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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
17 OCT 1973

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda




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17 OCTOBER 1973
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ARAB - ISRAELI WAR

USSR SCORES ISRAELI BOMBING, SILENT ON CEASE-FIRE PROSPECTS

Moscow's treatment of the Arab-Israeli war has made much of Israeli attacks on civilian populations, but even though Soviet casualties were involved the only official protest issued was a TASS statement on 12 October. The media give little indication of any diplomatic moves to bring an end to the fighting, and the most substantial public remarks on the war by a Soviet leader were Kosygin's at a dinner on the 15th for the Danish Prime Minister. Kosygin complained that "opponents of detente" had gone so far as to present Soviet solidarity with the Arabs "as the source of tension," and in standard fashion he said that the conflict was due to the "aggressive" Israeli policy which enjoyed "outside support and patronage."

The issue of U.S. arms resupply to Israel has been handled with circumspection: Moscow's increasing reportage has reflected the proliferation of reports in U.S. media, but the Soviet items have been carefully attributed to foreign sources with no comment added. Moscow media have displayed the usual reticence concerning Soviet arms shipments. Not until the 17th did TASS by indirection confirm ongoing supplies when it referred to military aid which "is" rendered to Egypt and Syria.

Typifying Moscow's propagandistic handling of the conflict, a PRAVDA Observer article on the 12th provided nothing more than a routine review of Middle East developments since 1967 couched in stereotyped terms, and PRAVDA's Mayevskiy in a 14 October review drew on the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR for an assessment of U.S. policy. Statements by U.S. officials, including the President, have been reported briefly and without comment, if at all.

USSR LEADERS' REMARKS, CONTACTS Aside from Kosygin's remarks on the 15th, the only Soviet leaders broaching the Middle East conflict publicly were Grechko, in a speech in Warsaw on the 15th, and Shelepin, addressing a trade union congress in Bulgaria on the 16th. Going beyond Kosygin's reference to "opponents of detente," Grechko, as reported by TASS, asserted that forces of reaction and aggression and "influential" quarters in imperialist

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countries, which wanted to turn the world back to the cold war, were "precisely the forces that by their short-sighted policy" brought matters to a new conflagration in the Middle East. Shelepin, as reported by the Bulgarian news agency on the 16th, merely repeated the accusation that Israel bears full responsibility.

Moscow has given little publicity to consultations with Arab leaders, belatedly reporting on the 12th the Iraqi foreign minister's visit to Moscow on 9 October. Algerian President Boumediene's unheralded "friendly visit" on 14-15 October was acknowledged by TASS on the 15th in an announcement that Boumediene met with Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin, Gromyko, and Grechko in "a friendly and frank atmosphere" for a detailed exchange of views on the Middle East situation. The sides, TASS said, affirmed their determination to assist "in every way" in the liberation of the occupied Arab territories.

Moscow has remained silent on other diplomatic contacts. Thus while TASS on the 13th reported Gromyko's meeting with the FRG ambassador, it did not acknowledge that the ambassador had conveyed Brandt's reply to a Brezhnev message on the Middle East. According to the West German DPA, Brezhnev sent messages to Nixon, Pompidou and Brandt; and Brandt in an FRG TV interview on the 14th said the exchange of views concerned whether and how something could be done to guarantee the right of Israel and the other states in the region to existence and security.

ISRAELI BOMBINGS, Denouncing Israel's "savage bombings and
OTHER ACTIONS shellings of civilian targets," the TASS
statement on the 12th pointed out that a
Soviet merchant ship was sunk that day in Tartus port and
that bombing in Damascus on the 9th had destroyed the Soviet
cultural center. Noting that Soviet and Syrian citizens were
victims in the Damascus bombing, the statement added at
another point that as a result of the "criminal" Israeli actions
there were victims among Soviet citizens in Egypt as well as
Syria. Moscow has provided no clarification regarding the
deaths of any Soviet citizens in Egypt; a Soviet friendship
societies statement, carried by TASS some hours before the
release of the TASS statement, had noted that a Soviet citizen--
a Russian-language teacher--and some Syrian staff members of
the cultural center had been killed in the Damascus bombing.

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The TASS statement contrasted the Israeli "atrocities" with the "enormous fortitude and self-control" displayed by the Arab states waging combat operations against the enemy's armed forces only. Echoing the statement, an Afonin commentary on the 15th told North American listeners of the Arabs' "humanity," lacked by the other side, in that "not a single Arab plane bombed cities or villages in Israel."

