

26 SEPT 1973

#39-73

STATSPEC

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800060014

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

**Confidential**

**FBIS**

# TRENDS


## in Communist Propaganda

### HIGHLIGHTS:

Brezhnev on Sino-Soviet Relations - page 1

Soviet Detente-Defense Dispute - page 3

Hanoi Concern Over Relations with Allies - page 9




STATSPEC

**Confidential**

26 SEPTEMBER 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.



STATSPEC

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

## C O N T E N T S

### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Brezhnev Indicates Prospects for Reconciliation Remain Bleak. . 1

### USSR

Soviet Controversy Over Detente-Defense Issue Continues . . . . 3

### EUROPE

Moscow Takes Tougher Line Regarding Exchange Issue at CSCE. . . 5

### INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG Reject Allied Protests, Laud Strength of PRG Forces. . 7

HOC TAP Urges DRV Independence, Proletarian Internationalism. . 9

### CHINA

Lin Piao Exposed as Direct Target of Attacks on Confucius . . 12

College Entrance Exams Remain in Force Despite Controversy. . 13

### NOTES

Soviet Disarmament Proposal; Brezhnev Visit to Sofia;  
USSR-Chile Relations; Chiang Ching's Status . . . . . 15

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . i

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 1 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## BREZHNEV INDICATES PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION REMAIN BLEAK

Brezhnev in his wide-ranging speech in Tashkent on 24 September clearly indicated that Moscow sees little, if any, chance of improving relations with Peking in the foreseeable future. This conclusion was conveyed by Brezhnev's pessimistic, almost plaintive discussion of the China problem and, more particularly, by his disclosure that the Soviet Union had in mid-June offered China another nonaggression pact which, in his words, "China did not even deign to answer." The recall of the chief Soviet negotiator in Peking in mid-July--a month after the abortive Soviet offer--and the subsequent escalation of Soviet polemics on China, under the authoritative pseudonym of "I. Aleksandrov," served to underscore the pessimistic judgment apparently reached in Moscow on relations with Peking.

Brezhnev, providing the first official assessment of the 10th CCP Congress, found in its "shameless anti-Sovietism" justification for the view that the Chinese leaders are currently in an unreasoning mood. Though as before leaving the door open for an improvement in relations--even, as the Chinese insist, on the basis of the peaceful coexistence formula reserved for the capitalist world--Brezhnev gave no indication that a favorable response from Peking was anticipated. Indeed, he seemed more intent on placing the onus on the Chinese for the lack of progress in bilateral relations.

Although Brezhnev's remarks reflect Soviet resignation to Chinese hostility for the indefinite future as well as Soviet determination to isolate Peking politically from the rest of the socialist world, they also reveal the continuity in Moscow's approach to the China problem since March 1972, when Brezhnev first revealed that the Chinese had turned a cold shoulder to a series of Soviet initiatives.\* In December 1972, at the USSR's 50th Anniversary celebration in Moscow, Brezhnev disclosed details of one nonuse of force package offered to the Chinese on 12 January 1971. In making these disclosures, as well as the most recent one, Brezhnev has sought to portray a conciliatory Soviet posture in the bilateral negotiations as a means of bringing pressure on the Chinese and countering their allegations about Moscow's aggressive designs regarding Peking.

---

\* For background, see the TRENDS of 22 March 1972, pages 8-11.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 2 -

BORDER TALKS      The timing of the latest Soviet proposal to China suggests that it was motivated by other considerations than the resolution of the border dispute itself:

‡ The proposal was presented on the eve of Brezhnev's visit to Washington. It may thus have been designed to optimize Moscow's position in the triangular relationship by reassuring Peking that the Moscow-Washington dialogue would not adversely affect Peking's interests. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the chief Soviet negotiator in the border talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, had already been in Peking for a month since his last consultation in Moscow when the proposal was presented, suggesting that it was intended more as a political than a diplomatic move. By contrast, the only other specific proposal revealed by Moscow to date--the nonuse of force proposal of 15 January 1971--was presented the day after Ilichev returned to Peking from consultations in Moscow.

