

[REDACTED] #10-73

STATSPEC

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060010-8

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

7 MARCH 1973

Doc No.
Confidential

FBIS

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda


Confidential

7 MARCH 1973
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 10)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

STATSPEC



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention	i
INDOCHINA	
DRV, PRG Assail GVN and U.S. on Prisoner Release, Withdrawal. . .	1
DRV Ministry Spokesman Charges Removal of U.S. Mines Delayed. . .	4
Paris 12-Nation Conference Lauded for Endorsing Peace Accord. . .	5
KHARTOUM EVENTS	
USSR Conveys Disapproval of Palestinians' "Senseless Crime" . . .	10
U.S. - USSR	
USSR Decries U.S. Defense Budget Hike, Avoids SALT II Linkage . .	15
PRC - TAIWAN	
Peking Calls for Negotiations with Taiwan Officials	18
CHILE	
Moscow, Havana See Elections as Triumph for Allende Regime. . . .	21
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR	
Tito Stresses Closer Ties with Moscow, Continued Nonalignment . .	25
USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS	
Gosplan Deputy Chief Sokolov Opposes Cutbacks in Agriculture. . .	27
CHINA	
Agricultural Pronouncements Continue Moderate Policies.	30

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 1 -

TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 FEBRUARY - 4 MARCH 1973

<u>Moscow (2930 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1378 items)</u>		
Vietnam	(9%)	14%	Domestic Issues	(45%)	40%
[Paris International	(--)	11%]	Vietnam	(6%)	32%
Conference			[Paris International	(--)	26%]
Conference			Conference		
China	(3%)	7%	Cambodia	(3%)	7%
Laos	(4%)	4%	Lios	(16%)	5%
Czechoslovak 25th	(19%)	4%	26th Anniversary of	(--)	4%
Anniversary			28 Feb. Taiwan Uprising		
DPRK Party Delegation	(--)	4%	Libyan Airliner Downed	(2%)	2%
in USSR					
Libyan Airliner Downed	(1%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

Hanoi and other communist media have hailed the international conference in Paris and the signing of the nine-article conference act on 2 March as putting an international stamp of approval on the Vietnam peace agreement. Stress was on the success of the conference, and there was little attention to such discordant notes as the controversy over Saigon's attempt to issue a statement on the exclusive legitimacy of the GVN in South Vietnam. Sino-Soviet antagonisms were for the most part obscured in propaganda on the conference, although Peking's NCNA, in noting Gromyko's remarks on Asian collective security, seemed to be reflecting pique over Moscow's campaign touting this project in the wake of the Vietnam settlement.

Hanoi has continued to obscure the U.S.-DRV controversy over the release of U.S. POW's which held up work at the international conference for a day, but it has continued to profess concern over alleged U.S. as well as GVN violations of the provisions of the peace accord. A 1 March NHAN DAN editorial went beyond other propaganda when it said the United States had made "private commitments" to see that the accord is properly implemented. And an editorial in the paper on the 6th, without referring to any private commitments, complained that the United States has not sufficiently carried out its responsibilities concerning GVN responsibilities on the issue of military and civilian prisoners.

DRV, PRG ASSAIL GVN AND U.S. ON PRISONER RELEASE, WITHDRAWAL

Just as Hanoi did not report the 27 February threat by a DRV spokesman in Saigon that the release of U.S. POW's might be held up if there were not strict compliance with the peace agreement by the GVN as well as the United States, so it failed to acknowledge that the work of the international conference was held up last week while Secretary Rogers, at President Nixon's instruction, sought and obtained assurance that the DRV would release U.S. POW's within the 60-day period provided in the peace agreement. VNA reported on 1 March that a meeting had been held in Paris the day before by Secretary Rogers and the foreign ministers of the three Vietnamese parties to the peace agreement "following very grave violations of the Paris agreement in South Vietnam" and that "strict implementation" of the agreement was discussed. However, Vietnamese communist media are not known to have reported the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 2 -

subsequent bilateral meeting at which Secretary Rogers--as he said at his 2 March Paris press conference--was assured by DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh that the U.S. POW's would be released by Hanoi in four phases in accordance with the peace agreement.

Hanoi's closest approach to a discussion of the controversy came in an article in the 1 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN which scored the White House for "raising a hue and cry" about DRV violations and for "claiming that Hanoi must be held responsible for the delay in handing over U.S. military personnel." The White House statements, not further described, were dismissed by the army paper as "a very brazen slander." The article claimed that the DRV had correctly implemented the peace agreement while "the U.S. and Saigon sides have blatantly and systematically sabotaged the most important and most urgent provisions of the agreement." Also on 1 March, a NHAN DAN editorial went beyond Vietnamese communist demands that the United States should help assure Saigon's implementation of the peace agreement to suggest that there were in fact secret understandings regarding U.S. responsibilities in the postwar period. Declaring that the United States had signed the peace agreement and set forth "private commitments [cam keets rieng] on a number of problems," the editorial claimed that the United States has shown that "it has not attached much importance to its signatures and commitments."

An indication that the Vietnamese communists expected the United States to assume special responsibility regarding implementation of peace accord provisions on civilian prisoners had appeared in an interview which DRV chief delegate to the Paris talks Xuan Thuy held with AFP on 10 November 1972. Hanoi media did not carry the interview, but as reported by AFP Xuan Thuy explained that the DRV had agreed to separate the issues of the release of POW's and Vietnamese civilian prisoners and said that the United States "should use its influence with the Saigon administration to urge it" to implement the clause on the detained civilians.

There has been no repetition of the 1 March editorial's explicit reference to "private" U.S. commitments, and the propaganda for the most part has reverted to general charges that the United States has abetted violations of the accord. However, the 6 March NHAN DAN editorial said that "adequate attention" must be given to the issue of civilian prisoners and complained that

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 3 -

"in the past month and more, the United States has not correctly and actively carried out its responsibilities" concerning the problem of military and civilian prisoners.

DEADLOCK ON VIETNAMESE POW'S While the controversy between Hanoi and Washington on the release of American POW's appeared to have been settled, Hanoi and Front media reported on the 6th that the four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC) on the previous day had reached a deadlock on the question of Saigon's return of Vietnamese prisoners of war. Liberation Radio noted the communist objection to the low figure on prisoners Saigon had proposed to return in the second phase of the Vietnamese POW exchange and said that even the United States "had to admit that each side had to return at least one fourth of the total number of personnel registered on the namelist." The deputy head of the PRG delegation, Dang Van Thu, was quoted as warning that Saigon must take steps to avoid prolonging the delay in the prisoner exchange because otherwise future exchanges will be adversely affected. He also declared that the PRG would not discuss other problems if the return of the second group of POW's was not solved satisfactorily. Thu was quoted as "demanding that the U.S. delegate shoulder responsibility for implementing all articles of the Paris agreement" and as "stressing that he should not be obsessed only with receiving U.S. military personnel, while at the same time condoning the Saigon administration's stubborn attitude and refusal to return PRG military personnel."