TASS said the "Soviet people" condemned the bombing, and the Soviet Union could not "regard indifferently" the Israeli actions, continuation of which would lead to "grave consequences" for Israel itself. The statement also observed that Israeli ruling circles were "profoundly deluded" if they thought their actions would go unpunished. The current TASS statement is similar in these respects to one issued on 16 February 1970 in a comparable situation--the Israeli bombing of the Egyptian metal works at Abu Zabal with civilian casualties. The 1970 statement was followed by a mounting campaign of protest meetings throughout the USSR, and in the present case, reports of such protests have also begun to appear.

TASS continues to report developments on the Sinai and Syrian fronts, conceding on the 12th that Israeli troops had broken through Syrian positions and moved beyond the 1967 cease-fire line. Jordan's dispatch of troops to the Syrian front was reported in a one-line TASS dispatch on the 13th, and TASS on the 14th briefly noted that Saudi Arabian troops in Jordan had reportedly crossed into Syria.

ARMS TO ISRAEL In the last few days, Moscow has picked up numerous foreign press reports regarding American supply of materiel to Israel, but has thus far refrained from comment. TASS' straightforward account of Secretary Kissinger's 12 October press conference sidestepped his remarks about Soviet behavior in the crisis, although it did quote him with respect to U.S. contacts with the parties and the permanent members of the Security Council. Kissinger outlined U.S. objectives, according to TASS, as ending the hostilities as quickly as possible and in such a way as to contribute to the promotion of a more permanent solution in the Middle East. TASS noted that in response to a question on U.S. military aid to Israel, Kissinger said the United States "has an ongoing military relationship with Israel." Moscow's domestic service gave the Kissinger press conference only two sentences, reporting that he refused to give a frank reply

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when asked the nature of U.S. military assistance to Israel, but said only that the United States maintained military ties with Israel.

State Department spokesman McCloskey's 15 October announcement on U.S. resupply of military equipment was only briefly reported by the domestic service on the 16th. TASS the same day said McCloskey "admitted" that U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel "reach considerable proportions." Noting that McCloskey refused to disclose the kind of military equipment being supplied, TASS went on to cite UPI, AP, and the Washington POST for reports of various deliveries including tanks, combat planes such as Phantoms, missiles, and electronic and other equipment. On the 15th TASS had reported NEWSWEEK as saying that Israel had asked the United States urgently to provide at least 75 up-to-date military aircraft including Phantoms, as well as tanks, artillery, and missiles, and that missiles and ammunition ordered earlier were dispatched last week.

Soviet media have picked up some Arab complaints of U.S. actions, including charges that planes piloted by U.S. citizens took part in the Israeli bombing of Damascus. And TASS on the 14th reported the Egyptian protest to the United States claiming that U.S. reconnaissance aircraft overflew Egyptian territory on the 13th. The Cairo paper AL-AHRAM was cited by TASS on the 15th for a report that Egypt had informed Greece, Turkey, and Spain of its concern over the use of NATO bases in these countries by U.S. reconnaissance planes, and that same day the Soviet agency reported that the Egyptian government spokesman, commenting on reports of deliveries of U.S. weapons to Israel, had emphasized that the entire responsibility for political, military and economic support "to the aggressor" rests with the United States.

ARMS TO ARABS Moscow was silent on its own arms resupply operations until the 17th, when TASS commentator Latyshev, attacking Peking for belittling Soviet aid to the Arabs, declared that the Arab public directly links the Syrian and Egyptian armies' fighting efficiency with the military aid which has been and "is rendered" by the Soviet Union.*

* Moscow had earlier referred to Soviet supply of arms to the Arabs in a commentary in Mandarin on the 9th also replying to PRC charges. Without specifying any ongoing deliveries, the broadcast set forth the stereotyped argument that if a country provides arms to the victims of aggression it cannot be accused of conniving with the aggressors.

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Moscow had indirectly affirmed such deliveries on the 16th in a TASS dispatch from Baghdad which cited ATH-THAWRAH as hailing the USSR's valuable assistance and its role in "the reinforcement" of the Arab armies' "defense potential."

Algerian President Boumediene's talks in Moscow dealt with Soviet "support" for Syria and Egypt, according to the Beirut AN-NAHAR as reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 17th. The paper said there were signs that the USSR intends "to expand the scope of aid to certain Arab states" to enable them to face any long war. Without mentioning any Soviet assistance, a Zakharov commentary broadcast in German on the 16th, analyzing Israel's "blitzkrieg strategy," asserted that Israel was now forced to wage a long war on several fronts which would exhaust its strength.

