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Approved For Release 2005/06/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300050039-8

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**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**

## **In Communist Propaganda**

STATSPEC

**Confidential**

27 SEPTEMBER 1972

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 18 - 24 SEPTEMBER 1972

<u>Moscow (2703 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1426 items)</u>	
Supreme Soviet Session	(1%) 14%	Domestic Issues	(36%) 40%
[Kirillin, Kapitonov	(-- ) 4%]	Iranian Empress in PRC	(-- ) 11%
Speeches		UNGA Session	(0.1%) 7%
UNGA Session	(1%) 8%	Japanese LDP Delegation	(-- ) 6%
[Disarmament	(1%) 6%]	in PRC	
Israeli Attacks on Lebanon	(9%) 5%	Zambian Vice President	(0.4%) 5%
& Syria		in PRC	
Indochina	(8%) 6%	Indochina	(12%) 4%
China	(3%) 4%	Chile National Day	(-- ) 4%
Iraqi President al-Bakr	(4%) 3%	Mali National Day	(-- ) 4%
in USSR			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi has taken steps in the past few days to dramatize the portrayal of the Vietnamese communist stand on a settlement of the war as serious and reasonable. Following PRG Foreign Minister Binh's rebuttal of U.S. charges at Paris that the PRG proposal would result in communist control of a tripartite provisional government, a 25 September NHAN DAN Commentator article went beyond the 11 September PRG statement to broach the issue of guarantees of an agreement that neither side would impose a regime in the South. On the 27th, VNA took the unprecedented step of transmitting the text of an unsigned article in the September issue of the DRV party theoretical journal HOC TAP which sets out the positions of the two sides in detail. Like other propaganda, HOC TAP takes issue with "sowing of illusions" by the United States that a solution may be near and stresses that "the key opposing point" lies in the question of the future administration in South Vietnam.

Gromyko's remarks at the UN General Assembly followed other pro forma expressions of Soviet support for the 11 September PRG proposal. Routine Moscow comment continues to focus on the question of a tripartite provisional government in the South. An apparently harmonious exchange of views took place between the DRV ambassador and Kosygin and Podgorny on 25 and 26 September, respectively.

Maintaining an unusually low posture in its treatment of the PRG's 11 September statement, Peking has confined its coverage of Vietnam developments to edited replays of Vietnamese communist statements and low-level reportage. There are no current reports of meetings between DRV and Chinese officials, but NCNA on the 25th announced that the PRC ambassador had a talk with the French premier that day.

Neither Hanoi nor Peking has mentioned that the route home of the three American pilots released by the DRV was by air through China. Hanoi has made fairly extensive efforts to denigrate the U.S. official attitude toward the prisoner release, embellishing charges that the Administration had plotted to "intercept and brazenly kidnap" the pilots in Laos in pursuit of war-related "schemes."

### DRV, FRONT PRESS FOR AGREEMENT NOT TO IMPOSE REGIME IN SAIGON

Vietnamese communist propaganda since the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article, which was the first substantial comment on negotiations since last winter, has been notable for its serious tone and its effort to present the communist stand as reasonable but firm. Since the release

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of the 11 September PRG statement there has been continued stress on the demand that the United States recognize the "reality" in South Vietnam--that is, that there are two administrations, two armies, and other political forces--and reach an agreement that neither side will impose a government on the other. Hanoi and the Front have countered U.S. charges regarding the PRG's intent to try to control a South Vietnamese government by charging that it is the United States which has imposed the Thieu "lackey" regime and which, through its eight-point proposal, wants to liquidate the PRG and the PLAF. This line was pursued in the NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 25th, which asked if the United States "dared, together with the parties concerned, to set forth and implement necessary measures for insuring that none of the parties will control the political life in South Vietnam during the transition period."

VNA's unusual release of the HOC TAP article\* takes on added interest coinciding as it does with the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meetings in Paris on the 26th and 27th. Consistent with its recent practice, Hanoi has not mentioned the meetings. There is no way of determining precisely when the article was written, but it clearly postdates the release of the 11 September PRG statement, to which it refers in setting out the opposing positions. The article resembles the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article in taking issue with U.S. officials, including the President and Secretary Rogers, for suggesting that a settlement might be reached soon. It declares that the negotiating stands of the two sides must be analyzed "to clarify this question."

NHAN DAN'S COMMENTATOR      The NHAN DAN Commentator article of the 25th pursued the line of the 16 September NHAN DAN editorial in contrasting the PRG's "reasonable" proposal for a South Vietnamese tripartite provisional government of national concord with U.S. "maintenance" of the Thieu regime. The article set out to demonstrate that it is the United States, not the communist side, that wants to impose a government in South Vietnam and charged that the Paris talks have been stalemated because the United States "demands the liquidation of the adversary" and opposes the setting up of a provisional government of three equal components. Otherwise, the article did not mention the Paris talks and thus did not acknowledge Ambassador Porter's charges that the communists hope in

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\* There has been comment in HOC TAP on the Paris talks over the past few years, but these items have not been carried by VNA or the radio.

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fact to dominate the government. However, it did refer cryptically to Kissinger's remarks at his Washington press conference on the 16th--the day after he had met privately with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy.

Commentator said Kissinger distorted the communists' stand by "declaring that the United States would reject any move that would impose a particular kind of government." The article went on to observe that judging from Kissinger's remarks, the Americans seem to fear that the PRG proposal would result in a certain form of government being forced upon the South. Calling this another "absurdity" of the U.S. stand, Commentator argued that if the United States wanted to negotiate seriously, "all sides would be able to agree on effective measures to dissipate that fear." The article then repeated the proposal that agreement be reached on neither side imposing a government and went on to interject the new element on guarantees:

The U.S. Government can agree with the parties concerned on the necessary measures aimed at insuring that no party controls political life in South Vietnam.\*

PARIS SESSION      Vietnamese communist media gave the usual sketchy account of the Paris session on the 21st, although there was at least a brief reference to the U.S. presentation by VNA, which had totally ignored the U.S. statement on the 14th. VNA said the U.S. delegate on the 21st "continued to use slanderous contentions to avoid responding positively to the fair and sensible proposals in the PRG's 11 September statement."

Mme. Binh declared that in its opposition to a provisional government, the U.S. delegation "has put forward several sophistries and distortions which should be rejected." She then repeated the

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\* This statement is similar to Pham Van Dong's remark in reply to columnist Victor Zorza's question regarding provisions to insure the implementation of an agreement not to impose a regime on the South. Dong said: "Naturally, there should be necessary measures firmly guaranteeing the realization of the aforementioned proposal, and the parties concerned will agree with one another on these measures." The Dong exchange with Zorza was transmitted in VNA's service channel from Hanoi to Paris on 23 September but has not yet been carried in Hanoi media.

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denial--standard for months--that the PRG's aim is to impose a communist regime, and she bolstered her denial by quoting the passage in the PRG statement on readiness to reach agreement that neither side will impose a regime. As refutation of U.S. charges that the formula for a government of national concord is a formula "to seize power," she merely repeated the proposal on the formation of the provisional government--that the PRG and Saigon administration "without Thieu" would appoint their respective people and that the appointment of people to the third component "will be made through consultations."

To counter U.S. charges that the provisional government proposal was aimed at avoiding general elections, the PRG delegate insisted that only a national concord government could hold "truly free and democratic elections."\* She denied demanding the dismissal of all the leaders of the military and civilian machinery of the Saigon administration, saying that the demand is that "Thieu resign and the Saigon administration give up its policy of repression and terrorism." She concluded by saying public opinion has acclaimed the PRG's "correct stand and serious, practical and constructive attitude" while it has "sternly criticized the U.S. negative and non-constructive reaction."

DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy again expressed "unreserved support" for the PRG statement. Vy did not rehash all the points of the 11 September statement, but he echoed Mme. Binh in his portrayal of the generosity of the proposal. He said that the PRG, "for the sake of national concord," advocates that internal South Vietnamese affairs should be settled on the basis of a provisional government of three equal components even though the PRG "is the authentic representative" and the Saigon administration "is created by the United States as an instrument of neocolonialist policy."

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\* VNA's summary of Binh's "refutation of U.S. sophistries" cited only her remarks on general elections.

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## MOSCOW GIVES PRG PROPOSAL ON SETTLEMENT PRO FORMA SUPPORT

Moscow's continued pro forma support of the PRG's 11 September statement includes Gromyko's remarks in his UNGA address on the 26th, statements by Soviet friendship committees, and an editorial in the weekly NOVOYE VREMYA. Radio Moscow reported briefly that PRAVDA's senior commentator Yuriy Zhukov, speaking on Moscow television on the 21st, had characterized the PRG statement as an "important" document and reiterated Soviet support for the Vietnamese. Comment lauding the PRG statement has emphasized the theme that it shows the Vietnamese communists' good will and desire for a peaceful settlement. Moscow has observed that the proposal for an agreement that neither side will impose a regime on South Vietnam should allay U.S. fears of PRG intentions and remove any U.S. justification for pursuit of the war.

An IZVESTIYA article by commentator Yevgeniy Vasilkov, summarized by TASS on 26 September, said the PRG's position that a Vietnam solution must be based on "the present actual situation in South Vietnam" is "principled and profoundly justified" from the viewpoint of both "international law and commonsense." Admission of these "realities" by the United States, Vasilkov said, would allow a start to be made on a solution of the conflict. He assailed "groundless" U.S. attempts to present intensification of aggression as aimed at bringing the prisoners home, adding that their release can be brought about "only after the end of military operations."

Soviet media at this writing have carried only sketchy accounts of Gromyko's remarks on Vietnam in his UNGA speech. A 26 September TASS summary in Russian reported him as saying that a way out of the war can be found, "but only through serious talks, a constructive basis for which is given by the well-known proposals of the PRG of 11 September and of the DRV Government on the 14th."\* TASS' summary in English quoted him as asserting that the Vietnamese cannot be defeated "by heavier bombings, by blockades, or by attacks against their hydroelectric installations." Neither of the brief summaries mentioned his remarks excoriating U.S.

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\* TASS' summary in English rendered this passage: A solution to the war can be found "only through serious negotiations on the basis of constructive proposals put forward by the PRG and DRV Government."

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"cruelty and inhumanity" and alleged efforts to "eliminate" the PRG and preserve the Thieu regime, or his support for the establishment of a tripartite provisional government.

LEADERS' MEETINGS  
WITH DRV AMBASSADOR

A harmonious exchange of views seemed indicated in brief TASS reports that the DRV ambassador was received by Kosygin on 25 September and by Podgorny on the 26th for "warm" or "cordial" and friendly talks. The meetings take on added interest in view of the U.S. announcement on the 26th that Kissinger was meeting again with Le Duc Tho in Paris. Katushev had met the DRV ambassador on 15 September, presumably to brief him on Kissinger's consultations with Brezhnev and perhaps also to receive the 14 September DRV Government statement supporting the PRG's 11 September proposal.

TASS' reports of the ambassador's meetings with Kosygin and Podgorny did not indicate any of the substance of the talks, but VNA gave more detail. The Vietnamese agency quoted Kosygin as pledging continued Soviet support and assistance to the Vietnamese people's struggle "against the U.S. imperialist aggressors" until "complete victory" and the DRV ambassador as expressing gratitude for the USSR's "great and precious assistance." According to VNA, Podgorny called the 11 September PRG statement "a very fair and reasonable proposal" which the USSR "fully supports." VNA said Podgorny also pledged Soviet support and assistance "until complete victory," promising that the Soviet Union would fulfill its "international obligation." VNA did not report the DRV ambassador's remarks to Podgorny, but a Hanoi domestic service broadcast noted that he thanked the USSR for its "great and precious assistance." Neither VNA report mentioned the atmosphere of the talks, although the Hanoi radio report on the meeting with Podgorny--but not on the talks with Kosygin--echoed Moscow's description of the "cordial and friendly atmosphere."

Moscow's description of the atmosphere of the DRV ambassador's meetings with both Kosygin and Podgorny contrasts sharply with its portrayal of an atmosphere of "comradely frankness" in talks between the ambassador and Kosygin on 11 February. Moscow's report of that meeting, clearly indicative of strains and never acknowledged by Hanoi, was publicized only hours before the release of a belated Soviet Government statement supporting the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" of its seven-point proposal. The PRG and DRV ambassadors had informed Kosygin of the 2 February elaboration and the DRV's support of it at a 4 February meeting marked by "friendship and cordiality"; Moscow's subsequent delay in coming out with an official endorsement may well have prompted the meeting with Kosygin on the 11th.

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## HANOI DERIDES U.S. OFFICIAL REACTION TO RELEASE OF POW'S

Hanoi comment on the release of Lieutenants Gartley and Charles and Major Elias stresses the "lenient" and "humane" nature of DRV policies toward American POW's and criticizes the U.S. Administration's attitude toward the release. A 27 September Hanoi broadcast reported that the prisoners had "left for home" on the 25th but did not mention that the route was via China. Earlier the media had suggested that there would be a problem in sending them out on a plane which would stop in Laos. A broadcast on the 20th cited the Western press for reports that U.S. embassy officials in Vientiane planned to board the prisoners' plane and subject them to a military debriefing or medical examination. The radio labeled such a plan an "evil plot" of the Nixon Administration to "intercept and brazenly kidnap" the pilots in the hope of using them again to implement "vile and dirty schemes" in pursuit of the war.

VNA on the 22d carried the text of the telegram to President Nixon in which members of the escort delegation set forth four conditions they wanted met "in the best interests of the remaining pilots and their families"--letting the pilots return home in the company of the escort delegation, granting them 30 days of leave if they so desired, permitting them to undergo medical examinations at hospitals of their choice, and exempting them from the need to do anything further "to promote the American war effort in Indochina." VNA also carried, on the 24th, the text of the prisoners' message to the President requesting that they be allowed to return to New York with the escort delegation and spend a few days with their families, as well as a message from Mrs. Charles and Mrs. Gartley assuring the President that the pilots are in excellent health and spirits and another from Major Elias to his wife.

A 25 September Hanoi broadcast scoring Secretary Laird's remarks in his "Meet the Press" television interview the previous day said the Secretary demanded that the United States reject the four conditions proposed by the escort delegation, that he "indirectly threatened" the pilots' families, and that he "lied" in saying Hanoi was using the pilots as propaganda tools. Calling his remarks "spiteful" and "insolent," the broadcast asserted that they reflected the anger and embarrassment of "leading cliques in the White House and Pentagon" over the release. Likening Laird's remarks to the "vile" plans of U.S. Embassy officials in Laos, the broadcast concluded that they constitute "proof that all of the Nixon clique's noisy statements about its concern for the

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U.S. POW's have been deceits aimed at concealing its dark scheme of taking advantage of the POW's as a pretext to prolong and step up the war of aggression in Vietnam."

