged by Moscow and Hanoi until after Podgornyy's departure, when both sides released an

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announcement on the 19th saying "friendly" talks had covered bilateral relations and the situation in Vietnam in connection with "the intensified U.S. aggressive actions." CPSU Secretary Katushev's "unofficial" visit in late April, in the wake of Kissinger's visit to Moscow to prepare for President Nixon's visit, was given similar treatment. In contrast, Podgorny's official visit to Hanoi last October had been highly publicized and produced a joint communique as well as the signing of aid agreements.

Podgorny was accompanied this time by Katushev and Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, who accompanied Katushev in April. Talks were held with Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Foreign Minister Trinh, Paris negotiator Xuan Thuy, and others, with Premier Pham Van Dong notably absent. No military or aid officials were said to have taken part in the talks.

If the purpose was to brief the North Vietnamese on the Soviet-U.S. summit and--as suggested by Xuan Thuy's presence and Le Duc Tho's imminent return--to sound them out on the prospects for a Vietnam settlement, the visit seems to have underlined the two allies' divergent interests and concerns. According to the announcement, the talks took place in an atmosphere of "frankness, friendship, and comradeship," a formulation serving to highlight the airing of issues marked by discord. The joint communique on Podgorny's visit last October had also referred to "frankness," but a markedly different emphasis at that time was registered in the formulation that the exchange took place in an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship, cordiality, and comradely frankness."* Moreover, that communique registered "unanimity on all the questions discussed," a claim missing from the current announcement. Katushev's talks in April were characterized as having taken place

* In each case the Russian word for "frankness" was "otkrovennost," although the TASS international service translated it variously as "frankness" and "openness" in October and as "sincerity" and "frankness" this time. Hanoi used a different term in October than in the current statement. In the October communique, the Vietnamese term was "coi mo," which connotes a relaxed openness and which VNA had rendered in English as "open-heartedness." The Vietnamese term in the current statement was "thang than," which carries the connotation of "straightforwardness"; VNA's English version used "frank."

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in an atmosphere of "cordiality, fraternal friendship, and mutual understanding," a formulation conveying greater harmony than that marking Podgornyy's visit after the Moscow summit.*

According to the announcement on Podgornyy's visit, the Soviet side routinely pledged that "true to the principles of proletarian internationalism" it will continue to provide the Vietnamese "all the necessary assistance and support." There was no expression of Vietnamese gratitude for Soviet aid. Both sides expressed "satisfaction" that the communist forces in South Vietnam are dealing "serious blows" at the Saigon troops and the Americans, but Soviet reserve may be reflected in the absence of any more specific mention of the communist offensive. Divergence between the two sides on the sensitive matter of the U.S. mining was evidenced in a passage decrying the interdiction measures. According to the Soviet version, the two sides demanded that the United States "immediately and unconditionally stop bombing, shelling, and mining of DRV ports," while the DRV version added a reference to the "blockade" of the ports. The Soviets thus went a step beyond their demand in last month's Soviet-U.S. communique--for an end to the bombing but with no mention of the mining -while stopping short of Hanoi's stronger characterization of a blockade.

The two sides also demanded that the United States end the Vietnamization program and "resume constructive talks" in Paris. The communist peace proposals, specifically the PRG's seven points and "elaboration," were cited as "a constructive foundation for an early solution" of the Vietnam question, but no particular issues or demands were raised. (Moscow has not reported Podgornyy's remarks in Calcutta on the 18th on his way home. According to noncommunist media, he said that the Paris talks "would be resumed soon" and that the USSR "would do everything possible for the de-escalation of the Vietnam conflict." He said he was "very satisfied" with the talks in Hanoi and that "everything went as we desired.")

* The role of Soviet-U.S. relations in complicating Moscow's relations with Hanoi had also been in evidence last February in the wake of the release of the U.S. and Vietnamese communist negotiating positions. TASS reported a "frank" talk between Premier Kosygin and the DRV ambassador on 11 February some two hours before disseminating a belated Soviet Government statement that carefully balanced Moscow's relations with Hanoi and Washington.

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SOVIET COMMENT Hanoi has not commented directly on the Podgorny visit beyond the announcement itself, but Moscow has followed up with routine radio commentaries stressing Soviet pledges of continued assistance to the Vietnamese and support for a political settlement of the war. Comment has stressed that the Soviets remain loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and a commentary in Mandarin over Radio Peace and Progress on the 20th recalled that the USSR has given the DRV military aid including missiles and jets as well as training by Soviet military instructors at "combat positions."

A foreign-language commentary widely broadcast by Radio Moscow on the 20th elaborated at some length on the call for a resumption of the Paris talks contained in the announcement on the Podgorny visit. After citing Xuan Thuy as having recently stressed the need for a negotiated settlement and as having expressed readiness to pursue this approach, the commentary explained "the most important points" of the PRG peace plan. The first point of the plan, the commentary said, provides for a return of POW's if the United States sets a final date for the withdrawal of its troops. According to the commentary, the cease-fire that then could take place would create the basis for a political settlement, provided that the South Vietnamese could exercise self-determination without outside pressure. In this connection the commentary described the Saigon regime as a tool of such pressure and cited the PRG's demand for the removal of Thieu.

A 19 June Moscow commentary broadcast to Chinese audiences most directly related the Podgorny visit to the ongoing Soviet campaign to defend the detente policy against hardline critics. After stressing that the visit showed Moscow's "Leninist internationalist foreign policy" to be "firm and unshakable," the commentary invoked an implicitly anti-Peking charge that has figured in the Soviet campaign when it claimed that Moscow's stand had undercut "the opportunist political actions of others, including such slanders as the one alleging that the Soviet Union is colluding with imperialists to divide up spheres of influence." Without directly mentioning the Moscow summit, the commentary concluded by observing that the Soviet Union has held negotiations with capitalist countries and has been "consistently faithful to its internationalist duty."

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The Vietnam question was specifically cited in a major PRAVDA article by Yu. Chernov on 15 June defending the Moscow summit against those who "like to derive benefit from artificially fomenting hostility and tension." The article claimed that the Soviet stand on Vietnam registered in the summit communique is "devoid of any ambiguity or misunderstandings, thus making groundless any speculation about 'a 'conspiracy' or a 'division of spheres of influence.'" An earlier PRAVDA article, by Inozemtsev on 9 June, had denounced speculation about a conspiracy between the superpowers to the detriment of "some third countries" but had not explicitly mentioned Vietnam in this context.*

HUNGARIAN ARTICLE In keeping with Budapest's role as a leading proxy spokesman on controversial issues, an article in the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG by Varnai on 17 June was notably more outspoken than Soviet commentators have been in seeking to reconcile the summit and Moscow's loyalty to an ally.** Where Moscow has limited itself to implicit polemical thrusts at the Chinese, Varnai made the first direct charge monitored in Soviet bloc media that "the Chinese rejected joint action in helping Vietnam even after the announcement of the U.S. blockade." He also charged that after the summit Peking revived its line on collusion between the superpowers.

