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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

APR 74

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F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

New Leader of Key Soviet Institute - page 10

the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older has increased by 50 percent. The number of people 75 years of age or older has increased by 100 percent. The number of people 85 years of age or older has increased by 200 percent. The number of people 95 years of age or older has increased by 400 percent.

24 APRIL 1974
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR PRAISES TIES WITH SYRIA, SHOWS CONCERN OVER CAIRO SHIFT

For want of more effective props to support its diplomatic posture in the Middle East, Moscow has continued to make the most of Syrian President al-Asad's recent visit to the USSR, presenting it as a symbol of Soviet-Arab friendship and a token of Moscow's claim to play a role in a Middle Eastern peace settlement. At the same time, Moscow has shown concern over the shift in Cairo's sympathies from a pro-Soviet to a pro-United States position. While it has rejected charges that its support for Syria is serving to perpetuate the fighting on the Golan Heights, it has warned the Arabs against turning to the West for military and diplomatic support, and assured them that the USSR offers "comprehensive support, including arms."

SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT

Routine comment on the Syrian-Israeli issue has kept up the criticism of "partial agreements" voiced by Brezhnev on the 11th in his speech at a dinner for al-Asad. Thus ZA RUBEZHOM, in an article reported by TASS on the 19th, cautioned against attempts being made, "under the guise of a search for a solution, to perpetuate the injustices engendered by Israel's aggressive policy." Moscow brushed off Western press assertions that the Soviet-Syrian talks constituted an obstacle to Secretary Kissinger's peace efforts. A broadcast to North America on the 19th insisted that the Soviet Union is not obstructing Syrian-Israeli disengagement, but that it does support Syria's position that troop separation must be part of an overall settlement.

Ponomarev, touching briefly on the Arab-Israeli problem in his Lenin anniversary speech on the 22d, pledged that the USSR would do everything necessary to defend the Arab countries' legitimate interests, to make its contribution to the liquidation of the crisis, and "not to permit a 'settlement'" that would encourage the "aggressors." A Middle East statement issued by the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on the 19th* declared that disengagement, a "first preliminary step" toward a general settlement, "must be followed without fail" by other steps aimed at implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. The statement noted the "significance"

* The last such Warsaw Pact PCC statement on the Middle East was issued on 3 December 1970; see the FBIS TRENDS of 9 December 1970, pages 19-20.

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of the Geneva conference and said it should lead to solution of the "key problems"--complete Israeli withdrawal, insuring the Palestinians' rights, and guarantee of the security, integrity and sovereignty of all states of the area.

ARMS ISSUE Moscow has not acknowledged Egyptian President as-Sadat's recent series of public complaints of Soviet unresponsiveness to his requests for arms, or his statements that Egypt intends to end its arms dependence on the USSR and seek other sources of supply. But Soviet broadcasts in Arabic have been quick to warn the Arabs against relying on the West--particularly the United States--for military equipment and to reassure them that the USSR renders "comprehensive support, including arms," to the Arabs. Arab audiences have been reminded that Washington remains the main arms exporter to Israel, and Moscow expressed "regret" over the placid reaction of "some Arabs" to the U.S. policy of continuing to arm and finance Israel and thus encourage its "aggressive, expansionist" policy.

At the same time, North American listeners were told, in a broadcast on the 19th, that "allegations by some Americans" that the USSR was encouraging the arms race in the Middle East were "absurd." A broadcast in Arabic on the 18th, moreover, dismissed as a "hysterical reaction" an "allegation" by the British GUARDIAN that, judging from reconnaissance data reaching Washington, the Kremlin was actively encouraging the fighting on the Golan Heights. The true issue, the broadcast asserted, was the attempt by some U.S. journalists to turn the Arabs away from friendship with the USSR by convincing them that the U.S. attitude had changed and that Washington was even sending arms to the Arabs.

An Arabic-language commentary on the 23d denounced the BBC for attempting to undermine Egyptian-Soviet relations by talk about Egyptian purchase of Western weapons, particularly from the United States, despite the fact that the U.S. State Department "turned its back on this question."

RELATIONS WITH U.S., EGYPT Moscow has shown increasing concern that the warming of relations between the United States and Egypt may encourage Cairo to adopt an increasingly hostile stance toward the USSR. The broadcast to North America on the 19th cited columnist Joseph Alsop as writing that "influential U.S. quarters" would like to induce Egypt to break off its "remaining ties" with the Soviet Union. This certainly would not bring a Middle East settlement any nearer, the commentary said, and "it is diametrically opposed to the interest of peace as well as to the spirit and letter of the Soviet-American agreements."

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Broadcasts in Arabic have complained that "certain persons" were taking a neutral attitude toward both the Soviet Union and the United States. A broadcast on the 23d referred cryptically to "certain diplomatic activities," in addition to "subversive propaganda," aimed at disrupting Soviet-Egyptian relations. The commentary took the position that these relations had weathered difficult tests and subversive actions before and would withstand them again, and pointedly recalled how Egypt in the past had rejected British and American conditions attached to offers of help in building the Aswan dam.

