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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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24 JAN 1973

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
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# **TRENDS**

## **in Communist Propaganda**

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


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24 JANUARY 1973  
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 4)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 15 - 21 JANUARY 1973

<u>Moscow (2757 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1107 items)</u>		
Luna 21 Moon Landing	(2%)	10%	Domestic Issues	(44%)	53%
Vietnam	(10%)	7%	Indochina	(13%)	11%
Brezhnev/Pompidou	(12%)	6%	[Vietnam	(6%)	8%]
Talks in Minsk			Zaire President	(8%)	8%
Soviet Note on	(--)	6%	Mobutu in PRC		
Reduction of Forces			Japanese Trade	(--)	4%
in Europe					
China	(6%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Hanoi maintained cautious restraint regarding the peace settlement in the period prior to the simultaneous U.S.-DRV announcement that an agreement had been initialed on 23 January and would be signed in Paris on 27 January. While the announcement that Kissinger and Le Duc Tho would resume talks on 23 January "to complete the text of the agreement" was carried by VNA and Hanoi radio in their English-language transmissions, it is not known to have been broadcast to Vietnamese audiences. Hanoi's careful avoidance of any reference to the private talks was also apparent in a NHAN DAN editorial on the 22d which repeated Hanoi's stereotyped call for the United States to sign at once the accord it had agreed to in October and complained that "President Nixon in his inaugural address put forth nothing definite about restoring peace in Vietnam."

Elements of the peace accord, including issues reportedly in dispute between Washington and Hanoi, were reviewed by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat in his report to a regular PRG Council of Ministers session, publicized on the 18th. The session, held from 8 to 10 January, followed the pattern of meetings for the past three years in reviewing the situation in the South and setting forth tasks. But in apparent anticipation of the peace agreement and of a shift to a political struggle, the conference for the first time defined the main task as expanding the "united front." Moreover, concern that policy guidance be disseminated widely in this critical transition period seemed reflected in the media's release for the first time of major reports delivered at the meeting.

Moscow carried prompt reports on the announcement of the initialing of the peace accord and on President Nixon's address. The first official Soviet reaction came from Kirilenko in a 24 January speech in which he expressed "hope that we are now on the threshold" of the end of the war and praised the agreement as a victory for the Vietnamese people and for the "solidarity of the fraternal socialist countries."

Having abstained from comment while calling attention to signs of movement toward a settlement, Peking promptly replayed the DRV's announcement of the agreement. PRC media have not mentioned a brief foreign ministry statement welcoming the agreement, as reported by REUTER.

## HANOI, FRONT MEDIA PUBLICIZE VIETNAM PEACE ACCORD

In tandem with the United States, Hanoi at 0300 GMT on 24 January transmitted a DRV Foreign Ministry communique containing the joint

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U.S.-DRV announcement of the conclusion of the Vietnam accord and began to publicize the text of the agreement at 1500 GMT. The only followup comment from the DRV at this writing has come from DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, at a gathering held on the 24th to mark Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's departure for Paris to sign the accord. In his remarks, carried by Hanoi radio at 1120 GMT, Dong portrayed the agreement as a "great victory" and "great success" and indicated that the Vietnamese people will "continue to step up their struggle" for their "great revolutionary cause" while implementing the accord and urging others to do likewise. The send-off ceremony was attended by First Secretary Le Duan and all the other North Vietnamese party Politburo members known to be in Hanoi. Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, who was not present, has not appeared in public since 29 December, when he was in Moscow as part of a Vietnamese delegation attending USSR anniversary celebrations.

Liberation Radio carried the DRV Foreign Ministry communique announcing the conclusion of the accord at 0400 GMT, an hour after Hanoi released it. A little more than an hour later, the Front radio carried a PRG Foreign Ministry communique repeating the details of the DRV communique and pledging that the PRG will "seriously implement" the accord. The PRG Foreign Ministry communique was repeated in all subsequent Liberation Radio programs on the 24th. The Front radio joined Hanoi in broadcasting the text of the agreement at 1500 GMT.

Front media have not yet broadcast a 24 January statement by the PRG delegation to the Paris conference, transmitted by VNA's Paris office to the VNA office in Hanoi at 1113 GMT. The statement went further than the terse PRG Foreign Ministry communique when it briefly summarized the agreement, among other things stating that it recognizes the existence in South Vietnam of "two administrations, two armies, two zones of control, and three political forces." The statement evaluated the accord as "a great victory for the Vietnamese people, the American people, and the peace-and-justice-loving forces in the world."

