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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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
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# TRENDS

## In Communist Propaganda

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
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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 23 - 29 OCTOBER 1972

<u>Moscow (2773 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1200 items)</u>		
Indochina	(12%)	19%	Domestic Issues	(41%)	37%
[Vietnam	(1%)	15%]	Indochina	(28%)	21%
[International	(8%)	3%]	[Vietnam	(16%)	13%]
Solidarity Week			[Cambodia	(7%)	6%]
Italian Prime	(--)	4%	UNGA Session	(9%)	12%
Minister Andreotti			Zambia National Day	(--)	4%
in USSR			Anniversary of CPV	(---)	4%
China	(4%)	3%	in Korean War		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

The predictable propaganda fanfare has followed the 26 October DRV Government statement revealing that the United States and North Vietnam in private talks had reached a peace accord which calls for an immediate cease-fire in South Vietnam and for the establishment of a three-segment "administrative structure" to promote implementation of the agreement by the GVN and PRG and to organize general elections. The DRV statement was formally endorsed in a PRG statement on the 28th and has been lauded at meetings of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, the Vietnam Fatherland Front, and lower-level organizations. The PRG statement claimed that the accord--released only in brief summary form--responds satisfactorily to the two basic demands of the 11 September PRG statement--that is, that the United States will end military involvement in Vietnam and that the internal affairs of South Vietnam will be settled on the basis of "the reality that there are in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and other political forces."

Followup propaganda has echoed the DRV statement in arguing against the U.S. stand that the agreement cannot yet be signed because of "difficulties in Saigon" and because further negotiations are needed on some points. Hanoi first acknowledged Kissinger's 26 October press conference in a domestic broadcast on the 31st which denied that there had been any misunderstanding about an agreement to sign the accord on the 31st. While Hanoi continues to press for a speedy agreement, it typically reiterates the Vietnamese communists' determination to continue the struggle until victory if a settlement is blocked.

Moscow has characteristically sought to strike a careful balance in expressing support for its allies while encouraging flexibility. No official Soviet statement has been issued thus far, but Kosygin expressed hope for a settlement when he met the DRV and PRG envoys on 27 October.

Peking has outpaced Moscow in lining up behind the Vietnamese comrades, issuing a government statement on the 30th that endorsed the DRV statement and pledged continuing assistance in the war effort. The Chinese statement, charging that Washington has raised new obstacles on the "pretext" of difficulties with Saigon, called on the United States to sign the draft agreement "as soon as possible."

## HANOI, FRONT PRESS FOR SPEEDY SIGNING OF PEACE AGREEMENT

DRV media have repeatedly echoed the claim in the 26 October government statement that the schedule for signing the U.S.-DRV peace

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accord on 31 October had in fact been suggested by the United States on the 20th. According to Hanoi's version, President Nixon in a message to DRV Premier Pham Van Dong on the 20th had welcomed the DRV's good will--in accepting the U.S. position on two unspecified issues which had remained in dispute as late as the 17th--and had confirmed that "the formulation of the agreement could be considered complete." The statement went on to say that the President in his message on the 20th had also raised a number of "complex points" but that two days later, in another message, he had expressed satisfaction with the DRV's explanation of these points. Thus, as of the 22d, Hanoi maintains, agreement had been reached that on the 23d the United States would stop the bombing and mining in North Vietnam, on the 24th the peace accord would be initialed in Hanoi, and on the 31st the U.S. and DRV foreign ministers would sign the accord in Paris. The government statement said that "a serious situation which threatens the signing of the agreement" was brought about by the United States on the 23d when it referred to difficulties in Saigon and demanded that negotiations be continued in order to resolve new problems.

It was not until the 31st that Hanoi media acknowledged Kissinger's press conference, held after Hanoi had released the summary of the peace agreement. The Hanoi domestic service commentary claimed that there was no misunderstanding about the schedule and observed that the 31st was the day on which the agreement should have been signed. It said that the Nixon Administration has adopted a "crooked attitude," not only having dodged the signing but having raised the question of changing the points agreed on. The broadcast noted that Kissinger had said that peace was at hand and that the six or seven issues which could be discussed in three or four days were minor. Without mentioning President Thieu, it countered that it would be a normal thing if "some side" [been naof doos] raised new issues for discussion while the two sides were still in the process of continued talks, but that the U.S. and DRV governments "and even their state leaders, grave and dignified, exchanged messages and reached agreement." The commentary called it noteworthy that it was while Kissinger was holding consultations with Thieu from 18 to 22 October that President Nixon sent two messages--on the 20th and 22d--confirming that the U.S. side considered the text as completed and expressing satisfaction with the DRV's interpretations. Asking if it was reasonable to say that the President sent messages without awareness of Kissinger's discussions in Saigon, the broadcast accused the United States of deliberately prolonging the talks.

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In ridiculing the U.S. "pretext" of difficulties with Thieu, the commentary claimed that in the bilateral negotiations the United States and the DRV had agreed that they were responsible for obtaining the concurrence of their allies and that the DRV had the PRG's and the United States had Saigon's. To further document its argument that no further consultations with Saigon should be necessary, the commentary referred to press conference statements by Kissinger and the President last February. The radio broadcast--like other comment, including a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 28th--quoted the President as having said in a 10 February press conference that any proposal he would advance would be a common proposal by the South Vietnamese and the U.S. governments, and that the United States would not advance any proposal without exchanging views with the GVN and obtaining its agreement.

The radio commentary on the 31st indicated that efforts to bring about a signing of the agreement would go on when it noted that the struggle must be continued on the "military, political, and diplomatic fronts." While insisting that further consultations with Saigon should not be necessary and that the text of the agreement should not be changed since the United States had approved it, Hanoi has taken care not to suggest that the DRV will make no changes. It seems noteworthy in this regard that there has been virtually no substantive Hanoi discussion of the nine-point outline of the draft agreement. The NHAN DAN editorial on the 27th did cryptically paraphrase most of the points but, perhaps significantly, did not even mention point six calling for joint military commissions, made up of the four parties and of the two South Vietnamese parties; an international commission of control and supervision; and the calling of a conference on international guarantees.

#### DRV SUMMARY OF DRAFT ACCORD LEAVES MANY POINTS AMBIGUOUS

In the absence of a full text of the peace agreement, it is difficult to compare current positions with those that have evolved over the years. The government statement, in observing that on 8 October the DRV took "a new, extremely important initiative," said the Vietnam problem "will be settled in two stages in accordance with the oft-expressed desire of the American side." However, the statement

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avoided describing the agreement as separating military and political questions\* when it said that

the first stage will include a cessation of the war in Vietnam, a cease-fire in South Vietnam, a cessation of the U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam, and an agreement on the principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; in the second stage, the two South Vietnamese parties will settle together the internal matters of South Vietnam.

An article in the September issue of the DRV theoretical journal HOC TAP\*\* is instructive regarding the meaning of Hanoi's assertion that the military and political questions are linked and must be settled together. HOC TAP said that according to American propaganda, the United States wants to separately settle two kinds of questions, military and political, whereas the Vietnamese side wants an all-inclusive solution. The journal article said that

in reality, in what the United States calls military questions, such as cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, release of POW's. . . , cease-fire encompasses a key political problem because it means recognition of the puppet administration. In the so-called political questions--that is, questions pertaining to the internal affairs of South Vietnam--there is the question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam, which is a question of military character. The United States desires that the political questions be solved only some time after the settlement of what it calls military questions.