Indications of diplomatic efforts to heal the Moscow-Cairo breach have recently been reported by Middle Eastern sources. The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY said on the 23d that the Soviet charge, at his request, had been received by Foreign Minister Fahmi and had handed him a letter from Brezhnev "on the Middle East problem." According to an IRAQI NEWS AGENCY report, the Cairo AL-AHRAM said on the 24th that Brezhnev's message included a reply to as-Sadat's expression of readiness "to meet with the Soviet leaders."

SADAT STATEMENTS Soviet media have virtually ignored as-Sadat's series of public statements outlining his troubles with Moscow. A Moscow broadcast in Arabic on 29 March summed up in two paragraphs the Egyptian president's interview with the Beirut AL-ANWAR, published that day. The Moscow account merely noted that as-Sadat called for complete Israeli withdrawal, described Israeli demands for secure borders as an effort to retain some occupied territory, and asserted that Egypt and Syria held identical views on Syrian-Israeli disengagement. In the Cairo version of the interview, as-Sadat had also complained that the Soviets had tried to mislead him during the October war by falsely reporting that the Syrians were asking for a cease-fire.

In a speech in Alexandria on 3 April, as-Sadat discussed at length his difficulties with the Soviet Union in obtaining arms, and in his 18 April speech to the ASU and the People's Assembly he mentioned several aspects of the "misunderstandings" with the Soviet Union--over arms, Egypt's "abandonment of socialism," and its improvement of relations with the United States. The latter speech was reported by Soviet media in one-line items: TASS noted that as-Sadat submitted a working document on Egyptian domestic and foreign policy, and Moscow's domestic and Arabic services said he declared that without Syrian-Israeli disengagement there would be no progress in implementing Resolution 242.

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Moscow may have chosen to reply to as-Sadat's charge that it had falsely reported Syrian intentions during the war by way of circulating the Soviet side of the argument in the Beirut press. A document described as a statement by Ambassador Vinogradov to Egyptian "official and political personalities" was published in the Beirut AS-SAFIR on 16 April. It would appear to have been given a stamp of authenticity by its republication the following day in the Lebanese Communist Party organ AN-NIDA'. In the statement Vinogradov, who was the Soviet ambassador to Cairo during the war, maintained that in his "daily" meetings with as-Sadat from 4 to 29 October last year there were no acrimonious debates or differences of any kind, and no criticism of the Soviet stand. The ambassador gave his version of the Syrian cease-fire request, suggested that there were some Soviet-Egyptian differences on military strategy in the Sinai campaign, and recounted the events of 20 October when he said as-Sadat urgently asked Soviet intervention to obtain a cease-fire. According to the story attributed to Vinogradov, the Soviet leaders on receipt of this request "immediately issued a decision for a partial alert of the Soviet forces and mobilized seven Soviet military divisions" and, in fact, "an advance group arrived in Cairo."

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WARSAW PACT MEETING

COMMUNIQUE REVEALS LITTLE NEW SUBSTANCE ON SECURITY ISSUES

The communique on the 17-18 April meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee (PCC) revealed little that was new, either in substance or form, in the formulations on European security and force reductions. It made the appropriate bow to the goal of easing international tensions and briefly noted that the treaties and agreements reached with the FRG have contributed to "normalizing the situation" in Europe. This reflects the view of Moscow and its allies that the "German question" is now a matter of history and that the CSCE should signal an acceptance by all European states of the postwar status quo. As usual, the communique reaffirmed the readiness of the Warsaw Pact to disband itself simultaneously with NATO, or as a first step, to liquidate their military organizations. The communique did not, however, reaffirm the unity of the Warsaw Pact, an omission which clearly reflects Romania's independent stance.

SECURITY CONFERENCE The lengthy section of the communique dealing with the CSCE repeated the call, long stressed in Soviet bloc comment and official statements, for a summit-level concluding session to be held at the "earliest" possible date. Although Moscow has usually not been specific about the timing of the third stage summit meeting, it has carried several recent reports which indicate that it may be aiming for a mid-summer 1974 windup. Moscow radio on 4 April cited a U.S. delegate to Geneva as saying that he thought the second stage would be "completed in June." On 5 and 22 April TASS publicized statements by Finnish government leaders pointing out that Helsinki is ready to hold the third stage in July, or when necessary.

The present communique pointed out that the conference's third stage should not be regarded as an end in itself but as a starting point for "the historic work of building new relations between all the states of the European continent." It went on to call again for the creation of a permanent organ to oversee the implementation of the security treaty once the conference was over.

Although the communique denounced what it called "attempts to create obstacles, to drag out the work" of the conference, and to detour

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it from "solving crucial tasks," it avoided the harsher language commonly used in the denunciations of Western "obstructionism" on the CSCE's third "basket" of humanitarian and personal contacts issues. The section of the communique dealing with these issues contained no reference to alleged Western attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of the socialist states, nor any insistence on the need for respecting the sovereignty and laws and customs of states. By contrast, the last previous joint summit statement by Soviet bloc leaders, the 31 July 1973 communique on the third annual Crimea meeting, declared:

The socialist countries proceed from the view that this cooperation must develop in the framework of strict respect for sovereignty of every state and noninterference in its internal affairs, while observing the laws and taking into account the customs and traditions of every country.