‡ Ilichev was recalled from Peking on 19 July, only a month after the proposal was submitted and only days before the start of the Crimean summit of communist leaders. In retrospect, Moscow's unprecedented announcement of Ilichev's return from Peking may have been a signal that a new impasse in the dispute had been reached.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 3 -

U S S R

## SOVIET CONTROVERSY OVER DETENTE-DEFENSE ISSUE CONTINUES

The signs of high-level Soviet controversy over the utility of military power in a period of detente, which emerged in the aftermath of the June summit, have continued to appear in the central press.\* In July, when the dispute first surfaced, USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov warned against overreliance on military power as a guarantor of peace and emphasized the decisive importance of diplomatic initiatives in this regard. Subsequently, RED STAR propaganda department head Col. I. Sidelnikov forcefully asserted the overriding importance of a strong military posture in advancing the goals of Soviet detente diplomacy and took strong exception to those who saw in the recent achievements of Soviet diplomacy cause for revising Soviet military priorities.

More recently, the argument advanced by Arbatov has been restated in IZVESTIYA by that paper's political observer Aleksandr Bovin, while the case for continued strengthening of Soviet military might has been defended in RED STAR by Capt. 1st Rank N. Shumikhin. In a double-edged argument aimed explicitly at Western proponents of such views, Bovin on 11 September denied that an international "balance of fear" based on U.S.-Soviet parity in strategic arms, but at high and increasing military force levels, was either desirable or capable of insuring stable relations between the two powers in the future. He conceded that the achievement of strategic parity had reduced the threat of a direct clash between the two powers, but went on to observe that "to base security on growing arsenals of nuclear missiles essentially means the perpetuation of the threat of war." For this reason, he insisted, there is an urgent need for "persistent, purposeful and active" measures by the Soviet Union and its allies to reduce and eventually halt the arms race.

Although Bovin saw no prospect of an "idyllic" relationship developing between the two power groupings represented by the United States and the Soviet Union, he counseled patience in resolving future differences. "Any attempt to accelerate the solution of the dispute between capitalism and socialism by

---

\* The earlier signs of this debate are discussed in the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 23 August 1973, "Soviet Debate Over Role of Military Power During Detente."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 4 -

military means," he emphasized, "would bring inestimable misfortunes to mankind. The aggressor would be crushed. But at what cost?"

Shumikhin, writing in RED STAR two days later, reasserted the importance of strengthening the economic and defensive might of the Soviet Union and its allies.\* Pointing to the continued opposition to detente in the West, Shumikhin declared: "There is no doubt whatsoever that even now, under the conditions of the fundamental positive shifts taking place in the world arena, there is still a need to strengthen this might." And he went on to reiterate almost verbatim Sidelnikov's earlier assertion about the direct relationship between increased military might and successful diplomacy.

Although Shumikhin endorsed the general goals of Soviet detente diplomacy, he apparently had certain reservations about measures in the field of arms control. This was made clear by his treatment of Brezhnev's description of the "urgent tasks" of Soviet foreign policy in his 15 August Alma Ata speech. Where Brezhnev had asserted the need "to supplement political detente with military detente, end the arms race and then take practical steps to reduce armaments," Shumikhin merely reiterated the first part of Brezhnev's Alma Ata formula, deleting the reference to ending the arms race and reducing armaments. In so doing, he may have exposed a major area of contention in the current Soviet debate. By contrast, Bovin not only described military detente and "practical steps" toward disarmament as general goals of Soviet diplomacy, but he went so far as to assert that these goals were specifically designed to reduce the burden of military expenditures and release resources for civilian needs.

---

\* Capt. Shumikhin, a candidate of philosophy, has written on Warsaw Pact affairs in military journals in recent years. In an 8 June 1972 RED STAR article, just after President Nixon's trip to Moscow, he stressed the "inseparability" of peaceful coexistence and the increased military might of the Warsaw Pact member states.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 5 -

## EUROPE

## MOSCOW TAKES TOUGHER LINE REGARDING EXCHANGE ISSUE AT CSCE

Under the impact of the strong Western reaction to the Soviet domestic crackdown on dissidence, Moscow's public discussion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has undergone a transition from cautious optimism to stiff intransigence regarding the prospects for East-West agreement on the exchange issue at the conference. Brezhnev on 19 September in Sofia, Kosygin on the 24th in Belgrade, and Gromyko on the 25th at the United Nations all took a strong stand against what they described as Western efforts to infringe Soviet sovereignty, suggesting Soviet determination to avoid being placed on the defensive on the issue at the conference. In the meantime, a Moscow commentator has broached for the first time the idea that the CSCE may end with less than full success. Moscow has also ceased calling for a "summit" level third stage in 1973, no doubt reflecting its knowledge that a presidential visit to Europe is no longer in the cards, but possibly also reflecting scaled down expectations regarding the prospects for the CSCE.

