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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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15 AUG 1973


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TRENDS

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


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15 AUGUST 1973
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INDOCHINA

SIHANOUK PREDICTS VICTORY, APPEALS FOR BREAK WITH LON NOL

As the U.S. bombing of Cambodia came to a halt, Prince Sihanouk and representatives of his front maintained their uncompromising position on a negotiated settlement and predicted military victory in the near future. In a message carried by NCNA on 10 August, Sihanouk warned foreign nations that they must break their ties with Lon Nol before Phnom Penh falls if they wish to establish relations with his government. However, in a telegram on the same day addressed to U.S. Senator Mansfield, as reported by AFP, Sihanouk reaffirmed that he would reestablish relations with the United States once Washington ends its bombing and military aid to Lon Nol. He reiterated that the front would allow the United States to evacuate Lon Nol and other top Phnom Penh officials and that lower-level officers would be pardoned if they agreed to support the front. Low-level appeals from the front's radio have continued to call for the defection of Phnom Penh troops and for popular uprisings, at the same time claiming that insurgents have already entered the capital and that it and other Lon Nol strongholds would soon become battlefields.

Sihanouk left Pyongyang for China on 14 August, after a stay of several weeks in Korea. NCNA announced on 15 August that he had arrived in Tientsin "for a rest after taking a rest" in Korea. This appears to be a deliberate move by Sihanouk to remain out of the diplomatic limelight.

HANOI While Sihanouk's backers in Peking have maintained their prudent low posture on Cambodian events, Hanoi has offered its first authoritative comment in a week with a 15 August DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement claiming that "recently," at Washington's behest, Saigon had sent "tens of thousands of troops" to intervene in Cambodia. Labeling the action a "new and extremely serious military adventure" in violation of the Paris agreement, it declared that the United States and Saigon must bear full responsibility for the "serious consequences."

MOSCOW In the face of developments in Cambodia, Moscow has taken a further step in its ongoing effort to position itself as a supporter of the insurgents. Following a steady stream of low-level Soviet commentaries over the past few weeks describing the victories of the Cambodian "patriots" and collapse of the

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Phnom Penh government, a lengthy 12 August IZVESTIYA article by M. Ilyinskiy more authoritatively placed the Russians on the side of the insurgents' cause. Recent low-level TASS reports have noted Sihanouk's travels, even once referring to the prince as Cambodian "head of state." IZVESTIYA ignored the prince and his government but pointedly hailed the FUNK as "true representative" of the Cambodian people.* The article asserted that the insurgents are expanding their liberated areas and holding the military initiative, and it hailed the landmark "national congress" in the liberated areas last month which had issued an appeal for international support. Reiterating the recent Crimean summit meeting's call for the strict fulfillment of the Paris peace agreement, it concluded warmly that "the Soviet people fully support the brave struggle of Cambodian patriots for the freedom and independence of their motherland."

* The formula used by IZVESTIYA (podlinnym predstavitelem naroda strany) leaves unclear whether Moscow is endorsing the front as "the" true representative of the Cambodian people, or "a" true representative of the Cambodian people.

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DRV DELEGATION'S TOUR OF EUROPE ENDS WITH SOVIET AID PACT

Having toured all the Asian communist countries in June, North Vietnamese leaders' visits to the USSR and four of its East European allies were concluded on 14 August when Premier Pham Van Dong left Moscow for home after the signing of a Soviet-DRV aid agreement. The pact was concluded a month after Le Duan and Pham Van Dong had paid a week-long visit to the USSR. Le Duan apparently is still vacationing in the Crimea, where Dong stopped off enroute from Sofia back to Moscow for the conclusion of the aid agreement.

SOVIET AID AGREEMENT The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the DRV delegation's Moscow visit last month had stated that an agreement was reached "in principle" on Soviet aid for developing the DRV's economy, apparently leaving the specifics to be negotiated by other functionaries while Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi and other members of the delegation went on to visit East Europe. Dong returned to Moscow on 11 August, held "warm and friendly" talks with Kosygin on the 13th, and, on the following day, joined Kosygin at a ceremony where the USSR-DRV aid agreement was signed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Novikov and Le Thanh Nghi.

A 14 August TASS report noted that agreements had been signed on economic and technical cooperation and trade between the two countries for 1974-1975. Hanoi's report said that the agreement on economic and technical aid was for 1974. TASS, but not Hanoi, specified that the Soviet Union would aid the DRV in the development of the power and coal industry, road building, prospecting, and the development of virgin lands. The aid was not identified as "gratuitous" although this characterization was given in the case of the DRV's aid agreement with China in June, and previous USSR-DRV agreements have generally mentioned "non-refund" aid.*

Neither Moscow nor Hanoi mentioned military assistance in reporting the aid agreement, although Defense Minister Grechko and the DRV's military aid specialist took part in the talks in Moscow last month. The joint Soviet-DRV statement last month mentioned military aid only in a passage noting the "continuous fruitful development of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and fraternal cooperation in all the most important fields--political, economic, ideological, and also in

* A TASS announcement on 1 August that the Soviet Union will grant economic aid to the PRG noted that it was "gratuitous."