The mellowing of the language on personal contacts and the exchange of ideas reflects the generally optimistic attitude that the Soviet and East European communit has cultivated during the CSCE Easter recess, 5-22 April. This is clearly related to the successful conclusion of the draft agreement on the principle of inviolability of borders on 5 April, which Moscow has described as the removal of a major stumbling block to agreement. Chief Soviet delegate to CSCE Kovalev, in a recorded statement broadcast by Moscow radio on the 6th, said that by adopting the agreed text on borders the second stage of the conference has overcome "a steep political obstacle in its work." Warsaw PAP's special correspondent in Geneva, Mysak, asserted on 19 April that "now the wording of the principle of the inviolability of borders is such that the socialist states will be able to sign it without objection." The full text of the agreement has not yet been published in Soviet or East European media.

FORCE REDUCTIONS The communique's one paragraph on the Vienna force reductions negotiations was routine and uninformative. It stated that the Pact leaders again affirmed the position taken by the January 1972 PCC meeting, namely, that recognition of the principle of "undiminished security for all the parties to the talks, with due consideration for the security of all the European states," makes it possible to reach a "constructive" agreement. Possibly with a nod to the Romanians, who have repeatedly stated publicly that talks on reductions of forces and armaments should also be extended to the Balkans, the communique declared that the success of the current negotiations would "create favorable conditions" for holding such talks in the future concerning "other areas of Europe."

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East European media in recent weeks have openly acknowledged difficulties between Romania, on the one hand, and Moscow and its five orthodox allies, on the other, concerning MBFR. One bone of contention has been Bucharest's dissatisfaction with the unofficial meetings which have taken place in Vienna outside the framework of the formal conference. AGERPRES publicized the Romanian delegate's remarks at the 21 March plenary session which criticized the unofficial contacts. And Ceausescu personally, in an interview with a Vienna paper on the 23d, voiced his concern over the "framework" in which the talks were taking place.

These signs of irritation by the Romanians were then followed by an item in the Hungarian press which implied that Romania in fact does not support the agreed Warsaw Pact position at Vienna. Writing in the Hungarian government daily MAGYAR HIRLAP on 31 March, Imre Tatar said that the proposal of the four direct socialist participants--the USSR, GDR, CSSR, and Poland--is "fully supported by Hungary and Bulgaria, countries attending the Vienna talks with consultative rights." The only other socialist special participant, Romania, was not mentioned.

BUCHAREST CONTINUES TO RESIST MOSCOW ON COMMUNIST UNITY

Romanian obstructionism at the Warsaw Pact meeting was pointed up by the notable failure of the final communique to include any reference to unity, limiting itself merely to calls for strengthening "friendship" and "cooperation." By contrast, the communique issued at the end of the January 1972 meeting of Pact leaders in Prague had recorded the participants' determination to increase "the stability of the socialist countries' unity." As was the case in the communiqués of the two Pact summit meetings that preceded the June 1969 Moscow international conference of communist parties, the 19 April communique failed to endorse current moves for a new world conference.

Where the 1972 communique had called for "repulsing imperialist aggression," the current document merely noted, in connection with the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact in 1975, that cooperation between the Pact member states "strengthens the defense capability" of the alliance. The communique added routinely that, as long as NATO exists "and effective disarmament measures have not been implemented," the Pact members consider it necessary "to strengthen their defenses."

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BILATERAL MEETINGS

The continued tension between Moscow and Bucharest was reflected in the characterization by Soviet and Romanian sources of the 18 April talks between Brezhnev and Ceausescu as merely "comradely." By contrast, Brezhnev's bilateral talks with Zhivkov, Husak, Kadar, and Gierak, respectively, during the Pact session, were described as "friendly," and his meeting with Honecker was depicted as "fraternal and cordial." At the same time, the blunt "comradely" designation was not uniformly used in reports of meetings involving the Romanian leaders: TASS reported on the 18th that Kosygin had a "friendly" conversation with new Romanian Premier Manea Manescu, and the Bucharest radio the same day reported a "friendly" meeting between Ceausescu and Gierak.

FOLLOWUP COMMENT

Perhaps because of the absence of the unity clause in the communique, both Moscow and its orthodox allies have heavily stressed this theme in their followup comment. Thus the 21 April PRAVDA editorial viewed the results of the meeting as "vivid evidence of the growing unity and cohesion of the fraternal states and the intensification of coordination of their foreign policy activities." Ceausescu, presumably under heavy pressure, had joined the other participants in subscribing to "coordination" of foreign policy in the communique on the 31 July 1973 Crimea meeting of Soviet bloc leaders, but was apparently successful in opposing its inclusion in the 19 April Pact communique.

The only direct reference to Romanian obstructionism in the media of a participating country appeared in a Prague domestic service commentary on the 19th on the results of the Warsaw Pact meeting. In an allusion to the traditional Romanian posture of independence, the Prague commentator charged that Western analysts "exaggerated and blew up certain unimportant nuances in the Romanian attitude at certain international talks and expected, like the Peking Maoists, that a rift or at least a serious difference of opinion would take place at Warsaw." Contrary to such hopes, the commentary maintained, the Warsaw Pact countries' "highest" representatives approved "with complete unanimity all decisions" on their further mutual cooperation and on key world issues.

