

[REDACTED] #22-73

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060022-9

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

31 MAY 1973

CONF


Confidential

F B I S

TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

STATSPEC




Confidential

31 MAY 1973

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

STATSPEC



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

CONTENTS

INDOCHINA

Le Duan, Pham Van Dong to Visit Peking In "Early June"	1
FUNK, DRV Deny Cambodian Settlement; Peking Attacks Soviets . . .	5
Hanoi Silent on Kissinger-Tho Talks, Scores Sullivan Remarks . . .	8
DRV, PRG Urge France to Establish Relations With PRG	9

U.S.-USSR

USSR, East Europe See Favorable Conditions for Summit	11
---	----

USSR-EGYPT

Moscow Plays Down az-Zayyat Visit, Security Council Debate . . .	13
USSR Hints at Differences in Treaty Anniversary Comment	14

USSR-ASIA

Podgorny Promotes Asian Security System in Afghanistan	15
--	----

CHINA-EUROPE

Peking Reacts in Low Key to Brezhnev Visit to FRG	18
---	----

POLAND-FRG

Warsaw Hedges on Brezhnev FRG Visit, Notes Unresolved Issues . .	20
--	----

USSR

Brezhnev's Controversial Agricultural Assistant Reappears	21
Foreign Affairs Specialist Becomes Podgorny's Assistant	22
Agriculture Ministry Journal Raps Critics of Farm Spending . . .	23

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics	i
---	---

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 MAY 1973

- 1 -

INDOCHINA

The Kissinger-Tho talks in Paris and Brezhnev's forthcoming visit to Washington provide a context for the 31 May announcement that a DRV delegation headed by party chief Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong will visit Peking in "early" June. Both Hanoi and Peking have expressed concern over the effects of big-power relations on their respective interests in Indochina, and Sihanouk's front has adamantly insisted that a Cambodian settlement cannot be negotiated by outside powers.

Hanoi media have said little about the Paris talks, that are to resume next week, and have not echoed Kissinger in assessing them as having made some progress. However, the North Vietnamese have twice issued terse denials that the United States and the DRV have reached an agreement on Cambodia.

LE DUAN, PHAM VAN DONG TO VISIT PEKING IN "EARLY JUNE"

Against the background of the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet summit meeting and other developments, the DRV-China summit can be expected to deal with long-term issues in bilateral relations and prospects for Indochina.

The impending trip to Peking by Le Duan and Dong has been preceded by other DRV visits, apart from the customary stop-over by Le Duc Tho on his way to Paris. Notably, Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, who has long figured in Sino-Vietnamese relations, arrived in Peking on 11 May on the same plane as Tho but not as part of the delegation heading for Paris. Characteristically, there has been no announcement indicating the duration of Hoan's stay or the nature of his visit. Similarly, the report that DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban had arrived in Peking on 29 May gave no indication of the purpose of his visit, although he normally engages in trade and aid negotiations. On 7 October Ly Ban had arrived in Peking for the announced purpose of discussing the 1973 aid agreement, which was signed by DRV Vice Premier Nghi on 26 November, and on 27 December Ly Ban signed the 1973 trade agreement before finally leaving Peking on 30 December. Hoang Van Hoan was present in Peking at the time of Nghi's visit.

It is possible that the North Vietnamese leaders will go on to Moscow to confer with Soviet leaders on Brezhnev's visit to the United States in the last half of June, although high-level DRV leaders were in Moscow within the past six months. Politburo members Truong Chinh and Hoang Van Hoan attended the USSR's 50th anniversary

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 2 -

celebrations in December and held talks with Suslov; Hoan stayed on for weeks after Truong Chinh left but the only indication of his activities was the observation in the 26 January PRAVDA report of his departure that he had been "resting." There were Soviet-DRV consultations before and after President Nixon's trip to Moscow last May, with CPSU Secretary Katushev paying an unofficial visit to Hanoi in late April and Podgorny visiting Hanoi in mid-June. No Sino-DRV talks attendant to the President's February trip to China were made public, but Chou En-lai was rumored to have visited Hanoi when he disappeared from public view for more than a week in early March 1972 after the President's departure.

PREVIOUS DRV VISITS TO PRC The imminent visit to Peking by the DRV party-government delegation headed by First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong will be the first such visit since November 1971 when Pham Van Dong led a party-government delegation to China. The 1971 visit, which returned one by a PRC party-government delegation headed by Chou En-lai,* gave the appearance of a reconciliation mission in the wake of Hanoi's vocal expressions of displeasure over the July announcement of President Nixon's scheduled visit to China

Three months after the announcement of the President's visit, in September 1971, Peking had tried to mollify and reassure the DRV regarding big-power summitry by taking the unprecedented step of dispatching a Chinese economic delegation headed by Li Hsien-nien to conclude the annual aid agreement in Hanoi rather than Peking. Emulating Peking, Moscow sent Podgorny to Hanoi in October 1971 to sign the Soviet aid agreement. Hanoi media in the past two years have continued with varying degrees of intensity to demonstrate concern over Peking's and Moscow's accommodations with the United States, and polemical comment, though in muted form, has continued to appear since the peace agreement was signed last January.

Prior to November 1971, the last previous DRV party-government visit to the PRC was one by Pham Van Dong in October 1969 to mark the 20th anniversary of the PRC. This was during the period

* Chou's March 1971 visit was at the time of the South Vietnamese operations in Laos, and was notable for the unusually strong pledges of Peking support for the Indochinese.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRADS

31 MAY 1973

- 3 -

that Hanoi--in the wake of Ho Chi Minh's death--was seeking to implement the appeal in Ho's last will and testament for harmony between the socialist countries, and Dong's delegation went on from Peking to pay an official visit to the USSR.

