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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
CONF

1 OF 1

4 APRIL 1973

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
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In Communist Propaganda

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


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4 APRIL 1973
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 MARCH -- 1 APRIL 1973

<u>Moscow (2659 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1270 items)</u>		
Vietnam	(6%)	11%	Domestic Issues	(48%)	43%
[Madame Binh in	(--)	3%]	Cameroon President	(2%)	18%
USSR			In PRC		
2d Anniversary of 24th	(--)	9%	Vietnam	(5%)	10%
CPSU Congress			Cambodia	(16%)	7%
China	(6%)	6%	[FUNK 3d	(13%)	4%]
Conference of USSR	(--)	5%	Anniversary		
Military Party			UN Seabed Meetings,	(7%)	3%
Secretaries			Superpower "Maritime		
			Hegemony"		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi and the PRG marked the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam with government statements and a flurry of editorial comment reiterating the standard line that the withdrawal is an historic victory. The DRV statement reaffirmed communist intent to abide by the peace accord while warning that peace in Vietnam and the future of U.S.-DRV relations depend upon scrupulous U.S. implementation of the agreement and abandonment of U.S. policies which led to war.

President Nixon's 29 March TV speech prompted a NHAN DAN article on the 31st which acknowledged the substance of his remarks on Vietnam in unusual detail and rebutted his contention that the United States is strictly implementing the peace accord. The article warned that despite U.S. troop withdrawal, "important forces" in Washington are intent on continuing a "neocolonialist" policy in South Vietnam. And a NHAN DAN editorial on 3 April viewed President Thieu's current visit to the United States as another step in U.S. efforts to interfere in Vietnam's internal affairs.

Peking's first substantive commentary on Vietnam since early last month came in a 3 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial supporting the DRV and PRG government statements. NCNA duly carried the texts of those statements, but in its own comment Peking took a more sanguine view of the situation and softpedaled alleged violations of the agreement.

The Soviets gave PRG Foreign Minister Binh a correct but not effusive reception during her official visit to Moscow from 26 March to 2 April. While Podgorny awarded her the Order of the Friendship of the Peoples and lauded the PRG, Moscow's welcome fell far short of the one she was given in Peking last December when, among other things, she was received by Mao. Soviet media have continued to report Vietnamese communist allegations about allied violations of the peace accord but have initiated no authoritative comment. Moscow's low posture on Vietnam developments was illustrated in PRAVDA's report on the President's remarks on Vietnam in his 29 March speech: The report noted his pledge to abide by the peace agreement but said nothing about his warning to the Vietnamese communists regarding their violations of the agreement.

DRV, PRG STATEMENTS HAIL U.S. WITHDRAWAL; NIXON TALK SCORED

In acclaiming the "victory" represented by the final U.S. withdrawal, the DRV and PRG government statements--issued 30 March and 1 April,

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respectively--observed that for the first time in more than a hundred years there are no "invading troops" on Vietnamese soil. At the same time, both statements charged that the United States is still unwilling to end its military involvement and intervention in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, and both called violations of the cease-fire in the past two months a threat to peace. While assailing alleged violations of the peace accord by both Saigon and Washington, the DRV statement placed major responsibility on the United States, demanding that it not only end its own military involvement and intervention in South Vietnam but also "honor its responsibility to prod the Saigon administration to strictly respect and scrupulously implement all the provisions of the Paris agreement."

Consistently over the past two months, Hanoi has pointed to U.S. responsibility regarding Saigon's adherence to the peace accord. For example, a 31 January NHAN DAN editorial suggested that all the signatories are responsible for implementing the provisions for a political settlement in South Vietnam. A 12 February DRV Foreign Ministry statement had also implied a broad U.S. responsibility when it said that along with its own strict adherence to the accord the United States must stop protecting the Saigon administration in its violations. And on 1 March a NHAN DAN editorial went beyond earlier demands that the United States help assure Saigon's implementation of the agreement to suggest that there were in fact secret understandings regarding U.S. responsibilities. It said that in addition to signing the agreement, the United States had made "private commitments on a number of problems."*

In addition to maintaining that the United States is responsible for Saigon's adherence to the peace accord, the DRV Government statement of 30 March warned that U.S. actions are the decisive factor for the future of DRV-U.S. relations as well as for the maintenance of peace. The statement said that only if the United States gives up its policies that led to war and strictly implements the peace accord can there be an "era of reconciliation" and a "new relationship" with the DRV. This notion, which seems to indicate Hanoi concern regarding the course of future U.S. actions, had first been articulated in a 19 March NHAN DAN editorial which warned that the United States must choose between resuming its military involvement or seriously implementing the

* See the TRENDS of 31 January 1973, page 8, 14 February, page 3, and 7 March, page 2.

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peace accord and advancing toward normal relations with the DRV.* This was in sharp contrast to Premier Pham Van Dong's 20 February speech before the National Assembly--a week after Kissinger's visit to Hanoi--in which he merely paraphrased the language of the peace accord in declaring that its "strict implementation" would "create conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship" between the DRV and the United States.

Hanoi's uncertainty about U.S. policies also seems reflected in its reaction to the President's 29 March TV address marking the completion of the U.S. troop withdrawal and the release of the American POW's. Comment on the speech came in the relatively low-level form of an article in NHAN DAN on the 31st which, in referring to unspecified criticism of the speech, raised the suggestion that U.S. leaders were not united around a single Vietnam policy: The paper claimed that "public opinion" had pointed out that the President was silent on "the fact that important forces in the U.S. ruling circles, while wanting to withdraw U.S. troops from the Vietnam quagmire, still cling to the Vietnamization policy in the hope of maintaining their neocolonialism." The article did not elaborate on the positions of various "forces" in the U.S. Government; as in the case of Hanoi comment on the President's 15 March press conference, however, the paper duly reported his charge of DRV infiltration into South Vietnam as well as his "threat" that the Vietnamese should have no doubts about the consequences if they fail to comply with the agreement. The article, as broadcast by Hanoi radio, did not comment on the President's warning but did take issue with his assertion on U.S. compliance with the accord, and it noted U.S. criticism of the President for failing to produce any juridical basis for U.S. air strikes in Cambodia.

