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Approved For Release 1999/08/26 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300060038-3

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

6 SEPT 1973

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
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# **TRENDS**

**in Communist Propaganda**

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
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6 SEPTEMBER 1973

(VOL. XXIV, NO. 36)

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FBI'S TRENDS

6 SEPTEMBER 1973

## CONTENTS

### CHINA

CCP's Tenth Congress Sanctions Party Restoration Era. . . . .	1
Chou Portrays Geopolitical Setting of Triangular Relations. . . . .	8

### INDOCHINA

Hanoi Marks National Day; Defense Minister Giap Still Absent. . . . .	11
Peking Downgrades Observance of North Vietnamese Anniversary. . . . .	15

### USSR

Anti-Sakharov Campaign Lifts Official Veil on His Views . . . . .	17
Georgia Endorses Controversial Moldavian Kolkhoz Councils . . . . .	19

### NOTES

Kissinger Appointment; Moscow on Disarmament. . . . .	20
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### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . .	i
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CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 1 -

## C H I N A

## CCP'S TENTH CONGRESS SANCTIONS PARTY RESTORATION ERA

The CCP's tenth congress held from 24 to 28 August, a milestone marking a party restoration era, formalized Lin Piao's downfall and certified a power structure in which Chou En-lai's party-oriented coalition occupies the commanding heights beneath only Mao himself. The congress also provided dramatic testimony to the intense animosity that a Chinese leadership headed by Mao and Chou harbors toward the Soviets. In addition to a denunciation of Lin's "antiparty clique"--for wanting to capitulate to the Soviets, among other charges--the political report Chou delivered to the congress featured a bitter excoriation of the "Brezhnev renegade clique" and even warned explicitly against a Soviet surprise attack.

On the surface the leadership certified by the congress might appear to be a balance of contending forces, moderate and radical, civilian and military. But in fact the new constellation possesses a strong center of gravity, a convergence of vested interests in the party as an institution that has been regaining the hegemony destroyed during the cultural revolution and challenged in the Lin Piao affair. The meteoric rise of young Shanghai leader Wang Hung-wen, who delivered the report on the revised party constitution, symbolizes these vested interests in the party. Wang's Shanghai Cotton Mill No. 17 formed the first party committee (20 June 1969) to be rebuilt after the ninth congress in April that year put party reconstruction on the agenda. The party has also waxed quantitatively, the congress revealing a membership figure of 28 million as compared with the official figure of 17 million before the decimations of the cultural revolution.

The tenth congress was unusual both for its brevity and the absence of a prior announcement or preceding plenum. Mao's health--he presided at the congress but did not speak, as he had at the ninth congress--and Peking's trend toward streamlining affairs may have been contributing factors, but the brevity of the proceedings may also reflect how those in charge viewed the business at hand. Both Chou and Wang in their reports were at pains to indicate an underlying continuity between the ninth congress and the present. Thus the tenth congress has formally rectified the deviation of Lin and his associates from the course already charted at the ninth congress, and there was no need to elaborate

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 2 -

on policy lines. The next step will be the convocation of the National People's Congress, an event that was delayed by the Lin Piao affair but which Chou has now promised will come "soon."

**LEADERSHIP** The composition of the new Politburo and Central Committee confirms Chou's ascendancy in the wake of the Lin affair and highlights Wang Hung-wen's rise to the formal position of third-ranking member of a collective leadership under Mao. It also registers the enhanced authority of a party-centered coalition at the expense of professional military leaders and the two militant "radicals" whose interests were closely identified with the cultural arena during the cultural revolution.

The first plenum of the Tenth Central Committee, held on 30 August, revived the collective institution of party vice chairmen, naming in apparent rank order Chou, Wang, ailing incumbent standing committee member Kang Sheng (who may have been rewarded for loyalty during the Lin affair), party-military leader and close Chou associate Yeh Chien-ying, and Li Te-sheng, head of the PLA General Political Department (GPD) who has been elevated from Politburo alternate. Whether or not the rank order implies the line of succession is not indicated in the new party constitution, in contrast to the previous constitution's imprudent designation of Lin as sole vice chairman and successor to Mao. With respect to party supremacy over the military, it is significant not only that the two military men among the vice chairmen are ranked behind the others but also that they represent party interests in the military: Yeh as the key figure in the party's Military Committee, and Li as GPD chief.

The new standing committee includes, in addition to Mao and all party vice chairmen, Shanghai chief Chang Chun-chiao and octogenarians Chu Te and Tung Pi-wu, the latter two having mainly honorary status. At this stage Chang's status seems perplexing, but he may be destined to stand in the front rank of leaders as party secretary general or, after the NPC, as chief of state or some other top title. Though there has been no reference to revival of a secretariat, Chang served as secretary general of the congress. The secretary general of the eighth congress in 1956, Teng Hsiao-ping, became party secretary general but not a vice chairman, a possible precedent for now. Should Chang not be awarded one of the top positions in the formal hierarchy but instead be upstaged by his former Shanghai protege, the stability of the new leadership might be questionable with the addition of another significant source of dissatisfaction over the current lineup.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 3 -

While all the Politburo members not purged with Lin have retained their posts and all active alternates have been promoted to full membership, some of the incumbents, notably Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, must surely be dissatisfied with their current status. They directed the cultural and ideological attacks that keynoted the cultural revolution, and Chiang in particular has lost ground by failing to make the standing committee after having previously ranked just below standing committee members. The new list elevates additional leaders above her and Yao. Similarly, the two regional military leaders in the Politburo, Hsu Shih-yu and Cheng Hsi-lien, have suffered a relative loss in view of the newly elevated leaders above them and the addition of other, nonmilitary provincial leaders to full Politburo status. No new regional military leaders were elected to the Politburo.