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the field of defense." Military assistance was mentioned in reports on the aid agreements signed earlier this summer in Peking as well as in Eastern Europe. And Soviet-DRV agreements in past years have referred to both economic and military aid.

During Pham Van Dong's tour of East Europe, the signing of other agreements in Moscow had been announced. Thus, on 25 July TASS reported an agreement on training North Vietnamese cadres as skilled workers in such fields as machine building, mining, and transportation. The future training in Moscow is to include 8,000 Vietnamese covering the period 1973-1976. Moscow's domestic service announced on 31 July the signing of a program for cooperation in 1973 between the USSR and the DRV in the area of public health service and medical science. And VNA reported on 9 August that an agreement was signed on cultural and scientific cooperation between Hanoi and Moscow.

PHAM VAN DONG VISITS
IN ROMANIA, BULGARIA

The DRV party-government delegation's "official friendship visits" to Romania and Bulgaria followed the general pattern established in the earlier trips to the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Poland.* During the visits in Bucharest, from 28 July to 1 August, and in Sofia, from 1 to 8 August, the DRV delegation was hosted by prime ministers Maurer and Todorov respectively, and attended the standard banquets and friendship rallies. The North Vietnamese were also received by the party chiefs, meeting with Ceausescu prior to his departure for the Crimea summit and with Zhivkov following his return from the Crimea. Neither communique claimed that identity of views had been achieved, thus according with the joint documents signed following the earlier DRV visits to Moscow, Warsaw and Peking. By contrast, complete unanimity was claimed to have been reached on all issues in the communique with the Hungarians, Mongolians, and North Koreans.

The Romanian and Bulgarian communiques stated that economic and military aid agreements with Hanoi for 1974 had been signed; however, only Bulgaria followed the lead of Moscow and Budapest and announced the signing of an agreement canceling previous DRV debts for economic aid. Following the pattern set during the DRV

* The 9-16 July DRV visit to the Soviet Union is discussed in the TRENDS of 11 July 1973, pages 1-5, and 18 July, pages 1-5. Pham Van Dong's 16-23 July Hungarian stay and his 23-28 July visit in Poland were treated, respectively, in the TRENDS of 25 July, pages 3-6, and 1 August, pages 20-21.

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visits to the USSR and other Soviet bloc countries, Bucharest and Sofia endorsed the DRV and PRG demand that the United States comply with the Paris agreement, but did not make this demand themselves in the communiques. Only Hungary, in its communique, called for an end to U.S. bombing in Cambodia.

Hanoi's accounts of all the communiques on the recent DRV visits have indicated that the host nations recognized the PRG as the only legitimate "representative" of the South Vietnamese people. However, accounts of the documents in the media of Moscow, Budapest, Warsaw, and now Sofia, watered down this endorsement by referring to the PRG as the only authentic "expressor" of the South Vietnamese people's aspirations. Romania, less reticent, used Hanoi's term "representative." Both Bucharest and Sofia gave their support to the PRG's 28 June six-point proposal for a settlement in South Vietnam, leaving Moscow as the conspicuous exception in its failure to endorse this program.

In line with the earlier Soviet bloc communiques, Bucharest and Sofia joined the North Vietnamese in noting the need for increased communist unity. The Romanians, but not the Bulgarians, went along with Dong's call for the "restoration" of solidarity among communist states. Dong first raised the call for restoring unity during his visit in Budapest and it was endorsed by the Hungarians in their communique. He continued to press his plea in the other East European capitals; however, perhaps because of the stepped up campaign against China by Moscow and its allies, the call was not echoed in the other communiques.

The omission of East Germany and Czechoslovakia from the delegation's swing through Eastern Europe was surprising in view of Hanoi's description of the trip as fulfilling Ho Chi Minh's behest to visit and thank all its allies for their assistance during the war. Although high-level delegations from Berlin and Prague did pay official visits to Hanoi this spring,* the two countries have not yet concluded new aid agreements with Hanoi. The GDR press agency ADN did announce on 3 August, when Dong was in Bulgaria, that the East German government had decided to consider past economic aid to North Vietnam as gratuitous.

* See the TRENDS of 21 March 1973, pages 5-6, for the East German trip and of 11 April, pages 10-11, for the Czechoslovak visit.