Hanoi did comment on the question of possible U.S. retaliation in a 4 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article which criticized Defense Secretary Richardson's remarks, in his 1 April Meet the Press interview, acknowledging that the United States might resume mining and bombing of the DRV. The article recalled that Richardson's statement "followed Nixon's threat of 'retaliatory measures,' emitted twice within just two weeks." It asserted that "what the authorities in Washington say is quite inadmissible," and it charged that "the White House and the Pentagon's threats are meant to give more heart to the U.S. henchmen in Saigon to nibble at the liberated zone."

* The editorial is discussed in the 28 March 1973 TRENDS, pages 1-2.

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Unlike Hanoi, the PRG promptly responded to the President's warning with a 30 March statement by its spokesman in Paris, Le Van Sau. As reported by Liberation Radio, he declared that "the Vietnamese people will never submit to such threats and that President Nixon is well aware that the Vietnamese people have in the recent past stood firm in the face of all U.S. threats and massive bombing." President Nixon's remarks on DRV infiltration drew further attacks in a 3 April Liberation Radio commentary which described the President as "a whistle-blowing international gendarme who has always grossly intervened in other countries' affairs."

Questions about future U.S. policies were also raised in the 3 April NHAN DAN editorial on Thieu's trip to the United States. The editorial took note of Thieu's remark, in a LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR interview, that in the event of a serious communist attack the United States might resume bombing without being asked. Pointing out that the United States has signed the peace agreement, the editorial asked: "How can they resume the bombing? Would they want to re-enact the tragedy which shook the United States and upset their global strategy?" (The Thieu interview had previously been reported in a 1 April Hanoi broadcast which criticized Thieu for "fabricating the story that the PRG is preparing for a major offensive to be launched in the next three to six months.")

Initial reaction to the 3 April Nixon-Thieu communique came the following day in a Liberation Radio broadcast which claimed that in the communique "Nixon continued to advance slanderous allegations about so-called North Vietnamese movements of troops and armaments" to the South and "threatened to make strong reactions." The broadcast also quoted REUTER, however, as noting that the communique "made no specific guarantees to Thieu." The President, the radio charged, is continuing to use Thieu as a tool to implement neocolonialism and Vietnamization and is "paving the way for the Americans to continue to intervene in South Vietnam in the new situation by intensifying the odious slander and brazen intimidation campaign"

Despite the warnings of U.S. persistence in "neocolonialist" schemes vis-a-vis South Vietnam, the propaganda pictures the communists as having won a greater victory than they did against the French in 1954. Along with expressions of jubilation over the withdrawal of the United States, "the main enemy," a NHAN DAN editorial on 30 March said that at the same time "half of our South Vietnam"

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has been "liberated." The editorial contrasted this situation with that in 1954 when the French withdrew and "half the country" was liberated. At the same time, propagandists have been careful to reiterate the reminder that the final objectives of the revolution have yet to be achieved.

In stressing its "victory," Hanoi has admonished the leaders in Saigon that they can no longer count on the United States for help and that "national concord" should be achieved. For example, a 30 March NHAN DAN editorial said that "outcasts in Saigon" should reconsider their actions. And a NHAN DAN editorial on the 3d, while denouncing Thieu as a tool of the United States, at the same time called on the "rulers in Saigon" to return "to live with the people and the fatherland."

U.S. CHARGED WITH VIOLATING ACCORD; POW COMPLAINTS DENIED

Hanoi and the PRG commentaries have continued to berate the United States for a host of alleged violations of the Vietnam peace accord, and Hanoi on 31 March issued a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement claiming--for the second time since the signing of the accord--that U.S. planes had carried out reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. The flights allegedly took place on 29 and 31 March, over Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces. The only other such protest in the past two months, issued on 15 March, claimed that there had been overflights on the 12th and 13th.

Hanoi predictably rejected U.S. denials of communist charges that U.S. military personnel are being illegally retained in South Vietnam. A 3 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article reiterated Hanoi's claim that 10,000 military personnel are staying in the South disguised as civilians, and it specifically denounced recent statements about the civilian forces in the South by State Department spokesman Bray and Defense Secretary Richardson. The U.S. spokesmen's explanations, according to the army paper, were aimed at "covering up their crimes."

REACTION TO POW STATEMENTS Beginning on 1 April, DRV and PRG media rejected recent claims by former U.S. POW's that they had been tortured and mistreated while in communist detention camps. Hanoi radio stated on 1 April that some of these men were "again serving as pawns in the hands of the White House and Pentagon leaders." On 2 April a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, broadcast by Hanoi radio, traced the POW statements to "a White House plan" which called for press conferences in which the former prisoners would detail their "'real situation'" in captivity as soon as all POW's were freed. Referring to a statement "made by Nixon in 1971 in which he

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said North Vietnam was treating the U.S. POW's inhumanely," the commentary alleged that the current campaign is aimed "primarily at easing the psychological impact that runs counter to Nixon's fabrications."

A NHAN DAN commentary, excerpts of which were carried by VNA on 1 April, recalled statements by U.S. observers that the POW's were in good health when they were released and charged U.S. authorities with trying to "rouse bigoted chauvinism among the American people in order to plead for their former mistakes and wreck the friendship between the Vietnamese and American people." It added the warning that "their trick will bring them no good and will not contribute to the building of normal relations between the DRV and the United States, as they often claimed."