The mention of a possible failure of the CSCE came in a Moscow Radio commentary broadcast repeatedly in European languages on 21 and 22 September. The commentator, Nikolay Kononov, who often discusses European issues, denounced the "ultimatum" which the West had allegedly set forth in demanding that if Moscow does not accept the West's demands on humanitarian issues, the West will not reach agreement with the USSR on security and economic issues. He concluded that to adopt such a course of setting "preliminary" conditions on the conference would "predestine both the Geneva conference and the subsequent important initiatives in favor of European detente to failure."

Although no such similar reference to a possible CSCE collapse has appeared in the Moscow central press, a prominent Soviet press commentator participating in the 23 September Moscow Radio roundtable alluded to the possibility only to dismiss it. Responding to a question whether one could conclude that the situation in West Europe had "become more difficult and less favorable to the success of the conference," IZVESTIYA political observer Matveyev remarked that the question was proper since it reflected an opinion that was being expressed by a Western observers. But he added optimistically that it

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 6 -

could be said "categorically and with confidence" that the present European political scene was not the product of the "skeptics and pessimists who love to spread gloom and despondency."\*

Another indication of Moscow's stiffening attitude toward the CSCE is the fact that it has ceased calling for a "summit" level third stage. Since the 31 July Crimean communique, which called for a "summit" level meeting in 1973, no elite-level Soviet statement has included a reference to a summit meeting for the third session. For example, Brezhnev's Sofia speech, as well as the joint communique on his visit to Bulgaria, called for a completion of the CSCE this year without mention of the session's level. Similarly, signed articles in PRAVDA on the 19th and 23d reviewing CSCE ignored the summit issue while calling for a conclusion of the conference this year. Perhaps still another hint that the Soviet leadership may foresee the possibility of Brezhnev's absence from the concluding stage was a statement in an IZVESTIYA article on the 11th that the "concluding forum" could be at the level of "heads of government and state," neither of which position is occupied by Brezhnev.

JAMMING HALT,                 Since the reported halt the week before the  
WESTERN RADIOS               reconvening of the current CSCE session of  
                                  Soviet jamming of Voice of America, BBC, and  
Deutsche Welle, Moscow has avoided criticism of these radios,  
with one noted exception. The exception was a Moscow radio  
commentary broadcast in several European languages on 20 and  
21 September which attacked the "propaganda" of the VOA, BBC, and  
Deutsche Welle over the "myth concerning the persecution of the  
dissidents in the Soviet Union, and especially the alleged  
persecution of Dr. Sakharov." In the meantime, Moscow has  
intensified its ongoing propaganda campaign against what it calls  
the "subversive" stations, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

---

\* Prague Radio's Antonin Kostka, who regularly reviews European security issues, went further than the Moscow commentators in a broadcast on 17 September. He charged directly that "Western representatives are directly undermining the success" of the conference by making demands which they know are "unacceptable" to the socialist countries. He asserted that the "anti-Soviet campaign" has gone so far as to "frustrate" the process of European detente and to force the Geneva conference "into a blind alley."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 7 -

## INDOCHINA

## DRV, PRG REJECT ALLIED PROTESTS, LAUD STRENGTH OF PRG FORCES

Hanoi and PRG media continue to give considerable attention to U.S. and Saigon charges, pressed since 11 September, that the communists are engaged in a military buildup in the South which could pave the way for an offensive.\* On 21 September, commentaries in the Hanoi papers NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN denounced a GVN Foreign Ministry note, publicized the day before, to the participants in the international conference on Vietnam. Both papers protested the GVN charge that the DRV and PRG are preparing to resume the conflict and its threat of countermeasures. And the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN also alluded critically to "slanderous" statements made by U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Clements on 17 September and to remarks by GVN Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem that the Paris agreement might be canceled. Both papers reiterated the communist view that the PRG has the right to rebuild and defend its territory and that any encroachments will be punished. The army paper underlined this position with the claim that the PRG "has become the master of the greater part of the southern territory and is developing its power and exercising its internal and foreign relations functions."