* The Chernov article is discussed further in the U.S.-Soviet Summit section of this TRENDS. The Inozemtsev article was discussed in the TRENDS of 14 June, page 12.

** During periods of relative restraint in Sino-Soviet polemics, Varnai has aired sensitive issues that Moscow has muted or side-stepped when speaking in its own name. Ironically, it was Varnai who previously had sought to score points at the expense of Sino-U.S. detente by invoking the interests of the international communist movement. In a 7 November 1971 article, Varnai said that "a flirtation between Peking and Washington would rightly elicit the misgivings and disapproval of the Indochinese, the DPRK, and many other Asian countries--countries in direct conflict with U.S. imperialism, whose vital interests are attacked to the unity of the anti-imperialist forces."

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Varnai's article, entitled "Peaceful Coexistence and the Class Struggle," clearly posed the issue underlying Moscow's defensive response to critics:

Some people fail to understand how one could sit down at the negotiating table and come to an agreement with the same U.S. imperialists who are committing a barbarous aggression against one of the socialist countries--the DRV. They feel that this procedure is in contradiction to the policy of solidarity with the Vietnamese people.

Hewing to the stock Soviet line, Varnai insisted that the policy of coexistence is not at variance with anti-imperialist struggle, "for both lines constitute an integral part of the homogeneous class struggle." Shifting to pragmatic grounds, he argued that the summit was justified by the "major" agreements reached, that Hanoi's national interests were not adversely affected, and that the Chinese are to blame for the lack of a united response to the mining of DRV ports. Noting that the war was going on before the summit and when there was no missile agreement, Varnai added that "following the talks--unfortunately--the war continues, but there is now an agreement on limiting missiles, and several other important agreements have been concluded also."

Emphasizing that Hanoi will prevail in its struggle "with the military and economic aid of the socialist countries, and primarily of the Soviet Union," Varnai observed that "the murderous and destructive bombing" is calculated "to give the impression that it compels the enemy to come to an agreement." In this context he outlined the following scenario for the outcome of the war:

The United States cannot change the situation through its military operations. There is no other way: it will have to end the bombings and the blockade policy, withdraw all its troops from South Vietnam, and acknowledge that this country will be independent and neutral and will be administered, without any outside interference, by a government of national concord.

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LE DUC THO RETURNS TO HANOI VIA MOSCOW AND PEKING

Le Duc Tho arrived in Hanoi on the 18th via Moscow and Peking after attending the Dimitrov anniversary celebrations in Bulgaria. His attendance at the Bulgarian celebrations had been announced beforehand but not the continuation of his trip. His departure from Peking on the 18th preceded Kissinger's arrival by one day, and he returned to Hanoi on the day of Podgornyy's departure. Hanoi acknowledged Tho's stopovers in Moscow and Peking in a VNA dispatch on the 18th reporting his arrival home that day. VNA noted that he was welcomed and seen off in Moscow by two deputy chiefs of a CPSU department and a deputy foreign minister, and that in Peking he saw Chou En-lai and was honored at a banquet given by Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao. A VNA service message from Moscow to Hanoi on the 17th said that the Chinese ambassador was present when Tho departed from Moscow on the 16th, but this was not noted in any of the reports released publicly.

MOSCOW Tho's 15-16 June stopover in Moscow was reported in PRAVDA on the 17th. Like the 18 June VNA dispatch, the Moscow report noted that he was welcomed and seen off at the airport by Rakhmanin and Chukanov, deputy chiefs of the Central Committee's department for relations with communist countries, and Deputy Foreign Minister Smirnov. There is no indication that he saw any higher-level Soviet officials.

Tho has received varying treatment on his stopovers in Moscow. When he arrived in Moscow on 28 April en route to Paris he was met by Rakhmanin and Deputy Foreign Minister Kosyrev, and he was seen off two days later by Katushev, who had just returned from Hanoi. As in the June stopover, there was no report that he had talks with Soviet leaders in April, but in each case his Moscow stopover coincided with Soviet-DRV talks taking place in Hanoi. When Tho stopped in Moscow last July en route home from Paris he had "warm and cordial" talks with Politburo member Kirilenko, and in June 1971 en route to Paris he met with Kirilenko and Katushev. There were no reports that he met any Soviet leaders during a stopover in January 1970. During earlier trips he met with Kosygin and once with Mazurov.

PEKING Although Tho received higher-level attention in Peking than in Moscow, his stopover in Peking this time occasioned more restrained expressions of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity than in the recent past. To some degree this may be attributable to the overshadowing ceremonies attending

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Prince Sihanouk's departure for a trip abroad, but it may also be due to strains between Hanoi and Peking involving the Vietnam war and relations with the United States. Hanoi may have had the Kissinger visit to Peking in mind when it observed--in a 21 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary citing the activities of Administration representatives--that "Nixon and Kissinger personally have also engaged in diplomatic activities."

During Tho's stopover this time the Chinese muted their expressions of support for the war effort and criticism of the United States. In the only reference to the war, Chang Chun-chiao and Tho were reported by NCNA to have toasted "the great victories" of the Vietnamese at the banquet on the 17th. They also toasted "the constant consolidation and growth of the revolutionary friendship and militant unity" of the two countries, but there was no reference to PRC backing of the Vietnamese. During Tho's 27-29 April stopover, Chou En-lai, who hosted a banquet for Tho then but was giving one for Sihanouk this time, pledged Chinese support "no matter in what form the war is carried out" while denouncing U.S. "war escalation" and charging that Washington had long violated the Geneva agreements. In the only reported contact between Chou and Tho during this month's stopover, the premier paid a courtesy call at the guest house on the 18th for "a very cordial conversation" (according to NCNA; the VNA report called it "a cordial conversation").

Attending both the banquet and the Chou-Tho meeting was DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, whose extended stay to discuss Chinese supplementary aid dates back to his arrival in Peking on 3 May.

HANOI URGES COMMUNIST UNITY, ASSAILS DIVISIVE U.S. SCHEMES

Hanoi's concern about the development of Soviet and Chinese relations with the United States was registered in North Vietnamese comment on the 90th anniversary of the birth of the Bulgarian communist and Comintern leader Georgi Dimitrov. The anniversary comment uniformly underscored the importance of a unified communist movement, and an 18 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial contained a sharp warning about U.S. policies toward communist countries. Repeating Hanoi's charge that the Nixon Doctrine is aimed at "exploiting the discord in the

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international communist movement," the editorial declared pointedly, with clear allusion to the Moscow summit in particular:

Wherever he goes and whatever he does, Nixon aims at realizing the U.S. imperialists' present reactionary global strategy. He has presented weapons as deterrent forces, used dollars and technology to woo other people, and used the venom of bourgeois nationalism to divide the revolutionary forces.

