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Trends In Communist Propaganda

19 June 74

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
In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

19 JUNE 1974

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NIXON MIDEAST TOUR

MOSCOW PROVIDES BRIEF, FACTUAL COVERAGE, SCANTY COMMENT

Moscow media have continued the muted, straightforward reporting on President Nixon's Mideast trip, briefly noting his arrival in each country. Apart from a Radio Peace and Progress commentary on the 18th pegged to the U.S.-Israeli statement, Moscow comment for the second week has been confined to PRAVDA's weekly international review. TASS and the central press gave some aspects of the visits fuller treatment, summarizing statements by the U.S. and Egyptian presidents opening the Cairo talks and the statement of principles issued at the end of that visit, as well as dinner speeches in Damascus and the U.S.-Israeli statement concluding the President's visit there.

Predictably, Soviet leaders did not mention President Nixon's Middle East tour in their Supreme Soviet election speeches. Aside from a broad hint by Brezhnev that the USSR might be entertaining the idea of resuming diplomatic relations with Israel in his own election speech, the Soviet top leadership confined Middle East references to standard formulations. Meager Soviet comment on the Arab-Israeli issue generally has also continued the same tack: Without mentioning the President's tour, Moscow has complained about "fabrications" in Western newspapers regarding Arab-Soviet relations and has continued to portray the Soviet Union as Middle East peacemaker.

MOSCOW COMMENT The PRAVDA review on the 16th noted that the Arabs had rightly regarded the United States as "the accomplice of the Israeli aggressors," but that the new international climate provided an opportunity for a change in the nature of U.S.-Arab relations. Obliquely suggesting Moscow's misgivings over the implications of this change, PRAVDA ascribed to "cold war advocates" a desire to interpret the President's trip "in their own way and use it for a campaign aimed at undermining Arab-Soviet friendship." The paper claimed that the Arabs themselves were rebuffing such attempts, and cited a Beirut paper as stressing that developing relations with the United States should not supplant the "historical friendship" with the Soviet Union. The PRAVDA review displayed sensitivity over what it described as "rightwing press" assertions that U.S. policy would lead to elimination of the USSR's influence in the Middle East. Replying to "Western observers" who were displaying enthusiasm for "'Americanization' of the Middle East," PRAVDA recalled Secretary

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Kissinger's assurance in his 6 June news conference that the United States had neither the intention nor the capability to eliminate Soviet influence from the region.

The Radio Peace and Progress commentary in Arabic on the 18th saw the U.S. affirmation of readiness to provide Israel with weapons on a long-term basis and supply "substantial" economic assistance as encouragement to the Israelis to maintain their occupation of Arab territory. While the broadcast cautioned against alleged U.S. and Israeli efforts to postpone resumption of the Geneva conference in order that they might deal with the Arab states separately, it did acknowledge that "certain changes" had occurred in the United States' Mideast policy which gave the Arabs "an opportunity to alter their relations with America." It ascribed much of the credit for these changes to the Soviet Union.

COVERAGE OF VISIT In limited reports on the various speeches made during the trip, Moscow has tended to play up statements that coincide with its own propaganda positions on the Middle East problem. Thus, an Arabic-language broadcast on the 14th cited Egyptian President as-Sadat as declaring that disengagement was only a step toward solving the issue on the basis of Security Council resolutions. Syrian President al-Asad was similarly quoted by TASS on the 16th as calling disengagement a first step toward a firm peace. The TASS account noted President Nixon's remark that the first steps already taken were only a beginning, and the task was now to advance step by step toward a just and lasting peace. TASS also cited the President as saying the United States understood Syria's concern over the Palestinian question.

In reporting the U.S.-Egyptian statement of principles, TASS on the 14th made no mention of the fact that the document called for a peace settlement that would take into account the "legitimate interests of all the peoples of the Middle East, including the Palestinian people." The account did note that the statement declared peace could only be attained through negotiations within the framework of the Geneva peace conference. TASS also reported that the United States and Egypt would begin negotiating an agreement on nuclear energy, and that a provisional agreement would be concluded this month on delivery of U.S. nuclear fuel to Egypt.