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The organization has been known by many titles in the intervening years: Indochinese Democratic Youth Union (1936-1939), Indochinese Anti-Imperialist Youth Union (1939-1941), Vietnam National Salvation Youth Union (1941-1956), and the Vietnam Working Youth Union (1956-1970). The other major youth organization in North Vietnam is the Vietnam Youth Federation (Hoi lien hiep Thanh nien Viet Nam) which, unlike the Working Youth Union, is a mass organization not affiliated with the VWP.

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USSR - IRAN

PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA'S VISIT HAILED, ASIAN SECURITY PRESSED

Moscow's comment on the 6-12 August visit of Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda has stressed its importance for general peace and security as well as for strengthening relations between the two countries.* Soviet interest in promoting an Asian collective security scheme, which was evidenced by Kosygin during the visit as well as in the joint communique, was again highlighted in Brezhnev's 15 August speech in Alma-Ata. Describing Soviet-Iranian relations as "good-neighborly," Moscow emphasized the benefits of Soviet assistance to Iranian development projects. Kosygin in his banquet speech seemed to suggest concern over the Shah's military armament program, but that issue and other sensitive questions such as Iran's relations with Moscow's treaty partners Iraq and India were largely softpedaled during the visit.

BILATERAL RELATIONS As with previous high-level Soviet-Iranian talks during the past year, Hoveyda's discussions with Kosygin and his separate meetings with Brezhnev and Podgorny were characterized as "frank and friendly." The joint communique noted that further expansion of economic ties had been discussed and "appropriate instructions" given to the joint standing commission for economic cooperation which is to hold a regular session in Teheran in October. Two agreements were signed during the visit: one on cooperation in the prevention of hijacking of civil aircraft, and a second, a "supplementary protocol" to the 14 May 1957 treaty, on "the procedure for settling border conflicts and incidents." This agreement, according to the joint communique, concerns the border along the Aras and Mil-o Moghan dams.**

* Hoveyda previously paid an official visit to the USSR in July 1967. During a stopover in Moscow en route home from London this past April, he had a "friendly conversation" with Kosygin.

** Negotiations on this border apparently have been under way since completion of the dams in 1970. In December of that year Moscow radio reported that the Shah had received the head of the USSR Main Administration of Border Troops and members of the Soviet-Iranian commission for demarcation of the frontier in the area of the dams.

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There is no indication that the topic of oil figured in the discussions, but Hoveyda was accompanied on a visit to Riga, at the end of his Moscow talks, by the Soviet minister of oil industry. Kosygin alluded to the subject in his banquet speech only in calling for observance of the right of every people to sovereign ownership of their natural resources. Moscow has given qualified approval of Iran's agreement with the consortium achieving sovereignty over its oil. A Shevchenko commentary broadcast in Persian on 31 July, while welcoming the agreement, noted that the consortium obtained an "important concession" in that for 20 years it would be "nearly the only purchaser of Iran's oil." Shevchenko no doubt had East European interests in mind. Recent Iranian negotiations with some East European countries had shown, he said, that Iran has a "big, reliable and expanding" oil market in these states.

IRANIAN ARMAMENT,
REGIONAL RELATIONS

The complex of questions relating to the Shah's armament program, Persian interests in the gulf and the Indian Ocean, and Iran's relations with Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India were generally bypassed in the official documents and the media coverage. The joint communique carried the usual Soviet-Iranian statement on the Persian Gulf, declaring again that questions pertaining to that region should be resolved by the countries of the area without foreign interference.

Kosygin may have had the Shah's armament program in mind when he referred at the 6 August banquet to unidentified "forces" which oppose international detente and "declare for military buildup, for inflation of military budgets." At another point he asserted that foreign policy should be determined by mutual trust and understanding, not by "tensions and arms race," and went on to call for strict observance of international treaties and agreements.

A more explicit though indirect criticism of the Iranian armament program was contained in a TASS commentary broadcast by Moscow in Persian on the 13th. Quoting the Teheran paper KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL as saying that Moscow had given no indication during the visit of any disapproval of Iranian policy in this regard, the commentary suggested that the paper was misrepresenting Soviet policy. The USSR, it said, attempts to base foreign policy on mutual trust and peaceful settlement of disputes rather than on tension and an arms race.

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On the Iranian-Iraqi dispute, Hoveyda was asked at a press conference on his return home whether the issue had been discussed in Moscow. He was reported by Teheran radio to have said: "We discussed all international issues, but I do not think anyone has the right to intervene in matters concerning Iran." He conceded that "we discussed this subject as well, however."

