

29 NOV 1972

#48

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**


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29 NOVEMBER 1972  
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FBI'S TRENDS

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 NOVEMBER 1972

<u>Moscow (2529 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1515 items)</u>		
50th Anniversary of USSR	(10%)	11%	Domestic Issues	(34%)	38%
30 December			UN Session	(21%)	19%
Vietnam	(5%)	5%	[Disarmament	(10%)	5%]
European Security	(2%)	5%	[LA Nuclear-	(7%)	5%]
[Helsinki Meeting	(1%)	4%]	Free Zone		
Brezhnev Meeting With	(--)	5%	Indochina	(18%)	13%
Chilean CP General			[Vietnam	(11%)	9%]
Secretary			[Cambodia	(4%)	3%]
China	(4%)	4%	PRC-Jamaica Diplomatic	(--)	5%
PDRY Delegation in USSR	(--)	4%	Relations		
FRG Elections	(1%)	2%	Nepalese Prime	(9%)	3%
			Minister in PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi media have characteristically all but ignored the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger private talks on the draft Vietnam peace accord, held daily in Paris from 20 through 26 November. VNA's international service on the 26th issued a one-sentence "communique" saying there would be a meeting again on 4 December, but the announcement is not known to have been carried in domestic Vietnamese communist media. VNA also reported that Tho and Xuan Thuy had met with the PRG delegation on the 27th "to make assessments" following the latest DRV-U.S. private meetings but did not mention that the talks had been suspended for a week.

Hanoi's stand at the private talks seemed reflected, however, in two NHAN DAN articles coinciding with their suspension. Both bore the authoritative signature "Commentator"--a label long used for significant comment on the political settlement issue. The articles pictured Hanoi as determined to stand firm on the basic points of the peace accord as summarized on 26 October, particularly on the issue of North Vietnamese troops in the South. The second of the two articles, on the 27th, warned that only stalemate can result if the U.S. side tries to negotiate from a position of strength "in hope of changing the situation."

Three days after signing the annual aid agreement with the DRV, Peking released "an important statement" on the 29th by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei expressing concern over the state of the Vietnam negotiations while voicing hope that a settlement will be achieved. Chi's remarks were only mildly critical of the United States and included a pro forma pledge of support for the war effort. Peking publicized the aid agreement with minimal fanfare, but Hanoi used the occasion to further its campaign to associate the Chinese more closely with its cause.

Moscow propaganda has a time-marking quality, with commentators continuing to repeat Brezhnev's 13 November demand that American "obstacles" to signing of the peace accord be removed. Moscow reported on 27 November that the DRV economic delegation had arrived to discuss the 1973 aid agreement.

### DRV, PRG SCORE CALL FOR MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL, PRESS PEACE ACCORD

Hanoi's persistent argument that no changes in the peace accord should be necessary was carried forward in the 25 November NHAN DAN Commentator article, which acknowledged in greater

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detail than previously President Thieu's contentions that an agreement should recognize that there are two separate Vietnamese countries and should provide for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South. Harsh commentators on the eve of the resumed private talks had first explicitly mentioned Thieu's demand that North Vietnamese troops withdraw; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and NHAN DAN articles on the 19th and 20th had assailed Indonesian officials for supporting Thieu's demands that all forces not native to the area below the 17th parallel be withdrawn.\* At the 16 November plenary session of the Paris talks, DRV delegate Xuan Thuy, as reported in the VNA account, "categorically rejected the Saigon administration's absurd claims about 'North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam' and 'mutual troop withdrawal,' which in the past has been used by the United States to justify the aggression from Washington."

The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 25th elaborated on these remarks when it noted that on 27 October Thieu had said: The draft peace agreement "makes no reference to North Vietnamese aggression or to any North Vietnamese troop withdrawal. North Vietnam believes that it has the right to remain in the South. It is waiting for a complete U.S. troop withdrawal so it can renew the offensive." Commentator went on to observe that Thieu's representatives at Paris "have repeatedly falsely accused our people of aggression against the southern part of our country," and it said GVN delegate Nguyen Xuan Phong at the 2 November session had "noisily propagandized that Saigon would not accept any cease-fire without a withdrawal of northern troops and restoration of the DMZ." Commentator's reporting on remarks by Phong at Paris is at complete variance with Hanoi's usual studied avoidance of even mentioning the Saigon statements there.

Commentator indicated that Hanoi regards Thieu's arguments about the DMZ and North Vietnamese troops as academic and the issues settled when he declared pointedly that the United States, in agreeing to the draft peace accord, had pledged to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and had agreed that the problem of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam "shall be solved by the two South Vietnamese sides."

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\* These articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972, pages 3-4.

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Commentator had preceded this passage with the communists' standard euphemistic argument in defense of the North Vietnamese presence in the South, saying that the U.S. "imperialists" are the aggressors and the Vietnamese people the victims of aggression and that the right of self-defense is sacred.\* Commentator said that in the past four years negotiations have been deadlocked because of U.S. charges that the North has waged aggression against the South and persistent U.S. demands for mutual withdrawal of troops. (The 19 November QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article assailing Indonesian officials for supporting Thieu had observed that "the worn-out demand" for mutual troop withdrawal "has even been set aside by the Americans.") But Commentator did not link U.S. dropping of this demand with the recent peace agreement. Instead he said that the negotiations "recently emerged from deadlock because of our side's efforts permeated with good will," and he went on to quote, as noted above, the provisions from the peace accord on respect for Vietnam unity and on the South Vietnamese parties' solving the question of Vietnamese armed forces in the South. He went on to cite the passages in the accord to the effect that the problems to be discussed by the South Vietnamese include measures "to reduce the troop ceiling of the two sides' armed forces and to demobilize the troops being reduced."

Recalling that Hanoi's 26 October summary was publicly confirmed by "the highest echelons" on the U.S. side, Commentator warned that there can be no peace if these major principles are not recognized. Saying it is unlikely that "the Washington authorities" do not understand this, he asked why they have stepped up their military activity and brought up, through Thieu,

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\* Assertions by U.S. and other Western news commentators that Hanoi does not acknowledge the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South have oversimplified Hanoi's stance in this regard. In 1966 and 1967 VNA did issue a series of authorized denials that there were VPA troops in the South. But in 1968, and particularly after the opening of the DRV-U.S. talks in May and the U.S. calls for mutual troop withdrawal, Hanoi begged the question and shifted to the argument that Vietnamese have a right to defend their country wherever the aggressor is. Most notably, DRV Premier Pham Van Dong in a speech before the DRV National Assembly in May of that year declared that wherever there are enemies, "every Vietnamese has the right to go there to fight them." He observed that it was necessary to highlight this point in order to reject the "absurd arguments" that North Vietnam has "invaded" South Vietnam.

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basic issues already agreed to. Commentator concluded by warning that if the United States "attempts to upset the whole game," the Vietnamese will have no alternative to continuation of their struggle.