COMMENT MARKS END OF FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION

The end of operations by the four-party Joint Military Commission (JMC) was marked with statements, publicized on 31 March, by the chiefs of the DRV and PRG delegations routinely deploring alleged allied violations of the peace agreement. PRG delegation head Tran Van Tra's statement was amplified by a deputy head of the PRG delegation, Vu Dong Giang, at a press conference for foreign newsmen on the 31st. Giang was particularly outspoken on the issue of the United States' failure to dismantle its bases in South Vietnam. He rejected as "ridiculous" the U.S. argument that the bases had been turned over to the Saigon government prior to the signing of the peace accord, asking why, then, the United States had signed the agreement providing for the dismantling of the bases. As in the case of earlier press conferences, Giang deplored the fact that Vietnamese newsmen could not attend, observing that if their presence was forbidden by the constitution then the constitution should be changed.

The first meeting of the two-party JMC, on 29 March, was noted by Hanoi and PRG media in reports on remarks made at the session by Tran Van Tra. A 30 March VNA account of the session reported that the two sides had reached agreement on procedural matters concerning the work of the JMC but complained that the Saigon side had "refused to recognize" previously-agreed-upon points on the privileges and immunities of the two delegations. Hanoi on the 2d belatedly reported the 31 March extraordinary session of the JMC, noting that the PRG representative at the meeting had rejected Saigon charges about communist attacks in the Tong Le Chan area

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and accused the ARVN of provoking the fighting by trying to move into PRG areas after the cease-fire. According to Hanoi radio's account, the PRG also denounced Saigon's "incorrect attitude" in calling for the cancellation of JMC sessions.

Hanoi has warmly welcomed a visit by the PRG chief delegate to the JMC and the return of the DRV delegation to the now-defunct four-party JMC. Tra arrived in Hanoi on 30 March and was met by a group of North Vietnamese military figures led by the head of the General Political Department, Song Hao. On the following day Tra was received by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and other leaders of the Defense Ministry, and on 2 April he met with Premier Pham Van Dong. Giap on 1 April also received the DRV's JMC delegation, which had returned on the preceding day, and in remarks on both occasions he expressed an optimistic view of the conditions for the Vietnamese revolution. At the 1 April gathering he propounded the theory that the United States had underestimated Vietnamese strength 18 years ago and had had to correct that mistake by stopping the war through negotiations and the signing of the peace agreement. He added the warning: "Now they should think twice before plunging into new adventurous schemes and acts."

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PEKING OFFERS RESTRAINED SUPPORT FOR ALLIES' PRONOUNCEMENTS

Peking responded with careful restraint to the 30 March DRV and 1 April PRG government statements on the implementation of the Paris peace agreement over the past two months, accenting the positive achievements while softpedaling its Vietnamese allies' charges against the United States. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 3 April, Peking's only substantive commentary on Vietnam since early last month, highlighted the completed U.S. troop withdrawal as having created "favorable conditions" for the Vietnamese to settle their own affairs and as thus representing "an important result" of the implementation of the Paris accord. Reflecting Peking's interest in a settlement and its sanguine view of developments, the editorial characterized the completion of "some important provisions" of the agreement--the U.S. withdrawal, return of POWs, establishment of the ICCS, and the international conference--as "conducive to the maintenance of peace in Vietnam and the easing of the situation in Southeast Asia."

Earlier, in "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with the DRV and PRG envoys in Peking on 30 March, Chou En-lai congratulated the Vietnamese on "their tremendous victories" in the war and "in implementing" the Paris agreement. NCNA's account of the meeting made no mention of the DRV statement that day, but Chou was quoted as having "firmly supported the correct attitude and the solemn and just stand" of the DRV and PRG regarding implementation of the agreement. In a highly unusual departure from Peking's customary prompt reporting of such meetings, the NCNA report was dated 4 April, five days after the fact. Peking may have delayed the report in order to assess the DRV and the subsequent PRG statements and to prepare its own editorial comment. It may also have decided to issue the report in response to President Nixon's meeting with Thieu.

NCNA duly carried the texts of the DRV and PRG statements, but in its own name Peking has struck a balance between supporting its allies and sustaining a propitious atmosphere for Sino-U.S. relations. Thus, on the question of violations of the Paris agreement, the Chinese editorial placed primary blame on Saigon and only secondarily on the United States, in contrast to Hanoi's stress on U.S. responsibility. Similarly, Chou on the 30th had condemned Saigon for allegedly violating the agreement "with the support of the United States." The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial criticized the United States in mild terms for retaining "disguised" military personnel in Vietnam, delaying the removal of mines, and continuing

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air strikes in Cambodia, but there was no echo of the more sweeping Vietnamese charges that the United States is seeking to maintain "neocolonialism" in South Vietnam, has continued bombing in Laos, and has maintained a force in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia that directly menaces the security of the region. In keeping with Peking's silence on President Nixon's warnings to the communists in his 15 March and 29 March remarks, the editorial also failed to repeat the Vietnamese charge that the United States has threatened to use force against the DRV.

On the score of Saigon's alleged violations, the editorial seconded charges relating to cease-fire violations and persecution of the South Vietnamese people, but there was no attempt to match the Vietnamese communists' portrayal of these acts as "in no way different in scale and atrocity from wartime operations." The editorial also avoided Hanoi's claim that the alleged violations have created "an extremely grave situation which directly threatens peace in South Vietnam."

The editorial concluded by routinely pledging that the Chinese will "firmly support" their allies' "just struggle." In Peking's only other recent elite pledge of support, Politburo member Yao Wen-yuan was reported by NCNA as declaring during a 1 April meeting with a visiting DRV youth delegation that the Chinese will continue backing the Vietnamese "like brothers" and that the two peoples will maintain their friendship "for generation after generation."

VIETNAMESE GOALS In addition to the five-day delay in releasing the report on the meeting, another curious feature of NCNA's account of Chou's talk with the DRV and PRG representatives on 30 March was the set of goals he attributed to the "Vietnamese people's cause." According to NCNA, Chou expressed his belief that their "cause for peace, independence, democracy, and national concord" will surely triumph. Such a list of goals notably omits the customary reference to reunification, unless the much vaguer reference to "national concord" can be taken as a substitute. In contrast, the 3 April PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial concluded with an expression of confidence that the "Vietnamese people's national aspirations for the peace, reunification, independence, democracy, and prosperity of their fatherland" will surely be realized. Likewise, the 28 January PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and the Chinese leaders' message on the next day hailing the Vietnam agreement contained these five goals.