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CPSU SLOGANS

MAY DAY SLOGANS REFLECT CONCERN OVER WORLD TROUBLE SPOTS

The CPSU Central Committee slogans for this May Day continue the recent practice of deemphasizing contentious issues in international relations and communist affairs while focusing specifically on major world trouble spots. Slogans calling for measures to make detente trends "irreversible" and proclaiming the "historic victory" of the Vietnamese over imperialism remain unchanged.

+ Reflecting Moscow's impatience with the pace of negotiations at the European security conference, the slogan on Europe adds a call to "strive for the successful completion of the conference on questions of European security."

+ The disarmament slogan adds a plea for "termination of the arms race" to previous calls for general and complete disarmament and the implementation of Moscow's 1972 nonuse of force proposal at the United Nations.

+ An expression of concern about developments in Chile, inserted for the first time last October, has now been broadened to include a specific call for freeing Chilean Communist Party Secretary-General Luis Corvalan and "all prisoners of the fascist junta."

+ Reflecting the evolving situation in the Middle East, the slogans replace a demand for an end to "Israeli aggression" with a call for "a reliable and stable peace for all states and peoples" and a routine call for elimination of the "consequences" of Israeli aggression.

+ The most notable change in the domestic slogans reflects priorities set out in Brezhnev's speech to the December 1973 CPSU plenum in calling on agricultural workers to "develop specialization on the basis of the concentration of agricultural production and interfarm cooperation."

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MODERATES GAIN LEADERSHIP OF KEY SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE

The six-month deadlock over leadership of one of the Soviet Union's top ideological institutions, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, was finally broken in mid-April with the identification of former KOMMUNIST chief editor A.G. Yegorov as new director of the institute. The post had been vacant since early November 1973, and the naming of an official with Yegorov's moderate credentials to head a key institution for interpreting Soviet doctrine appears to represent a victory for the forces of moderation in the leadership.* Yegorov had authored a highly controversial article in the November 1973 issue of the literary journal ZNAMYA, an article that expounded unusually moderate positions on a wide range of intellectual issues. By contrast, his predecessor as director, P.N. Fedoseyev, has been one of the prime movers of the recent ideological crackdown on the social sciences.

Yegorov had been abruptly removed in January as chief editor of KOMMUNIST in circumstances suggesting he was in disfavor because of his ZNAMYA article. Since then the top post in KOMMUNIST has remained vacant, and the journal has become a forum for sharply divergent viewpoints. At a belated ceremony in Moscow on 17 April commemorating the 50th anniversary of KOMMUNIST, the journal was represented by deputy chief editor Ye. I. Bugayev. The continued vacancy in the regime's principal theoretical journal indicates that the issues in dispute remain unresolved.

The 66-year old Fedoseyev apparently surrendered the post of institute director in late October or early November, his last identification in this position being in the 24 October MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA. Since 13 November he has been identified in the central press only as vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a post he had held concurrently since 1971. Apparently because of this vacancy, important conferences in the institute on 18 December and 18 January were supervised by first deputy director P.A. Rodionov, with neither Fedoseyev nor Yegorov in attendance.

Yegorov was identified as institute director in PRAVDA on 16 April--the same day the leadership sent a belated message of congratulations and an Order of Lenin to KOMMUNIST on its anniversary. The 54-year

* For background on Yegorov's views, see the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 22-24.

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old Yegorov had not been mentioned for three months following his removal as editor of KOMMUNIST and the appearance of his ZNAMYA article. In his new post Yegorov will have overall responsibility, under the provisions of the 14 August 1967 CPSU Central Committee decree on the social sciences, for work in the field of party history--a field of study serving mainly to rationalize and authenticate current Soviet policies.

FEDOSEYEV'S ROLE In contrast to the moderate views expressed by Yegorov, Fedoseyev has in recent years been stressing the threat of ideological subversion. After he became director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in May 1967, Fedoseyev allied himself with Brezhnev's Stalinist protege, S.P. Trapeznikov, head of the CPSU Central Committee section for science and higher educational institutions, against the forces of moderation led by A.M. Rumyantsev. The latter had succeeded Fedoseyev as Academy of Sciences vice president in May 1967. Attempts by moderates to legitimize sociology in the Soviet Union succeeded in 1968 in having established the Institute for Concrete Social Research, with Rumyantsev as its director. The new institute became one of the most innovative institutions in the Soviet social sciences as well as a prime target for criticism by advocates of orthodoxy led by Trapeznikov and Fedoseyev.

The reactionary campaign to discredit Rumyantsev succeeded in obtaining his ouster both as Academy of Sciences vice president in May 1971 and as director of the sociological institute several months later. Fedoseyev then resumed the post of academy vice president, and M.N. Rutkevich, who in 1969 had echoed Fedoseyev's criticism of innovative, empirically-oriented sociology, became director of Rumyantsev's institute.*

In December 1971 Fedoseyev assailed sociologists for copying Western methods. In 1972 the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences censured the institute's former leadership for ideological shortcomings and ordered the institute to reorganize its work "on the basis of dialectical and historical materialism." The institute was renamed the Institute of Sociological Research, dropping the word "concrete" from its title as smacking of empiricism. In his role as social science supervisor Fedoseyev also keynoted the December 1971 founding congress of the new Philosophy Society, calling for intensification of ideological influences in the social sciences.