The notion that Hanoi would not agree to any major changes in the peace accord was reinforced in the second NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 27th. It declared that the U.S. refusal to sign the agreement on schedule as well as "the subsequent overbearing allegations advanced by lackey Nguyen Van Thieu and drummed up feverishly by the U.S. press and ruling circles have gradually dispersed the silhouette of peace so recently painted by many U.S. journalists." Commentator said that the peace accord made public last month remains the best way to end the conflict and that apparent U.S. efforts to try to reverse the situation "can only bring stalemate." Commentator did not in this article bring up substantive issues in contention but instead stressed the alleged failure of U.S. military policy in Vietnam and warned that the latest "re-Americanization" through the massive use of air power was suffering the same fate. The article concluded that "the Vietnamese people deem it necessary to tell the U.S. authorities once again that negotiating from a position of strength is not a fruitful way of negotiating." It added that if the U.S. side is intent on going back on the points agreed on, "our people, with the sympathy and support of the fraternal socialist countries and all mankind, are determined to fight on until total victory."

Since the appearance of the Commentator articles Hanoi has broadcast no significant comment bearing on the issues in contention. But the Front's LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) on 28 November carried an article by its Commentator which echoed the NHAN DAN article of the 25th regarding Thieu's demands on troop withdrawal and the DMZ. LPA said flatly that the Nixon Administration is "playing a farce" in delaying the signing of the agreement on ending the war and accused it of having inspired Thieu's opposition. Like NHAN DAN, LPA noted that Thieu "calls South and North Vietnam two separate states," is "clamoring" for the North to withdraw its troops from the South, and has said he would not accept a cease-fire without the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and restoration of the DMZ. Prior to the current articles, neither Hanoi nor the Front had explicitly mentioned Thieu's remarks about the DMZ, although there had been a few mentions of his opposition to

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unification and his desire to perpetuate the partition of Vietnam. DRV press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le, when asked--at the briefing after the Paris session on 16 November--whether pending reunification the DRV is for or against restoration of the DMZ, said tersely: "There are clauses in the agreement dealing with the reunification of Vietnam and with relations between the two zones during the period prior to reunification." In keeping with standard practice, Hanoi media did not report the press briefing.

Use of the Commentator article as the format for the recent discussion of substantive issues in contention appears to invest the discussion with special importance. This long-standing vehicle for major comment on a political settlement had not been used since Hanoi's 26 October release of the summary of the peace agreement. Notable substantive comment on a settlement had appeared in the two unsigned NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles attacking the Indonesians on the 19th and 20th and in a series of four NHAN DAN editorials from 8 through 11 November which touched on such issues as political prisoners, a cease-fire, an administrative structure in the South, and the unity of Vietnam.\* Hanoi has presumably used the NHAN DAN Commentator format now out of concern to lend authority to a declaration of intent to stand on the draft agreement on this issue. Hanoi may also have wished to argue the reasonableness of its position by calling special attention to the fact that the 26 October summary indicated that the problems to be discussed between the two South Vietnamese sides include "measures to reduce the troop ceiling of the two sides' armed forces and to demobilize the troops being reduced."

The two most recent previous NHAN DAN Commentator articles were particularly significant: The one of 31 August was the first clear public Hanoi signal of a resumption of serious negotiations. The one of 25 September pressed the 11 September PRG statement's proposal for a tripartite provisional coalition government and argued that the United States should stop trying to "eliminate" the PRG and recognize the reality of South Vietnam, where there were two administrations and two armies--"realities" that were to be stressed in Hanoi's 26 October summary of the draft peace accord.\*\*

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\* See the TRENDS of 15 November 1972, pages 3-6.

\*\* The 31 August and 25 September articles are discussed, respectively, in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 3-6, and 27 September 1972, pages 1-3.

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## PEKING SIGNS AID PACT WITH DRV, APPEALS FOR SETTLEMENT

Three days after signing the annual aid agreement with the DRV, Peking expressed both concern over the state of negotiations on a Vietnam settlement and hope that an agreement will still be reached. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, speaking at an Albanian reception on 29 November, complained that the United States not only has "backed out from the schedule" for signing the draft accord but has been attempting to make "substantive changes" in the agreement. Observing that the communist side has shown "the greatest flexibility" in the negotiations, Chi declared that the Chinese "still hope" that the U.S. Government "will through negotiations" sign the agreement.

NCNA disseminated a separate report on Chi's remarks on Vietnam, labeling them "an important statement" on the Vietnam-U.S. negotiations, "which the people throughout the world are closely watching." After having issued a spate of authoritative pronouncements in the wake of Hanoi's disclosure of the draft accord on 26 October, Peking had taken a low posture on the Vietnam question while awaiting the results of the resumed Paris negotiations. In now choosing to make a new appeal for a settlement, Peking has sought to strike a balance between mildly questioning Washington's desire for a settlement and expressing hope that an agreement can be negotiated. Chi remarked that people have reason to ask whether the United States truly wants a settlement or is trying to prolong the war by making use of the negotiations, but he did not specify what substantive changes may be at issue and observed blandly that people throughout the world are now watching what move Washington will take next.

Significantly, Chi introduced the element of Chinese interest when he pointed out that a Vietnam settlement would be "greatly helpful" toward a relaxation of tension in the Far East. The Chinese have previously singled out the Vietnam conflict as the primary source of tension in Asia at a time of growing detente, and the Shanghai communique on President Nixon's visit linked U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan--a central PRC interest--with the prospects of diminishing tension "in the area."

As to be expected, Chi concluded with a pledge of continuing Chinese support for the war effort should the fighting be prolonged. Peking had given only minimal fanfare to the signing of the annual aid agreement on the 26th and muffled its expressions

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of support for its Vietnamese allies. In contrast, Hanoi used the signing of the aid agreement to press its effort to associate the Chinese closely with its cause, notably publicizing strong supporting remarks made by Chou En-lai after the signing ceremony that have not been reported by Peking itself.

After having reported that new talks were in the offing, Peking has not explicitly mentioned the new round of Kissinger-Tho negotiations since their inception on the 20th. Chinese pickups of foreign comment on the Vietnam question, typically sanitized to soften criticism of the Nixon Administration and its intentions concerning a settlement, have included the 25 and 27 November NHAN DAN Commentator articles on a peace settlement.

**AID ACCORD** NCNA reported that an agreement on China's "economic and military materials assistance" in 1973 and a protocol on the "supply of military equipment and materials" for Vietnam in 1973 were signed on 26 November, noting for the first time that the annual grant was "gratuitous." (NCNA's report on the supplementary aid agreement for 1972 signed on 26 June mentioned a protocol on the supply of "ordinary materials" and one on "military equipment and material," only the latter being characterized as gratuitous.) As in past years, VNA said the agreement covered "nonrefund" aid. The agreement was signed by DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi and his Chinese counterpart, Li Hsien-nien, both of whom had returned to Peking the previous day after separate week-long tours of Chinese provinces (Li having accompanied the visiting Nepalese prime minister). Consistent with DRV Premier Dong's attendance at signing ceremonies in Hanoi last September and with the customary practice in Peking in previous years, Chou witnessed the signing ceremony.

NCNA's account disclosed that after the ceremony Chou and Li had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with the North Vietnamese but reported none of its substance. Last year's NCNA account of the signing ceremony in Hanoi said the two sides "enthusiastically proposed toasts to the new development" of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity, and at the time of the 1970 agreement Peking specified that the aid was to help defeat the United States and strengthen the Vietnamese resistance. Peking's coverage this year was also subdued in reporting the DRV Delegation's departure, failing to spell out the usual slogans shouted by the airport chorus in behalf of Sino-Vietnamese

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solidarity. NCNA noted that the delegation was departing for "some European countries," indirectly indicating the next stop by noting the presence at the airport of Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov.