Prior to the Latyshev commentary, Moscow's references to the Arabs' Soviet weaponry were largely confined to a 13 October RED STAR article and to broadcast pickups of remarks by Mrs. Meir that Israeli losses were due to the increased strength of Arab forces trained by Soviet specialists and armed with Soviet weapons. In the RED STAR article, Pustov pointed out that the Egyptian and Syrian armies were well trained and "equipped with modern weapons." He cited Western correspondents as impressed by the Arab forces' military technique and effectiveness, and noted an "admission" by an Israeli air force general that the biggest problem for Israel's air force was the Syrian army's air defense batteries-- "the best and most modern missile installations."

AS-SADAT SPEECH Soviet media promptly reported the basic points of President as-Sadat's 16 October speech to the Egyptian People's Assembly, with Moscow radio's Arabic-language service filling in some details omitted by TASS. None of the reports mentioned as-Sadat's reservations on the policy of detente: Egypt wants this policy to succeed, he said, and is prepared to contribute, but this cannot happen "while aggression is being committed" against the Arab nation.

TASS noted as-Sadat's remark that the United States was siding with "the aggressor" but that Egypt would not be intimidated by new deliveries of weaponry to Israel. And TASS reported his statement that Egypt was ready to accept the proposal of a cease-fire with the provision of Israeli withdrawal, and that after Israeli troops were withdrawn Egypt would participate in

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a peace conference under UN auspices and exert efforts to insure participation of other Arab leaders and Palestinian representatives. TASS also noted his statement that Egypt was ready to reopen the Suez Canal immediately and had started preparations for this.* The account quoted his reference to the Arabs' "loyal and sincere friends," whom the Arab world will not forget--his only allusion to the Soviet Union.

An Arabic-language commentary on the 16th went beyond TASS in pointing out that as-Sadat addressed his words to President Nixon when he said Egypt was prepared to halt the war on condition of immediate Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and recognition of Palestinian rights. And a brief Arabic-language news item on the speech noted as-Sadat's remarks on Egypt's Zafir missiles, citing him as stating that the Egyptian army possessed missiles capable of hitting targets deep inside Israel but that Egypt, aware of its responsibility for using such missiles, refrains from using them.

Israeli Prime Minister Meir's statement to the Knesset on the 16th was characterized by Soviet media as "aggressive" and "hostile." TASS cited news agency reports that Mrs. Meir said the war would end only when the Arabs were defeated, and the Arabic-language commentary noted that she made peace conditional on the return to the pre-6 October lines, reconfirming that Tel Aviv wants a "peace built on occupation and annexation of others' territories."

* Victor Louis, in an article in the 12 October London EVENING NEWS, claimed that the Arabs were looking to the USSR and East Europe for assistance in reopening the canal, and that volunteers to act as pilots and technicians "are already being recruited in Moscow."

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INDOCHINA

Vietnamese propaganda attacks on Washington and Saigon since the beginning of the month have shown some striking changes from the pattern followed since last spring. Alleged violations of the peace agreement have been protested by the foreign ministries rather than the lower-level ministry spokesman, and some of the protests inexplicably have focused attacks on long-standing examples of U.S. support for Saigon without indicating any new cause for concern. Moreover, for the first time since the January peace agreement, on 15 October the PLAF Command issued an order assailing alleged U.S. encouragement of recent Saigon military actions and threatening communist counterattacks. Whether or not these changes in the propaganda indicate genuine concern over Saigon military actions and allied intentions, they may reflect a shift in policy decided upon in recent weeks when the top North Vietnamese leaders were all in Hanoi for the first time in months.

FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENTS, PLAF ORDER SCORE SAIGON, U.S.

The current shift in propaganda was signaled in the first week of October when the PRG and DRV sent notes on alleged U.S. and Saigon violations of the peace agreement to participants in the February international conference on Vietnam--the first such notes issued since mid-April. The level of regular official protests was raised shortly after when, on 7 and 8 October, the communists used the authoritative format of foreign ministry statements, rather than what had become the routine spokesman's protest, to denounce Saigon air strikes in Tay Ninh Province. This new pattern was reinforced with another pair of foreign ministry statements from the DRV and PRG, on the 13th and 15th respectively, assailing U.S. support for Saigon. The PLAF order on the 15th not only added a new dimension of threat to the propaganda, but was also given more prominence than the earlier foreign ministry statements, with both Hanoi and Liberation Radio repeatedly featuring the order in their broadcasts.