A 17 June TASS report on the U.S.-Israeli statement also noted that the two countries would sign an agreement on cooperation in nuclear energy and U.S. delivery of nuclear fuel to Israel, and that a

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temporary agreement on the sale of such fuel would be signed this month. The TASS account focused on the matter of aid, reporting that the President reaffirmed that military deliveries would be continued on a long-term basis and that the United States would give "substantial economic 'aid'" to cover Israel's expenses in maintaining its military potential.

TASS on the 16th reported without comment the announcement on the resumption of U.S.-Syrian relations. TASS reports on the U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-Jordanian statements noted the President's invitations to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and King Husayn to visit the United States, but the invitation to President as-Sadat was not mentioned in TASS' report on the U.S.-Egyptian statement. Other than a two-sentence report on the President's arrival in Jiddah, the visit to Saudi Arabia was ignored.

BREZHNEV ON MIDEAST In a possible hint of Soviet readiness to resume diplomatic relations with Israel, Brezhnev in his 14 June Supreme Soviet election speech declared that "progress" toward a settlement would create conditions for the development of Soviet relations with "all" countries of the region. This is by far the broadest hint of this nature to be made by any Soviet leader since the October war.* Heretofore, the only remarks on this subject had been limited to the assertion that the Soviet Union did not oppose Israel as such but only its policies. Gromyko took this position in his 21 December 1973 address to the opening session of the Geneva conference. He added that "the situation may change when Israel will confirm with deeds its readiness to accept an honest and mutually acceptable settlement." Kosygin had indicated much the same position when questioned at a Stockholm press conference on 5 April last year about resumption of Soviet-Israeli relations. According to NEW TIMES (No. 15, 13 April 1973), Kosygin said the Soviet Union believed the state of Israel had a right to exist, "but this does not mean that we can come to terms with its aggression."

On other Mideast issues, Brezhnev referred approvingly to the Sinai and Golan disengagement agreements, but in keeping with recent Soviet comment described them as "only the first steps." He declared that examination of the "main questions" at the Geneva peace conference would be an "extremely complicated task" which would

* Israeli Foreign Minister Alon was reported by Jerusalem radio on 19 June as saying he saw no change in the USSR's Middle East policy and that relations with the Soviet Union "are as bad as they have ever been since diplomatic relations were broken."

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require the joint efforts of the "states" taking part in the conference. Although he did not refer directly to Palestinian representation, his use of the word "states" rather than parties or participants could be taken as an indication that Moscow might be inclining toward Palestinian inclusion under the auspices of the Jordanian delegation. The Soviet Union has not spelled out its position on this point; it is on record only as endorsing an undefined Palestinian presence at Geneva. It is equally possible that Moscow is still undecided on the best way of handling Palestinian representation as long as the concerned Arab states and the Palestinians have not thrashed this out among themselves.

OTHER SOVIET LEADERS Remarks on the Middle East problem in election speeches by other Soviet leaders reiterated standard themes. Podgorny on the 13th said only that despite the fact that a start had been made on talks for a political settlement, "a highly complex situation" still prevailed in the region. Kosygin on the 12th noted that the conflict was shifting to the arena of political settlement, and declared that the "forthcoming continuation" of the Geneva conference must lead to a solution of the "main problems"--Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, insuring the lawful rights of the Palestinians, and guaranteeing the security of all states of the region.

Gromyko, speaking in Minsk on the 10th, insisted that disengagement was only the first step toward a settlement and the first step in the "liberation of Arab lands." He predicted that the struggle for a genuine settlement within the Geneva framework would be a difficult one. Unlike the other Soviet leaders, Gromyko repeated previous Soviet admonitions against partial measures: "One cannot allow just half measures to which Israel and its protectors would like to restrict themselves," he declared, adding that Israel had yet to furnish proof of its readiness to turn from a "policy of aggression" to a policy of peace.