As in its coverage of the beginning stage of the DRV delegation's visit to China, Hanoi made pointed efforts to link the Chinese with its interests on both the military and the negotiating fronts. In particular, VNA on 28 November disseminated a separate report on Chou's conversation with the DRV delegation after the signing ceremony that included the substance of remarks exchanged by the two sides. According to VNA, Chou "reaffirmed the unswerving stand of China to resolutely support and assist" the Vietnamese struggle and "severely condemned the obdurate attitude of the U.S. Government in trying to delay" the signing of the draft accord and "scheming to revise" its provisions. In an intriguing remark touching the sore point in Sino-Vietnamese relations, Chou asserted that in no circumstances will Peking allow the United States "to do harm to the friendship and militant solidarity" between China and Vietnam. These remarks were notably more militant than those contained in Chi Peng-fei's "important statement" on the 29th.

VNA quoted Nghi as having stressed the "great significance" of the aid agreement, "especially now that the U.S. imperialists are persisting in their obduracy and reversing their attitude by stalling the ending of their war of aggression." In addition, VNA's account of the delegation's departure from Peking quoted slogans voiced by the Chinese in support of Sino-Vietnamese solidarity and the Vietnamese struggle. The customary NHAN DAN editorial on the 28th hailing the aid agreement also highlighted Peking's support, citing recent Chinese pledges contained in the 30 October government statement, Li Hsien-nien's banquet speech on 16 November, and Chou's remarks during a talk with Nghi on the 17th. NCNA's account of the editorial omitted the passage citing those pledges. It also deleted a sentence stressing the "great importance in the present situation" of aid from China "and other fraternal socialist countries."

#### MOSCOW COMMENT MARKS TIME, NOTES DRV AID DELEGATION'S ARRIVAL

Moscow propaganda on Vietnam continues to mark time with routine charges of U.S. procrastination in signing the DRV-U.S. peace

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agreement, accusing the United States of using Saigon's obduracy as a pretext for delay while stepping up military activities in Indochina. Moscow carried brief reports noting the private talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho and mentioned them in passing in some comment. TASS briefly reported Kissinger's return home and his consultations with President Nixon as well as the White House announcement that Kissinger would return to Paris for talks to be resumed on 4 December. TASS also reported that Le Duc Tho consulted with Mme. Binh on the confidential talks with the United States.

Commentators continue to repeat Brezhnev's 13 November demand that American "obstacles" to signing of the accord be removed, one foreign-language commentary on 22 November noting that the Washington POST had said this was the Soviet Union's "first big criticism of U.S. policy on the issue." While Moscow's comment for the most part has avoided discussing the substance of the peace agreement, the issue of a cease-fire was raised briefly in a 22 November domestic service commentary and by a panelist in the 26 November domestic service roundtable discussion; both speculated that the United States is preparing to maintain its military presence in South Vietnam under the guise of civilian advisers after a cease-fire.

A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Asia on the 22d atypically broached the issue of political power in the South. It criticized "Washington propaganda" for trying, by claiming that there are no "third forces" in Vietnam, to denigrate the proposal of the "Vietnamese patriots" for a "tripartite coalition government." The reference to a coalition "government" rather than the term "administrative structure" used by Hanoi in its 26 October summary of the peace accord may have been merely a translation error. On the other hand, the commentator may have been confused because of the 11 September PRG proposal on such a "government." The commentary went on to argue that there exists a "powerful opposition" to the Thieu regime composed of the vast majority of the political parties and organizations in South Vietnam and Vietnamese expelled from the country, and it scored "reprisals" being taken by the Saigon regime against these "third forces."

Moscow reported on 27 November the arrival of the DRV economic delegation led by Le Thanh Nghi to discuss the 1973 aid agreement. The Soviet side is represented, as usual, by Vice Premier Novikov, who said in a radio interview that the talks were to

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cover "technical assistance" in building and restoring industrial installations and roads as well as trade relations. A 28 November report of talks said the two sides had discussed matters concerning "trade and economic relations" and "assistance in the strengthening of the economic and defensive capacity of the DRV." VNA's 28 October report of the delegation's arrival in Moscow typically said it had come for "talks on Soviet economic and military aid to Vietnam for 1973."

#### HANOI CONTINUES ROUTINE PROTESTS OF U.S. AIR STRIKES IN DRV

U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam have continued to draw protests in daily statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman which repeat the standard charge that such "war acts" only reveal the Nixon Administration's desire to deceive world public opinion into believing peace is at hand while it continues to pursue the Vietnamization policy and seek a position of strength.

Following up on last week's "special communique," which condemned U.S. air and naval action during the first 18 days of November, the DRV War Crimes Commission issued another communique on the 24th covering U.S. "crimes" from the 20th through the 23d. Claiming that U.S. planes flew some 690 sorties during this four-day period despite bad weather, the communique charged that they dropped 12,170 tons of "demolition and antipersonnel bombs" on 84 populated areas in the four southern provinces and the Vinh Linh zone. The cities of Vinh and Dong Hoi were cited as sustaining heavy damage, along with a number of districts, towns, villages, and factories. The communique further charged that on 22 November U.S. Marine helicopters from a "landing ship" stationed in the South China Sea concentrated a "wanton" attack on Ky Phuong village in Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh Province. It claimed that the armed forces and people "punished the U.S. aggressors" by downing six planes during the four days, including two B-52's and one F-111.

Other comment on the air war included a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of the 25th which argued the need for "passive air defense"--building adequate shelters and trenches, organizing evacuation and dispersal activities, coordinating alerts, and "maintaining a wartime way of life." Stressing that this task is as important as actually fighting the enemy, the editorial urged proper coordination between and within party and military organs in carrying it out.

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PLANE DOWNINGS,  
AIR DEFENSE

As of 28 November, Hanoi's claimed total of  
downed U.S. planes stood at 4,062.

Included in the latest figures were the  
claimed downing of an F-111 over Quang Binh on 21 November, two  
B-52's over Nghe An on the 22d, and the 300th plane over Haiphong  
(an unmanned reconnaissance plane) on the 26th.

U.S. officials had announced that on 22 November a B-52 had been  
downed for the first time in the war. The announcement said it  
had been damaged over the DRV, probably by a SAM, and crashed  
in Thailand after the crew ejected safely. VNA, in a  
tabulation of alleged B-52 downings since 17 September 1967,  
claimed that the B-52 was one of two shot down on the 22d and  
that these downings brought the total to 27, of which 19 were  
said to have occurred since the resumption of the air war in  
April. VNA broke down the claimed total as follows: 15 B-52's  
downed over the Vinh Linh zone, five over Nghe An, three over  
Quang Binh, two over Thanh Hoa, and one each over Haiphong and  
Ha Tinh.

