

26 JULY 1972

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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26 JULY 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 17 - 23 JULY 1972

<u>Moscow (3098 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1219 items)</u>		
Indochina	(11%)	14%	Domestic Issues	(34%)	33%
[Geneva Agreements	(--)	7%]	Indochina	(19%)	17%
Anniversary,			[Geneva Agreements	(2%)	9%]
Solidarity Month			Anniversary		
Egypt	(5%)	8%	[Sihanouk Tour	(12%)	5%]
[Revolution	(0.3%)	4%]	Yemeni (Sana) Premier in PRC	(1%)	10%
Anniversary			Yemeni (Aden) Government	(6%)	6%
[Withdrawal of	(--)	4%]	Delegation in PRC, DPRK		
Soviet Advisers			New Japanese Cabinet	(1%)	5%
CEMA Sescion	(13%)	6%	Korean Unification	(4%)	3%
Polish National Day	(--)	5%	Withdrawal of Soviet	(--)	3%
UN Secretary General	(--)	3%	Advisers from Egypt		
Waldheim in USSR					
Iraqi-Soviet Treaty	(--)	3%			
Ratification					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi's propaganda campaign on the U.S. air strikes in North Vietnam includes denunciation of strikes against the capital in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on 22 July--the first protest at this level since 4 July. Charges of strikes at dikes are also reiterated, with the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 20th, 21st, and 25th assailing alleged strikes in Thanh Hoa, Nam Ha, and Hai Hung provinces, respectively. At the same time, while warning against continued bombing, a NHAN DAN editorial on 25 July declared that because of early work on the embankments, "our dikes are now big, high, and solid."

Hanoi gave its usual perfunctory attention to the 20 July session of the Paris talks; the standard VNA account summarized the communist delegates' statements in which they again insisted on a simultaneous military and political settlement and rejected the notion of a cease-fire prior to such a settlement. Glossing over the allied statements, VNA observed that they "rehashed their colonialist bellicose stand" and dwelled on the eight-point plan and President Nixon's 8 May proposal. The account also noted cryptically that the DRV delegation had announced Dr. Kissinger's meeting with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy on the 19th.

Moscow has continued its routine denunciation of the U.S. air strikes and insistence that the war must be ended by negotiations. The launching of a month of Soviet-Vietnam friendship and solidarity on 20 July, the anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements, occasioned pledges of continued Soviet assistance, with commentators citing Brezhnev's description of Soviet aid as "immutable" and to be continued until final victory.

Peking used the occasion of the anniversary of the Geneva agreements to repeat its call for an accommodation in Vietnam while again pledging support for the war effort in the absence of a settlement. The Chinese have also lent their voice to the condemnation of alleged U.S. bombing of North Vietnamese dikes but have avoided raising broader issues in that context.

DRV MINISTRY ASSAILS STRIKES AT HANOI, CLAIMS DIKES BOMBED

U.S. air strikes at Hanoi on 22 July triggered a protest at the authoritative level of a DRV Foreign Ministry statement. However, strikes on the 3d in the outskirts of the capital and of Haiphong were protested only in a routine statement by the DRV Foreign

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Ministry spokesman. Many of the higher-level protests since the resumption of the air strikes in early April have been issued in response to action against Hanoi or Haiphong.*

The current foreign ministry statement cited bombing of Nam Dinh city and "populous areas" in Ha Tay Province as well as strikes in the capital. In claiming that populous areas and economic establishments within Hanoi and the nearby suburban districts were "savagely bombed," the statement said that "these frenzied, criminal war acts" prove that the Nixon Administration "has not stopped dreaming of success in salvaging, by means of military might, the collapsing 'Vietnamization'" and in "forcing the Vietnamese people to accept its insolent terms." Additional details on U.S. raids on the 22d were provided by VNA on the same day in an item which claimed that U.S. aircraft dropped bombs on "nearly 20 places" in Hanoi and its outskirts, killing or wounding many civilians and destroying a number of houses. VNA on the 24th said that 16 rows of houses near a building-materials factory were also demolished in the raid. And U.S. planes were said to have "rained bombs" on a residential section of Hai Ba Trung district inside Hanoi.

DRV RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST ALLIES The DRV Foreign Ministry statement reverted to a previously standard Hanoi practice when it raised the issue of socialist support and assistance to the Vietnamese. The two most recent foreign ministry statements, on 26 June and 4 July, had differed from all the other high-level Hanoi statements on the air strikes since April in failing to mention the socialist countries. The current statement returned to the more usual pattern when it said "it is the conviction of the DRV Government that the governments and people of the brother socialist countries and the other countries championing peace and justice . . . will act in time and with resolve to check the bloodstained hands of the American war maniacs and to give still more vigorous support and assistance to the Vietnamese people's just struggle"

* Such foreign ministry statements were issued on 4 July, 26 June, 10 June, 18 May, and 11 May. A 6 May foreign ministry statement had protested action against Nam Dinh; the announcement of the mining of Haiphong and other ports prompted a DRV Government statement on 10 May, and the initial attacks against Hanoi and Haiphong on 16 April had brought a DRV joint party-government statement that day. A 6 April foreign ministry statement condemned strikes at Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces as well as Vinh Linh.

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The 10 June statement, the last previous statement on the air strikes to mention the socialist countries, had expressed gratitude for condemnation of U.S. actions and had also gone on to appeal to "brothers and friends" to struggle "even more vigorously" to stay the aggressors' hand and "to continue to support and assist the Vietnamese people." Other high-level statements since April had used various formulations on communist support and assistance; the 10 May government statement on U.S. mining was somewhat similar to the current one in expressing "firm confidence" in strengthened support and further assistance.* It is unclear why references to socialist support were omitted from the 24 June and 4 July statements and what relation these omissions might have to the state of the DRV's relations with its two big communist allies. One development between the 4 and 22 July statements that may be relevant was Le Duc Tho's 11 July departure from Hanoi for Paris and the resumed peace talks.** It is possible that factors that led to the resumption of the Paris talks and Le Duc Tho's subsequent conversations during his stopovers in Peking and Moscow en route back to Paris accounted for the DRV Foreign Ministry's resumption of its standard references to its communist allies.

ALLEGED STRIKES AT DIKES Along with routine protests by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman that the U.S. air strikes continue to be aimed at dikes, Hanoi recently has been publicizing statements by heads of provincial Water Conservancy Departments. Hanoi radio's domestic service on the 17th broadcast a statement by the Nam Ha Water Conservancy chief, Do Van Tuyen, which reviewed alleged strikes at local dikes and water conservancy projects since the April escalation. The statement--which was also reported in a Moscow Mandarin-language broadcast on the 23d--concluded that "all of these attacks were premeditated and calculated to destroy the whole dike and dam system in our most important areas." It said that "thousands of assault units consisting of tens of thousands of members" who are "thoroughly trained" in all technical aspects of dike repair

* See the TRENDS of 14 June 1972, pages 3-4.

** It seems noteworthy that DRV Foreign Ministry statements on 13 and 19 July, in support of PRG Foreign Ministry statements on "crimes" in Quang Tri, also contained appeals to socialist as well as other countries to take timely action to check the United States.

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have been organized and that inspections are made "every day, hour, and minute so that the appropriate measures can be taken in time to protect the dikes."

A similar statement by Thanh Hoa's Water Conservancy head was broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 24th. Claiming that dike and dam systems within Thanh Hoa Province have been hit 22 times during the past four months, the statement argued that these strikes were "premeditated and planned" and charged the "Nixon clique" with attempting to weaken Thanh Hoa's dikes and dams "so that there will be gaps in the dikes before the high water season comes." The statement concluded that if breaks occur in the dikes and dams that have been bombed and "gravely damaged," the President "must be held responsible for the crime of genocide."