The comment has virtually ignored the Afghanistan issue. Moscow has sought to reassure Iran that while the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent" to what takes place in Afghanistan, the change of regime there was purely an internal affair. In his banquet speech, Kosygin asserted that Soviet-Iranian cooperation was not directed against any other country, adding that the same held for Soviet cooperation with other countries such as India, Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan. Echoing Kosygin's assurance, a Persian-language commentary by Zholkver on 7 August said the USSR tried to establish its relations with its neighbors, and also relations between these countries, on the basis of good-neighborliness, peaceful cooperation, and reciprocal understanding. An earlier Persian-language commentary on 25 July had dismissed "Western propaganda" allegations that the proclamation of a republic in Afghanistan was a victory for the USSR, describing them as "unfair attempts" to undermine Soviet foreign policy and "its methods with regard to Afghanistan and other Eastern countries." The broadcast had cited Hoveyda's forthcoming visit as an indication of the steadily improving relations between the USSR and the Eastern countries.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY Soviet interest in promoting an Asian collective security scheme was again reflected in Kosygin's banquet speech on the 6th and in the joint communique. The latter referred to the "intent" of the two countries to work toward the creation of an Asian collective security system--words first used in the communique following Kosygin's March visit to Iran.* The current document added that this should be done "in such a way as to cover all countries of the continent." Earlier Soviet communiqués with Iran, last October, and with Afghanistan, in March 1972 and May 1973, had touched upon--but not specifically endorsed--the idea of a collective security system, declaring that peace and security in Asia "require the joint efforts of all countries" of the region.

* Kosygin's March visit to Iran is discussed in the 21 March TRENDS, pages 10-12.

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Moscow has been on record as favoring participation of all Asian countries in a security system, and Brezhnev spelled out this position in his 15 August speech in Alma-Ata: "We repeat again," he said, "that the Soviet Union is in favor of active equal participation of all the Asian countries without exception in the collective security system." Every Asian state, he added, is called on to make a contribution to its creation. Last December, Brezhnev, in his speech on the USSR's 50th anniversary, had rejected allegations that the collective security system was designed to contain China. "As we conceive the idea," he had said, "the People's Republic of China will become an equal partner of such a system." Gromyko had indicated, in his UNGA addresses in 1969 and 1970, that the USSR envisioned participation by all the Asian states in creating such a system.

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AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW, PEKING REACT CAUTIOUSLY TO DAUD COUP, NEW REPUBLIC

The 17 July coup converting Afghanistan from a monarchy to a republic has met with a cautious welcome in Moscow and wariness in Peking. Moscow moved promptly to recognize the new government but has offered little comment on developments. Peking only belatedly took note of the coup in reporting the 17 July speech by Daud, the new head of state, and announcing PRC recognition at Afghanistan's request. Peking's 11-day delay in reacting suggests Chinese concern over the implications of a major change in a region that has been marked by instability, particularly in view of Moscow's gains in recent years and the losses incurred by Peking's ally Pakistan.

Both Moscow and Peking have steered clear of the Pushtunistan question, a sensitive issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan which Daud raised at the time of his takeover. On 15 July the PRC initiated broadcasting in Pushtu, thus joining the Soviet Union as the only communist states broadcasting in that language.

MOSCOW The Soviet decision to recognize the new government was conveyed two days after the coup when Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, one of the few full members of the CPSU Central Committee serving as envoys to noncommunist countries, met with new head of state Daud. The Moscow press carried banner headlines on the change in government, according to TASS, and favorable treatment was given to Daud's 17 July speech proclaiming the establishment of a republic. Daud received a congratulatory telegram on his "election" from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin expressing confidence that good relations would continue between the two countries. This, however, has been the only authoritative Soviet reaction to the coup. Although implicitly favorable reportage on events in Afghanistan has been carried in Soviet media, original comment has been sparse and has been limited mainly to foreign-language broadcasts. Foreign speculation about Soviet involvement in the coup was rebutted in these broadcasts.

While proceeding cautiously in the new situation, Moscow may hope that the close relations it enjoyed with Daud during his former tenure as prime minister from 1953 to 1963 will be renewed and serve the Soviet cause of an Asian collective security system. Afghanistan had lent support to the idea of collective security in the past, but Moscow's intensified drive in behalf of its

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proposal since the Vietnam settlement in January received a setback in May when the joint communique on Podgorny's 21-24 May visit to Afghanistan took a more noncommittal stand on this subject than that enunciated in a similar communique issued last year when the Afghan prime minister visited Moscow. Kabul's hesitancy in May was the more conspicuous in the light of Podgorny's vigorous advocacy of the proposal in a major speech he delivered during his visit.*

Although Moscow has not referred to the collective security proposal in the context of the coup, the Slovak party daily PRAVDA on 27 July cited the new government's announced policy of neutrality and nonalignment as "a favorable element especially as far as the emerging system of collective security in Asia is concerned." Moscow's continuing interest in the proposal was reflected during the Iranian prime minister's visit this month to the Soviet Union** and in the major I. Aleksandrov article in the 7 August PRAVDA elaborating on Soviet foreign policy objectives. Attaching "unusually great importance" to the idea of collective security in Asia, the article took note of the difficulties posed by unnamed forces inside and outside Asia interested in preserving an atmosphere of distrust among Asian states.