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\* Last winter, in divulging the DRV-U.S. private negotiations, President Nixon had acknowledged that the United States had variously proposed separating military and political questions--as in a secret 31 May 1971 U.S. proposal--or, in accordance with Hanoi's desire, had negotiated combined military and political questions as set forth in the DRV's nine-point proposal submitted in private on 26 June 1971 and revealed by the President on 25 January.

\*\* The importance Hanoi attached to the HOC TAP article, which set out the respective negotiating positions, was indicated when VNA and Hanoi radio carried it in their international services--unique handling of a HOC TAP article on the Paris talks. Moreover, the transmissions, on 27 September, coincided with the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho meetings in Paris on the 26th and 27th. See the TRENDS of 27 September 1972, page 1, and 4 October, page 12.

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CEASE-FIRE Point two of the agreement as summarized in the DRV Government statement says that 24 hours after the signing of the agreement, a cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam. While this is at variance with the PRG's 1 July 1971 seven-point proposal, it is similar to the DRV nine-point proposal advanced in the private talks on 26 June 1971. The approach taken in the nine points was reflected in the article in the September issue of HOC TAP and in the 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article which had treated the issue of a political settlement in greater detail than any propaganda since last winter.\* Commentator called the military and political aspects of the Vietnam issue inseparable and said that after the United States agreed to a solution, a cease-fire would be put into effect. HOC TAP had said that following the signing of a comprehensive agreement, there would be a cease-fire and "implementation of provisions agreed upon" would ensue.

The PRG's seven-point proposal made public on 1 July 1971 dealt separately with cease-fires with U.S. and Saigon forces. Thus point one, after spelling out the demands on U.S. withdrawal, said that a cease-fire would be observed between U.S. and PLAF forces after agreement was reached on U.S. withdrawal. Similarly, point two of the July proposal, on a three-segment government of national concord which would organize general elections, said that a PLAF-ARVN cease-fire would be observed when the government of national concord was formed. The matter of a cease-fire had not been raised in the PRG's 11 September statement.

Point seven of the DRV's nine-point proposal of 26 June 1971 said that a cease-fire would be observed after the signing (ky ket) of agreements on the problems outlined in the previous points of the proposal. (Point six of the U.S. eight-point proposal had called for a general cease-fire throughout Indochina to begin when the final agreement was signed.)

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\* See the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 3-6.

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The DRV Government statement introduced some confusion regarding the cessation of U.S. bombing and mining of North Vietnam. The statement indicated that the bombing and mining would be stopped and then the agreement would be initialed and signed. But point two of the summarization of the agreement, after declaring that the cease-fire will be observed throughout South Vietnam, says that "the United States will stop all its military activities and end the bombing and mining of the North." The specification in point two that U.S. troops will be withdrawn within 60 days is consistent with time frames for withdrawal in proposals on both sides in the past.

"SELF-DETERMINATION"  
IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Point four on self-determination for the South Vietnamese, as summarized in the government statement, provides for the continued existence of both the Saigon government and the PRG. It thus drops the communist demand that the two governments get together to form a provisional coalition government made up of their representatives and a third neutralist faction. Instead it says that an administrative structure of three equal segments called "the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord" will be set up to promote the implementation of the signed agreements by the PRG and GVN and to organize general elections.

The recognition of the PRG meets a complaint repeatedly voiced in Hanoi and Front propaganda in the past two months that the United States denies the existence of the PRG. The 31 August NHAN DAN Commentator article--which had indicated a notable Hanoi attempt to call attention to the seriousness and reasonableness of its negotiating posture--had said that by referring only to the Liberation Front, President Nixon wants to deny the existence of the PRG, "the South Vietnamese people's genuine and legal representative and a government whose prestige has continually risen in the world," as allegedly proved most recently at the nonaligned conference in Guyana.\* Following the release of the

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\* President Thieu in his 24 October TV speech, following Kissinger's five-day visit to Saigon, did not deign to mention the PRG in complaining that the North Vietnamese "wanted us to recognize the existence of two different governments in South Vietnam." He continued: "I am against this demand and hold that the problems concerning the North and the South must be solved by the Saigon and Hanoi governments, and the internal affairs of the South must be settled by the legal and constitutional RVN Government and the Liberation Front." The U.S.-Saigon eight-point proposal publicized last January had said that presidential elections would be organized by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam. . . President Nixon in his 25 January speech and President Thieu on the 27th had specified that these forces

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11 September PRG statement expressing readiness to reach agreement that neither a communist regime nor a U.S. "stooge regime" would be imposed, Hanoi and Front propaganda stressed that in fact the United States was intent on "maintaining" Thieu and denying the existence of the PRG.

The nature of the "administrative structure" called for in the agreement is complicated by the fact that the word Hanoi chose to use for "administrative"--"chinh quyen"--can also be used to mean "government."\* (Earlier communist proposals demanding a coalition government had used the unmistakable term for government--"chinh phu.") The DRV statement's opening summation of the 8 October initiative suggested that "chinh quyen" should be interpreted to mean a government when it noted that the two administrations (chinh quyen) in the South would hold consultations with a view to forming an "administration (chinh quyen) of national concord." Instead of "chinh quyen," Hanoi could have used a less ambiguous term for administration, "hanh chanh" or "hanh chinh."

In agreeing that two governments will exist in South Vietnam, Hanoi has of course dropped the call for Thieu's resignation. A notable precedent for such a reversal of attitude toward a South Vietnamese leader exists in the treatment of former GVN Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky. In early 1971 Vietnamese communist media routinely reiterated the position, stated in the PRG's 17 September 1970 statement, that the PRG would negotiate with a Saigon administration "without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem." Consistent with this position, communist reports of Ky's criticism of Thieu in the course of the presidential election went on to declare that there was no essential difference between the two.\*\* However, the seven-point PRG proposal of 1 July 1971 dropped the previous reference to the three top GVN leaders, instead asking that the

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\* As an example of the broad usage of the term "chinh quyen," a VNA English translation of a 23 September 1969 Truong Chinh speech variously translated 'chinh quyen' as administrative organs, administration, power, and state power. Hanoi also uses "chinh quyen" in referring to the Nixon or Saigon "administrations" as well as in reference to the communists' "revolutionary administrations" in South Vietnam.

\*\* A 13 May 1971 Hanoi broadcast cited Ky criticism of Thieu but went on to declare that "everyone knows that both Thieu and Ky are ugly traitors" and that they are denouncing each other "because each wants to be the number one lackey of the Americans." See the 19 May 1971 TRENDS, pages 11-12.