A somewhat similar complaint had been made by Hanoi last summer at the height of its polemic following the announcement of the plans for the Peking summit. A 22 August NHAN DAN Commentator article decried the "perfidious move" of the President to "spray the toxic gas of chauvinism into opportunistic heads in a bid to play off socialist countries against one another and sow schism among the communist and workers parties."

The current QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article followed up its denigration of the President's summitry with a pointed linkage of the U.S. aims in the Moscow and Peking visits to its aims in Vietnam, observing that the United States is "adopting a mild attitude in one area" in order to "concentrate on attacking another place" and to "block the offensive posture of the revolution and to counter the world revolutionary movement by priority sectors."

Less polemical arguments for international unity were pressed in an 18 June NHAN DAN editorial on the Dimitrov anniversary and in speeches at a 16 June anniversary meeting in Hanoi by Politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh and alternate member of the Central Committee Nguyen Khanh Toan. The theme of international unity keyed a 13 June speech by Le Duc Tho at a conference in Sofia marking the Dimitrov anniversary. In the speech as released by Hanoi media on the 18th, Tho stressed the need for an international united front to check U.S. "schemes" and implicitly joined issue with the Soviets over the Moscow summit by declaring that "peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems cannot detract from this basic objective and motto or negate the principle that truly links nationalism with proletarian internationalism." Playing on a theme associated with Dimitrov's historical role in promoting the antifascist united front strategy, Tho advocated the formation of three kinds of united fronts in opposition to the United States, in Vietnam, in Indochina, and in the world--a program

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which had been spelled out at length by Truong Chinh in a speech to a Vietnam Fatherland Front congress last December.*

The importance of communist unity was also underlined in an article in the May issue of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN journal, now available in translation. The article, signed by one Nguyen Ngoc Giao, stressed the abiding North Vietnamese concern with communist unity, warning that President Nixon is seeking ways to exploit differences in the socialist camp and international communist movement and to "incite one country to stand against another in order to weaken the forces" of the camp and the movement. Giao called it "an important and urgent duty" of the world revolutionary forces to "resolutely expose and to smash Nixon's wicked scheme to spread differences," and he reiterated the directive in Ho Chi Minh's testament for the North Vietnamese party to do its best to contribute to the restoration of unity among fraternal parties.

* Truong Chinh's speech was not published in full until 1 February. See the 9 February TRENDS, pages 6-7.

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SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST JOURNAL SCORES DEFENSIVE ATTITUDES

Vietnamese communist propaganda on the offensive in South Vietnam continues to hail "great victories" but also seems to reflect dissatisfaction with the lack of achievement in some areas. Failure at lower levels to carry out the intentions of the leadership in the offensive was sharply criticized in a 15 June Liberation Radio broadcast of an article from TIEN PHONG (VANGUARD), the journal of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)--the communist party in South Vietnam. It is unusual for Vietnamese communist media to even mention the PRP or its journal; this, however, is the second such TIEN PHONG article on the offensive to be publicized, the first having been broadcast by Liberation Radio on 13 June.* While the article on the 13th warned against hesitation in launching attacks, the one of the 15th was critical of political aspects of the offensive and stressed the need to "motivate the rural masses to unleash intensive and extensive concerted uprisings."

Suggesting that directives on political action from higher echelons have not been implemented, TIEN PHONG complained that "victories on the battlefield are still restricted; the direction of the uprising movement and three-pronged offensive of the masses is not thoroughly imbued with the strategic determination of the leading echelons." The article warned particularly against failure to "thoroughly realize the significance, requirements, and content of the concerted uprising" and commented that the current "uprising" is not a mere improvement but a "highpoint of the offensive and uprising movement with a higher quality than that of previous times." In a passage which may have been meant to discount bitter memories of the failure of the 1968 Tet offensive and uprising, the article lectured: "It is necessary to be fully aware of the fact that this time the spirit of concerted uprising is higher than the last time"

Seeming to echo the earlier article's concern over lack of aggressiveness in the offensive, this one enjoined: "It is necessary to resolutely oppose rightist thoughts--the tendency to fall back on the defensive, the fear of stringent trials, the wait-and-see attitude, and the spirit of dependence." It also assailed the practice of carrying out tasks in a "furtive, indecisive, and unaccomplished manner," citing such examples as the failure to destroy strategic hamlets and the use of

* See the 14 June TRENDS, pages 16-17.

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"such general forms of struggle as sounding drums and gongs, displaying banners and flags, and so forth." Instead, the article asserted, "we must lead the masses to engage in realistic and violent revolutionary actions."

Communist defensiveness about the offensive as a whole seemed reflected in an 18 June Liberation Radio "editorial" on the PRG Council of Ministers' 6-8 June meeting. Much as the communique on the meeting had seemed to respond to criticism of the offensive in endorsing the Council's appraisal of the situation leading up to the communist assault, the editorial struck a defensive note when it declared: "The PRGSV Council of Ministers' evaluation of the victories of our southern armed forces and people is very important because we can base ourselves on it to assert that our southern armed forces and people have made a sound decision in initiating the offensive and uprising high tide"*

DRV MINISTRIES PROTEST U.S. BOMBING, ATTACKS ON DIKES

Hanoi propaganda on U.S. strikes against North Vietnam seems to reflect increased concern about the effect of the bombing on the dike network. Alleged strikes against the dikes were protested in a DRV Water Conservancy Ministry statement on 16 June, the second such statement since the intensification of air strikes in early April,** and a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 15th focused on the bombing of dikes. Strikes against water conservancy projects were also mentioned in continuing daily foreign ministry spokesmen's protests on the 16th, 19th, and 20th. Hanoi has noted and derided U.S. denials that strikes are aimed at the dike system, but there has been no acknowledgment of U.S. announcements that supply boats and barges are being hit on DRV waterways.

The Water Conservancy Ministry statement was released by the ministry on 16 June at a press conference which it sponsored

* The Council of Ministers meeting is discussed in the 14 June TRENDS, pages 14 and 15.

** The first statement was dated 26 May and released on 30 May. See the 1 June TRENDS, pages 22-25.

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jointly with the DRV War Crimes Commission.* In scoring alleged U.S. strikes at the dike system from 10 April to 10 June, the statement charged that 32 "important dike portions of large rivers and 31 irrigation works" in the DRV had come under attack and that 665 bombs were dropped in the course of these actions, as well as "hundreds of shells" fired from ships. The statement claimed that the dike systems of the Red, Thai Binh, Day, Ma, and Lam rivers had each been hit several times and noted that these river networks protected "hundreds of thousands" of hectares of land as well as the lives and property of millions of people. On 21 June, a VNA report enumerated alleged U.S. raids on dikes in Nam Ha Province, in the Red River Delta, from 15 April to 18 June to rebut U.S. denials of such strikes.

The Water Conservancy Ministry statement charged that in addition to attacking river dikes, the United States had bombed portions of sea dikes in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, and Ninh Binh provinces and attacked canals and other irrigation works. It also claimed that the United States "deliberately used such antipersonnel weapons as steel pellet bombs and perforating bombs" against people assembled to repair the dikes "in a bid to prevent the restoration of the damaged dike portions and massacre the civilian population."