Praise was accorded the Fourth Military Region for its achievements  
in downing the B-52's as well as an F-111 (U.S. sources on  
22 November acknowledged the loss of one of the swing-wing planes)  
in a commendation by the VPA High Command on 25 November. The  
order specifically praised "the cadres and combatants of the  
anti-aircraft and missile units, the local forces, the militia  
and self-defense forces" for the recent downings. It called on  
them to continue their vigilance against U.S. air and naval  
forces, as well as to satisfactorily carry out the communications  
and transport tasks and provide reinforcements for the frontline.

The downings were also hailed in commentaries in NHAN DAN and  
QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, which declared in general terms that the  
United States is doomed to defeat if it persists in prolonging  
the war. It was left to Hanoi radio on the 23d to comment more  
specifically on the significance of the downings; the commentary  
claimed that "the boasts about the capability of the eight-million-  
dollar B-52 Stratofortress to disturb the adversary's radar and so  
forth have finally been shattered by the strength of our people's  
war." Declaring that no modern aircraft or new tactics "can  
escape the punitive firenet of our army and people," the broadcast  
praised the responsibility, vigilance, and fighting will of the  
armed forces in the Fourth Military Region and Thanh Hoa Province.

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QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 23 November reported on a conference held by the Northwest Military Region--contiguous with the Tay Bac Autonomous Region, including the provinces of Lai Chau, Son La, and Nghia Lo--to improve combat operations and techniques among the military cadres and to unite the local people in fulfilling "the mission to down U.S. aircraft, capture aggressor pilots, exterminate and neatly capture spy and commando teams, adequately carry out the people's air defense, and insure smooth communications and transportation operations." The significance of this exhortation to step up air defense for localities outside the area currently subject to U.S. air and naval attack was pointed up in comment hailing the downing of the pilotless reconnaissance plane over Haiphong--allegedly the 300th over that city. Hanoi claims to have downed two other reconnaissance planes above the 20th parallel since 25 October, one over Hai Hung on 12 November and another over Vinh Phu on the 24th. The downing over Haiphong received editorial praise in both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 27 November. The latter paper called the downing "a glorious milestone marking the outstanding, all-round victories of the heroic port city." Both papers discussed the downing in the context of earlier, heavy U.S. air attacks on the city and of the continuing naval blockade, and both stressed Haiphong's ability to maintain production, communications, and transportation, as well as to provide assistance "to the frontline."

HOLIDAY MAIL            In a VNA transmission of 28 November, Hanoi set  
FOR POW'S                forth the procedures governing the sending of  
                             Christmas and New Year's cards and packages to  
U.S. prisoners of war during the 1972-73 holiday season.  
Virtually identical to last year's announcement, which came some  
two weeks earlier,\* this year's states that the same procedures  
will apply: packages weighing up to five kilograms, two  
kilograms over the usual limit, are to be sent by post via  
Moscow "in accordance with the procedures already laid down,"  
while cards and letters can be sent direct by mail or through  
the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen in Vietnam,  
in New York. The announcement warns that packages sent by  
procedures other than those stipulated will not be accepted.

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\* Last year's instructions are discussed in the 17 November 1971  
TRENDS, pages 13-14.

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## SALT

## POLISH, CZECHOSLOVAK PAPERS DISCUSS SALT II AGENDA

Recent commentaries on the resumption of the SALT negotiations in three East European bloc papers have provided the most extended discussion to date in Soviet or East European media of the substantive issues at stake in SALT II. These commentators say the second round will focus on the problems of restricting qualitative developments such as MIRV, restricting research and development on offensive weapons systems in general, and taking into account U.S. forward based systems (FBS) in Europe and on carriers. Negligible and very generalized Soviet comment on SALT II has avoided any mention of the MIRV and FBS problems.

Antoni Olczak in a 22 November article in the Polish army paper ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI--the third article in that paper within three months to discuss SALT II issues in some detail--asserted that a permanent treaty to replace the provisional agreement signed in Moscow "would have to cover aspects of the strategic offensive armaments left out of the Moscow accord such as the bombers carrying nuclear weapons and the MIRV. It would also have to introduce restrictions on the research into and the development and testing of new types of weapons." Referring to the verification problems that a treaty dealing with qualitative developments will encounter, and to the liabilities entailed in relying solely on national means of verification, Olczak contended that "particular difficulties" will be presented by FBS and "by the effort to achieve agreement on the limitation of MIRV's, which cannot be controlled by space satellites."

According to Karol Szyndzielorz in the 23 November Polish Government paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY, "life itself" has also included on the SALT II agenda the problem of freezing defensive systems not covered by the SALT I agreements--"mainly the systems of combating submarines and the systems of air defense." The article added that "we will have to wait at least two years for another SALT success, as haste is not a commendable virtue in cases like this."

An article by Milos Krejci in the 21 November Czechoslovak party organ RUDE PRAVO, foreseeing a similar agenda, commented that a "special artificial obstacle" to the second round had been

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created by the Jackson amendment's call for numerical equality. In rebutting the logic of the Jackson amendment, Krejci cited figures on the numerical advantage in launchers granted by the Interim Agreement to the Soviet Union, 1,618 to 1,052 in ICBM's and 62 to 48 in submarines--the first known appearance of any of these figures in Soviet or East European bloc media. In the first direct discussion of details of the "asymmetry" problem, the Czechoslovak commentator argued that "it is not the number of missiles but the number of their warheads which determines nuclear strength," noting that to make up for the deficiency the United States has MIRV's and FBS as well as "certain technical advantages." Moscow media to date have not specifically acknowledged the existence of the protocol to the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons outlining the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and ballistic missile submarines allowed both sides.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA - FRG

## PRAGUE APPEARS TO SOFTEN STAND ON MUNICH PACT ISSUE

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek, in public statements expressing "satisfaction" with the results of the West German elections, has reinforced indications of a softening of Prague's stand on the 1938 Munich agreement--the principal issue holding up a Prague-Bonn accord on normalizing relations. Prague reports of a speech by Chnoupek on 23 November and remarks made by Chnoupek in a radio interview on the 24th failed to repeat the stock Czechoslovak demand that Bonn recognize the invalidity of the Munich pact from its inception, instead calling on Bonn to recognize the "initial invalidity" or simply the "invalidity" of the agreement.

Chnoupek had used the "initial invalidity" formula once before, introducing it in an article on Czechoslovak foreign policy in the October issue of the monthly NOVA MYSL. And some but not all recent Czechoslovak reiterations of the original Czechoslovak demand for recognition of the invalidity of the accord "ab initio" had left off the final phrase. The latest successive statements by Chnoupek, however, take on added significance in that they came on the heels of a series of statements by Soviet and other East European leaders in the past three weeks which consistently failed to explicitly support Prague's original demand.\* Foreseeing the possibility of a break in the stalemated negotiations with Bonn, Chnoupek said the Brandt-Scheel victory had "removed the obstacles which evidently impeded Brandt's government from proceeding in the normalization of FRG relations with the socialist states in the way it wished."

"INITIAL INVALIDITY" Czechoslovak media were inconsistent in reporting the language Chnoupek used in his speech on the 23d, at a party aktiv meeting in Bratislava. A Prague domestic broadcast that day reported him as saying that Czechoslovakia now assumes Brandt "will be able to settle relations with all member-states of the Warsaw Pact" and that "as far as Czechoslovakia is concerned . . . , there have not been, nor are there now, any barriers whatsoever to a normalization of relations between Czechoslovakia and the FRG on a basis of recognizing the

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\* See the TRENDS of 22 November 1972, pages 30-31, for discussion of these Soviet bloc statements.