EAST EUROPE ALLIES SEE UNCHANGED U.S. AIMS, DEFEND KISSINGER

With varying degrees of intensity, scattered comment from Moscow's orthodox East European allies generally argued that President Nixon's tour did not signify any basic change in "imperialist" aims in the Middle East, but was undertaken because of "realistic" U.S. awareness of the new Arab clout stemming from successes in the October war and the oil embargo. These countries' commentators saw a connection between the trip and the President's Watergate-related

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difficulties at home, reiterating their standard charge that the President's critics are motivated mainly by opposition to detente. Such motives were blamed by Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the attacks on Secretary Kissinger, in the wake of the Secretary's Salzburg press conference. The orthodox East European comment also duly included tributes to the Mideast role of the Soviet Union, under Brezhnev's leadership.

U.S. POLICY Czechoslovakia's Bratislava PRAVDA on 13 June, viewing the President's trip as "unquestionably the high point of a demonstration of the 'new' U.S. policy" in the Middle East, charged at the same time that the United States and "other imperialist forces" aimed, as before, at capitalist exploitation and undermining of progressive forces in the area. Dominant in U.S. thinking, the commentary added, was the realization that oil is found in the Arab countries, not in Israel. Another Bratislava paper, SMENA, declared on the 19th that the results of the President's visit to Israel confirmed that there were "no essential changes" in U.S. policy toward the Arabs or its political, financial, and military support to Israel. On the 15th, a dispatch from RUDE PRAVO's Washington correspondent predicted that while the President would be welcomed throughout his tour, he would be repeatedly confronted with the "decisive," still unsolved Palestinian problem, first raised by President as-Sadat during the Cairo visit. The dispatch paid tribute to the results of Moscow's "patient and unostentatious diplomacy" in persuading the Arabs to accept a UN settlement. The East Berlin domestic service on the 18th grudgingly praised the President for pressing Israel into a "change of course" toward a peaceful solution. The commentary doubted at the same time whether the President's influence could be "decisive" on this score.

While Prague, Sofia, and East Berlin took a largely cynical view regarding allegedly unchanged U.S. pro-Israeli policy, Poland and Hungary were relatively muted on this score. Thus, ZYCIE WARSZAWY on the 12th was favorable in tone in attributing two basic aims to the President's trip: first, to convince the Arabs through aid agreements that the present, more evenhanded U.S. policy represented "a durable change"; and second, to show Moscow, on the eve of the President's trip there, his readiness to cooperate with the USSR in restoring peace to the area. The paper noted in this connection that President Nixon "is known as a consistent advocate of detente and coexistence." And the Budapest daily MAGYAR NEMZET, also on the 12th, praised the timing of the trip--after the troop disengagement agreements and before the next phase of the Geneva negotiations and the Moscow summit--and predicted that a just settlement could be

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achieved "if all sides display good will." An 18 June commentary on Budapest domestic TV, while characterizing current U.S. Mideast policy as "a double game," assessed the overall results of the tour as "fruitful" and "successful" with regard to detente and to the President's standing at home.

WATERGATE In pointing to domestic motivations for the President's trip, Bratislava PRAVDA on the 12th stressed that he "is under the furious pressures of the adversaries of detente, and this is reflected in the course of the Watergate affair" and the Congressional impeachment deliberations. In favorable tones, the commentary noted that the Middle East trip could divert attention from these domestic matters and direct it toward the Nixon Administration's efforts to complete the transition from a policy of confrontation to one of negotiation. In a similar vein, a talk on the Budapest domestic radio on the 10th remarked that "while the wrangling over the raising of impeachment charges is in progress in Congress and in other forums, the American President is obviously concentrating his efforts on international diplomacy." And the 12 June ZYCIE WARSZAWY also gave the President the benefit of the doubt in commenting that "it would be a considerable simplification to place this trip, as some commentators are doing, merely in the context of the political showdown between the White House and Congress," adding that "its scope and significance reach far beyond Washington."

