TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda
This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.
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These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
INDOCHINA

Hanoi media's only reference to the private U.S.-DRV talks came in a brief report on 14 January that the DRV spokesman in Paris had told reporters the Le Duc Tho-Kissinger meetings "had made progress." Kissinger's return to the United States on the 14th to report to the President has not been mentioned. And Hanoi's report of the U.S. announcement that military action against the DRV had been halted on the 15th ignored the White House explanation that the decision was taken because of progress in the talks. During the week Hanoi has remained silent on the substance of a peace accord; but Liberation Front media as late as the 13th again pressed the communist line on the unity of Vietnam and took issue with President Thieu's stand on two Vietnams.

Hanoi has continued to laud heroic North Vietnamese actions during the massive U.S. air strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area between 18 and 29 December. This publicity included reports that Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap were among leaders attending a ceremony at which awards were presented. Hanoi also reported that First Secretary Le Duan had addressed a conference of air defense and air force personnel. Recent articles by a member of the DRV State Planning Commission, reviewing economic activities over the past year, claim that the North achieved outstanding agricultural production and that the volume of shipments from foreign countries increased despite the bombing and mining.

Soviet hope for an early settlement in Vietnam was again registered in the joint communiqué on President Pompidou's "unofficial" visit to the USSR for talks with Brezhnev. Characteristically, Moscow promptly reported the positive assessments of the Paris negotiations by both Kissinger and the DRV spokesman as well as the U.S. announcement that the bombing had been halted because of progress in the private U.S.-DRV talks.

Sustaining its low posture on Vietnam developments, Peking carried its first report on the private Paris meetings since they resumed this month by replaying statements by both the DRV and U.S. sides registering progress in the negotiations. Earlier, in a show of support for Sihanouk's front, Peking reported the signing on the 13th of agreements on economic and military aid for the Cambodians in 1973.

DRV NOTES BOMBING HALT, STRESSES CONTINUED VIGILANCE, HEROISM

The first monitored Hanoi reaction to the U.S. announcement on 15 December that all military action against the DRV had been halted
as of 1000 hours that day Eastern Standard Time—1500 GMT—came in a domestic service broadcast at 0450 GMT on the 16th, some 14 hours after the announcement. Ignoring Presidential press secretary Ziegler's explanation that the bombing was halted because of progress in the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks, Hanoi observed that cessation of the bombing has been a legitimate DRV demand which has had the support of world public opinion. It went on to warn, however, that the U.S. "imperialists" have many times totally or partially halted the bombing only to resume it more violently. The broadcast concluded that in the face of continued "aggression" in the South and in Cambodia and Laos, the Vietnamese will heighten their vigilance, persevere in the struggle on the military, political, and diplomatic fronts, and "demand that the Americans stop their aggression and immediately sign" the peace agreement.

VNA repeated the Hanoi radio item verbatim some two hours later, and Liberation Radio first mentioned the halt some six hours after Hanoi's initial report. The Front broadcast said that "the public" is waiting to see if the Americans will honor their commitment. It went on to call on the United States also to end military action in the South, where, it observed, the Vietnameseization policy and "cruel bombing" were continuing.

Hanoi's only explicit reference to the bombing halt since the initial reports came in an English-language broadcast on the 17th which noted that a U.S. peace organization planned to go ahead with its demonstrations on the day of President Nixon's inauguration despite the bombing suspension. Hanoi reported the organization as recalling that Kissinger's 26 October statement that "peace is at hand" was followed by "the most murderous bombing in the history of warfare."

On the 17th Hanoi claimed that a reconnaissance plane was shot down that day over Quang Binh Province, raising the total of downed planes to 4,181. Also on the 17th VNA reported that three U.S. ships had been "set ablaze" off Nghe An and Thanh Hoa provinces on the 13th and 15th.

Concern about possible resumption of attacks north of the 20th parallel was registered in continuing foreign ministry spokesmen's statements issued through 15 January, protesting bombing of southern DRV provinces, as well as in other propagandas. A 16 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast shortly before Hanoi reported the bombing halt, said that U.S. reconnaissance
planes had stepped up their activities over many areas, including Hanoi and Haiphong, and that the situation "demands that our people's armed forces be vigilant... if the aggressors conduct brutal new military measures." The foreign ministry spokesman's statements singled out reconnaissance flights on 10, 11, and 14 January and said these actions represented preparation for "new war activities."

Continued attention to evacuation and other air defense tasks included a broadcast on the 11th discussing activities in Haiphong carried out on the orders of the Haiphong party and administrative committees and the city's military command. And on the 13th Hanoi broadcast remarks by Le Xuan Binh, director of Hanoi's trade department, stressing the need to be ready to cope with "the crafty schemes of the U.S. imperialists, who might again attack our capital more fiercely."

DRV LEADERS' APPEARANCES

Hanoi propaganda has continued to highlight the revolutionary heroism of units and individuals in the face of the massive December bombing.