PEKING On 28 July NCNA broke Peking's silence on Afghan developments by reporting Daud's 17 July speech and announcing that the PRC on the 28th had extended recognition "at the request of the new government." NCNA's brief account of Daud's speech pointedly cited his professed intention to follow a foreign policy based on neutrality, nonalignment, and friendship "with all nations and peoples in the world." There has been no subsequent Chinese reporting on Afghan developments, an arm's-length posture reflected in Peking's failure this year to report the customary PRC embassy reception in Kabul marking Chinese Army Day (1 August).

Peking's concern over developments in this region has been expressed in warnings against Soviet expansionism and was underscored by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei's visits to Iran and Pakistan during his four-nation tour in June--the first trip by a Chinese

* Podgorny's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 31 May 1973, pages 15-16.

** See the U.S.-Iran section of this issue of the TRENDS.

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foreign minister outside East Asia since the 1960's. An effort to counteract Soviet influence may also have been reflected in NCNA's report on 25 May that two days earlier--during Podgorny's visit to Kabul--the Afghan prime minister had received the Chinese ambassador for a "cordial and friendly" talk and had asked him to convey "kind regards" to Premier Chou En-lai. In another sign of Chinese interest, Peking on 15 July began broadcasting two daily half-hour programs in Pushtu, the first new language to be introduced in Peking's international broadcasts since 1969. Moscow has been broadcasting in Pushtu since 1957.

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CHINA

PEKING PUBLICIZES MOVEMENT FOR "PEACEFUL" UNIFICATION

Marking another step in its evolving campaign to promote reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, Peking for the first time in recent years has advanced the prospect of "peaceful unification." According to NCNA, senior military leader Yeh Chien-ying on 27 July urged a group of "Chinese patriots" from Hong Kong and Macao to "contribute to the cause of patriotism and peaceful reunification of the motherland." Apart from noting that the meeting took place in the Taiwan Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Peking, the NCNA report made no direct reference to Taiwan.

Though Yeh's appeal was made in the context of Hong Kong and Macao, the pitch for peaceful unification was beamed directly to Taiwan in several broadcasts from the mainland beginning on the 27th. These broadcasts have portrayed a broad movement on Taiwan, particularly among youth and students, struggling for peaceful unification in the face of a panic-stricken Chiang Kai-shek regime. One broadcast describing a demonstration by Taiwan university students in February said some students wrote on walls with their own blood such slogans as "peaceful unification of the motherland."

The new theme of peaceful unification recalls but differs from the line taken by Peking when the Taiwan question was high on the agenda in the 1950's. Though firmly refusing to foreclose the option of using force, Peking at that time expressed a preference for "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan. In its current discussion, however, Peking has avoided that particular formulation. In the nearest approach to reviving the formulation, an open letter to the Taiwan governor broadcast by the PLA's Fukien Front radio on 14 July cited Chou En-lai's 1956 appeal to Kuomintang officials to play a role in the "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan.

Peking's avoidance thus far of the call for "peaceful liberation" may reflect sensitivity to the issue of nonuse of force, an issue which bedeviled Sino-U.S. talks in the past and which in recent years has been the focus of bitter dispute in the Sino-Soviet context. The theme of "peaceful unification," on the other hand, has the advantage of avoiding past associations with the question of force and serves mainly as an appeal to Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao to identify their interests with the mainland and to work toward an accommodation. In the past year there have been signs

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that Peking is seeking to develop a campaign of conciliation capitalizing on the changing Sinc-U.S. relationship and playing on a sense of Chinese patriotism. Yen Chien-ying had enunciated a conciliatory line on 29 September in an address to "compatriots" from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as well as Overseas Chinese attending a reception marking PRC National Day. Yen declared that "patriots belong to one big family" and that no distinction would be drawn between "those who come forward first and those later" in responding to the call for reconciliation.