KISSINGER The Hungarians, followed by Czechoslovakia and Poland, promptly denounced the charges against Secretary Kissinger which occasioned his threat to resign at his 11 June press conference in Salzburg. Early the next day the Budapest radio carried a comment from its New York correspondent to the effect that, in the U.S. domestic controversy, "the attack is now directed, through the person of the Secretary of State, against the main foreign policy line of the Nixon Administration." A Budapest TV commentary the same day predicted that the possibility of Kissinger's resignation would cast a shadow over the President's talks with both Arab and Israeli leaders. This talk, as well as the government paper MAGYAR HIRLAP the next day, publicized favorable comments on Kissinger by Senator Fulbright and other Congressional leaders.

Subsequent attacks on the Secretary's critics by Polish media culminated in a 16 June Broniarek commentary in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU. Entitled "Rumors and Insinuations," the article construed the charges against Kissinger as a warning from pro-Israeli elements to the Secretary and President Nixon that they should not lose sight of Israel's interests during negotiations

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with the Arabs. The article also characterized the charges as "a new stage (since H. Kissinger has been spared up to now)" of the alleged campaign by U.S. politicians, such as Senator Jackson, against U.S.-Soviet detente.

A Washington correspondent's dispatch published in Prague's RUDE PRAVO on the 14th, while cautioning that speculation regarding Kissinger's guilt or innocence would be premature, denounced the raising of "old charges" against the Secretary at this juncture--at the start of the President's Mideast trip and before the Moscow summit. Charging that the Washington POST played "a considerable role in the anti-Kissinger campaign," the dispatch added that "once it proved impossible to wreck Nixon's trip to Moscow, Kissinger was placed on the firing line."

BUCHAREST, BELGRADE, TIRANA GIVE VARYING TREATMENT OF TOUR

A sizeable volume of Yugoslav comment was uniformly favorable both with regard to the President's tour and to Secretary Kissinger, while the Romanians have thus far refrained from commenting on the trip, limiting their coverage to brief, factual reports. Albanian comment, predictably hostile to the President and Kissinger, viewed the tour as symbolizing both conflict and "collusion" between Moscow and Washington.

ROMANIA As the only East European country that has relations with Israel, Romania was virtually silent about the trip, limiting its coverage to terse reports. Refraining from comment, it avoided having to join or break with the other Warsaw Pact countries in their praise of the Soviet Union's role in the Middle East situation. The party daily SCINTEIA noted in a Cairo dispatch on the 12th that the "normalization" of U.S.-Egyptian relations was taking place "in the framework of important developments which occurred in the Mideast situation, that is, the Geneva conference and the disengagement on the Sinai and Golan fronts." However, it avoided any reference to either the U.S. or Soviet mediating roles. This contrasted with a 1 June SCINTEIA article on the Syrian-Israeli disengagement, in which Gromyko and the Soviet Union were given praise equal to that for Kissinger and the United States.

YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade media before and during the trip took a positive view of the President's initiative in visiting the Mideast and expressed optimism that the visit would serve

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useful purposes. Belgrade generally displayed little concern that the visit might create problems in U.S.-Soviet or Arab-Soviet relations.

Describing the visit as "undoubtedly useful," BORBA on the 11th viewed it as necessary to "disclose the depth and complexity" of the Mideast crisis, but noted that its "full significance" would be measured by progress achieved in settling the crisis. Belgrade media repeatedly emphasized that the crisis could not be settled without resolving the Palestinian question, and on the 15th a TANJUG commentary singled out as the "greatest result" of the visit up to that time the U.S.-Egyptian statement recognizing the "interests" of the Palestinians. TANJUG pointed out, however, the distinction between "interests" and "a real act of granting recognition to the national rights of the people of Palestine," which "is still rejected in practice." Even prior to the signing of the communique, Belgrade radio commentator Milutin Milenkovic on the 12th pointed out Arab satisfaction with the trend in U.S. relations, citing the opinion of unnamed Arab sources that the United States had "essentially changed its position" on the Mideast situation and was adopting "an objective, and even a neutral, mediating" role between the Arabs and Israelis. Milenkovic qualified these observations by noting that "no breaking up of the real alliance" with Israel had occurred.