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS Communist complaints about the implementation of provisions on the withdrawal of U.S. troops were spelled out in a 1 March statement by the PRG delegation to the four-party JMC. The statement charged that the United States had refused to discuss the modalities for troop withdrawal and that the JMC and International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) had been unable to supervise the withdrawal of foreign troops. It maintained that U.S. communiques on troop withdrawals are "unacceptable" because the withdrawals were unsupervised and "there is no practical or legal basis to confirm how many troops the United States has withdrawn and whether the withdrawing troops have taken with them all arms, munitions, and war means as provided for in Article 8" of the cease-fire protocol. The statement rejected the contention, in a 25 February note from the U.S. delegation, that the United States was correctly implementing the provisions on withdrawal. It accused the United States of attempting to "cover up its secret maintenance in South Vietnam of disguised military personnel as

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 4 -

well as the illegal transfer of arms, munitions, and war means to the republic of South Vietnam." Condemning such "tricks," the statement demanded that the United States give proof to the JMC and ICCS of the number of troops withdrawn and of the removal of their weapons and that it ensure effective control by the control organizations over future withdrawals.

In the pattern of propaganda beginning in mid-February which made specific charges of alleged U.S. violations, a NHAN DAN editorial on 5 March again claimed that the United States has not carried out the provision on troop withdrawal "under due supervision and control," that it has evaded the dismantling of U.S. bases, and that it has not "strictly and quickly" implemented the protocol on removal and deactivation of mines in North Vietnam.

MOVEMENT OF SAM'S INTO QUANG TRI

Hanoi and Front accounts of the 28 February session of the JMC noted that PRG representative Dang Van Thu rejected allied charges that the communists had installed SA-2 missile sites at Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province, since the start of the cease-fire. Thu reportedly recalled that PRG delegation head Tran Van Tra, at the previous session of the commission, had stated the PRG position that "there has been absolutely no movement of missiles or technical weapons since the time the agreement came into effect." Thu added that "nobody has the right to ask the PRG to withdraw any of its units from the area under its control." He was also said to have "served notice" on the U.S. delegate in connection with the latter's "threat to use violence against the area controlled by the PRG"--an evident allusion to General Woodward's statement at the 28 February JMC meeting that if the communists failed to move the missiles the United States and its allies would reserve the right to take appropriate actions.

DRV MINISTRY SPOKESMAN CHARGES REMOVAL OF U.S. MINES DELAYED

Hanoi's policy of avoiding discussion of the prisoner-release controversy was also evident in propaganda related to U.S. mine clearance. On 1 March a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, released at a Hanoi press conference, charged that no mines had been cleared and maintained that the United States has "deliberately violated the spirit and letter of the protocol" on mine removal. At the press conference, Major Pham Lam, a member of the DRV delegation on the problem of the mines,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 5 -

criticized the alleged U.S. delay in some detail, among other things noting, without elaboration, that scheduled operations did not begin on 26 and 27 February and that on the 28th U.S. personnel returned to their ships, which withdrew from their positions near the coast. Thus, consistent with Hanoi's silence on the controversy over POW's, Pham Lam obscured the fact that the suspension of preparations for clearing the mines at that time was related to Hanoi's delay in releasing the second group of American POW's. On 4 March a brief VNA item recalled the 1 March foreign ministry spokesman's protest and noted, again without further explanation, that on the 4th U.S. representatives and the U.S. fleet assigned to clear mines had returned to the Haiphong area.

Pham Lam complained about various alleged U.S. interpretations of the accord: He criticized the position that delayed-action bombs would not have to be cleared since they were not mines, and he assailed the view that mines need only be cleared from the central channel of rivers and not from one bank to the other. The latter point elaborates on cryptic references in the foreign ministry spokesman's statement as well as in the 26 February DRV Government statement that the United States was trying to evade responsibility for clearing mines on the inland waterways. Pham Lam also complained about U.S. failure to provide equipment to the DRV, noting that North Vietnam had been given no means to transport five-ton "pipes" which were to be used to destroy mines. And he took the United States to task for failing to supply the means for removing mines on the grounds that the U.S. Navy does not have such equipment.

The issue of mine clearance continued to be pressed in comment on the 2d with an article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, for example, accusing the United States of "nurturing the dark scheme of continuing the blockade of the sea entries of the DRV in an attempt to prevent transport between our country and others and to isolate North Vietnam."

PARIS 12-NATION CONFERENCE LAUDED FOR ENDORSING PEACE ACCORD

HANOI DRV propaganda, highlighted by a 3 March NHAN DAN editorial, greeted the 2 March signing of the act of the international conference on Vietnam as a great victory for the Vietnamese people and for world peace. Underlining Hanoi's satisfaction, a report from the Paris correspondent Hong Ha, published in NHAN DAN on the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 6 -

4th, claimed that the act "contains nearly all the contents" of a draft act proposed by the DRV delegation "with the agreement of the PRG delegation." The editorial on the 3d set the tone for other comment when it maintained that the act had "increased the juridical value on the international arena" of the peace agreement and had provided a "new political and juridical basis" for the struggle to make the United States and Saigon respect and implement the accord.

The NHAN DAN editorial also credited the act with affirming the "important position and great prestige" of the DRV and PRG and the "powerful support" of the socialist countries for Vietnam. The controversy at the conference over the PRG's position was reflected in Hong Ha's report on the 4th, which noted GVN Foreign Minister Lam's attempt at the 1 March meeting to have his statement on the exclusive legitimacy of the GVN be made an official document of the conference; the report also quoted Gromyko's objections to the proposal.

Hanoi's reports on the conference had taken note of PRG Foreign Minister Binh's meetings with other delegates, including UN Secretary General Waldheim. However, it was not until 7 March that Hanoi radio carried a more detailed report on "meetings and an exchange of views" between Waldheim and Binh, noting for the first time that the Secretary General had confirmed that they had discussed the PRG's establishment of a liaison office and designation of observers at the United Nations.

The 3 March NHAN DAN editorial, like other propaganda, decried alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace accord and warned: "These acts pose a great danger to the Paris agreement . . . and have, in a dangerous manner, increased the tension in Vietnam and Indochina as a whole." In a similar vein, DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh had warned of the dangers to peace in his press conference statement at the close of the international conference. Trinh maintained that "Vietnam's experience since the 1940's has proved that foreign military involvement and interference and domestic fascism in the service of neocolonialism are the origin of war." He went on to advocate an end to such policies, the achievement of reconciliation and concord, and respect for self-determination in South Vietnam, warning that "only in this way can peace in Vietnam be maintained and consolidated. Otherwise, violations will grow from small-scale hostilities to major conflicts, and peace will be wrecked. . . ."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 7 -

PEKING The Chinese have authoritatively endorsed the results of the Paris conference as providing an "explicit international guarantee" for the "fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people" acknowledged in the 27 January peace agreement. The basic thrust of the brief speech by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei at the final session of the conference on 2 March and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial the next day was that primary responsibility for implementing the Vietnam settlement rests with the four signatories and that the other parties represented at the international conference have now committed themselves to respect the settlement. This approach accords with Peking's welcome for the agreement as removing a major source of tension in Asia.