A statement by Hai Hung's Water Conservancy chief, broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 25th, denounced "the war maniac U.S. clique headed by President Nixon" for ordering 12 air strikes at local dikes and dams from 10 May to 18 July. Aircraft were said to have dropped 151 bombs on 23 portions of dikes within the province. Asserting that damaged portions of the dikes have been repaired and are "taller and higher than previously," the statement cautioned that "they remain the most vulnerable and worrisome spots in this season of flash floods because many of them had their foundations destroyed or their surface heavily cracked by bombs." Spelling out the need for greater mobilization "to frustrate Nixon's scheme to destroy our dikes," the statement warned that "flash floods, with high water pressure, can cause leaks then collapse dikes, thus causing a great disaster to the people in our province."

An editorial in NHAN DAN on the 25th was atypically optimistic regarding the condition of the DRV dikes when it predicted that the coming high water season could be dealt with satisfactorily. As broadcast by Hanoi radio, it said that "because of the early work on the embankments, our dikes are now big, high, and solid." The VNA press review for the 25th noted that the paper additionally had said that "according to estimates of specialists, the dike systems are capable of standing the biggest floods in North Vietnam." In the same vein, a Hanoi radio commentary in English on the 25th said that according to experts the successful repair campaign should make it possible for the dikes and dams "to withstand the heaviest floods ever known in this country if they are not bombed by U.S. aircraft before or during the flood season."

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In detailing the repair work, the NHAN DAN editorial claimed that by early July the provinces with dikes on large rivers had successfully embanked their dikes with several million cubic meters of earth; the repair work was said to be of "high technical quality." Dike repair teams were, nevertheless, cautioned to intensify their efforts to quickly repair even slight weaknesses in the dikes in order to prevent more extensive damage and to insure "that the dikes will not collapse even against high water and strong waves." It said that newly repaired dike sections "must be watched closely and protected carefully throughout the season of high water." Dike "protectors" are to be trained to understand the basic techniques of spotting and making temporary repairs while waiting for more professional assistance from larger "assault armies" which have been organized and are stationed at designated places along the dikes.

"WAR CRIMES" A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 25th cited White House statements that there is the possibility of error in the use of laser-guided bombs or "smart bombs" in denouncing the President for attempting to use "the error logic . . . to whitewash his genocidal crimes" of bombing dikes and killing civilians. Arguing that laser-guided bombs are known to be extremely accurate, "with a tolerance margin not wider than two feet," the article charged "Nixon and company" with spreading "round-about arguments to appease public opinion."

Publicizing the "legal aspects" of alleged U.S. strikes at dikes, Hanoi radio on the 23d broadcast an interview with Pham Thanh Vinh, member of the standing committee of the Vietnam lawyers association, which advanced the now routine thesis that the bombing of dikes and dams by "the U.S. imperialists is part of an elaborate plan . . . to destroy the networks of dikes and irrigation projects in North Vietnam on a large scale and in a systematic manner to cause floods in the coming flood season." Pham Thanh Vinh observed that since the Nuremberg trials 30 years ago, "striking at dikes has been a category of major war crimes."

The Nixon Administration's "crimes" were also highlighted in publicity on the 20th for a press conference on the 18th by the DRV War Crimes Committee which detailed stepped-up U.S. actions during the past three months. It said that the President "has brazenly sent aircraft and warships to barbarously strike at such civilian targets in the northern part of our country as our cities, villages, schools, hospitals, nurseries, churches, pagodas, dikes, and water conservancy projects." It specifically claimed that 17

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of the DRV's 23 provinces and "all six municipalities, including Hanoi and Haiphong, have come under heavy attacks" and that "many compatriots, most of them women and children, were killed or wounded." U.S. aircraft were also said to have strafed 58 important portions of the network of dikes along large rivers 135 times and to have hit 46 small and large water conservancy projects in the "northern part of our country" within the past three months.

Hanoi also exploited statements attributed to actress Jane Fonda during her two-week visit to the DRV to bolster its charges of U.S. war crimes. Recorded statements purportedly in her own voice were broadcast by Hanoi radio, particularly in its English-language broadcasts directed to American servicemen in Indochina but also in other services. Among other things, these statements denounced President Nixon for continuing to commit "war crimes" against the North, including bombing of nonmilitary targets, while trying to convince the American people that he was working to "wind down" the war. In other respects as well, the statements hewed closely to Hanoi's basic propaganda themes--for example, the demand that the United States immediately end the war in accordance with the demands in the PRG's seven-point proposal, and the assertion that U.S. bombing will never blunt the determination of the Vietnamese to fight until final victory.

PLANE DOWNINGS, Hanoi reports during the week of 20-26 July
MISSILE SERVICE credited the armed forces and people of the capital and nine provinces with downing a total of 21 U.S. planes. Six planes each day were claimed for 22 and 23 July, with the armed forces and people of Hanoi receiving credit for two each day; the next largest figure for daily downings was five for the 24th, with Lang Son Province claiming three. The total number of claimed downings over the North was 3,783 as of 24 July.

A plane Hanoi said was downed on 22 July and its pilot captured was hailed as the 500th plane downed by Nghe An Province, which thus gained the distinction of becoming "one of the localities that have shot down the greatest number of U.S. aircraft." A message from the VPA High Command commended Nghe An's "feats of arms" and stressed the province's support of "the great frontline"--sentiments echoed in radio and press comment, including an article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 23d. A Hanoi radio commentary on the 23d said that Nghe An--venerated as the birthplace of Ho Chi Minh--had been the first province to down a U.S. plane "on the first day that Johnson waged the destructive war against the northern part of our country." The broadcast also singled out the city of Vinh for outstanding achievements since then.

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A 24 July NHAN DAN article lauded the VPA missile service on its seventh anniversary, marked on the date of the first alleged downing of a U.S. plane by a missile. Praising the "original tactics" of the missile service and its cooperation with air and ground forces, the article, as reviewed by VNA, said the service "has contributed in a worthy manner to the common success of the people." It claimed that missile units downed six B-52's during "LBJ's war" and 10 more during the past four months. NHAN DAN also praised four outstanding battalions, each of which it credited with 30 or 40 planes "or more."

BACKGROUND: During the 1965 period, Hanoi propaganda did not acknowledge that U.S. planes had been downed by missiles. The first known claim of a downing by a missile was on 30 April 1966. That Hanoi in fact had first downed a plane with a missile in 1965 is not known to have been claimed in the media until 24 July 1967, when a NHAN DAN editorial marked what it called the second anniversary of Missile Services Day and alleged that hundreds of U.S. planes had since been downed with missiles.

A NHAN DAN article on the fifth anniversary of Missile Services Day in 1970, in the course of citing missile feats, said that "the Ha Long units, though operating on a very difficult terrain, knocked down hundreds of U.S. aircraft, including six B-52's"--the figure claimed in the current article for the period during the Johnson Administration. Hanoi alleged that a missile had downed a B-52 on 2 April this year, but it is not known to have previously claimed a total of 10 B-52's since the escalation of the air strikes in April. (The United States has denied that any B-52's have been downed.)

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN'S PROTESTS Five foreign ministry spokesman's statements were issued during the period 20-26 July, protesting U.S. actions of the 18th through the 25th. Specific charges are as follows:

+ Referring to U.S. actions on 18 July, the statement of the 20th said that in addition to strikes at Hanoi and Nam Dinh--cited in the spokesman's statement of the 18th--targets included Cat Ba island in Haiphong and populated areas in the provinces of Quang Binh, Vinh Phu, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh. It further charged that on the 19th U.S. planes struck at Nam Dinh and Vinh cities, Dong Hoi township, Cat Ba island, and the outskirts of Haiphong as well as populated areas in Lang Son, Ha Bac, Hai Hung, Thai Binh,

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Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. Dropping of mines at the mouth of the Van Uc River in Haiphong was also alleged, as was bombing of hamlets and villages in Quang Binh Province by B-52's. Among various economic and cultural establishments report hit was a portion of the Ma River dike in Thanh Hoa Province, said to have been "seriously fissured" as a result.