Yugoslav comment on Moscow's attitude toward the trip shifted somewhat following the tumultuous welcome given the President in Egypt. A Teslic BORBA commentary on the 11th, the day before his arrival, maintained that the visit was "welcomed" not only by the Arabs and the Israelis but also by the Soviet Union, which saw the tour as a "component and indispensable part of joint American-Soviet efforts to reach a just solution of the crisis through negotiations in Geneva." The Egyptians' enthusiastic welcome for Nixon, however, seemed to raise questions about possible Soviet irritation. On the 17th Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic described the Cairo treatment as an "embarrassing episode" which, he said, would be "quickly forgotten, if for no other reason than because it is not in the interest of the United States to upset relations with Moscow." Claiming that Washington-Moscow relations remained not only good "but even better," Sundic predicted that Cairo would do all in its power to "iron out its difficulties with Moscow as soon as possible."

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Comment on Kissinger's Salzburg press conference was generally sympathetic. On the day after the news conference TANJUG cited Arab press comment that allegations against Kissinger were the result of a "Zionist conspiracy" aimed at undermining the visit, and Belgrade radio commentator Kosta Timotijevic forecast that Kissinger "has all the chances to survive politically both the present and who knows how many future presidents."

ALBANIA Tirana comment emphasized that the United States had not abandoned its close ties with Israel and that President Nixon was aiming at strengthening Washington's "imperialist" influence in the Arab countries at the expense of Moscow, even though the two big powers continued to operate in "collusion" against the Arabs. On the opening day of the trip the Tirana domestic radio in an unattributed commentary outlined the President's three main objectives: to present U.S. "imperialism" as "peaceloving" and to gain "political capital at home"; to erase the image in Arab minds of the United States as "pro-Israeli, warmongering and profoundly hostile" to the Arabs; and to "undermine" Moscow's position, just as Moscow was trying to do to Washington. The Washington-Moscow rivalry, however, was viewed as tempered by an "understanding" between the two that fundamental Mideast problems should remain unsettled so that the two superpowers could emerge in the future in the role of "arbiters of the fate of the Arab peoples under the guise of so-called special responsibilities" in the Mideast.

The party daily ZERI I POPULLIT, in an article carried in full by ATA on the 13th, contended that President Nixon was practically forced to visit the Arab states in order to seek a "disengagement" between them and the United States once he had seen the "dark perspective" both for the United States and Israel resulting from Arab successes in the October war, the oil embargo, and rising public opinion in favor of the Arabs. The daily warned the Arabs to beware of "vain promises for peace" and "various diplomatic maneuvers."

Picking up American press reports on Kissinger's alleged wire-tapping role, Tirana portrayed the allegations as facts. In an unattributed article titled "Kissinger--Participant in the Water-gate Scandal," ZERI I POPULLIT on the 11th cited the Washington STAR-NEWS as reporting that "he had failed to speak the truth" in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last September. Although Kissinger's Salzburg press conference was ignored, ATA on the 18th interpreted the Mideast visit as designed to save both Nixon's and Kissinger's "skins."