STATEMENTS ON U.S.
RESPONSIBILITY

The 13 October DRV Foreign Ministry statement stressed the primary responsibility of the United States in Vietnam, maintaining that the Paris agreement was "signed on the basis of U.S. commitments" to end its involvement in Vietnam and that the United States has "blatantly broken" its commitments. The statement cited specific examples of "illegal" U.S. military assistance to Saigon, charged

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that Saigon is using this aid to violate the cease-fire and repress the people, and demanded that Washington end its military involvement and its interference in South Vietnamese internal affairs. The attack on the United States was pursued in editorials in the party paper NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 14 October. NHAN DAN maintained: "the Thieu clique's acts are designed to carry out U.S. schemes and plans. These acts are directed, planned, and financed by the United States, and the Thieu clique is supplied with weapons and encouraged by the United States." In a curious adjunct, the editorial evoked an earlier period of difficulty between the United States and Hanoi that took place during the peace negotiations. The editorial observed: "everyone still remembers that in October 1972 the United States adopted a double-dealing attitude and refused to sign the agreement to which it had agreed in order to gain time for the introduction of massive quantities of aircraft, tanks, and artillery guns, and hundreds of thousands of tons of other weapons and ammunition into the South to strengthen the Saigon army."

PLAF ORDER While responding to Saigon military actions the 15 October PLAF Command order charged the United States with primary responsibility. The order led off with the contention that the United States was "forced" to sign the peace agreement but "has not yet renounced its evil design to continue to impose neocolonialism on South Vietnam" and continues to "encourage and aid" Saigon actions. Maintaining that the United States and Saigon have never seriously implemented the peace agreement, the order went on to protest recent specific GVN actions, including "nibbling" actions in Kontum and Pleiku, and Cai Lay and Chuong Thien, as well as air strikes in Tay Ninh and Thu Dau Mot on 3 and 11 October. Addressing an injunction to the military forces, the order stated: "As long as the Saigon administration continues its acts of war, the PLAF must resolutely counterattack its forces anywhere, in appropriate form and with appropriate forces, and force the adversary to scrupulously and strictly implement the Paris agreement on Vietnam and end all its acts of war and sabotage of the agreement."

Liberation Radio, in a commentary on the order broadcast on the same day, clearly spelled out the implications of its guidance to the military forces. It stated: "If they attack us in an area, we will counterattack them in the same area and attack them in

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other places as well. If they send aircraft and artillery to bomb and shell our liberated areas, we will counterattack them in the same areas and also directly attack their rear bases." Hanoi media have publicized the Liberation Radio commentary but have not used its more explicit warning on counterattacks in original comment. The ominous perspective of the PLAF order was reinforced, however, in Hanoi editorial comment on the 17th. For example, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, claiming that the PLAF has patiently respected the peace agreement, warned that "it will not sit idly by while its adversary insolently continues to violate and sabotage the agreement and schemes to eliminate all revolutionary achievements." The army paper maintained that "appropriate counterblows" are "necessary and urgent" and aim at protecting the agreement.

The warning that communist forces would not only respond to ARVN attacks on the spot, but would also counterattack elsewhere, including against rear bases, previously appeared in Hanoi comment at the end of June and beginning of July, first having been raised in a 27 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial. Major GVN military activities in Kontum at that time, including the 2 July bombing of the communist airfield at Dak To, prompted a statement from the regional Kontum PLAF Command which gave official voice to this warning. The central PLAF Command has not previously issued an order on cease-fire violations, although the Command did issue instructions on implementing the cease-fire following the January peace agreement and the 13 June joint communique. Alleged military actions were denounced in a 17 February statement by the PLAF spokesman which paralleled the format of current order but was much more subdued.

HANOI BROADCAST CITES FOREIGN CRITICISM OF NIXON, KISSINGER

For the second time in a month Hanoi media have departed from the circumspect treatment accorded the President and Secretary Kissinger since the January peace agreement. The earlier atypical denunciation was in mid-September press comment on the Chilean coup,* and the most recent criticism came in an isolated Hanoi Vietnamese-language broadcast of 10 October with no clear peg.

* North Vietnamese criticism of the President and Secretary Kissinger at the time of the Chilean coup is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 September 1973, pages 5-7.

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The radio commentary accused Nixon and Kissinger of following, for many years, "an aggressive, interventionist, and divisive policy," and quoted from foreign commentaries to demonstrate that "the U.S. ambition to rule the world, as well as its objectives and designs, remains unchanged."