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United States cease backing "the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu." Communist propaganda continued to attack Ky for several days in the wake of the new proposals, but by 26 July Liberation Radio seemed to be justifying the proposal's new line when it took pains to dissociate Ky from Thieu: The radio claimed that Ky was "forced" by Ambassador Bunker to run on the same slate with Thieu in the 1967 elections and quoted him in 1968 as denouncing those elections as a farce.\*

The stipulation in point four that "general" elections will be organized by the council is consistent with the call for general elections in previous communist proposals and is at variance with proposals for presidential elections in the eight-point proposal and other allied statements. Hanoi's summary of the agreement does not elaborate on the nature of the general elections or reflect Kissinger's explanation in his press conference on the 26th that the two parties in Vietnam would negotiate about the timing of elections, the nature of the elections, and the offices for which the elections would be held.

President Thieu complained in his 24 October speech about the use of the term "general elections"; he charged that the communists want more than presidential elections and that "a general election means that the current regime in the South must be ended completely so that a new constitutional national assembly can be elected to draft a new constitution, and then a new national legislative assembly, a new judiciary, and a new executive will be formed." Past communist proposals bear out Thieu on this point. The NFLSV's 8 May 1969 10-point solution and the PRG's 17 September 1970 elaboration called for general elections to set up an assembly, work out a constitution, and install a new government. While the function of the general elections was not spelled out in the PRG's 1 July 1971 proposal, the PRG's 2 February 1972 elaboration of that proposal repeated the scenario for general elections leading to a new assembly, constitution, and government. In its 11 September statement the PRG merely called for general elections. However, Mme. Binh at the 5 October session of the Paris talks recalled that the communists had proposed that the future government in South Vietnam be chosen through "general elections which would provide a constituent assembly. The new constitution will decide which political regime South Vietnam will adopt."

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\* See the 28 July 1971 TRENDS, page 10-11.

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In addition to providing for the formation of a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, the DRV summary of the agreement indicates that "the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels." Previous communist proposals have not discussed the future development of the political situation at the local level, although the 2 February 1972 PRG elaboration had seemed to require the dissolution of existing local governments in the South when it demanded that Saigon "disband its machine of oppression and constraint against the people." President Thieu in his 1 November national day message and reception speech appeared to interpret the agreement as calling for the formation of three-part governments at every level. Detailing objections to the proposed agreement, Thieu charged in his reception speech that "the communists propose the formation of a three-segment government from the central level down to the village and hamlet levels, demanding that all our institutions--including the southern constitution, national assembly, armed forces, police, and cadres--be eliminated."

VIETNAM "UNITY" Point one in the DRV statement's summary of the peace agreement says that the United States will respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements. The U.S. eight-point proposal had called on both sides to respect the 1954 and the 1962 Geneva agreements; and point five of the DRV's nine-point plan had called for U.S. respect of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements. But there was no call on that occasion for the United States to recognize Vietnam as one country.

President Thieu in his 1 November message on GVN National Day, in observing that the communists demand that everyone respect the Geneva agreements, said that they say there are only three countries in Indochina and do not recognize that there are four--Cambodia, Laos, and South and North Vietnam. He went on to complain that the communists give themselves the right to maintain "several hundred thousand North Vietnamese troops" in the South.\*

\* Point two of the agreement, as summarized in the DRV Government statement, says that "the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam." Point four says that "the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties." The 1 July 1971 PRG seven-point proposal said that the "Vietnamese parties will together settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam." The DRV's 26 June 1971 nine-point proposal did not address this issue; however, point five of the U.S. eight points said that among the problems that would be settled by the Indochinese was the implementation of the principle that "all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers."

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**KOSYGIN URGES CONTINUED TALKS FOR VIETNAM SETTLEMENT**

Moscow's support for the 26 October DRV Government statement on the peace agreement was highlighted by reports of Kosygin's meeting the next day with the DRV and PRG charges d'affaires, who handed him a copy of the DRV statement. Moscow said the talks were held in "a cordial and friendly atmosphere." According to available summaries of his remarks, Kosygin did not mention the 31 October deadline demanded by the DRV for signing of the agreement but expressed the hope that continued negotiations would lead to agreement "soon." Successive reports of his remarks, however, subordinated the emphasis given his reference to continued negotiations:

+ The initial TASS report on the 27th led off by saying Kosygin "expressed the hope that the talks on Vietnam would be continued and lead soon to the signing of an agreement ending the war," adding that "this would meet not only the interests of the Vietnamese and American peoples but also those of world peace." TASS went on to underscore the point by noting that Kosygin, in avowing support for the Vietnamese struggle, declared that the USSR "supports the efforts aimed at the speediest termination of the war . . . ."

+ A TASS report later on the 28th, however, began by reporting Kosygin as expressing "support" for the DRV statement, citing at a later point his assertion of hope for continued talks.

+ The shift in emphasis was carried a step further in a version of Kosygin's meeting with the DRV and PRG envoys frontpaged in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on the 28th. The press report highlighted remarks by the DRV and PRG envoys, which had been mentioned only at the end of the initial TASS report, to the effect that the U.S. line at the talks had constituted "an attempt to avoid agreement and to drag out military operations" and that the DRV and PRG would do "everything necessary to restore peace in Vietnam on the basis of ensuring the Vietnamese people's national rights." It then went on to cite Kosygin on "support," relegating to the end his remarks on his hope for further talks.

VNA's report of the meeting predictably stressed the Vietnamese envoys' remarks, attributing to them more militant statements than Moscow did. VNA noted that they specifically criticized the U.S. "scheme of maintaining the Saigon puppet regime" and charged the Nixon Administration with responsibility for the delay in

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signing of the agreement. VNA quoted the diplomats as asserting that the Vietnamese people are determined to "step up the struggle on the three fronts, military, political, and diplomatic," until they achieve their goal of liberating the South, defending the North, and advancing toward peaceful reunification. VNA briefly noted Kosygin's remarks on "support," adding a reference to Soviet "assistance" until "final victory." It omitted entirely his expression of hope that negotiations would continue.

Kosygin's remarks constitute the only authoritative Soviet comment to date on the recent political developments.

**BACKGROUND** The PRG's 2 February 1972 "elaboration" of its seven-point program has been the only Vietnamese communist statement on a settlement to occasion a supporting official statement from Moscow--a USSR Government statement issued belatedly on 11 February. Moscow had endorsed the PRG's seven-point proposal of 1 July 1971 with a PRAVDA editorial on the 5th, the day after Peking had extended editorial support. The PRG's 11 September 1972 statement on a settlement was given only generalized support in speeches by various Soviet leaders, including Podgornyy at a dinner for the visiting Iraqi president on 14 September and Gromyko in his UNGA speech on the 26th.

There has been no consistent pattern of Moscow media reporting on Soviet leaders' meetings with the DRV and PRG envoys to receive copies of Vietnamese communist statements. TASS reported that CPSU Secretary Katushev saw the DRV ambassador on 15 September, the day after Kissinger's departure from Moscow, but the report contained no indication that the ambassador handed over a copy of the 14 September DRV Government statement supporting the PRG's 11 September proposal. Nor was there any report that a Soviet leader met with a PRG representative at that time. Two days after the PRG had issued its 2 February 1972 elaboration, TASS reported that Kosygin received the DRV and PRG ambassadors, who informed him of the PRG statement and the DRV's "stand" (Hanoi's own statement not having yet been released).