Le Duan has never taken part in an official party-government visit to China although he has consulted with Chinese leaders during several stopovers in Peking. He last was there when he stopped over en route to and from the 24th CPSU Congress in March and May 1971. The VWP first secretary had similarly stopped over in Peking in May 1970 en route home from the Lenin centennial celebrations in Moscow. He also attended the celebrations in Moscow marking the 50th October Revolution anniversary in November 1967, but the propaganda does not indicate that he stopped over in Peking on that occasion. Le Duan did stop in Peking in March and April 1966, however, en route to and from the CPSU Congress.

The first secretary paid "friendship" visits to both Moscow and Peking in April 1965, but only the Soviet visit occasioned a joint communique. He stopped in Peking in January and February 1964 on his way to and from Moscow, and in December 1960 on his way home after participating in the international communist conference at the time of the 43d October Revolution anniversary.

DRV POLEMIC AGAINST
BIG POWER DETENTE

The announcement of the June DRV visit to China comes in the wake of renewed Hanoi criticism of big-power detente: An article in the 25 May issue of the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN associated the Nixon Doctrine with efforts to reach a "detente among the big powers" and to restrain them so as to be able to "repress the small nations." Denouncing the Nixon Doctrine as "wicked and reactionary," the article took note of the President's efforts to urge foreign nations to exert a moderating influence in Indochina. Even more noteworthy was a 7 April NHAN DAN Commentator article which for the first time since last August pressed the charge that the Nixon Doctrine is aimed at creating divisions in the communist world.

Hanoi had launched its propaganda campaign against communist detente with the United States in July 1971, after the President's planned visit to Peking was announced, but its diatribes were modified in September and October when the Li Hsien-nien and Podgorny delegations to Hanoi signed the Chinese and Soviet aid agreements, respectively. In October 1971 the North Vietnamese party's theoretical journal HOC TAP carried an article by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh which indicated that Hanoi had been mollified: Trinh argued that continuing communist aid--particularly from the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 4 -

Soviet Union and China--indicated that the United States had failed in efforts to "sow discord" between North Vietnam and other communist nations.

In the months following President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow, in February and May 1972, respectively, Hanoi media continued to show its obvious displeasures. But concern over the policies of the DRV's two big allies reached new heights in August 1972 with a flurry of comment bitterly assailing "reconciliation" and "compromise" with the United States. A 17 August NHAN DAN editorial, coming after a round of talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho and coinciding with Tho's return home after stopovers in Moscow and Peking, read like a strident lecture to Hanoi's big allies against pressuring the North Vietnamese to compromise their basic goals.

This propaganda barrage was short-lived, however, and, by the end of August 1972, Hanoi commentators turned toward preparing the groundwork for the draft peace proposal submitted by the DRV at the private Paris talks on 8 October. The likelihood that the interests of Hanoi's allies played a part in its willingness to reach a settlement was directly suggested in a EOC TAP article in November 1972. The article, in contrast to polemical comment three months earlier, argued that when it is necessary to reach an agreement, communists do not allow "narrow and immediate interests" to blur awareness of "lasting interests" of the entire movement and "do not allow national selfishness to control and undermine the common interests of the world revolution."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 5 -

FUNK, DRV DENY CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT; PEKING ATTACKS SOVIETS

Sihanouk and the Cambodian resistance leaders have been at pains to stress their opposition to a compromise settlement, a position that has been backed by North Vietnamese denials that an agreement on Cambodia has been reached in the Kissinger-Tho talks. At the same time as the FUNK has been rejecting an accommodation with Phnom Penh, the Chinese have voiced acute concern over a possible arrangement that would serve Soviet interests in Cambodia at their expense. Chinese misgivings reflected in a 27 May NCNA attack on the Soviets for aiding a U.S. "peace talk fraud" may have been a factor in the decision to hold a Sino-Vietnamese summit meeting.

During his African tour Sihanouk has been emphatic in rejecting a compromise. In a speech in Zambia on 25 May that was reported by NCNA, the prince declared that "my government will never agree, neither yesterday nor tomorrow, next year or any other year, to negotiate or be reconciled with the Phnom Penh traitors." In a speech in Morocco on the 28th he reiterated his readiness for reconciliation with the United States provided it withdrew from Cambodia. He returned to this theme at a press conference in Rabat on the 29th, proposing the immediate restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States if the latter abandons "the Phnom Penh traitors." NCNA quoted him as saying that the North Vietnamese have not discussed Cambodia with the Americans. NCNA noted the presence in Rabat of a RGNU "minister charged with special missions," Chau Seng, who was in Paris during the Kissinger-Tho talks and may have traveled to Rabat to brief Sihanouk.

Peking-based RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, in an appeal to the Cambodian nation issued on 22 May and carried by Radio Peking in Cambodian as well as by the FUNK news agency AKI, warned against maneuvers of "peace, compromise, and concord" and moves "in the diplomatic field." At the same time, the Khmer Rouge elements in the FUNK have chimed in with equally intransigent language to denounce calls for a compromise and cease-fire. The top in-country insurgent leader, RGNU Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Khieu Samphan, issued a 24 May statement in the name of the RGNU denouncing "the diplomatic maneuver of the U.S. imperialists and the Nixon Administration aiming at collecting their partners on the international arena by means of a Munich conference so as to force the Cambodian nation and people to surrender and to isolate them." The statement attacked the "new treacherous government" formed by In Tam as a U.S. maneuver to promote "deceitful" peace negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 6 -

Sihanouk's Khmer Rouge shadow, Ieng Sary, has also issued a statement, an unusual move by him that serves to underscore FUNK unity on the question of a settlement. Reported by NCNA, the statement, which was issued in Mauritania on 29 May, vigorously rejected the possibility that the insurgents would accept a cease-fire in the wake of the January Vietnam agreement and demanded that the United States end "all its aid" to Phnom Penh. The statement also put the Cambodian question in the context of international politics, saying that Cambodia is only a bargaining chip for the United States and complaining that "certain big powers" are seeking to promote a Cambodian "third force" as a solution to the conflict. The statement linked this effort with claims by the Phnom Penh information minister that contacts have been established with the FUNK.