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SOVIET ELECTION SPEECHES

POLITBURO SHOWS CONFIDENCE ABOUT FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRENDS

In the current round of electioneering for the USSR Supreme Soviet, begun on 18 April and completed on 16 June, Soviet leaders have sought to project a public image of confidence about the course of world affairs. Following the pattern of previous elections, most of the leaders' speeches were made at republic or regional gatherings and were carried in full by local media and reported in abbreviated summaries in the central press. The speeches in Moscow by the CPSU Politburo troika--Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin--received the most extensive national publicity, with Brezhnev's climactic election speech the only one to be carried in full by the central press and on all domestic radio channels. The version of Kosygin's remarks which appeared in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, however, was slightly longer than Brezhnev's speech, which in turn was longer than Podgorny's.

In the distribution of plaudits, Brezhnev was praised lavishly not only by members of his own political entourage but also by leaders of unmistakably independent stature. The conspicuous display of support for Brezhnev's leadership, which has been subjected to increasingly heavy veiled criticism since mid-October of last year,* suggests that the praise may be essentially an exercise in public relations designed to project an image of "monolithic unity" on the eve of President Nixon's visit to Moscow.

TROIKA ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS Kosygin staked out a position as the most consistent advocate of international cooperation within the leadership in his remarks carried live on Moscow domestic radio on 12 June. Podgorny, on the other hand, adopted the stance of a more cautious supporter of detente in his 13 June speech, emphasizing still urgent international problems and paying greater deference to the special role of Soviet might and initiative in compelling Western leaders to recognize the futility of a policy of confrontation toward the Soviet Union. In this respect, the two leaders seemed to be addressing constituencies at different ends of the political spectrum.

* For background on leadership developments, see the TRENDS of 15 May 1974, page 15, 30 May 1974, pages 23-37, and 12 June 1974, pages 29-30, and the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT OF 29 May 1974, "The Struggle for Change in the Soviet Social Sciences."

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Brezhnev, in closing out the round of speeches on the 14th in a live broadcast from the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses, avoided both extremes in giving the most detailed exposition of Soviet foreign policy. Brezhnev dwelt on Soviet detente initiatives, breaking new ground in some areas, while at the same time paying homage to Soviet defense might and eschewing the more outspokenly internationalist orientation of Kosygin. All three leaders, as well as virtually all others speaking during the election campaign, reaffirmed the recent Soviet priorities in world affairs, combining a recognition of the decisive role of U.S.-Soviet relations in furthering the aims of Soviet detente diplomacy with condemnation of Peking for its alliance with the most reactionary elements of "imperialism."

Kosygin returned repeatedly to the theme of international interdependence, arguing that the balance of power and the level of armaments made detente and international cooperation the only feasible solution to international disputes. What was urgently needed, he maintained, was "a new system of international relations which corresponds to the interests not of just one state or a narrow group but of all mankind." Notably, most of these remarks were dropped from the slightly abridged version of his speech which appeared in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA. Kosygin pointed to favorable developments in Vietnam and the Middle East and the "substantial progress" since the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971 in eliminating "hotbeds" of international conflict. He noted that Washington and Moscow had agreed to "coordinate" their foreign policies in the interests of peace.

Podgornyy, avoiding the internationalist rhetoric of Kosygin, focused instead on the role of Soviet might and the changing world balance of power in effectuating the "turnabout" from confrontation to detente. His assessment of the state of the world also contrasted with that of Kosygin. According to Podgornyy, detente was gaining strength, but because it was only in its initial stages, it was "hard to say" how long the rest of the trip would take. Shelepin and Ponomarev had anticipated Podgornyy in pointing out that detente was only in its first stages. Podgornyy pointed to the "highly complex" situation in the Middle East and the continuing struggles in Vietnam and Cambodia as trouble spots threatening "the outbreak of new armed conflicts." His emphasis on the pitfalls in the international situation was underscored by his warning about the "increasing nuclear missile potential" of China. Only Grechko, among the top Soviet leaders, has previously evinced similar concern, in remarks made last January in an awards speech in Kazan that were deleted from the abbreviated summary published in the central press.