**COMMENT, REPORTAGE** Moscow has been most forthcoming, in keeping with the initial emphasis in the reporting of Kosygin's remarks, in a 28 October domestic service commentary which observed that "at the present responsible moment it is particularly important to show flexibility and realism." This remark was prefaced by a statement of support for the PRG and DRV stand on a settlement and followed by a condemnation of U.S. efforts to delay a solution by bringing up difficulties with Thieu.

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But the message was clear. Without specifying either side, the commentary welcomed in the recent U.S.-DRV talks "a realistic and constructive approach, an essential flexibility and the wish to find a key to solution of the Vietnam question." The agreement, the commentary said, shows that "real possibilities exist" for peace.

Moscow's reports of statements by Administration spokesmen have highlighted remarks suggesting that agreement is close. TASS' brief account of Kissinger's 26 October press conference cited his confirmation of the main provisions of the agreement and his comment that peace is close at hand, with only relatively less difficult points outstanding. TASS noted that Kissinger "contended" that the United States could not sign the agreement on the 31st and that he "tried to justify this approach" by citing the need to reach agreement with Thieu. Hanoi's insistence on a 31 October signing had been noted at the outset in TASS' prompt report of the DRV Government statement, which had been followed by longer reports and by publication of the full text in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. While Moscow picked up calls by Vietnamese spokesmen for signing of the accord on 31 October, its own comment called in more open-ended terms for signing without delay and did not explicitly endorse Hanoi's deadline.

A 28 October TASS report of President Nixon's campaign speech at Ashland, Kentucky noted his remark that there has been "a significant shift" in the peace talks and that while there are still certain differences, "I believe that these will be resolved." On the 31st TASS briefly reported the White House spokesman's announcement that the United States would not sign the agreement that day because it believed some points must be defined more precisely. But TASS added the spokesman's expression of hope that the agreement "will shortly be signed."

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## PEKING ISSUES GOVERNMENT STATEMENT BACKING HANOI'S STAND

Peking moved promptly and authoritatively to line up behind Hanoi's 26 October statement on the Vietnam negotiations\* and to pledge continuing assistance should the war be prolonged. After Chou En-lai had expressed generalized support for the Vietnamese communists' stand when he received a copy of the statement from their envoys on the 26th, Peking issued a government statement and a companion PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 30 October accusing the United States of delaying a settlement and calling on Washington to sign the draft agreement "as soon as possible."

Until the date had passed Peking had skirted Hanoi's demand that the agreement be signed by 31 October, a deadline not explicitly mentioned in the government statement or Commentator article. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 1 November rather blandly took note of the "timetable," observing that the date for the signing had slipped by and blaming the United States for "this complication." The editorial invoked the international community as demanding that the United States sign the agreement "as speedily as possible"-- a formulation leaving open the possibility of further negotiations.

Peking's issuance of a government statement and accompanying commentary parallels the pattern of its reaction to the PRG's 2 February "elaboration" of peace terms and to President Nixon's 8 May announcement of the mining of DRV ports. Similarly, in meeting with the Vietnamese envoys Chou repeated a practice he followed in February, April, and July. In contrast, Peking had not issued a formal statement in response to the PRG's 11 September statement on a settlement, and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien had substituted for his chief in receiving the PRG statement from the Vietnamese representatives.

Peking has thus chosen on the latest occasion to lend the full weight of its authority to pressures on the United States to sign the draft agreement and to go on record as a firm backer of Hanoi. In addition to expressing support for "the solemn and just position" taken in the DRV statement, the PRC Government statement took the occasion to reaffirm that the Chinese will perform "their

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\* Peking has also in standard fashion carried the texts of the DRV statement and the supporting PRG 28 October statement, the 27 October communique of the DRV National Assembly demanding that Washington sign the accord, and the 29 October NFLSV appeal for support for the DRV and PRG statements.

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internationalist duty" of continuing "all-out support and assistance" in the war effort in the absence of a settlement.

TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT      Peking's discussion of the terms of a peace settlement has focused on Thieu's objections to the draft accord. The 30 October Commentator article, warning that Thieu's position as reflected in his 24 October speech "threatens to torpedo completely a peace which is about to be realized," contended that Thieu "fundamentally" opposed the draft agreement rather than disagreeing on minor points. The article did not address the terms of a settlement as such, broaching them indirectly by citing Thieu's objections on various points, but it indicated Peking's view on one issue of particular significance to the Chinese in denying that a cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia could be included in the Vietnam settlement. At a Peking banquet on 29 October, Prince Sihanouk "categorically" declared that an eventual Vietnam settlement should not apply to Cambodia. Chou avoided this issue in his speech at the banquet (see the section of the TRENDS discussing Sihanouk's visit to the DRV and the Peking banquet.)

While taking the United States to task for delaying the signing of the accord on the "pretext" of difficulties with Saigon, Peking has not explained what may have been Washington's motive. The Commentator article, insisting that Washington bears responsibility for "correcting the truculent and unreasonable" attitude of the Thieu government, was at pains to rebut "the utterly ridiculous and untenable" claims ascribed to both Saigon and Washington that there had not been time to consult Thieu. In this connection the article cited remarks by President Nixon and Kissinger last February to the effect that Thieu has always been fully consulted, and it made Peking's only reference to the 26 October Kissinger press conference in noting his remark that the South Vietnamese were informed of the negotiations as they proceeded.

The 1 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, echoing the Commentator article, said the United States faces "a crucial test" in deciding whether to achieve a settlement now. Repeating Peking's insistent contention that Thieu cannot block a settlement if the United States really desires one, the editorial observed that it is "by no means accidental" that Thieu has set "an extravagant price" for a settlement. The editorial did not explain what issues may be involved, and it resorted to an exceptionally opaque formulation in appearing to suggest that Thieu's demands could scuttle realistic prospects for an early settlement. Nonetheless, the editorial's call for a settlement "as speedily as possible" suggests that the Chinese countenance further negotiations as required to firm up the agreement.

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## SIHANOUK VISITS DRV, AGAIN REJECTS CEASE-FIRE UPON RETURN

Cambodian Prince Sihanouk arrived in Hanoi on 26 October, the date of the DRV statement on the Vietnam negotiations, for a visit that gave the two sides an opportunity for consultations at a crucial juncture in the Indochina conflict. Though there was the usual show of solidarity, the results of the visit and statements by the Cambodians upon their return to Peking reflected the two sides' divergent situations at a time when the Vietnamese are pressing for a cease-fire agreement and the Cambodians insist that they will not accept a compromise.

Sihanouk's visit, from 26 to 28 October, marked the fourth time he has made a publicized trip to Hanoi since being ousted from power in Phnom Penh. (His last previous visit, from 12 February to 3 March, had been billed as an unofficial visit for Tet and provided Sihanouk a pretext for being absent from Peking during President Nixon's visit.) According to the joint communique on the recent "friendship visit," released on 28 October, Sihanouk met with DRV President Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Nguyen Duy Trinh. Unlike his previous visit, he did not see Le Duan, but he had also failed to see Le Duan during earlier visits in May-June 1970 and January-February 1971.