Denouncing U.S. attacks on the DRV dike and water conservancy system as a part of the "cruel and premeditated policy of the Nixon Administration," the statement accused the United States of seeking to sow death and famine in North Vietnam in order to save Vietnamization from collapse. It claimed that "political circles and public opinion" worldwide have condemned the attacks and have warned that if a breaking of the dikes this summer "provokes inundation, full responsibility for this genocide would fall upon the Nixon clique." After protesting the "continuous, atrocious attacks against the DRV dike and water conservancy system," the statement vowed that the Vietnamese people "are determined to smash the Nixon Administration's wicked and devilish schemes, defend the dikes and water conservancy works, and overcome all difficulties caused by the enemy."

* The DRV War Crimes Commission was also said to have released materials to reporters on the Nixon Administration's "crimes" since April. VNA on the 19th carried a statement by the commission--described as having been "made public recently"--which may have been the statement released at the 16 June press conference.

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Denigrating U.S. statements about the dikes, a 16 June Hanoi radio commentary rejected Defense Department "denials that any U.S. bombings or shelling have been directed at the dikes or have accidentally caused damage to dikes." It also berated "Nixon's closest adviser" Kissinger for stating that the Americans did not intentionally bomb nonmilitary targets and that any such attack would be unintentional and not in accord with U.S. policy. The radio claimed that the President "himself revealed his dark intention to strike at North Vietnam's dikes when he said that dikes constitute a strategic target and an indirect military target." According to the commentary, the President was attempting to "conceal his crime" when he said he would try to avoid attacking the dikes so as to hold down civilian losses. It charged that "by deliberately trying to destroy the North Vietnamese dike system to cause floods, Nixon has committed an extremely odious crime, a war crime cited in the indictment of the Nuremberg tribunal."

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY Hanoi did not, of course, acknowledge
SPOKESMAN'S PROTESTS the U.S. restriction of air strikes
 during the 15-18 June visit of President
Podgorny, but the avoidance of strikes in the Hanoi area was reflected in the locations cited in the DRV's continuing protests against the bombing. Specific charges leveled in the foreign ministry spokesman's statements include the following:

+ A 15 June statement charged that U.S. planes on the 14th bombed a portion of the sea dike in Nam Cuong village, rocketed the Lan canal in Tien Hai district, Thai Binh Province, and attacked peasants who were repairing damaged dikes in Nam Ngan area, Thanh Hoa Province. (VNA on the 16th detailed injuries caused in the reported 14 June attack on workers repairing "a dike heavily damaged in a previous raid" in Dong Son district, Thanh Hoa. The 16 June DRV Water Conservancy Ministry statement also discussed this incident.)

Using unusually strong language for a foreign ministry spokesman's protest, the 15 June statement charged that these attacks were "barbarous new crimes committed by the Nixon Administration in its wicked scheme to cause floods in North Vietnam." It claimed that "although the U.S. authorities have painstakingly declared that no U.S. bombardments in North Vietnam have been directed at dike systems or have accidentally caused damage to dikes, the fact is that U.S. air and naval forces in the past two months and more have not only attacked dikes, but also conducted hundreds of strikes on other

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irrigation works of North Vietnam, including the Thac Ba Dam." The statement charged that the Nixon Administration "was brutally trampling underfoot all norms of morality and conscience" and "insolently challenging" world public opinion. It also called on the "fraternal socialist countries" and others to "act in a timely manner to stay the bloody hands of the U.S. aggressors"--an appeal usually reserved for higher-level foreign ministry statements.

+ The spokesman's statement on 16 June, condemning "continued barbarous strikes on many populated areas in North Vietnam," charged that on the 14th and 15th U.S. planes "barbarously struck at the Ninh Binh provincial capital, several populated areas in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces, and the Vinh Linh area." It also said B-52's bombed "a number of hamlets in Quang Binh Province" and that "the U.S. aggressors indiscriminately dropped their bombs and shells on villages, hamlets, street districts, factories, dikes, and schools, deliberately trying to kill civilians and destroying many houses and economic and cultural establishments," including a school in Hung Nguyen district, Nghe An Province.

+ Another statement, dated 16 June by Hanoi radio and 17 June by VNA, charged that planes including B-52's "bombed and strafed many populous areas in Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh" on the 16th. It said U.S. bombs and shells "killed or wounded many civilians and destroyed many homes" and other property.

+ A statement dated 17 June by Hanoi radio and 18 June by VNA said that planes including B-52's "bombed and strafed many populous areas in Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces" and Vinh Linh on the 17th. "These barbarous air strikes," it said "killed or wounded many civilians and destroyed many homes and economic and cultural establishments of the people."

+ The protest of the 19th scored alleged actions on the 18th, charging that the United States continued "to barbarously bomb and shell many populated areas in Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, and Ha Tinh provinces" and that B-52's bombed "a certain number of villages and hamlets of Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh area." The spokesman also claimed that the United States "intentionally bombed and strafed many sections of dikes and canals in Y Yen, Hai Hau, Xuan Thuy, and Nghia Hung districts, Nam Ha Province."

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Specific details about the raids on the 18th were offered in a 19 June Hanoi broadcast. The radio claimed that while peasants in Nghia Hung district, Nam Ha Province were harvesting, "consolidating dikes and other protective embankments," and making preparations for floods, U.S. planes bombed and strafed "part of the dike along the Dao River in Nghia Minh village," the Minh Chau culvert, and "a number of populous areas in Nghia Hung district." The report noted that the Dao River dike in Nghia Minh "was recently consolidated to control flash floods and floods and protect production and the lives of the people in a number of villages of Nghia Hung and Nam Ninh districts," and that "the Minh Chau culvert, one of the major culverts in Nghia Hung district, is designed to control flash floods and protect production and the lives of peasants in the northern villages of Nghia Hung district." Claiming that many people were killed, it charged that the United States has committed "new, extremely savage crimes" by mobilizing a large number of planes and "using many types of large-sized demolition, CBU, and delayed action bombs to continuously strike for one month at many sections of river and coastal dike and many culvert, irrigation, and drainage systems and electrically powered pumping stations and massacring many laborers working on the dike in Nam Ha."

+ The 20 June statement charged that on the previous day, "pursuing their criminal war escalation," the Americans sent planes "to barbarously strike at many populated areas in Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area." It also said B-52's bombed a number of villages in Quang Binh and Vinh Linh. The bombings allegedly destroyed "a great number of houses and hydraulic works, including a section of the sea dike in Bach Long village, Xuan Thuy district, Nam Ha Province, and wounded and killed many civilians." The spokesman claimed that the army and people downed a B-52. This and subsequent claims of downings brought Hanoi's total of U.S. plane losses over the North to 3,665 as of 21 June.