* For background on the purge of Rumyantsev and his institute, see the TRENDS of 24 May 1972, pages 38-40, and 15 November 1972, pages 22-23.

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CURRENT CRACKDOWN In the spring of 1973 Trapeznikov began a renewed campaign against the dangers of ideological penetration from abroad in an era of emerging detente. At a May 1973 Central Committee conference of the Academy of Sciences division on philosophy and law, Trapeznikov, Rutkevich and others denounced ideological errors in philosophy, sociology and law. On 28-30 November Trapeznikov convened a similar conference of economists to reassert ideological orthodoxy in this field. He was joined by Fedoseyev and others in accusing the nation's leading economist, N. P. Fedorenko, of deviating from Marxist-Leninist ideology and importing alien ideas--the same charges used to discredit Romyantsev and the unorthodox sociologists in 1971.

Fedorenko, director of the Central Economic Mathematics Institute, had become academic secretary of the economic division of the Academy of Sciences at the same May 1971 academy session which elected Fedoseyev as vice president in place of Romyantsev. Although the work of Fedorenko's institute has been under constant attack during the past decade, it appeared to receive high level support in a 4 June 1973 PRAVDA article. However, the attacks by conservative economists and Gosplan officials continued during the summer and fall, and Fedorenko defended the work of his institute and assailed its critics in an article in the October 1973 issue of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY.* Although under fire from his superiors at the November conference, Fedorenko avoided polemics and, judging from the version of his conference speech published in QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, merely acknowledged the role of ideology in Soviet economics.

COUNTERATTACK Soon after the November conference, however, there were indications of stubborn resistance to the ideological crackdown. QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, which had carried Fedorenko's defense in October, published a bold editorial in its January issue defending the right to free inquiry by scholars and assailing "cavalry raids" against the latter.**

* For the attacks on Fedorenko, see the TRENDS of 31 October 1973, pages 27-30.

** For details, see the TRENDS Supplementary Article of 3 April 1974, "Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences."

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Although the editorial appeared to be a thinly disguised reply to Trapeznikov's hardline speech at the May 1973 conference on philosophy, sociology and law, its broad applicability to all of the social sciences was clearly evident. Whereas Trapeznikov had complained that persons "calling themselves innovators" were "vulgarizing" Marxism-Leninism and that detente increased the need for tightening up controls against ideological subversion, the editorial emphasized the need to seek truth "no matter how bitter and mercilessly critical it is" and the importance of objective research under conditions of increased contacts with the West.

This remarkable editorial, as well as the prolonged stalemate over the choice of new leaders for the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and the journal KOMMUNIST, suggests the absence of a stable consensus in the top Soviet leadership. The deadlock over the new chief editor for KOMMUNIST was apparently responsible for the postponement of the scheduled 5 April celebration of KOMMUNIST's 50th anniversary. Even so, when the ceremony was finally held, the journal remained without a new chief editor.

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CYPRUS

MOSCOW SEES TURKEY'S FEDERATION PROPOSAL AS NATO PLOT

Moscow, in sustaining its low-keyed but persistent comment supporting an independent Cyprus, has recently moved toward open disapproval of a Turkish-advocated "federal" solution which it suggests would amount to partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey. Mindful of its relations with the various concerned states, Moscow itself has not directly attributed to Ankara the federation proposal, set forth in the program of Prime Minister Ecevit's government in January.* Instead, it has described the idea as a disguised ploy for partition in the interests of "NATO circles" which allegedly wish to convert the island into a military base. At the same time Moscow has continued to accuse the Greek regime of collaboration with the Greek Cypriot EOKA underground movement of the late General Grivas in furtherance of enosis, or union with Greece.

Some years ago Moscow mentioned the idea of federation as a possible solution for the Cyprus problem, but only within the framework of a single state. Following a Podgorny visit to Turkey in January 1965, Gromyko in an IZVESTIYA interview later that same month had remarked that Cypriots might choose a federal structure, but that such a system presupposed the existence of a single central government, single defense organization, and centralized administrative and judicial system. Since that interview the question of federation has not been broached in elite comment and only rarely in routine propaganda.

In keeping with the USSR's contention that Cyprus' communal differences must be settled by the two communities without outside interference, Soviet propaganda has supported the inter-Cypriot talks since they began in 1968. The talks have been suspended since early April over the issue of Turkey's espousal of a federal solution, which according to the Makarios government alters the basis of the talks, which are premised on a unitary state.

* The Turkish-language communist clandestine "Our Radio" in a 16 April broadcast did rebuke Ecevit for advocating a federal system for Cyprus, claiming this had annoyed "progressive public opinion" in Cyprus just as Greek support for enosis had done, and observing that Ecevit's suggestion "has been characterized as intervention."

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COMMENT ON PRAVDA on 21 March foreshadowed the current impasse
FEDERATION on the inter-Cypriot talks when it criticized EOKA
demands for enosis as well as demands for partition
"irrespective of their origin." Encouragement of these demands,
PRAVDA declared, could only be regarded as interference in the
internal affairs of the sovereign Cypriot state.