+ Mining and blockading of harbors was also denounced in the 21 July statement, though no specific locations were mentioned. Areas listed as hit were Vinh city and populated sectors of Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces; B-52's were said to have hit a number of areas in Quang Binh Province. A portion of the Ninh Co River dike in Nghia Hung district of Nam Ha Province was described as "seriously damaged."

+ Civilian dwellings and economic and agricultural establishments on the outskirts of Hanoi were among targets reported hit on the night and morning of 22-23 July in a statement of the 23d. The statement further charged that U.S. planes "bombed and fired rockets at" populated areas on the outskirts of Haiphong and in many provinces.

+ Rejecting U.S. denials, the statement of the 25th charged that since April the United States has "thousands of times" attacked densely populated areas in North Vietnam and "hundreds of times" attacked the DRV's dike systems. Among areas hit on the 24th, it listed the outskirts of Haiphong; Bac Ninh township; towns in Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung and Ninh Binh; populated areas in Lang Son, Quang Ninh, Hai Hung, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces; and the Vinh Linh area. The statement said that B-52's bombed a number of localities in Vinh Linh and that U.S. warships "wantonly attacked" several coastal hamlets and villages in Quang Binh Province. Specific targets said to have been hit included a church, a school, a pagoda, and a dike in Hai Hung Province.

+ Describing the alleged bombings and shellings of 25 July as "mad war acts" which violate all elementary principles of international law and "constitute an impudent challenge to world public opinion and to American public opinion," the spokesman's statement of the 26th charged that U.S. aircraft bombed populated areas in Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area. It further denounced U.S. warships for launching "indiscriminate artillery attacks" on coastal areas of Quang Binh Province, and B-52's for bombing "a certain number of localities" in the Vinh Linh area.

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HANOI PREPARES FOR 25TH SOLDIERS AND WAR HEROES DAY

Hanoi media have been carrying the usual propaganda in preparation for the anniversary of Wounded Soldiers and War Heroes Day (27 July 1947), an occasion when the DRV underlines the need to care for sick and wounded combatants and to assist families whose sons are in the army or have been killed in combat. Presumably because it is the 25th anniversary, instructions on the occasion were issued by the party secretariat for the first time. The pattern has varied in previous years, with instructions coming from the Premier or the Ministry of Interior--the ministry having responsibility for policies toward veterans--or from both.

The Secretariat instructions--dated 12 July and published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 14th--said that policies and duties toward wounded soldiers and their families "must be given greater care and be fulfilled even more satisfactorily" in view of the present "extremely fierce phase" of the war, which requires mobilization of "very great human and material resources for the frontline."

In addition to the Secretariat's directive, on 17 July Hanoi broadcast a letter from President Ton Duc Thang to the wounded and to families of soldiers, and on the 21st the radio carried a statement from Thang addressed to wounded and sick soldiers. Hanoi media also reported on the 21st that the president, along with Defense Minister Giap and Minister of Interior Duong Quoc Chinh, had recently visited wounded and sick combatants under treatment at various army hospitals.

Press comment on the anniversary includes a 10 July HANOI MOI editorial and editorials in NHAN DAN on the 13th and 22d. The 22 July NHAN DAN editorial dealt with the status of wounded combatants, noting that those able have returned to their units while those "not physically able to return to the battlefield" have engaged in work or study. References to the need for disabled veterans to engage in some form of work has long been a staple of Hanoi propaganda. The policy was discussed in detail in an article by Vice Minister of the Interior Le Dinh Thiep, published in the July 1971 HOC TAP. Thiep noted that veterans constitute a valuable source of labor and also pointed out the psychological benefits of work in helping the veterans overcome their disabilities. He recalled that as early as 17 May 1965 a circular of the Council of Ministers had said "it is necessary to create conditions for the disabled veterans and the families of the war dead to use their labor capabilities for the benefit of society"

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PEKING MARKS GENEVA ANNIVERSARIES, CONDEMNS BOMBING OF DIKES

For the second successive year, following a five-year absence of authoritative comment on the occasion, Peking has marked the 20 July anniversary of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial endorsing a negotiated settlement. As last year's anniversary editorial came in the wake of Peking's prompt endorsement of the PRG's seven-point peace plan, this year's has appeared at a time when Peking has been calling for an agreement that would enable the Vietnamese parties to reach an accommodation free of outside involvement. Consistent with this approach, the editorial focused on the issue of a coalition government as the basis for a Vietnam settlement. At the same time the editorial again pledged Chinese rear area support for the communist war effort so long as the fighting continues.

The editorial also took brief note of the 10th anniversary of the 23 July 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, an anniversary which was not mentioned in last year's editorial and was last marked authoritatively on the fifth anniversary in 1967. In marking the two anniversaries, Peking has replayed statements from its Indochinese allies and reported a film show at the DRV embassy on the 19th which was attended by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei. Also during this period Peking's increased attention to charges that U.S. planes are attacking North Vietnam's dikes was highlighted by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 25th supporting DRV protests. However, while lending its voice to the condemnation, Peking carefully limited the target of its criticism and avoided raising broader issues.

VIETNAM SETTLEMENT This year's editorial on the Geneva anniversary was more carefully tailored in expressing support for the Vietnamese communists' negotiating position than was last year's offer of "firm and full support" for the PRG's seven points. Thus, in the only explicit endorsement of the PRG plan, the editorial observed that the plan "stands for" the formation of a tripartite coalition government and the subsequent election of a government in South Vietnam. "This is completely reasonable and just," the editorial stated. In this connection the editorial took issue with the U.S. position, rebuking Washington not only for refusing to cease its support for the Thieu government but also for spreading the "lie" that the communist side seeks to establish a communist regime in South Vietnam. This shows, according to the editorial, that the United States is out to "obstruct a genuine solution" and to

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"sabotage the peaceful reunification" of Vietnam. However, apart from the issue of a coalition government, the editorial did not criticize the U.S. negotiating approach. Similarly, NCNA's account of the NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary omitted passages disparaging President Nixon's 8 May proposal and attacking "cunning political and diplomatic" moves by the United States.

In what may reflect Peking's emphasis on a settlement by the Vietnamese themselves and its sensitivity concerning outside involvement, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial this year avoided striking the positive note that stood out in the 1971 editorial's praise of the Geneva agreements as "an important success." NCNA's account of a North Korean article on the anniversary deleted a passage referring to the agreements as a "brilliant victory."

The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial concluded by reaffirming last year's pledge to provide "powerful backing" for the war effort and declared that the Chinese "will resolutely support" the fight to the end as their "bounden internationalist duty." However, Peking's reluctance to associate its own security interests with the Indochinese conflict was reflected in NCNA's failure to include in an account of an 18 July DRV "war crimes" statement a charge that U.S. planes have struck Chinese ships during attacks on the North.

ALLEGED ATTACKS ON DIKES

Weighing in with the first authoritative Chinese comment on the alleged bombing of North Vietnamese dikes, the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 25th supported recent DRV protests and "strongly" demanded that the United States immediately stop "such barbarous undertakings." But while feeling constrained to join in the chorus of condemnation, the Chinese have limited their attack on this issue and have stressed that the alleged bombing will not change the political and military situation. Thus, Commentator made the point that the alleged U.S. raids show not only the "brutality" but also the "feebleness" of the United States, and the article's concluding passage went to some length to express confidence that the North Vietnamese could not be intimidated and would persist in the fight. Consistent with this focus, the article did not raise the question of a settlement or mention Chinese aid. It also avoided an attack on the Nixon Administration by name, referring vaguely to attempts by "U.S. official circles" to "cover up the crimes."