Some of the promotions to the Politburo had been previously signaled in central leadership rankings: Wang Hung-wen, Hunan chief Huao Kuo-feng, and Peking municipal chief Wu Te had been accorded positions in central leadership lists which implied future Politburo status. All are civilians, as are the other two new full members of the Politburo, Kwangsi chief Wei Kuo-ching and leader of the model Tachai production brigade Chen Yung-kuei. Politburo alternate members seem to have been selected with a view to rounding out representation from various groups: Wu Kuei-hsien from Shensi is a woman who was a full member of the ninth committee; Ni Chih-fu is a model worker; Su Chen-hua, former navy political commissar whose successor Li Tso-peng fell with Lin, seems to represent the rehabilitated cadres and is the only one to achieve Politburo status; and Saifudin, like Wei Kuo-ching, is a member of a national minority. Unlike the other alternate members, Saifudin has a power base in his own right as Sinkiang party chief.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE      Though the total number of Central Committee full and alternate members rose from 294 to 319, nearly a third of the Ninth Central Committee members was dropped from the new committee, mostly military leaders who fell after Lin's demise or "revolutionary" leaders from the provinces. On the other hand, the new Central Committee includes some 20 members of the Eighth Central Committee who were not retained at Ninth Congress in 1969. Two of the most prominent returnees, former Politburo members Tan Chen-lin and Ulanfu, made public appearances on 26 August while the congress was in session, and another former Politburo member elected to the Central Committee, Li Ching-chuan, appeared publicly on 29 August. Other newly

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 4 -

rehabilitated leaders elected full members include former member of the party secretariat Wang Chia-hsiang, former Anhwei chief Li Pao-hua, former senior deputy chief of staff Chang Tsung-hsun, and former capital construction chief Ku Mu. Returnees elected Central Committee alternates include former minister of commerce Yao I-lin and former provincial first secretaries Yeh Fei, Chiang Wei-ching, and Chiang Hua.

Of the 27 active provincial first secretaries, 23 were elected full members of the new Central Committee; the others were made alternates. As in the Ninth Central Committee, the leaders of China's two smallest provinces, Ningsia and Tibet, were not elected to full membership. The other exceptions are Wang Chia-ao of Heilungkiang, who was out of public view for nearly two years before reappearing in his province in June, and Shansi first secretary Hsieh Cheng-hua, who is overshadowed in his province by Tachai leader Chen Yung-kuei, now a full member of the Politburo.

NEW CONSTITUTION,  
POLITICAL REPORT

Chou En-lai's political report and Wang Hung-wen's report on the new party constitution represent determined efforts to link present policies with the line adopted at the ninth congress, presenting the Lin Piao's group as a defeated minority even at the ninth congress. Both Chou and Wang reaffirmed that "the political line and organizational line of the ninth congress are correct," and Chou pointed out that the political report delivered by Lin at that congress was "drawn up under Chairman Mao's personal guidance." The thrust of both Chou's and Wang's reports was thus that business will be carried on largely as it has been for the past four years and that cadres need not expect line changes or detailed new programs.

As Wang noted in his report on the party constitution, "there are not many changes in the articles" and these changes were drawn up according to "Chairman Mao's specific proposals." Wang's report is closely tied to an explication of the constitution, but both he and Chou stress the same major points--the supremacy of the party, the inevitability of future revolutions like the cultural revolution, and the difficult role of the cadre who must be willing to sacrifice everything in opposing erroneous trends. Wang delved deeper into the rights of the masses to supervise the party than did Chou, but he did so in explaining the addition to the constitution of the warning that "it is absolutely impermissible to suppress criticism and to retaliate."



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 5 -

The two major changes in the constitution are the omission of the provision naming Lin as Mao's successor and a revised treatment of Mao's thought, an instrument that had been used by Lin and cultural revolution forces in the assault on the party. The new constitution omits the claims that Mao's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the present era and that he has brought Marxism-Leninism to "a higher and completely new stage." In the political report Chou in effect explained this deflation of the Maoist universalism that had had such a disastrous effect on Peking's foreign relations during the cultural revolution. After first citing Mao himself as affirming that this is still the era of imperialism, Chou quoted Stalin as saying "Leninism is Marxism of the era of imperialism" and then drew the logical conclusion that "the era has not changed" and that "the fundamental principles of Leninism are not outdated." Chou added that these principles remain "the theoretical basis guiding our thinking today," but elsewhere in the report he paid due deference to Mao's personal contributions. The new constitution posits "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" as the theoretical basis guiding the CCP's thinking.