Earlier, a 24 May communique by the FUNK information office in Peking categorically denied that any member of the resistance had been in contact with Lon Nol's government. A similar denial was issued by Chau Seng on the 24th and carried by AKI on the 29th. His statement explicitly cited the Kissinger-Tho talks in asserting that the Paris talks concern only Vietnam and cannot arrange a Cambodian settlement.

HANOI Reacting to Western news reports, the North Vietnamese have twice issued terse denials that the United States and the DRV had reached an agreement on Cambodia. VNA issued an "authorized" denial on 29 May, stating that the Cambodian question must be settled by the Cambodian people, and a similar denial by the DRV embassy in Paris on the 29th (released by VNA on the 30th) added that the DRV "firmly supports" the "just stand" of Sihanouk and the RGNU. Likewise, a NHAN DAN article on 30 May combined a categorical denial of the reported agreement on Cambodia with a generalized expression of support for the RGNU's stand, but there was no specific endorsement of the insurgents' demands.

Hanoi has been less than forthcoming in responding to its Cambodian allies' appeals for support. Hanoi's last authoritative endorsement of Sihanouk's five-point demands came in comment marking the Indochina summit anniversary in April, and its most recent authoritative response to Cambodian pronouncements came in a 19 May DRV Foreign Ministry statement seconding a RGNU statement on U.S. bombing in Cambodia. Hanoi responded only indirectly to the 16 May RGNU open letter appealing for international support

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 7 -

against U.S. moves to isolate the Cambodian resistance, with VNA replaying a 24 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article that focused on U.S. involvement as the basic issue.

PEKING Representing Peking's first authoritative comment on Cambodia in three weeks, the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article reiterated the line that U.S. involvement is "the basic reason why the Cambodian issue has not been settled up to now." Commentator routinely demanded that the United States end its bombing, cease rendering "all kinds of aid" to Phnom Penh, and withdraw U.S. military personnel. According to the article, the new Phnom Penh cabinet cannot rescue the regime from its crisis and "the traitorous Lon Nol clique cannot escape the fate of total collapse." Commentator did not name In Tam or other Phnom Penh leaders besides Lon Nol and did not endorse the insurgents' demands.

Where the Commentator article followed the restrained lines taken by Peking in recent months, a 27 May NCNA correspondent's article denouncing the Soviet posture on Cambodia struck discordant notes reminiscent of Peking's polemical assaults in the 1960's against a negotiated settlement in Indochina. The article, ostensibly criticizing PRAVDA for "recently" having deplored the Cambodian fighting as a "fratricidal" war with pernicious consequences, charged that the Soviets are promoting a Cambodian settlement in coordination with "the peace talk fraud hatched by U.S. imperialism and the Lon Nol clique." NCNA quoted a recent speech by Sihanouk in Guinea rejecting "a deceptive peace" and pledging to continue the fight until the enemy surrenders unconditionally.

The NCNA attack was not a random shot at a target of opportunity, for the PRAVDA article criticized was published more than two months earlier to mark the FUNK's anniversary on 23 March. Against the background of Kissinger's talks with the Soviets and with Le Duc Tho, old Chinese fears of a settlement in Indochina benefiting the Soviets at Peking's expense may have been rekindled, leading to the renewed charge of Soviet-U.S. coordination in behalf of a "peace talk fraud." Reflecting concern over pressures to divide part of the FUNK from the pro-Peking elements, NCNA claimed that the Soviet move is an effort to "split the patriotic Cambodian forces."

The Chinese last year had voiced suspicion over Soviet efforts to promote "a third force" in Cambodia that would achieve a settlement by excluding Sihanouk. This theme was sounded, for example, by Chou En-lai in a 19 March 1972 speech on the second anniversary

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 8 -

of Sihanouk's arrival in Peking after his overthrow. The theme now appears in FUNK pronouncements, as in Ieng Sary's 29 May statement, but the Chinese themselves are not now referring to a third force. Taken together with Peking's avoidance of direct attacks on the other major Phnom Penh leaders besides Lon Nol, this reticence suggests that the Chinese wish to keep the door open for a Cambodian accommodation while putting top priority on big-power disengagement. As NCNA's attack on the Soviets demonstrates, however, the suspicion of a Soviet role in a Cambodian settlement has the Chinese reaching for their polemical guns.

HANOI SILENT ON KISSINGER-THO TALKS, SCORES SULLIVAN REMARKS

DRV media continue to virtually ignore the 17-23 May talks in Paris between Presidential adviser Kissinger and DRV representative Le Duc Tho. Hanoi is not known to have reported Kissinger's 23 May statement prior to his departure from Paris that the meetings with Tho were conducted in a constructive and positive manner and that significant progress was made. Hanoi has similarly ignored DRV Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach's 22 May statement, reported by Western newsmen in Paris, that the DRV could not yet say that the talks had made some progress. By contrast, a 25 May Liberation Radio broadcast did cite Kissinger's remarks on progress in the talks and quoted a PRG spokesman in Saigon as observing that "the United States must transform its words into deeds and must not say one thing and do another."