Peking's coverage of the conference proceedings included the text of the act, texts of the speeches by the Vietnamese communist delegates, and reports on Chi's meeting with Secretary Rogers on 25 February and his dinner for the Secretary on 1 March. Peking's accounts of speeches by other delegates were generally straightforward except for the South Vietnamese and Soviet foreign ministers. NCNA derisively observed that "while presenting no positive views" on the issues, Gromyko had "boasted" that the Paris agreement had proven the effectiveness of what Moscow calls its peace program. Most notably, NCNA took the opportunity to respond to Moscow's campaign touting its Asian collective security project in the wake of the Vietnam settlement. According to NCNA, Gromyko sought to bring the Indochina situation "into the orbit of that 'collective security system.'" (During the period when it adamantly opposed negotiations on Vietnam, Peking had repeatedly charged that Moscow was seeking to bring the Vietnam question into the orbit of Soviet-U.S. cooperation.) Turning Moscow's language back against it, NCNA observed that the Asian collective security system "is none other than a 'policy of grouping, a policy of ranging some states against others.'"

Peking did not indicate that Chi joined in the criticism of GVN Foreign Minister Lam at the 1 March session for pressing the notion that his government is the only legitimate one in South Vietnam. However, Chi apparently was alone in delivering a formal speech at the final session on the 2d. Alluding to the contention over the PRG's status, he complained that "certain people" still want to deny its existence. And apparently as a further demonstration of support for the PRG, he went on to specify that "the Saigon authorities" have been creating serious

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 8 -

incidents, taking particular note of attacks on the communist delegations to the JMC. In his main address at the conference on 26 February he had observed that violations of the agreement had occurred but did not blame particular parties.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the conference included the United States in its indictment of violations of the agreement, though it singled out "the Saigon authorities in particular." Earlier, a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 1 March--seconding PRG and DRV protest statements of 25 and 26 February--spelled out charges against Saigon and added that the United States had delayed the removal of mines in North Vietnam and refused to dismantle its military bases in the South. The editorial noted cryptically that these acts not only violated the relevant provisions of the agreement "but also made it difficult to implement other important provisions."

Reflecting Peking's interest in the situation, the 1 March editorial asserted that strict implementation of the agreement would contribute to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia. In this context it pointed out, rather cautiously, that "people cannot but show concern" over violations of the agreement.

MOSCOW Moscow media's reporting of the closing events of the international conference included Foreign Minister Gromyko's departure statement on 3 March. He expressed hope that all the parties would "observe strictly and punctually" the provisions of the Paris agreement as well as the act signed at the conference, a document which he said has "great positive significance." The Moscow press published the text of the act promptly on the 3d, but there is little available independent Soviet comment. The TASS press review on the 5th reported that IZVESTIYA expressed hope that the conference decisions would serve the cause of "the establishment of lasting peace"; the paper stressed "editorially," TASS added, that "it is necessary to exclude any possibility of the resumption of interference in whatever form in the internal affairs of Vietnam."

Moscow promptly took issue with Peking's account of Gromyko's speech* at the Paris conference in a Mandarin-language broadcast

* Although Hanoi media reported that Gromyko had participated in the criticism of GVN Foreign Minister Lam at the 1 March session, Moscow is not known to have reported Gromyko's remarks. A dispatch published in PRAVDA on the 2d, reporting DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le's press conference on the session, quoted Le as saying only that Lam's claim of sole legitimacy for the GVN was rejected by the "other delegates."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 9 -

on the 2d which claimed that Peking "slandered" and launched an "unbridled attack" on Gromyko's statement. Moscow argued that Gromyko's remarks renewing the Soviet proposal for a collective security system in Asia were "completely in order" and would "remove the basis for forming any kind of alliance and for any imperialist intervention." Echoing other recent Soviet propaganda in the weeks since the peace agreement was signed, the broadcast went on to charge that Peking's policy is aimed at forming a temporary alliance with "the imperialist bloc" and not objecting to the retention of U.S. armed forces in Asia.

The notion of U.S.-PRC "collusion" has continued to be expressed in other Moscow propaganda. For example, an item in PRAVDA on 4 March reiterated that the PRC takes an "indulgent attitude" toward the fact that although the Vietnam war has ended, the U.S. military presence in that part of the world "is not being reduced."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 10 -

KHARTOUM EVENTS

USSR CONVEYS DISAPPROVAL OF PALESTINIANS' "SENSELESS CRIME"

Moscow has again conveyed its disapproval of terror tactics in reportage on the 1 March seizure of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum by members of the Palestinian Black September Organization (BSO) and their killing of three of the five diplomatic hostages the following day. In keeping with the guarded Soviet treatment of past terrorist incidents, Moscow's reaction has been confined to brief media reports of events surrounding the seizure of the embassy and the deaths of incoming U.S. Ambassador Noel, outgoing U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Moore, and Belgian Charge d'Affaires Eid.

Press comment thus far has been limited to brief "reference information" on the BSO appearing in PRAVDA on 4 March, appended to five short TASS dispatches. In apparent effort to transfer at least some of the opprobrium from the Palestinian organizations, PRAVDA referred cryptically to "certain facts" suggesting ties between Black September and "certain extremist non-Palestinian organizations." It recalled the BSO's responsibility for aircraft hijackings as well as for the "attacks" on athletes at the Munich Olympics and on embassies in Bangkok and Khartoum "and a Cairo hotel"--an allusion to the assassination of the Jordanian prime minister in Cairo in November 1971. At the time Moscow all but ignored the assassination, which was acknowledged only in a one-sentence TASS report from Cairo that at-Tall "was killed today" at the entrance to the Sheraton Hotel.

PRAVDA's "reference information" was repeated without attribution in a Moscow broadcast to Britain on the 4th which also remarked that the BSO "unites a few extreme groupings of Palestinians." Echoing a past theme of Soviet comment on terrorist activities, the PRAVDA information note added that "numerous representatives of the Arab public" consider such actions "tremendously damaging both to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to the Arab countries' common struggle against the consequences of Israel's aggression." A Moscow domestic service broadcast on 5 March similarly called the terrorists' action a "senseless crime" which did "immeasurable harm" to the national liberation movement. Noting that "bourgeois news agencies" had already forgotten Israel's downing of the Libyan airliner, the broadcast claimed

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 11 -

that the reaction of "Western propagandists" showed who benefited from such terrorist actions as that in Sudan. The broadcast said it was impossible not to agree with the Cairo AL-AHRAM, which editorially called the attack on the embassy and the killing of three Western diplomats a blow to the Arab people's struggle against "Israeli aggression."

While TASS' initial two-sentence report on 1 March said "Palestinian partisans" were holding the American ambassador and other diplomats hostage in Khartoum, subsequent reportage has almost uniformly described the perpetrators as members of the "terrorist" Black September. There has been no comment on the incident in Moscow's broadcasts to Arab audiences, but programs on 3 and 4 March briefly reported developments, again ascribing the events to this "extremist" or "terroristic" organization. A 5 March broadcast in Arabic said that PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, reporting the BSO action, published extracts from the telegram sent by Sudanese President Numayri to President Nixon in which "he described the killing of the foreign diplomats as despicable" and said his country definitely rejected such a means of solving problems.