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In addition to replays of DRV charges, the Commentator article was preceded by dispatches from an NCNA correspondent in Hanoi detailing eyewitness reports of the alleged bombings. Like Commentator, the correspondent expressed confidence that the North Vietnamese could not be subdued.

HANOI, FRONT CLAIM SUCCESSES IN QUANG TRI, SCORE USE OF GAS

Vietnamese communist propaganda continues to portray the Saigon counteroffensive in Quang Tri as a failure. LPA on the 22d maintained that in the first 23 days of the offensive--from 28 June to 20 July--some 9,500 allied troops were put out of action or captured, 81 aircraft downed or destroyed on the ground, and 120 vehicles wrecked, more than half of which were tanks and armored cars. Communist battle reports highlight fighting on 20 and 22 July when the PLAF allegedly killed or wounded nearly 500 troops; no mention is made of the current Saigon assault in Quang Tri city to capture the citadel.

A 23 July NHAN DAN editorial claimed that President Nixon had ordered Saigon to launch the counteroffensive because the allies needed a military victory to press their position at the Paris talks as well as to prevent the "disintegration of the puppet army." The paper said, however, that the allies' political ambitions are in sharp contradiction to their strength on the battlefield where they are encountering insurmountable problems. Commenting that the counteroffensive, like the Vietnamization policy and the war itself, is a mistake, the editorial said that the Saigon troops are being sent into a death trap.

The alleged allied use of "toxic gas to massacre the people of Quang Tri" was protested in a 20 July statement by the committee on war crimes in South Vietnam, reported by LPA on the 22d. It echoed complaints on this issue in PRG Foreign Ministry statements on 11 and 18 July,* but was more precise when it cited the use of CS gas, rather than referring generally to "toxic chemicals." The statement cited several instances when chemicals were allegedly used and accused the allies of using "poison-gas bombs and shells to force the civilians out of their air-raid shelters" and then "killing them with anti-personnel bombs and shells."

* See the TRENDS of 12 July, pages 11-12, and 19 July, pages 16-17.

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USSR - EGYPT

MOSCOW WHITEWASHES CAIRO OUSTER OF SOVIET PERSONNEL

Acknowledging, a day after President as-Sadat's 18 July announcement, that Soviet military advisers were being returned from Egypt, Moscow has sought to present the action as a perfectly natural outgrowth of the "completion" of their mission, a move arrived at by mutual consultation and signifying no change in either side's desire for continued friendship and cooperation. But Soviet sensitivity is betrayed in a resurgence of complaints, particularly in broadcasts for Arab audiences, about intrigues by "imperialists" and local "reactionaries" aimed at undermining Soviet-Egyptian friendship-- a theme also prominent in Moscow media at the times of the successive consultations now identified by as-Sadat as landmarks in the exacerbation of Soviet-Egyptian frictions.

The withdrawal was formally acknowledged in a TASS communication, released late on the 19th, which claimed that the decision was taken after "an exchange of opinions" between the two sides. Subsequent Moscow comment, both on the withdrawal and on the 20th anniversary of Egypt's revolution on 23 July, has hewed closely to the TASS announcement, couched in language that bears out as-Sadat's characterization of Egypt's "friend" as being "excessively cautious." Propagandists have reiterated TASS' assertion that the Soviet Union plans to continue developing and strengthening "in every way" its relations with Egypt based on the "strong foundation" of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty.

The pledge to continue to develop relations was notably absent, however, from the Soviet leaders' message of congratulations to as-Sadat on the revolution anniversary. The message did hail the two countries' relations, "consolidated" in the treaty, as an example of "true equality, full understanding, and fraternal solidarity," and it repledged firm support for the Egyptian and other Arab peoples in their struggle to regain the occupied territories. But where last year's "warm" congratulations from Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin had assured Egypt it could always rely on Soviet "aid" as well as support, this year's "sincere" congratulations said nothing about aid. And where last year the military paper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published a congratulatory telegram from Defense Minister Grechko to his Egyptian counterpart, no mention of such a message has appeared in any Soviet media this year. Press and radio sources have

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reported only the cable from the three top leaders, Kosygin's separate message to Prime Minister Sidqi, and Gromyko's congratulations to his Egyptian counterpart Ghalib. Articles marking the anniversary duly appeared in the Soviet central press, but Radio Moscow gave the anniversary far less play than would normally be expected on the major decennial observance.

TASS ANNOUNCEMENT Setting the tone for subsequent reportage and comment, the TASS announcement noted that in response to Egypt's request for help in insuring its "defense potential," a "numbe." of Soviet military personnel had been "temporarily" stationed in Egypt to give friendly assistance "over a number of years" to help the Egyptian forces master Soviet military equipment. Now, it said, the military personnel had completed their mission; "with the awareness of this, after the exchange of opinions," the two sides deemed it expedient to bring back the personnel who had been in Egypt "for a limited period." TASS then underlined as-Sadat's assurance, in the 18 July speech, that the "measures taken now" would not affect Egyptian-Soviet friendship. It did not acknowledge that the measures included Egyptian takeover of military equipment and installations or that as-Sadat had called for talks with the Soviets. TASS stressed as-Sadat's high assessment of Soviet assistance and his desire for continued friendship. It was in this context that TASS pledged the Soviet Union to continue developing and strengthening its relations with Egypt on the basis of the treaty and in pursuit of the joint struggle for "liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression."

In a Cairo-dated dispatch carried shortly after the formal announcement on the withdrawal, TASS reported that in his speech of the 18th as-Sadat emphasized the "great role" played by the Soviet Union in assisting Egypt. Quoting from his remarks on Moscow's military, political, and economic support, TASS brushed off--toward the close of the report--the fact that he "also made an announcement" about the windup of the Soviet military advisers' mission.

The next day Moscow publicized an "official statement" issued by the Egyptian embassy in Moscow expressing gratitude for the assistance of "individuals--officers and soldiers--of the Soviet armed forces" who had accomplished their duties "efficiently and satisfactorily." The embassy statement said the Egyptian forces'

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development had enabled them now to assume their national tasks themselves. It added, in an echo of as-Sadat's theme of independence, that Egypt would not allow others to bear the brunt of its fight and that the Egyptian people alone were responsible for undertaking the necessary tasks for their country's defense.

Moscow of course has not revealed the time frame of as-Sadat's move; he said in his 24 July speech that the "resolutions" were issued on 8 July, and "I gave the friends nine days, to 17 July, the day they should be implemented." Adding that "not a creature in the world had any indication until 16 July," as-Sadat claimed that the secrecy was maintained "out of care for our friends." The TASS announcement on the 19th said the Soviet personnel would "shortly return" home. On the 21st TASS reported that the Egyptian forces were giving a warm sendoff to the departing Soviet advisers, and on the 22d TASS welcomed home the "first group" of "military specialists" and reported an order issued by the defense minister praising their conduct in the discharge of their tasks.

Acknowledgment of the presence of military "advisers" in Egypt has been infrequent in Soviet media. The one such statement at the elite level--by Kosygin in a 4 May 1970 press conference in Moscow--got virtually no followup publicity. Asked at that time about Soviet pilots flying operational missions over Egypt, Kosygin replied, according to the Moscow domestic radio: "We have an agreement with the UAR Government to the effect that our military advisers are attached to the UAR troops. This is done with the object of combating Israeli aggression, which again, in turn, is taking place only because of the great assistance from the United States, which is in fact delivering the necessary weapons and supplying and supporting the aggression Israel is waging against the UAR. The respective functions of our military advisers are being coordinated with the UAR Government."