A Moscow broadcast in Greek to Cyprus on 4 April, two days after the talks were broken off, pointed to "foreign press" debate on the question of establishing a federation on the island and charged that "leading NATO circles" were encouraging such discussions in an effort to thwart the talks. The broadcast cited President Makarios as declaring that creation of a federal state was impossible because "in Cyprus there are no prerequisites for a federation," which would be unacceptable to a great majority of the population. And a Greek-language commentary broadcast to Cyprus on 18 April asserted that the Cyprus Government was "absolutely justified" in rejecting any change in the basis of the talks. The new difficulties in the talks had arisen, it explained, when the press of "certain NATO member countries" began propagandizing the idea of solving the Cyprus problem on the basis of federation.

Moscow presented the same argument to the other side in a Turkish-language commentary broadcast to Cyprus on the 19th. After first routinely denouncing enosis, the commentary offered various arguments against the notion of a federal state being bruited about by "some authoritative NATO politicians." For one thing, it said, Turkish Cypriots were scattered geographically, and separation would be "practically impossible," not to say unnecessary since Greeks and Turks could and did work and live together. Capping its argument, the commentary added that "NATO's plans to partition Cyprus are hidden behind words of federation."

PRAVDA took up the issue again on the 21st in an article exploiting Cypriot press agitation over the arrival at British bases of U.S. military personnel and equipment in connection with the assemblage of helicopters for use in mine-sweeping operations in the Suez Canal. The PRAVDA article, as reported by TASS, warned that this development was at variance with the relaxation of tension in the eastern Mediterranean and spoke darkly of "hostile intrigues of the NATO military and their agents" on the island. PRAVDA pointedly went on to caution against plans for a division of the island or for "such a reform of its state system" as would lead not to stronger cohesion but to isolating Greek and Turkish Cypriots from each other.

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SOVIET DEMARCHES Soviet media did not publicize Moscow's demarches in mid-March to the governments of Greece, Turkey, the United States and Britain over alleged foreign interference in Cyprus' internal affairs. But the Cyprus communist party (AKEL) organ KHARAVYI, which has in the past publicized Soviet diplomatic activity about which Moscow has kept silent,* said in a 27 March article that the USSR had again "decisively intervened" to prevent the overthrow of President Makarios and the imposition of a "NATO partitionist solution and a fascist regime" in Cyprus. According to KHARAVYI, the Soviet Government had sent a "strongly worded" note to Greece warning it would not remain indifferent if the legal Cyprus Government were overthrown, and had also "delivered a note" to Turkey and notified the U.S. and British governments and the UN secretary general.

* Previous Soviet representations to Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, and Britain were reported by KHARAVYI in March 1970, for instance; see the TRENDS of 26 March 1970, pages 4-5.

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CHINA

KIRIN LEADERSHIP CRITICIZED, TRADE UNIONS ASSUME MAJOR ROLE

An 18 April Kirin radio report of a provincial trade union rally stated that the provincial party committee must be "held responsible" for errors committed during the previous stage of the campaign against Lin and Confucius and emphasized that workers must be the "major force" in implementing the current campaign. The broadcast thus seems to be a response to a 2 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, which warned cadres that the issue of criticizing Lin and Confucius would be "a test for every leading comrade" and that the latter would not be allowed to assume a passive role. The Kirin meeting report stated that some cadres "were afraid to mobilize the masses" and some even "suppressed the masses" out of fear of criticism.

The Kirin trade union meeting carefully stressed the need for unified party leadership at every stage of this campaign. It also firmly reiterated guidelines contained in several recent PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials emphasizing the need for carrying out the campaign without manifestations of factionalism and affirming the overriding importance of stimulating production, with revolution relegated to "spare time."

The trade union rally also added two more moderating injunctions to the list previously noted in central media. It specifically prohibited "experience-exchanging" among various units and areas, which was responsible for much of the spread of the disorder connected with the cultural revolution, and it stated categorically that "mass organizations must not be formed within the armed forces." With the Shenyang military region, of which Kirin is a part, presumably in some disarray following the apparent purge of Li Te-sheng, the order may reflect actual, ongoing problems within PLA units in Kirin.

While Kirin is the first province in which the provincial party committee has been criticized openly, other provinces have called on mass organizations, especially the trade unions, to take a more active role in the anti-Lin/Confucius campaign and have noted leadership problems at higher levels. For example, a 12 April Honan broadcast noted that some leaders in Hopi municipality had doubted the ability of workers to serve as the main force in criticizing Lin, but that the party committee had attached great

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importance to the role of "mass organizations, particularly that of trade unions," had provided them with relevant central committee documents and had invited their participation.

The first province to indict a provincial-level leadership organ for mistakes was Shansi, where the provincial cultural bureau was criticized last month for having encouraged the production of the opera "Three Trips to Taofeng." While the provincial party committee was not attacked, Western press agencies have reported poster attacks on the Shansi first party secretary and one of his supporters. The apparent victor in the provincial struggle was Politburo member Chen Yung-kuei, who is also concurrently secretary of the provincial party committee and the Hsiyang county committee and founder of the model Tachai production brigade. A 19 April Shansi broadcast describing leadership activities in Hsiyang presumably reflects the recent victory in stating that county cadres no longer blindly follow instructions from upper levels but instead "ask 'why?' about each instruction and see whether it conforms with reality and whether it is rational."