As in its reportage and comment surrounding the Munich incident last September, Moscow has again taken pains to dissociate the chief fedayeen groups, such as Fatah and the overall umbrella organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), from responsibility for terrorist actions. Thus Moscow's reports have repeatedly pointed out that PLO chairman and Fatah leader Yasir 'Arafat in a telegram to Numayri insisted that "the organization which he heads" had nothing to do with the Khartoum incident. But TASS on the 7th did acknowledge that Numayri, in a radio and television speech on the 6th, charged that the Khartoum branch of Fatah had a hand in the seizure of the Saudi embassy. TASS cited Numayri as saying "specifically" that the head of the Fatah office in Khartoum had left for Libya in a Libyan plane several hours before the attack on the embassy, and it added that Numayri announced the termination of Palestinian organizations' activities in Sudan. TASS disseminated, in conjunction with this Khartoum report, a Beirut-dated dispatch noting that the PLO publication FALASTIN ATH-THAWRAH had rejected any link whatsoever between Fatah and Black September and had pointed out that the BSO was not represented in any organ of the PLO.

U.S. REACTION Reporting President Nixon's 2 March press conference, TASS noted that he said a senior State Department official had been sent to Khartoum to seek the release of the diplomats held hostage there by the BSO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 12 -

"terroristic organization." The President said, TASS added, that the United States would do everything it could to get them released but that it would not yield to the blackmail demands of the terrorists. A short TASS dispatch on the 7th reported that President Nixon, addressing a ceremony at the State Department commemorating the two American diplomats killed in Khartoum, pointed out that U.S. policy is not to submit to international blackmail and asked other governments to take the same firm stand.

EVENTS IN JORDAN Moscow has reported--but drawn no direct connection between--the demands of the BSO terrorists in Khartoum for the release of Palestinians held in Jordan and the Jordanian Government's decision confirming death sentences meted out to this group. But Soviet reportage has briefly and indirectly indicated Moscow's concern over the latter development, with TASS on 5 March citing the Paris LA NATION as emphasizing that execution of the "Palestinian patriots" might "greatly damage Arab unity."

A TASS dispatch from Khartoum on the 3d acknowledged the BSO demands for the release in Jordan of a group of Palestinians "accused of preparing a state coup" and of a number of political prisoners, as well as the release of Robert Kennedy's assassin, Sirhan Sirhan, and members of the Baader-Meinhoff "terrorist group" arrested in the FRG. Subsequent reports broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the 3d and 4th indicated that the demands had been scaled down, with the terrorists insisting on the release of Palestinians held in Jordanian and "Saudi Arabian" prisons and said to be calling for the release of Palestinians arrested "in some countries."

Without recalling the Khartoum demands, TASS on the 5th reported from Amman the Jordanian Government decision confirming the death sentences handed out by a military tribunal on Fatah leader Abu Dawud and other Palestinian guerrillas arrested in February. They were charged, TASS noted, with infiltrating into Jordan in an attempt to stage a coup d'etat.* (The clandestine "Voice of

* A PRAVDA analysis of the Palestinian movement last August cited "the committing of terrorism inside Jordan" among various "desperate acts" perpetrated by some Palestinian organizations which had greatly damaged the reputation of the entire resistance movement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 13 -

Palestine," in a broadcast on 27 February, admitted that Abu Dawud had entered Amman "to carry out a suicide fedayeen operation against King Husayn's regime and to paralyze the political activity which the king began in the United States.")

TASS subsequently reported a growing campaign in Arab countries in protest against the death sentences, citing messages to Arab heads of state by PLO leader 'Arafat and Algerian leaders. And in promptly reporting King Husayn's appointment of Lt. Gen. Rasul al-Kilani as director of general intelligence and national security affairs advisor, TASS added the observation, in an Amman-dated report on the 6th, that "local circles" viewed the appointment as an indication of a tougher policy toward the Palestinian resistance movement.

BACKGROUND Moscow has consistently handled extremist fedayeen actions with caution, treating them in reluctant and implicitly disapproving fashion when mentioning them at all. Its coverage of the Munich events last September glossed over much of the detail, and there were only semiofficial expressions of regret, confined to brief statements by sports officials and organizations. * While displaying the same restrained approach with regard to the Khartoum incident, Moscow seems to have been a shade less hesitant in this instance to brand the actions as those of "extremists" and "terrorists."

Subsequent to the Munich events, Podgorny had gone on record at a 14 September banquet for the visiting Iraqi president with a declaration that "we cannot look with favor on the actions of certain elements who harm the Palestinian movement." Gromyko had been more explicit in his 26 September address at the UN General Assembly when he said it was impossible to approve of the terrorist actions of "certain elements" in the Palestinian movement, which led among other things to the tragic Munich events. Declaring that "their criminal actions" had struck a blow at the Palestinians' national interests and aspirations, Gromyko expressed Soviet opposition to acts of terrorism "which violate the diplomatic activity of states and their representatives, transport, communications," and the normal progress of international contacts and meetings.

* Soviet media's treatment of the Munich incident is discussed in the TRENDS of 7 September 1972, pages 23-24, and 13 September, pages 18-21.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 14 -

A Kornilov article in NOVOYE VREMYA (No. 42, 13 October 1972) deplored "rash extremist acts of terror such as the hijacking of civilian aircraft, attacks on nonmilitary targets, and the assassination of individuals," observing that such actions seriously damaged the prestige of the Palestinian movement. Most recently, the same Soviet weekly (No. 5, 2 February 1973), in a column "answering young readers" on the Black September Organization, explained that "progressive forces rightly point out that the methods employed by Black September ultimately do harm to the just struggle waged by the Palestinian Arabs."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 15 -

U. S. - U S S R

USSR DECRIES U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET HIKE, AVOIDS SALT II LINKAGE

Reacting with a predictable show of dismay to the announced boost in U.S. defense expenditures projected in the draft FY-1974 U.S. budget, Moscow has deplored the boost as an expression of the continuing influence of the "military-industrial complex" on U.S. policy and as a reflection of an attitude that is inconsistent with the developing spirit of detente in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, in keeping with the policy of circumspection it has observed since the opening of SALT II in November, it has refrained from dwelling on the negative implications of this criticism for the prospects in SALT and has continued to draw attention to positive as well as negative indicators of U.S. intent in this regard.

BUDGET HIKE Voluminous Soviet criticism of the new U.S. defense budget has focused on the charge that the planned increase in expenditures is due primarily to increased outlays for strategic weapons. Moscow has complained that this runs counter to the spirit of the times. Typical was the charge by PRAVDA commentator Victor Mayevskiy and correspondent B. Strelnikov in the 31 January issue of that paper that the budget proposals were in "flagrant contradiction to the period of easing in tensions." While avoiding any detailed analysis of specific weapons programs embodied in the budget proposals, the commentaries have referred in general terms to strategic arms implications. Mayevskiy and Strelnikov, for example, referred to new "superweapons," and V. Berezin, writing in RED STAR on 3 February, mentioned U.S. plans for new submarine-launched missiles.