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HANOI LAUDS, EXHORTS COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT WORKERS

Hanoi media on 15 and 16 June cited several units and individual workers awarded the title of "Labor Hero" by President Ton Duc Thang for outstanding achievement in communications and transportation. The decision to award the titles was evidently made at a 31 May meeting of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, reported by VNA on 1 June. In an apparent effort to bolster the morale of workers engaged in communications and transport, propaganda pegged to the awards praised the efforts in this area and maintained that despite all U.S. "schemes and tricks," DRV transportation and communications arteries "cannot be severed." The awards were discussed in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials on the 16th and again in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 17th. The papers noted that the communications and transportation front includes professional communications and transportation forces of the state as well as other units such as "assault youth units," military transportation forces, engineer units, antiaircraft and airforce units, radar, signal and liaison units, people's security forces, corvee terms, and transportation cooperatives.

Stressing the "strategic importance" of transportation efforts, the NHAN DAN editorial of the 16th said that the Nixon Administration is "seeking ways to break its stalemate" by concentrating efforts on "fiercely striking at our communications and transportation means in the hope of interdicting the flow of support and assistance from the fraternal countries and preventing the North from providing support and assistance for the South." Despite the sophistication of U.S. weapons, the editorial claimed, "our traffic has kept running, our goods have kept flowing to the frontline, and our troops on the battlefield have had enough food to eat and have achieved victories."

The 17 June editorial was more specific in detailing methods used by the allies to impede communications. It charged the United States has "resorted to shrewd maneuvers, launching large-scale attacks to completely destroy the targets, attacking all day long, coordinating bombing raids and shellings of specific targets by warships, spotting and hitting vehicles along the roads, spraying toxic chemicals to defoliate trees along the roadsides, and airdropping rangers to carry out investigation and sabotage activities."

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In addition to discussing the movement of supplies, this editorial also contained an unusual reference to the construction of roads to the battlefields, on the order of the communist construction in the period prior to the current offensive. It singled out PLAF engineers among other groups for praise, and it noted that one unit had "opened roads while exterminating enemy reconnaissance agents" and had "readied materials and equipment, reopened old roads, opened new roads, linked our roads to enemy highways, and insured the secret and safe advance of tanks toward the battleground."

Logistics tasks in the battlefield area had been noted in an article in the April issue of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN journal. Citing the duties of rear-services personnel, the article cited the need for coordination among various organs and forces, including the local rear services of each battlefield and the strategic rear services. It stressed the manifold nature of logistics requirements for large-scale combat and, among other things, claimed that the assuring of sufficient supplies played a key role in attacks during Lam Son 719 in early 1971 and during the assault on the Plain of Jars last December.

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U. S. - SOVIET SUMMIT

PRAVDA DEFENDS DETENTE POLICY AGAINST UNNAMED CRITICS

Moscow has sustained its effort to convince doubters abroad and possibly at home that "the impressive concrete results" of President Nixon's visit have enhanced the Soviet Union's prestige and have not compromised its internationalist image or its loyalty to an embattled ally. The latest in the series of authoritative articles in this vein, which have included the 26 May NEW TIMES article by Zagladin and the 9 June PRAVDA article by Inozemtsev, is an article in PRAVDA on 15 June under the presumed pseudonym "Yu. Chernov." Like its predecessors, Chernov's article in effect rationalized the holding of the summit despite Vietnam, developing the theme that the outcome of the President's visit "will have a great positive effect on the international situation as a whole," redounding both to the benefit of the Soviet people and to the interests of the entire international movement. Radio Moscow broadcast summaries of the article widely in foreign languages, including Vietnamese, Mandarin, and Korean.

Entitled "A Real Force in International Development," the article urged that the summit's results be judged "in the context of the development of the contemporary international situation" and the need for coexistence in the nuclear age--and, by implication, not strictly in the narrower context of such immediate considerations as Vietnam. Hailing the results of the summit in the most euphoric terms to date, Chernov remarked that "it is difficult to find another example of such fruitful results achieved during negotiations in the entire history of international relations." In the pattern of earlier comment, he went on to stress the international importance of the agreements reached, emphasizing first of all the strategic arms limitation accords as well as the pledges by both sides in the joint document on principles "to do everything possible to avoid military confrontation and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war." Summing up the summit accomplishments, Chernov said: "These agreements marked a real and positive advance in relations between the two countries and laid the foundation both for a considerable development of these relations and for the further normalization of the international situation as a whole."

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In effect adducing the substantive results as vindication of the CPSU leadership's decision to go ahead with the summit despite Vietnam, the article took unnamed critics to task in the bluntest language to date:

The fact that such a dialog did take place despite the complexity of the international situation and the occasionally direct resistance of people who like to derive benefit from artificially fomenting hostility and tension between other states is a credit to the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo, which pursue a foreign policy based not on mere ad hoc considerations or whims but on the profound and fundamental interests of the Soviet people and world socialism. . . .

Driving the point home to hardline elements in the international movement, Chernov argued that "tactical compromises" are not "a sign of weakness or softness," but are "an obligation for all who are guided in their actions by the real interests of peace and socialism rather than by 'revolutionary' phraseology." As in Inozemtsev's PRAVDA article, he was at pains to demonstrate that during the talks the USSR upheld its "principled position" on Vietnam and "spoke from a position of immutable solidarity with and resolute support for the Vietnamese people's heroic struggle."

As if in reply to those critics who see a contradiction between the positive results of the summit and the fact that the war in Vietnam is continuing,* Chernov pointed out that the world situation remains complex and that "problems and conflicts cannot be expected to solve themselves even in the presence of authoritative international agreements." He sought to put the onus on the United States for persisting tensions, commenting that such problems cannot be resolved "if aggressive circles in the capitalist countries resume their attempts to resolve questions 'from a position of strength.'"

* At a 5 June dinner in his honor during his recent visit to Moscow, Tito pointed to "the paradox" that such "positive" developments as the U.S.-Soviet summit should occur while "the aggression against North Vietnam continues."

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BREZHNEV GIVEN SPECIAL PRAISE FOR SUMMIT DIPLOMACY

Local aktiv meetings held throughout the USSR to approve the results of the summit talks are being used to give Brezhnev personal credit on an unprecedented scale. Having reported on 2 June that the Politburo, Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Council of Ministers had endorsed the work of the Brezhnev-Podgornyy-Kosygin troyka in the summit talks, PRAVDA began on the 9th to publicize local aktiv meetings that approved the foreign policy activity both of the Politburo collectively and of Brezhnev "personally." Only a few areas have not gone along with this formula. For example, the 9 June Estonian aktiv meeting praised only the Politburo's activity, according to both PRAVDA and SOVIET ESTONIA on 10 June. PRAVDA has clearly sought to point up Brezhnev's personal role: Where KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA on 10 June reported the preceding day's Tadzhik aktiv meeting as adopting what seemed a compromise formula praising the activity of the Politburo, of Brezhnev "personally," and also of Podgornyy and Kosygin, PRAVDA's version cut the reference to Podgornyy and Kosygin.