There was extensive reportage and editorial comment on a ceremony held in Hanoi on the 12th by the air force-air defense command to present awards to 24 units and 12 individuals from among the armed forces and militia for outstanding performance and heroism. Following the reading of President Ton Duc Thang's order granting the awards, Politburo members Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, the DRV Defense Minister, made short speeches praising the air force and air defense troops as the "core force in the people's war against the war of destruction."

While Truong Chinh's speech was mainly an exhortation to the award winners to maintain proper attitudes, improve their fighting skills, and obey party and army guidelines, Giap emphasized the extent and importance of the recent "victory" over the U.S. Air Force, which he characterized as a victory for the party, the armed forces, and the people's fighting will. Offering thanks to the PLAF and compatriots in South Vietnam for adding their victories to those of the North, Giap stressed the importance of continuing the struggle "as long as the enemy continues to invade our country." Both Truong Chinh and Giap, offering special praise to the missile force, stressed as one of the tasks facing the armed forces the continued understanding and application of modern technology as a step toward developing a "modern army." The citation ceremony drew editorial praise from NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 12th, plus a
further editorial from the army paper on the 13th; a
Liberation Radio commentary on the 12th also praised the
"brilliant exploits" of the units and individuals cited.

Further praise for air defense and air force personnel was
expressed by Party Secretary Le Duan at an 11 January
conference "on drawing combat experiences from the victorious
fight" against the large-scale U.S. strategic air offensive
against North Vietnam. Le Duan reportedly urged cadres at the
conference to realize that although the Americans have been
"heavily defeated," they remain "very stubborn, perfidious, and
ruthless" and "continue to seek every means possible to
maintain neocolonialism in South Vietnam and continue their
acts of destructive war against the North."

Premier Pham Van Dong's activities were also noted when Hanoi
radio on the 16th said he had offered his personal praise during
a "recent" visit to a first-aid station in Hanoi.

LE DUAN CITSES BLOC AID; HOC TAP ASSAILS BIG-POWER DETENTE

The Hanoi radio account of First Secretary Le Duan's remarks at
the 11 January conference of the air defense and air forces
quoted him as saying that the DRV has received assistance and
support from the socialist and other countries because its armed
struggle contributes to the world revolution. Le Duan's
statement represents a standard DRV formulation, but it takes
on added interest in that last fall, as earlier, the formulation
was used in the context of Hanoi's polemical attacks on its
two big communist allies. Moreover, Le Duan's remark's came in
the wake of an article in the December issue of the theoretical
journal HOC TAP which revived sharp criticism of USSR and PRC
policies of detente with the United States and of President
Nixon's alleged policy of splitting the socialist countries.
Whether or not there is Hanoi dissatisfaction with some aspects
of foreign assistance, Le Duan's remarks may have been meant to
reassure his audience, in the wake of the escalated U.S. attacks,
that necessary defense assistance must continue because of the
self-interest of North Vietnam's allies.

PROPAGANDA BACKGROUND

A 4 July 1972 article in the DRV army paper QUAN
DOI NHAN DAN had been particularly pointed in
linking the DRV's contributions to world revolution
and to socialism with socialist obligations to aid Vietnam. The
article cited what it professed to regard as the "durable and
continuous" nature of socialist aid in the course of arguing that President Nixon had made a serious strategic mistake in resuming the air strikes in April and mining North Vietnamese ports in May. It said that aid to the DRV not only fulfilled the international obligations of socialist countries but "met the requirement of their international position and national interests."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article took on further interest when a NHAN DAN editorial on 17 August, suggesting that Hanoi had been under pressure from its big allies to make compromises toward a peace settlement, warned that their policies of detente toward the United States might jeopardize their support for the DRV. Referring to a socialist country's efforts to carry out peaceful coexistence, NHAN DAN said: "Caring only for the narrow, immediate interests of a country and abandoning its high international duty will not only harm the revolutionary movements of various countries, but in the end will bring to these very countries incalculable losses."

Against this background, it seems noteworthy that Premier Pham Van Dong, in his address marking the anniversary of the 2 September DRV National Day, suggested in strong terms that socialist assistance is the DRV's right in view of its contributions to the world struggle against "imperialism."*

The DRV's usual aid agreements for 1973 with the PRC and the USSR were signed on 26 November and 10 December 1972, respectively. While a supplementary aid agreement with the PRC had been concluded on 28 June, there has been no report that Moscow concluded a supplementary aid agreement with the DRV in 1972. However, a 5 August PRAVDA editorial article—on socialist solidarity with Vietnam—had said without further elaboration that the USSR "had recently increased its aid to the Vietnamese people still further." Hanoi but not Moscow media had reported that from 22 to 29 July a delegation of the USSR Ministry of Maritime Fleet visited the DRV "to work with" the DRV Ministry of Transportation and Communication and Ministry of Foreign Trade.