The joint communique said that the talks took place in an atmosphere of "militant solidarity, fraternal friendship, and complete mutual trust" and that the two sides reached "identity of views on all problems discussed"--formulas virtually identical to those used on all the earlier visits. However, the latest communique seems to reflect the current developments looking toward a Vietnam cease-fire and raising the question of how Cambodia would fit into a settlement. The two sides condemned the United States for "perfidious maneuvers on the political and diplomatic planes" and hailed their growing "militant solidarity and fraternal friendship." As in their communique last March, they cited the passage from the Indochinese summit conference declaration asserting that the liberation of each country is its own affair and pledging "reciprocal support according to the desire of the party concerned and on the basis of mutual respect." The latest communique went on to stress the "sacred and inalienable right" of each Indochinese country to arrange its own settlement, affirming that the two sides "strictly respect and resolutely support" their respective stands on a settlement "in conformity with the peculiarities and interests of each country and the general situation in Indochina."

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The communique insisted that the United States sign the draft agreement disclosed in the 26 October DRV statement by 31 October, and it reiterated that the Cambodian question must be settled on the basis of Sihanouk's five-point declaration of 23 March 1970 and the FUNK program. Affirming that Sihanouk is the "representative of the legality, legitimacy, and continuity of the Cambodian state" and that his government is "the only legal and legitimate government of the Cambodian people," the communique stressed that the Cambodians are determined to "struggle uncompromisingly and unflinchingly" to overthrow the "traitors" Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Son Ngoc Thanh. It also expressed stock support for the NLHS' 6 March 1970 plan for a Laos settlement, but there was no mention of the negotiations now taking place in Vientiane.

**PEKING BANQUET** Sihanouk pressed his adamant line at a 29 October Peking banquet upon his return from Hanoi. The banquet, celebrating Sihanouk's 50th birthday, was hosted by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth and was also addressed by Chou En-lai, who led a high-ranking Chinese turnout for the occasion.

Sihanouk again rejected a cease-fire in Cambodia, obliquely criticizing the Soviets in the process. There are "big countries" other than the United States, he said, who rely on the Lon Nol regime and "engage in dishonorable political and diplomatic maneuvers" to prevent Sihanouk's forces from "winning final victory." These "hostile governments," Sihanouk went on, believe that the day the DRV and PRG sign a peace agreement with the United States the Cambodian liberation forces "will vanish into thin air." Making his anti-Soviet barbs still more pointed in another passage, Sihanouk thanked the DRV, PRG, and other friends in Africa, Latin America, and Europe for having recognized the RGNU despite "imperialist pressure and menace." This illustrates, he said, the proverb "It is only in misfortune that one comes to distinguish the true friends from the false."\*

Sihanouk argued that an eventual cease-fire in Vietnam, far from breaking up the Cambodian liberation armed forces, would only further develop them. He asserted that the Cambodian liberation forces are bent on "finishing off, in a very brief period of time, the Lon Nol

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\* Peking has given Sihanouk some low-level propaganda support on the issue of Soviet failure to support the RGNU. For example, a 20 October NCNA commentary took the Soviets to task for voting in favor of the participation of the representative of the "Lon Nol clique" in the current UNESCO conference.

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traitors who will then be deprived of U.S. air cover and armed protection by the Saigon troops." He concluded by declaring that "an eventual Vietnam-U.S. peace agreement should never extend its authority to Cambodia" and that Cambodia "will never accept a compromise with the United States" and "will never carry out an international agreement resulting from negotiations in which it did not participate."

Penn Nouth echoed Sihanouk's line in his banquet speech when he recalled that Sihanouk's government has defeated all the U.S. "schemes and plots designed to split the FUNK and to obtain 'negotiations' and 'compromise' between the FUNK and the traitors in Phnom Penh, a 'partition of Cambodia,' a 'cease-fire in Cambodia', etc."

Unlike previous occasions when the Chinese voiced support for Sihanouk's rejection of a cease-fire, Chou did not address himself to this issue in his speech at the banquet. Curiously, in taking note of Sihanouk's latest visit to the DRV Chou said the Cambodian side had expressed its "resolute response" to the 26 October DRV statement, but he reiterated Peking's "firm support" for the position taken in the statement. Chou's usage may reflect an ambiguity in the joint communique on Sihanouk's visit to Hanoi as to whether the Cambodians went clearly on record as endorsing the 26 October statement. At any rate, Chou professed encouragement over what he called "the constant strengthening and consolidation of the militant solidarity and fraternal friendship" of the three Indochinese peoples.

Having hailed the "brilliant victories of strategic significance" won in the past year by the Cambodians, Chou concluded by pledging that the Chinese will give "all-out support and assistance to the Cambodian people's just cause."

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**DRV ROUTINELY PROTESTS AIR STRIKES SOUTH OF 20TH PARALLEL**

Despite the curtailment of U.S. bombing of the North, Hanoi has continued to issue daily routine statements of protest by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman. Statements since 25 October have referred to attacks only below the 20th parallel--in the provinces of Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and in the Vinh Linh zone--and have consistently portrayed continuing U.S. strikes as evidence of the "deceitful" nature of claims by the Nixon Administration that "the war is coming to an end" and that "peace is at hand."

Reiterating Hanoi's long-standing charge of deliberate U.S. strikes at nonmilitary targets, VNA on the 28th alleged that attacks took place that day on Thieu Hoa, Nong Cong, and Quang Xuong districts in Thanh Hoa province. It said the attacks involved antipersonnel bombs and were timed to occur when the villagers were asleep; it further stressed the civilian nature of the targets by claiming that at least one of the hamlets hit was "far from any military target." A "special communique" issued on the 27th by the DRV War Crimes Commission detailed U.S. strikes on the Vinh Linh zone between April and 25 October, charging that they were directed at "a great many urban sectors and populous centers" and that they caused damage to farms, schools, dams, hospitals, and private homes, as well as incurring large numbers of civilian casualties. The communique then denounced the United States for continuing these strikes in October, "the month when the Nixon Administration has been ceaselessly claiming that it 'would end the war' and that it is 'seriously negotiating.'"

Widespread success in overcoming U.S. attempts to wage a "war of destruction in the North" was claimed in a TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary publicized by Hanoi radio on the 26th. Portraying a "stable and powerful" North, the commentary applauded the armed forces and people for carrying out air defense tasks while serving "the frontline at the same time." Efforts to create an effective antiaircraft firenet, which was said to have "punished U.S. aircraft throughout our airspace both day and night and whether the enemy made large or small attacks," drew specific praise in the commentary. And a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of 1 November said that air defense forces, aware of "the U.S. imperialists' cunning maneuvers," have pledged to heighten their vigilance in response to the DRV's 26 October statement. Now "more than ever," the editorial declared, it is important to defeat the "U.S. aggressors," defend North Vietnam's airspace, and "wholeheartedly fulfill the great rear's duties toward the great frontline." As of 29 October, Hanoi claimed to have downed a total of 4,023 planes over the North.

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## U. S. ELECTION

## MOSCOW IN EFFECT CONCEDES VICTORY TO PRESIDENT NIXON

While continuing to avoid direct speculation on the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, Moscow commentators are in effect preparing the Soviet public for the probable reelection of President Nixon. Limited in volume and directed almost entirely to domestic audiences, Moscow's comment on the election now points consistently to the President's commanding lead in public opinion polls and to Senator McGovern's failure to galvanize the "general discontent" which Moscow says exists among "the majority of American voters."