A 26 September QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on Laird's TV interview again brought up the charge of efforts to "kidnap" the pilots in Vientiane, in this context quoting Senator McGovern as saying that the Administration is "playing politics" with the released pilots and that "no clause of the Geneva convention requires that these three men report to U.S. Army officers for questioning."\* The paper was at pains to rebut Laird's charge that Hanoi was violating the Geneva conventions by "parading around" prisoners it had promised to release but had not actually freed. The article said that the pilots were living "freely and comfortably" in a hotel and had walked around Hanoi on their own on 18 September, and it observed that strolling around a lake in Hanoi did not constitute being "paraded around." Recalling earlier remarks by Secretary Laird about "inhumane treatment" of POW's, the broadcast rejoined that released prisoners and visitors to the DRV have "repeatedly affirmed that these captured U.S. militarymen have been treated very humanely."

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 26th noted Laird's statement that the Administration had advised the pilots' relatives against going to North Vietnam. This move, it charged, revealed that "the Nixon clique does not want the wives and mothers and these POW's themselves to witness and tell freely the truth about the savage crimes" which the United States has committed by bombing North Vietnam.

The 27 September Hanoi broadcast announcing the departure of the prisoners reported that the escort delegation had "recently" been received by Premier Pham Van Dong and that he had "talked intimately" with them. The broadcast also noted that the delegation had met with the Commission for the Investigation of U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam, called on the PRG's special representation in Hanoi, and visited victims of U.S. attacks and areas raided by U.S. planes. Earlier, Hanoi had given selective publicity to the activities of the delegates, the pilots, and their relatives.

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\* An AP report of Senator McGovern's statement was also picked up by Hanoi radio in two short broadcasts on 25 and 26 September; the one of the 26th also reported Ramsey Clark's statement on 24 September that "the U.S. military authorities are not allowed to lay a hand on these pilots."

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VNA on 20 September recounted a trip made on the 19th and 20th to Nam Ha and Ninh Binh provinces, where they reportedly viewed the destruction caused by U.S. bombs in Nam Dinh city and in the Phat Diem cathedral area. The report said the trip had deeply impressed the visitors, especially with regard to the extent of the bombing, the fact that the local population was continuing its daily activities, and the warm reception allegedly given the visitors wherever they went. A Hanoi broadcast in English to Southeast Asia, also on the 20th, provided a transcript of statements purportedly made by the Americans concerning their trip, expressing compassion for the suffering of the Vietnamese people and hope that the war will end soon.

#### DRV SUSTAINS CHARGES OF STRIKES AT DIKES, SCHOOLS, CHURCHES

In addition to continuing routine DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protests against U.S. bombings, a statement by the Water Conservancy Ministry spokesman on 21 September denounced alleged U.S. strikes at hydraulic works during the first 20 days of the month. A higher-level protest by the ministry, first reported by VNA on the 13th, had rounded up alleged damage to the dike system during August.

The Water Conservancy Ministry spokesman's statement charged that 26 dikes and other installations had been damaged by bombs on 50 occasions from 1 through 20 September in the provinces of Ha Tinh, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Ninh Binh, Nam Ha, Ha Tay, Ha Bac, and Hai Hung. Focusing on the Fourth Military Region comprising the three southernmost provinces of the DRV and the Vinh Linh zone, the statement cited damage to "vital dike sections" and "major hydraulics works" on the La and Lam rivers in Ha Tinh and Nghe An provinces, respectively. Stressing that the provinces in the Fourth Military Region were facing a period of typhoons and floods, it declared that should such installations break "when the water rises," the Nixon Administration would "bear full responsibility for this savage crime." Similar concern over the state of the hydraulics projects in the southern provinces was expressed in a Hanoi broadcast in Mandarin on 20 September, which claimed that the Americans are deliberately bombing the dikes along the La River in Ha Tinh Province during the current period of heavy rains and rising waters "in a wild attempt to carry out their policy of genocide, biocide, and ecocide."

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With the opening of the new school year, Hanoi has sustained an increased level of protest against alleged U.S. attacks on DRV educational institutions, inaugurated on 14 September with a statement by the Ministry of Higher Education and Vocational Secondary Schools condemning attacks on secondary schools and colleges. VNA reported on the 21st that Vietnamese architects in Hanoi had sent a message to the general assembly and 11th congress of the International Union of Architects singling out an attack of 10 September on the Hanoi College of Building as an example of the systematic destruction of "architectural achievements" including "towns and villages, schools and hospitals, churches and pagodas, dikes and hydraulics works." The alleged attack of 10 September drew further protest in a letter from the minister of higher and vocational middle schools to the chairman of the Cuba Committee for Solidarity With Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, also reported by VNA on the 21st. And on the 25th the College of Building was among several schools mentioned in a VNA report of a statement issued that day by the Vietnam Teachers Union condemning alleged U.S. bombing of schools since April.

VNA announced on 22 September that the National Liaison Committee of Patriotic and Peace-Loving Vietnamese Catholics had issued a statement condemning the alleged bombing of churches and killing of Vietnamese Christians since April. The statement was publicized on the same day as a news conference held by the Rev. Harry Bury and Mrs. Marianne Hamilton, members of the Second International Assembly of Christians in Solidarity With the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian Peoples, who had arrived in the DRV on the 16th together with the escort delegation for the recently freed American POW's and had toured several bombed areas with them. Rev. Bury, according to VNA's account of the press conference, stated that his purposes in visiting the DRV included investigation of the damage caused by the American bombing and of the freedom of worship allowed in the North. The Phat Diem cathedral complex in Nam Dinh Province, one of the areas visited by the Rev. Bury and Mrs. Hamilton, was cited in the statement as the target of "most serious and savage" bombardment in two separate attacks of 24 July and 15 August; it has been one of the targets most frequently cited by Hanoi as an example of U.S. destruction of nonmilitary installations. (According to VNA on the 23d, Rev. Bury and Mrs. Hamilton were received during their visit by Vice Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh; they left the DRV on the 23d, after Rev. Bury said a Mass attended by the recently released POW's at the Da Minh church in Hanoi.)

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SPOKESMAN'S           The following charges were leveled in the  
STATEMENTS           continuing series of routine protest statements  
                      by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman from 20  
through 25 September:

+ The statement of the 20th, protesting strikes of 19 and 20 September, said targets hit on the latter date included the town of Phu Ly in Nam Ha Province as well as other populated areas in that province and in Vinh Phu; a sanatorium in Kim Bang district of Nam Ha was reported damaged. Areas said to have sustained damage on the 19th included Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone; in addition, damage was reported from B-52 bombings in Quang Binh and Vinh Linh and from shelling by U.S. warships in Ha Tinh Province.

+ Bombings of the 20th were again decried in the spokesman's statement of the 21st, which also charged U.S. aircraft with attacking the capital of Thanh Hoa Province, the island of Lang Chau near Haiphong, and populated areas in Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Ha Tay, Hoa Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. The statement also charged U.S. warships with attacking coastal areas in Quang Binh.