Hanoi, however, alluded to the Paris talks in a 29 May broadcast scoring remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan in Bangkok on the 26th. The broadcast critically cited Sullivan's statement that the United States is returning to Paris to compel the North Vietnamese to do what they agreed to when they signed the agreement on Vietnam. Other Hanoi comment, including a 30 May NHAN DAN article, joined with the radio commentaries in deploring Sullivan's additional remark that North Vietnam's ambition to take over Indochina is the obstacle to a settlement. Another article in the same issue of NHAN DAN noted that an alleged division-size ARVN operation in PRG-controlled areas north of Saigon was launched "in the midst of the U.S.-Saigon clamor for the speeding up of the negotiations for the implementation of the Paris agreement."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

31 MAY 1973

- 9 -

Continued Vietnamese communist publicity for the Watergate case includes reports and comment on the President's 22 May statement. A 24 May NHAN DAN article portrayed the President's statement as "half admitting and half denying" responsibility and alleged that he was losing the confidence of the U.S. public. On the 26th, a lengthy Liberation Radio commentary, which cited the statement, maintained that the President's prestige and power have never before been so "heavily damaged" and concluded that: "The President's position in his last term of office is that of a man who is limping along on his Indochina-Watergate crutches." The President's 24 May speech to U.S. POW's was characterized, in a 26 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article, as a further effort to "avert public criticism" about Watergate.

DRV, PRG URGE FRANCE TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH PRG

In the wake of the French decision to elevate its relations with the Saigon government to the ambassadorial level, announced on 13 April, Vietnamese communist media have belatedly initiated a campaign to pressure France to establish diplomatic relations with the PRG. PRG and DRV media last week began carrying comment on the issue as well as reports of meetings of PRG representatives with French officials to discuss the subject of relations.

Liberation Radio on 23 May noted cryptically that on the previous day the acting head of the special PRG representation in Hanoi had called on the French embassy to discuss "the matter of relations." It was not until 29 May that the Liberation Radio reported that on the 25th PRG "Ambassador" Dinh Ba Thi--the senior PRG representative at the PRG-GVN talks in Paris--had visited the French Foreign Ministry to express the PRG's "disappointment" with the French decision to establish ambassadorial relations with the GVN. Dinh asserted that this move represented "differential treatment" of "the two present administrations in South Vietnam," a political situation Dinh said France acknowledged when it signed the Paris agreement on Vietnam. Dinh added that continuing postponement of "the settlement of relations" with the PRG did "not contribute to the correct implementation of the Paris agreement and the international treaty on Vietnam" and was "inconsistent with the long-lasting interests of the Vietnamese and French people."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 10 -

Hanoi's NHAN DAN initiated the communist news media campaign with an article on 25 May and PRG media quickly followed suit. VNA reported that the NHAN DAN article "criticized the French Government" for failing to establish relations with the PRG, a policy that if maintained would encourage "Nguyen Van Thieu and his junta to continue their violation of the Paris agreement." A commentary carried by Liberation Radio on the same day and LPA on the 27th called the French decision a "partial act" and reasserted the claim that the PRG was "the sole authentic representative of the South Vietnamese people," an argument not mentioned in VNA's account of the NHAN DAN article. Both Hanoi and PRG media have also reported statements by groups in France advocating French recognition of the PRG.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 11 -

U. S. - U S S R

USSR, EAST EUROPE SEE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR SUMMIT

Although still in low gear, Moscow's advance publicity or Brezhnev's visit to the United States has begun to pick up momentum. Moscow drew attention last week to the anniversary of last year's summit and continued to publicize reports of favorable opinion trends in the United States. Articles on the anniversary of the Moscow summit gave a positive assessment of the first year of the new era in U.S.-Soviet relations, concluding that the promises raised by the summit had been largely justified by the practical results achieved since then. The picture of U.S. opinion trends given to Soviet readers has stressed the rapid change in attitudes toward the USSR occurring in all strata of U.S. society.

Commentary directly addressed to the visit has remained limited. Moscow has avoided raising hopes that any new major agreements are likely to emerge and has emphasized instead that the purpose will be to further the main goal, set by the April plenum, of making "irreversible" the gains achieved as a result of last year's summit. Moscow radio's Washington correspondent Soltan was a little more specific, quoting "official circles" in Washington as predicting that the visit will focus on facilitating further agreement on limiting strategic weapons and expanding economic cooperation. Reporting on reaction from the United States, not unexpectedly, has highlighted public interest in the visit and has suggested that opponents of better U.S.-Soviet relations are isolated.

WATERGATE IMPACT Moscow itself has not broached even indirectly the issue of a possible impact of the Watergate affair on the summit. While the East European press has also been reticent on the issue, several commentaries have disputed Western speculation about the linkage. They have denied that the Watergate affair will influence Moscow's approach to Brezhnev's visit and have accused opponents of U.S.-Soviet detente of attempting to capitalize on Watergate to impede a further improvement in relations.