#### MOSCOW REPORTS AGREEMENT, EXPRESSES CAUTIOUS HOPES

Moscow carried prompt reports of the announcements by the DRV Foreign Ministry and by President Nixon of the peace agreement initialed in Paris. A TASS report of the President's speech

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singled out without comment his statement that the United States will continue to recognize the Saigon regime as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam. As would be expected, the report did not acknowledge his remarks directed at the USSR and China, urging restraint in order that the peace can be kept. Moscow also reported the departure of DRV Foreign Minister Trinh for Paris to sign the agreement. Soviet reports of the statements by Pham Van Dong and the PRG delegation in Paris emphasized their assertions that the initialing of the agreement is a victory for the Vietnamese people and for the "solidarity of the fraternal socialist and other countries" and that it has the consent of the PRG.

The first official Soviet comment came in a speech by Kirilenko at a 24 January congress of scientific and technical workers. Calling the initialing of the agreement an "important milestone," he observed cautiously that there are now "grounds for hope that we are now on the threshold of the liquidation" of the war. Like Pham Van Dong, he assessed the agreement as a victory for the Vietnamese people and for the "militant solidarity of the fraternal socialist countries rendering all-round assistance and support to the Vietnamese people," as well as for the forces of peace.

Prior to the announcement of the initialing, Moscow had carried typically brief reports of the developments in Paris, including Kissinger's arrival, talks with Le Duc Tho, and return to the United States. Restraint and caution had marked Moscow's limited comment, typified by a 22 January domestic service commentary which said the talks were regarded as "significant" by "international public opinion," coming as they did after "considerable progress" at previous meetings. Adding that "political observers abroad" noted that the new round of talks had come only after the December mass bombings "failed," the commentator said the observers also pointed out that the war--and Vietnamese "vigilance"--were continuing. Other commentaries noted that world reaction to the bombing halt had been "mixed" and "restrained" because the war was continuing and the United States had in the past halted and then resumed the bombing.

Moscow media duly reported President Nixon's assessment, in his inaugural address, that the war was "drawing to an end," but a Moscow domestic service report said that this statement was received with "reserve" by Americans who had heard such assertions too often in the past. TASS noted that antiwar demonstrations took place throughout the United States on inauguration day and

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that nearly 160 congressmen boycotted the ceremony to protest the delay in reaching a peace settlement.

SOVIET Moscow publicized its support of the Vietnamese  
SUPPORT with brief reports that Katushev received the DRV  
ambassador on 18 January for talks on "further  
development of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation" in a "cordial,  
comradely atmosphere." No further details were given, but Vice  
Premier Novikov--who customarily handles Soviet aid to the DRV--  
received DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who stopped in Moscow  
on his way home for his annual tour of East Europe to sign aid  
agreements. Le Thanh Nghi and Novikov had signed the Soviet-DRV  
aid agreement on 9 December. Le Thanh Nghi arrived in Moscow  
on 20 January and saw Novikov on the 22d for a talk in an  
atmosphere TASS characterized as "friendly." Nghi left Moscow  
the same day for North Korea.

TASS briefly reported Mme. Binh's 20-21 January stopover in  
Moscow on her way back to Paris but did not indicate that she  
conferred with any Soviet leaders. Last month, when she was  
attending the USSR anniversary celebrations before proceeding  
to Hanoi, she was received (on 26 December) by Gromyko for a  
discussion of the Vietnamese struggle on "the military, political,  
and diplomatic fronts" in an atmosphere of "friendship and  
cordiality."

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## PRG COUNCIL SETS TASKS, HEARS MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC REPORTS

Judging by the communique of the 8-10 January PRG Council of Ministers meeting, broadcast on the 17th, the session followed the pattern of similar Council meetings at the beginning of each year, reviewing the situation in the South and setting forth guidelines and tasks for the future. Since the founding of the provisional government in June 1969, its Council of Ministers has met every year in January or February and in 1972 a meeting was also held in June.\*

In addition to broadcasting the communique of the 8-10 January meeting, Liberation Radio departed from past practice by releasing the major reports to the Council by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, and Le Chanh, a representative of the PLAF Command and the PRG Defense Ministry. The PRG has not publicized speeches made at any previous Council meetings; it seems likely that they were released this time in anticipation of a peace accord and a shift to a political struggle. The speeches are probably intended to supply policy guidance during the critical transition period. An 18 January Hanoi broadcast indicated that other reports were also presented at the meeting, including a "diplomatic report" delivered by Tran Buu Kiem, minister attached to the office of the PRG president.

EXPANSION OF  
UNITED FRONT

In a departure from the pattern of the two most recent PRG Council of Ministers communiques, which stressed strengthening the revolutionary administration, this one stated that "the most important and basic task is to further strengthen and enlarge the national united front." It said that diverse elements must be gathered together to "oppose the U.S. aggressors and the stubborn, bellicose Nguyen Van Thieu lackey clique." And it went on to note that the Council had agreed that "the national concord policy is the most appropriate policy in line with the realities of the present situation in South Vietnam and with the requirements for our national salvation and building."

Groundwork for elevating the expansion of the united front to the status of the major task had been laid in the past six months.