+ Alleged destruction of civilian targets and water conservancy projects highlighted the statement of the 22d, which claimed that U.S. planes on the 21st attacked the capital of Thanh Hoa Province, the outskirts of the cities of Thai Nguyen and Haiphong, and populated areas in Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, Bac Thai, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It also said that B-52's raided Quang Binh Province and that U.S. warships shelled coastal areas in Thai Binh. Specific targets reported hit included a tuberculosis sanatorium, two medical schools, a pharmaceutical shop, a "capital construction school" in Nam Ha, and the resort of Dong Chau in Thai Binh, as well as a sea dike in Tien Hai district of Thai Binh, a portion of dike along the Day River in Nghia Hung district of Nam Ha, a dam or sluice in a village in Cam Pha district of Quang Ninh, and a section of the Thuong Trung canal in Ky Anh district of Ha Tinh.

+ Continued attacks on the capital of Thanh Hoa Province as well as on the outlying province of Lai Chau on the 22d were reported in the statement of 23 September. Other targets reported hit included the town of Cam Pha, the outskirts of Haiphong, and populated areas

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in Bac Thai, Quang Ninh, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. B-52's were charged with carpet-bombing areas in Quang Binh Province and the Vinh Linh zone and U.S. warships with bombarding coastal areas in Quang Binh.

+ The statement of the 24th said attacks on Haiphong the preceding day proved that the United States was pursuing a "policy of extermination bombing to ruin cities, provincial capitals, and townships, massacre the civilian population, and destroy economic and cultural establishments." In addition to citing alleged damage to several districts of Haiphong, the statement charged that air raids were carried out over Vinh city, the capital of Thanh Hoa Province, and populated areas in Viet Tri municipality (Vinh Phu Province), the provinces of Bac Thai, Yen Bai, Vinh Phu, Ninh Binh, Hai Hung, Quang Ninh, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and the Vinh Linh zone. B-52's and U.S. warships were said to have struck at Quang Binh Province.

+ The 25 September statement charged U.S. aircraft with striking the city of Vinh, the capital of Ha Tinh Province, Nam Dan township, and populated areas in Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. It further charged that B-52's carpet-bombed localities in Quang Binh and that U.S. warships "indiscriminately shelled" coastal villages in Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. The Vinh hospital and the Nam Dan dam in Nghe An Province were among civilian targets allegedly hit.

+ Charges of "massive attacks" on districts in Bac Thai and Ha Tinh provinces on the 25th highlighted the statement of 26 September, which also protested alleged bombings of populated areas in Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Hoa Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, and Quang Binh provinces, the Vinh Linh zone, and Cat Ba Island off Haiphong. The statement claimed that B-52's had bombed localities in Quang Binh and that U.S. warships had "wantonly attacked" coastal hamlets in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An. Specific targets reported hit included an agricultural middle school in Hoa Binh Province, an elementary school in Nghe An, and the Tra Thuong sluice and a section of dike in a village in Xuan Thuy district of Nam Ha Province.

+ Reacting to air strikes of 26 September, the statement of the 27th claimed that the cities of Nam Dinh, Vinh, Ky Anh, and Dong Hoi (the capital of Quang Binh Province) had been hit, together

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with populated areas in Yen Bai, Hoa Binh, Ha Tay, Quang Ninh, Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces. It further charged that warships had shelled coastal areas in Ha Tinh Province. Alleged damage to civilian installations included the destruction of an elementary school in Ky Son district of Hoa Binh Province.

PLANE DOWNINGS,           As of 24 September, Hanoi claimed to have  
AIR DEFENSE               downed 3,938 U.S. aircraft, 13 of them during  
                              the past week over the provinces of Nam Ha,  
Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Thanh Hoa, Quang Binh, and Quang Ninh and the  
Vinh Linh zone. One U.S. warship was reported set afire by the  
artillery force of Thanh Hoa Province on 24 September.

A NHAN DAN editorial of 27 September, praising the achievements of the Vietnam People's Air Force, claimed that DRV air defense forces had shot down more than 480 U.S. planes since 1 April, as well as capturing "a number of pilots." Citing the achievements of several specific units and individuals and praising the air force for scoring such victories despite its youth, the paper quoted U.S. Seventh Air Force Commander Gen. John W. Vogt as saying on 8 July that "Migs are now the biggest threat to the new American bombing campaign." The paper attributed the success of the Vietnamese air force to "the Vietnam Workers Party's correct line for the building of the people's armed forces and its right understanding of the relationship between man and weapons." The editorial was reported by VNA and Hanoi radio on 27 September, and the VNA press review for that day said a similar editorial appeared in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN.

NHAN DAN on 17 September, in an editorial recently available in translation, pursued a subject of continuing concern in cautioning against "the scourge of subjectiveness" that led people to ignore air raid warnings and to fail to maintain air raid shelters and trenches. It lectured that protecting lives and minimizing property losses is just as important to victory as downing planes and capturing pilots. A 19 September editorial broadcast by Hanoi radio covered the same topic. Short articles throughout the summer had chided the people for not taking air raid warnings seriously enough.

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## HANOI COMMENTATOR "CHIEN THANG" AGAIN LAUDS SOUTHERN OFFENSIVE

Hanoi's confidence that further military gains can be made in South Vietnam was reaffirmed in an article signed by the military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor) which was published in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 22 September. Chien Thang has been closely identified with the communist offensive, having signed an article published in both the army and party papers on 24 March--six days before the offensive was launched--which set up Hanoi's rationale for the attacks. He argued that the communists were in an advantageous position and that major battles by main forces were required to alter the balance of forces. Subsequently, Chien Thang commented on the progress of the offensive in articles, also published simultaneously in both papers, on 3 May and 18 August.\*

In his latest article Chien Thang again praised the communist offensive as a "new peak" in the war of resistance and argued that allied measures to counter it have failed. He said that "the offensive commenced well and overcame the great obstacle caused by the intensive and massive participation of the U.S. air and naval forces." And he suggested that the offensive will be sustained when he referred to "extremely bright prospects." In his 3 May article, he had claimed that the communists were able to fight protractedly and on a large scale.\*\*

Chien Thang said that massive U.S. air and naval operations can "to a certain extent, delay the collapse of the U.S. puppets." But he insisted that they "decidedly cannot turn defeat into victory or stop the strategic push of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people." He also reiterated Hanoi's contention that the renewed attacks on North Vietnam have only increased its determination to pursue its goals. And he claimed that the United States has had to admit that the bombing and mining have done no more than reduce the continuing flow of supplies to North Vietnam and to the "frontline."

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\* For discussions of Chien Thang's articles, see the TRENDS of 29 March 1972, pages 8-11; 12 April 1972, pages 13-15; 3 May 1972, pages 4-6; and 23 August 1972, pages 9-10.

\*\* Chien Thang had also made this point in a series of articles, published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN from 11 to 17 December 1971. See the TRENDS of 12 January 1972, pages 14-15.

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### DRV, PRG CITE MILITARY ACTION IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

Communist reports on the fighting in South Vietnam highlight the action in Quang Ngai Province, citing the capture of Ba To township and military subsector on 18 September and attacks in the Mo Duc area, and claiming that in the week ending 21 September the South Vietnam Government forces had lost 38 posts and positions and more than 2,000 troops. LPA also claimed that 50,000 people "rose up" and joined with the liberation forces to "smash the enemy's coercive machinery" and seize control of many villages and hamlets. The news agency noted that the units dispatched to meet the attacks in Quang Ngai--battalions of the 2d Division and the 11th multibattalion ranger unit--had already "sustained heavy losses" in engagements at Que Son and Tien Phuoc, Quang Tin Province (the communist province of Quang Nam), at the end of August and beginning of September. According to LPA, the relief forces were immediately intercepted, "many" of the planes sent to aid them were downed, and "most of the airlifted supplies for puppet soldiers fell into the liberation fighters' hands."