There are no provisions in the constitution for succession to the party chairmanship, other than that a Central Committee plenum elects the chairman. There is no mention of a secretariat, as there had been in the constitution drawn up by the eighth congress, but "a number of necessary organs...shall be set up to attend to the day-to-day work of the party." An identical provision appeared in the 1969 constitution, but no secretariat emerged after the ninth congress.

Chou's claim that the political report given by Lin at the ninth congress was a Mao document and not what Lin really preferred was a necessary prelude to the denunciation of Lin; most of what Lin said in the report is still applicable today. Chou's economic attack on Lin and Chen Po-ta, who was also denounced at the congress, may relate to actual divergences over resource allocation, but it was couched in almost precisely the same terms used by Lin in his attack on Liu Shao-chi for "grasping production" and for stating that the question of whether capitalism or socialism wins out "is already solved."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 6 -

A principal tactic used in Chou's report is to vilify Lin as a Soviet agent, and in the course of doing so the report puts on public record such details as Lin's alleged attempt to assassinate Mao and his death in a plane crash in Mongolia while trying to flee to the Soviet Union. In a notably evasive remark, Chou begged off going into detail about the anti-Lin struggle, observing that it is already well known and "there is no need to dwell on it here." Such a formula--almost a signal of sensitive and contentious issues--has been used on at least two previous occasions, by Lo Jui-ching in regard to Lin's strategy of people's war in September 1965, and in the 1 July 1971 party anniversary editorial in regard to the cultural revolution.

Chou's caution fits with the gingerly way in which the congress treated the Lin affair, particularly its implications for leaders other than those already purged. Thus Chou observed that the Lin clique was "only a tiny group which was extremely isolated." The congress communique, while announcing the expulsion from the party of Lin and Chen Po-ta, was unrevealing about the fate of "the other principal members" of the Lin clique. The communique merely noted that the congress supported unspecified decisions and "all the corresponding measures" taken with regard to these unnamed figures.

Some of Chou's remarks, like those of Wang on the constitution, were less than reassuring to wary cadres, who were warned that "unhealthy tendencies" still exist and that "quite a few party committees are engrossed in daily routine and minor matters, paying no attention to major issues." If they do not change, Chou warned, they will "inevitably step onto the road of revisionism." This admonition, along with Wang's injunction against "going in by the back door," may be aimed at the type of error that has recently been aired concerning educational policy. The emphasis at the congress on individual cadre's responsibility for standing firm against an erroneous tide may be designed to extol those like the rusticated youth in Liaoning who insisted on a matter of principle in questioning how the new college admissions policy was being implemented. His case served as a national example during the pre-congress deliberations in July and August.

WANG HUNG-WEN      Notwithstanding his cultural revolution origins, Wang should feel quite comfortable in the upper echelon at a time of party restoration. He appears to have made the spectacular leap from factory worker in Shanghai's No. 17 Cotton Mill to second position next to Chou among the party vice

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 7 -

chairmen by playing an active role in ending factionalism among Shanghai student rebels in 1967 and then hitching his star to early efforts to rebuild the party. As head of the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary General Headquarters, a workers group organized to quell factional strife among feuding groups, Wang played a major role in seeing that central directives calling for an end to violent struggle were carried out in his home base.

The Shanghai radio in August 1967, for example, praised Wang's group for urging "misled" revolutionaries in a local shipyard to forget their factional disputes and to adhere to Mao's correct line. Leading members of Wang's organization blasted two rival groups for "hoodwinking . . . young people" and seeking "to stir up a second chaos in the yard." Similarly, in a rally speech that same month, Wang himself hit out at "bad elements" for taking "to rumormongering and inciting" as a means to take advantage of the masses. Wang charged these groups with

carrying out perverted forms of armed struggle and attack against organizations and individuals holding opinions which differ from theirs, causing armed struggles...and embroiling themselves in violence. This is incorrect and in contradiction to the present general orientation of the struggle. It is damaging to the effort to unite the majority and isolate and attack the few.

Wang won a spot on the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee in 1967 and was later elected a member of the new Central Committee at the ninth party congress, where he delivered a speech. In June 1969, just two months after the party congress ended, Wang's cotton mill became the first to establish a party committee at the primary level in Shanghai. Editorials in the Shanghai press praised the new committee for providing an inspiration to all other units in Shanghai.

In recent years, Wang has moved rapidly to the top rungs of Shanghai's power elite. He was identified as a vice chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee in 1970 and emerged as a secretary on Shanghai's new party committee in 1971. Since the turn of the year, Wang has functioned as Shanghai's chief when the Politburo duties of Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan kept them in Peking. Under Wang's guidance, Shanghai became the first province-level unit to establish a new Communist Youth League (CYL) committee last February. The Shanghai model set

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 8 -

the pattern for rebuilding the CYL into a tightly disciplined organization to funnel youthful energies toward goals set by the central party apparatus. Wang's keynote address at the Shanghai CYL congress firmly called upon party organizations at all levels to strengthen their leadership over youth work. In April of this year Wang appeared in Shanghai, after one of his stays among the upper reaches in Peking, as head of the reconstructed Shanghai Trade Union Council.