TREATMENT OF ANNIVERSARY Broadcasts of the three top Soviet leaders' congratulatory message to as-Sadat accounted for the bulk of Radio Moscow's generally low-key publicity for Egypt's revolution anniversary on the 23d. Moscow also reported, on 26 July, that as-Sadat's telegram in reply expressed "deep-felt gratitude" for the Soviet "sentiments" of support and solidarity as well as "high appreciation" of Soviet-Egyptian friendship based on mutual understanding, joint struggle, and fruitful cooperation.

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Moscow's Arabic-language service carried, among other things, the customary anniversary statement by the Egyptian ambassador in Moscow and an account of a ceremony held by the Soviet-Egyptian friendship society in Moscow, as well as an interview with the society's chairman, Electricity and Power Minister Neporozhnyy. A broadcast in Arabic on the 21st noted that a Soviet-Egyptian "sports week" had begun in Egypt in connection with the anniversary, with the opening ceremony attended by Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov and--pointedly--"the Soviet experts working on construction of industrial and agricultural projects in Egypt."

Articles pegged to the anniversary appeared in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 23d and in the July issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, signed to press 21 June. All the articles paid tribute to Nasir, and all made at least passing reference to as-Sadat. Each, discussing aspects and achievements of Egypt's domestic developments, called attention to Soviet assistance to Cairo in various fields, including the military. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's article referred to the "Soviet specialists' selfless labor" in construction of the Hulwan metallurgical complex, and it dwelt on how Egyptian prejudices against Europeans turned to "respect and liking" once "Soviet man" appeared in Egypt.

The opening of the anniversary session of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) National Congress on 24 July--rather than on the 23d, as is customary--was reported by TASS in a two-sentence item which noted cryptically that "the question of national unity at the present stage" was on the agenda. A brief Moscow domestic service report on the 24th mentioned that as-Sadat made a "long speech," and a later newscast that day disposed of the speech in the statement that the Egyptian president "summed up the results of Egypt's developments over the 20-year period and dwelled on the main tasks for the present period." It added only that he pointed out the deep social changes that have taken place in the country and the considerable successes achieved in the development of the Egyptian economy, culture, education, and medical services. Monitored Soviet media have totally ignored his lengthy discourse on relations with the Soviet Union and the United States.

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CHARGES OF "INTRIGUES" Moscow's insistent emphasis on continuing Soviet-Egyptian friendship has been accompanied by repeated rejections of alleged attempts by "the imperialists" and their "agents" as well as by "Arab reaction" to disrupt that friendship. On the 20th a dispatch from Cairo correspondent Kudryavtsev, broadcast in Arabic, said AL-AHRAM's political commentator had declared that any attempts to sow seeds of doubt as to the stability of Soviet-Egyptian friendship serve only the Arabs' enemies. The paper's commentator--presumably chief editor Haykal--had in fact written on the 20th that "many people" had called for a serious discussion of Soviet-Arab relations, not wanting to cast doubt on them but rather to preserve them; the commentator also said that the question of the advisers was not the core of Arab-Soviet relations, and he explained that the results of the Moscow summit conference "were the point that necessitated the 'objective pause'" in Soviet-Egyptian relations referred to by President as-Sadat.

Soviet broadcasts in Arabic have continued almost daily since the 20th to impress on listeners the dangers of imperialist plots. A commentary on the 21st deplored "imperialist lies and provocations" in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel; it charged that when imperialists go to a country they never leave it, while in contrast the Soviet staff which worked in Aswan had left Egypt "a long time ago." On the 24th, for its Arab audiences, Radio Moscow accused Israel and "the imperialist powers behind it" of recently stepping up subversive activities against the Arabs in "several major directions," including the continued arming of Israel by the United States despite Arab protests. It also charged the United States with trying to "divide patriotic forces in this or that Arab country" and to mobilize "internal reaction and the bourgeois elements."

In what may have been a suggestion of Soviet concern lest Egypt's move set off a chain reaction among Moscow's other Arab clients, a Kudryavtsev commentary in Arabic on the 20th claimed that imperialists and their "Israeli agents" were trying to deprive Egypt of its friends and allies by, among other things, consolidating the activity of reactionary forces in Egypt and "the other Arab countries." Similar overtones seemed present in the IZVESTIYA anniversary article, by Klenov, which observed that while "Egypt has first place in our thoughts" on its 20th anniversary, "everything which has been said about it also applies to the whole Arab world, primarily the countries with

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progressive regimes." Klenov observed that Syria's economic potential and "defense capability" were developing successfully in cooperation with the country's "natural ally, the Soviet Union," and added that Iraq's "anti-imperialist positions" had strengthened.*

Echoing the theme of the broadcasts in Arabic, the PRAVDA anniversary article by Demchenko complained of "speculation" by "enemies of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation" about the return of the Soviet military personnel from Egypt. Demchenko also expressed concern that "in a number of Arab countries, including Egypt, rightist, reactionary forces who oppose the social transformations being pursued there are striving to step up their actions."

A flurry of similar comment on "imperialist intrigues" against Soviet-Arab relations had appeared last fall, around the time of as-Sadat's October visit to Moscow; again last February, after his next visit; and still again in April, prior to his last talks in the USSR.** The theme cropped up again early this month: A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 3 July defended the May U.S.-Soviet summit--which as-Sadat indicated in his 24 July speech was a sore point--and rejected "irresponsible allegations" in "some Arab newspapers" that the USSR had made "certain concessions" harmful to the national liberation movement. Broadcasts in Arabic on 5 and 6 July denounced propaganda by "hostile forces" seeking to misrepresent Arab-Soviet cooperation. The one on the 6th professed bewilderment and regret that "certain Arab journalists" were portraying Soviet aid to the Arabs as a "commercial deal in which each side seeks its own advantage"; undoubtedly responding to Egyptian arguments, the broadcast maintained that when the USSR provides "impartial aid to Egypt," it does not at all seek special advantages "or aims such as access to warm waters."*** PRAVDA on the 11th

* Moscow gave no special emphasis to the 20 July ceremonial exchange of ratification documents on the Soviet-Iraqi treaty as a counter-balance to its Egyptian embarrassment; publicity for the occasion was less than half that given the same ceremony for the Soviet-Egyptian treaty a year ago.

** Belgrade's POLITIKA recalled on 20 July that at the time of as-Sadat's April talks in Moscow it could have been deduced from articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and NOVOYE VREMYA that "the USSR was aware of some phenomenon in the Arab world which it did not like."

*** A Budapest broadcast on the 25th noted that Egyptian Minister of State for Information az-Zayyat, in a 22 July press conference, affirmed that Soviet warships would continue to enjoy Egyptian port facilities. Neither the short TASS account nor the Cairo reports of the press conference mentioned this point.

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drew on Cairo's AL-JUMHURIYAH for refutation of "false rumors" of alleged Soviet interests in Egypt and rejection of any analogy between the USSR and the United States as great powers.

AIR INCIDENT The air incident on 24 July, when Cairo claimed that it had downed one of four Israeli Phantoms in Egyptian airspace, was reported by Moscow radio in the usual fashion with a short factual account attributed to the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY. The incident was brought up on the 25th in a foreign-language commentary by Shakhov which cited the alleged intrusion into "Egyptian airspace" as an example of Israeli provocations and claimed that "the crime did not go unpunished." Shakhov drew the standard propaganda conclusion that renewed Israeli provocations meant still another secret agreement with Washington for the dispatch of new arms.