Comment on the fighting includes a 24 September article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which praised the overrunning of military subsectors and district towns in recent weeks, citing the communist successes in Tien Phuoc, Que Son, Hieu Duc, and Ba To districts of the communist-designated provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Da, and Quang Ngai. The paper claimed that the "people's forces" were also "tightening the noose" around military subsectors in Duc Tho, Mo Duc, Tu Nghia, and Binh Son districts.

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## SINO - SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW SAYS CHINESE HAVE FAILED TO ACCEPT SOVIET PROPOSALS

Moscow has responded to a recent column by Joseph Alsop--long an irritant with his insistent anticipations of a Soviet preventive strike against China--by disclosing that Peking has "thus far" failed to accept proposals that were first aired by Brezhnev in his major foreign policy address on 20 March. Moscow's latest rejoinder to Alsop, in the form of a PRAVDA article by G. Ratiani on 23 September, provides further evidence that the Sino-Soviet negotiations were not bugged off dead center by conciliatory Soviet gestures to the Chinese last March in the period between the Peking and Moscow summits. Coinciding with the return of the Soviet chief negotiator to Peking, Brezhnev had made a concession to the Chinese by offering to base Sino-Soviet relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence--the accepted basis for relations along the other two sides of the big-power triangle but regarded by Moscow as heterodox in relations between two communist countries.\*

Accusing Alsop of trying to slander Moscow's China policy by speculating about a preventive strike, Ratiani said the Soviets have advanced "concrete and constructive" proposals to the Chinese concerning nonaggression, nonuse of force, settlement of border questions, and improvement of relations on a mutually beneficial basis. This set of proposals represents an exact repetition of the formulation used by Brezhnev in his 20 March address as carried live by Radio Moscow. At that time, however, the proposal on nonuse of force was deleted from texts of the speech published in the press, suggesting second or conflicting thoughts by the Soviets over undercutting the implied threat of military pressure along the border and diluting the Brezhnev doctrine's justification of the use of force against a wayward communist state. The inclusion of this proposal in the Ratiani article follows a move by Moscow to neutralize anticipated Chinese criticism of Soviet arms control policy at the United Nations by proposing that nonuse of force in international relations be discussed at the current UNGA session.\*\*

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\* Brezhnev's speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 1-11.

\*\* The Soviet proposal, contained in a letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary General Waldheim, is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 September 1972, pages 30-32.

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
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The Soviets thus seem to have calculated that the proposal on renunciation of force strengthens their case in responding to the Chinese challenge and rebutting those who are imputing aggressive intentions to Moscow. Seeking to put the onus on Peking, Ratiani claimed that the Chinese have remained silent about the Soviet proposals in order to avoid self-exposure as "great-power expansionists."

That Moscow wished Ratiani's message to reach the international community is indicated by the fact that TASS disseminated the text of the article in English in its international service. In addition to denigrating Moscow's China policy, Ratiani complained, anti-Soviet elements have sought to slander Soviet foreign policy as a whole, and in this context he cited bilateral renunciations of force among measures proposed by Moscow for reducing international tension. While caustically taking note of Alsop's reference to sources in the CIA and the Pentagon, Ratiani made no mention of the Nixon Administration in directing his attack on "those who poison public opinion on orders from the aggressive imperialist circles."

Ratiani reflected particular sensitivity to an assertion by Alsop that PRAVDA had advocated a reduction of Soviet support for the Vietnamese. "This is really the ultimate in lying," Ratiani retorted.



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SOVIET BLOC COMMENT      In the wake of Moscow's comprehensive critique of Chinese policies in the 5 September PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov, the ultraloyalist Bulgarians have pressed the anti-Chinese line even beyond the point Moscow has recently gone. For the first time in recent years, the Order of the Day issued by the Bulgarian defense minister on the occasion of National Day denounced Peking's policies. The order, after duly paying respect to "the great Soviet Union," accused "the treacherous Mao Tse-tung ruling clique" of rendering services to the imperialists' "bloody course against the peoples of the world" by following an anti-Soviet

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policy and engaging in dissident activities within the international communist movement.

Two days earlier, an article by Ivan Donev in the party organ RABOTNICHESKO DELO took aim at the world atlas published recently in the PRC--a target of Soviet denunciation--to direct a stinging attack on Peking for pursuing "not only a stupidly mistaken policy, but also a dangerous one!" After deploring the "insolent" Chinese claim to Soviet territory in the Far East, the writer maintained that eventually the Maoists "will no doubt stretch their hands to Europe and the other continents." Raising a sensitive issue that Moscow has largely avoided, Donev referred to the "cowardly" killing of Soviet border guards in 1969 and said the publication of the atlas was meant to intensify military hysteria in a China where everything was subordinated to readiness for war against the Soviet Union. He also recalled Brezhnev's offer in March to establish relations with the PRC on the basis of peaceful coexistence--an offer not mentioned in the Radiani PRAVDA article.

The other East European allies of Moscow, except Romania, contributed to the attack on a more subdued level. In addition to standard criticism of Peking's superpower concept, anti-Soviet line, and activities in the United Nations, they have directed attention toward European topics such as PRC opposition to a European security conference and support for a stronger EEC. The authoritative Aleksandrov article, which invoked the recent Crimea conference in calling for cohesion within the Soviet bloc, was duly played up in East European media. The 15-21 September issue of the Soviet weekly ZA RUBEZHOM, in a roundup of socialist press comment on China, said that the Aleksandrov article engendered a response stressing "the incompatibility of the actions and aims of the Maoists with the tasks of the world communist and liberation movement." ZA RUBEZHOM reprinted articles from the Czechoslovak PRACE and the East German BERLINER ZEITUNG emphasizing the need for the unity of the socialist community, and from the Hungarian NEPSZABADSAG condemning Peking for trying to isolate the developing countries from the socialist states.

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## K O R E A

## PYONGYANG CRITICIZES PAK, WARNS ROK AGAINST IMPEDING TALKS

Pyongyang has resumed personal criticism of ROK President Pak Chong-hui in the wake of remarks by Kim Il-song strongly warning the South Koreans against obstructing North-South contacts. Personal attacks on Pak began reappearing on 23 September for the first time since the 4 July North-South joint statement on reunification in which the two sides agreed, among other things, to refrain from mutual "slander" and "defamation." Pyongyang had been giving that restriction a limited interpretation, continuing criticism of conditions in the South and of Seoul's policies, but it had refrained from naming Pak or the ROK Government while censuring the South Korean "ruling circles," "authorities," and the like.\*

The personal attacks on Pak have thus far appeared only in routine-level comment. In his interview with the Japanese paper MAINICHI, which took place on 17 September and was carried in full by KCNA on the 19th, Kim referred vaguely to the "South Korean authorities" in charging that they have used "double-dealing tactics" and have failed to implement the agreements stipulated in the joint statement. Kim's interview remarks and the ensuing commentaries criticizing Pak seem to represent an effort to pressure the Southerners into moving faster at the Red Cross talks and to permit the broader political contacts demanded by the North. Pyongyang may also be seeking to pressure Seoul to relax its domestic security measures and its support for the U.S. military presence by hinting that these policies endanger the future of the North-South talks.