#### CHOU PORTRAYS GEOPOLITICAL SETTING OF TRIANGULAR RELATIONS

If the discussion of domestic affairs stressed continuities between the ninth and tenth congresses, the treatment of foreign affairs reflected the transformed triangular relationship and Peking's trend in recent years toward geopolitical and diplomatic approaches to foreign policy. Chou's report to the congress pressed the familiar line of forming "the broadest united front" against the "hegemonism of the two superpowers," but it did so in a way that clearly sanctioned the moves toward Sino-U.S. detente in the interest of counterbalancing Soviet influence. Chou's report also served as an authoritative rebuttal of the recent Soviet polemical offensive against Peking. Observing that "the Brezhnev renegade clique" has recently "talked a lot of nonsense" about Sino-Soviet relations, Chou retorted that Moscow has been playing up to monopoly capitalists by accusing Peking of opposing detente and refusing to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

Chou notably sharpened the formula of great-power rivalry that has served as the major premise of Peking's foreign policy in recent years. While noting that the superpowers "contend as well as collude" with each other, Chou advanced a clear-cut formulation of where the balance lies: "Their collusion serves the purpose of more intensified contention. Contention is absolute and protracted, whereas collusion is relative and temporary." In the late 1960s, at a time when Sino-U.S. relations were frozen in hostility, Peking had stressed the convergence of interests between the Soviet Union and the United States, even to the point of accusing them of forming a military alliance against China.

In the context of analyzing superpower contention, Chou cited Europe as "strategically the key point" in their rivalry. According to Chou's analysis, the West always seeks to divert the Soviet "peril" toward China, and the Soviets for their part

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 9 -

are now feinting to the east while thrusting toward the west. The 1 October 1972 PRC National Day editorial had said Moscow regarded Europe as the main area of its contention with the United States, and in the past year the Chinese have issued a stream of reports contrived to question Moscow's detente posture in Europe and to promote Western vigilance and concern.

Consistent with the emphasis on geopolitical considerations, Chou all but ignored revolutionary movements and aimed struggles. In contrast, Lin Piao's ninth congress report gave pride of place to this subject in its discussion of foreign affairs. Typifying Peking's current approach, Chou's report hailed the awakening of the Third World as "a major event in contemporary international relations," and Chinese efforts to cultivate West Europe and Japan were reflected in Chou's reference to resentment in these areas toward superpower dominance.

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS      Chou's report pulled few punches in its attack on the Soviets, likening Brezhnev to Hitler and all but writing off any hope for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Chou recited a familiar litany of charges, accusing the Kremlin of enforcing a fascist dictatorship at home and practicing "social imperialism" across the globe. He reiterated Peking's position that the dispute over "matters of principle" should not hinder normalization of state relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, and that the border question should be settled peacefully through negotiations "free from any threat"--a formulation reflecting Peking's demand for a mutual troop withdrawal. But that he made these points merely for the record seemed indicated by his sarcastic rhetorical question: "Must China give away all the territory north of the Great Wall to the Soviet revisionists" in order to demonstrate a willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relations?

Chou made a passing reference to Soviet troops massed along the Chinese border, but the most direct portrayal of a threat to China's security came in the course of an appeal for vigilance against "any war of aggression that imperialism may launch and particularly against surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist social imperialism."\* The warning against surprise

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\* Wang's report on the constitution referred to surprise attack by "imperialism and social imperialism," but this was presumably a function of format rather than a reflection of divergent lines. Wang's brief discussion of foreign affairs encapsulated the references to both "any war of aggression" and surprise attack.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 10 -

attack, which is new, also appeared in the congress communique. Taken as a whole, however, the congress' discussion of foreign affairs did not evoke a sense of imminent threat, and Chou's report put a gloss on Mao's 20 May 1970 dictum on the danger of a new world war by asserting that it is possible "to prevent such a war."

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS Chou's report contained a directly positive assessment of the Sino-U.S. detente. In the course of listing Peking's successes in foreign affairs, Chou observed that "Sino-U.S. relations have been improved to some extent." The National Day editorial last October had said that President Nixon's visit to Peking had ended two decades of suspended relations and had opened the door to friendly contacts between the people of the two countries. The upturn in these relations can be measured against Lin's ninth congress report, which had called the United States "the most ferocious enemy" of the world's people and had criticized the President for playing "counterrevolutionary dual tactics."

In a notable passage, Chou's report justified Peking's moves to improve Sino-U.S. relations while denigrating Soviet-U.S. detente. Distinguishing "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries" from "collusion and compromise" between Moscow and Washington, Chou cited Leninist scripture for the observation that "there are compromises and compromises." Chou hammered his point home by invoking Lenin's conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and contrasting it with "the doings of Khrushchev and Brezhnev" as "betrayers of Lenin."

In another justification for Sino-U.S. detente, Chou said the United States has "openly admitted that it is increasingly on the decline" and that it "could not but pull out of Vietnam." This portrayal of receding U.S. power contrasted with Chou's catalog of the "evil and foul things" perpetrated by an expansionist Soviet Union.