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initial invalidity [pocatecni neplatnost] of the so-called Munich agreement on the part of the Federal Republic." Later on the 23d, citing the same passage, CTK in English quoted Chnoupek as merely calling for "recognition of the invalidity of the so-called Munich agreement," dropping "initial." However, the "initial invalidity" formulation recurred in a Bratislava PRAVDA account on the 24th of another "CTK report" on the speech, which was accompanied by a statement that this position "has already been repeatedly stated by the highest Czechoslovak representatives." RUDE PRAVO's brief summary on the 24th also retained "initial."

In the interview on Prague radio on the 24th, Chnoupek used the "initial invalidity" formulation twice in a discussion of FRG-CSSR relations. In welcoming the reelection of the Brandt-Scheel coalition and calling on Bonn also to demonstrate "willingness and good will" to reach a mutual agreement, Chnoupek's lengthy remarks seemed unusually insistent and repetitive, as if to emphasize to Prague's Soviet bloc allies that Czechoslovakia is ready to negotiate its differences with the FRG.

In introducing the "initial invalidity" formula in NOVA MYSL, signed to the press on 10 October, Chnoupek had said the FRG would have to resolve "the question of recognition of the initial invalidity of the Munich agreement." Noting that "matters have now matured and clarified to such an extent that a mutually acceptable agreement may be reached without any further delays," he went on to say that Prague had shown "sufficient good will" to find a mutual agreement both in the exploratory talks and in statements by the "highest" Czechoslovak leaders. During the talks, Chnoupek wrote, Prague had announced its willingness to search for a "solution of consequences of the invalidity of the Munich agreement from the very beginning which would not infringe upon the legal security of physical persons, as well as other problems, and would even provide the necessary guarantees."\* But he added that it was not enough that "willingness and good will are demonstrated by one side only."

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\* See the TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 26-28, for a discussion of Prague media's handling of this issue in the stalemated Prague-Bonn talks.

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BACKGROUND      Recent statements by Czechoslovak leaders and commentaries in Prague media have been inconsistent in dealing with the Munich issue. Where Chnoupek in his foreign policy statement to the Federal Assembly on 31 October explicitly demanded recognition of the invalidity of the Munich pact ab initio in discussing relations with the FRG, a 16 November RUDE PRAVO account of remarks made by party leader Husak at the October Czechoslovak CP Central Committee plenum merely reported that Husak "briefly informed the session of our approach to the negotiations with the FRG and of our efforts to achieve progress in the solution of certain open questions."

Prague has ignored reports in West German media suggesting behind-the-scenes movement since the conclusion of the exploratory talks at the end of June. Czechoslovak media have not mentioned a personal letter from Premier Strougal to Brandt, reported by the West German DPA on 5 October to have dealt with the bilateral talks; FRG Government spokesman Ahlers announced on the 9th that Brandt had replied to the letter. On 27 October, DPA reported that a West German paper had quoted "diplomatic quarters" in Prague as saying a possible compromise had been reached. According to DPA, the compromise was to consist of two steps: 1) a treaty would be concluded in which Bonn would declare the Munich agreement "unjust" from the outset and contrary to international law and ethics; and 2) after the treaty signing, Prague would state for the record that Czechoslovakia has never been a signatory to the Munich agreement, has never legally recognized it, and considers it invalid from the outset.

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## ALBANIA - USSR - CHINA

## MOSCOW URGES, TIRANA REJECTS RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC TIES

An article in the Soviet weekly NOVOYE VREMYA keyed to the 28-29 November Albanian national holidays goes beyond such commentaries in prior years in calling outright for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Tirana. Albanian media have taken indirect cognizance of the Soviet article, which appeared in the 17 November issue of the weekly, in an article in the party organ ZERI I POPULLIT on the 27th spurning the "trial balloon" launched by "old and new imperialists" who are seeking "ways to enter into relations with" Albania. The keynote anniversary speaker on the 27th underscored the Albanian reaction, recalling a statement by Enver Hoxha last November ruling out normalization of relations with the Soviet Union under its present leadership.

SOVIET OVERTURE      Moscow commentaries on relations with Tirana, ruptured in 1961, have hewed until now to the formula established at the October 1964 CPSU Central Committee plenum and reiterated by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress last year, simply asserting Soviet readiness to "normalize" relations. The current article in the 17 November NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 47), entitled "In Common Interests" and signed by Tangalov, concludes that "the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries . . . could be an important step on the path of the general normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the Albanian People's Republic."

The article strengthens the thrust of the Soviet overture by repeatedly mentioning diplomatic relations in the course of a review of bilateral relations highlighting historical Soviet friendship and support. It recalls a Soviet note delivered to the Albanian provisional government on 10 November 1945 announcing that "the Soviet Government has decided to establish diplomatic relations with Albania and exchange envoys," and it refers again in a later passage to the Soviet "decision on diplomatic recognition of Albania." It goes on to regret "the abnormal situation in Soviet-Albanian relations since 1960" that led to the "break in diplomatic relations" between the two countries.

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On the day the NOVOYE VREMYA article appeared, the Hungarian domestic radio called attention to the fact that "the most reputed Soviet political weekly" urges an improvement of Soviet-Albanian relations "and also takes up the idea of resuming diplomatic relations." The broadcast commented that the present "unnatural state of affairs" meets neither Soviet nor Albanian interests and damages the cause of socialism. It also mentioned that the Soviet side has taken "initiatives to improve relations."

Radio Moscow itself has not been heard to broadcast the NOVOYE VREMYA article in Albanian, instead marking the November anniversaries with routine radio talks reminding Albanian listeners of past Soviet friendship. Such comment, aired intermittently by Moscow in broadcasts to Albania since the diplomatic break, has served the propaganda purpose of projecting Soviet good will and underscoring the notion that Albania alone is responsible for a breach that has only hurt its own interests.

Moscow did, however, report in Albanian on 29 November that the Soviet-Albanian Friendship Society had sent a message to the Albanian-Soviet Friendship Society--an inoperative body--on the occasion of the November anniversaries, asserting the Soviet people's "desire for friendship and cooperation" with the Albanians. A message from the same body last year had merely expressed congratulations on the anniversaries, and Moscow waited until the Albanians declined to accept that message before announcing that it had been sent: Radio Moscow told Albanian listeners on 30 November 1971 that the Albanians had refused to accept the message in order to prevent the Albanian people from learning about it, then broadcast the brief, innocuous text.

Last year's message had been the first publicized one from the Soviet-Albanian Friendship Society since the 1961 break. Messages signed impersonally by the leading Soviet Government bodies were sent to their Albanian counterparts on the November anniversaries in 1964, 1965, and 1969, but no Soviet messages of any kind were publicized in other years. Government-level Soviet messages have marked the January anniversary of the founding of the Albanian People's Republic on the major quinquennials--the 20th anniversary in 1966 and the 25th in 1971.