In his lengthy interview, Kim took the Southerners to task for violating each of the "three principles of reunification" set forth in the joint statement:

† Recalling that the joint statement called for reunification without outside interference, Kim again called for a U.S. withdrawal from South Korea and the prevention of interference

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\* The joint statement and followup comment are discussed in the TRENDS of 6 July 1972, pages 16-19, and of 12 July 1972, pages 34-35.

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by "other foreign forces," which he defined as "some reactionaries of Japan." Kim added pointedly that the DPRK is in alliance with the USSR and China but that they "do not meddle in the internal affairs of our country" and have no troops in Korea.

‡ Noting that the joint statement called for reunification by peaceful means, Kim warned that the South Korean military modernization program and military exercises are "a grave act further aggravating the tension between North and South." Warning that the South Korean rulers' "provocative acts" are "evoking resentment among our people and people's army," he asserted that "such acts will only produce an atmosphere of fight rather than an atmosphere of reunification."

‡ Kim censured the South for violating the joint statement's provision that unity should be promoted in a manner "transcending differences of ideology, ideal, and system," for speaking of sending a "wind of freedom" to the North in connection with the Red Cross talks, and for continuing to suppress opposition in the South by enforcing the anticommunist and national security laws.

Kim concluded his recital of South Korean offenses by warning the South Koreans of the possible consequences--left unspecified--of their "treachery," pointing out that their provocative acts "are evoking great resentment" among the people of Korea and the world but that "we are restraining our wrath for the sake of reunification." Going on to elaborate the steps desired by the North, Kim said that the DPRK would do all it could to bring the Red Cross talks to a successful conclusion and that it wants to establish as soon as possible the North-South coordinating committee called for in the joint statement. But treating these "limited moves" as insufficient, Kim repeated the call for "political negotiations" such as a joint conference of political parties or of legislative deputies. He defined as a necessary "immediate step" the formation of a North-South confederation, "which means organizing a supreme national council" of North and South Korean government representatives.

The personal attacks on Pak beginning on 23 September--the day the vote was taken in the UN General Assembly to postpone discussion of the Korean question--have appeared in several contexts and have put Pyongyang on record with across-the-board criticisms of his policies. He has been scored for planning to attract Japanese capital to the ROK, for repressing Southerners who call for reunification, for engaging in "provocative"

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## CHINA - JAPAN

### PEKING EXPECTS TANAKA VISIT TO ACHIEVE "COMPLETE SUCCESS"

In the first days following Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka's arrival in China on 25 September, Peking has set the pace in seeking to sustain the momentum toward a decisive breakthrough in PRC-Japanese relations. In keeping with the formulation in the original announcement on the visit that Tanaka was coming "to negotiate and settle" the question of normalization of relations, Peking's well-orchestrated moves have been designed to put Tanaka on the spot and in the spotlight in the face of strong pressures to achieve an agreement.

While PRC media have given the visit much the same treatment that they gave President Nixon's in February, the special relationship developing with the Japanese has been clearly signaled. Most notably, Mao received Tanaka on the third day for what NCNA termed "serious and friendly discussions" lasting an hour. President Nixon had seen Mao on the first day of his visit for what NCNA called "serious and frank discussions"--a difference in formulation registering major divergences in Sino-U.S. relations as compared with the rapidly improving relationship between Peking and Tokyo.

Where Mao's meeting with President Nixon on the first day served to put the highest seal of approval on the invitation to the President, the deferral of Tanaka's audience with Mao until the third day may have been planned to permit the Chinese to assess the progress of the formal talks between Tanaka and Chou En-lai and parallel talks between the two foreign ministers. In his toast at the welcoming banquet he hosted on the 25th, Chou made clear Peking's intention of achieving substantial agreement during the visit. After noting that Tanaka had "resolutely put forward a new policy" toward China after assuming office and had "expressed full understanding of China's three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations," Chou declared that there "is already a good basis" for normalizing relations and added: "Now is the time for us to accomplish this historic task." He brought the point home by noting that talks "of great significance" had begun that day and asserting that "we expect that our talks will achieve complete success."

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military exercises, for supporting the continued U.S. "occupation" of South Korea, and for approving the dispatch of ROK troops to Vietnam. Pak's activities have been judged to be "treacherous," contrary to the spirit of the joint statement and the Red Cross talks, and aimed at obstructing reunification.


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PRC MEDIA COVERAGE      As in the case of President Nixon's visit,  
Peking has provided television as well as  
press and radio coverage of Tanaka's activities.



or along the road as Tanaka entered a limousine and left the airport. On the next two days Canton television opened its transmissions with relays of reports on the Japanese group's activities. A filmed report on the 25 September banquet included announcer-read summaries of toasts by Chou and Tanaka which omitted their references to past difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations while carrying only those passages anticipating the normalization of relations.

While it has not characterized the atmosphere of the formal talks, Peking introduced a touch of warmth early in the visit by depicting "a friendly meeting" that took place just before the first round of talks on the 25th. In addition to an NCNA dispatch on this event, one of the television reports and an NCNA radiophoto (an "extra" added to the day's file) also publicized the "friendly meeting."

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Chou's remarks on the prospects of a quick settlement contrasted with the long-term view taken by the Chinese during President Nixon's visit. At that time, noting that the purpose of the visit was to "seek the normalization of relations" between the PRC and the United States, Chou had said "the day will surely come" when that goal would be realized.

Chou had said at his banquet for the President that the Chinese hoped through "a frank exchange" of views to gain "a clearer notion of our differences and make efforts to find common ground" in order to make "a new start" in relations with the United States. In addressing Tanaka, he predicted that normalization of Sino-Japanese relations "can certainly be realized" by conducting "full consultations and seeking common ground on major points while reserving differences on minor points." Pointing out that the Chinese, following Mao's teachings, make "a strict distinction between the very few militarists and the broad masses" of Japanese, Chou touched only briefly on the "tremendous disasters" inflicted on the Chinese by "Japanese militarists' aggression" while observing in the same breath that "the Japanese people, too, suffered a great deal from it." He pointedly noted that the state of war between the two countries "has not been declared terminated," but he gave no indication of how this question might be resolved and he made no mention of Taiwan or Japanese-U.S. relations.

In contrast to Chou's forecast of complete success in the negotiations, Tanaka struck a more tentative note at the first day's banquet, expressing a "hope" that relations can be normalized while pointing out a need for the two sides to "conduct frank and sincere talks for the common goal of peace and prosperity in Asia and the world as a whole." He took note of "some minor differences" between the two sides' views but said he believed it "possible" for Japan and China to "overcome their divergence of views and reach agreement in the spirit of seeking common ground."

Tanaka stopped short of a full apology for the "great troubles" dealt to the Chinese by Japan, asserting: "I once again make profound self-examination" regarding these "unfortunate experiences." Stressing, however, that "we should not forever linger in the dim blind alley of the past," Tanaka then expressed his hopes for the negotiations. Like Chou, he avoided mentioning Taiwan, but he indicated that the Japanese wish to put aside issues involving third parties by saying he hoped China and Japan will "respect each other's relations with its friendly countries."

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## DISARMAMENT

### GROMYKO ELABORATES, COMMENT DEFENDS NONUSE OF FORCE PROPOSAL

Addressing the UNGA 27th session on 26 September, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko introduced a draft resolution incorporating the call for an international agreement on nonuse of force and a permanent ban on the use of nuclear weapons which he had urged be placed on the UN agenda in a letter to Secretary General Waldheim first publicized on 16 September.\* The draft resolution added an enforcement mechanism to the proposal as outlined in the letter, recommending that adherence be made mandatory through Security Council action. Available TASS summaries of Gromyko's speech did not mention his proposal that the Council meeting on this issue be at the foreign minister level, as reported in the Western press, nor did they emphasize his discussion of the new Soviet initiative in the speech itself. Soviet comment has not elaborated on the substance of the proposal as announced on the 16th and has given almost equal exposure to other disarmament items on the UN agenda, including the proposed world disarmament conference.