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\* Previous Council of Ministers meetings are discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 14 June 1972, 2 February 1972, 24 February 1971, and 4 February 1970.

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Thus, the communique of the June 1972 session, while giving primary stress to strengthening the revolutionary administration, also noted that the session had "paid special attention" to "promulgated policies aimed at expanding the anti-U.S. national salvation unity front." More recently, a communique issued by a joint conference of the NFLSV and Vietnam Alliance on 1-2 November 1972--five days after Hanoi released the draft peace accord--declared that the two groups considered national reconciliation and concord to be their "foremost, fundamental, and long-term policy."\* The current PRG communique, after lauding a policy of national concord, endorsed "the basic present and future policy" set forth at the November Front/Alliance meeting.

Huynh Tan Phat's report to the Council of Ministers meeting, broadcast in installments beginning on 18 January, included the injunction contained in the communique that the most important and fundamental task at present is to broaden the national united front. Phat scolded the allies for attempting to divide the people and set Vietnamese against Vietnamese, and he repeated the contention that "except for a handful of uprooted people who have deliberately served as lackeys for the enemy," the overwhelming majority of the people are unanimous in their "hatred for the enemy." He voiced an emotional appeal to "unite and love one another" and eliminate antagonisms so as to reunite families and bring harmony and happiness to all hamlets. Phat urged that those who have gone astray be persuaded to return and that the people unite to fight and drive out the "U.S. aggressors and their lackeys," heal the wounds of war, rebuild the country, and "restore to everyone a meaningful and beautiful life."

Speaking of people who had "served the enemy," Phat maintained that the PRG "advocates unity and collaboration with all those who want to return to the nation and contribute in the glorious national salvation undertaking, except for a number of henchmen who deliberately oppose the revolution and follow the enemy to the end to kill the people." Phat's statement of policy on this question is consistent with past communist pronouncements, most notably a 10-point policy toward members of the ARVN and their

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\* The NFLSV/Alliance meeting is discussed in the 8 November 1972 FBIS TRENDS, pages 5-6.

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families adopted at the January 1972 Council of Ministers meeting which seemed aimed at bringing about affiliation with the PRG of the widest possible range of people in South Vietnam.\*

Phat related the PRG's concern for unity to the proposed provisions of the peace accord: The PRG, he said, is convinced that with the implementation of the principles in the October agreement "there will be sufficient favorable conditions for eliminating hatred, achieving unity, healing the war wounds, and leading South Vietnam to a stable, lasting era." Here he echoed the 28 October PRG statement endorsing the 26 October DRV Government statement in which the substance of the peace accord had been revealed. Phat pointedly recalled that the PRG had advocated formation of a coalition government and "firmly continues to demand" the establishment of a three-segment Council of National Reconciliation and Concord.

**OTHER TASKS** The Council of Ministers communique, in addition to stressing the united front effort, outlined other "guidelines and tasks" for the coming days, including a call for the offensive and uprising to be stepped up so as to "completely defeat" Vietnamization. It also urged that any new allied schemes be shattered and that the United States be "forced" to sign "the agreement already approved." In addition, the communique called for building and developing political and armed forces and consolidating the liberated areas and revolutionary administration, "insuring that we defeat the enemy under any circumstances and advance toward total victory."

Phat's report provided a more detailed list of "immediate tasks" in which he called for stepped-up military and political activities, for strengthened unity and insistence that the United States sign the already reached accord, for development of the political and military forces, for the immediate construction and consolidation of revolutionary administrations, and for efforts to win foreign backing. In the course of his discussion, Phat noted that "the problem of administration is a fundamental problem of all revolutions." He cited specific problems faced by local administrations including the need to "eliminate [quets sachj] spies and lackeys left by the enemy." . . . .

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\* The 10-point policy and earlier policy statements are discussed in the TRENDS of 2 February 1972, pages 21-23.

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ISSUE OF SETTLEMENT Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh, in her report to the Council of Ministers meeting, claimed that the PRG's serious attitude and good will had been reflected last year in its initiatives for a settlement, including the 11 September PRG statement which, she said, "contributed to leading the U.S. and DRV governments" to achievement of the October accord. She scored the United States for "refusing to sign the agreement as reached" and for asking for modifications in its content, but she did not discuss the substance of the accord.

By contrast, Huynh Tan Phat's report to the Council meeting summarized the accord in terms similar to those used by Nguyen Huu Tho in his speech on the 19 December NFLSV anniversary. Among other things, he stated that the United States had agreed to "recognize the reality that there are in South Vietnam two administrations, two armies, and three political forces" and that a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord would be set up "at various levels" composed of the three segments. Other Hanoi and Front comment in December contained such a reference to the formation of councils at various levels, departing from the language of the accord which specified that "the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels."