Gratuitously focusing censure on Kissinger, the broadcast cited arguments against the view that "Nixon is a warlike and cunning scoundrel" while "Kissinger, as the main adviser and executor of Nixon's foreign policy, is a man who advocates peace and wants to improve the world situation." In this context, the radio cited the views of a 2 March NEW STATESMAN article that Kissinger has always advocated a show of strength and is the most hawkish of Nixon's advisers. The broadcast also noted that NEW STATESMAN saw similarities to Metternich and Bismarck in Kissinger's actions and observed that the two earlier statesmen had advocated a balance of power among countries in which zones of influence were divided up to maintain an equilibrium.

In an apparent reflection of Hanoi's antipathy for U.S. policies of detente with Moscow and Peking, the radio commented on its own authority: "Learning from Bismarck, Kissinger advocates taking advantage of the contradictions among major powers to forcibly control them and seizing opportunities to put forth bold decisions about policies." Just as Hanoi ignored Kissinger's trip to Peking last February, it did not report the announcement of his plans to visit the Chinese capital beginning on 26 October. There was an allusion to his travel plans, however, in an 8 October Hanoi broadcast which alleged that U.S. spokesman John King, in a press briefing on the 5th, had justified U.S. reconsideration of its withdrawal of forces from Thailand, in part, by citing Kissinger's plans to "visit here and there late this month."

The 10 October broadcast's denunciation of Administration policy also cited evidence of U.S. economic problems and came close to reviving Peking's "paper tiger" thesis when it commented:

U.S. imperialism has often been likened to an old lion. Although such a comparison is not yet suitable, we can already compare the United States with a heavyweight boxer who is used to brandishing his fist to threaten one person after another. The boxer has been soundly beaten and is rather advanced in age, and his fist has become soft.

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SIHANOUK, SPOKESMEN SOFTPEDAL NEED FOR "ARMED STRUGGLE"

At a time of military stalemate, recent pronouncements by Prince Sihanouk and other Front spokesmen have been marked by notable restraint. They have moderated previous persistent calls for uncompromising armed struggle and have avoided authoritative criticisms of Phnom Penh leaders. The change was particularly apparent in Sihanouk's 29 September National Day message to PRC leaders which merely promised to "wage a struggle" until the objectives of the five points are achieved. Last year's message emphasized the resolve to carry out a "war of resistance" "without retreat or compromise, whatever may be the sacrifices and duration of the war." Unlike last year, the message sidestepped criticism of the Phnom Penh government leaders by name and failed to assail "Saigon and Bangkok lackeys." Another exercise in restraint has been the Front's failure so far to comment on the Phnom Penh government's 24 September reiteration of its 6 July settlement proposal. When the plan was first proposed it was greeted by harsh invective.

Sihanouk's moderation comes at a time when Peking, his major supporter, has shown sustained reserve in regard to the Cambodian situation. Peking continues to replay Front pronouncements, to press strongly for the entry of Sihanouk's government (RGNU) into the United Nations, and to feature Sihanouk prominently in reports of celebrations in Peking. However not since early July, not even on his return from the nonaligned conference last month, has Peking feted him at a banquet, an occasion requiring a major Chinese speech on Cambodia. Sihanouk, in discussions with Western newsmen, last month complained that PRC and DRV arms aid had been halted.

At the same time, Moscow has seemed to be gradually moving toward recognition of Sihanouk's government, although it still maintains its embassy in Phnom Penh. According to an 11 October TASS report published the following day in PRAVDA, Soviet ambassador to China Tolstikov paid a visit to "head of state" Sihanouk on an unspecified date in Peking and voiced support for the Cambodian struggle under the leadership of FUNK and RGNU. According to Sihanouk's statements to Western newsmen, the meeting took place on 9 October and Moscow had acknowledged his regime as the legal representative of Cambodia. A more forthcoming Soviet attitude to Sihanouk's government had been indicated in August when a TASS report of a RGNU statement included its references to Sihanouk as "head of state" and the RGNU and FUNK as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Cambodian people.*

* See the TRENDS of 22 August 1973, pages 1-3.

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C P S U S L O G A N S

DETENTE DIPLOMACY, EVENTS IN CHILE, MIDEAST REFLECTED

The CPSU Central Committee's October Revolution anniversary slogans this year continue the recently established practice of deemphasizing the broader contentious issues in East-West relations and international communist relations in these semiannual statements but responding to specific trouble spots that have developed around the world. While registering Moscow's concern about events in Chile and the Middle East, the slogans, published in the central press on 14 October, also incorporate new themes that have emerged in Moscow's detente diplomacy in the six months since the May Day slogans were issued in mid-April.