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INDOCHINA

CAMBODIAN FRONT LEADER EXTENDS TOUR, REAFFIRMS FRONT UNITY

Following its return to Peking from Pyongyang on 8 April, the Cambodian Front delegation led by insurgent armed forces chief Khieu Samphan spent two weeks visiting Peking and touring Chinese provinces before embarking on 19 April on what appears likely to be a prolonged trip to several European and African countries.* Samphan's stay in China coincided with Prince Sihanouk's annual pilgrimage to North Korea on 11-23 April, to honor Kim Il-song on his birthday. Remarks by Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan during their travels have stressed the Front's unity in the face of alleged U.S. efforts to divide it, and have reiterated standard conditions for a peace settlement and denunciations of U.S. involvement in Cambodia.

Following Samphan's return from Pyongyang and his welcome by PRC Politburo members Yeh Chien-ying and Wu Te, Peking was strangely silent about the Cambodian delegation's activities from 8 to 14 April. The sole reference to the group was NCNA's 12 April report that on the previous day Samphan and his "special advisor" Ieng Sary had been present, along with Chou En-lai, to see Sihanouk off to the DPRK. NCNA gave full coverage to the delegation's tour of PRC provinces. The group left Peking for Szechwan, accompanied by Yeh Chien-ying, on the 14th, returned to Peking on the 17th, and was seen off for Albania by Yeh and Wu Te on the 19th. NCNA reported that diplomats from Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania, Algeria, Mauritania, and Cameroon were at the airport--a good indication of the delegation's probable lengthy itinerary.

The likelihood that Samphan's visit to Peking had provided an opportunity for high-level Front consultations was underlined by the appearance at the airport on the 19th of the chief Front spokesman in Paris, Chau Seng. The date of Chau Seng's arrival in China is unknown; he had not been reported to have been in Peking for several months.

* The delegation's earlier visits to Hanoi, Peking, and Pyongyang are discussed in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974, pages 9-11, and 10 April 1974, pages 11-15.

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FRONT UNITY

Portraying an image of Front unity, Khieu Samphan, in a 20 April speech in Tirana, called attention to the insurgents' "immense bloc of national union." Similarly, Sihanouk had underlined his solidarity with Samphan in a 12 April speech in Pyongyang in which he hailed the armed forces chief's international debut on his current tour and labeled him "the authentic representative of our people and the number one figure responsible for their armed struggle." Unity was also the watchword of authoritative comment marking this month's commemoration of Queen Sisowath Kossamak's birthday and the Cambodian new year. RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, in a message to the queen broadcast by Peking in Cambodian on the 10th, lauded Samphan's international tour and concluded his birthday greeting with a statement introducing Samphan to the queen. The broadcast then carried a message from Samphan to the queen--the first such greeting he has ever offered. Penn Nouth's usual New Year's message on 12 April also praised Samphan's visits abroad as a counter to the "dark schemes" designed to "undermine and divide the iron-like unity of our Front."

PRG, DRV STATEMENTS DENOUNCE GVN RETALIATION FOR FALL OF BASE

The PRG and DRV issued foreign ministry statements, on 18 and 19 April respectively, protesting the GVN's "intensification" of the war and the "indefinite" suspension of La Celle-Saint-Cloud negotiations between the two South Vietnamese parties in retaliation for the alleged communist seizure of Tonle Cham base on 12 April.* Both statements demanded a resumption of the GVN-PRG talks and denounced other retaliatory actions by the South Vietnamese Government--12-15 April air strikes against Loc Ninh, the suspension of "privileges and immunities" of the PRG delegation to the Joint Military Commission, and the cancellation of weekly liaison flights between Saigon and Loc Ninh.

According to the PRG statement, the GVN's "fuss" over Tonle Cham is aimed not only at "sabotaging" negotiations and "preparing for new military adventures" but also at "obtaining an excuse to beg for U.S. aid." Both statements accuse the United States of supporting Saigon actions, but the DRV statement goes further to specifically criticize U.S. arms deliveries to South Vietnam and the Administration's request

* An earlier discussion of the Tonle Cham incident is contained in the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 12-13.

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to Congress for more military aid to the GVN. Secretary of State Kissinger is the target of criticism in both statements: The DRV protest, for example, reiterates the charge--leveled at Kissinger in connection with his 25 March letter to Senator Kennedy--that he has distorted the spirit and letter of the Paris agreement to justify increased U.S. military involvement and interference in South Vietnam.

REPORT ON DRV ARMY CAMPAIGN MENTIONS "PARTY MILITARY CONGRESS"

Hanoi has begun a widespread "emulation drive" in the North Vietnamese armed forces, with the dissemination on 14 April of an instruction from the Standing Committee of the Central Military Party Committee and reports in the following days of meetings to launch the drive organized by military commands throughout the country. Such campaigns are a regular feature of DRV military activities. However, a surprising new element was introduced when Hanoi's report on one of the meetings raised the possibility of the convocation of an unprecedented nationwide meeting of the army's political cadres: A 16 April report on a meeting by the air defense and air force service quoted an unnamed "colonel political commissar" as urging emulation not only to mark the May anniversaries of Ho Chi Minh's birth and Dien Bien Phu, but also to "greet the 2d party military congress." There have been no other known references in Hanoi media to such a congress, either in the past or in the future.