Moscow has been generally reticent about linking these criticisms of the budget to the prospects for SALT. However, USA Institute head Georgiy Arbatov in an article on U.S.-Soviet relations in the latest issue of KOMMUNIST--summarized serially by Moscow radio between 1 and 5 March--noted that the new budget request came in the wake of the SALT I agreements as well as the Vietnam cease-fire. He implied that the expanded military budget was one of the "leftovers" of the cold war in U.S. policy that presented an obstacle to further normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations. An unusually detailed article on the budget in the 8 February PRAVDA UKRAINY by that paper's military observer V. Zharov concluded that since the Pentagon was intent on continuing the arms race, the USSR was forced to strengthen its own forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 16 -

MIRV, ULMS This criticism comes against a background of Soviet comment expressing concern over current trends in U.S. strategy, particularly the programs for improving sea-based strategic forces and for MIRVing land-based ICBM's.

Spokesmen have for some time been citing budget figures and official U.S. statements bearing on the importance of the U.S. naval forces--present and projected--in overall U.S. strategy. More recently, Captain 1st rank Ye. Shcheglov, in the 20 February RED STAR, discussed the "decisive" role of the Atlantic fleet including the 6th Fleet--the Navy's "forward grouping in the Mediterranean"--and particularly its nuclear missile submarines. The Zharov PRAVDA UKRAINY article noted that the U.S. military press was discussing a U.S. transition to a "sea strategy," since, as he put it, underwater missile systems are relatively invulnerable to a surprise pre-emptive strike. Zharov noted that the proposed ULMS system was a product of this strategy.

Moscow's sensitivity to the potential impact on the SALT negotiations of possible improvements in the U.S. missile submarine fleet has been displayed in recent weeks in its reaction to British press reports that Prime Minister Heath had discussed acquisition of Poseidon missiles in his recent visit to the United States.*

While Moscow has been reticent about discussing MIRV's since the SALT I agreements were signed, two recent articles have mentioned the subject in discussing U.S. strategic programs. The USA Institute's I. L. Orlenkov, in a survey of the U.S. Air Force in the December 1972 issue of USA magazine, cited estimates of the timing of the MIRV conversion on the basis of U.S. Senate hearings. Although he noted that "the rates of [MIRV] rearmament are considerable," he did not cite MIRV specifically in concluding that "several" Air Force programs are aimed at achieving "military-technical supremacy."**

* Moscow's reaction to these reports is discussed in the TRENDS of 28 February 1973, page 25. Shcheglov's discussion of the U.S. Atlantic fleet complements a previous analysis by him of the Pacific Fleet in the 20 April 1972 RED STAR.

** In proceeding to discuss other elements of the U.S. strategic strike force, Orlenkov offered an argument for maintaining the role of strategic aviation in the strategic forces when he noted that aircraft "allow one to react to an alert signal without making an irreversible decision to launch strategic missiles-- a decision fraught with suicidal consequences."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 17 -

The Zharov PRAVDA UKRAINY article also focused on MIRV and noted that the system would considerably enhance the U.S. nuclear strike potential.

SALT II Arbatov, in the KOMMUNIST article, appeared to have U.S. weapons development in mind in asserting that the initial SALT agreements will take on lasting significance only if "attempts are not made to seek loopholes in order to accelerate the arms race in those spheres not yet embraced by treaties." Otherwise, however, Moscow has not directly linked its expressions of concern over U.S. strategic weapons development with the SALT negotiations. It has sustained an even-handed approach to SALT, limiting its direct comment since the opening of the second round to occasional reaffirmations of Soviet interest and to reiterations of Brezhnev's hopeful remarks on the subject at the USSR's 50th Anniversary celebrations last December.*

TASS, in brief reports on President Nixon's inaugural address and on remarks by Secretary Rogers to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 22 February, singled out their statements on continued U.S. interest in the negotiations, including Rogers' remark that the United States was "encouraged" by Brezhnev's reference to the desirability of a gradual reduction in strategic weapons. The only extensive commentary on SALT II, by Boris Svetlov in the first 1973 issue of NEW TIMES, was generally objective and noncommittal but notable for its warning against those in the United States who were hoping to obstruct the second round by calling on the government to continue arms development to acquire "trump cards" for the negotiations. Svetlov's reference to the permanent consultative commission established by the first session of SALT II is the only Soviet mention of that body to date since the TASS communique at the end of the session on December 21.

* Soviet and East European bloc comment on the opening of SALT II is discussed in the TRENDS of 22 November 1972, pages 18-20, and 29 November, pages 13-14. Brezhnev's remarks are discussed in the issue of 4 January 1973, pages 28-29.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 18 -

P R C - T A I W A N

PEKING CALLS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH TAIWAN OFFICIALS

Against the background of Peking's strengthened international position highlighted by the 22 February communique on Dr. Kissinger's 15-19 February visit to China announcing the establishment of liaison offices, Peking took the occasion of a Taiwan anniversary that has been ignored in recent years to accelerate its campaign encouraging moves toward reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Peking's first major overture to the ROC concerning peaceful negotiations since the period of "peaceful coexistence" in Chinese foreign policy during the mid-1950s took place at a meeting sponsored by the united front organ, the CPPCC, marking the 26th anniversary of the 28 February 1947 uprising on Taiwan against the rule of the Chiang Kai-shek government. Major speeches by PRC Overseas Chinese expert Liao Cheng-chih and former Kuomintang general Fu Tso-i as well as several briefer addresses all stressed the need for reconciliation, with Fu Tso-i's keynote address specifically urging ROC officials to begin negotiations.

This marked the first time Peking has observed the anniversary since 1965 and the first major celebration of the event since the 10th anniversary in 1957. In keeping with the discreet approach taken by Peking in the period of developing detente with the United States, the treatment of the anniversary avoided portraying the uprising as a model for insurrection today and muffled invective against Chiang and his entourage.

The major speakers at the anniversary meeting were obviously chosen for their special ties to the Kuomintang. Liao Cheng-chih is the son of a famous Kuomintang martyr who was associated with Sun Yat-sen. Fu Tso-i is the former KMT commander of Peking who surrendered to the communists after peaceful negotiations in 1949. Because of his surrender and his subsequent honored position in the PRC hierarchy, though never in positions of real power, Fu has traditionally been held up by Peking as a model for ROC officials in Taiwan to follow. Fu had made a similar speech on 3 February 1956, backing a Chou En-lai report four days earlier which called for "peaceful liberation" and negotiations with Chiang. Chou has not yet lent his personal prestige to the current effort.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 19 -

Setting the stage for Fu's keynote address, Liao Cheng-chih dwelt on themes present in PRC comment on Taiwan over the past year in playing up Peking's strengthened domestic and international position. Liao cited in particular PRC entrance into the UN, improved relations with the United States and Japan, as well as the 22 February Sino-U.S. communique and recent peace agreements in Vietnam and Laos to demonstrate that the "situation is now very favorable" for the liberation of Taiwan. Calling attention to a feeling of common pride among people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait over Peking's accomplishments, he noted that many Taiwan "compatriots" have returned to tour and visit relatives, helping to promote "great patriotic unity." Addressing ROC officials, Liao asserted that the "general trend and the desire of the people" to liberate Taiwan "is now very clear" and warned them not to "miss the opportunity to make contributions to the unification of the motherland." Promising that Peking regards all patriots as "one big family whether they come forward early or late," he assured all who work for reunification that they will be treated with "due respect" and will be forgiven past wrongs.