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PRG FOREIGN MINISTER BINH PAYS OFFICIAL VISIT TO USSR

PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh's visit to Moscow as head of an "official friendship" delegation, from 26 March to 2 April, received correct but not unduly effusive treatment. While Binh met with Podgorny as well as with Gromyko, there was no indication that she was received by either Brezhnev or Kosygin. By contrast, her official visit to Peking last December had occasioned an unusually strong leadership turnout.*

The joint communique is available at this writing only in summary form, as carried by TASS on the 3d. Judging from the summary, while the communique expressed concern over serious violations by Saigon, it contained no charge of U.S. violations. However, TASS noted that it said "both sides believe that the United States, just as the other sides, should strictly fulfill the Paris agreement." In conclusion, TASS reported, the Soviet side reaffirmed its support for the Vietnamese cause as its internationalist duty.

Circumspection regarding U.S. implementation of the peace accord was also reflected in Podgorny's remarks during the visit. Speaking on the 28th when he presented the Order of Friendship of the Peoples to Mme. Binh, Podgorny referred to Saigon's attempts to sabotage the peace but did not mention the United States. The Soviet leader followed a similar pattern on 2 April when Binh again met with him to hand over a copy of the 1 April PRG statement on implementation of the peace accord during the past two months. Thus, judging from the TASS report, Podgorny "resolutely condemned the actions of the Saigon authorities" but apparently ignored the anti-U.S. charges in the statement. Moscow, however, duly reported both the PRG and DRV government statements; and a radio commentary on the 3d, reviewing Binh's visit, noted that the PRG statement accused the United States of maintaining a covert military presence in South Vietnam and of illegally delivering arms to the GVN.

In presenting the friendship order, Podgorny went beyond prior elite Soviet statements when he called the PRG "the lawful spokesman of the interests of all the South Vietnamese people." He observed that the award was in recognition of Mme. Binh's great services in the strengthening of international solidarity of all progressive and democratic forces. Binh in reply expressed "sincere and deep-felt gratitude" to the Soviets for their "great and valuable" assistance which she called an important factor in the Vietnamese communists' victory.

* See the TRENDS of 4 January 1973, pages 13-15.

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Binh's other activities included a meeting with alternate Politburo member Ponomarev as well as with Foreign Minister Gromyko, who hosted a luncheon for her on the 28th. She also met with various public organizations and spoke at a Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship meeting on the 29th, on that occasion again expressing her people's gratitude for the Soviet Union's active support.

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U S S R - U N

MOSCOW CALLS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON NONUSE OF FORCE

In NEW TIMES, PRAVDA, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA articles last week Moscow called on the UN Security Council to take measures to implement the General Assembly's resolution on nonuse of force and a permanent ban on the use of nuclear weapons (NUF). The compromise resolution, which was passed last fall after the new Soviet initiative on this issue, had called on the Security Council to take "appropriate measures" for its implementation as soon as possible. To date the NUF package has received only modest publicity in Soviet media. The notable exception was Brezhnev's statement at the USSR's 50th Anniversary celebrations last December indicating the USSR's willingness to sign bilateral NUF agreements with the nuclear powers. That offer was renewed most recently by Soviet delegate Roshchin at a session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva reported by TASS on 29 March.*

The propaganda dimension of the renewed call for Security Council action on NUF was apparent in the nature of the action called for. G. Stakh, in the 23 March 1973 (No. 12) NEW TIMES, recommended that the decision be made in accordance with Article 25 of the UN Charter under which member states agree to "accept and carry out" the decisions of the Security Council. According to Stakh, such a procedure would "make it possible to avoid the complex procedures of internal legislation connected with the adoption of international obligations by a number of states."

Stakh, as well as V. Viktorov in the 31 March PRAVDA and Boris Svetlov in the 30 March SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, criticized Chinese opposition to the resolution last fall. That Moscow had the West as well as Peking in mind in setting forth the NUF proposal, however, was suggested in Stakh's explanation of Moscow's reasons for linking the general nonuse of force pledge with a specific ban on the use of nuclear weapons--a subject that was obscured in earlier comment. Clearly alluding to past West European and U.S. objections to nuclear weapons ban proposals, he explained that NUF provides a way out of the "vicious circle" in which "powers which possess nuclear weapons have in the past repeatedly alluded to the presence in other states of powerful armed forces equipped with conventional weapons in order to avoid banning nuclear weapons."

* Poland's Vice Foreign Minister Jan Bisztyga in a 12 March speech (discussed in the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, page 9) implied that Moscow will also push NUF as a major agenda item at the proposed world disarmament conference.

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USSR - GERMANY

MOSCOW BEGINS PREPARATION FOR BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRG

Moscow has begun to prepare the ground for Brezhnev's tentatively scheduled May visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, the first by the top Soviet party leader, although the Soviet people have yet to be officially informed that the visit is planned. Moscow's central media had not publicized the invitation extended by Brandt to Brezhnev during their September 1971 Crimea talks, nor did Moscow report Brezhnev's subsequent statement to a West German correspondent in Minsk--at the time of the January Pompidou-Brezhnev talks--that an invitation was outstanding but that no date had yet been set.* The media have now begun to depict West German pleasure over the "possible" visit, in anticipation of a firming up of arrangements that will permit an announcement of the dates.

Noting that a "great deal" of comment had been stimulated by the 26 March meeting between Brezhnev and FRG Ambassador Sahn, IZVESTIYA's M. Mikhaylov observed in the 1 April Moscow domestic service observers' roundtable program that the West German press is calling "this noteworthy event" a "beginning of a new dialog between the top leaders of the two states." Recalling the 1971 meeting between Brezhnev and Brandt, Mikhaylov said that Soviet-West German relations "have been developing favorably" since the ratification of the USSR-FRG treaty; and without explicitly stating that Brezhnev will meet with Brandt, he observed that it was understandable that the public should greet with satisfaction the news of "a continuation of contacts at the summit level." He went on to say that both the FRG and the USSR are now "showing readiness for a further expansion of cooperation and a deepening of mutual understanding."