A cryptic reference to increased Chinese aid had also appeared in Hanoi propaganda on the 23d anniversary of PRC National Day on

* See the TRENDS of 23 August 1972, pages 1-4, as well as of 6 July 1972, pages 4-5, and 7 September 1972, pages 7-8.
1 October. The DRV leaders' message as well as Hanoi editorial comment said that "recently, in the face of the extremely serious war escalation . . . the Chinese Government has taken measures to increase assistance to the Vietnamese." Western press agencies on 4 September had reported Sihanouk as saying in an interview in Peking that the USSR and China had reached an agreement on the transport of arms and material to the DRV. It seems likely that the coordination of aid efforts in the aftermath of U.S. mining and interdiction moves in part explains DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban's prolonged stay in China from 4 May to 23 August.

REVIVAL OF POLEMIC IN DECEMBER HOC TAP

An article in the December issue of HOC TAP by Hoang Quoc Viet, Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee member and chairman of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, again displayed DRV opposition to Peking's and Moscow's policies of detente with the United States. Under the title "Broad and Close Solidarity, Great and Glorious Victories," Viet discussed the worldwide support given the Vietnamese in their struggle against U.S. "imperialism," the "main enemy." Reviving the charge that President Nixon's policies are aimed at splitting "the socialist camp," Viet said that he "is endeavoring to achieve his dark scheme by stimulating chauvinism in the big countries and narrow-minded nationalism and by using 'negotiations' with a number of socialist countries to 'control' these countries."* Viet added that while U.S. "imperialism" works for cooperation with socialist countries in the economic, cultural, scientific, and technical fields, it has "never given up its design of sabotaging and overthrowing" the socialist countries.

Declaring that the socialist forces play the decisive role in the broad world front which supports the Vietnamese struggle, Viet said that socialist support and assistance, "especially that of the USSR and China," help create conditions to win worldwide support. In an earlier passage, he wrote that world support for Vietnam is not only a matter of fulfilling an international duty but also "protects their genuine national interests." He claimed that worldwide solidarity has taken on new impetus since the 26 October DRV Government statement that revealed the substance of the peace accord. Viet concluded by stressing that the Vietnamese struggle has combined national with international interests and that this line "represents a correct combination of genuine patriotism and proletarian internationalism."

* An article in the November issue of HOC TAP had atypically argued that when it is necessary to reach an agreement, communists do not allow "narrow and immediate interests" to blur the awareness of "lasting interests" of the entire movement and "do not allow national selfishness to control and undermine the common interests of the world revolution." See the TRENDS of 13 December 1973, pages 3-5.
DRV CLAIMS SUCCESS IN FOREIGN AID SHIPMENTS, AGRICULTURE

Hanoi propaganda reviewing economic achievements over the past year claims that despite the U.S. mining and attacks on the North, outstanding progress was made in agriculture and lines of communication with the outside world remained open. A 5 January VNA interview with Che Viet Tan, a member of the State Planning Commission, highlighted the alleged transportation successes, claiming that the DRV "preserved and even expanded the volume of transportation between our country and others and ensured good receipt of foreign aid in all fields." Going beyond previous vague assertions by Hanoi that aid has not been blocked, Tan maintained that "the daily rate of receipt of foreign aid has surpassed by far the highest level in the 1965-1968 period and on some days even surpassed that in peacetime."

Agricultural production received particular attention in the interview and in a three-part article by Che Viet Tan, broadcast by Hanoi's domestic service in daily installments from 12 through 14 January. Tan followed the pattern of recent years in giving no figures on production, but he said the rice output in North Vietnam during 1972 was the highest in the past 12 years. This would apparently represent the second highest level ever achieved; in 1959 Hanoi claimed an all-time record production of 5.2 million tons with an average yield of 2.28 tons per hectare. Tan also said progress had been made toward achieving the goal—set in 1965—of reaching an average output of five tons of rice per hectare.* He stated that the entire area of the Red River Delta, with more than 40 percent of the rice-growing area in the North, had achieved the five-ton goal. During the 1965-68 period of bombing, Tan recalled, only Thai Binh Province had produced the average of five tons. Now, he said, the goal has been reached by the provinces of Hai Hung, Ha Tay, and Nam Ha—"the provinces cultivating the greatest quantity of rice in the Red River Delta."

The possibility that North Vietnam may set higher agricultural goals had been suggested in a 21 November speech by First Secretary Le Duan, broadcast by Hanoi on 24 November. Instead

of repeating the usual objectives of the production of five tons of paddy and two pigs with one laborer on each hectare, Le Duan declared: "Each worker must not only cultivate one hectare of land with an output of five tons of paddy per year but must also try to cultivate two to three hectares of land with higher output and must insure an income of two to three dong and then four to five dong per man-day." In a similar vein, Pham Van Dong was quoted in a 9 December Hanoi broadcast as asserting:

To achieve the five-ton goal is not enough; it is not a firm and stable basis. With five tons of rice per hectare, we are still far from being rich. Formerly we dared not think about the five-ton goal. But now it is not a high point. We must strive even harder to score greater successes.