Chou's report failed to repeat the recent call for "peaceful unification" of the motherland, but Peking's conciliatory approach during the past year was reflected in Chou's appeal to compatriots on the mainland and in Taiwan to "strive together" to liberate Taiwan and unify the country.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 11 -

## INDOCHINA

## HANOI MARKS NATIONAL DAY; DEFENSE MINISTER GIAP STILL ABSENT

North Vietnam celebrated the 2 September DRV National Day with traditional observances the preceding day: Hanoi leaders attended a wreath-laying ceremony at a military cemetery, a grand rally was held at Ba Dinh Square, and Premier Pham Van Dong hosted an evening reception. The appearance of most Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo members at these events, or at the 31 August ceremony welcoming First Secretary Le Duan back from the USSR, called attention to the continued unexplained absence of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, who has not appeared in public since early July. Hoang Van Hoan, the only other active Politburo member who was not present on these occasions, is currently in Peking on an undisclosed assignment. NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who was in Hanoi on his way to the nonaligned conference in Algiers, also participated in the major national day events and spoke at the rally.

Hanoi did not hold its usual commemorative ceremony to mark the anniversary of the death of Ho Chi Minh on 3 September 1969, an event which previously had also prompted a turnout of the Politburo. The omission of the ceremony is consistent with the trend of diminished attention to this anniversary: Last year Hanoi held the ceremony but did not continue the previous two years' practice of giving major press attention to the anniversary.

GIAP ABSENCE        Vo Nguyen Giap's failure to appear at national day ceremonies, or at Politburo gatherings greeting the return to Hanoi of Pham Van Dong on 17 August and Le Duan on 31 August, further underscores the unusual nature of his recent absence from public view. Since 1965, Giap on at least three occasions made no public appearances over even longer periods, but he had not missed a national day ceremony for more than 10 years. During his most extended absence--from mid-November 1967 to 5 February 1968--he similarly failed to make a traditional appearance at the time of the 22 December DRV army anniversary.\* During this earlier absence, Giap may well have been visiting somewhere outside the DRV: A Moscow broadcast on 20 November 1967 reported that Giap

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\* Giap also was out of public view for periods of more than 50 days from 5 May to 27 July 1972 and from 23 February to 1 May 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 12 -

was among members of a DRV delegation to October Revolution anniversary celebrations which had departed from Moscow on an unspecified date. However, he may not have accompanied that delegation back to the DRV, since an 18 November Hanoi report on the group's return did not list its members.

Giap's last definite public appearance was on 8 July when he was listed among those who saw the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong delegation off to the Soviet Union. The first traditional public function which he missed was the 31 July PRC embassy reception marking Chinese Army Day. Although Hanoi media in mid-July continued to describe Giap's activities, they did not specify precise dates. Thus, Hanoi radio on 17 July revealed that he chaired a "recent" conference convened by the Standing Committee of the Central Military Party Committee. Again on 19 and 27 July Hanoi reported that "on the occasion of wounded soldiers and fallen heroes' day," which falls on 27 July, Giap had accompanied President Ton Duc Thang on a visit to Army Hospital 108 in Hanoi to see wounded and sick army men. The reports of the visit did not say when it occurred.

Appropriate messages from Giap have continued to appear since he dropped from view: On 26 July Hanoi radio broadcast a message signed by Giap to Raul Castro on the anniversary of the Cuban uprising; and on 6 August VNA transmitted Giap's condolences on Ulbricht's death. There has been no occasion for further Giap messages since that date; he would next be expected to sign messages on the Bulgarian and Hungarian army days, 23 and 29 September respectively.

PHAM VAN DONG  
RALLY ADDRESS

Pham Van Dong's traditional address to the national day rally predictably lauded the "great victory" achieved in the anti-U.S. resistance war and pledged that the DRV and PRG would strictly respect and implement the Paris peace agreement. He routinely accused the United States and Saigon of violating the Paris accord; but, in line with Hanoi's current circumspect comment, his complaints against the United States were kept at a low key. He decried U.S. "neocolonialism" in the South and alleged that U.S. reconnaissance planes had continued flights over the DRV and that Washington was delaying "concrete realization of its commitment" to "healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the DRV." However, he did not specifically raise the question of resuming the U.S.-DRV joint economic talks in Paris and did not repeat complaints, voiced in a 6 August Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, about U.S. mine-clearing efforts. Dong charged both Washington and Saigon with violating the provisions of the peace

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 13 -

agreements on Cambodia and Laos, and listed several alleged GVN violations of the accord's provisions for a settlement in South Vietnam. However, in his routine criticism of the Saigon administration he did not specifically press for acceptance of the PRG's six-point proposal for a political solution in the South.