On the 3d TASS carried a long dispatch from Bonn reviewing West German press discussion of the "possible visit" by Brezhnev. Observing that the West German papers say the visit "will be held in the near future, although no definite date has yet been

* The West German DPA reported on the 3d, citing Bonn "diplomatic circles," that Bonn had suggested 12-18 May for the visit and that Moscow was expected to respond within the next few days.

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net," TASS went on to point out the "political importance" the West Germans attach to the idea, quoting one paper as pointing out that this will be Brezhnev's first visit to Bonn. Reflecting sensitivity to old animosities toward the Germans dating from World War II, TASS pointedly quoted one West German paper's comment that Brezhnev "wants to emphasize that the lengthy period of confrontation is becoming a matter of the past." Discussing the developing USSR-FRG relationship, TASS also noted that West German spokesmen have mentioned the possibility that bilateral agreements on cultural and scientific-technical cooperation and air travel may be signed during the visit.

KOSYGIN, PONOMAREV SPEECHES Kosygin's speech at a dinner in Stockholm on 2 April contained passages that seemed contrived with an eye to Brezhnev's West German trip. In remarks devoted almost entirely to the developing international detente, with particular reference to Europe, Kosygin went out of his way to laud the Brandt government for its policy of "realism." Singling out only the Brandt-Scheel government in addition to the Soviet Union and "other socialist countries" for praise in this connection. Kosygin paid tribute to the FRG's "realism" as a factor which had contributed to bringing about a change toward the question of European security, particularly "full respect by all [countries] of the existing European borders." While outlining in general terms the Soviet aims for the European security conference, Kosygin made no mention of the Vienna force reduction talks.

Along with these intimations of closer ties with the FRG, Moscow has sought to reassure the GDR leadership that the Soviet-West German relationship can develop only along nonideological lines. Thus CPSU Politburo candidate member Ponomarev, in a broad-ranging speech reviewing world developments since the 1969 Moscow international communist conference, told the 15-16 March conclave of communist parties in East Berlin--convened to honor the 125th anniversary of the Communist Manifesto--that "on the question of ideology there is not nor can there be any cooperation with the West German Social Democrats." Naming Brezhnev as the authority for this position, Ponomarev noted that Soviet-FRG cooperation is limited to "finding common points of view" in developing peaceful relations between the two countries and in Europe. He described the FRG treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, the four-power agreement on "West Berlin," and the agreements between the FRG and the GDR--"two sovereign German states"--as constituting a "recognition under international law of the territorial and political realities on the European continent." Thus, Ponomarev concluded, "the final line has essentially been drawn under the results of World War II."

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USSR - UK

MOSCOW AGAIN SIGNALS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH LONDON

Moscow has again conveyed its interest in improving relations with London in an article by TASS director general Leonid Zamyatin. In a 29 March SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA article, written in response to a London TIMES article on the deterioration of Soviet-British relations, Zamyatin declared that "the leaders of our country stated that we are prepared to improve relations with those European countries with which they are still not smooth--provided, of course, they show a willingness to do the same." The passage cited is from Brezhnev's 21 December speech, which did not mention Britain by name.

Zamyatin, in reviewing relations between the two countries, stated that the Soviet Union was "optimistic about the development of bilateral relations with Britain, realizing full well that there is a great store of friendly sentiments amidst the British people for the Soviet people and an understanding that Britain was just as interested as the Soviet Union in all-round business cooperation." He sought to place the onus for the current climate of hostility on the Conservative government and the British press. He appealed to the British press to improve, rather than "undermine," Soviet-British relations in the present period of developing European detente.

It is noteworthy that TASS transmitted the Zamyatin article textually in its international English service, a procedure usually reserved for significant speeches, documents, and articles. The Zamyatin article is the latest in a series of his commentaries in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on important international issues. On 18 January, in a review of the Pompidou-Brezhnev meeting at Minsk, he discussed the possibility of French participation in force reduction talks; on 27 February he discussed the 15-19 February Kissinger visit to the PRC; and on 13 March he reviewed the state of Soviet-Japanese relations.

A similar hint of Moscow's attitude had come in an article in the 23 February London EVENING NEWS by Victor Louis. Opening his article with the statement that "Moscow would very much like to see the Queen in Russia," Louis observed that there was "hope" in the Kremlin that such a state visit was "more than a possibility." Louis made this statement in the context of discussing the

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possibility that Prince Philip and Princess Anne would visit in Kiev in September for an international equestrian competition and would extend their stay in the USSR at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet--a move described by Louis as "breaking the ice" in the "still strained relations" between Moscow and London.

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CHINA

PRC PROMOTES "NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT" IN THIRD WORLD

Reflecting a major element in its current foreign policy, Peking has introduced a new formula into its lexicon: "the national independence movement." This formula, which is to be distinguished from "the national liberation movement," encapsulates Peking's moves across a broad front to identify its interests with those of a wide variety of third-world states and to broaden its diplomatic base in the international community in competition with the superpowers. It also registers a shift in the 1970's from Peking's former obsession with the politics of insurgency--in which Vietnam was held up as a model of people's war--to an active diplomatic campaign that has markedly enhanced its international political assets and overcome its earlier isolation.

The Chinese made use of last month's UN Security Council meeting held in Panama City as an appropriate forum for promoting the theme of a growing national independence movement in the third world. Speaking on 19 March, PRC representative Huang Hua noted that the Panama City meeting and a Security Council session in Africa last year marked the first time that the council had met in Africa and Latin America since the founding of the UN. According to Huang, this shows that during that period important changes have taken place in the international arena and "great progress has been made in the national independence movement" in Africa and Latin America. He added that countries in the third world--among which Peking counts itself--"are enjoying an increasingly higher and stronger position and role" in international affairs.