The most authoritative PRG pronouncement on the issue was by Nguyen Van Tien, PRG representative in Hanoi, in a 24 September interview with AFP. As reported by Hanoi and PRG media, Tien accused Defense Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary of State Kissinger, along with Clements, of making "bellicose remarks and insolent threats" against the PRG and DRV. Maintaining that the PRG "is fully empowered to decide all domestic and foreign affairs de facto and de jure, related to defense and construction in areas it controls," he warned that "if the United States and the Saigon administration continue violating the agreement and embark on new military adventures, the PRG will reserve for itself the right to use every necessary measure to defend its territory, air space, and territorial waters."

Hanoi and Liberation Radio on the 26th objected to the view, said to have been voiced by U.S. Ambassador Sullivan at a

---

\* Earlier comment on this question, including DRV and PRG foreign ministry spokesmen's statements on the 12th, and a DRV Foreign Ministry note on the 14th, is discussed in the 19 September 1973 TRENDS, pages 7-8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 8 -

Manila press conference on the previous day, that any future armed conflict in Indochina would be the result of North Vietnam's erroneous calculations. The broadcast accused the United States and Saigon of attempting to avoid their responsibility for continuing violations of the peace accord and to prepare for "new acts of sabotage" in coming days. Similarly, Hanoi and PRG broadcasts commenting two days after Secretary Kissinger's 24 September speech the UN General Assembly complained that he referred to the unstable peace in Indochina without acknowledging "U.S. responsibility for playing such an important role in creating the tense situation."

**ATTACK ON GVN BASE** Statements by the DRV and PRG foreign ministry spokesmen on 26 September denounced Saigon military operations in Pleiku and Kontum provinces and GVN charges that on 22 September North Vietnamese troops had overrun the Le Minh (Plei Djareng) ranger base, 23 miles west of the city of Pleiku. The statements did not clearly deny an attack on the base: The DRV said the GVN charges were "made up" to divert attention from allied violations of the peace accord. The PRG took a similar tack, but elsewhere noted that, in response to ARVN attacks, the PLAF and people had "directed many appropriate punitive blows at the enemy, putting many enemy troops out of action." In late June the communists specifically warned that Saigon attacks on "liberated areas" might provoke attacks on GVN bases; but this warning has not been repeated in recent weeks.\*

**RESISTANCE DAY ANNIVERSARY** The military situation in South Vietnam was also discussed in propaganda marking the 28th anniversary on 23 September of the outbreak of the South Vietnamese resistance against the French. Editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN that day repeated claims that the PRG controls a major part of the land in the South. The party paper, NHAN DAN, typically went on to praise the South's "mighty liberation army, strong revolutionary administration, and immense liberated zone, rich in natural resources and covering many important strategic operational theaters." Both papers reaffirmed the North's obligation to the South, but the army paper was most emphatic with its assertion that: "As long as the southern compatriots continue to be dominated and repressed by

---

\* The warning that GVN bases might be attacked first appeared in an article in the 27 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and was repeated in Liberation Radio broadcasts during the following week.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 9 -

the U.S. lackeys, the North will coordinate its efforts with the South in the struggle. The North will strenuously carry out economic construction, consolidate national defense, and closely side with the South in completing the glorious revolution."

A Liberation Radio "editorial" on the anniversary, broadcast on the 22d, not only lauded the strength of the communist forces, but also stressed the importance of attacking the enemy in order to progress further. In terms reminiscent of demands in earlier years for offensive action, the radio maintained that the 1945 resistance had taught that "only by perseveringly building and developing our forces and by continuously attacking the enemy can our people repulse the enemy step by step and defeat him partially in order to advance toward winning total victory and completing the national democratic revolution in the entire country." It added that "history also shows that the imperialist aggressors will resign themselves to taking each step backward only after they suffer one defeat after another, and that their aggressive, stubborn, and doubledealing nature will remain unchanged."

#### HOC TAP URGES DRV INDEPENDENCE, PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

An article in the August issue of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) journal HOC TAP, recently available in translation, sheds light on Hanoi's changing relations with its communist allies in the wake of the Paris peace agreement. The article by Nguyen Khanh Toan, an alternate member of the VWP Central Committee, in discussing the relationship between patriotism and proletarian internationalism stressed the rights of small nations not only to obtain assistance but to decide their own course as well. This is a complete turnabout from the stand Toan took last fall, when in an unusual article in the November HOC TAP he argued in effect that the Vietnamese should be flexible in reaching a peace agreement and not allow "national selfishness" to undermine "common interests" of the world communist movement.\*

The switch in focus between Toan's two articles suggests that he may now be speaking for elements disappointed in the meager support that Hanoi has received from its allies in the past year.