MILITARY SITUATION Liberation Radio's account of the report by Le Chan, broadcast on 21 January, did not indicate what position he holds, merely identifying him as a "representative of the PLAF Command." The 18 January Hanoi Radio report on the meeting said he also represented the Defense Ministry. The usual spokesman on military affairs would be PRG Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung, who delivered, for example, the military report at the November 1972 NFLSV/Alliance conference.

Le Chan reviewed the fighting since the start of the communist offensive late last March and maintained: "After one year of fierce test of strength and hard, tenacious, and valiant struggle, our southern compatriots and PLAF won strategically significant victories in every respect, changing the balance of forces and the war situation and revealing that our military line is correct and creative and our military art is skillful." Discussing the military science revealed by the offensive, Le Chan lauded the coordination of attacks in different areas of the South, the launching of "complicated joint operations," the successful centralization of leadership, and the close coordination among the armed services and of the military,

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political, and proselyting activities. Like other communist analyses of the offensive last year, his report claimed that the communist attacks succeeded in limiting the response of the allies aircraft and artillery and in causing Saigon to move its main forces around haphazardly. Le Chan also noted that the allies were surprised by the communists' ability to fight in any region in both the dry and rainy seasons.

Reviewing the factors responsible for "victories" in 1972, Le Chan included a gratuitous allusion to North Vietnam's troops in the South. He said the victories resulted in part from "the considerable contributions in manpower and materiel, from kith-and-kin love, from the noble sacrifices, and from the wonderful fighting coordination of the valiant northern fighters and compatriots."

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**HANOI IN WAKE OF BOMBING HALT CITES HEROISM, VIGILANCE**

With the cessation of U.S. bombing of the North, Hanoi has confined its comment on that subject to praise of heroic actions of various units, combined with affirmations of their determination to maintain "revolutionary vigilance." A 17 January order by President Ton Duc Thang awarding medals to 140 localities and units for their actions in opposing the "U.S. aggressors" since last April drew editorial praise the following day from both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The party paper set forth the future tasks of such units and localities in general terms typical of comment on the subject. It said the Vietnamese people are determined

to constantly heighten their vigilance and combat readiness, to step up all activities, to quickly overcome the consequences caused by the enemy, to care for and stabilize the livelihood of the victim compatriots, to firmly maintain and develop production, to strengthen the economic and national defense potentials, and to worthily fulfill the obligations of the great rear base toward the great frontline.

The bombing halt itself was discussed directly in a 19 January LPA commentary which described Press Secretary Ziegler's announcement of the halt as mere "drumbeating about the U.S. good will" on the part of the Nixon Administration, carried out in order "to placate public opinion." It claimed that "everybody knows that the United States has many a time declared total or partial cessation of the bombing and shelling of North Vietnam, but later resumed it with even greater violence." It went on to demand that the United States end its involvement in the South and sign the peace agreement.

Other criticism of the Nixon Administration was confined to reports of such criticism as that by various peace delegations visiting Hanoi. Premier Pham Van Dong's remarks to three of these groups, as reported by VNA on 19 and 20 January, merely expressed thanks for their support and that of "peace forces throughout the world." Hanoi radio on the 19th quoted Western sources on criticism of the December bombing by former CIA Director Richard Helms and Ohio Senator William Saxbe. Reportage of U.S. and foreign demonstrations on Inauguration Day focused on the demonstrators' demands that the President sign the peace agreement immediately and withdraw U.S. forces from Vietnam. The harshest language appeared in a Vietnamese-language item of the 21st which described the burning of the President in effigy at rallies in several European countries and referred to shouts "opposing the Americans and cursing the new Hitler."

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## DISARMAMENT

## MOSCOW CLARIFIES STAND ON TEST BAN, LATIN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

An article by A. Alekseyev in the year's first issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, explaining the Soviet votes on disarmament issues at the UN General Assembly session last fall, expressed in unequivocal terms the position that all states possessing nuclear weapons must adhere to any future comprehensive test ban agreement--a question on which prior Soviet statements had hedged. Alekseyev's formulation may reflect increased Soviet concern over the Chinese nuclear capability.

The article also justified Moscow's opposition to a Latin American nuclear-free zone as defined in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in effect responding to Chinese efforts to denigrate the Soviet position in the eyes of the Third World. Alekseyev's comments on the question of a world disarmament conference (WDC), following the UNGA's establishment of a committee to study various countries' views on the subject, aimed some explicit jabs at Peking and served to underscore the propagandistic motivations of the USSR's WDC proposal.

**TEST BAN TREATY** Alekseyev's article, defending the USSR's abstention in the UNGA on a resolution calling for unilateral cessation of underground testing by 5 August 1973, stated that Moscow now considers a comprehensive test ban possible "only on the basis of an international agreement to which all nuclear powers are party." Previous Soviet comment had left open the possibility of some form of agreement without China and France.