Concurrently, the troyka is still being cited. Thus at the 13 June Supreme Soviet Presidium session on the Iraq-Soviet treaty, according to IZVESTIYA on 14 June, Kunayev praised the "deeply realistic, purposeful, and farsighted foreign policy actions" of the Politburo "and Comrades L. I. Brezhnev, N. V. Podgornyy, and A. N. Kosygin personally."

The pervasive praise for the Politburo and Brezhnev "personally" stands in sharp contrast to the formula used at the last such round of aktiv meetings, which almost uniformly lauded the foreign affairs activity of the Politburo collectively. At local meetings held in December 1971 to approve the November 1971 Central Committee plenum decisions, Brezhnev was singled out for separate praise only in a few isolated cases--by Central Committee Secretary Katushev at the Komsomol Central Committee plenum, by the Leningrad oblast soviet, by the Adzhar obkom first secretary, by a Ukrainian raykom secretary, and by individual workers or peasants in Moscow, Azerbaydzhan, and Moldavia. Of these accolades, PRAVDA reported only (on 18 December) a Moscow workers' statement about the "tireless activity of the Politburo and General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in conducting the Leninist peace-loving policy"--without the "personally."

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POLAND-YUGOSLAVIA

TITO ARRIVES IN WARSAW ON "OFFICIAL FRIENDLY" VISIT

Warsaw and Belgrade comment surrounding the start of President Tito's "official friendly" visit to Poland on 19 June underscores the improvement in bilateral relations, especially in the economic sphere, with some commentaries also making a point of the good relations between Poland as a Warsaw Pact member and nonaligned Yugoslavia. Positive portrayals of Belgrade's nonalignment in the Polish comment contrast with the Soviet comment during Tito's recent visit to the USSR, which avoided the subject of nonalignment and stressed instead the need for coordination of foreign policy.

In his toast at a dinner after initial "cordial and friendly" talks with Tito on the 19th, Polish party leader Gierek noted that bilateral contacts "have developed well in recent times" and that "economic relations in particular are developing dynamically." He assessed as "identical or similar" the Polish and Yugoslav attitudes on European security and "many other questions"--an assessment reported the next day by TASS, which also noted Tito's remark in reply that "our views are convergent" on the need to convene a European security conference.

On receiving an honorary degree from Warsaw University on the 20th, Tito characterized Yugoslav foreign policy in standard terms as one of "nonalignment and active peaceful coexistence" and dwelt candidly on domestic difficulties in implementing workers' self-management--"there are almost no guidelines or experiences"--and combatting nationalism, fomented by "the class enemy." Gierek had inherited a nominal workers' self-management system from the Gomulka era but has generally called directly for greater worker participation in decision-making rather than for strengthening the self-management system itself.

As in the case of his visit to the Soviet Union, Tito's visit to Poland is his first since the 1968 Czechoslovak episode; he last visited Poland in June 1964, and the most recent high-level Polish visit to Belgrade was by Premier Jaroszewicz in October of last year. On the 20th, the day after Tito arrived in Warsaw, TASS announced the arrival of Jaroszewicz on a "friendly unofficial" visit to Moscow, where he was greeted by Kosygin. Later that day, Moscow media reported Jaroszewicz's

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return to Warsaw after "warm and comradely" talks with Kosygin. TASS said their "exchange of opinions" helped deepen USSR-Polish friendship, based on "complete mutual confidence and identity of views on all basic issues."

WARSAW COMMENT TRYBUNA LUDU on the 19th viewed Tito's visit against the background of "the deep-seated concordance in the assessment of key international issues" by the two countries, noting that "political and interparty" as well as economic relations had improved "in the recent period." The differing status of the two socialist countries was openly discussed in other articles: The military daily ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI on the 17th observed that, "as is known," Belgrade's foreign policy "differs from the policy of Poland and other socialist states of central and southeast Europe which cooperate in the economic field in CEMA and are linked by a political and defensive alliance whose expression, in terms of international law, is the Warsaw Treaty." The paper went on to remark that "the Yugoslav Communist League has recognized it as expedient--taking into account the conditions of its country--not to join any military alliance and to conduct a policy of nonalignment." At the same time, it stressed that Belgrade's stand against "imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism" is "much convergent with the objectives of the states of the socialist commonwealth" and that Yugoslavia's foreign policy principles "are a good basis for its rapprochement with Poland, the Soviet Union, and the whole socialist commonwealth." It added that "in fact, such a rapprochement is taking place."

The Peasant Party daily DZIENNIK LUDOWY on the 19th commented that "while resolutely reconfirming its membership in the group of socialist nations, Yugoslavia has been playing for almost two decades an extremely important and active role in the movement of nonaligned states, enjoying a big prestige among the third-world countries."

BELGRADE COMMENT TANJUG's diplomatic editor observed in a commentary on the 18th that Belgrade-Warsaw differences of views "are logical owing to the two countries' different positions--one is nonaligned, the other a member of the Warsaw Treaty." The commentary traced the improved relations to the Polish change of leadership in December 1970. "Since the new leadership came to power in Poland" the two countries' relations have been "freed of the weight which had burdened" them "in the preceding years," it said, adding that Tito and Gierak "will face no past burdens or present-day problems in their talks."

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TANJUG on 17 June carried an interview Tito had given on the 13th to a Warsaw radio and television correspondent in Belgrade, focusing heavily on the World War II bases of Polish-Yugoslav friendship. Tito described relations today as "very good and friendly," with cooperation "developing" in the economic, political, and cultural fields. Implicitly reasserting the rationale for Belgrade's "workers' self-management" brand of socialism, he pointed to current implementation of the "workers' amendments" to the Yugoslav constitution, stressing that "in socialism, those who create things, the producers, must be the main factor," and "we do not want them ordered about or decisions made on their behalf" by "various technocrats and others."

CEMA AGREEMENT Coinciding with Tito's arrival in Warsaw, TANJUG reported on the 19th that Yugoslav representatives had signed "multilateral agreements with the representatives of the member countries of CEMA on specialization, division of labor, and cooperation" in the fields of shipbuilding and machine-tool production. The head of the Yugoslav delegation at the signing, Federal Assembly appropriations committee head Cetinic, was quoted to the effect that "this is the first multilateral agreement of this kind concluded between Yugoslavia and CEMA." He added that the members of CEMA, "of which Yugoslavia is not a member,* have accepted in a special manner the specific features of the Yugoslav self-management economy."

The Yugoslavs have upped the level of their delegation to the 26th CEMA Council session scheduled to open 29 June in Moscow. TANJUG announced on the 20th that Premier Bijedic would head the delegation. The highest ranking member of the Belgrade delegation to the 25th CEMA session in Bucharest last July was the first deputy premier, Grlickov.