An article by Peter Sereny in the 15 May issue of the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABADSAG discounted the import of Watergate and concluded that the stakes of the summit meeting were too high for the Soviet leadership to permit itself to be distracted by what was only "the latest upheaval in U.S. domestic political life." The Washington correspondents of the Czech party daily RUDE PRAVO and the Hungarian popular front organ MAGYAR NEMZET filed articles

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 12 -

noting, and discounting, Western speculation that Brezhnev would attempt to extract concessions from a "weakened" Nixon. The two articles asserted that Moscow would take a broader view of the situation and observed that international negotiations would come to a standstill if questions of timing and tactics were predicated on internal events of individual countries. The MAGYAR NEMZET article, which was published on 27 May, said that Moscow would hardly risk the improvement in bilateral relations--achieved after years of effort--for "short-term and doubtful tactical advantages."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 13 -

USSR - EGYPT

MOSCOW PLAYS DOWN AZ-ZAYYAT V'SIT, SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE

Moscow, in line with its limited attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute, gave meager publicity to the 27-29 May visit to the USSR of Egyptian Foreign Minister az-Zayyat, who met with Gromyko on the 28th to consult on the imminent Security Council debate on the issue. The visit also came against the background of the Soviet-American summit in June; as-Sadat himself went to Moscow for talks last April in advance of President Nixon's visit to the USSR, and in his May Day speech this year as-Sadat indicated his displeasure with the results of last May's summit meeting and apprehension that the Soviets would fail to stand up to the Americans in discussing the Middle East next month. On the day az-Zayyat arrived in Moscow, the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY released an as-Sadat interview with the Yugoslav daily VJESNIK, reported by TANJUG the previous day, in which he showed his displeasure with the Soviets. The Egyptian president rejected the idea that the "all-out confrontation" with Israel should depend on the June summit, remarking that some people proposed "waiting until Brezhnev and Nixon meet, but we always view such developments in light of our interests." He added that the May meeting last year brought no results, and he rebuked "our friend" the Soviet Union for failing to heed his warning two years ago about the Middle East situation.

The Egyptian foreign minister apparently met only with his counterpart Gromyko, and Moscow gave no indication of the substance of the "friendly speeches" exchanged at Gromyko's luncheon on the 25th. The joint statement on the visit reflected Moscow's evident lack of enthusiasm for the Security Council debate, being held at Egypt's request. The propaganda has given little advance publicity to the session, and the statement, while attaching "important significance" to the meeting, merely expressed hope that the discussion would contribute to a just settlement. The sides appealed to Security Council members to assist in the unconditional and complete implementation of the relevant UN decisions on the Middle East and to condemn those hindering implementation of these decisions and threatening peace and security. The statement noted the sides' "unchanged positions" on questions of a Middle East settlement--perhaps reflecting Moscow's

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 14 -

advocacy of a peaceful settlement, a position repeatedly criticized by as-Sadat in his May Day speech. And the sides again stressed the need for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory and for insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

In a statement on his return to Cairo, az-Zayyat put his Moscow talks in the context of several consultations prior to the Security Council debate, noting that he had met in Moscow with the French secretary of state for foreign affairs, also visiting the USSR, as well as Ambassador Jarring, and that he hoped to have similar talks with other representatives of UN member states in London and New York.

USSR HINTS AT DIFFERENCES IN TREATY ANNIVERSARY COMMENT

Moscow observed the second anniversary of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship and cooperation treaty with the usual ceremonies and a message to as-Sadat from the Soviet leaders pointing out that the Soviet Union has invariably given Egypt extensive assistance and support. While az-Zayyat's Moscow visit coincided with the treaty anniversary, the occasion was not mentioned in the joint statement on the visit, which merely affirmed the sides' determination to develop ties on the basis of the treaty. Propaganda on the anniversary, although extolling the treaty, suggested continuing Soviet-Egyptian differences. Thus Kudryavtsev in a 27 May IZVESTIYA article conceded that the complex situation in the Middle East engendered complicated problems which "inevitably also affect the complete implementation" of the treaty's clauses. He found reassurance in the fact that the treaty itself sets forth opportunities "for overcoming the difficulties."

A NEW TIMES article on the anniversary, broadcast in Arabic on the 26th, complained that "certain Egyptian and Arab journalists" invented fabrications about Soviet policy and the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, and in particular assailed an unidentified editor of "a famous Cairo illustrated magazine" for representing the treaty as a one-time commercial deal based on "temporary and incidental considerations" and for equating Moscow's Middle East policy with that of imperialist states.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 15 -

U S S R - A S I A

PODGORNYI PROMOTES ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTAN

Soviet President Podgorny used his 21-24 May visit to Afghanistan to lobby publicly in behalf of Moscow's proposal for an Asian collective security system, a project that has been pursued with renewed vigor since the signing of the Vietnam agreement in January. Podgorny may have hoped to duplicate Premier Kosygin's success, during his mid-March visit to Iran, in obtaining a more explicit Iranian endorsement of the Soviet proposal than had appeared in the joint communique on the Shah's October 1972 Moscow visit. If this was his intention, however, the joint Soviet-Afghan communique on Podgorny's visit showed little if any give in Kabul's noncommittal stance, and surrounding Soviet comment has acknowledged the difficulties besetting Moscow's project in Asia.

Podgorny's speech on the first day of his visit was notable both for the length at which he dwelt on an Asian security system and for his thinly veiled denunciation of the Chinese for seeking hegemony on the continent. Having referred to a "pressing" need for an Asian security system, Podgorny deplored the obstructionist efforts of unnamed "imperialist powers" seeking to revitalize military blocs and of "certain adventurist circles" which, prompted by their "hegemonistic aspirations," seek to play a dominant role in Asia and hamper efforts to normalize the situation. Though routine-level Soviet comment has more directly linked the China question with the proposal on Asian collective security, Podgorny's anti-Chinese jab represents the furthest Moscow has gone on an elite level to acknowledge that one purpose of the project is the containment of China.