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Brezhnev seemed closer to Kosygin than to Podgorny in his optimistic account of Soviet detente diplomacy, his portrayal of the "obvious progress" in U.S.-Soviet relations, and his closing remark that the change of government in Portugal, not that in Chile, represented the prevailing trend in world affairs. Like Kosygin, Brezhnev saw progress in Vietnam and the Middle East and concluded that the 24th Congress peace program plank on eliminating "hotbeds" of conflict was being successfully fulfilled. Brezhnev placed particular importance on reaching further agreements with the United States on arms limitation in announcing readiness to sign a ban on underground nuclear tests and reach agreement on limiting the development of new types of weapons. He dismissed "pessimistic assessments" in the foreign press about the President's upcoming visit.

But like Podgorny, Brezhnev made only passing reference to the theme of international interdependence. While acknowledging with Kosygin the foreign policy role of Soviet defense might, Brezhnev went on to note that because of a "failure to halt the arms race," Moscow must continue to strengthen its defense might. At the same time, Brezhnev drew from arguments by spokesmen from Moscow's prestigious foreign policy institutes in maintaining that national security was not synonymous with military might. In a remark that seemed clearly aimed at those opposed to limitations on the Soviet strategic arsenal, Brezhnev played down the risk in limiting or reducing Soviet arms, arguing that the greater danger lay in continuing the arms race.

OTHER LEADERS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS KGB chief Andropov, speaking in Stupino, near Moscow, on 5 June presented one of the strongest cases for detente, arguing at length that it is the "logic of life" and that despite any "turns and zigzags," Western leaders will pursue detente because they realize it is "the only possible and necessary basis for relations between states with opposing systems." He especially praised summit meetings and declared that Moscow is determined to make the talks with the President productive.

Foreign Minister Gromyko, speaking in Minsk on 10 June, also praised summitry and the benefits of improved U.S.-Soviet relations, declaring that the imminent summit talks "must be no less important than the previous ones." Shelepin, speaking in Leningrad on 3 June, cited Lenin on the value of peaceful coexistence in facilitating domestic development. He welcomed the dampening of "hotbeds of dangerous confrontation and war," the movement toward a Middle East settlement, "the historic

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Soviet-American agreements," especially on avoiding nuclear war, and the prospects for long-term international economic relations. Kirilenko, speaking in Sverdlovsk on 11 June, stressed the importance of the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations and the efforts to end the arms race. He lauded the productiveness of past summitry.

Grishin and Pelshe and Shcherbitskiy also roundly praised the successes of Soviet detente diplomacy in brief remarks on foreign affairs, while Shcherbitskiy praised in particular improved U.S.-Soviet relations. Ponomarev stressed the "extremely important" results of detente, but he went on to criticize increased military spending in the West. Shelepin and Gromyko did the same, adding that it is necessary to continue strengthening the Soviet armed forces even while pursuing detente.

Suslov, speaking in Leningrad on 11 June, blended caution with his optimism about world affairs. While praising the "outstanding successes" of Soviet policy and noting "a certain lessening of the military danger," he pointed to the "huge" military spending in the West and the creation of "new types of weapons of annihilation." Rejecting "bourgeois-apologetic" and "revisionist" arguments that capitalism is changing its nature, he recalled the "lessons of the past" that the Soviet Union should do everything to strengthen its defense so as not to be caught unprepared. The version of Suslov's speech published in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA included the observation that detente is "based precisely" on the change in the world balance of power in favor of socialism. Suslov was also reported to have declared that the successes of Soviet detente diplomacy "create opportunities for further peaceful offensive and open more favorable prospects for further pushing ahead by revolutionary forces"

The 8 June PRAVDA version of Mazurov's speech, delivered in Minsk the previous day, portrayed him as clearly downplaying East-West detente, as he stressed the overriding goal of "strengthening the world socialist system" and combining a "constructive" approach to foreign policy with "a firm rebuff to imperialist aggression and uncompromising struggle against the class enemy." However, the version of his speech carried in SOVIET BELORUSSIA included some favorable comments on detente as well, including statements expressing confidence that the new leaders of France and West Germany would continue to seek good relations with Moscow.