Among other things, Che Viet Tan also claimed that in 1972 the rate of requisition and purchasing of grain increased by 1.5 times over the previous year and reached the highest level ever recorded. He indicated that as a result of increased grain production, intensive collection and purchase of grain, and better circulation and distribution, the market prices have decreased by six percent compared with the previous year.

MOSCOW REPORTS BOMBING HALT, EXPRESSES HOPE FOR SETTLEMENT

Moscow reacted in typical fashion in promptly reporting without comment the 15 January White House announcement that all military actions against the DRV had been halted. As in the case of the 30 December U.S. announcement of the halt in bombings above the 20th parallel, Moscow's reports preceded Hanoi's acknowledgment. The first Soviet reaction to the bombing halt, at 1853 GMT on 15 January, was a brief TASS report that the PRC Paris delegation, upon being informed of the halt by the DRV delegation, had issued a statement calling for a cessation of bombing in the South as well and demanding that the United States sign the peace agreement. Minutes later, TASS and Moscow radio reported the White House announcement that the President had made the decision to suspend the bombing, shelling, and mining "because of the progress" made at the Paris talks. (On 14 January TASS had promptly reported optimistic statements by both Kissinger and the DRV Paris spokesman regarding the private talks.)
Moscow's reports also noted the announcement that Kissinger would soon return to Paris to continue private talks with DRV representatives. An hour later TASS and the radio reported a Pentagon spokesman's announcement that the United States will continue required military operations in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and his refusal to reply to a question regarding continued U.S. reconnaissance flights over the DRV. On the 16th TASS reported Gen. Haig's arrival in Saigon. Other reports included coverage of favorable reaction to the bombing cessation from various U.S. and European spokesmen. But Moscow at the same time cited reminders, including one from VNA, that the United States has previously resumed bombings after earlier halts.

There has been no Soviet comment on the bombing halt to date beyond a brief report, in the domestic service on the 16th, that a Moscow radio correspondent in Hanoi had called the cessation "the result of the mighty international wave of solidarity with the struggling people of Vietnam, the united action of all those who truly want peace in Indochina."

The Soviet-French communique on Pompidou's talks with Brezhnev expressed the two leaders' "deep concern" over the continuing war in Indochina and their hope that the current negotiations will lead to an "early settlement." Confirming that the two sides have "very close" views on a settlement, the two sides agreed that the USSR and France "will continue efforts towards facilitating the earliest political settlement of the Vietnam problem." Soviet leaders have made similar references to such Soviet efforts from time to time in the past. Most recently Brezhnev, speaking at a 13 November dinner for a visiting Bulgarian delegation, said that "we strive to facilitate the ending of the war and will welcome the restoration of peace in Indochina."

Moscow media have not, however, publicized Brezhnev's remarks on a Vietnam settlement at an impromptu airport press conference in Minsk on 11 January while awaiting Pompidou's arrival. According to Western reporters, the Soviet leader expressed the opinion that "the Vietnam affair is drawing slowly to its conclusion" and commented favorably on the continuing U.S.-DRV negotiations. At the same time, Brezhnev reminded the reporters of his 21 December warning that the future of Soviet-American relations depends on Vietnam developments.
Prior to the bombing halt, routine Moscow comment had continued along established lines, scoring continued U.S. air actions over the DRV, praising the resumption of the negotiations in Paris "thanks to the good will of the DRV," and demanding a "speedy" signing of the peace agreement. A 10 January domestic service commentary atypically discussed some questions of substance: Echoing Hanoi and the Front, the commentator took issue with Thieu's claim that there are two states and that the demilitarized zone is an international frontier. Claiming that this "clearly contradicts the spirit and letter of the 1954 Geneva agreements" which provided for only a temporary demarcation line, the commentator charged Thieu with trying to liquidate the gains of the southern "patriots" and also to prove his claim of aggression from the North.

PEKING CITES PARIS PROGRESS; SIGNS AID PACT WITH CAMBODIANS

While continuing to refrain from comment and greatly reducing coverage of Vietnam developments, Peking seized upon statements by the negotiating sides registering progress in Paris. An NCNA dispatch on the 15th juxtaposed a report on the DRV spokesman's statement that the talks have made progress and a report quoting Kissinger's reference to "very useful negotiations." This dispatch represented Peking's first report on the private meetings since they were resumed this month.

AID TO CAMBODIA

While sustaining a low posture on Vietnam, Peking has reaffirmed its support for Sihanouk's movement with the announcement on 13 January of the signing that day of agreements on the PRC's "gratuitous supply of military equipment and materiel" and "economic aid to Cambodia" for 1973. An agreement had been signed on 11 February 1972 covering "economic aid and military supplies" for 1972, and one on 17 August 1970 dealt with "gratuitous military aid" for 1970, but there was no announcement on an agreement on aid in 1971.