Pham Van Dong's remarks on North Vietnamese military needs were carefully placed in the context of requirements for defense and the preservation of peace--an approach which may have been calculated to appeal to foreign allies anxious to avoid a resumption of conflict in Vietnam. Dong linked the Vietnamese struggle against the United States and Saigon with the defense of the Paris agreement, and claimed that it not only aimed at achieving the national rights of the Vietnamese but also contributed to "the maintenance and consolidation of peace in this region and in the world." He contended that the DRV's defense preparedness was a significant factor in insuring the implementation of the Paris accord and that the maintenance of peace required the strengthening of the DRV armed forces and defense potential. The premier offered a conventional pledge of DRV support for the South and reaffirmed the standard thesis that the North is "the firm base of the nationwide revolution." No North Vietnamese commentator has echoed the militant position, pressed last month in articles under the pseudonym "Chien Thang" (Victor), that the communist forces in South Vietnam are in a position to resume military action and that the North has an important role to play in shifting the military balance in the South.\*

The premier paid routine tribute to the "wholehearted and extremely valuable support and assistance by the Soviet Union, China, and the other fraternal socialist countries." He recalled that DRV party-government delegations had already visited several communist nations, in compliance with Ho's will, to express gratitude for wartime assistance. The visits to communist nations would continue, according to Dong, and "other friendly countries" would also receive delegations. He did not repeat the strong pledge, voiced during his tour of East Europe in July and August, that Hanoi would continue to endeavor to restore international communist unity. However, he did raise the question of restoring unity when he

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\* The Chien Thang articles, published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 18 and 25 August, are discussed in the 29 August 1973 TRENDS, pages 7-9.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 14 -

commented that gains in the international movement in solidarity with Vietnam "have inspired persistent efforts aimed at restoring and consolidating unity among the international communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, in keeping with reason and sentiment."

Dong's discussion of the North Vietnamese economy seemed to indicate that Hanoi is adhering to the general path for restoration and development which the premier had advanced in his report to the DRV National Assembly in February this year. The focus on peacetime development which had been apparent in February was maintained in Dong's current address and was accentuated in some passages, including one which recalled Ho Chi Minh's prophesy in his will that after the defeat of the United States "we will rebuild our land ten times more beautiful." Dong reviewed the tasks of different sectors of the economy and the progress made in several fields this year, claiming the "initial restoration" of the communications network and the return to prewar levels of power capacity and output. He reiterated his National Assembly call for the speedy rehabilitation and development of the national economy on a large scale and for the transition to large-scale socialist production in all branches, "first of all in agriculture."

Expanding upon the immediate tasks he had enunciated in his February report, the premier noted that from 1973 to 1975 the DRV should "basically complete the restoration of a developed North, while pondering, studying, and determining the building of the material and technical foundation of socialism according to the long-term plan--1976-1980--in the following period." The goals for the first three postwar years and the apparent decision to launch a five-year plan in 1976 may be contained in a VWP Central Committee Politburo directive which has been mentioned in propaganda in the past month, but has not been released. A speech by DRV trade union chief Hoang Quoc Viet, reported by Hanoi radio on 28 August, specifically noted that the Politburo directive had dealt with the need to restore and develop the economy in the 1973-1975 period, adding that an attempt would be made to raise production to prewar levels by the end of 1975. Hanoi's last five-year plan, extending from 1961 through 1965, was launched at the Third VWP Congress in September 1960; the war aborted DRV plans to launch a new five-year plan in 1966.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 15 -

## PEKING DOWNGRADES OBSERVANCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ANNIVERSARY

In line with the trend of reduced Chinese attention to Vietnamese developments in recent months, Peking marked the DRV National Day at a lower level than in past years. The anniversary celebrations in Peking, highlighted by the DRV ambassador's reception on 1 September, did not occasion the traditional turnout of major Chinese leaders, and Peking has not publicized any of the usual speeches at the anniversary gatherings. In addition, the PRC leaders' message and the 2 September PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the anniversary were more subdued than last year, and contained notably milder pledges of Chinese support. While Peking media have not publicized the leaders' message, this omission may not be related specifically to Sino-Vietnamese relations: Peking also refrained from reporting the Chinese message on Romania's 23 August national day. According to Vietnamese and Romanian accounts, both messages were signed by Mao, Tung Pi-wu, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai.

The leaders' message, as reported by VNA, and the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial avoided criticism of either the United States or the Saigon administration in the current context. Peking hailed the Vietnamese struggle to implement the peace agreement and thwart the sabotage of "reactionary forces," praised DRV efforts to rebuild the country, and expressed confidence that, despite the "arduous tasks" ahead, the Vietnamese would advance to still greater victories. The editorial recalled the June visit to China of the DRV party-government delegation led by Le Duan, and duly affirmed that support for the Vietnamese is Peking's "proletarian internationalist duty."