* The formal basis of Belgrade's gradually increasing contacts with CEMA is an agreement signed in Moscow on 17 September 1964, a month before Khrushchev's ouster, which provided for Yugoslav "participation" in the work of several CEMA commissions and increased attendance as "observer" at other commission sessions.

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MIDDLE EAST

SELECTIVE MOSCOW PUBLICITY FOR EGYPTIAN WAR MINISTER'S VISIT

Moscow's moderate publicity for Egyptian War Minister Sadiq's 8-13 June "official friendly" visit to the USSR, its apparent failure to publicize some aspects of the visit, and the absence of a communique seem calculated to reassert Soviet solidarity and cooperation with Egypt while suppressing any indications of military bargaining or differences. The invitation to Sadiq had been extended by Grechko during his 14-17 May visit to Egypt; the communique on those talks had said Sadiq's trip would take place "in the near future."* A followup commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 15th called the Sadiq visit fruitful, stressed the relations of "friendship and comprehensive cooperation" between Moscow and Cairo, and again pledged assistance, including "military aid," to peoples struggling for their legitimate rights, noting that the USSR believes the Arabs "should use all necessary means" to protect these rights.

In his only reported speech during Sadiq's visit, Grechko merely said, according to the Soviet military paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, that the Arabs have the support and solidarity of the Soviet Union. A Cairo account of this speech, at a dinner on the 11th, reported Grechko as saying the USSR continues to provide Egypt with aid to "enhance its military ability and the preparedness of its armed forces" and as remarking that the discussions in Cairo and Moscow contributed "to a better understanding" and constituted a new step in strengthening the friendly relations of the two armies. On the same occasion, Sadiq was reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) as saying he had the impression, after his meeting with Brezhnev, that the Soviet people not only stand by the Egyptians in seeking a peaceful solution, if this is possible, but also "stand by our side with strength to liberate our land" by strengthening Egypt's armed forces. Cairo radio, but not Moscow media, reported that in welcoming Sadiq on the 8th Marshal Grechko voiced assurance that "neither Nixon nor anybody else" could affect Soviet-Egyptian friendship.

* The markedly differing Soviet and Egyptian versions of the communique on Grechko's visit to Egypt are discussed in the 24 May TRENDS, pages 32-36.

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Moscow failed to recount some of Sadiq's activities and glossed over others. Thus KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reported a meeting of the Soviet and Egyptian delegations on the 8th, the day of Sadiq's arrival; Cairo's AL-AHRAM additionally noted that Sadiq and Grechko met after the delegations' talks. On the 9th, TASS reported Sadiq's "warm and friendly conversation" with Brezhnev, as well as talks between Grechko and Sadiq. Cairo media said "further talks" were expected between the two, and AL-AHRAM on the 12th reported that Sadiq had his second private meeting with Grechko the afternoon of the previous day. But KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's 13 June roundup of his activities failed to mention this meeting, and available Soviet accounts do not refer to any official talks after the 9th.

Reporting Sadiq's presence at military exercises on the 10th, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA did not point out--as AL-AHRAM did--that the "tactical exercises" included "crossing water obstacles." AL-AHRAM on the 10th mentioned that Sadiq had been invited by Admiral Gorshkov to visit Moscow River; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA merely acknowledged Gorshkov's presence at some of the functions in Moscow. AL-AHRAM also said that Sadiq's visit had been extended by a day to enable him to visit the major Soviet naval base in the Black Sea and later reported that Sadiq had been accompanied from Moscow by Gorshkov. Soviet reports glossed over this aspect of the visit, merely saying that Sadiq had a "short rest on the southern shore of the Crimea," visited Sevastopol "on a fast launch," toured the city, and was seen off for home by several military leaders, including Black Sea fleet officers. There was no mention of Gorshkov's presence on this part of the tour. In his thank-you cable to Grechko, reported by MENA but not by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, Sadiq expressed pleasure at having visited the Black Sea fleet on the 13th.

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CHINA

PEOPLE'S DAILY EXPLAINS THAT NO LEADER IRREPLACEABLE

A PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 11 June, broadcast that day on the domestic radio, may be preparing the ground for a China without Mao by putting the role of the leader in perspective. Attacking "swindlers" for promoting the view that history is made by geniuses, the article affirms that history is made by the masses and that "it is not heroes who create the situation, but the situation that produces heroes." The article cites Engels as saying that a particular leader may arise at a particular time, "but cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found." Conveying the message to the world at large, the NCNA international service a week later carried excerpts of the article, including the intriguing citation of Engels.

The article is not an attack on Mao; since Lin's Piao's fall "swindlers" have been accused of presenting themselves as false heroes and believers in innate genius. The current article goes further, however, in emphasizing that no leader is irreplaceable. Mao's historical position is preserved in the article's observation that "in particular the role played by the leader of the proletariat . . . surpasses any heroic character in history."

Attempts to portray Mao as a genius were laid directly at the feet of the swindlers by a 13 June Chengtu broadcast which attacked them for "misinterpretations out of context" in teaching the theory of genius. While "they appeared to be praising the revolutionary leader," actually they were praising themselves.

The appearance of the PEOPLE'S DAILY article is likely to fuel speculation that Mao is seriously ill and that the succession question is particularly topical. During his latest absence from view Mao failed to see two visitors--the Somali chief of state and the widow of Edgar Snow, who has recently been eulogized in glowing terms--whom he might be expected to receive. The May Day celebrations were arranged in such a way as to obviate a Mao appearance. Similar arrangements had marked a change in celebrations of National Day last October, but at that time a significant number of leaders in addition

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to Mao were absent. On May Day the top leaders were carefully accounted for (except for Li Hsien-nien, who, however, was performing his usual duties just before and after May Day). There have also been indications that the top leaders have been engaged in consultations, perhaps over the succession problem--what PEOPLE'S DAILY may have meant by the "demand for a substitute."

MILITIA INSTRUCTION ANNIVERSARY USED TO ATTACK LIN VIEWS

Extensive publicity for the 10th anniversary of Mao's dictum that "militia work must be put on a solid basis organizationally, politically, and militarily" has concentrated on attacking military errors of "swindler" Lin Piao. The most authoritative comment was a LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on 19 June attacking swindlers for taking an incorrect approach to organizational building of the militia while outwardly pretending to follow Mao's line on people's war. The primacy of organization over politics, a primacy not often stressed during the cultural revolution, was sanctioned by dredging up a Mao quote that "the first requisite for the militia is organization . . . 'have' or 'have not' must first be answered before talking about politics." While the editorial noted the militia's role in labor and education, it continued the trend obvious since Lin's downfall of stressing the military role of the militia. In a possible allusion to Soviet-U.S. arms control agreements, the editorial cited Lenin's remark that as long as people are oppressed "what we should strive for is not to abolish armed forces, but to arm all of the people."

Pressing a theme developed by many recent provincial broadcasts, the editorial firmly stated that military priorities have been restructured and that instead of PLA involvement in all fields in support of the left, "the provincial military districts and military subdistricts should regard militia work as their primary task." Members of people's armed forces departments must resume their role of being subordinate to the party and "serve local party committees as their staff officers."