**ALBANIAN REBUFF** Albanian media have sustained their anti-Soviet stance over the years with varying degrees of truculence. Moscow's exceptionally forthcoming overture this year has met with a notably pointed rebuff. An article in the 17 November ZERI I POPULLIT seemed to take note of the NOVOYE VREMYA article in scorning the "trial balloon" in which the "old

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and new imperialists invite us to enter their 'paradise,' as if we had not suffered in the past the perfidies and evils they have caused us." They also, added, "make flatteries and speculations as if Albania is trying openings in their direction, and they want to find ways to enter into relations with it." In rebuttal to the alleged thesis of "the Moscow social imperialists and their lackies" about Albania's "isolation," the article noted that while Tirana had diplomatic relations with 26 countries in 1960, "today it maintains diplomatic relations with 55 countries" as well as trade and economic relations with "more than 40" states.

A more cryptic response to the Soviet overture was made by Politburo member Kapo in an anniversary address on the 27th in Vlore, attended by Hoxha, Lleshi, Shehu, and other top leaders. Following a denunciation of "the so-called European security" as a device to perpetuate the hegemony of "the two imperialist superpowers," Kapo remarked that "for some time the Soviet social imperialists have changed their tactics toward our country," and "they speak about the normalization of new relations." Avoiding any specific reference to diplomatic relations, Kapo recalled the stock rejection registered by Hoxha at the Albanian party congress in November last year: "Genuine normalization" can take place only when the present Soviet leaders are replaced by "true Bolsheviks."

#### PEKING PRESSES LINE ON SOVIETS AS MOST DANGEROUS ENEMY

Peking used the occasion of the dual Albanian anniversaries to reaffirm solidarity with its Albanian ally while pressing its line on the Soviets as the most dangerous adversary today. As usual, the top Chinese leaders sent a greetings message--this time signed by Mao, Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and Chou En-lai--and PEOPLE'S DAILY carried an editorial marking the occasion. There were also receptions in Peking, and a rally in Nanking marking the occasion was attended by the touring Albanian military delegation headed by Defense Minister Balluku.

Notwithstanding the expressions of solidarity, the divergence between the long-time allies caused by Peking's current global strategy came through clearly in Chinese insistence on treating Moscow as the primary enemy, with the implicit corollary that improved relations with the United States are justified by changing circumstances. Thus, the Chinese message lauded opposition

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to "modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism as its center and imperialism headed by the United States"--a reversal of the order of adversaries that was introduced in Peking's 1 October joint editorial on PRC National Day. That joint editorial had also introduced the line that Soviet "social imperialism" is more deceitful and therefore more dangerous than old-line imperialism, and this line was pressed in the 28 November editorial on the Albanian anniversaries.

Albanian opposition to Peking's strategy in the triangular big-power context, already reflected in Tirana's reaction to the Chinese invitation to President Nixon, had been aired in remarkably clear terms on the first day of Balluku's latest visit to China.\* Responding to a Chinese leader's speech at a welcoming banquet on 6 November, Balluku took direct issue with Peking's line by insisting in his denunciation of the United States and the Soviet Union that each "is as dangerous as the other." Balluku also stuck to the traditional formulation by naming the United States first. Similarly, in remarks at a Peking reception marking the Albanian anniversaries the Chinese speaker mentioned the USSR before the United States and the Albanian reversed the order.

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\* See the TRENDS of 8 November 1972, pages 19-20.

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## UN DISARMAMENT DEBATES PROVIDE FORUM FOR BITTER EXCHANGES

Offering a forum for appeals to the international community and a subject that has long been at the heart of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the disarmament discussions at this year's UNGA session have set the scene for acrimonious exchanges between the two rivals that have again underscored how intractable their conflict is. In what could be viewed as preemptive moves to neutralize the anticipated Chinese attacks, the Soviets used the session to press their call for a world disarmament conference (WDC) and to revive proposals on the nonuse of force (NUF) and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Reacting to these initiatives as an effort by Moscow to promote its detente policies at the expense of Chinese interests, Peking has vigorously pounced on the Soviet proposals to give focus to its current line that Moscow's "social imperialism" is more deceitful and therefore more dangerous than old-line imperialism. During this ongoing exchange the United States has largely escaped the polemical crossfire.

**NONUSE OF FORCE** Having earlier centered on the WDC proposal,\* the Sino-Soviet jockeying shifted to the NUF package when debate opened on these proposals in plenary sessions on 2 November. Yakov Malik, head of the Soviet permanent UN mission, elaborated on NUF in a speech that day along lines laid out by Foreign Minister Gromyko in his 26 September address to the UNGA. Malik's speech, reported only in summary form by TASS on 2 November and PRAVDA on the 4th, was marked by a low-key approach devoid of polemics, with only veiled references to Chinese positions. A week later the Chinese reacted with a series of strong attacks highlighted by a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 12 November and a sharply polemical address at the UN by Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua on the 13th which was disseminated in full by NCNA.

The Chinese response, punctuated with bitter ridicule of the Soviets as hypocrites and of their NUF proposal as "a downright fraud" that was cold-shouldered during the meetings, zeroed in on the Soviet Union as an expansionist power whose real nature has been revealed in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the dismemberment of Pakistan, and military pressure along the Sino-Soviet border. Making use of an aphorism long favored by the Chinese in the past when denigrating

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\* See the TRENDS of 1 November 1972, pages 30-31.

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the prospects of detente with the United States, Chiao derided the Soviets for trying to make people believe that they have "laid down their butcher's knives and become Buddhas."

Malik responded to the Chinese attacks in a concluding speech on 15 November which, unlike the one on 2 November, contained extensive polemics against the Chinese. A TASS summary quoted Malik as interpreting Peking's challenge to the Soviet proposal to mean that Peking "favors the use of force in international relations while its objections to the prohibition of nuclear weapons for all time means that it actually comes out for the use of these weapons."

**BORDER ISSUE** While Peking's use of the UNGA forum to deride Moscow's detente posture was clearly designed with an eye for the international gallery, much of the argumentation and, in particular, the repeated references to the Sino-Soviet border reflect Peking's concern and resentment over Soviet military pressure along the border. A fundamental argument advanced by Peking is that the Soviet disarmament proposals are contrived to maintain the two superpowers' dominance in nuclear capability while arresting the nuclear weapons development of countries like China before the strategic imbalance can be meaningfully redressed. The 12 November Commentator article, observing that the Soviets have increased their strategic nuclear weapons more than sixfold in the past six years, argued that the small and medium-size countries' defense capabilities are inadequate and that their present task "is not disarmament but to strengthen their national defense." At the same time, Peking has reiterated its intent to pursue its nuclear weapons program for self-defense and has repeatedly challenged Moscow to agree to an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Peking's sharp reaction to the Soviet NUF position is particularly relevant to the border situation in the light of Moscow's proposals regarding a bilateral renunciation of force. In addition to dismissing the Soviet NUF package as a sham designed to cover up Moscow's expansionist policies, Peking has linked the Sino-Soviet border question with its general demand that the Soviets withdraw their troops from foreign countries. Thus Ch'ao in his speech on 13 November challenged the Soviets to withdraw their troops and dismantle their bases in Mongolia "instead of unabashedly uttering empty words about the renunciation of the use of all force." Earlier, an NCNA correspondent's report from the UN on 9 November sarcastically cited "the massive troop concentration

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along the Sino-Soviet border" as an illustration of Moscow's good-neighbor policy. Moscow has repeatedly claimed that it has made concrete proposals to the Chinese--including one on nonuse of force--in the interest of restoring good-neighborly relations, but Peking has made clear its resentment over the Soviet troop concentrations near the border.