Podgorny also acknowledged the "difficulties and obstacles" facing the project, and he duly offered the assurance that it would conform with the UN Charter and would "not be directed against any states." In a major 21 December speech before a large audience of foreign leaders, Brezhnev had been more forcefully explicit in dismissing as "totally groundless" the allegation that the proposed Asian security system was designed to "contain or encircle" China.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 16 -

Judging from the Soviet-Afghan communique, the neutralist hosts were not inclined to follow the Shah's example in moving toward the Soviet proposal.* The two sides repeated the formulation from their communique on the Afghan Premier's March 1972 visit to Moscow in asserting that the achievement of Asian security "requires the joint efforts of all countries of this area," but in the new communique they cited only the principles of peaceful coexistence as the means for achieving a lasting peace in Asia. The March 1972 communique had cited the basic principles of the Soviet proposal for Asian collective security as a means to this end. In his 21 May speech Podgornyj enumerated these principles, which include renunciation of force, inviolability of borders, and nonintervention. The Soviets did manage to get Afghan endorsement in the communique of their proposals for renunciation of force and a ban on the use of nuclear weapons as embodied in resolutions adopted by the UNGA. These proposals had been the focus of heated Sino-Soviet polemics.

A dispatch from Kabul carried in PRAVDA on 26 May sought to portray sentiment in Afghanistan as recognizing the need for an Asian security system, but it frankly conceded that this "is clearly a complex problem." The dispatch went on to criticize unnamed forces that seek to undermine other states' relations with Moscow and engage in "false slogans and clamorous demagogy."

DACCA CONFERENCE Podgornyj's visit to Kabul coincided with a Dacca conference of Asian countries in preparation for the forthcoming World Congress of Peace Forces to be held in Moscow next October. The conference provided another forum for airing the proposal for Asian collective security as well as for mobilizing anti-Chinese forces. In a message to the session Kosygin urged "all-round cooperation" and "collective security," and the chief Soviet delegate observed that "now that the war in Vietnam has ended it is possible to achieve a basic turn toward peace by establishing a collective security system." TASS on 25 May reported that a resolution was unanimously passed defining a policy of peace as based on the key principles of the

* The March Soviet-Iranian communique registered the two sides' "intention to help in the realization of the idea of creating an Asian collective security system." Their previous joint communique, in October, called for "joint efforts and cooperation" by Asian countries to insure peace. See the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, pages 10-12.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 17 -

Soviet proposal for collective security, and stating that Moscow's bilateral treaties with India and Iraq and the Indian-Bangladesh treaty "serve as a model" of cooperation.

The conference also passed a resolution condemning Peking's position on Bangladesh, and the Mongolian delegate was quoted by TASS on the 24th as saying his country is "seriously concerned about the continuing nuclear weapon tests in China." A commentary broadcast by Moscow in English to South Asia on 23 May used the occasion of the Dacca conference to recall the speech by a Chinese delegate at a session of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East on 12 April as an example of Peking's attempt to "slander" the idea of a collective security system. The Chinese delegate had in fact delivered a stinging attack on Moscow's proposal as designed "to control and divide Asian countries and incorporate them gradually into its sphere of influence."

Peking has reacted to Podgorny's trip to Afghanistan by carrying critical Pakistani comment (NCNA, 28 May) deriding his enunciation of the principles of the proposed collective security system. One commentary was quoted as saying Podgorny had accused China of aspiring to become a dominant power.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 18 -

CHINA-EUROPE

PEKING REACTS IN LOW KEY TO BREZHNEV VISIT TO FRG

Consistent with its current practice--and in contrast to past fulminations against Soviet policy on Germany--Peking reacted in a low key to Brezhnev's FRG visit, avoiding polemics while continuing its own cultivation of the West Germans. A lone NCNA dispatch dated the 23d was carefully contrived to indicate that Brezhnev urgently sought West German economic cooperation and that the FRG was standing firm on its commitments to the EEC and NATO. Also on the 23d, NCNA announced the arrival in Peking of a West German economic delegation that was accorded high-level Chinese attention. Peking has thus conveyed the impression that it is taking the Soviet-FRG relationship in stride while developing its own ties with West Germany.

In addition to reporting that Brezhnev "repeatedly stressed" a desire for extensive economic cooperation with the FRG and "appealed" to West German business to sign contracts, the NCNA account of Brezhnev's visit made a point of indicating that Bonn's interests have been served in the Soviet-FRG relationship. Thus, in noting the background of the visit, NCNA cited the September 1971 four-power agreement on West Berlin as having for the first time recognized Bonn's ties with West Berlin. NCNA also quoted the joint statement on the visit as saying the two sides had "a detailed exchange of views" on the four-power agreement and called for "strict observance" of the agreement as essential for improving Soviet-FRG relations. In the past the Chinese had sharply denounced Moscow's moves on the German question, as in the charge in the 1972 New Year's Day joint editorial that by signing the West Berlin agreement the Soviets were guilty of "selling out the sovereignty" of the GDR.

In keeping with Peking's effort to foster Atlantic and West European unity, the NCNA account closed by noting that in his Bundestag speech on the 23d Brandt "stressed" the consensus of views between Bonn and its NATO allies. In effect expressing Chinese confidence that FRG membership in the Atlantic alliance has not been eroded, NCNA quoted Brandt as declaring that "nobody should speculate that we would let ourselves be thrown into unrealistic thinking."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 19 -

The West German economic delegation, which arrived in Peking the day after Brezhnev's visit to the FRG concluded, was headed by a businessman who had been among those seeing Brezhnev in Bonn. Though it was a private delegation hosted by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, an agency handling nongovernmental relations, the West German group was received by Premier Chou En-lai* and was honored by a banquet given by a vice foreign trade minister as well as one given by an official of the host council.