The Chinese Politburo was represented at the DRV embassy reception only by military leader Yeh Chien-ying--a sharp break with the tradition of past years when the reception always prompted the appearance of higher-level PRC officials: Chou En-lai attended the reception in 1972 and every other year since 1964, when Liu Shao-chi was the ranking guest. Last year Yeh Chien-ying gave a lengthy address at the embassy gathering, but this year Peking reported only brief "toasts" by the DRV ambassador and Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei. Chi voiced routine support for Peking's Indonesian allies and focused primary attention on the Cambodian situation. In Peking's first authoritative comment on Cambodia in five weeks, Chi reaffirmed support for Sihanouk's five points and offered China's first endorsement of the major 15 August statement by Sihanouk's government on a Cambodian settlement. His only critical reference to the United States was a call for an end to U.S. military intervention so that the Cambodians could settle their own affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 16 -

LE DUAN STOPOVER      Peking was also restrained in its treatment of DRV First Secretary Le Duan's 29-31 August stopover in Peking on the way home from the Soviet Union. Chou En-lai and Chang Chun-chiao duly greeted, feted, and saw off Le Duan; however, NCNA omitted the usual characterization of the atmosphere during the visit. A 30 August NCNA account of a meeting between the two sides did report that Chou told the Vietnamese about the 10th CCP Congress and that Le Duan offered congratulations. VNA described the atmosphere at the meeting as "cordial." Other signs of Sino-Vietnamese differences had been reflected during Pham Van Dong's 16-17 August stop in China, on the way home from the Soviet Union and East Europe, when VNA did not characterize the atmosphere of his meeting with Chou but NCNA said the two premiers had "a cordial and friendly talk." NCNA usually describes such meetings with its close allies as "very cordial and friendly." Like Dong, Le Duan met with Prince Sihanouk and other Cambodian leaders while in Peking.

DRV Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan arrived with Le Duan and stayed on in Peking after the first secretary's departure: NCNA reported he was present at the 1 September DRV ambassador's reception. Prior to his departure from Moscow with Le Duan, Hoan's activities were last noted when PRAVDA on 11 August reported that he had stopped over in Moscow en route home from Ulbricht's funeral in East Berlin. In the past, Hoan has spent extensive periods of time engaged in unpublicized activities in both China and the Soviet Union. It is possible that he is again undertaking his apparent role as a high-level envoy to Hanoi's allies. Earlier this year, Hoan traveled to Peking on 11 May and did not reappear until 29 May, when he showed up again in Hanoi without explanation. He spent most of January in the Soviet Union, having remained there after attending the December 1972 celebrations of the USSR's 50th anniversary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 17 -

## U S S R

## ANTI-SAKHAROV CAMPAIGN LIFTS OFFICIAL VEIL ON HIS VIEWS

In the intensive public campaign against dissidence now under way in the Soviet Union, the Soviet press has for the first time given wide publicity to the views of the dissident Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov. His frank criticisms of the Soviet system and especially his recent warnings against the dangers of detente have been used to exploit popular sentiments of patriotism and desires for peace. However, although every effort has been made to distort Sakharov's views and manipulate them for official purposes, the ultimate impact of these far-reaching revelations of intellectual alienation may be greater than the organizers of the current campaign have bargained for.

The current wave of public clamor against Sakharov was touched off by his outspoken interview in July with Swedish radio and TV correspondents in Moscow. In response, Yuriy Kornilov launched an attack, broadcast in English over Moscow radio on 12 July and published in LITERARY GAZETTE six days later, that portrayed Sakharov as running down virtually everything in the Soviet Union. He was quoted as declaring that the Soviet Union is a "closed country," that its "isolation from the outside world has a harmful effect on our life," that the Soviet "system of education is in shameful condition," that medical services in the Soviet Union are "often more expensive" than in the West, and that the Soviet practice of "holding back private initiative makes life simply very dull."

Sakharov's 21 August interview with Western correspondents in Moscow in which he warned against the "dangers of detente" set the next stage which was marked by a concerted effort to portray him as a foe of peace and an ally of Western warmongers. Citing a condemnation of Sakharov in L'HUMANITE, IZVESTIYA on the 25th quoted him as saying that "if the countries of the West agree to peaceful coexistence on the terms set by the Kremlin, they run the risk of confronting a Soviet Union armed to the teeth which will be a danger to its neighbors." This was followed by a veritable barrage of collective and individual letters and statements in the Soviet press expressing outrage over Sakharov's positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 18 -

Presumably because of the popular appeal of the peace issue, most of the attacks on Sakharov concentrated on his opposition to unconditional detente and his warnings of Soviet aggressiveness. However, many other details of his recent activities and views were disclosed in a lengthy 1 September IZVESTIYA article by K. Petrov, which was couched in the form of answers to readers' questions about the dissident physicist and his friends. The article publicized Sakharov's appeal to the West, in his Moscow interview, to use trade as a means of exerting political pressure on the Soviet Union and interfering in its domestic affairs. "The trade of the West with the USSR," he was quoted as saying, "could deliver this country from problems it cannot solve independently and could thus allow it to concentrate on developing its might. In this event, the world would again be confronted with an uncontrolled bureaucratic apparatus."

The article went on to point out that this was the "basis" of Sakharov's support for the Jackson amendment to the trade bill linking the grant of most-favored-nation status to the principle of "freedom to emigrate." Sakharov, Petrov added, advocates some sort of Western control over the Soviet Union "so that it cannot become dangerous to its neighbors."

In addition to these disclosures, the Petrov article lifted the official veil of secrecy on some of Sakharov's past activities and views. It recalled his 1968 memorandum which gained world renown for its advocacy of convergence through the democratization of the East and the socialization of the West as a means of averting war. Moreover, notwithstanding the current effort to impugn Sakharov's motives, he was quoted as having written the memorandum for the explicit purpose of "relaxing tensions" in international affairs, and his views on this matter were reported as unchanged.