The recent improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations has invariably been treated in the Soviet radio and press commentaries as the main reason for the swing in public support behind the Administration. Panelists in the weekly domestic radio roundtable discussion on 22 October typically portrayed the Administration's current popularity in the polls as being almost wholly dependent on its "contacts, links, and steps directed at improving relations with the socialist countries." Correspondingly, Moscow's harshest comments on Senator McGovern have been triggered by his stated opposition to an expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade unless the Soviet Union revokes the recently enacted exit fees for would-be emigrants. For this position McGovern has been roundly scolded in both LITERARY GAZETTE and ZA RUBEZHOM. Most notably, writing in ZA RUBEZHOM No. 43, 20-26 October, M. Yevgenyev declared:

George McGovern's attempt to use Soviet rules on the departure of citizens abroad as a pretext for putting a brake on Soviet-American relations--for putting a brake on a process whose success is desired by the overwhelming majority of the U.S. people--might seem stupid, to put it mildly, even to Americans not very experienced in politics.

Seeking to define other deficiencies in Senator McGovern's campaign, Moscow has continued to note "inconsistencies" in his public positions and their adverse impact on the electorate. A 24 October domestic radio commentary by New York correspondent Valentin Zorin, for example, ascribed McGovern's inability to overcome the President's overwhelming lead in the polls to a widespread belief that the Senator had abandoned many of the electoral promises he made in Miami. "The electors, young people primarily," Zorin explained, "are disillusioned by McGovern's reservations on the question of ending the war in Vietnam and his retreat from his promises to subsidize the poor and cut military expenditures."

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Drawing up a balance sheet in which the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations was "a clear plus" for the Administration, a 26 October IZVESTIYA dispatch by Washington correspondent S. Kondrashov went on to observe that Vietnam had been "a minus" for the Administration in the eyes of the "average American" but that McGovern's stand on the war had been "an even greater minus," since it was "a retreat from chauvinistic concepts and conventional rhetoric about 'America's honor' and 'loyalty to allies' (read Saigon puppets)." Among other major drawbacks, Kondrashov listed McGovern's failure to win "undisputed leadership" and "general loyalty" within the Democratic Party and to make inroads into the Wallace constituency.

In keeping with tradition, the Soviet commentaries have at the same time disparaged the election campaign as an exercise in political manipulation offering no "realistic" or "radical" solution to pressing domestic problems facing the nation. According to Kondrashov, McGovern was making a last-ditch effort to overcome liabilities in his campaign by focusing on the theme of "corruption in Washington"--"the scandalous facts of eavesdropping on the national committee of the Democratic Party and the shadowing and sabotage in the headquarters of the Democratic leaders." But Kondrashov sarcastically dismissed the possible effects of such a tactic, stating that "the scandals, widely illuminated in the press, have not aroused the anger of the voters who, it appears, consider them a common phenomenon both for American politics and for American politicians."

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## TITO CALLS FOR "SETTLING ACCOUNTS" WITH OPPONENTS IN LCY

As the purge of dissident elements in the Yugoslav party and state structure gathered momentum, Tito summoned the LCY Presidium to Brioni on the 30th for a one-day meeting which he opened with a firm defense of the current housecleaning. In his introductory speech, released so far only in a 1,500-word TANJUG summary, the Yugoslav leader noted the "very great acclaim" which greeted his early-October disciplinary letter sent to all LCY members and organizations and declared that "we will not stop at the letter but shall proceed to deeds" to implement it. He charged that in the chief target of the purge, the League of Communists of Serbia, "much had been said about the need for struggle against nationalism, various antiseif-management elements, various technocrats, Rankovicites, and others, but there had been no action."

While denying that "heads would roll" literally, Tito served notice that he would not be satisfied with a "few" resignations and called for "mobilizing all forces" to prevent splinter-group activity in all the republics, "particularly in Serbia." He concluded that "nothing more is being demanded than is being done now"--the creation of "a strong and united League of Communists of Yugoslavia" capable of "settling accounts with all opponents of our self-managing socialist society."

**DEVELOPING PURGE** On the day the Presidium session opened, TANJUG reported the "resignations" of Slovene Premier Stane Kavcic and Aleksandar Nenadovic, chief editor of the authoritative Belgrade daily POLITIKA. The most prominent of the recent purge victims is Marko Nikezic, a former Yugoslav foreign minister, whose resignation as chairman of the League of Communists of Serbia was announced after a five-day delay in an LCS Central Committee statement on the 26th. The statement said the purge of Nikezic and his deputy, LCS Secretary Latinka Perovic, served to "eliminate vagueness regarding the readiness of the Central Committee to consistently determine responsibilities and duties" in the spirit of Tito's early-October letter and tough speech to the Serbian aktiv on the 16th. Nikola Petronic, successor to the purged Perovic as LCS secretary, had the honor of leading off the parade of speakers at the Presidium session who accepted Tito's criticisms and vowed to implement the directives of his letter.

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On the 31st, the day after the LCY Presidium session, the Zagreb radio announced that in the Karlovac, Croatia party organization "so far 17 communists have been expelled, 13 taken off membership lists, and 23 punished with party warnings." Self-criticism by the Federation of Youth of Belgrade was reported on the 24th by POLITIKA, which said the youth federation "fully accepts the views and criticism of Chairman Tito" and admitted that "youth began to call us a 'paper leadership.'"

TANJUG on 1 November reported without elaboration that Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac had "asked to be relieved of his present post" and that his deputy, Jaksa Petric, had been appointed Acting Foreign Minister. Tepavac had held his post since April 1969.

SOVIET COVERAGE      Moscow has refrained from any comment but has reported the 30 October Brioni session of the LCY Presidium and noted that it was concerned with "implementation of the directives of the letter of the chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia" to party organizations and members. PRAVDA reported without elaboration on the 27th that the Serbian LCY Central Committee had "accepted the resignations" of Nikezic and Perovic from the posts of LCY chairman and secretary, respectively, and TASS the next day noted equally briefly the resignations of S. Milosavlevski from the Macedonian party secretariat and of B. Pavlovic as Belgrade city committee secretary.

On the 31st TASS publicized some of the content of Tito's speech, including the Yugoslav leader's remarks that his letter had received a good response in the party and that the purge was needed because "speeches" had not been followed up with "action." TASS typically obfuscated a reference to the heterodox self-management system in Yugoslavia: Where Tito spoke of his quest for a united LCY able to settle accounts with opponents of the self-management system, TASS represented him as pursuing the internationally oriented goal of a united LCY able to "defeat all enemies of the socialist community."