Another NCNA correspondent's dispatch, on 19 November, amplified the Chinese charges in posing a series of questions which Malik allegedly avoided in his 15 November speech. Among others, one question asked rhetorically if the Soviet Union had not stationed "an armed force of a million strong along the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-Mongolian borders" and staged a "military occupation" of the MPR. Contrasting Soviet behavior with that of the Chinese, NCNA pointed out that China has no troops or military bases abroad and "has not threatened other countries with force." The dispatch also reiterated Peking's position that it develops nuclear weapons solely for defense and has often declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Moscow has avoided publicizing the border issue as a dimension of the disarmament exchanges. PEOPLE'S DAILY on 21 November, in an extensive account of Malik's 15 November speech, claimed that in attempting to becloud the fact that the Soviets had provoked incidents along the border Malik had declared Moscow's readiness to renounce the use of force in settling disputes with Peking. Malik was quoted in the account as referring to the "concrete and constructive proposals" the Soviets have made to the Chinese.

L.A. NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE      Apart from the bilateral issues imbedded in the disarmament debates involving Moscow and Peking, the two sides have also pitched their appeals to the international community, especially to the third world. Thus, Peking seized on the First Committee's discussion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America as another case study of Moscow's sham disarmament posture. Mexico and other Latin American countries have been urging nuclear countries to sign Additional Protocol II to the treaty, thereby undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty and to insure Latin America's nuclear-free status. In a note to the Mexican ambassador to the PRC released on 15 November, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei announced Peking's support for the nuclear-free zone while declining to sign the protocol on the grounds that it affirms the nuclear nonproliferation and test-ban treaties, to which "China has always been opposed."

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Peking contrasted its undertaking to respect a Latin American nuclear-free zone with Moscow's failure to make a like commitment. A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 17 November devoted to the issue made a point of charging that Moscow's response in this case gave the lie to its "loud and big talk" about the nonuse of force. Making characteristic use of the Latin American proposal, the article asserted that "it is legitimate for small and medium-size countries to demand and propose the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones or peace zones with a view to opposing the superpowers' policies of aggression, expansion, and war."

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## USSR - JAPAN

## MOSCOW-TOKYO TIES HINDERED BY "NORTHERN TERRITORIES" ISSUE

In the wake of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in September, Soviet spokesmen have put the Tanaka government on notice that the USSR does not, at this time, feel pressured to show any flexibility on meeting Japanese demands for the return of the northern territories--the four islands seized by the USSR at the end of World War II--as a means of offsetting Japan's emerging relationship with China. While Moscow has opted for a wait-and-see policy on the territorial question, at least until the exact dimensions of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement are known, Peking has sought to keep the question alive by publicizing the issue in an apparent attempt to block any substantive progress in the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations.

The first major Soviet assessment of the new Sino-Japanese relationship--a 2 November IZVESTIYA article by V. Kudryavtsev--applauded assurances in the September Sino-Japanese joint statement that the normalization of relations between the two countries was not directed against third countries but professed "perplexity" over the targets of the passage in the statement which jointly opposed any countries' hegemony in Asia. After excluding the PRC, Japan, and the United States as possible targets, Kudryavtsev implied that the formula was directed at the USSR. Taking a swipe at the Japanese, he then specifically pointed to "some of the recent speeches in the Japanese parliament, whose authors are again advancing pointless and absurd territorial demands with regard to the USSR" as evidence of Tokyo's "unrealistic positions" on a "number of very important foreign policy questions."

The new Tanaka government, which enjoyed a virtual reprieve from hostile Soviet propaganda during its first few months in power, was taken to task on the territorial issue in a lengthy article by I. Latyshev in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, signed to press on 24 October. In reviewing former prime minister Sato's seven and a half years in office, Latyshev argued that the "revanchist anti-Soviet campaign for the return to Japan of the so-called northern territories" was one of the main reasons for Sato's resignation and warned the new leadership in Tokyo that this "absurd campaign" did not "yield any political dividends for the

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Sato government." While stressing the need for a "new approach" to Japan's problems, Latyshev was quick to claim that "as yet the Tanaka government's foreign policy is not distinctive for its innovative nature." He concluded with the assertion that "evidently it is still not clear to some people in Japan that the successful development of Japanese-Soviet relations demands a sober, realistic approach to reality."

Similar criticism was expressed by Vsevolov Ovchinnikov in a 24 November PRAVDA article which dealt in unusually candid terms with the current campaign in Japan for the return of the northern islands. Characterizing the campaign as "being waged in higher tones than ever before," Ovchinnikov lashed out at recent Japanese press articles which urged Tanaka to pursue a course of "'assertive diplomacy'" in dealing with the territorial issue in the negotiations with the USSR. Ovchinnikov complained that some Japanese writers had "gone even further" and had stated "unequivocally that the further development of economic cooperation between the two countries will depend on the relaxation of the USSR's position on the so-called territorial question."

Aiming his remarks at a higher level, Ovchinnikov implicated the Tanaka government in the attempt to link the demand for return of the islands to the recently resumed talks on a peace treaty between the two countries. As evidence that the campaign is "actually being inspired and directed from above," Ovchinnikov cited a 7 November rally in Hiroshima held by emigres from the Kurile islands. He quoted the Japanese press and--revealing Soviet sensitivity to Chinese efforts to exploit the territorial issue--"the Chinese NCNA"\* as having reported that the rally was held with the assistance of the prime minister's office and that Foreign Minister Ohira had sent a message to the rally stressing that "the solution of the question of the northern territories is a prerequisite for the conclusion of a Japanese-Soviet treaty." In unusually blunt terms, Ovchinnikov asserted that "it is still not clear to somebody in Tokyo" that

the further comprehensive development of relations  
between our neighboring countries--in which the

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\* Peking's attempt to keep the northern territories issue alive and thereby enhance its leverage against the Soviet Union vis-a-vis Japan was illustrated in NCNA's full report of the 7 November Hiroshima rally. NCNA's coverage, more complete than previous reports on similar Japanese rallies in the past, highlighted several anti-Soviet remarks contained in the rally speeches as well as Ohira's message to the rally.

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Japanese side is no less interested than the Soviet side--is possible only on the basis of a sober, realistic approach to reality. To make territorial claims now in point of fact means to demand a review of the results of World War II and to slide into revanchist positions.

Turning to those Japanese leaders seeking to use the normalization of relations with China as a lever to pry concessions from the USSR on the territorial question, Ovchinikov flatly declared that "calculations that . . . foreign policy actions of recent times will make it easier for Japan to exert pressure on the USSR are illusory."

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## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### SUSLOV RECEIVES EXCEPTIONAL HONORS ON 70TH BIRTHDAY

In addition to the conventional awards and messages of congratulations published in the 21 November PRAVDA, Central Committee Secretary M. A. Suslov has received several unusual honors on his 70th birthday:

† PRAVDA on 21 October announced the publication of a collection of Suslov's speeches and articles and on 19 November carried a long, enthusiastic review of it. Brezhnev is the only other Politburo member to share this distinction.