Alekseyev's newly categorical statement, taken together with his own and other recent Soviet press comment on the chemical weapons (CW) issue, suggests that the Soviet Union hopes to deemphasize discussion of restrictions on weapons testing at the forthcoming session of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) opening 20 February and to focus on CW. The latter objective had already been anticipated by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Shevel in an UNGA speech last fall, reported in the 2 October PRAVDA UKRAINY, when he said chemical weapons should be the subject of the "next" agreement at Geneva.

While repeating Soviet assertions that seismic technology had progressed to a point where "national means" were sufficient to monitor a comprehensive test ban and that only a "political decision" was needed to reach an agreement, Alekseyev said Moscow

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had offered at the last UNGA session to broaden international cooperation in the exchange of seismic data within the framework of a comprehensive test ban treaty as "an important supplement" to verification by national means. Although they have not recently broached the issue in public, Soviet spokesmen in the past have indicated that such exchanges could take place only on a strictly voluntary basis. Alekseyev's remarks appear to indicate some flexibility on the issue.\*

Alekseyev reaffirmed Moscow's recent positions in the CW discussions at Geneva, noting that the main points of disagreement continue to concern the scope of a CW agreement and procedures for monitoring it. Recent articles in PRAVDA and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA have reported on continuing CW research and development activities in the United States and have cited the British magazine NEW SCIENTIST in asserting that the "volume" of U.S. research on CW has almost doubled in the last three years. Neither article mentioned the CCD, although both criticized continued U.S. delay in ratifying the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

LATIN AMERICAN ZONE      The Soviet Union abstained in the UNGA last fall on a resolution which called on France and the USSR to adhere to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. TASS and central press dispatches on the progress of the 27th UNGA session did not report the debate, nor was it mentioned in post-session wrapups. Responding to Peking's attempts--through NCNA reportage--to make propaganda capital of the Soviet position, a Radio Peace and Progress commentary on 24 November had justified that position by noting that the treaty did not restrict U.S. nuclear weapons at bases or on ships in the area and asserted that Moscow would recognize Latin America as a nuclear-free zone when all nuclear powers agreed to do so. The NCNA reports had focused on Moscow's objections to the treaty provision on zone of applicability which allowed Latin American nations to define their territorial waters unilaterally.

Moscow has been reticent on this issue in the past, but Alekseyev cited the full argument which had been put forth by Soviet delegate Roshchin in the First Committee debates, including the

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\* Moscow media have reported that the joint U.S.-Soviet agreement on environmental cooperation includes provisions for the study of earthquake prediction, but they have not reported that the two countries will set up seismic detection facilities on each other's territory, as reported in the West.

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complaint that "the designation of the area of the zone in the treaty was made in violation of existing generally recognized norms of international law, and in particular of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Open Sea." Roshchin had been slightly more explicit, asserting that a state has no right to establish, without the consent of other interested states, a particular regime on the high seas at its own discretion.

Peking's comment on the UN debate had sought to play on Moscow's vulnerability on the Latin American zone, and specifically the territorial waters issue, in the eyes of the Third World. Peking cited Moscow's position on the Mexican-sponsored resolution as well as its abstention on the other Third World disarmament initiative--Sri Lanka's resolution on establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean area. In both cases, Peking contended, Moscow had exposed its posture on authentic disarmament measures as opposed to those emerging from the CCD discussions, which had only served to maintain the nuclear monopoly of the "superpowers."

**DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE** Moscow and Peking have recently traded charges over last fall's UNGA action on a world disarmament conference. T. Kolesnichenko in the 9 January PRAVDA attacked the Chinese for declining the seat reserved for them in the study committee on WDC called for by the UNGA resolution and subsequently named by the Assembly President, Poland's Trepczynski, and accused them of "backstage intrigues" aimed at wrecking preparations for the conference. Peking in turn, in a statement by its permanent representative Huang Hua reported by NCNA on 12 January, accused Trepczynski of "catering" to Moscow by naming a committee that violated the sense of the UNGA resolution, by failing to consult with regional groups, by reserving places for the four nuclear-weapon states other than the Soviet Union, and by basing the membership on that of the CCD--a forum Peking has long rejected. With respect to the position of other states, Moscow has mentioned only that the majority favor a speedy convocation of the study committee.

Further underscoring the propaganda nature of the Soviet Union's WDC initiative, Alekseyev's MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN article focused on U.S. and PRC opposition to the Soviet-proposed WDC and noted that "Third World countries regard a world conference as a rostrum for bringing pressure to bear on the enemies of disarmament for the purpose of spurring all the major states, and primarily the United States, to initiate substantive measures to limit the race in both conventional and nuclear arms." Alekseyev reaffirmed that Moscow did not envisage a conference that would detract in any way from the Geneva CCD forum.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA - FRG

## FOREIGN MINISTER CHNOUPEK WELCOMES BRANDT STATEMENT ON MUNICH

Prague's efforts to maintain a position of flexibility on the issue of the invalidity of the Munich pact and revive the stalled talks with the FRG were reflected in its positive reaction to Chancellor Brandt's 18 January statement welcoming an early FRG-CSSR agreement "so that the Munich agreement will no longer impede relations between the two states."