Fu Tso-i's "few words to the military and administrative personnel" on Taiwan dwelt in the most explicit terms thus far on the improvement in Sino-U.S. relations in order to show the futility of the ROC's continued reliance on Washington, and he alluded to possible ROC-USSR ties in warning against shifting reliance to "someone else." Calling unification the "trend of the times" that "no force whatever can obstruct or undermine," Fu gave notice to officials on Taiwan that they "should no longer cherish any illusion about outsiders." Asserting that American policy toward Taiwan had changed as "is very clearly shown in the two Sino-U.S. communiqués," and calling attention to Kissinger's remarks "of late" that the United States favors a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem, Fu asked rhetorically: "It is obvious: how long can Taiwan rely on the United States? Absolutely not long."

Moving immediately to the problem of possible Soviet involvement, he warned against the "dream of relying on someone else," asserting the ROC "must not make a fresh error." Claiming that President Nixon has now become committed to a policy of coexistence with China that will make it "absolutely impossible for the United States to maintain its former relations with Taiwan for long," Fu claimed that the United States at the same time would not "allow Taiwan to 'cooperate' with anybody else to disrupt peace" in Asia. He cited in this connection the 1972 Sino-U.S. Shanghai communique which affirmed the two sides' determination to oppose "any third party" seeking hegemony in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FRIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 20 -

Pointing out that "this situation cannot be changed," Fu got to the main point of his address with a patriotic pitch: "We are all Chinese. Why couldn't we talk for the sake of the sacred cause of unifying the motherland?" Citing the authoritative example of Mao Tse-tung's trip to Chungking in October 1945 to conduct talks with Chiang Kai-shek, Fu said the two sides should come together and talk, "the sooner the better." Avoiding any specification of PRC terms for the talks, Fu merely asserted that Peking remains open to either formal sessions or informal contacts, and that it would remain silent on the talks if so desired by Taipei. In an effort to reassure ROC officials with "doubts" that they will receive good treatment during the talks and after unification, Fu cited not only his own position despite his past record as a "war criminal" but pointedly mentioned the example of PRC treatment accorded the most famous ROC returnee to the mainland, former ROC President Li Tseng-jea, whom he made a point of calling by his honorific name, Li Te-lin.

PRC media devoted extensive coverage to the 28 February meeting but have thus far not followed up with significant comment. Radio Peking extended its usual 30-minute programs on 1 March to 45 minutes in order to cover the session, while Peking's programs to Taiwan were extended from the usual 15 minutes to 45 minutes. The only subsequent developments related to Taiwan have been a 3 March report describing the arrival in Peking of a former ROC commercial attache in Australia and a 1 March account of a meeting of Chinese residents in Japan which stressed the importance of Taiwan's liberation.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 21 -

CHILE

MOSCOW, HAVANA SEE ELECTIONS AS TRIUMPH FOR ALLENDE REGIME

Extensive but repetitive Moscow comment and more limited Havana comment on the 4 March Chilean legislative elections have treated the outcome as a triumph for the Popular Unity (UP) government and a vindication of its program. Both Soviet and Cuban media have emphasized that the UP managed the difficult feat of increasing its share of the popular vote over that obtained in the 1970 presidential elections, ignoring the fact that the earlier election was a three-way race while the current contest involved only two major contenders.

Moscow and Havana also stressed that the opposition's effort to obtain two-thirds control of the Chilean Senate--the number required to impeach President Allende--had been thwarted for the most part ignoring pre-election statements by key opposition spokesmen emphasizing their goal of a simple majority of the popular vote. Although pre-election comment had noted the opposition's view of the contest as a plebiscite and Allende's denials that this was the case, there was scant reference to this point in postelection comment. Moreover, Moscow and Havana conveniently chose to play down the opposition's continuing control of both houses of congress, while highlighting the UP's increased representation in the two chambers.

MOSCOW Exultant Soviet reaction to the election was typified by a 5 March TASS commentary by Nikolay Chigir. Hailing the "new major success" by the UP, Chigir noted that the tendency of the party in power in Chile to lose popular support with the passage of time had been reversed by the Allende regime, with the election serving to demonstrate "convincingly" that the government had "considerably gained in strength in two years and four months" in office. Like other Soviet commentators, he alleged that the aim of the "reactionary" opposition was "to seize political power" by gaining two-thirds control of the Chilean Senate and stressed that this goal had been rejected by the electorate. Chigir characterized the outcome as "a victory of the entire Chilean people" who favor "further implementation of the program of revolutionary socioeconomic transformation" paving the way to Chile's "further socialist development."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

7 MARCH 1973

- 22 -

Although Moscow comment focused on the opposition's failure to gain the two-thirds control of the Senate and on the gain's made by the regime, a Radio Moscow commentary beamed to Latin America on the 6th recalled the opposition's contention that the elections were "a kind of plebiscite to decide the fate of the popular government" wherein Allende would have to "quit and make way for the opposition" if the UP obtained less than half of the votes. However, it went on to denigrate the notion as "unconstitutional in its very essence," implying that the government's continuing minority status would not produce a retrenchment: "The government led by President Salvador Allende is fully determined to continue realizing its program of radical transformations."

Some Moscow comment observed vaguely that the Chilean electoral results would have a salutary influence on the political situation elsewhere in Latin America. Thus, a PRAVDA article on the 7th termed the election "a graphic illustration" of the "significant" political changes taking place on the continent and concluded that it would be "difficult to overestimate" its impact on "the direction of further development of events in Latin American countries." In a similar vein, Radio Moscow the day before predicted that the Chilean balloting would have "broad political repercussions" on Latin American "democratic and progressive circles." The "strengthening" of the government's position, it alleged, was "evidence of the upsurge of the liberation processes, not only in Chile but throughout Latin America."

Despite Moscow's ebullient reaction to the elections, there were some intimations of doubt about the future stability of the Allende regime. A Radio Moscow commentary on the 5th for example, cited Chilean leftist sources as alleging that Chilean extreme rightists "generously supported from the outside" have not eschewed their coupist plans and that "the danger of civil war remains very real." It concluded, however, that Chilean workers were prepared "to repulse any reactionary attempts to foil revolutionary changes."