Moscow's brief commentaries to date on the nonuse of force proposal have sustained themes calculated on the one hand to counter Chinese positions and polemics and on the other hand to defuse potential arguments that the proposal would adversely affect third world interests. On the first count, against the background of Soviet censure of the Chinese for trying to "artificially divorce" the consideration of the problems of conventional and nuclear armaments, these commentaries have underscored the proposal's inclusion of conventional as well as nuclear arms--its linkage of a ban on use of force of all kinds with a ban on use of nuclear weapons. On the second count, they have argued that the proposal does not interfere with the right of any country to individual or collective defense or with a people's right to seek liberation from colonial oppression; in this context they have deemphasized the fact that the proposal covers conventional weapons.

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\* The TRENDS of 21 September 1972, pages 30-32, discusses the Gromyko letter and the Soviet initiative.

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Igor Belyayev, deputy director of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, commented in a broadcast in Portuguese to Africa on 20 September that until the problem of the "full liberation of Africa" has been solved, "we consider that all means, including armed fighting, may be used in this struggle." Indeed, Belyayev contended, stressing the ban on the use of nuclear weapons rather than conventional arms, acceptance of the Soviet proposal would contribute to "the victory of the cause of liberty and independence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America" since it would make impossible the implementation in practice of "the theories expressed on more than one occasion about the possibility of using nuclear weapons for local aims, having in mind conflicts such as Vietnam, the Middle East, and national liberation revolutions on the African continent."

In comment directed to a wider international audience stressing the proposal's inclusion of conventional arms, Moscow has underlined the fact that numerous wars entailing widespread destruction since the Second World War have utilized conventional weapons solely. Only one commentator has attempted to explain the Soviet decision to link the nonuse of force proposal focusing on conventional weapons with the nuclear use ban at this time. Radio Moscow's Boris Dmitriyev, in the domestic service roundtable discussion on 24 September, analyzed the reasons why the principle of nonuse of force had not been successfully implemented on an international scale before, even though it had been raised at many earlier sessions of the UN General Assembly and in other international forums. He concluded that one reason was that "the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons and the question of banning conventional arms were discussed separately." The separation of the two problems "understandably created an atmosphere of uncertainty and weakened the effectiveness of the decisions adopted at the United Nations," he said, and "the effectiveness of the present Soviet proposal is based on the fact that it removes the weaknesses inherent in the former discussions and decisions." Dmitriyev's exposition of the reason behind Soviet linkage of the two questions affords further evidence that the polemic with Peking heavily influenced the development of the new position expounded by Gromyko.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## GROMYKO SUPPORTS PALESTINIAN CAUSE, DEPLORES "TERRORIST ACTS"

In his 26 September address at the UN General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko voiced Moscow's strongest criticism thus far of the Palestinian "terrorist acts" in Munich, at the same time reaffirming Soviet support for the Palestinians' struggle to reestablish their "undeniable rights." TASS' summary of Gromyko's remarks included no reference to the item on terrorism submitted for UNGA discussion by Secretary General Waldheim on 8 September and accepted as an agenda item by the steering committee on the 22d, with the Soviet Union abstaining. In calling for consideration of the Soviet proposal on nonuse of force in international relations, Gromyko asserted the "undeniable right" of all states and peoples suffering aggression to "repel it by using all means" while the "aggressor" attempts to retain territories seized by force. He cited "sufficient examples" of this in Indochina and the Middle East.

On the Arab-Israeli conflict, Gromyko declared that "the latest events, together with new criminal aggressive acts by Israel" against the Arab countries, demonstrated the seriousness of the situation. He claimed that the responsibility was shared by "the aggressors" and those protecting and supporting them, thus giving Israel the right to challenge UN decisions. The United Nations, he maintained, has "the right and means" to "put the aggressor in his place."

**PALESTINIAN TERRORISM** Gromyko reinforced the cautious disapproval of the Munich events first expressed at elite level by Podgorny on 14 September at a dinner for the visiting Iraqi president. Podgorny had said only that "we cannot look with favor on the actions of certain elements" who harm the Palestinian movement. Gromyko, professing support for the Palestinians' "just struggle," added that at the same time "one cannot approve of the terrorist acts by certain elements among the Palestinian movement, which led in particular to the recent tragic events in Munich." He added that "their criminal acts" harm the "national interests and aspirations" of the Palestinians and are used by the Israelis to cover up their "piratical policies" against the Arab people.

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Soviet references to Palestinian "national" interests and aspirations are infrequent, the customary formula being an expression of support for the Palestinians' "legitimate" or "inalienable" rights and interests. Gromyko also included a variation of this stereotype in supporting the Palestinians' just struggle to reestablish their "undeniable rights." An atypical reference to "national" rights also appeared in a Kosygin message of greetings to the international conference of solidarity with Iraq, reported by TASS on 16 August: Kosygin declared Soviet solidarity with the Arabs in their struggle to insure "their legal rights, including the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine." Somewhat similar phraseology appeared at least once recently, in a 10 September PRAVDA article calling for a just Middle East settlement including "recognition of the national rights" of the Arab people of Palestine.

Soviet comment on the Munich episode has sought to absolve the Arab states, and the Palestinian movement in general, of any responsibility for it while accusing Israel of using the "tragic event" as a pretext for retaliatory strikes against Syria and Lebanon. Following Podgorny's speech, commentators said repeatedly that the USSR "cannot take a positive attitude" toward the actions of "some elements" which damage the entire Palestinian movement. More emphatically, Primakov declared in the Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable on the 24th that as far as Munich was concerned, "the actions of extremist elements, which as a matter of fact do not represent the entire Palestinian resistance movement, indeed cannot win approval or support. This is completely natural."

Moscow has reported but Soviet commentators have virtually ignored the inclusion of the item on terrorism on the UNGA agenda. A foreign-language commentary by Rassadin on the 21st charged that Israel, supported by "circles in the West," wanted only "the so-called antiterrorist movement program" discussed at the United Nations while ignoring the Middle East situation as a whole. TASS on the 24th, briefly acknowledging that an item on measures to prevent international terrorism had been approved for the agenda, neglected to mention the USSR's

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abstention in the voting.\* Reporting Secretary Rogers' UNGA address on the 25th, TASS noted only that he devoted a considerable part of his speech to "the question of 'international terrorism'" and submitted for UNGA consideration a draft convention on prevention and punishment of certain acts of international terrorism.

A broadcast in Arabic on the 26th asserted that mass terrorism "is one of Tel Aviv's main policy lines" toward the Arab people and that U.S. support for the "international terrorism pursued by the Israeli extremists" was confirmed by the recent U.S. veto in the Security Council. The broadcast complained that Secretary Rogers failed to denounce Israel's raids on Syria and Lebanon in his UNGA speech, instead "trying to justify those brutal actions and connect them with the tragic events in Munich." It conceded that "a group who have become desperate, who were in an extraordinary unnatural state, and who are not controlled by any Arab government or the Palestine Liberation Organization committed an act which cannot be approved of." Had it not been for Israeli occupation of Arab territories, the commentary added, and for Tel Aviv's refusal to heed UN decisions calling for granting the Palestinian people their rights, the Middle East situation would be completely different.