Identifying China as a developing country, like the Latin American countries, Huang set forth a Chinese model for the developing nations, much as Peking had formerly propagated the Chinese revolutionary experience as a model of people's war for the national liberation movement. In both cases self-reliance has been stressed while external aid has been minimized as being of only supplementary value. Thus, according to Huang's reading of the Chinese experience in "the independent development of national economy," it is "most essential to rely on one's own strength and to wage protracted arduous struggle in pursuance

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of the policy of relying mainly on one's own efforts while seeking external assistance as an auxiliary."*

Peking took another opportunity to enunciate its policy on the occasion of the recent visit by the Cameroon president. A 25 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial welcoming the visitor hailed the Cameroon Government for its policy of nonalignment and its support for "the national independence movement in Africa." According to the editorial, Cameroon opposes the "monopoly of international affairs by the superpowers" and advocates "stronger unity and closer cooperation" with countries of the third world. Striking a recurrent theme of common interests among these countries, the editorial observed that the people of China and Cameroon had the common experience of suffering from imperialist oppression and now are "confronted with the common task of opposing imperialism and building their own countries."

FROM INSURGENCY TO COOPERATION Peking's vigorous, wide-ranging effort to develop friendly and cooperative relations with a variety of governments represents a reversal of Chinese priorities in the 1960's, when the ideological needs deriving from the Sino-Soviet rivalry dictated an emphasis on insurgent movements as representing the Maoist revolutionary model. That trend had been further fueled by the "Red Guard diplomacy" of the cultural revolution, with its xenophobic overflow into foreign affairs. In the present phase, however, Peking has sought to establish its credentials as a trustworthy friend of the developing countries and as a supporter of their efforts to counteract superpower hegemony.

In addition to the ongoing efforts to develop diplomatic and trade relations as well as to offer Chinese aid, Peking has tried to make clear its determination to promote friendship and cooperation without undue regard for ideological considerations. Thus, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei declared during a speech before a group of Tanzanian visitors on 20 August 1972 that the PRC "is determined to establish and develop friendly relations with all the independent African countries" on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. On 17 September Chou En-lai, whose

* Lin Piao's September 1965 tract on people's war insisted that "it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance" in fighting a people's war and that "foreign aid can only play a supplementary role."

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pronouncement in the previous decade that Africa was ripe for revolution had evoked shudders among African leaders, offered his assurance at a banquet for the Zambian vice president that the Chinese are determined to "continue their efforts" to establish friendly relations with "all independent African states" while supporting the national liberation struggles of those peoples still under colonialist rule.

Two visits by African heads of state before the recent one by the Cameroon president exemplified Peking's current approach. After having previously supported the Eritrean Liberation Front's campaign against Ethiopian control, Peking in late 1970 established diplomatic ties with Addis Ababa and in 1971 warmly welcomed Emperor Haile Selassie for a visit. More strikingly, Peking early this year cordially received Zaire President Mobutu, who had formerly been reviled as "chief running dog for U.S. imperialism in Africa."

Peking thus far has taken a less ecumenical approach toward Latin American states, perhaps reflecting a reluctance to offer a blanket endorsement that would embrace regimes with which Peking would be loath to identify common interests. Nonetheless, as registered in the formula on the national independence movement, Peking has replaced its former ideological propaganda keyed to the Sino-Soviet competition in the communist movement with a campaign linking the PRC's interests with those of a widening range of Latin American states.

The other area of the third world, Asia, presents even more complications and has not been explicitly included within the new formula. In Asia Peking has followed a dual approach of cultivating better relations with existing governments while offering limited support for selected insurgent movements. Here also, however, the trend has been toward diplomatic rather than insurrectionary instrumentalities.

REGIONAL UNITY In the process of encouraging African and Latin American governments to pursue a policy of national independence, Peking has demonstrated an increasingly favorable view of various regional groupings of states that are promoting unified opposition to extraregional forces. NCNA's 30 December 1972 yearend review of the situation in Latin America carefully noted Peking's changed assessment of the role played by the Organization of American States and other inter-American bodies, stating that such groups in the past had been "instruments of the United States" but have increasingly become forums for unity against the superpowers. A similar trend has been reflected in

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Peking's view of the Organization of African Unity and similar inter-African bodies which Peking now welcomes as safeguards for African interests. Chou expressed this view in remarks at a 27 March reception in Peking given by African diplomats in which he hailed African unity as the means "to win and safeguard independence" in the struggle "against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, and hegemonism."

Peking's stress on African cohesion has been reflected in its line on African insurgent movements directed against colonial and white-ruled sub-Saharan states. In the past Peking had usually bestowed its favor only on those segments of the insurgent movements that would tout Peking's line and eschew Moscow's tutelage--a policy that had the familiar effect of splitting liberation groups into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions. Now, however, Peking has begun publicizing efforts sponsored by the OAU and other African groups designed to reunify these splintered movements in the interest of more effectively conducting the struggle against white-ruled regimes. Most recently, NCNA last month reported on the unification as a result of OAU mediation of a PRC-backed anti-Rhodesian insurgent group with its Soviet-backed counterpart.

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C U B A

HAVANA ENDORSES "IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM" IN LATIN AMERICA

Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, speaking at a meeting of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in Quito on 26 March, embraced the concept of "ideological pluralism" in Latin America--in effect formalizing policies that Havana has followed in Latin America during the past four years. He declared that until socialism triumphed throughout Latin America the Cuban regime would "work in association with dissimilar political and social systems." However, in defining the concept of "ideological pluralism," Rodriguez stipulated that it did not mean coexistence with hostile regimes or hostile ideologies.

Rodriguez' statement provides ideological justification for Havana's policy of courting regimes which pursue courses of action inimical to the United States regardless of their professed ideologies. Havana's endorsement of pluralism at this time appears related to its belief that polarization is growing in the hemisphere and that the United States is becoming increasingly isolated. Both the ECLA conclave and the UN Security Council meeting in Panama have been cited regularly by Cuban media as evidence of this phenomenon.