HAVANA There has been very little Cuban comment on the elections thus far--a limited reaction that may be related to Havana's fundamental skepticism about elections in general and more specifically to its reservations about the feasibility of Allende's effort to build socialism within the confines of a "bourgeois" system. Last September Castro had

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

7 MARCH 1973

- 23 -

been embarrassed by foreign press reports that he had privately alleged that the Chileans would have to abandon "bourgeois legality" if their revolution was to progress. While he strongly denied the reports, they appear consistent with his views on revolution in Latin America.

Havana's initial reaction was by domestic TV commentator Jose Maria Gonzalez Jerez on the 5th in an analysis of the Chilean and French elections. Both contests, he alleged, demonstrated "the victory of the people, their radicalization, and their clearcut veer toward the left--a characteristic of this nascent post-Vietnam phase." Observing that opposition efforts to gain the necessary two-thirds control of the Senate for Allende's impeachment "fell flat," Gonzalez Jerez hailed the election result as "a splendid battle won by the people," one that "sets up more favorable conditions" for the UP to implement its program.

The only other monitored Cuban commentary, by PRENSA LATINA correspondent Pedro Lobaina, examined the results of the senatorial races in Santiago province and their implications for the 1976 presidential contest. In a Santiago-dated dispatch on 6 March, Lobaina noted that former Chilean President and leading Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei was the chief vote-getter among the senatorial candidates--the opposition captured three out of the five of the senate seats at stake in the province--and concluded that he had "emerged as the possible candidate for the right" in the 1976 presidential elections. While noting that of the two victorious UP candidates the Chilean Communist Party's (PCCh) representative had garnered slightly more votes than that of the Socialist Party (PS), he declared that it was "still premature" to forecast who the left's presidential candidate would be. Lobaina concluded that emergence of "a clear majority" for either the PCCh or the PS would "undoubtedly" influence the choice of Allende's successor. PRENSA LATINA on the 5th had carried a PS Political Commission statement declaring that the election had resulted in the party's maintaining "its position as the foremost political force in the UP."

Lobaina's commentary was unusual, since Havana has only rarely acknowledged the sharp political rivalry between the two major elements in the UP coalition. Although PRENSA LATINA correspondents in Santiago have reported to Havana in great detail on policy and ideological conflicts between the PCCh and Allende on the one hand and the more radical PS and extremist Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) on the other, these reports have rarely appeared in Cuban media, presumably because of Castro's desire to avoid any impression of interference in the internal politics of his closest ally in the hemisphere.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA TRENDS

7 MARCH 1973

- 24 -

The only available Havana commentary on the internecine pre-election conflict was by Lobaina on 8 February. Reporting the adoption of the UP political platform after "two weeks of intensive debates on tactics," he noted that "discrepancies among the ruling parties arose over differing priorities." Without spelling out the positions of either party, he indicated that the PCCh regarded the consolidation of existing gains and the improvement of the efficiency in state-run industries as a "key task;" the PS argued that "top priority" must be given to enlarging the "socially owned" sector of the economy. While noting that top PCCh and PS leaders, "in a unity gesture," had sat alongside Allende at a political rally, Lobaina implied that the modus vivendi might not survive the elections. The new UP platform, he charged, "does not define the issues of the recent polemics." The document, he went on to say, "appears to demonstrate, rather, the desire of the UP parties to keep discrepancies from going any further with just a short time to go before the crucial parliamentary elections."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 25 -

YUGOSLAVIA - USSR

TITO STRESSES CLOSER TIES WITH MOSCOW, CONTINUED NONALINEMENT

More cordial relations with the Soviet Union, along with steadfast adherence to the nonalignment policy, were underscored by Tito in a lengthy interview published in the 23 February issue of VJESNIK, the authoritative Zagreb daily of the Socialist Alliance of Working People (SAWP) of Croatia. The interview, which also included remarks on Belgrade's relations with the People's Republic of China and the United States, steered clear of the internal situation--still marked by a continuing purge of "liberal" elements, the latest victims being the top three officials of the SAWP of Serbia.

The Yugoslav President was interviewed by VJESNIK editor Dara Janekovic on Brioni on 5 February, but the interview was not publicized until the 21st when the TANJUG domestic service carried the text, published in identical form in VJESNIK two days later. After discussing Vietnam, Europe, and the Middle East ("the USSR has a right to be interested in the Middle East situation"), Tito stressed that Belgrade's cooperation with the Soviet Union was increasing, mainly in the economic realm. "Since our relations with the Soviet Union improved several years ago," he noted, "our economic cooperation has developed constantly." He added that the USSR "is now in third place, and it could soon be in first place in our trade with foreign countries." Alluding to the Soviet loan granted to Belgrade last November, Tito remarked that "as for the credits, who else would give us half a billion dollars or even more than that--600 to 700 million?" and added that the amount would increase to a billion within a year or two. The USSR, he remarked, is also a valuable market for Yugoslav goods which cannot be sold in Western markets.

Tito made it clear that the bad feelings aroused by the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis no longer stand in the way of improved Moscow-Belgrade relations, noting that "what happened in Czechoslovakia has been outgrown" although Yugoslavia's disagreement with the intervention is well-known. "The Soviet Union is not at war anywhere," he added, praising the USSR's "pacification" course and its "enormous" support for liberation movements in Vietnam and elsewhere.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

YBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 26 -

Tito portrayed Belgrade's policy of nonalignment as approved by the Soviet leaders, "primarily Brezhnev," who "told me they fully agree" with this policy as "beneficial in the struggle against imperialism." At the same time, he remarked that "a little bit of time was needed" before the Soviets could publicly express this view. Regarding the Soviet loan, he insisted, as Belgrade commentaries had last November, that the Yugoslavs had made "no political concessions" to get the loan. He declared that Yugoslavia "is accepted as a nonaligned socialist country outside the Warsaw Pact," pointing out that Belgrade had also accepted credits from the West, including the United States, "and yet we have not joined the Atlantic pact." One factor underlying Tito's emphasis on continued nonalignment was highlighted by a Moscow-dated report in the same newspaper on the 28th stressing Yugoslav-Soviet disagreements on questions of bilateral trade.

The Yugoslav leader portrayed relations with Peking as improving though understandably less developed than those with the USSR, with which Belgrade has party and cultural as well as economic ties. He insisted that he would not take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict, saying he had "told this to Comrade Brezhnev, too."

Relations between Belgrade and the United States, Tito declared, "are not only normal but also good, regardless of the fact that we do not agree with their policy"--a disagreement he said had not prevented increased tourism and economic relations between the two countries.

PRAVDA COVERAGE A Belgrade-dated TASS report of Tito's interview carried in PRAVDA on the 24th briefly cited his reference to Belgrade's nonaligned policy, though not including his remark that the policy had Soviet sanction, and featured his portrayal of developing Moscow-Belgrade relations. While predictably omitting his favorable remarks on relations with Peking, PRAVDA did include his criticism of unspecified attempts "to equate the USSR and the United States" because both are big powers, without taking into account the respective countries' specific actions.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS PRINT

7 MARCH 1973

- 27 -

USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

GOSPLAN DEPUTY CHIEF SOKOLOV OPPOSES CUTBACKS IN AGRICULTURE

In the wake of calls by Premier Kosygin and Gosplan Chairman Baybakov to cut back on construction starts, Gosplan First Deputy Chairman T.I. Sokolov has written an article in the February **PLANNED ECONOMY** expressing concern that this may be done at agriculture's expense. Where Baybakov at the December Supreme Soviet session had sharply assailed the proliferation of local construction projects, Sokolov came out in their defense on grounds that such projects have enabled farms to meet their urgent construction needs. The journal containing Sokolov's article was signed to press on 11 January--three weeks before the demotion of top agricultural spokesman Polyanskiy. Kosygin and Baybakov have usually associated themselves with the interests of industry, while Sokolov is a longtime agricultural spokesman like Polyanskiy.