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## AGRICULTURE OFFICIAL REBUTS WRITER'S ATTACK ON VIRGIN LANDS

In the 4 October LITERARY GAZETTE Deputy Minister of Agriculture Petr Morozov defended the policy of intensification of agriculture, and especially the cultivation of the virgin lands, against criticisms made in Vladimir Soloukhin's new book "Grass." Excerpts from the book, published the same issue of LITERARY GAZETTE, featured Soloukhin's claims that preservation of meadows and pasture land in their "natural" state would produce enough fodder to "bury Europe" and that conversion of the virgin lands from grazing to grain production had hindered the growth of livestock herds and disrupted agricultural progress. Soloukhin, whose neo-slavophile writings in the mid-1960's were instrumental in the resurgence of interest in Russian history and traditions, based his opposition to recent agricultural policies on the belief that they violated nature and the traditional system of farming.

The airing of Soloukhin's unorthodox views at this time is particularly noteworthy in view of the Soviet Government's massive purchases of grain from abroad this year to save its livestock program and in view of the good harvest in the virgin lands this year that helped offset some of the crop losses elsewhere in the USSR. His views were presumably considered easier to refute than other criticisms of official policy because of his lack of scientific credentials and the recent performance of the virgin lands.

Soloukhin argued that the historically-developed mixture of grasses on natural meadows and pastures provides better and more varied feed for livestock than the so-called "cultured" or improved pasturage and on these grounds criticized the official program of plowing up meadows and resowing them with selected grasses. He stressed the absurdity of converting 20 million hectares of Kazakh and Altay grasslands to grain while the fodder shortage was forcing the conversion of millions of hectares of traditional RSFSR grain land to fodder production. Waxing lyrical over the charm of the old Kazakh grasslands, Soloukhin claimed that the virgin lands in their "natural" state could today be supporting 20 million or even 200 million sheep. In addition to contributing to inefficient land usage, the cultivation of the virgin lands had, in his view, caused a "violation of the biological balance on a grandiose section of the planet."

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Despite the heretical nature of Soloukhin's views, they were not harshly condemned; the excerpts and Morozov's refutation were presented simply as a dialog in which LITERARY GAZETTE's editors did not take sides. While conceding that natural fodder land is being poorly managed, Morozov declared that Soloukhin's solution contradicts Soviet as well as advanced world practice. Characterizing Soloukhin's views as backward, he assailed the writer for advocating that livestock production be based on "wild grasses" and even weeds and for attributing "fantastic productivity" to natural pastures. He rejected Soloukhin's notion that replacement of virtually useless plants with useful plants harms the environment. Defending virgin land policy at length, he argued that it has greatly increased the production of livestock as well as grain.

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## CUBA - BOLIVIA

## HAVANA AIRS VIEWS OF GUEVARIST GUERRILLA GROUP IN BOLIVIA

A 19 October PRENSA LATINA summary of an interview with the "high command" of the Bolivian National Liberation Army (ELN), the guerrilla organization founded by Che Guevara, marked a departure from Havana media's general reticence over the past year on the ELN and the Bolivian Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Front (FRA), the leftist antiregime grouping with which it is affiliated. The interview was notable for an assertion of the continued relevance of Guevara's doctrines of guerrilla warfare, and the summary disseminated by PRENSA LATINA was notable for a strengthening of this assertion as originally transmitted to Havana from the PRENSA LATINA office in Santiago, Chile.

Havana's reluctance to associate itself publicly with the ELN has seemed dictated, at a time when expansion of ties with Latin American regimes is a major aim of Cuban foreign policy, by a desire not to furnish ammunition to those in the hemisphere who maintain that relations with Castro cannot be resumed because of his continued "export of revolution." Sensitivity on this score was reflected in the media's handling of the ELN interview, transmitted to Havana from PRENSA LATINA's Santiago office on 14 October under a La Paz dateline with a notation by the interviewer, Alberto Urquieta, that it had taken place "somewhere in Bolivia." In summarizing the ELN leaders' remarks five days later on its external circuits, PRENSA LATINA gave the report a Buenos Aires dateline and excised the mention of the locale of the interview. No report of the interview was carried in monitored Havana broadcasts or telecasts.

PRENSA LATINA's summary, however, while in most respects a faithful summary of Urquieta's original report transmitted to Havana on the 14th, doctored a reference to the validity of Guevara's teachings to make it less defensive. The original version read:

The fundamental and strategic lines established by Che remain fully operative and unchanged. But the roads leading to revolution demand a correct interpretation of the political moment and its tactical application to attain the objectives.

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PRENSA LATINA's summary somewhat strengthened the first sentence and changed the second one in such a way that it no longer read as a qualifier:

Che Guevara's basic directives and strategy continue unchanged because they are indisputably up to date. The path to a revolution is a correct interpretation of Che's thinking and the putting into practice of his thinking.

In the version transmitted to Havana on the 14th, the ELN leaders' mention of Guevara was responsive to a question on whether the ELN's charter membership in the FRA constituted a "change" in the organization's line. Replying in the negative and affirming the continuing relevance of Che's dogma, the ELN spokesmen defended the group's affiliation with the FRA: "We believe the FRA corresponds to the true needs of the hour. But this does not constitute our only task, and the frontist policy forms only a part of our present tasks." Later they asserted that the ELN still believed in the primacy of armed struggle as a "superior stage" in the revolutionary process. The reporter's question about a change in the ELN's line was not included in PRENSA LATINA's summary, but the summary did note that the ELN was one of the first to propose creation of the FRA and it quoted the ELN spokesmen as asserting that joining the front did not mean abandonment of armed struggle, "which is the superior phase in the path to victory."

The question of the ELN's ties to the FRA is a touchy one for Havana as well as for the ELN. One of the FRA components is the pro-Moscow Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), which Castro in the 1960's had accused of betraying the ELN and had made the scapegoat for the fiasco suffered by Guevara's guerrilla band in Bolivia. As late as June 1971, Cuban media still conveyed signs of hostility to the PCB, even as Castro was moving to mend his relations with a number of other Moscow-leaning Latin American parties.\* Havana has given the FRA little publicity. The last statement by the front to be given appreciable Cuban coverage was a document issued in March 1972, summarized by Havana radio and published in full

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\* For background on Cuban attitudes toward the PCB as reflected in Havana's treatment of the party's third national congress in June 1971, see the TRENDS Supplementary Article of 14 July 1971, "Grievances Against Bolivian CP Resurface in Cuban Reports," Pages S1-6.

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several months later in the Havana-based magazine TRICONTINENTAL. Cautious on the subject of armed struggle, the statement appeared to imply that it must await a later stage in the revolutionary process:

It is evident that the FRA aims to conquer power in Bolivia, but not in a haphazard way. Power must be taken by the vanguard of the working class as a result of an extensive mass mobilization . . . . We assert that power must be taken by the working class through its own methods and with the participation of the masses, culminating in popular insurrection, which is the violent action by which legitimate revolutionary power can replace the power of the bourgeoisie.

This was a far cry from Guevara's notion of an elite rural guerrilla nucleus as the force vital to the revolution. A more recent FRA declaration reported to PRENSA LATINA's home office by its Santiago correspondent on 23 June, allegedly circulated in Bolivia in May, was even less militant. No mention was made of insurrection; Bolivians were simply admonished to "strengthen unity, preserve popular organizations, demand their rights, and strengthen the FRA." They were also urged to improve their capabilities "by struggling" to improve training "for the battles which are drawing nearer."