In an obvious effort to generate public resentment against the beleaguered scientist, the article revealed that Sakharov receives a monthly income of 400 rubles as a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and an additional 350 rubles a month for his position in the Lebedev Physics Institute. The article also revealed that Sakharov had once stood in the highest esteem of the Soviet government. Petrov cited a complaint by one irate reader asking why such figures as Sakharov and the writers Sulzhenitsyn and Maksimov, though "well-educated and enjoying all the material pleasures and cultural achievements of the Soviet people," could criticize their country.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 19 -

In ridiculing Sakharov's "naive notions" about domestic and world affairs, the Petrov article failed to offer its seemingly perplexed letter-writers any satisfactory explanation for the once prestigious scientist's transformation from a dedicated servant to a determined critic of the Soviet regime and its policies. In this respect alone, the disclosures of Sakharov's far-reaching criticisms may have inadvertently raised new questions in the minds of the Soviet public.

#### GEORGIA ENDORSES CONTROVERSIAL MOLDAVIAN KOLKHOZ COUNCILS

Georgia has become the first republic to endorse Moldavia's transfer of kolkhoz management from the agriculture ministry to elected kolkhoz councils. In a 27 July Georgian Central Committee plenum speech First Secretary Shevardnadze praised the Moldavian experiment and emphasized the value of having a special agency to manage and represent kolkhozes and interkolkhoz organizations. His endorsement was repeated verbatim without attribution in a 18 August ZARYA VOSTOKA editorial on agriculture. Georgia's agriculture secretary had visited Moldavia in late June for the purpose of studying the Moldavian innovations and had publicly approved some of them.

Shevardnadze also went beyond the confines of the Moldavian experiment to call for the establishment of a "Kolkhoz Center" to manage kolkhozes throughout the country. Although similar proposals were made in 1966, most notably by Brezhnev at the 23d CPSU Congress, the subject has not been aired publicly since mid-1967, when it was raised by Brezhnev's assistant V. A. Golikov in a KOMMUNIST article.

Support for the traditional forms of agricultural management continues to be displayed, however. In a 23 August SOVIET RUSSIA article on interkolkhoz organizations, for example, Kursk First Secretary A. Gudkov bluntly declared that "the time has come to create a production association under the RSFSR Agriculture Ministry" in order to "coordinate and purposefully decide all questions regarding the growth and development of interkolkhoz complexes." Moreover, the USSR Agriculture Ministry recently extended its jurisdiction over the previously independent kolkhoz and sovkhos subsidiary enterprises. A 11 May decree on subsidiaries, published in the COLLECTED DECREES OF THE USSR GOVERNMENT, No. 12, accepted the "proposal" of the ministry to establish a new main administration for subsidiary enterprises within the ministry.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 20 -

## NOTES

**KISSINGER APPOINTMENT:** Moscow went on record belatedly with a highly favorable assessment of Kissinger's appointment as Secretary of State in a 30 August PRAVDA article by its Washington correspondent Boris Strelnikov. Although Moscow had reported the State Department change promptly on 22 August, it had left the initial comment to its East European allies--Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. The measure of Moscow's approval of the appointment may be gauged by the appearance of the article on Kissinger in the leading party daily; by contrast, most of the other East European commentaries appeared in less authoritative papers.

Peking seemed to have conveyed implicit approval by atypically reporting a U.S. cabinet change. A brief, straightforward 23 August NCNA report cited the President's disclosure that the new secretary will maintain his post as Presidential advisor in order to achieve closer coordination in U.S. policy formulation.

**MOSCOW ON DISARMAMENT:** After publicly softpedaling disagreements with Washington on disarmament and related issues in the wake of the June summit, Moscow has begun to shift to a somewhat more critical stance. In a 4 September radio commentary to Romania on the recently concluded session of the UN disarmament committee in Geneva, Vladimir Komlev held the United States primarily responsible for the "impasse" in reaching international agreement on banning chemical weapons. He charged that the United States and its allies were employing delaying tactics in the disarmament talks and that a similar impasse was being created in the talks on the cessation of underground nuclear tests because of U.S. insistence on on-site inspections. However, while chiding the United States in moderate terms, Komlev spoke hopefully about the "new and wider" prospects for agreement on disarmament issues in the atmosphere of growing international detente.



FBIS TRENDS  
5 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 1 -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 27 AUGUST - 2 SEPTEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2477 items)</u>		<u>Peking (950 items)</u>	
China	(7%) 13%	Domestic Issues	(39%) 57%
[Aleksandrov	(1%) 6%]	[CCP 10th Congress	(--)] 37%]
PRAVDA Articles		Tricontinental Table	(18%) 15%
[CCP 10th Congress	(1%) 2%]	Tennis Tournament,	
Vietnam	(2%) 5%	Peking	
Yakir, Krasin Trial	(--)] 3%	Vietnam	(2%) 4%
Chile	(2%) 3%	Cambodia	(4%) 4%
October World Peace	(1%) 3%	UNCTAD Session, Geneva	(1%) 4%
Congress, Moscow			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.