TIRANA In contrast to the changes in Peking's position on the German question, Tirana has remained adamant in denouncing any and all improvements in Bonn-Moscow relations. Consistent with its longstanding hostility toward what it calls a "Washington-Moscow-Bonn axis" and echoing the former fulminations of its Chinese allies, Tirana has vehemently denounced the "new unscrupulous concessions" which Brezhnev allegedly made in Bonn in exchange for credits and West German technology to the detriment of the "sovereignty and dignity of the GDR" and to "the detriment of the German nation and peace in Europe." Tirana has also repeatedly noted in its commentary on the Brezhnev visit that Moscow, moving in tandem with Brandt's Ostpolitik, has attempted to settle the postwar problems without a peace treaty--a theme which Peking has not publicly commented on since the visit to the PRC by FRG Foreign Minister Scheel in October of last year.

* As reported by a West German correspondent, Chou's conversation with the group was marked by his characteristic subtlety and anti-Soviet thrusts. He said he knew only "Koenigsberg and not Kaliningrad," and he remarked that he lived a year in Berlin on Kantstrasse--a street named after the sage of Koenigsberg.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 20 -

POLAND - FRG

WARSAW HEDGES ON BREZHNEV FRG VISIT, NOTES UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Sounding a discordant note in the otherwise unanimous chorus of East European praise for Brezhnev's FRG visit, Warsaw has qualified its endorsement of the event with discreet reminders of its own unsettled claims against West Germany. While professing adherence to the "full concordance of views" among the socialist states on relations with Bonn, Warsaw has repeatedly recalled Gierek's 22 March Poznan speech in which Polish claims for indemnification for Germany's World War II crimes were outlined.

Taking this speech as a text, Polish media have argued that the Polish government "cannot put aside such an important issue as the suffering of concentration and forced labor camp prisoners." Authoritative Polish commentators have stressed that the Polish-FRG treaty is not the "final goal" of the normalization process between Warsaw and Bonn but only the beginning of a long and difficult process of resolving outstanding bilateral differences. Elaborating on a suggestion by Gierek on the desirability of a personal meeting with Brandt in the near future to resolve outstanding problems, the Polish press has stated that "there is no question that such a meeting is necessary and that the results can only facilitate the solution of the difficult problems connected with the heritage of the past."*

There has been no Polish commentary as yet on the recent agreement between Tito and Brandt which appears to have settled Yugoslavia's indemnification claims in a way that might be applicable to the Polish case. According to the communique following Brandt's 16-19 April visit to Yugoslavia, the agreement was reached on the basis of "long-term cooperation in economic and other spheres." A similar solution of the Polish indemnification claims may be viewed favorably by Warsaw, since Gierek had also complained in his Poznan speech about Bonn's slowness in implementing measures of economic cooperation.

* TASS and PRAVDA, in summarizing Gierek's March speech, noted his remark about the persistence of "important problems" in Warsaw-Bonn relations, but failed to report his elaboration of those problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FET'S TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 21 -

U S S R

BREZHNEV'S CONTROVERSIAL AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANT REAPPEARS

Brezhnev's longtime agricultural aide V. A. Golikov, whose status has been under a cloud in recent years, was among those who met Brezhnev on his return from West Germany on 22 May. PRAVDA the following day reported Golikov's presence at the Moscow homecoming and identified him as Brezhnev's "assistant." Although other Brezhnev aides--G. E. Tsukanov, A. M. Aleksandrov, K. V. Rusakov, and A. I. Blatov--have accompanied him on various occasions and have been publicly identified as his assistants, Golikov had never previously appeared on such an occasion, and had not been identified as a Brezhnev assistant since 1966.

Golikov is unique among the members of Brezhnev's personal staff both for the rarity of his public appearances and for the outspokenness of his views on controversial matters. The only Brezhnev aide known to have expressed himself publicly, Golikov has authored articles on agriculture which have taken controversial stands--on free marketing, kolkhoz unions, and resource allocation--similar to those adopted by Politburo member Polyanskiy. His involvement in controversial issues may explain why he was not elected to any Central Committee posts by the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971, even though other members of Brezhnev's staff lacking his seniority were so honored. Whatever the reasons for his apparent fall from grace, his recent reappearance indicates that he now enjoys high political standing.

CLOSE TIES WITH BREZHNEV Golikov's ties with Brezhnev date back to the early 1950's, when he served as head of a sector of the Moldavian Central Committee during Brezhnev's tenure as republic party boss. He became an assistant to Brezhnev in the mid-1950's while the latter served as a Central Committee secretary. Golikov's close relationship with Brezhnev was described in a book on the virgin lands, which recalled a visit to that area made by Brezhnev and his "assistant" in 1957. By contrast, Tsukanov joined Brezhnev's staff in 1958, and Aleksandrov followed suit in the early 1960's. The other identified Brezhnev aides, bloc affairs specialists Rusakov and Blatov, were added to Brezhnev's staff last year in connection with the party leader's growing preoccupation with foreign affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 22 -

Golikov distinguished himself as a conservative, if not a neo-Stalinist, by his February 1969 KOMMUNIST article criticizing the rehabilitation of a Stalin purge victim and by his April 1972 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article absolving Stalin of any wrongdoing in the collectivization of agriculture and polemicizing with "revisionist" Khrushchev-era histories.* Golikov's stand on collectivization coincided with positions taken by S.P. Trapeznikov, head of the Central Committee science and educational institutions section, with whom Golikov had worked in the Moldavian central party apparatus. According to a report in the underground samizdat publication, "Political Diary," Golikov teamed up with Trapeznikov in early 1970 to attack a supposedly "revisionist" passage in Brezhnev's April 1970 Lenin anniversary speech prepared by A.M. Aleksandrov, V.V. Zagladin, P.N. Fedoseyev and A.Ye. Bovin, but this effort was said to have failed.