The latest agreement was handled at a lower level than the previous ones. The highest-ranking officials present at the signing ceremony were Premier Penn Nouth and "special envoy" Ieng Sary for the Cambodians and PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. In February 1972, at a time when Peking may have been concerned to emphasize support for Sihanouk on the eve of President Nixon's
visit, the signing of the aid agreement was witnessed by Sihanouk and a high-powered Chinese delegation led by Chou En-lai and Yak Chien-ying. Chou had also attended the 1970 signing ceremony.

In another show of Chinese support for Sihanouk's position, NCNA on the 12th reported a 30 December statement by Sihanouk's minister of information surveying the front's victories in 1972 and reiterating its consistent opposition to a cease-fire and negotiated settlement in Cambodia. However, Peking has continued to avoid directly endorsing the FUNK's rejection of a settlement.

PATHET LAO ANNIVERSARY

Departing from past practice, Peking failed to publicize a greetings message on the NLHS anniversary, though the Pathet Lao news agency on 11 January reported a message from Chou dated the 5th. The message lauded the struggle led by the NLHS against the United States and its "lackeys." Peking's failure to publicize the message may reflect a concern to avoid complicating relations at this time with the Vientiane government, with which it agreed in the past year to exchange ambassadors once again.
ILICHEN RETURNS TO PEKING; MOSCOW SUPPORTS INDIA ON BORDER

Against the background of CPSU chief Brezhnev's gloomy assessment of Sino-Soviet relations in his 21 December speech, TASS reported on 12 January that Soviet border negotiator Ilichew and Ambassador Tolstikov returned to Peking that day after attending the USSR's semicentennial celebrations at which Brezhnev spoke. Brezhnev disclosed that the Soviets had submitted to the Chinese on 15 January 1971 a draft treaty renouncing the use of any type of force. The fact that Ilichew had returned to Peking the day before the treaty was submitted suggests that he transmitted Moscow's proposal. In view of Brezhnev's assertion that Soviet proposals on nonaggression and nonuse of force have been unavailing, the disclosure regarding the draft treaty before an international assemblage of communist leaders seemed designed mainly to put the onus on Peking for the Sino-Soviet stalemate. Peking had exhibited its intransigence on the question of nonuse of force by its vehement attacks on the Soviet proposal submitted at the UNGA session last fall.

Though in keeping with Moscow's current practice Brezhnev did not refer directly to the border talks, his repeated references to the territorial question underscored the intractability of the border issue.* This was also reflected in a review of a 1971 book on Sino-Soviet relations published in the first issue this year of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (signed to press 25 December). The review made several references to the history of the border question, including border incidents from 1960 to the clashes in 1969. In recent weeks Moscow has also called attention to the Sino-Indian border dispute in a manner having implications for the Sino-Soviet conflict. Most notably, an article in the fourth issue of the new Soviet journal PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST (signed to press 21 November) strongly implied Soviet support for India's territorial claims and provided the firmest indication that Moscow had moved from its neutral stance on the Sino-Indian border dispute. The article, by G.V. Matveyev, maintained that in 1958 Peking "laid claim to considerable sectors of Indian

* Brezhnev's remarks on China and other indications of deadlocked positions on the border dispute are discussed in the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, pages 26-28.
territory," and that this culminated "in the invasion of Indian territory by Chinese troops in 1962." In supporting India's position Moscow would in effect be sanctioning the territorial arrangements made by the British Empire in parallel with the Soviet contention that the border agreements concluded between Tsarist Russia and China in the 19th century remain legitimate and binding.

There have been other recent signs of Moscow's use of the Sino-Indian dispute for its anti-Chinese purposes. A commentary broadcast in Mandarin to China on 14 December asserted that the inclusion of "part of India" on a map published in Peking's "Short History of Modern China" reflected the Chinese leaders' "great-power policy," and in early January Soviet media publicized a book by an Indian linking the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian border conflicts. The book was quoted as saying that Peking was raising "territorial claims to its neighbors, including India and the Soviet Union," to divert "the attention of broad segments of China's population from the genuine causes of the country's difficulties." The 2 January TASS account of the book was published the next day in PRAVDA and other Moscow papers.