† Where birthday awards are not normally presented immediately after they are announced and the presentation ceremonies customarily get little publicity, Suslov's were presented the day after they were announced and the ceremonies were prominently publicized. PRAVDA on 22 November published a picture of the awards ceremony along with the texts of Podgorny's presentation speech and Suslov's acceptance speech. The only other septuagenarian in the Politburo, A. Ya. Pelshe, received his 70th birthday Order of Lenin 20 days after its announcement, and the presentation ceremony merited only a one-paragraph report in PRAVDA on 27 February 1969. Although Brezhnev received his 60th birthday award the day after its announcement, PRAVDA on 20 December 1966 carried no picture of the ceremony.

All the Moscow-based Politburo members except Polyanskiy attended the Suslov awards ceremony, and Podgorny's speech contained warm praise of Suslov. In reply, Suslov singled out Brezhnev for special recognition, expressing his "great happiness" in working in the Central Committee and "especially...in the present Politburo--in the remarkable cohesive and creative collective, among you, my friends, along with the General Secretary, our dear Leonid Ilich Brezhnev."

### ARMENIAN PURGE REFLECTS SERIOUS FAILURES IN LEADERSHIP

The exposures of corruption, nationalism, and lagging in industrial and agricultural production which have recently brought down the leaders of Azerbaydzhan and Georgia may soon extend to the neighboring Transcaucasian republic of Armenia as well. In a two-day purge supervised by a Moscow cadre official, the Armenian

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republic witnessed the removal of its premier, B. A. Muradyan, its Central Committee secretary for agriculture, M. S. Melkonyan, and its KGB chief, G. A. Badamyants. Although no public charges have been aired against these officials and no unusual economic shortcomings or corruption have thus far been revealed, the sudden purge clearly indicates major failings which place Armenian First Secretary A. Ye. Kochinyan's future in jeopardy.

The Armenian changes commenced on 22 November with the removal of 62-year-old G. A. Badamyants as KGB chief, a post he had held for more than 18 years. The replacement of Badamyants, an Armenian, by Arkady Pavlovich Ragozov, apparently a Russian, bodes ill for the republic; native Armenians have long held all the top posts in their republic, without the presence of Russian overseers usually found in other republics. On the same day, 57-year-old Premier Muradyan was replaced by the 53-year-old Central Committee secretary for industry, G. A. Arzumanyan.

On 23 November an Armenian Central Committee plenum attended by CPSU Central Committee deputy cadre section chief B. N. Moralev met to discuss organizational questions, according to a brief 24 November Yerevan broadcast. The plenum removed Melkonyan and Muradyan from their republic party posts. Central Committee agriculture section head V. B. Galumyan succeeded Melkonyan and Yerevan Second Secretary K. S. Demirchyan became industry secretary, filling the vacancy left by Arzumanyan.

To date, there has been no public explanation of the shakeup. In fact, at a 31 October plenum on agriculture Kochinyan had presented a rather favorable picture of Armenian agriculture which, though hard hit by the harsh winter, was alleged to have yielded good results.

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## CHINA

### SZECHWAN PLENUM PROVIDES FURTHER SIGN OF RETURNING ORDER

Breaking a long period in which practically no provincial leaders appeared and no publicized meetings were held, the Szechwan radio on 22 November announced that the provincial revolutionary committee held its sixth plenum from 1 to 21 November. No successor was formally named to replace former provincial chief Chang Kuo-hua, who died in February, but former Kwangtung chief Liu Hsing-yuan made a report on behalf of the provincial revolutionary committee. Liu made his last appearance in Kwangtung in early March. The only other provincial leader at the plenum who was named was party secretary and pre-cultural revolution governor Li Ta-chang, who gave a speech. Party second secretary and regional military commander Liang Hsing-chu continued his year-long absence from public view.

The Szechwan plenum, combined with the reappearance of Yunnan's leaders earlier in the month, indicates that the problems in Southwest China created by Lin Piao's fall are in the process of being solved, though Kweichow and Tibet leaders have still not reappeared. That serious obstacles to order remain, however, is indicated in the Szechwan plenum report's call for suppression of class enemies still "sowing discord, spreading rumors to stir up trouble, sabotaging the campaign to criticize revisionism, embezzling state property, and sabotaging production, communications, and social order."

Leading cadres have also been reappearing in several other provinces. Among them is Mao Yuan-hsin, reported by the Liaoning provincial radio on 26 November to have participated in a local forum for intellectuals. Mao, reportedly Mao Tse-tung's nephew, is a deputy secretary of the Liaoning party committee and was an active "leftist" during the cultural revolution. He had not appeared in public since the spring of 1971.

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## TOPICS IN BRIEF

## SOVIET SUBMARINE SAGA

Soviet media have ridiculed "hysteria" raised in the Western press over reports that a Soviet nuclear submarine entered Norway's Sognefjord in early November and plied the waters of the fjord until the 24th, when the Norwegian Government allowed it to leave in order to avoid an incident that might jeopardize the preparatory talks on a European security conference. TASS suggested that the story had been conjured up by Western opponents of detente and of the conference. None of Moscow's several reports has explicitly denied that the submarine was Soviet (it was so identified only belatedly in the Western press reports), but TASS on the 28th cited reports saying it was British. A lengthy commentary over East Berlin radio on the 27th derisively labeled the "unidentified" vessel "the Loch Ness submarine."

TASS ignored but the East Berlin broadcast derided a report that the "Soviet" submarine had entered the fjord after putting down an attempted mutiny--an allegation attributed in the British press to a ham operator who said he heard it in a Tirana broadcast in English. No mention of the incident has appeared in monitored Albanian news agency transmissions or domestic or international broadcasts of Radio Tirana. FBIS does not regularly monitor Tirana's voicecasts in English; they are known to carry much the same fare as its other international broadcasts, all of which in turn draw most of their material from the primary ATA services in English and French.

## PALESTINIAN UNITY

Moscow has used the occasion of the opening of the "Arab popular conference for support of the Palestine revolution" to again stress the "special importance" of unity in the Palestine resistance movement. Soviet interest in the meeting, which opened in Beirut on 27 November after several postponements, was indicated by the dispatch of a delegation headed by Yevgeniy Primakov, deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations and former PRAVDA Middle East expert. Primakov addressed the conference in the capacity of secretary of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. According to a Moscow

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broadcast in Arabic on the 28th, he deplored differences in the Palestine resistance movement and "disagreement among some Arab states" over support for the Palestinians' cause. He expressed the "Soviet people's" hope for deeper understanding that would lead to closer solidarity with Palestine resistance "militants," and he recalled the "very useful" visit to Moscow last July of a Palestinian delegation led by Yasser 'Arafat.

Moscow's most recent criticism of disarray in the Palestinian resistance movement came in a 25 October SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article by Baryshev which ticked off the movement's undefined political and ideological aims, lack of unity in methods of struggle, and "motley" social composition. The article also criticized extremist elements in the movement and groups advancing "nationalist and religious slogans."

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