---

\* Toan's November article is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 December 1972, pages 3-5.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 10 -

His implicit criticism of other communist countries is particularly noteworthy since his previous articles have given substantial credit to the world communist movement for its contribution to the Vietnamese revolution.

Toan's recent article appeared to respond to the displeasure evidenced by Moscow and Peking over the disruptive international effects of Hanoi's continuing pursuit of its long-standing goals. He stressed that every nation, "no matter how small," has the right to decide its own destiny, and he went on to deny that Vietnamese patriotism is "narrow and blindly nationalistic, racist, antiforeign, and chauvinistic." Some of Hanoi's most extreme polemical attacks on its allies' detente policies with the United States have included the charge of chauvinism; and it is possible that North Vietnam's allies have privately responded in kind. (A December 1972 HOC TAP article by Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet contained the last Hanoi charge that President Nixon was stimulating "chauvinism in the big countries." The very same issue was raised in August 1971--in articles by the military commentator "Chien Thang" and NHAN DAN's Commentator which claimed Nixon was encouraging chauvinism so as to divide the communist movement.)

PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM      In several passages Toan laid particular stress on the question of international aid, arguing that such aid to revolutionary causes is the touchstone of proletarian internationalism. Thus, for example, he declared that "there is no proletarian internationalism" without "support and active aid to the revolutionary movement of people of other countries to allow them to liberate themselves and to make worthy contributions to the common revolutionary movement in the world." Laying the basis for broader ideological attacks on Hanoi's recalcitrant allies, Toan went on to assert that proletarian internationalism was an integral part of communist orthodoxy: "Following Marxism-Leninism without raising the banner of proletarian internationalism is not being truly Marxist-Leninist."

Hanoi's calculated manipulation of the theme of proletarian internationalism has been most evident during critical periods in its relations with its allies. Thus, after the July 1971 announcement that President Nixon was to visit China, Hanoi not only launched an attack on Peking's detente policy, but also dropped the conventional references to the proletarian internationalist relationship between the two countries. By the same token, the improvement of Sino-DRV relations in the fall of 1971 was marked by the return of the conventional formula.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 11 -

More recently, the Sino-DRV communique on the 4-11 June visit to Peking of a delegation led by VWP First Secretary Le Duan included the statement that the unity and friendship of the two parties, countries, and peoples are based on "Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." By contrast, the joint statement at the conclusion of Le Duan's 9-16 July official visit to the USSR contained no such assertion. The visit to China produced an agreement on economic and military aid to the DRV, while an agreement on Soviet aid was not signed until 14 August--a month after the official visit--and made no mention of military assistance.

It would thus appear that Toan's current criticism is aimed primarily at Moscow, although he has demonstrated sympathy toward the Soviet Union in the past. His previous articles have lauded the Soviet experience; he has studied in the Soviet Union; and he is a vice chairman of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Association.\*

---

\* Toan is also chairman of the VWP Central Committee Commission for Teenagers and Children and of the Social Science Commission.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 12 -

## CHINA

## LIN PIAO EXPOSED AS DIRECT TARGET OF ATTACKS ON CONFUCIUS

Building upon earlier articles by Canton professor Yang Jung-kuo, Peking has now embarked on a full scale campaign to discredit Lin Piao for allegedly attempting to use Confucian ideas to restore capitalism in China. The identification of Lin as the target of the anti-Confucius campaign sheds light on an otherwise obscure passage in a 7 August PEOPLE'S DAILY article by Yang which attacked Confucius for trying to "revive states that had been extinguished, restore families whose line of succession had been broken, and call to office those who had retired into obscurity." Although the article seemed to implicate Lin in noting that Confucius and his disciples were eventually forced to "run away like 'homeless dogs'," it also contained elements that could be interpreted as an attack on the current leadership for rehabilitating leaders purged during the cultural revolution. However, subsequent criticism of Lin, including the claim in Chou En-lai's congress report that the Lin clique wanted to "reinstate the landlord classes . . . and to institute a feudal-comprador-fascist dictatorship," clearly established Lin as the target of the anti-Confucius campaign.