Implicit in Rodriguez' statement was the notion that ideological differences between Latin American states must be submerged in the interest of hemispheric unity vis-a-vis the United States. He made this clear in a Havana TV interview on the 28th after his return from Quito, when he was asked whether a U.S.-Latin American "confrontation" was occurring. Rodriguez noted in reply that "a process of unity vis-a-vis the United States' position again surfaced at the ECLA meeting" despite "the diversity of regimes in Latin America." Alleging that "we accept the present ideological plurality but we do not resign ourselves to it," he concluded that the Cuban example had been a catalyst in promoting the confrontation.

In his address to the ECLA, published in the Cuban party organ GRANMA on the 27th, Rodriguez stressed that there were certain limitations on Cuban acceptance of ideological diversity. For Cuba, he said, "ideological pluralism" does not signify "coexistence with petty tyrants" or a betrayal of "peoples who

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see in the Cuban revolution a vision of their own destiny." And a 29 March PRENSA LATINA commentary, highlighting the significance of Rodriguez' remarks, noted that he had severely criticized such "reactionary" regimes as those of Brazil and Paraguay. It went on to report that at a Guayaquil press conference Rodriguez had said Havana's "acceptance of peaceful coexistence" in Latin America did not denote any slackening of "the ideological struggle--which is more necessary now than ever to help the countries of the area understand the fatal consequences of the capitalist system."

BACKGROUND The PRENSA LATINA commentary stated that the concept of ideological pluralism had been "accepted in fact but not verbally until now by the leaders of the revolution." The Cuban shift away from a virtually exclusive policy of supporting Latin American guerrilla movements seeking to topple established regimes had come in 1969. A more flexible approach was signaled by Havana's public endorsement of the "revolutionary" character of the newly established Peruvian military regime. Although Havana had initially censured the Peruvian leaders as typical Latin American "gorillas," it quickly changed its line with Castro hailing as "revolutionary measures" the new regime's expropriation of International Petroleum Company assets and the enactment of a new agrarian reform law.

While he did not use the term "ideological pluralism," Castro espoused a similar concept in his April 1970 Lenin Day speech. Noting that Havana's support for revolution did not have to be confined solely to guerrilla movements, he asserted that it could extend to "any government that sincerely adopts a policy of economic and social growth and is for liberating the country from the Yankee imperialist yoke." Castro stressed that "regardless of how such a government has come to power, Cuba will support it." In Havana's estimate, such criteria have already been met by Chile and Panama as well as Peru and by the Caribbean ministates that recently established relations with Cuba. Regime spokesmen have even intimated that Ecuador and Argentina (after the Peronists take power next month) may also qualify for membership in this circle.

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U S S R

NEW CAMPAIGN LAUNCHED AGAINST UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

The Ukrainian leadership has launched a new offensive against Ukrainian nationalism, marked by regional meetings called to intensify "international education" and denounce nationalist deviations. Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy touched off the campaign with a 16 March speech stressing the primacy of national values and interests over provincial ones. Shcherbitskiy has emphasized these themes ever since he succeeded Shelest last May, reflecting a reaction against Shelest's promotion of Ukrainian historical traditions and his defense of Ukrainian economic interests. At the same time, the exposure of nationalist deviations in literature and the arrest of a foreign tourist for contacts with dissident Ukrainian writers have apparently served as pretexts for a new shakeup in the Ukrainian writers union, placing the most reactionary writers in firm control.

REGIONAL MEETINGS According to RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 17 March, Shcherbitskiy launched the new offensive at a Kiev aktiv meeting the previous day with a call for greater emphasis on the notion of "a new historical community of people--the Soviet people--and the significance of a unitary national economic complex for development of each union republic and the country as a whole." Emphasizing a class approach to evaluating the past, he attacked the idealization of "patriarchalism" and the stress on Ukrainian nationhood in Ukrainian literature. Assailing errors by the Ukrainian institutes of archaeology and philosophy and by the Ukrainian Society for the Protection of Monuments of History and Culture, he called for closer party control over writers and publishers and personnel in the social sciences.

Addressing the same meeting, Kiev First Secretary V. M. Tsybulko attacked the Kiev city organizations for failing to take effective action against manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism and Zionism, antisocial acts, "incorrect understanding of our Soviet life," and "ideologically harmful" literary works. Deputy party secretary of the Ukrainian writers union B. Chalyy likewise declared that lack of firm ideological leadership had encouraged some writers "to get carried away with false romanticizing of the past, patriarchalism, and ethnography and sometimes deviate from class evaluations of the past and present."

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The Kiev meeting was followed by similar aktiv meetings in Lvov, Donetsk, Kharkov, Poltava, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernigov and Vinnitsa. While attacks on nationalism are common in Lvov and the western Ukraine, such attacks are rare in the east Ukrainian cities of Kharkov and Poltava. However, the meetings in these two cities received special attention, as they were supervised by Secretary for Ideology Malanchuk and Premier Lyashko, respectively. The Kharkov meeting called for increased vigilance against Ukrainian nationalism and Zionism, while the Poltava meeting criticized manifestations of an "oversimplified approach" to the nationality question and an "incorrect understanding of historical processes." Party committees in Poltava were instructed to intervene more directly in the choice of repertoires for professional and amateur cultural groups to ensure greater emphasis on "teaching the workers a feeling of pride in belonging to one socialist fatherland and to the great international family of fraternal people."

'DISTORTIONS' OF HISTORY Attacks on nationalist deviations in historical novels commenced immediately after the replacement of Shelest protege F. D. Ovcharenko by the reactionary historian V. Yu Malanchuk as ideology secretary on 10 October. LITERATURNA UKRAINA ON 20 October reported that a historical novel by Ivan Bilik and a science fiction work by Oles Berdnik had been criticized for ideological errors, and a long 17 November LITERATURNA UKRAINA article berated Bilik's novel for portraying Ukrainian culture as predating Russian culture.