In the recent interview, both as transmitted originally to Havana and as summarized by PRENSA LATINA, the ELN guerrilla leaders expressed the view that Bolivia "is the weakest link of the imperialistic chain in Latin America" and therefore is the main center for revolutionary influence in Latin America, looking toward a prolonged struggle of continent-wide scope. While this is consistent with Guevarist dogma, there was no mention of Che's notion of a rural guerrilla nucleus as the vanguard of the revolution. In fact, the locale for future armed struggle was pointedly left undefined in the interview. ELN chieftain Osvaldo "Chato" Peredo, however, in an interview appearing in the Chilean Castroite publication PUNTO FINAL on 21 December 1971, had indicated that "urban and/or rural guerrilla warfare" would be the "basic" method of struggle used.

Included in Urquieta's original report to Havana, but largely edited out of the version disseminated by PRENSA LATINA, was a preface to the interview which described the history and current status of the ELN. Urquieta said his report of the interview could not incorporate "a number of details regarding the present activity of

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the ELN" because of ongoing regime efforts to repress the organization. Praising the ELN as "one of the decisive tools for changing the political situation," he observed that it had attracted young revolutionaries to its ranks who are bent on "reinitiating the struggle begun by Guevara in southeast Bolivia." He described the ELN as "a clandestine organization par excellence" which had proved its mettle in the attempt to abort the August 1971 coup that deposed General Juan Jose Torres, although he added that since then the ELN and the rest of the Bolivian left had failed to "reach the level demanded by the times to victoriously lead the Bolivian masses."

**GUEVARA ANNIVERSARY** In marking the fifth anniversary of Guevara's death in Bolivia on 8 October, Havana gave less emphasis to "the Heroic Guerrilla's" final campaign than it did last year. While Cuban Politburo member Ramiro Valdes, in his speech marking the occasion, eulogized Che as the embodiment of "Latin Americanism and internationalism," little was said about his abortive Bolivian venture. Valdes did expatiate on Guevara's concept of a Latin American revolutionary struggle based on "internationalist cooperation and unity" among revolutionaries, but he did not allude to Guevara's belief in rural guerrilla struggle as the most viable method available to revolutionaries.

Touching on the debacle in Bolivia, Valdes was defensive in saying that the "imperialists" were holding it up as evidence of "the inevitability of the 'guerrillas' military fiasco'" in an effort to discourage Latin American revolutionaries. Guevara's detractors, he said, thus viewed Che's last campaign "from a purely military point of view, leaving out political objectives and ideological projection." Valdes concluded that despite such "imperialist" efforts, Guevara would become "more and more the symbol and the example to be followed by all those who fight against imperialism and oppression."

**MOSCOW AND PRAGUE  
ON CHE GUEVARA** While Havana, in eulogizing Guevara, did not allude to his ideological differences with the orthodox communists over the revolutionary role of guerrilla warfare, Soviet and Czechoslovak commentaries on Guevara's death anniversary were less discreet. Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, in a 9 October commentary beamed to a wide assortment of foreign audiences, inveighed against "treacherous authors" who variously depict Che as a "lone superhero, . . . an anarchist, a Trotskyite, a follower of Mao Tse-tung." But its defense of Guevara was qualified. It labeled him "a revolutionary

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romantic," part of a group that merits sympathy "even when we disagree with them."

An article in the Bratislava PRAVDA on 7 October was more explicit. Stating that Guevara's name had "become a myth which has been misused," it observed:

He persevered in his error, maintaining that small partisan actions can replace a systematic long-term work in the organization and education of the masses, without which there is no real and lasting revolutionary change. The vestiges of the Bolivian partisan unit became the victim of a bad assessment of the situation and of betrayal . . . .

The Czechoslovak article wound up on a note of faint praise for Guevara's "courage" and "sincerity" despite his "errors."

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## DISARMAMENT

## MOSCOW, PEKING CLASH AT UN ON DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

As anticipated in their respective major addresses to the current UNGA session, Moscow and Peking have collided in the debate on disarmament that opened in the Political Committee on 23 October. While Moscow has sought to capitalize on the atmosphere of detente fostered by Soviet-U.S. agreements on nuclear arms control, Peking has warned the world against being lulled by a deceptive relaxation that leaves the superpowers unfettered in putting military pressure on lesser powers. In effect, the Chinese have been constrained to qualify their professed interest in detente in order to justify their own arms program in the face of the Sino-Soviet confrontation.

The Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference has brought into focus the divergent approaches being taken by Moscow and Peking before the international community. Soviet representative Malik promoted the proposal at the opening day's meeting of the Political Committee, drawing from NCNA the complaint that the Soviets have "again peddled" a draft resolution that had been shelved at last year's UNGA session. NCNA derided Malik for "openly opposing the reasonable demand for the dismantling of military bases in foreign countries" on the pretext of opposing prior conditions, a stand that "once again reveals Soviet revisionist social imperialism's true features of sham disarmament and real arms expansion."

In his speech before the Political Committee, Chinese representative Chen Chu maintained that necessary conditions for a WDC do not exist and asserted flatly that "there can be no talk even about the preparatory work for the conference." Chen reiterated the "necessary conditions" that the PRC has said must be fulfilled before a WDC can be convened: All nuclear countries must pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and must withdraw all armed forces and dismantle all military bases on foreign soil.\* Chen argued that until these conditions are fulfilled a conference would be held under circumstances in which the overwhelming majority of countries would be obliged to

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\* These conditions were posited in the 3 October address to the UNGA by PRC delegation chairman Chiao Kuan-hua. See the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 10-12.

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"accept 'terms of surrender' under nuclear threat." Defensively, Chen acknowledged a legitimate desire for peace among many countries, but he insisted that concrete planning for a conference at this time would "only give rise to fond illusions" that would be "most harmful." He declared that Peking declines to be a party to an effort by "certain people" to exploit the interest in disarmament to serve their "deceptive trick of sham disarmament and real arms expansion."

Anticipating Chinese opposition to the Soviet proposal, Malik had attempted to capitalize on the WDC issue in the Sino-Soviet rivalry for Third World influence. The brief 24 October TASS dispatch reporting Malik's speech emphasized his assertion that those who want to prevent the holding of the conference "are actually seeking to deprive many small and medium states of a possibility to express at a special forum their opinion on such an important problem." TASS reports and Radio Moscow commentaries on Chen's speech have also focused on Peking's "isolated" position by noting that 93 countries have expressed support for the Soviet proposal and that Chen was the only speaker to express opposition, a move proving that China "always comes out against any constructive steps in disarmament, especially if the initiative comes from the Soviet Union."

The treatment by both Moscow and Peking of the U.S. position concerning a WDC has been peripheral to their exchange of accusations. NCNA noted tersely that U.S. delegate George Bush opposed the convocation of a WDC at this time because it would not "be conducive to reaching concrete agreements on arms control." Moscow's approach has not been uniform. A 28 October PRAVDA article by Sergey Vishnevskiy followed the usual practice of stressing the similarity of the U.S. and PRC positions, but Radio Moscow commentator Zholkver on 24 October played down U.S. opposition by observing that the United States "no longer risks a complete and total rejection" of a WDC and "in principle" even "accepts its usefulness."

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