Apart from the implications for the Sino-Soviet border question, Moscow's moves toward the Indian position may be intended to bolster the Soviet-Indian alliance and to counter any Indian tendency to move back toward a more neutral position among the big powers, including China. As part of its effort to contain Chinese influence, Moscow has sought to gain Indian support for the project of an Asian collective security system proposed by Brezhnev in June 1969 during the period of explosive Sino-Soviet border tension. On 9 January PRAVDA carried a TASS dispatch from Delhi claiming that the establishment of such a system is "being attentively studied and receiving growing support in India" and that the success of talks in Helsinki to convene a European security conference "is undoubtedly spurring peace-loving forces in Asia to take analogous steps," Brezhnev had touched on the subject in his 21 December address, including a disclaimer that the project was "designed to contain or encircle China," which could "become an equal partner of such a system." However, the Soviets have spelled out this proposal as being based on such principles as renunciation of force and the inviolability of borders, thus begging the very questions lying at the heart of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
BACKGROUND  From the initiation of serious military engagements between India and China in 1959 until Peking refused to accept the terms of the Colombo conference proposals in 1963, Moscow took a neutral stance on the Sino-Indian dispute, expressing regret over the conflict, urging settlement through negotiations, and portraying imperialism as the main culprit. In 1963 Moscow began to accuse the Chinese of being responsible for continuing the dispute, though the Soviets largely avoided discussion of the subject in subsequent years. While Moscow avoided a direct endorsement of India's position, both Peking and Delhi said that Soviet Defense Minister Malinovskiy expressed support for India's claims during his Indian counterpart's visit to the USSR in August-September 1964. Also in that period, the 19 September 1964 joint communique on the Indian president's visit to the USSR registered India's approval of Khrushchev's 31 December 1963 proposal on the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes on the basis of "historically determined boundaries." Indian media interpreted the inclusion of this statement in the communique as an implicit endorsement of India's position.

Moscow's circumspect treatment of the issue, however, was reflected in a map published in the 20 September 1967 issue of NEW TIMES. The map, accompanying a series of articles dealing with the provinces of China, was ingeniously designed to evade a show of support for either Indian or Chinese claims: Although the right side of the map depicted all of eastern China (and even included Korea, Taiwan, and part of Japan), the left side omitted the western portions of Sinkiang and Tibet, conveniently excluding the disputed border area in Kashmir. The disputed area in the eastern sector was covered by a corner of the map's legend box. Moscow also evaded the Sino-Indian border question in its polemical attacks on the world atlas published by Peking early last year. Only one monitored commentary alluded to the subject: After saying that Peking had tried to annex a mountain in Nepal, a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on 9 August maintained that "Peking also attempted to occupy the territory of other countries along China's southern border."
PEKING REACTS TO SOVIET CHARGES OF DRUG TRAFFICKING

Moscow's persistent needling of the Chinese on the score of alleged drug trafficking elicited an angry response from Peking that shows sensitivity to charges that the Chinese are engaging in the narcotics trade to earn American dollars. For several months Soviet media have given extensive currency to reports alleging Chinese drug trafficking, and a 27 December TASS account included a charge that the PRC earns at least 12-15 billion dollars a year from its opium trade abroad. This prompted a rejoinder on 7 January by NCNA, which sarcastically noted that the figure cited by TASS represented a marked increase in the amount allegedly earned in the Chinese drug trade according to reports earlier disseminated by the Soviets. NCNA interpreted these inconsistencies not only as exposing Moscow's rumormongering but also as showing that "the Soviet revisionist clique, now running hither and thither and begging everywhere in order to 'grab U.S. dollars,' is really infatuated with the U.S. dollar."

According to NCNA, the "wicked aim of Soviet revisionist social imperialism in these low-down acts" is to "impair China's international prestige and disrupt the daily growing friendship between the Chinese people and the people of various countries." Though NCNA dismissed the TASS account's reference to Chinese shipments of "a huge amount of opium" to the United States, the charge that China was selling opium cheaply to U.S. servicemen in Vietnam was ignored. Notably, NCNA quoted the U.S. special coordinator for narcotics, Nelson Gross, as saying in March 1972 that there was no evidence of any drug trafficking from China into any other area.

Moscow returned to the attack in a particularly explicit talk carried by Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin the day after NCNA's rejoinder. The broadcast accused the PRC Government of maintaining exclusive control over poppy cultivation, running scientific research institutes engaged in studies to increase opium production, and shipping narcotics abroad through a state trade agency. A similar point was made by TASS commentator Kornilov on 13 January reacting to the NCNA article. Kornilov noted that the appearance of the NCNA article coincided with the arrival of a Norwegian journal containing an article asserting that more than 70 factories in China are engaged in processing poppy for opium.
CHINA - U.S. - EUROPE

PEKING IMPLIES SUPPORT FOR U.S. PRESENCE IN EUROPE

Reflecting its more relaxed stance toward U.S. military policy since President Nixon's visit to China and its increasingly evident concern to encourage a continued strong American military presence in Europe to counterbalance Soviet power, Peking reacted to Secretary Laird's annual defense report to Congress with a low-level NCNA account on 11 January—carried only in the agency's domestic service—that ignored U.S. policy in Asia while highlighting the Secretary's call for a strong U.S. defense posture together with enhanced West European military capabilities. While observing that the United States "will continue its arms race with another superpower," NCNA avoided the sharply critical comment that marked Peking's reaction to last year's defense report. On 18 February last year, just prior to the President's China trip, NCNA's international service issued a lengthy commentary discussing the Laird report along with the President's annual foreign policy report and charging that the "enormous program for arms expansion and war preparations" in the defense report revealed Washington's policy of "global aggression and power politics backed by strength."