Another stage in this evolving campaign appeared last February when Peking used the occasion of a Taiwan anniversary that had been ignored in recent years to make a highly publicized pitch for "great patriotic unity" and for talks between PRC and Nationalist Chinese officials. One of the main speakers on the occasion, which came within a few days after the announcement of the agreement to establish liaison offices in Peking and Washington, declared that it would be "absolutely impossible for the United States to maintain its former relations with Taiwan for long." In a direct appeal to ROC officials the speaker said: "We are all Chinese. Why couldn't we talk for the sake of the sacred cause of unifying the motherland?" It was not, however, until Yeh's remarks to the Hong Kong and Macao visitors on 27 July that Peking began referring to "peaceful unification."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

EAST EUROPE REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO MOSCOW'S MOVES AGAINST CHINA

Moscow's insistent demand for unity in the face of the Chinese challenge, conveyed in the 7 August PRAVDA article by I. Aleksandrov,* has to date received a cautious response in East Europe. Moscow's orthodox allies for the most part avoided direct comment on the China issue and limited themselves to republication of the Aleksandrov article, either in full or in part. Maverick Romania ignored the PRAVDA article and instead maintained its even-handed treatment of Soviet and Chinese affairs. Yugoslavia, alone among the East European countries, commented directly on the Aleksandrov article, interpreting it as a Soviet call for concerted action on all fronts.

ORTHODOX ALLIES In a display of unconditional support for concerted action, the Aleksandrov article was published in the major newspapers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland. By contrast, the Hungarian press published only the lengthy passages of the article dealing specifically with China--reflecting Budapest's continuing reluctance to submit unconditionally to Moscow's diktat. For the most part, however, Moscow's orthodox allies avoided direct comment on China along the lines of the Aleksandrov article. A Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo "evaluation" of the Crimea meeting, as reported by Sofia radio on the 8th, attached "especially great significance" to the "coordinated unmasking" of leftist opportunism. Prague's English-language radio service for foreign listeners broadcast commentaries criticizing Peking for engaging in "hostile activities against the socialist countries" in collusion with the "most reactionary forces" in the West. East Germany, Hungary and Poland have not disseminated anti-Chinese comment in the context of the Crimea conference, but the latter two countries have criticized Chinese disarmament policies and ideology, respectively, since the meeting.

ROMANIA Bucharest predictably ignored the Aleksandrov article and further demonstrated its determination to pursue an independent course in the wake of the Crimea conference. There has been no discussion of Crimea in Romanian media since the measured praise of the conclave by the RCP Executive Committee on the 3d and an unsigned article in the party daily SCINTEIA on the 4th. A 9 August SCINTEIA article hailing Romanian-Soviet cooperation, on

* The Aleksandrov article is discussed in the TRENDS of 8 August 1973, pages 1-3.

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the occasion of a new bilateral economic agreement signed in Bucharest by Soviet Deputy Premier Lesechko, was balanced two days later by an AGERPRES commentary entitled "Fruitful Development of Romanian-Chinese Economic Cooperation." And Ceausescu was effusive in hailing China's "successes in socialist construction" at the Bucharest ceremony on the 11th for the new PRC Ambassador Li Ting-chuan.

In addition to broadcasting summaries of the Aleksandrov article in Romanian, among other languages, Moscow reminded Bucharest, in a 7 August Nikolayev radio commentary in Romanian only, that "Crimea showed the socialist countries" "determination" to "always coordinate their actions."

YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA Yugoslavia alone among the East European communist countries, commented directly on the Aleksandrov article. In addition to a brief summary of the article in BORBA on the 8th, POLITIKA the same day carried an analysis by the paper's Moscow correspondent R. Bajalski. Featuring the PRAVDA article's attack on the Chinese, the commentary attributed the failure to mention China in the Crimea communique to Romania's consistent opposition to "public criticism of any socialist country." The commentary also pointed to the PRAVDA article's stress on ideological vigilance and policy coordination. Other Yugoslav commentaries on the Crimea conference had similarly surmised that Moscow would intensify its drive for "ideological alertness."

Tirana ignored this year's Crimea conference, as it had done in the past.

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USSR ON WATERGATE

MOSCOW OFFERS FIRST DIRECT ASSESSMENT OF WATERGATE AFFAIR

On 12 August Soviet citizens were given the first direct Soviet commentary on Watergate as well as the most extensive explanation of the affair by Soviet media. The Watergate assessment came in a discussion between two Moscow radio commentators, Valentin Zorin and Leonid Zavyalov, in the weekly radio roundtable on international affairs. Both observers maintained that Watergate is essentially a struggle for power between the President and Congress, the outcome of which remains in doubt. They also said that "various influential groupings" with their own axes to grind were attempting to take advantage of the Watergate revelations.

Sympathy for the President's position in the Watergate affair, which had been implied in selective reporting in Soviet media in the weeks since the June summit, was made somewhat more explicit in the roundtable's observation that rightwing opponents of the President's foreign policy of "relaxation" were among those attempting to exploit Watergate. However, the discussion did not go beyond this allusion to the foreign policy implications of Watergate.

On the whole, the roundtable observers were cautious about taking sides. The protagonists--the President and the Senate committee--were portrayed in a more balanced manner than was evident in previous reporting. On the one hand, they asserted that the Senate hearings had been transformed from an investigation of election irregularities into a "political trial." On the other hand, they pointed to the enormous concentration of power in the hands of the President and caustically labeled this phenomenon the "quintessence" of the "vaunted American democracy."