The prompt response by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chnoupek, in an interview with CTK the next day, did not include Prague's once-standard condition that the FRG acknowledge the Munich pact as invalid "from the beginning"--a condition involving the invalidation of all legal acts concluded by residents of the German-occupied regions of Czechoslovakia after the 1938 Munich agreement. Chnoupek noted Chancellor Brandt's statement "with interest" and reiterated Prague's long-standing desire for "normalization" of relations with the FRG, which he said would include "the formulation of the nullity of the so-called Munich agreement that would be acceptable to both sides." Chnoupek hopefully observed that "now, after the statement of the Herr Bundeskanzler, the pause for reflection ends and a period begins in which the FRG Government will take concrete initiative steps." Chnoupek's reference to a "pause for reflection" was in rebuttal to a statement by the FRG side, after the June bargaining session in Prague, that the talks had reached an impasse requiring a "pause for reflection" by both sides.

TASS on the 20th reported Chnoupek's interview, including his remarks on Prague's readiness to resume negotiations, on the Munich pact, and his hope that the FRG would take concrete steps to nullify Munich. However, the TASS report made no reference to the policy statement by Chancellor Brandt which had evoked Chnoupek's response. On the 18th, TASS had reported details of Chancellor Brandt's policy statement, including his expression of hope that the Munich agreement would cease to complicate relations between the FRG and CSSR.

**BACKGROUND** Since the windup of the bilateral talks last June, statements in Prague and other Soviet bloc media have displayed inconsistency and a measure of flexibility on the Munich pact issue. While some statements still insist that the FRG declare the pact invalid ab initio, others have skirted the

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issue. Brezhnev, in his major speech on 21 December at the Kremlin observance of the USSR's 50th anniversary, simply cited "the invalidation of the Munich diktat" in noting that "to be sure, some problems in Europe still need to be solved." Husak and Honecker, the two most directly concerned foreign party leaders at the Moscow anniversary celebration, ignored the Munich pact issue entirely in their speeches.

Czechoslovak statements in November and December were already reflecting apparent pressures from Moscow for greater flexibility. The "ab initio" stipulation sometimes appeared but at least as often was dropped. There were still some high-level reiterations of the original position: Chnoupek declared in an article in the 12 December Bratislava PRAVDA that relations with the FRG must be normalized "understandably on the basis of recognition of the invalidity from the outset" of the Munich pact by Bonn. And CPCZ Presidium member and Secretary Bilak declared on the same day that no Czechoslovak government could "ever recognize a temporary validity of the Munich diktat." But the 30 December RUDE PRAVO, reporting a Honecker speech the preceding day, omitted a statement of support for the view that the Munich pact "must be liquidated as invalid from the beginning."

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## CUBA-CHILE

## HAVANA MEDIA PLAY DOWN REPORTING ON PROBLEMS FACING ALLENDE

Cuban media have been notably circumspect in handling recent pessimistic statements by Chilean President Allende acknowledging the threat of civil war and implying that regime prospects in the March legislative election are not promising. While PRENSA LATINA correspondents in Santiago have been regularly filing reports to Havana on the political turmoil in Chile, relatively little of their material has found its way into the media. Havana's restrictive coverage of news from Santiago indicates that the regime is particularly anxious to avoid suggesting to domestic audiences that the political future of Cuba's closest ally in the hemisphere may be in doubt.

A series of Allende discourses during the past week on the serious political and economic problems facing his regime have been reported extensively by PRENSA LATINA's Santiago office in information dispatches to Havana but have been treated gingerly in Cuban media. For example, a five-hour talk by Allende on 18 January at a nationalized textile factory in Santiago, in which he engaged in self-criticism and painted a gloomy picture of the current Chilean scene, was covered in a Havana domestic broadcast the next day in a brief summary stressing that he had "reaffirmed that the Chilean process is irreversible." The summary contained no reflection of the Chilean President's assertions that the country was "on the verge of civil war" and that the situation was "very difficult and serious" or of his self-critical remarks.

On the 20th PRENSA LATINA carried a report of the same speech which included the abovementioned points but left out references to Cuba that had duly appeared in the reports of Allende's remarks filed by PRENSA LATINA's Santiago office to Havana two days earlier. Among those was a statement by Allende which affirmed Castro's revolutionary credentials while noting that the Cubans had not ousted the United States from Guantanamo. This was a reiteration of earlier Allende statements designed to persuade the Chilean ultraleft of the need for conciliation with the "class enemy" for the sake of survival of the revolution. Havana media also failed to report Allende's reference to Cuba as an "exemplary organization of the people"--a country where the populace "even had to suffer from rationing sugar"--and his prediction that "in eight or ten years Cuba will be the country with the highest social level in Latin America."