Last year's commentary had placed heaviest stress on U.S. military strategy along China's periphery in Asia, noting that the Laird report's statements concerning the use of indigenous Asian forces and the encouragement of the modernization of Japanese military forces could not but arouse the Chinese to "high vigilance and firm opposition." As in the 1972 commentary, Peking this year briefly noted recent Soviet-U.S. agreements, including the SALT and Berlin accords and movement toward a European security conference and talks on balanced force reduction, but last year's charges of Soviet-U.S. "collusion," were notably absent. Peking also muted last year's stress on U.S. difficulties with major European allies while citing the Secretary's appeal for the West Europeans to make a greater contribution to allied strength.

U.S. ROLE IN EUROPE

In keeping with Peking's line that recent trends toward Soviet-U.S. and European detente are deceptive and mask Moscow's expansionist urges, NCNA quoted Secretary Laird's admonition against lowering the West's guard and his observation that profound differences still exist between the two blocs. NCNA also cited his reference to Soviet

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Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060003-6
naval expansion, and it took care to quote his remarks on the complexity of the question of balanced force reduction in Europe. In discussing the appeal for the West European countries to assume a greater defense role, NCNA cited the Laird report as stressing that the United States will continue to shoulder the major responsibility for the allied nuclear deterrent and will continue massive contributions to the alliance's conventional military forces. The NCNA account concluded by noting, with implicit satisfaction, that Defense Secretary-designate Richardson voiced similar views in testimony to a Senate committee on 9 January.

Peking's treatment of the Laird report comports with other recent signs pointing to a concern to encourage a continuing American presence in Europe as a counterweight to the Soviets. Previously, Peking's line had stressed the need for European unity and independence vis-a-vis the two superpowers, but this approach has now been offset in some measure by Peking's overriding interest in promoting countervailing forces against the Soviets above all. NCNA's 16 December report on the first session of the preparatory talks on European security pointed up Romania's assertion of independence in demanding an equal voice for all states despite their alliance affiliations, and similarly noted West European objections to the Brezhnev doctrine; however, NCNA softened criticism of American dominance in West Europe while taking note of the U.S. representative's assertion that Europe's security is indivisible from the United States. Earlier, an 11 December NCNA account of the NATO ministerial meeting gave top billing to U.S. statements at the session, including a letter from President Nixon pointing to a need for continued NATO military preparedness despite prospects for detente and pledging that the United States will maintain its forces in Europe. NCNA also quoted Secretary Rogers to the effect that NATO must remain wary of any attempt by Moscow to use the European security conference to confirm its hegemony in Eastern Europe. An NCNA dispatch datelined Bonn on 10 January, reporting the NATO military maneuvers that began the day before, pointedly quoted a commentary in a West German paper as saying that the presence of American troops in Europe is important for the FRG.

Peking's approach has also been reflected in its coverage of Common Market developments. In keeping with a shift from the former portrayal of the Common Market as an instrument for asserting West European independence of American control, Peking has begun favoring British spokesman rather than the French in
conveying Chinese attitudes toward West European developments. Where the French had long voiced views that served Peking's interest in fostering independence of the superpowers, the British are now being cited as favoring continued close ties with the United States. Thus, Xinhua's 4 January account of Prime Minister Heath's remarks on Britain's accession to the Common Market quoted him as saying that Europe should seek to be a "valid partner" of the United States while striving to develop its own strength.
EUROPEAN SECURITY

WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET; NO COMMUNIQUE ISSUED

Soviet and East European media have carried a brief report on the 15-16 January conference of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers but have, at this writing, failed to publicize a substantive communiqué on the talks, suggesting the possibility of continued disagreement on participation in the force reduction talks still tentatively scheduled for 31 January in Geneva. The report on the 16th stated carefully that the conference discussed questions relating to security in Europe and to "steps which are the subject of an exchange of views between the interested states." GDR Foreign Minister Winzer, in an interview over the East Berlin radio, may have sought to offset the impact of this cryptic language when he reported that the foreign ministers had two days of "very intensive consultations" marked by "the absolute unanimity with which all the foreign ministers discussed European security problems."

Moscow radio reported that Brezhnev received the foreign ministers on the 16th and had "a warm and friendly talk" with them on problems of developing cooperation on international issues, including "the consolidation of peace and security in Europe."