In an atypical and perhaps significant remark on Israeli withdrawal, Shakhov reaffirmed the Soviet position on unconditional withdrawal on the basis of Resolution 242, but went on to add that "of course, the ways and means of the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces can be the subject of discussion."

PRC PLEASED AT CAIRO MOVE; USSR REACTS TO PEKING COMMENT

Peking's obvious satisfaction over Moscow's discomfiture comes through in NCNA's reportage on the Egyptian action and in remarks by Chou En-lai. NCNA on the 20th reviewed in some detail the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY report on as-Sadat's 18 July speech, concluding with the observation that Cairo citizens thronged the streets listening to broadcast reports of the president's speech and asking: "Indeed, what have the Russians really done for us?" An NCNA dispatch on the 21st quoted ASU First Secretary Mar'i for the remark that as-Sadat's decision to terminate the Soviet military mission was "one we're all looking forward to." Other NCNA reportage has underscored Egyptian support for as-Sadat's "wise decisions," as well as approval from Libya and Lebanese press comment critical of the Soviet Union.

Chou En-lai took the occasion of a 21 June farewell banquet in Peking hosted by visiting Yemeni Prime Minister al-'Ayni to obliquely congratulate the Egyptians: "We are glad to see that the Arab peoples' struggle in defense of independence and

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sovereignty and against the superpowers' control and interference is forging ahead." More forthrightly, the congratulatory message from Chou and Tung Pi-wu on the Egyptian revolution anniversary referred specifically to as-Sadat's 18 July speech in which he "once again expressed the strong determination of the Egyptian Government and people to fight for justice." The Chinese Government and people, the message went on, firmly and consistently "support you in opposing the aggression committed by Israeli Zionism with the connivance and support of the superpowers."

The sentiments of the message were echoed in a 23 July NCNA dispatch which noted that as-Sadat's speech had evoked warm support at home and "won the sympathy and support of the people of the world." On the same day, NCNA reported the Cairo weekly AKHBAR AL-YAWM as saying that Egypt had requested "a certain type" of weapon from the Soviet Union, which accepted the request but demanded that the weapon's use be subject to Moscow's approval. NCNA quoted the paper as adding that Egypt found it difficult to accept such a condition and that consequently "this type of weapons did not arrive." The article wondered, said NCNA, what use Soviet experts served if they belonged to a state that did not want to fight. On the 26th, an NCNA dispatch quoted liberally from passages in as-Sadat's 24 July speech "sternly condemning" the United States and detailing his differences with the Soviet Union.

SOVIET REJOINDER Moscow promptly set about countering Peking's jibes. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on the 20th reported as-Sadat as having "emphatically" pointed out that the Soviet Union had played an important role in Egypt's struggle against U.S.-Israeli "aggression." Almost as an afterthought, the broadcast observed in passing that as-Sadat also said the Soviet advisers who had worked in Egypt at Cairo's request had completed their mission.

On the 23d, a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin marked the Egyptian anniversary with the usual praise of Cairo's domestic progress achieved with Soviet assistance. Without mentioning the affair of the withdrawn advisers, the broadcast charged the Chinese leadership with distorting the nature of Soviet-Arab relations and sowing seeds of distrust toward the Soviet Union "and the nature of its policy and assistance to the Arab countries."

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C O R R E C T I O N

In the USSR-Egypt section of the 19 July TRENDS, page 19, second paragraph, the last sentence should read: The apparently hastily arranged Sidqi visit was announced in Cairo on the 11th, with MENA reporting that Sidqi had met twice the previous day with Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov.

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ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU UPHOLDS ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE, REJECTS "GENERAL LAWS"

The 19-21 July national conference of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) was used by Nicolae Ceausescu as a forum to reassert Bucharest's independence vis-a-vis the "general laws" of socialist building propounded by Moscow. The maverick Romanian leader implicitly challenged the guidelines laid down at the June 1969 Moscow international conference of communist parties by calling for a redefinition of "the principles and norms that should guide relations among all socialist countries." He reaffirmed his country's determination to maintain good relations with "all" socialist countries, including Moscow and its bloc allies as well as Peking and Tirana. While emphasizing Bucharest's economic ties with Moscow, Ceausescu called for an expansion of trade with the West and the establishment of a Balkan organization to promote economic cooperation in the region. He strongly reiterated the need to reach international agreements guaranteeing the equality, independence, and sovereignty of "all" states and went so far as to call for the codification of such agreements in international law.

On domestic affairs, Ceausescu conveyed a picture of only modest economic gains since the 1969 party congress. He was chosen by the party conference to head a new "Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development" designed to supervise the newly formed coordinating councils in such fields as machine-building, finance, and banking. Although Ceausescu did not address himself directly to the subject of factionalism in the party, as he had done in his 7 May 1971 speech on the 50th anniversary of the RCP, he made an unusual appeal for a personal vote of confidence: "From this forum of the national conference I wish to assure the party, the entire people, that as far as I am concerned I will devote my whole activity, my life, to achieving this goal, to the cause of socialism and communism and to the happy future of our entire nation." To shore up party unity, he proposed the addition to the Central Committee of "20 to 30 party activists who are directly employed in production" and "a greater number of women."

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BLOC RELATIONS In his treatment of foreign affairs, Ceausescu stressed the importance of Romania's close ties with the USSR and his personal relations with the Soviet leaders. He noted "the intensification of the exchange of experience between our country and the Soviet Union" and the "important role" played by his contacts with Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin. Calling attention to the importance of the economic exchanges, he said: "I want to particularly note that within the framework of our international trade, the first place is occupied by the Soviet Union, whose share is 25 percent." He added that "this requires our permanent concern with further expanding our exchanges and cooperation in production with the USSR."

Ceausescu's affirmations of friendship with the USSR were matched by his expansive remarks on Romania's good relations with other countries, including Albania, China, Israel, and the United States, and by his polemical statements on the need to develop "new" standards to govern relations among communist parties and socialist states. While conceding that relations among "the 14 socialist countries"--a pointed formulation that includes China and Albania--must be based on the "single" philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, Ceausescu went on to declare that "the mere assertion of the general principles is not sufficient for the creation of relations of a new type." The socialist states, he argued, require a "better definition" of the principles governing their relations, and they "must establish in more detail how these principles should operate." The Romanian leader thus delivered a new tacit rebuke to Moscow's view that a "new" type of relations had been established in the socialist world and that "general laws" of social development were applicable to all socialist countries. In his speech to the 24th CPSU Congress, Brezhnev had authoritatively restated the thesis of the main document of the June 1969 Moscow international party conference on the "indivisibility" of national and international interests. And Soviet commentary has since consistently hewed to the 1969 conference formulation on the dialectical unity of national and international interests and to the notions of "general laws" of socialism and of a "new" type of socialist international relations.

As a counter to the Soviet view, Ceausescu repeatedly emphasized the need to develop "new production relations," "a new type of nation," and "a new type of relations" between the socialist countries based on the overcoming of differences through consultations and negotiations and "excluding any form of interference."

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The Romanian leader called for "a unity of a new type" among the world communist parties "which should in its turn start out from the dialectical-materialist outlook, from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and should be based on full equality among all parties and on the observance of the independence of each party."

Ceausescu reasserted "the right of each party to work out its political line in keeping with the concrete conditions" in which it operates, buttressing this assertion with a reference to the dissolution of the Comintern--a body which Moscow portrayed in a notably favorable light in recent comment commemorating the 90th birth anniversary of Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov. Ceausescu recalled "the appraisal made by the Communist International in 1943, when it decided to dissolve itself," to the effect that "the existence of a single leading center is no longer possible, and each party . . . bears the entire responsibility for the working out of revolutionary strategy and tactics." In a further slap at Moscow's traditional dominance in the movement, Ceausescu added that "nobody can hold the absolute truth" and "it is the duty of each party always to support what is new and what is developing, to act in a conscious manner against the old, against all that is outdated and does not correspond any more to the demands of social life."

SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT Presenting an updated review of Romania's views regarding a conference on European security and cooperation, Ceausescu repeated long-standing positions with typical Romanian colorations that stressed the independence and security of "all" European states. After calling on the European countries to reach an understanding on equality, independence, and sovereignty of all states and non-interference in internal affairs, he said that a "solemn pledge" to uphold these principles was "necessary" and that "nothing could justify their violation"--a clear rejection of the notion that any socialist state could arrogate to itself the right to intervene in another's affairs in the cause of "proletarian internationalism."

As if to reinforce Romania's firm stand on this issue, he added that an agreement in "an appropriate juridical form is also required" whereby the European states would pledge themselves to refrain from the use or threat of force in relations with other states and in the "settlement of divergencies in existence or which might crop up." Ceausescu continued: "These pledges should explicitly specify that any transgression of these rules

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by any state signifies a violation of the peoples' right to independence, of the United Nations" In a related vein, in a passage outlining Romania's views on the United Nations, Ceausescu declared that the world organization "must also be more active" and that "it should not permit the violation of the sovereignty of a member state by other states for any reason whatsoever." He added that "any such act must be considered as being incompatible with UN membership and should incur public condemnation and adequate measures."

Ceausescu made no direct reference to the issue of force reductions in Europe, but he reiterated Bucharest's calls for "military disengagement" and for "reducing and withdrawing troops on the territories of other states and of foreign military bases, including the reduction of national troops." And in a vaguely worded passage expressing Romanian interest in force reductions, he said "it is also necessary to act so as to create appropriate conditions for the liquidation of opposed military blocs"

Later, after stressing that international problems must be solved with the participation of the "small- and medium-sized" states and with the interests of those states in mind, Ceausescu declared that "any violation" of the principle of equality or interference in their internal affairs "shall be considered acts directed against peace and mankind." In a passage that drew strong applause from the assemblage, he proclaimed that "the sacred right of all countries to freedom and sovereignty should be recognized, as well as their legitimate right to defend themselves with all means, including military means, against any violation of this right."

In discussing nuclear disarmament, Ceausescu seemed to offer proposals containing elements taken from both Soviet and Chinese proposals. He appealed to all states, "and first and foremost the big countries," to renounce the use or threat of force against other states, "including the use of nuclear weapons and rockets"--a formula which coincides with the Chinese call for a world summit conference to discuss the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, and as a first step "to reach agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons." Balancing this appeal with one drawn from the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference, Ceausescu also called for a "general conference on disarmament with the participation of all the peoples of the world." He said that the Geneva disarmament committee should improve and extend its activities, which should then be "submitted to effective public control," and

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that the committee should be "democratized"--a possible allusion to the restricted membership of the committee, particularly the absence of the French and the lack of Chinese representation on it.

In calling for a meeting of Balkan representatives, Ceausescu reiterated the proposal to convert the Balkans into an atom-free zone--a notion also endorsed by the USSR on occasion in the past--and a zone free of military bases.

BALKAN ORGANIZATION Ceausescu went beyond previous Bucharest pronouncements in calling for formalized cooperation among the countries of the Balkan region. He declared that "the time has come to pass over from general statements to concrete actions" in the Balkans and that "it would be particularly useful to pass on to achieving closer economic collaboration by the setting up of an organization for this purpose, which should help in intensifying exchanges and organizing cooperation in production."

An unsigned commentary carried by AGERPRES on 14 September 1971 had said, in a discussion of European security, that "all the Balkan countries are duty-bound to take initiatives and actions with the objective of improving the climate in that zone" and that "large possibilities exist" for development of closer economic cooperation in the zone.

MOSCOW GLOSSES OVER SPEECH; PEKING REPORTS IT APPROVINGLY

Ceausescu's proposal for a Balkan economic organization and his remarks on European security and disarmament were ignored in Moscow's brief coverage of his speech. A Moscow domestic service report--attributed to a TASS correspondent but not carried in TASS' English and Russian international services--noted Ceausescu's statement that 55 percent of Romania's trade is with CEMA and went on to sharpen Ceausescu's tribute to the Soviet Union: "The Soviet Union, he pointed out, which with its outstanding successes in many fields of activity has shown itself to be a giant force in the world today, is first and foremost in this respect." The corresponding passages in the text as broadcast by the Bucharest radio do not contain the underlined portion, which the TASS correspondent lifted from another passage in which Ceausescu had balanced praise of the Soviet Union with praise for the PRC. A PRAVDA

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correspondent's report, published in the paper the same day, also singled out Ceausescu's call for expanded trade and cooperation with the USSR and his remarks on meetings with the top Soviet leaders.

Ceausescu's remarks on relations with the Soviet Union were similarly emphasized in reports in the GDR's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, and Prague's CTK and RUDE PRAVO. East German, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak reports took note of the Romanian leader's endorsement of a conference on European security and cooperation, his statements on Vietnam, and--selectively--his remarks on the Middle East, but for the most part focused on domestic affairs. Reports in Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU on the 20th and 24th notably avoided any mention of the content of Ceausescu's remarks on foreign affairs.

A report in Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on the 20th was notably fuller than the other countries' accounts, including Ceausescu's references to "erroneous measures" in the economy, his appeal for overcoming "nationalist and chauvinist" manifestations at home, and his call for "unity and overcoming disagreements of a temporary nature" in relations between the socialist countries. At the same time, Romania's independent course was implicitly attacked in an article on the third anniversary of the June 1969 Moscow conference written by Hungarian party Politburo member and secretary Komocsin for the August issue of the Soviet journal RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNYIY MIR, reprinted in the July-August issue of the Budapest theoretical monthly TARSADALMI SZEMLE. The appearance of the article in TARSADALMI SZEMLE was announced by the Hungarian Government organ MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 21st, the last day of the Bucharest party conference. The article contained a thinly veiled warning to the Romanians: It observed that "lasting success cannot be achieved by proclaiming a sovereignty with nationalist content," a course which it alleged gains the approval of "the class enemy" and leads to "abandoning internationalism and the international workers movement."

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PEKING COVERAGE Peking promptly reported Ceausescu's speech in an NCNA dispatch that included the Romanian leader's account of his talks in the Far East with Mao, Chou, Kim Il-song, and Le Duan but ignored all his references to other socialist countries, including Albania. Consistent with Peking's efforts to encourage East European independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the report's main thrust highlighted Ceausescu's defense of Romania's "independence and national sovereignty," emphasizing his call for an end to "all inequality and national oppression" in relations among socialist countries. NCNA also cited approvingly the Romanian leader's support for the Vietnamese war effort, Sihanouk's Peking-backed Cambodian "government" which Moscow has not recognized, and Pyongyang's efforts toward Korean reunification.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

PRAVDA PUBLICIZES SPANISH CP DELEGATION'S VISIT TO USSR

In the first known direct reference to the Spanish Communist Party (PCE)--the "official" faction led by Dolores Ibarruri and Santiago Carrillo--to appear in Soviet media in more than a year, PRAVDA on 5 July published a brief report that a group of PCE "journalists" had toured the Soviet Union "for three weeks at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee" and had met with party, trade union, and youth organizations. No dates were cited.