Yang has continued to play an active role in the campaign and has directly tarred the Lin clique with the Confucian brush. An article by Yang broadcast by Canton radio on 18 September picked up Chou's criticism of Lin as a restorationist, claiming that the Lin clique used Confucian ideas to "build a feudal, fascist kingdom" and "pass on the restored fascist dictatorship of the landlords and comprador-bourgeoisie from generation to generation."

Some of the recent articles criticizing Confucius have directly invoked the authority of Chou En-lai, quoting his injunction to the tenth party congress to "attach importance to the class struggle in all parts of the superstructure which do not conform to the economic base." A central KWANGMING DAILY article urged compliance with this instruction in the course of drawing parallels between Lin and Confucius, who was said to be "eulogized by some people as the 'pioneer' and 'revolutionary.'" Chou's authority was also invoked in a 23 September broadcast of a Honan forum on education which called criticism of Confucius an important part of the struggle-criticism-transformation movement in the superstructure.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 13 -

The anti-Confucius theme has been greatly expanded during the past week, especially in matters relating to youth and education. Several provinces have held forums to demonstrate how Lin's education policies followed discredited Confucian lines. In addition, Hunan second secretary Chang Ping-hua linked Lin with Confucius in a speech to the Hunan women's congress on 23 September, implying that Lin's ideas on women resembled those of Confucius on slavery.

#### COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMS REMAIN IN FORCE DESPITE CONTROVERSY

The pre-congress dispute over college admission guidelines appears to have been resolved a manner consistent with the moderate educational policies of recent years. Comment on educational reform since the tenth party congress has clarified some of the motivations behind the public criticism of college entrance examinations last July and August. The criticism was apparently not an attack on quality education as such but rather a calculated move to place local officials on notice that although the new system of entrance exams had shortcomings, a return to the old form of examination based on rote memorization of middle school texts would not be permitted.

The post-congress guidelines on college admission are essentially the same as those released last spring, but the national publicity on this subject has clarified the continuing role of political activism in student selection. This issue was fuzzed in the earlier enrollment instructions and apparently became subject to much local misinterpretation and dispute. Peking's most comprehensive statement on enrollment since the congress, an NCNA report on 19 September, noted that this year's crop of new college students possessed secondary educational standards and were admitted on the basis of voluntary application, recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership and reexamination by the colleges concerned--the same criteria outlined last spring. In contrast to the spring guidelines, however, NCNA specifically stated that entrance examinations were used on a "supplementary" basis as a means of ascertaining "the recommended applicants' practical experience and their ability to apply their basic knowledge to analysing and settling practical problems." An examination for testing learning aptitude was said to be superior to the old type examination "designed to test only the students' book knowledge" and convert young people "into bookworms who shut themselves in behind closed doors and detached themselves from the workers and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 14 -

peasants," a reaction which endangered the important youth-to-the-countryside program. After college education, the newly admitted students are instructed to "go back to where they came from" and apply their college skills to local production problems.

MODEL. The campaign to change the nature and role of the entrance  
YOUTH examination in selecting new college students was touched off by Chang Tieh-sheng, a Liaoning youth who gained national fame last July after writing on the back of his blank examination book that he had failed because he had devoted himself to farm work at the expense of substantive academic review. Chang's criticism of the examination as too heavily weighted toward recall of material acquired from middle school texts, a task difficult for rustivating students two years out of school, is now being touted as an example of individual responsibility for resisting an erroneous tide, a theme developed by both Chou En-lai and Wang Hung-wen at the congress. Peking Radio on 19 September, for example, reported on a recently held Liaoning provincial conference concerning youth sent to the countryside at which Chang, "the youth who dares to fight," was "especially invited."

Chang, who was portrayed at the Liaoning conference as "not content with what he has already done" and as pledging to "continue to develop the revolutionary spirit of daring to go against the tide," serves as a link between the two major youth campaigns of this past summer, education and living conditions for rustivating youth. Part of Chang's complaint against the examination system as it existed in July was that as a rustivating youth, he was not given sufficient time to prepare for it. His case fuels the drive for improving the living conditions of rustivating youths, including provisions for more leisure and time for study apart from the masses, while stressing the responsibilities of youth. A Liaoning broadcast last August reported that Chang just received notice on the afternoon of 27 June that he was to take the entrance examination the next day and that he was "still making arrangements for the farming work of the production team...and therefore failed to handle the test of physics and chemistry with satisfactory results." This was only on his first try, however, and after studying for "more than one day" Chang took the examination again and was able to "answer the questions on physics and chemistry with fairly good results."