The roundtable discussion marks a progression in Moscow's coverage of Watergate and represents the first time Moscow has publicly conveyed uncertainty as to its outcome. Soviet media had maintained a virtual silence on Watergate until 16 May, when a factual report in LITERARY GAZETTE provided the first overall look at the affair. Subsequent brief reports by TASS and various domestic media added bits and pieces. Since the June summit such reports have emphasized statements by President Nixon defending his position. A TASS report on the Senate hearings published in the central press on 3 August singled out statements by former Administration officials denying Presidential involvement.

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U S S R

REGIONAL LEADERS STUDY MOLDAVIAN FARM INNOVATIONS

Since the CPSU Central Committee approved Mo'davia's transfer of control of kolkhozes from the agriculture ministry to elective kolkhoz councils, numerous officials from other republics have visited Moldavia to study the councils and other agricultural innovations.* The parade appears to have been stimulated by USSR Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy, who stressed the importance of the Moldavian experiment in a March speech and who visited the Baltic republics and Belorussia in early June, perhaps to apply pressure. However, the visitors left the republic without having endorsed the Moldavian experiment.

Since late June Moldavia has been toured by the first secretaries of Lithuania and Estonia and of five RSFSR oblasts -- Moscow, Ivanovo, Kostroma, Yaroslavl and the Chuvash ASSR -- and the agriculture secretaries of Georgia and Lithuania, with each visit receiving heavy publicity in the Moldavian press. Moldavian First Secretary I. I. Bodyul has personally accompanied the visitors around the republic, seeking to promote his various innovations -- agro-industrial complexes, interkolkhoz organizations and kolkhoz councils. But the only endorsement of the controversial councils that Bodyul has been able to obtain was by Polyanskiy's deputy, I. N. Kuznetsov, who, in presenting an award to Moldavia on 28 July, praised the republic's new forms of farm administration for having increased production and helped solve "urgent social and economic problems in the village."

Perhaps the least enthusiastic visitor was Estonian First Secretary I. G. Kebin, a longtime opponent of kolkhoz unions and a staunch supporter of the agriculture ministry. Unlike the Lithuanian, Georgian and Moscow secretaries, Kebin did not grant an interview to local reporters upon his departure from Moldavia, and his 30 July-1 August visit was not reported by the Estonian press as late as 9 August. Although the RSFSR secretaries reportedly studied the structure and activity of rayon kolkhoz councils and were escorted by Moldavian Kolkhoz Council Chairman N. M. Zaychenko, Kebin's tour covered other aspects of Moldavian agricultural development.

* For background, see the TRENDS of 14 March 1973, pages 25-26.

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Although Kebin spent some time inspecting livestock farms and big agro-industrial complexes and heard Bodyul's sales pitch on the "advisability of creating large agricultural enterprises," the Estonian leaders are on record in 1970 and 1971 for having criticized such expensive livestock complexes. Bodyul did, however, manage to persuade Georgian Agriculture Secretary B. G. Gigiberiya, according to the 26 June SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA. Gigiberiya declared that he had become fully convinced of the value of investing in such complexes.

MILITARY INDOCTRINATION REMAINS HARD LINE DESPITE DETENTE

A militantly hostile view of the West continues to be cultivated by the Soviet military training establishment despite the support for detente currently being displayed by the military leadership. This dualism is pointed up by two articles in the July, No. 14, issue of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES. One, written by Lt. General A. Shevchenko, an officer whose previous writings identify him with the Main Political Administration, presents a highly distorted picture of Western military training programs clearly calculated to inspire distrust of the West and an attitude of vigilance. The other, written by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, A. Manshulo, projects a directly contrary image by presenting a highly favorable assessment of the prospects for East-West trade.

The Shevchenko article strikes a jarring note in the current detente atmosphere. Setting his account against the background of a highly negative assessment of current political and social trends in the capitalist world, Shevchenko portrays the Western troop training programs as instruments of class domination. The resultant picture is an almost mirror-image likeness of the practices and philosophy of the Soviet system: centrally directed indoctrination programs carried out by "apparats" of professional propagandists, featuring daily, compulsory study sessions in which servicemen are drilled in the official rationales of government policy.

While articles of this type are presumably standard fare in the Soviet political training program, this one deserves special notice because of its timing and manner of presentation in the journal. Both circumstances suggest a special effort by the editors to draw attention to the need to tighten up any slack in the Soviet military training programs that may have been occasioned by

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detente. By placing the two articles together, the editors appear to be reminding the military community that the regime's current policy has two sides--ideological struggle as well as detente.