The failure of the foreign ministers to publish a communiqué on the conference may reflect the continued impasse over which states are to participate in the force reduction talks.* As if to highlight Romania's maverick position, AGERPRES summarized an article published in the Romanian party organ SCINTEIA on the 16th by the authoritative foreign affairs commentator Caplescu reiterating Bucharest's insistence on the participation of "all states" in any discussion of arms reduction or other disarmament measures in Europe. On the other hand, TASS carried a commentary on the 15th, the first day of the resumption of the ambassadorial multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki, which again took the task "certain persons" at the Helsinki talks for proposing the

* Moscow media have publicized none of the substance of Brezhnev's impromptu remarks to the foreign press at Minsk airport on the 11th before French President Pompidou's arrival. He is reported to have said, among other things, that consultations on "questions of procedure" will start at the end of January and that "the actual question of the reduction of forces and arms will not arise in concrete terms until somewhat later, after the European conference." Continuing in a jocular vein, Brezhnev said it would be "a good thing" if arms were reduced a little in Europe and added that even if this is "only a little" bit successful, then "we can go further."
inclusion of "military security measures" on the conference's agenda and which routinely criticized attempts to link force reductions in Europe with the European conference. While this attack was clearly directed at the West, it may also have been aimed at Romania.
GERMANY

MOSCOW NOTES "SPECIAL" RULES GOVERNING BERLIN AIR ROUTES

Broaching a rarely discussed subject, an 11 January commentary broadcast by Moscow's purportedly unofficial Radio Peace and Progress expounded for German audiences on the "special" nature of the air corridors linking Berlin with the Federal Republic. East German media have been totally ignoring the question of Big Four responsibility for the air routes—a sensitive issue for both Moscow and East Berlin as the GDR moves toward full international recognition following the signing of the Basic Treaty between the two Germanys on 21 December. Avoiding the areas where GDR sovereignty remains restricted under the four powers' residual rights, GDR comment on the treaty has sought to portray East Germany as a fully independent and sovereign state and to counter Bonn's view that it holds a "special relationship" with West Germany which the Basic Treaty leaves unaltered. The Soviet commentary of the 11th, while directing its criticism at the FRG and the West Berlin Senat, may well have been intended for audiences in both German states.

The Peace and Progress broadcast took the Senat to task for requesting that the FRG Government deny landing rights to Bulgarian aircraft in 1973 if Sofia does not open its airports to British and American charter planes coming from West Berlin via the Berlin air corridors.* Alluding to four-power agreements governing the air corridors, the broadcast pointed out that the air routes "are governed by special rules and regulations based on the relevant quadripartite agreement; these are no normal air routes." It said that the Senat, in demanding that the air corridors be used for "commercial transport of tourists" to Bulgaria, was "forgetting the limits of realism and of existing possibilities," and it described the Senat's demand on the Bonn government as "absurd."

* At the present time, many West Berliners who vacation in Bulgaria depart from East Berlin's Schoenefeld Airport. On the 16th the Federal government stated publicly, according to DPA, that it would not deny landing rights to Bulgarian aircraft and pointed out at the same time that it would work toward including West Berlin in international air traffic, in consultation with the Big Three and the GDR.
In effect reaffirming Big Four responsibility for the air corridors, the radio asserted that the FRG and the Senat "have no say whatever over the regulations and use of the air routes" and noted that the quadripartite agreement on Berlin stipulated that no party could change the situation "in and around West Berlin" unilaterally. The commentary did not address itself to the role of the GDR in this issue except to remind the West Berlin Senat, "which is situated in the middle of the GDR," that it must observe "legal and political realities" which include the GDR's "sovereignty."

The subject of residual rights of the Big Four as World War II victor states had been all but ignored in Soviet as well as East Berlin media as Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik was being brought to fruition. While both publicly reported that the November Quadripartite Declaration on Germany said the Big Four rights and responsibilities remain in effect and are not altered by the Basic Treaty, they have since disregarded this point and concentrated on the second issue outlined in the Declaration—that of Big Four support for the application of the two Germanys for membership in the United Nations.
SECOND NEW FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER TO BREZHNEV IDENTIFIED

PRAVDA on 12 January identified deputy head of the Central Committee’s bloc relations section A. I. Blatov as an assistant to General Secretary Brezhnev. Blatov is the second new foreign affairs assistant to Brezhnev appointed in recent months; Blatov's boss, former bloc relations section head K. V. Rusakov, transferred to Brezhnev's staff in mid 1972. The enlargement of Brezhnev's foreign affairs staff may reflect his growing preoccupation with international affairs. Brezhnev's two new advisers, unlike his other assistants A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, V. A. Golikov, and G. E. Tsukanov, have no long career ties with him.

Blatov, a longtime specialist in German affairs, was transferred from the foreign ministry to deputy head of the bloc relations section in mid-1968, shortly after Rusakov's promotion to head of the section. Blatov's appointment as Brezhnev's assistant may have been made at about the same time as Rusakov's. Rusakov was last identified as section head on 18 March 1972 and first identified as assistant to Brezhnev on 7 June. Blatov's last identification as section deputy head was on 11 April; he was identified as a "responsible official" of the Central Committee rather than as a deputy section head when he attended the 31 July Crimea conference of Soviet bloc leaders along with Rusakov.

Blatov's identification as Brezhnev's assistant occurred in connection with Brezhnev's 11 January Minsk meeting with French President Pompidou. Brezhnev's third foreign affairs assistant, A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, was also reported present.