Bilik and Berdnik were again criticized in LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 6 February and RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 18 February, but a writers meeting was reported in LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 6 March to have heard complaints that Bilik's novel had not been adequately criticized. Citing Bilik's historical errors, conservative Kiev writers union chairman Yuriy Zbanatskiy closed the meeting by urging a joint conference of historians and writers to enable writers to gain a proper understanding of the Kievan period in history. In the wake of these attacks, LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 20 March reported that a 15 March writers union presidium meeting had accepted the resignation of the chief editor of the Soviet Writer Publishing House, which had been criticized by Zbanatskiy in October for publishing Bilik's work.

RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 13 March announced the arrest of a Ukrainian tourist from West Germany who was alleged to have contacted Berdnik and two other Ukrainian writers. Berdnik was assailed for accepting gifts sent by anti-Soviet emigres.

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WRITERS UNION SHAKEUP RADYANSKA UKRAINA on 24 March reported a Ukrainian writers union board plenum on the "ideological convictions of the Soviet writer." The plenum, which was attended by Malanchuk, heard demands for a class approach to evaluation of the past and condemnation of writers who violate the writers union statutes and "bring shame on the high title of Soviet writer." Writers union first deputy chairman Vasil Kozachenko, longtime leader of the hardline faction, keyed the plenum, assailing Bilik's novel and calling the matter "much more serious than the author and certain defenders of his novel pretend," according to the 27 March LITERATURNA UKRAINA account of his speech. He also attacked Berdnik for writing works propagating the "messianism" of the Ukrainian nation and for disseminating hundreds of "provocatory" letters, some of which were published abroad. He cited the 13 March RADYANSKA UKRAINA article to show that Berdnik "willingly associates with doubtful nationalist elements from abroad" and violates the writers union statutes.

At the conclusion of the plenum, 72-year old Yuriy Smolich resigned as leader of the writers union, allegedly for reasons of health, and was replaced by Kozachenko. The posts of chairman, deputy chairman, and organizational secretary were abolished in favor of a secretariat, consisting of First Secretary Kozachenko and Pavlo Zagrebelnyy, Yuriy Zbanatskiy, Oleksandr Levada, and Ivan Soldatenko. Zagrebelnyy and Zbanatskiy had been deputy chairmen and Soldatenko had been organizational secretary. Deputy chairman Boris Oliynik, a moderate, was dropped, leaving Zagrebelnyy as the only moderate in the top leadership. Zagrebelnyy has been under fire for his historical novel "Death in Kiev," which allegedly portrayed an embellished image of a tsarist prince. The novel had been criticized at meetings reported in LITERATURNA UKRAINA on 12 December and 6 March, but at the latter meeting Zagrebelnyy defended the novel and the right of writers to interpret history without being dictated to by historians.

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ALL-ARMY CONFERENCE SHUNS DOCTRINAL ISSUES, BOOSTS BREZHNEV

The first all-army conference of secretaries of party organizations to be held in 13 years met in the Kremlin from 27 to 29 March to hear a series of largely self-congratulatory speeches on the work of party organizations in the armed forces and on the status of party-military affairs in general. Pegged to the recent issuance of new Regulations and Instructions governing the functions of political organs and party organizations in the armed forces, the conference concerned itself mainly with low-level organizational and morale-training questions. As for the larger issues between the party and the military--the questions of the respective provinces of political control and institutional prerogatives--no hint of dissatisfactions emerged from the spokesmen of either side. Indeed, the conference marked a post-Khrushchev high in declarations of mutual satisfaction in this regard, with Grechko's assertion that the Politburo "headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev" concerned itself "directly" with all issues of military development representing an extreme, but characteristic, expression of the love-feast atmosphere/ which this feature of the proceedings exhibited.

In this respect, the conference was in marked contrast with the last such conference which met from 11 to 14 May 1960--a period of turmoil in party-military relations following the ouster of Zhukov. The first steps in restoring party control had been taken in 1958, when new Regulations and Instructions on political organs and party organizations were issued; the 1960 conference represented the second step and was aimed at reinforcing the 1958 reforms. The thrust of the deliberations, thus, reflected a clearly pro-party bias.

By contrast, the speeches at the present conference appear to reflect a pro-army bias--in the sense that they gave precedence to the combat-related, as opposed to the more purely indoctrinational, aspects of military training. Most speakers, in referring to the subject, listed the tasks of political work in the above order, and one, General Yepishev, described the shift of emphasis to the professional side of the soldier's training as a "povorot"--a turning point--in the style of political work.

That the dividing line between these two aspects of training is likely to become blurred under the new dispensation is suggested by some of the goals of political work in a number of the speeches. They include injunctions: (1) to raise the combat readiness of the armed forces; (2) to encourage an offensive

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spirit among the troops; (3) to support the campaign for a better understanding of weapons and equipment; (4) to inspire a forward-looking spirit in military affairs, particularly with respect to the potentialities of science and technology. One speaker, Marshal Kutakhov, went so far as to suggest that party-political work was simply an exemplary performance of military duties. "It is carried on everywhere," he said, "on flights and during exercises."

Marshal Grechko's unstinting tribute to the party and Brezhnev personally was notable both as a declaration of the military's allegiance to the political leadership, and as an example of the political benefits Brezhnev has been able to derive from his patronage of military interests. In these respects, the statement is unparalleled in the post-Khrushchev era:

In deciding the great and important national economic tasks, the party, its Central Committee, and the Politburo of the Central Committee, always keep the questions of national defense at the center of their attention and regard the strengthening of the Armed Forces as one of the most important tasks of their practical activity. There is not a single question affecting the development of the Armed Forces, regardless of how important or unimportant it may be, that is not addressed by the Central Committee, and by the Politburo directly, under the leadership of Comrade L.I. Brezhnev.

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