The current drive to cut back local construction projects was launched by Kosygin at a 30 September Gosplan meeting. Kosygin harshly assailed the proliferation of new construction projects and especially the ballooning of construction financed with noncentralized investments, which in 1971 exceeded the plan by 3.2 billion rubles. Baybakov's report on the 1973 plan at the December Supreme Soviet session likewise complained of "great excesses" in the use of noncentralized investments, such as the construction of unnecessary projects not stipulated in the plan and the resultant diversion of material and labor resources from construction of "very important" projects.

To ensure completion of the "most important" projects, the 1973 plan placed limits on capital investments made through noncentralized sources. This, according to Baybakov, was designed to ensure that the economic priorities stipulated in the five-year plan would be maintained. He pointed out that the previously adopted level of investment for agriculture was being retained, but there were also hints in his speech that this sector may suffer. For example, in citing the need to limit noncentralized investments, he exempted projects financed by sovkhoses operating under full cost-accounting or using special-purpose bank credits, but he said nothing about projects of other sovkhoses and kolkhoses.

The implications of the Kosygin-Baybakov austerity program appear to have alarmed Sokolov, who emerged as an outspoken defender of agriculture immediately following his appointment as Gosplan first

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 28 -

deputy chairman in the spring of 1970. In his latest article Sokolov indicated that agriculture is highly dependent on non-centralized investments because centralized funds are still being diverted from that sector. He pointed out that agricultural construction tasks were overfulfilled in 1971-72, but only because of the overfulfillment of non-centralized financing. And he warned that "attempts to limit farms' rights to use noncentralized capital investments under the pretext of a shortage of material resources are objectively aimed at holding back the growth of the material-technical base of agricultural production," especially since centrally funded materials are not used for many farm construction projects. In another article, in the February ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE, Sokolov had also discussed agricultural needs and urged industry to seek out additional possibilities for producing more fertilizer and equipment for agriculture.

CUTBACKS IN
"NONPRODUCTION"

Sokolov's warnings appears to be directed at cutbacks in the so-called "nonproduction" sphere, which now accounts for only 15 percent of state capital investment in agriculture and includes such projects as the construction of rural housing, schools, hospitals, and the like. Figures cited by Gosplan Deputy Chairman N. Gusev in a February 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE article indicate that while agriculture this year will retain approximately the previously planned level of funds--16.4 billion rubles--construction of production facilities will increase, especially for the two priority fields of livestock complexes and land improvement. Construction of livestock complexes will increase from 622 million rubles in 1972 to 1.1 billion for 1973, while an October 1972 Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree "significantly increased" investment in land improvement, raising it to 5.3 billion rubles, according to Gusev. The increases were apparently obtained at the expense of the nonproduction sphere.

Sokolov, like Polyanskiy, has favored increases in construction not only of rural production facilities but also of rural housing and other nonproduction projects as a means of raising rural living standards. After transferring to Gosplan, Sokolov managed to alter Gosplan's planning practices so that beginning in January 1971 production and nonproduction projects in agriculture were planned jointly rather than independently. The result, according to Sokolov, has been better provision of resources for rural housing and cultural projects, which in the past usually received the leftovers. Investment in rural nonproduction projects increased considerably in 1971 and building materials for such projects

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 29 -

financed by kolkhozes and sovkhoses were supplied from central and republic resources, although, as Sokolov complained, some of these materials were still being diverted to industrial uses. Prospects in this field appeared to brighten when RSFSR Premier Voronov, whose republic was singled out in 13 October 1971 RURAL LIFE for delaying finances and resources for rural construction, was removed in late July 1971 and the Central Committee and Council of Ministers adopted a 26 August 1971 decree levying quotas on ministries for the production of building materials for rural construction.

But the proliferation of kolkhoz and sovkhos construction projects presumably contributed much to the swelling of non-centrally financed construction and to the abuses condemned by Baybakov. An article by L. Braginskiy in the February QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS criticized the absence of central controls over kolkhoz construction projects and urged that such projects be included in the plan. Even Sokolov in his recent article conceded the need to improve control of construction financed by kolkhozes and sovkhoses in order to avoid "excesses" and "mismanagement," but the thrust of his argument was to expand rather than restrict the scope of such construction.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
7 MARCH 1973

- 30 -

CHINA

AGRICULTURAL PRONOUNCEMENTS CONTINUE MODERATE POLICIES

The annual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring planting, released on 2 March, indicates no change in agricultural policies in the wake of last year's disappointing harvest. The editorial calls for continued implementation of the party's moderate rural policies, which have been in full effect since the fall of 1970, following the second party plenum at which the position of Lin Piao and the radicals was eroded. The "most important task" for the coming year in agriculture, according to the editorial, is intensification of "criticism aiming at the political and ideological essence of the revisionist line pushed by swindlers like Liu Shao-chi." Policies advocated include continued stress on all-round development and agricultural diversification, and an unusually strong directive to cadres to personally work on the farms, including "places with harsh living conditions." Implying that natural conditions this year are no better than those which were responsible for last year's disappointing harvest, the editorial quotes "comrades" as saying: "If there is any doubt as to whether or not there will be natural disasters, we must be prepared for this eventuality. If we do not know whether the disaster will be serious or mild, we must be prepared for a serious one."

Continuation of recent policies had been clearly indicated in several provincial and central articles calling for agricultural diversification even though grain harvests were down. A 28 February Peking radio commentary reiterating this line noted that "merely grasping grain, that is, developing an economy through one single sector, cannot satisfy the varied needs of the state and of the people's daily life." This is a direct attack on policies advocated at the height of the cultural revolution when grain was stressed to the detriment of other crops. The reversal of that line had not been reflected fully in the media until the spring planting editorial in 1971, but a September 1970 editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, shortly after the second party plenum, had laid the basis for the changes by denouncing leftist as well as rightist errors in agriculture. There have been several recent provincial references to that editorial as a continuing guide to correct policy.

The 28 February Peking radio commentary criticized the view of "some comrades" who have apparently decided that the answer to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

7 MARCH 1973

- 31 -

current grain shortages is to plant more "high-yield crops" such as sorghum and corn. Rejecting any quick-fix solution to grain shortages, the commentary pointed out that low-yielding crops can eventually be made to yield more and that in any case emphasis on output alone, "causing an unbalanced proportion of the crops planted, will affect the people's daily life and the fulfillment of state plans."

CONFIDENTIAL