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**THE MARCH ELECTIONS** While PRENSA LATINA summarized a 20 January Allende speech to high-ranking regime officials in which he sharply criticized the government bureaucracy, it ignored his gloomy comments on the March elections. PRENSA LATINA's Santiago office, in a lengthy summary of Allende's remarks, had reported to the home office that he "explained that the opposition considers it important to obtain a two-thirds majority and thus be able to constitutionally eliminate the president" and that

he asked what would happen if the UP won barely 33 percent of the vote and said that in this event there would be a political upheaval in the UP. We must be prepared for a political result of that sort.

On the 18th PRENSA LATINA reported an interview in which Allende observed that if his opponents obtained the necessary two-thirds legislative majority, they "would not hesitate a minute to remove me, and they would do so within the constitution and the law." Neither this interview nor the speech to government officials has been reported in any monitored Havana broadcasts to date.

**AVOIDANCE OF COMMENT** Havana media have scrupulously refrained from commenting on Allende's seemingly dreary political prospects--a reticence that may well stem from Castro's embarrassment last September over foreign press reports that he had privately criticized Allende and had alleged that the Chilean regime would have to abandon "bourgeois legality." While Castro strongly denied the reports, Cuban media may have been instructed to avoid comment that could be construed as meddling in Chilean internal affairs. In any event, alarmist comment by PRENSA LATINA's Santiago correspondents in dispatches filed to Havana have not been disseminated in Cuban media.

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## SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

## PEKING OFFERS STRAIGHTFORWARD ACCOUNT OF INAUGURAL ADDRESS

Reflecting the past year's movement toward Sino-U.S. detente, Peking's sole reaction to President Nixon's inaugural address has been a factual NCNA account that highlighted his references to the Peking and Moscow summits while citing passages registering the U.S. retrenchment on the world scene. The account was carried in NCNA's international and domestic services and was broadcast by Radio Peking, though it was not repeated in the national hookup program. In addition to the account of the inaugural address, two accompanying NCNA reports described antiwar demonstrations in the United States and abroad, but these avoided quoting personal attacks on the President.\*

Peking's account of the inaugural address in effect read as a statement of the Nixon Doctrine, as reflected in passages noting a reduction of U.S. involvement in other nations' conflicts or responsibility for their future. It has been a significant mark of Peking's reassessment of the U.S. role in Asia that the Chinese, unlike their North Vietnamese and North Korean allies, have drawn back from their former hostile portrayal of the Nixon Doctrine as an attempt to pursue the old U.S. aims through new means. And on the subject of Vietnam, where this portrayal has persisted, the NCNA account quoted the President's remark that America's longest and most difficult war was coming to an end.

NCNA duly quoted the President's pledge to respect treaty commitments, but it omitted passages immediately following in the address that raised sensitive issues. Thus, in apparent deference to Vietnamese communist sensitivities, NCNA omitted the President's assertion that the United States will "support vigorously" the principle that no country has the right to impose its rule on another by force. NCNA also omitted the next passage, in which the President pledged to continue working for nuclear arms limitation and for reduction of the danger of confrontation between the great powers. The overall effect of Peking's inclusion and

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\* Peking's treatment of the inauguration contrasted with the hostility shown by hardline Asian communists, as in Pyongyang's characterization of the President as a "notorious warmonger" whose professions of peace were hypocritical.

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omission of passages from the address was to provide a favorable picture, from Peking's present vantage point, of the President's enunciation of his foreign policy. NCNA's account touched briefly on domestic matters, quoting the President as turning away from old policies that relied on government solutions.

Earlier, in a 13 January NCNA dispatch from Washington reporting the President's meeting with the Shenyang acrobatic troupe, Peking had made a point of citing his remark on the beneficent effect of last year's summit. NCNA quoted him as saying that as a result of his meetings with Mao and Chou En-lai the wall of hostility that had separated the Chinese and American people for 20 years is now coming down.

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## CHINA

## SEVERAL PROVINCIAL YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE ORGANS IN OFFING

Party committees of four provinces--Liaoning, Tsinghai, Shensi, and Shantung--have now followed Shanghai's November lead and announced their readiness to hold provincial Young Communist League (YCL) congresses to elect provincial-level YCL committees. New YCL committees are to be forthcoming from Shantung and Shensi before 4 May--the anniversary of the major student movement in 1919--and from Liaoning on 5 March. Shanghai and Tsinghai have pledged to produce new committees at "appropriate" times in 1973. In contrast to the process of rebuilding the provincial party committees, for which no anticipatory dates were given, the announcements of deadlines for the YCL organs seem aimed at alerting local party officials to the need for prompt attention to the task of selecting delegates for the provincial congresses. This approach also serves to reinforce signs of a return to pre-cultural revolution normalcy at the provincial and lower levels at a time when the center remains gutted by the purges of recent years. The New Year's Day joint editorial called for revival of various mass organizations, including the YCL, while failing for the first time in three years to promise the convocation of a National People's Congress, the body that would ratify changes in the regime's top structure.