Chang is apparently now a model student at Liaoning Agricultural College. Shenyang radio on 25 September reported that he is a "representative of the new students" and has pledged, in a speech greeted with "enthusiastic applause," to study hard and become both "red and expert."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 15 -

## NOTES

SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL: In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 25 September, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko dusted off an old Soviet proposal on mutual reduction of military budgets. Soviet spokesmen at the UN have long proposed that part of the savings from such a reduction be directed to aid developing countries. Moscow's last specific proposal came in a memorandum to the General Assembly in December 1964 which called on the "great military powers" to reduce their military budgets by 10 to 15 percent or "another agreed percentage." The current proposal calls attention to the inclusion of the Chinese by specifying for the first time that it applies to all members of the Security Council, precluding an attempt by Peking to classify itself as a developing country. Moscow thereby seems to be inviting Peking's disapproval, a ploy calculated to highlight China's isolation on issues of detente and disarmament and place it on the defensive with the third world at the United Nations.

BREZHNEV VISIT TO SOFIA: Brezhnev's 18-21 September "friendly" visit to Bulgaria served to underscore Moscow's solidarity with its staunch Balkan ally on the eve of Kosygin's visit to Yugoslavia, with whom Sofia constantly bickers over the Macedonian issue. Brezhnev last visited Bulgaria in September 1971, on his return from Belgrade, and that visit was capped by a communique underscoring the "profound trust" between the two countries. The effusive expressions of solidarity in the speeches and communique of the latest visit were in keeping with the ostensible purpose of Brezhnev's trip--to receive Sofia's highest award, Hero of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. The visit was also used to remind the Romanians of the elements of an ideal communist relationship: A Shalygin commentary on the visit broadcast on the 21st by Radio Moscow in Romanian, among other languages, stressed that while nationality plays a role in socialist building, this endeavor also has "common rules" that socialist countries must follow "in the first place."

USSR-CHILE RELATIONS: A Soviet government statement issued on 21 September announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Chile due to "acts of arbitrariness and violence" committed against Soviet institutions and citizens in Chile. These harassment, it claimed, resulted from the "wave of sanguinary terror" and "anti-communist hysteria" unleashed by "rightwing forces" in

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 16 -

the wake of the coup. The statement asserted that this "intolerable situation" prevents the necessary conditions required for continuing normal relations between the USSR and Chile. On 21 and 22 September, respectively, the East German and Bulgarian governments announced the severance of their diplomatic relations with Chile, and on the 25th Czechoslovakia followed suit. While Soviet media have made a few references to alleged U.S. collusion in the coup, Moscow's official position continues to reflect a measured tone. Thus, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 25 September, treated the event as a localized issue and adhered closely to the language of the 21 September statement in explaining the reasons for the Soviet action.

CHIANG CHING'S STATUS: An NCNA report on 24 September lauded Chiang Ching for her achievements in cultural reform, the first such mention by Peking since the 10th CCP Congress seemed to reduce Chiang's status. The report stated that the revolutionization of Peking opera was led by Chiang and recalled that when she started the revolution following Mao's instructions in 1962 she "met opposition and sabotage from the revisionist line." The reaffirmation of Chiang's revolutionary credentials is another indication that she probably retains her rank-order position immediately behind Politburo standing committee members. All her appearances since the congress have been by rank-order listings.

FBIS TRENDS  
26 SEPTEMBER 1973

- i -

A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 17 - 23 SEPTEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2778 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1012 items)</u>		
Brezhnev in Bulgaria	(--)	19%	Domestic Issues	(33%)	45%
Chilean Coup	(19%)	18%	[CCP 10th Congress	(11%)	8%]
[Soviet Government	(--)	2%]	Pompidou in PRC	(16%)	8%
Statement			Egyptian Vice President	(--)	6%
UNGA Session	(--)	10%	Ash-Shafi'I in PRC		
[GDR/FRG Membership	(--)	6%]	UNGA Session	(--)	3%
China	(9%)	5%	Laotian Protocol	(4%)	3%
European Security	(1%)	3%	Cambodia	(?)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.