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ISRAEL - PALESTINIAN "TERRORISTS"

MOSCOW DISAPPROVES LEBANESE PLANE, ATHENS AIRPORT INCIDENTS

The Soviet press, according to TASS on the 12th, has "sharply condemned" Israel's interception and forced detainment of a Middle East Airlines passenger plane on 10 August as an "impudent act of air piracy" and a "bandit action." Soviet media have also given publicity to worldwide critical comment on the incident, and have exploited it in routine propaganda. A TASS item on the 13th--described as a TASS statement in foreign language rebroadcasts--charged that air piracy had been elevated to state policy by Israel. It expressed the indignation of the Soviet public over the incident, and said that Soviet "competent circles" regarded the action as flouting the UN Charter and international law.

Reporting the Security Council session on the 13th, TASS cited Soviet delegate Safronchuk as condemning the "terrorist methods of Israel in its foreign policy," and expressing Soviet readiness to support "the most effective sanctions" against Israel. TASS reported that many delegates suggested that the council should not limit itself to censuring Israel but should discuss the possibility of applying disciplinary measures.

The account noted that Ambassador Scali had expressed the regret of the United States over Israel's violation of Lebanon's sovereignty and the violation of the UN Charter and the norms of international civil aviation. A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 13th declared that Israel's "traditional protectors" could find no excuses for Tel Aviv this time, and that the U.S. State Department "was forced" to express regret. IZVESTIYA's Koryavin noted on the 13th that Tel Aviv had admitted that the operation was aimed at seizing a leader of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 13th cited the Cairo AL-AKHBAR as saying that the CIA through its connections with Israeli intelligence passed on information about the movements of leaders of the Palestinian resistance.

A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in English to Africa on the 13th quoted a representative of the Soviet commission of the International Civil Aviation Organization as saying that Israel's "criminal activities" threatened security of air transportation in the Middle East and contravened the principles outlined in the convention on international civil aviation.

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ATHENS AIRPORT INCIDENT Moscow's minimal attention to the terrorist attack by two Arabs at Athens airport on 5 August typically focused on Palestinian denials of an connection with the incident. TASS on the 6th cited the Palestinian news agency as charging that forces hostile to the Palestinians were seeking to discredit their struggle, and a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast the next day attributed to a Syrian paper the theory that the "terrorist incident" in Athens was planned by Israeli intelligence to distract attention from the recent murder of a Moroccan in Norway. Moscow's domestic service on the 8th reported that the "strictly secret organization" Black September had announced that one of its members was being sent to Athens to help establish the true identity of the terrorists.

While condemning incidents of international terrorism, Moscow has held that struggle inside the occupied territories is legal and justified. Commentator Belyayev, in the weekly Moscow domestic service observers' roundtable on the 5th, claimed that the Palestinian organizations were "decisively dissociating" themselves from acts such as aircraft hijacking. All Palestinian national liberation organizations, Belyayev added, are maintaining that the main front of the struggle "is in the occupied territories and not beyond their borders." And a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 9 August asserted that the Palestinian struggle in the occupied territory was assuming increasing proportions, and that "these operations are entirely legal from the point of view of international military law."

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NOTE

CHINA-INDIA: As part of a series of recent reports critical of Indian policies, Peking marked this year's anniversary of the 1971 Soviet-Indian friendship treaty by replaying Indian politicians' adverse comment on the pact. Peking had ignored the anniversary last year. An NCNA report on 9 August--the date of the treaty--quoted various Indian political figures as expressing dissatisfaction with India's "alliance" with the Soviet Union and demanding an "independent" foreign policy and normal relations with neighbors. While thus probing areas of Soviet-Indian discord, Peking has also taken a tougher approach to the Gandhi government by carrying a wider range of reports portraying India in an unfavorable light. Thus, a 30 July NCNA pickup of foreign comment depicted India's "imperialistic role" in the Persian Gulf together with the USSR, comparing an Indian drive for riches to the west with the 1971 moves against what was then East Pakistan. On domestic affairs, which Peking had discreetly ignored from September 1972 to May 1973, a number of NCNA reports in recent months have highlighted labor troubles, police mutinies, and food riots attacking Indian government policies.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 6 - 12 AUGUST 1973

<u>Moscow (2575 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1006 items)</u>		
Crimea Meeting of Soviet Bloc Party Leaders	(15%)	11%	Domestic Issues	(50%)	60%
China	(4%)	5%	Cambodia	(4%)	8%
10th World Youth Festival, Berlin	(9%)	4%	Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 10th Anniversary	(---)	7%
Iranian Prime Minister Hoveyda in USSR	(---)	4%	NCNA Attack on Soviet Admirals' Navy Day Articles	(---)	4%
Chile	(---)	3%	Vietnam	(7%)	2%
Indochina	(2%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.