Judging by the notably detailed organizational guidelines recently relayed by each of the above provinces, the new provincial-level YCL committees will share more characteristics with their pre-cultural revolution forms than with the various youth groups which rallied millions of youthful supporters during the cultural revolution behind such now anachronistic slogans as "to rebel is justified." Central authorities are clearly intent upon achieving tight party control over the revived YCL by building certain institutional controls into the formation of all rebuilt YCL provincial committees. Red Guard groups, for example, will be organizationally cut out of the decisionmaking process at all of the announced provincial YCL congresses. While the congresses themselves will be attended by well over a thousand delegates in each case, Red Guard organizations will generally be limited to no more than 50 representatives sitting as observers without the right to vote. Shanghai, a provincial-level

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municipality with a large number of former student activists, will, however, send 300 nonvoting Red Guards to watch the proceedings of the 1,500 regular members of the congress.

The guidelines also indicate that the PLA will be relieved of much of the leadership role in youth work it inherited from the shattered party apparatus during the cultural revolution. PLA representatives will also attend the congresses as nonvoting observers but in fewer numbers than the Red Guards. In Shantung, for example, only 20 "specially invited" PLA representatives will attend. Furthermore, the total number of new YCL committee members who hold other offices at or above the county level is to be no more than 25 to 40 percent-- a stipulation that would allow an influx of new leadership blood and would avoid drawing heavily on the largely military-dominated power structure at and above the county level. By contrast, overwhelming civilian party control over the new provincial YCL committees seems assured by the generous stipulation that not more than 70 percent of the new committee members may be CCP cadres.

#### PROVINCIAL COMMENT EXPLAINS PRIORITY TASK OF CRITICISM

In further explaining the meaning of the instruction in the New Year's joint editorial to give priority to criticism of revisionism in carrying out the tasks of criticism of revisionism and rectification of the style of work, comment from several provinces has recently stressed that the instruction is meant to inspire unity, not to allow more divisive attacks on cadres who have committed minor mistakes. Indicating that the instruction is perhaps being either misunderstood or ignored while cadres jockey for position, several provincial organs have been more explicit than the editorial in spelling out that criticism of revisionism is directed against those judged to be enemies and who have been purged. The task of rectification in work style applies to cadres who are still in office and is a question of contradictions within the ranks of the people.

The most straightforward explication of the campaign was offered by a Commentator's article in the INNER MONGOLIA DAILY broadcast on 20 January. The article called on party committees to make a strict distinction between contradictions "between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people themselves," directing the spearhead of criticism at "political swindlers," the code term for Lin Piao and his associates. Since differences with swindlers "cannot be reconciled," this criticism campaign provides a scapegoat which can be a useful tool for unifying the people. As the article more decorously phrased it, "when criticism of revisionism comes first, it is comparatively earlier

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to unify the thinking within the party and among the masses." Criticism of the purged swindlers also serves the educational purpose of explaining what policies and approaches are now considered to have been mistaken, thus providing guidelines for cadres to orient themselves toward current policies.

An ANHWEI DAILY editorial broadcast on 19 January strongly indicated that some people have not correctly followed the directive contained in the New Year's editorial. The Anhwei editorial called for overcoming such tendencies as "paying attention not to thorough criticism of revisionism but to problems among the people" and "directing the spearhead against one's own comrades in criticizing revisionism and rectifying the style of work." Indicating that such tendencies have caused serious problems, the editorial repeated several times the injunction to "never put criticism of revisionism and rectification of the style of work on the same footing, much less reverse the relationship between the two," and not to confuse shortcomings or mistakes among the people "with the fallacies of swindlers like Liu Shao-chi."

The Anhwei editorial pressed the point, stressed in a number of other articles, that the criticism campaign is far from complete and will, together with the task of rectification, be a lengthy process; some other articles have compared it to the 10-year period necessary to eliminate the Wang Ming line (1935-45). But in this regard the editorial seemed to offer some hope to cadres that rectification will not take the form of extensive mass criticism as in the cultural revolution. Rather the editorial stressed rectification through self-criticism, noting that leading comrades should "make strict demands on themselves, strictly examine themselves, and strive to know themselves." Similarly, a Kiangsu broadcast on 20 January reporting on criticism and rectification in an artillery unit indicated that it would be achieved in large part through cadre study classes. Perhaps going further in the direction of purely theoretical study than intended by the center, the broadcast called for an effort "to completely understand the original texts of the various philosophical works by repeatedly reading them chapter by chapter."