The instruction of the Central Military Party Standing Committee labeled the new campaign "the determined-to-win emulation drive" and cited as its objectives the education and encouragement of cadres and combatants, the development of the strength of the armed forces, and the motivation of the armed forces to participate in building the North and maintaining domestic order and security. To meet these objectives, the instruction advocated emulation in increasing combat strength, practicing self-discipline, developing the regular army, and stimulating production and practicing thrift.

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NOTES

CHINESE LEADERSHIP: CCP vice chairman Li Te-sheng has failed to join other party vice chairmen in sending a wreath to the funeral of a prominent PRC leader for the second time in succession. The 23 April NCNA account of the funeral of Fu Tso-i listed all other vice chairmen as having sent wreaths, as did the 27 March account of the funeral of Chen Yu. Following Li's transfer to head the Shenyang military region at the end of last year, he was listed with other vice chairmen as sending wreaths to two funerals in January. Thus his failure to send a wreath to the recent funerals is not explicable merely on the basis of his being the only vice chairman not resident in Peking. His inclusion on the list for the second January funeral, on the 30th, marked his last mention in PRC media. Li has recently been the target of a wide-spread poster campaign.

PEKING ON PRC-JAPAN AVIATION ACCORD: Direct Chinese comment on the recently concluded civil air agreement with Japan, a breakthrough on the most important issue facing the two countries since relations were normalized in 1972, has thus far been confined to brief welcoming remarks by Liao Cheng-chih, president of the China-Japan Friendship Association. Liao predicted on 23 April, three days after the agreement was signed in Peking, that "no reactionary force on earth" can halt the historical trend for China-Japan friendship. Peking's strong interest in expediting the signing of other business agreements, as well as in a treaty of peace and amity with Japan, has, however, been revealed in several NCNA reports publicizing carefully selected statements by various Japanese spokesmen on the accord. An NCNA report on 23 April quoted a Japanese trade official as stating that Japanese businessmen are especially determined to support Diet ratification of the air agreement. On 21 April, two separate NCNA reports carried statements by several Japanese political leaders calling for the conclusion of a treaty officially ending World War II hostilities between the two countries. Reflecting its sensitivity to the relationship now emerging between China and Japan, Moscow has not yet commented on the air agreement.

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PRC ON FRENCH ELECTIONS: Peking's only report to date on the French presidential elections, a 19 April NCNA Paris dispatch, manages to suggest, by selective quotations, that each of the three main candidates supports policies which Peking endorses--the development of European defense cooperation plus a continuing independent French foreign policy. NCNA ignored French CP support for Francois Mitterand, noting only that he was "jointly nominated by the opposition parties, including the Socialist Party." NCNA applied similar disdainful treatment to the French communists in reporting the March 1973 parliamentary elections. French communist leader Marchais had sharply criticized the Chinese leadership at the 26-28 January Brussels conference of West European communist parties, labeling alleged PRC support for a West European political and military alliance as "an eloquent illustration of their desertion of the principles of proletarian internationalism."

MOSCOW ON INTER-AMERICAN MEETINGS: Moscow gave routine coverage to the 17-20 April Washington and Atlanta sessions of American foreign ministers attended by Secretary of State Kissinger, stressing that "sharp contradictions" emerged between the United States and other countries on major issues affecting inter-American relations. Moscow described Kissinger as "sharply out of tune" with Latin American delegates because he maintained silence on economic and trade policy and the status of Cuba and the Panama canal zone. In a Spanish broadcast on the 18th by Soviet commentator Levchenko, Kissinger's proposal for creation of a "new Western hemisphere community" was criticized as an attempt to "merely renew the facade" of inter-American relations without instituting basic changes. On the issue of Cuba, Moscow noted that the foreign ministers of Peru and Argentina called for an end to the blockade, and claimed that they and others opposed the embargo on the grounds that it contradicted present realities in Latin America as well as international detente. TASS promptly reported on the 19th the U.S. decision to authorize the sale of automobiles to Cuba by Argentine subsidiaries.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15 - 21 APRIL 1974

<u>Moscow (2599 items)</u>			<u>Peking (811 items)</u>		
Warsaw Pact Meeting	(1%)	14%	UNGA Special Session	(35%)	32%
[Communique	(--)	3%]	[Teng Hsiao-ping	(1%)	5%]
China	(5%)	6%	Speech, 10 April		
Syrian President	(9%)	6%	Criticism of Lin Piao	(8%)	11%
al-Asad in USSR			and Confucius		
[Joint Statement	(--)	2%]	Japan	(1%)	6%
Supreme Soviet	(--)	5%	[PRC-Japan Civil	(--)	4%]
Elections			Aviation Agreement		
Lenin Birth Anniversary	(--)	4%	Cambodia	(7%)	3%
May Day Slogans	(2%)	3%	USSR	(1%)	3%
UNGA Special Session	(8%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.