BACKGROUND: Mao's stress on militia organization was honored mainly in the breach during the cultural revolution. The fifth anniversary of Mao's statement in 1967 was ignored completely by PRC media as the PLA's political role in supporting the left was emphasized. However, the reappraisal of both domestic and foreign policies prompted by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes

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included the question of the role of the militia and of the PLA, which was to a great extent tied down with civil tasks. PRC media during 1969 became increasingly attentive to the militia's military role, though most often simply by stating the decisive role of "people not things" rather than reporting changes toward more militia training. Apparently Lin resisted any great increase in military training for the militia, either because of not wishing to take PLA men out of positions of civil power to supervise training or because of not wanting to divert resources from regular to militia units.

Broadcasts in 1970 and into 1971 sometimes revealed the pulling and hauling between the two lines and the uncertainty of local leaders. The eighth anniversary of Mao's militia dictum was celebrated in a few provinces in 1970, and a Canton rally stressed that organization was primary. A speech by Chen Yu at the rally, however, paid relatively little attention to military training and continued to stress politics. Honan broadcasts in the late winter of 1971 showed an awareness of the struggle against "politics above everything," but revealed that the local leaders had not yet quite gotten their line right. One of the broadcasts, from Chengchow radio on 13 March, admitted that some military representatives had set the building of political power against militia building, saying that in order to perform their revolutionary duties well they had to neglect militia work. The radio's answer at that time was that by "building political power we can promote militia building." The view that "power is above everything" was recently denounced by a Tsinghai military forum on 15 May, part of a more general effort to stress that power is useless unless it is used to carry out correct policies.

Even before Lin's open fall from power last September, he was evidently losing his battle to maintain the army and the militia as his political instruments. In a ninth anniversary editorial on 19 June last year, the KWANGSI DAILY attacked "Liu and his ilk" for having said that "in the three aspects of militia building, politics should come first."

CAMPAIGN AGAINST LIN BUTTRESSES MODERATE EDUCATIONAL LINE

Peking's recently intensified campaign against "leftist" swindlers--part of the ongoing ideological drive against Lin Piao and his followers--is being used to repudiate many educational guidelines that arose during the cultural revolution. The move to temper radical educational reforms is being justified by building a case against Lin charging that he exploited Mao's works for his own ends and is responsible for a "leftist" deviation from Mao's educational line during the cultural revolution.

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In order to correctly implement current domestic policies, cadres are now instructed to deepen their study of Mao's works in their entirety--rather than simply to read selected quotations--in order to avoid the tendency of looking at problems narrowly and adopting simple approaches to complex problems. It was under Lin's aegis, of course, that selections of QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO (more familiarly known as the "Little Red Book") were compiled and annotated.* The need to read Mao's original works rather than just quotations was firmly argued in an unusually frank NANFANG DAILY commentator's article, broadcast by the Canton radio on 2 June, which faulted local cadres for "failing to understand sufficiently the importance of persisting in reading Marxist-Leninist and Chairman Mao's original works seriously." Castigating those cadres who argued that "they were so busy that they had no time to read the original works," the article specifically denounced the view "that it was all right to study some quotations and dissertations in the light of special topics" and that "it was necessary to read the original works thoroughly." Stressing the need to read the original works "one by one," the article cautioned leadership cadres at and above the county level that "if we are satisfied only with understanding the individual phrases, sentences, and conclusions of Marxism, if we study them by way of improvisation, and if we do not understand and master the basic principles, we cannot grasp firmly our revolutionary teacher's standpoint."

Similar themes were developed in a commentary broadcast by the Szechwan provincial radio on 13 June which lauded members of a local party committee for "heightening their ability to distinguish between genuine and sham Marxism" and for repudiating the "leftist opportunist line" by "seriously reading books." The commentary described how one member of the committee was able to deepen his understanding of the "antiparty and antisocialist plots" pushed by "swindlers" who "hung up the signboard of Marxism and even quoted authoritative works, scaring people." "Actually," the commentary declared, "they were adopting the method of making deliberate misinterpretations out of context, completely distorting the basic principles of Marxism . . . in order to cheat and hoodwink the masses."

* The front page of QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO, originally compiled for distribution in the ranks of the PLA in 1964 and then released to the civilian masses in the early months of the cultural revolution in 1966, contained an injunction in Lin's own handwriting: "Study Chairman Mao's writings, follow his teachings and act according to his instruction."

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Linking the campaign to study Mao's works in their entirety with the need for correct implementation of the party's policy on intellectuals, Radio Peking on 17 June called upon cadres to increase their ability to "distinguish between the party's policy on intellectuals and the trash peddled by swindlers" in order to avoid the "great confusion" which will arise "if we implement what is incorrect." It is essential, the commentary argued, "to overcome the tendency of looking at problems one-sidedly or with a simple approach and to conduct an overall and concrete analysis of problems" and "to make everyone understand that the building of socialism in China calls for the service of as many intellectuals as possible."

Striking at "the fallacy of the extreme 'left' that 'politics can oust everything,'" the Shenyang radio on 13 June reported on the rejection of erroneous educational theories at Liaoning University. The commentary asserted that "the effort to improve the quality of teaching and study" at the university was "adversely affected" as several teachers had failed to handle correctly the relationship between politics and professionalism in teaching. This failure was attributed to "the pernicious influence of the fallacies spread by swindlers like Liu Shao-chi." Condemning "swindlers" who attempted to "separate politics from profession" and "make people deviate from Chairman Mao's revolutionary line," the article argued that students "must strive to study well cultural and scientific knowledge under the command of proletarian politics and take the road of being both Red and expert." Current efforts to downplay the "Red" or ideological objectives for students and raise the quality of education were reflected in a KWANGSI DAILY commentator's article broadcast by Nanning radio on 13 June which called for intensifying repudiation of the educational line that "emphasized political requirements one-sidedly."

These moderate educational guidelines were given authoritative sanction in a PEOPLE'S DAILY article broadcast by Radio Peking on 5 June which reported on the progress of using scientific and technical personnel at the model Taching research institute. In order to "give full play to the technical expertise of intellectuals in accordance with the party's policy," the article reported that "98 percent" of all former technicians have assumed scientific research posts, thus giving impetus to the development of scientific research work. In an instructive parable, the article told about a female technician at the institute who came from "a family of the

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exploiting classes" and was "criticized during the great cultural revolution, which somewhat dampened her enthusiasm." The party committee at the institute was applauded for overcoming initial misgivings and finally "putting this technician in charge of an important scientific research project." Pointing out that "for a period of time the Taching oilfield's exploitation research institute was influenced by the extreme 'left' trend of thought," the article lauded the institute's party committee for successfully overcoming the fears of "quite a few scientific and technical personnel who were afraid to study techniques" and "dared not consult foreign-language materials nor adopt the advanced technological experiences gained by foreign countries."

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