USE OF "ALL MEANS" Gromyko's reference to the right to repel aggression by using "all means" is reminiscent of the formulation, first appearing in the Soviet-Egyptian communique on as-Sadat's April visit to Moscow, declaring that the Arab states "have every reason to use other means" to regain the occupied territories. The Soviet-Egyptian communique on Prime Minister Sidqi's July visit amended this formulation to say that the Arab states "have every reason to use all the means at their disposal" for the liberation of the occupied territories and for insuring the rights of the Arabs, including the Palestinians. The formula was virtually abandoned after the Sidqi visit: Its last known appearance was in a Ukraintsev commentary broadcast in Arabic on 7 August.

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\* PRC representative Chen Chu, according to NCNA on the 23d, declared that China had "never been in favor of adventurist activities of terrorism." But he criticized the item on terrorism as failing to distinguish between aggressors and the oppressed and said the PRC delegation supported some African and Arab countries in opposing inclusion of the item on the UNGA agenda.

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Following the 17 September Soviet Government statement on the Israeli attacks on Syria and Lebanon, Moscow has cited the Arab press for "alarming reports" that Syria will be the next Israeli target and that the Arab states are preparing to counter this threat. Apparently echoing the government statement's assertion that it is necessary to "rebuff the aggression," some comment has pointed to Arab efforts to "collect all means at their disposal" to rout any aggression. PRAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov seemed to intimate that Arab preparations were far from complete, observing on the 20th that the question of coordinating pan-Arab actions and preparing "retaliatory measures in case of attack" was of paramount importance. The Arab public, he said, was expressing concern that the question of unity of action of the Arab countries in repulsing Israeli aggression "remains open."

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## AFRICA

## MOSCOW WELCOMES OAU, SOMALI MOVES TO SETTLE UGANDA CONFLICT

Continuing cautious Soviet reportorial coverage of the Uganda-Tanzania situation has sustained a semblance of neutrality, uncritically publicizing the dispatch of Libyan troops to aid Ugandan President Amin while reporting Dar es Salaam's denials that any regular Tanzanian troops were involved in the incursion from Tanzanian soil into southern Uganda. The first Soviet commentary on the subject in a week appeared in a Radio Moscow broadcast on 26 September, beamed only in English to Africa, keyed approvingly to the steps taken by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Secretary General and the Somali foreign minister to settle a conflict that benefits only "imperialism." Moscow's first and only other comment, in the domestic service and PRAVDA on 19 September, had similarly deplored the fighting that had erupted two days earlier as injurious to the interests of the emerging African states.

Noting that "Africans have been fighting Africans and the armed clashes have already resulted in considerable casualties, including the civilian population," the 26 September broadcast added that "such conflicts are taken advantage of by imperialist propaganda, Western diplomacy and the agents of the imperialist powers, and the colonial and racist regimes." In reporting President Amin's recent order expelling foreigners, Soviet media had said only that Amin was expelling "British subjects"--not Asians. The present commentary singled out the British coverage of the Ugandan situation: "As for the British press, there is a badly concealed threat behind all its decoration, and as always it puts forth the argument about the need to protect Her Majesty's subjects." The commentary concluded that "to cool off the enemies of Africa it is necessary to eliminate the dangerous situation and to strengthen the unity and cohesion of all member countries of the OAU."

In keeping with the stress on the need to cool the tensions and mediate the conflict, TASS' reportage has been careful to acknowledge both sides' positions--up to a point. It has ignored the more inflammatory charges issuing from the Tanzanian radio and has leaned toward fuller publicity for the Ugandan side. It has emphasized evidence of both sides' desire to settle the conflict, and it has played down the fighting by glossing over

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the details. Reporting Tanzanian President Nyerere's receptivity to the OAU initiative to settle the tensions, TASS on the 22d noted noncommittally that Ugandan-Tanzanian relations "are known to have deteriorated recently as the result of armed clashes" in Uganda in which the Government of Uganda says Tanzanian troops took part; TASS hastened to add that the Government of Tanzania said no Tanzanian troops had crossed the border. On the 24th, Soviet media publicized a Ugandan military spokesman's statement that the latest clashes were "not between Ugandans and Tanzanians" but between "rival detachments of guerrillas who support former Ugandan president Obote, part of whom, according to the spokesman took the side of the [Ugandan] government troops.

TASS' 22 September report, observing that "the present tension is a source of serious concern" to the African public, noted reports from Kampala that Somali Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Omar Arteh Ghalib had arrived in the Ugandan capital on a goodwill mission bearing a message from the Somali president to Amin. But Moscow has ignored steps taken by Egypt to mediate the dispute: MENA on the 22d quoted the Cairo AL-AHRAM as saying President as-Sadat had responded favorably to a request from Nyerere "to personally intervene," and the Kampala radio quoted directly from what it said was a message from as-Sadat to Amin pledging assistance in checking "the barbaric aggression" against Uganda by "the imperialist and Zionist elements."

TASS on the 22d impartially reported both the Sudanese and the Libyan versions of the incident: in which five Libyan planes carrying troops and equipment to Uganda had been forced to land in Khartoum on the 20th and to return to Tripoli the next day. The report noted the Sudanese Foreign Ministry's explanation that the flight had been made without the permission of the Sudanese Government, then mentioned a Libyan Foreign Ministry statement insisting that the Sudanese Government had been informed in advance of the flight over its territory. TASS cited MENA as the source for its report on the Libyan statement. On the 24th TASS reported without elaboration from Kampala that President Amin had "inspected here a detachment of Libyan officers and men who arrived in Uganda on 22 September."

Peking media have sustained their total silence on the whole situation.

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER CULTURAL AGENCIES ARE TIGHTENED

The publication of the August Central Committee decree criticizing the film industry and the removal of film czar A. V. Romanov has been accompanied by a tightening of central controls over cultural agencies.\* Under a 4 August decision to transform the Committee for Cinematography into a union-republic organization, the republic cinematography committees were subordinated to the USSR Cinematography Committee. In addition, beginning in January the newspaper SOVIET CULTURE will be removed from the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Culture and placed under the Central Committee. The transfer of the newspaper and the tightening of controls in the cultural sector appear to have placed the status of longtime culture minister Ye. A. Furtseva in doubt.

The reorganization of the Ukrainian cinematography committee into a union-republic organization was reported in RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 29 August. Similar announcements followed in other republics-- Kirgizia on 8 September, Tadzhikistan on 9 September, and the RSFSR on 14 September. On 30 August PRAVDA announced that SOVIET CULTURE would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee in January, and on 14 September RADYANSKA UKRAINA revealed that former film czar Romanov would become chief editor of the new Central Committee publication. The Ukrainian paper identified Romanov as "O. V. Romanov," reflecting the Ukrainian rendering of the Russian name Aleksey as Oleksiy.

SOVIET CULTURE continues to list P. S. Dariyenko as its chief editor, and presumably he will remain in that post until January. The 49-year old Dariyenko appears to be a Brezhnev protege, having risen at the age of 30 to the post of chief editor of the main Moldavian Central Committee paper in 1953. Brezhnev was Moldavian first secretary in 1950-52. Dariyenko became chief editor of SOVIET CULTURE in early April 1968, shortly after Brezhnev's Moscow speech initiating a general ideological crackdown.

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\* For background, see TRENDS for 30 August, pages 36-37.