Neither the PRAVDA report nor similar reports in Moscow radio newscasts in Spanish and Portuguese carried any additional information on the delegation's visit. But the PCE's clandestine Radio Independent Spain (REI) noted on 15 June that the five-man delegation had arrived for "an information-gathering visit" and reported in broadcasts on 1 and 6 July that the delegation included Central Committee members Ramirez, Izcaray, and Melchor. REI said the delegation's account of the visit would appear in a forthcoming issue of the PCE theoretical journal NEUSTRA BANDERA.

The only reference to substantive issues discussed by the CPSU and the PCE visitors appeared in the clandestine radio's broadcast of 6 July, which said the delegation had noted the CPSU's "deep interest" in the situation in Spain and the struggle of the Spanish people and the PCE "against the Franco dictatorship." REI reported that "everywhere, stress was laid on the fraternity of Soviet and Spanish communists in the common struggle against imperialism." It added--in a statement which implied that the visit was a success--that the delegation "expressed its appreciation to the CPSU Central Committee for the attention and courtesy it had received" and promised the CPSU "and all those who contributed to the fulfillment of the delegation's mission" to convey its impressions to the people and communists of Spain.

The appearance of even the brief, undetailed report of the visit in PRAVDA, obscuring as it does the fact that PCE Central Committee figures were in the delegation, suggests a desire by the Soviet Union to place its relations with the maverick, independent-minded PCE on a firmer basis. Moscow has recently made clear its concern over the freewheeling behavior of such parties as the PCE and the small Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), with a PRAVDA Observer article in May

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evinced interest in resuming long-interrupted contacts with the CPN. Cool CPSU relations with the PCE date back to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and could only have deteriorated further with PCE leader Carrillo's visit to Peking last fall and Carrillo's public espousal of a Roman-type line on the desirability of cordial relations with "all" parties. Moscow media have, of course, never mentioned Carrillo's Peking trip. In the period since the Czechoslovak events, a splinter pro-Soviet faction of the Spanish party has been organized under the leadership of General Enrique Lister, with apparent behind-the-scenes Soviet support.*

That Moscow may now wish to move to mend its fences with the Carrillo-led faction of the party seemed indicated in a report appearing in the PCE organ MUNDO OBRERO of 10 June. According to this report a meeting hosted by the PCE's permanent representation in the USSR in Moscow on 29 April, to express solidarity with the people of Spain, took place in a "packed house" and was marked by "indescribable enthusiasm." Among those reportedly attending the meeting were Secretary of the PCE Committee in the USSR Juan Avestaran, who outlined the PCE struggle in Spain, and Emilio Garcia, who praised the work of the illegal "workers' commissions" in Spain and personally pledged allegiance to the PCE Central Committee headed by Ibarri and Carrillo. Moscow media did not publicize the meeting, but it could only have taken place with Soviet approval. The PCE's permanent representation has remained in the USSR throughout the period of cool CPSU-PCE relations; Soviet media have carefully suppressed the continued in-fighting between this group and the Lister faction, whose existence Moscow has never acknowledged.

In recent months, commentaries and reports on Spain in Soviet central media have discussed the internal Spanish situation in broad, general terms and have made only passing reference to the Spanish communist movement. Moscow has noted the activities of the Spanish workers' commissions, linking them to Spanish communists among other opposition forces but not specifically to the PCE organization as such. The weekly NEW TIMES (No. 15, 7 April 1972), for example, published an interview with an unidentified representative of the workers' commissions to the Soviet trade union congress in March which made no reference to the PCE.

* See FBIS Special Report No. 305 of 7 March 1972, "Spanish Communists Reestablish Relations with Peking: Background and Ramifications," for background on the split in the PCE.

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JAPAN - CHINA - USSR

PEKING FORTHCOMING, MOSCOW CAUTIOUS TOWARD TANAKA CABINET

The 6 July election of Kakuei Tanaka as Japanese premier was greeted favorably by Peking and welcomed more cautiously by Moscow. The Chinese lost no time in signaling their readiness to deal with the new government, with Chou En-lai noting on 9 July that the Sato government--"which long remained hostile toward China"--had been "forced to step down" and expressing "welcome" to the new cabinet's statement that "normalization of relations between China and Japan would be expedited." Chou's approving acknowledgment of the change in Japanese government appeared in a major address hailing trends toward detente in Asia free of superpower control. The abrupt shift in Peking's posture toward Japan, previously a target of sustained polemical attack, has served to bring Sino-Japanese relations into the pattern of Peking's moves to enhance its leverage against the two superpowers and to erode their influence.

Peking's extensive publicity for the new Japanese government, which has been free of critical comment, has included reports on activities by two Chinese officials in Japan that in effect mark a step toward opening diplomatic relations, or at least convey Peking's interest in developing official contacts. Peking reported a reception in Tokyo on 20 July given by Fujiyama, an LDP member long associated with PRC-Japanese relations, in honor of the two Chinese officials, the new chief of the Chinese trade office and the leader of a Shanghai dance troupe now in Japan. NCNA quoted Fujiyama as hailing the presence at the reception of new Foreign Minister Ohira as "an epoch-making event" which conferred added significance on the gathering. The Chinese trade official, Hsiao Hsiang-chien, was quoted as expressing the readiness of his office to work for the normalization of PRC-Japanese diplomatic relations "at an early date." Speaking at another reception on the same day, also reported by NCNA, Hsiao echoed Chou's welcome for what he called Tanaka's "positive statements" on Sino-Japanese relations since taking office, noting that the premier had expressed an intention to realize diplomatic relations at an early date. NCNA reported on 22 July that the two Chinese officials and Foreign Minister Ohira had a "friendly" talk that day in which they expressed the hope that Sino-Japanese relations would be normalized as soon as possible and agreed to hold talks again "if required."

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In a show of flexibility, Peking has not been pressing its three principles for establishing diplomatic relations--that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, that Taiwan is part of China, and that the Japan-ROC treaty must be abrogated--while taking note of the Tanaka cabinet's professions of "full understanding" of the three principles. NCNA's account of Tanaka's 19 July press conference juxtaposed his statement that the China question is the biggest diplomatic question and that the time is ripe for normalizing relations with his remark that Taiwan represents an important question which should be settled "together with such a big question as the normalization" of PRC-Japanese diplomatic relations. If unchallenged, such an approach would circumvent the demand that Tokyo sever its formal ties with Taipei as a precondition for negotiating relations with Peking. NCNA's account of the Tanaka cabinet's replies to opposition questions on 18 July included the assertion that the clause on Taiwan in the U.S.-Japanese joint declaration was a product of its time and that the situation "underwent a tremendous change later on," resulting in a change in the "understanding" of the government.

Peking's first reference to an invitation to Tanaka to visit the PRC was contained in a 24 July NCNA dispatch reporting his speech that day at the first meeting of the LDP's council for normalizing Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Tanaka was quoted as saying that "as to the visit of the foreign minister and I to China, it should be decided" by the council. He was next quoted as saying he would hold talks with President Nixon next month and that he hoped to learn "the U.S. attitude and ideas on China." NCNA's report on Tanaka's 19 July press conference had quoted his statement that Tokyo would maintain the U.S.-Japanese security treaty.

MOSCOW Soviet reaction to the Tanaka cabinet has been one of cautious welcome. Soviet media reported factually the formation of the new cabinet and a PRAVDA article on 8 July "welcomed" a statement by Nakasone, one of the chief ministers in the new cabinet, that he supports "cooperation with the Soviet Union." An IZVESTIYA commentary on 8 July observed that only "time will show" the new government's approach but noted that Tanaka's expressed desire for "closer relations with the Soviet Union" had been "favorably received by the Soviet public." Soviet caution was reflected in the TASS account of Tanaka's press conference on 15 July. TASS took note of his call for concluding a peace treaty with the USSR but did not report his remarks on the need to solve the northern territories issue.

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