In any case, Golikov's career appeared to be in eclipse following his failure to be elected to any Central Committee posts by the 24th CPSU Congress. By contrast, his colleague Tsukanov became a Central Committee member, while Aleksandrov was elected to membership on the Central Auditing Commission. Since that time Tsukanov and Aleksandrov have appeared frequently in public, accompanying Brezhnev in his talks with foreign leaders or greeting him at his airport arrivals and departures. Golikov's only public activity in this period involved authorship of several journal articles on controversial agricultural issues. In the May 1971 KOMMUNIST he praised Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul's various agricultural innovations, and in the July 1972 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY he complained that agriculture was still not receiving sufficient resources. On his election to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in June 1971, he was identified merely as a "responsible official of the Central Committee." Doubts about Golikov's status were further heightened by the shake-up in the agricultural hierarchy and the demotion of Polyanskiy and were not dispelled until his latest public appearance.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPECIALIST BECOMES PODGORNYY'S ASSISTANT

Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Podgornyy appears to be following Brezhnev's example in reorienting his staff toward foreign affairs.

* For background on these articles, see the SURVEY for 13 March 1969, pages 5-6 and the TRENDS of 26 April 1972, pages 52-53.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 23 -

Just as Brezhnev selected bloc affairs specialists K.V. Rusakov and A.I. Blatov as new additions to his personal staff, so Podgorny has chosen international affairs specialist V.V. Kortunov as a new assistant, apparently to replace his longtime top aide, L.M. Shevchenko, who died in July 1972. This was revealed by PRAVDA's 26 May identification of Kortunov as an "assistant to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium" and a member of Podgorny's delegation to Afghanistan.

Shevchenko, a former metallurgical engineer and local party official, had assisted Podgorny while he was Ukrainian First Secretary, Central Committee Secretary and then Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman. Kortunov was a lecturer on foreign affairs in the late 1950's and a high official of agitprop until the mid-1960's, when he became deputy head of the Central Committee's new information section. The section appears to have been abolished by 1968, although local "information and foreign relations" sections still exist in some republic central committees.

The 1971 Diplomatic Dictionary identified Kortunov as an ambassador and listed him in "responsible work in the central apparatus of the foreign ministry" since 1968. He evidently joined Podgorny's staff quite recently, since he was not among the numerous Podgorny assistants who signed the 16 January 1972 obituary of Podgorny aide M.N. Tsuranov and the 13 July 1972 obituary of Shevchenko. Like Rusakov and Blatov, Kortunov has no career ties with his new boss.

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY JOURNAL RAFS CRITICS OF FARM SPENDING

An editorial in the April issue of the Agriculture Ministry's journal ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE has launched an attack on those who oppose greater allocations to agriculture on grounds that what is needed is more efficient operations. Though ostensibly addressed to the writings of an obscure agricultural economist, the editorial espouses views believed to have been advocated by Polyanskiy and challenged by Voronov at the highest levels of the regime. Since the journal carrying the editorial was prepared for publication shortly after Polyanskiy's appointment as agriculture minister in early February, it is conceivable that the editorial reflects Polyanskiy's determination to continue to press for more agricultural investment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
31 MAY 1973

- 24 -

The editorial criticized a book by V. P. Yefimov published in 1971 for allegedly maintaining that agricultural intensification can be achieved without additional investments and that this goal can be reached by more efficient use of land and capital. In reply the editorial bluntly defined intensification of agriculture as greater investment and cited quotations from Marx and Lenin to uphold this view. The editorial complained that "adherents of V. P. Yefimov's views" question whether additional expenditures in agriculture are necessary on grounds that "sometimes it is not the increase in the means of production which is important but the improvement in their use."

The editorial also complained that Yefimov's book had received a favorable review in the January issue of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS. The review by Saratov and Tbilisi economists V. Lumelskiy and D. Chachua had praised Yefimov for viewing agricultural intensification basically as a qualitative problem involving more efficient use of resources rather than large outlays. And the review contrasted Yefimov's views with those of "a number of economists who consider intensification as increasing the investments of labor and funds."

The editorial in the ministry's journal represents the latest episode in a longstanding dispute over agricultural policy. Indeed, under the impetus of recurrent agricultural crises and increasingly complex demands on the economy, the agricultural dispute has acquired a life of its own seemingly unrelated to such momentous events as Polyanskiy's sudden demotion to ministerial status and Voronov's protracted descent into forced retirement.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 21 - 27 MAY 1973

<u>Moscow (2893 Items)</u>			<u>Peking (1276 Items)</u>		
Brezhnev in FRG	(25%)	33%	Domestic Issues	(44%)	43%
Podgorny In Afghanistan	(--)	7%	Cambodia	(11%)	14%
China	(4%)	5%	[Sihanouk Tour	(10%)	7%]
OAU 10th Anniversary, African Liberation Day	(1%)	4%	of Africa, Europe		
Afghanistan Independence Anniversary	(--)	3%	OAU 10th Anniversary, African Liberation Day	(1%)	14%
Dacca Preparatory Meeting for Moscow Conference on Peace and Security	(--)	3%	World Health Organiza- tion Session	(1%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.