+ The two Middle East slogans, abbreviated in May to a call for "elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression," now call upon the world to "demand an end of Israeli aggression against the Arab states" while reactivating language used in previous years calling for "the liberation of Arab lands."

+ The slogans carry on Moscow's recent rhetorical concern about the military coup in Chile in adding greetings to the "working people and all democrats in Chile, who are waging a courageous struggle against the campaign of terror by reactionary fascist forces."

+ A slogan directed specifically at Asia as a whole was added for the first time since the foreign affairs section of the slogans was shortened considerably in 1967. The slogan calls for "collective security in Asia," reflecting Moscow's recently reinvigorated campaign in support of this now well-established plank in its foreign policy platform.

+ Moscow's general satisfaction with international developments over the last six months and its continuing interest in detente diplomacy were registered in a new slogan reiterating the April 1973 plenum's call for steps to make the relaxation of international tension "irreversible" and to place the principle of peaceful coexistence at the basis of relations between states with different social systems.

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THAILAND

THANOM OUSTED HAILED BY DRV; OTHER COMMUNIST COMMENT CAUTIOUS

The massive student disturbances resulting in the resignation of the Thanom-Praphat administration over the weekend elicited routine-level comment from North Vietnam and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) hailing the insurrection and castigating the policies of the "Thanom-Praphat clique." Limited Peking and Moscow response has consisted of generally straightforward coverage of the crisis, sidestepping harsh criticism of the Thanom government and making no connection between the riots and the U.S. presence in Thailand.

HANOI North Vietnamese media promptly responded to the demonstrations with replays of Western press reports, but avoided substantive comment until after the resignation of the Thanom government on 14 October. Hanoi has subsequently released scathing denunciations of the policies of the Thanom government, calling special attention to its willingness to allow a large U.S. military presence in the country. Typically, a 16 October NHAN DAN commentary charged that Thanom's policy of throwing in his lot with "the sinking boat of the 'Nixon Doctrine' in Southeast Asia" was at the root of the riots and expressed confidence that the struggle would reduce Thai dependence on the United States. The commentary focused attention on the CPT-led armed struggle in the country, but failed to suggest any direct CPT role in the recent disturbances.

THAI CP Coverage of the crisis by the CPT clandestine station based in China was limited to brief reports of student protests until after the start of all-out rioting on 13 October. Subsequent coverage has relied extensively, but not exclusively, on Western and Thai press reports, and has noted the change in the Thai government in brief, straightforward fashion. In contrast to Hanoi, the CPT has viewed the riots as stemming from Bangkok's internal suppression and has not connected them with the U.S. presence in Thailand. The CPT station has thus far made no monitored reference to a CPT role in the disturbances.

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NOTE

NEW USSR MINISTRY: PRAVDA on 12 October announced creation of a new Ministry of Machine Building for Livestock Raising and Fodder Production--a move reflecting the top priority being accorded the lagging livestock sector, which bears major blame for forcing the Soviet Union into massive grain purchases abroad. The new ministry is headed by K.M. Belyak, formerly first deputy head of the Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building Ministry, which had previously administered the branch which has now been elevated to the status of a new ministry.

A major drive to improve livestock raising, the least mechanized sector of Soviet agriculture, was begun in 1971 with a program to create large mechanized livestock raising complexes. Recent manifestations of official concern have included a November 1972 decree demanding improvement in the mixed feed industry, the creation of a special institute for the mixed feed industry in late 1972, a June 1973 decree ordering "significant expansion" of production of livestock raising equipment, and a 16 June PRAVDA editorial complaining of a continuing fodder shortage.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8 - 14 OCTOBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2821 Items)</u>			<u>Peking (1122 Items)</u>		
Middle East	(3%)	22%	Middle East	(--)	37%
[USSR Government	(1%)	3%]	[UNGA, Security Council	(--)	7%]
Statement			Debate		
[TASS Statement	(--)	3%]	Domestic Issues	(45%)	30%
Chilean Coup	(16%)	11%	Canadian Prime Minister	(--)	13%
Japanese Prime Minister	(1%)	8%	Trudeau in PRC		
Tanaka in USSR			UNGA Session	(22%)	8%*
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	3%]	Indochina	(9%)	7%
China	(8%)	6%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* Material on the Middle East is excluded from this figure.