Defense Minister Grechko, not surprisingly, dwelt on the limitations of Soviet detente diplomacy. Speaking in Moscow on 4 June, he urged the Politburo to base its foreign policies not on the most probable course

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of world events but on worst possible case assumptions. Grechko noted that strengthening peace and strengthening defense are "indivisible" goals. He attributed the positive changes in the international situation to past strengthening of Soviet economic and military might and pointed out that the West was continuing to increase military preparations.*

TROIKA ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

Within the Politburo troika, Kosygin again emerged as the most forthright advocate of economic reforms tailored to the requirements of a modern industrial society and the tastes of the Soviet middle class. Stressing the complementary nature of central and local decision-making and the availability of skilled personnel at all levels of society, the premier pointedly recalled the recent "very important" decision to grant enterprises in light industry authority to determine production quotas on the basis of "direct ties" with trading agencies. This decision, he said, was motivated by the need for greater responsiveness by industry to consumer demand. In addition to allowing to work "now in progress" toward reforms in industrial management, Kosygin was lavish with praise for the achievements and potentialities of Soviet science and technology in promoting economic and social progress.

The remarks of Brezhnev and Podgornyy on domestic affairs for the most part followed conventional lines, the most notable exception being Brezhnev's references to the role of science in promoting economic progress. In particular, Brezhnev praised the great contribution made by scientists, mentioned the anniversary of the USSR Academy of Sciences and praised its "outstanding" president, M.V. Keldysh.

OTHER LEADERS ON
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

The speeches of Andropov, Kisilenko, Mazurov, Grishin, Shelepin, Shcherbitskiy, Masherov, Ustinov and Solomentsev concentrated on a broad range of economic issues, while those of Polyanskiy and Kulakov focused almost exclusively on agriculture. Andropov in particular appeared to argue for significant reforms, declaring "it would be incorrect to think that the socialist system by itself ensures us

* The TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 4-6, discusses in more detail some recent arguments of Grechko and other military leaders on the interconnection of detente and Soviet defense policy.

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all the necessary blessings." He stressed the overriding importance of "questions of raising the effectiveness of public production and the introduction into practice of the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution."

Agricultural overseer Kulakov pointed to the need to inculcate Soviet administrators with a "feeling for what is new, [to] know the fine points of modern technology, economics and organization of production, and find the most effective paths for deciding growing tasks." He cited Lenin's injunction not to be satisfied with traditional methods of managing the economy but "without fail to go further and without fail to strive for more."

Devoting much of his speech to economic modernization, Belorussian First Secretary Masherov pressed hard for a change from "archaic methods" of administration to "a modern, scientifically-based, rational system" in both production and social spheres, declaring that "without this, any other measures to speed scientific-technical progress, as they say, will not pay off or produce proper return." He stressed that economic administration now depends increasingly on computers, mathematical methods and other scientific achievements, and he encouraged ministries to experiment. These remarks were not carried in PRAVDA's abbreviated version of his speech.

Dwelling on leadership of the economy, improvement of planning and incentives, and use of scientific-technical achievements, First Deputy Premier Mazurov declared that under present conditions questions of labor productivity, return on investment and quality of production are "the main yardsticks of economic activity," rather than only questions of quantitative plan fulfillment. He praised the "skilled cadres of workers, specialists and economic leaders" and stated that the CPSU Central Committee demands "a truly party style of work, a scientific approach in all spheres of economic activity." In comments reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA but not in PRAVDA, he noted that industry is changing over to a two-three tier system of production associations and that new measures are presently being worked out to make economic levers more effective.

CPSU Secretary Demichev, in his speech as reported in the Moscow LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA of 1 June, emphasized that "the strength of our economy ensures the strength of our defense" and that the United States--the most powerful country of the capitalist world--is forced to talk to us on equal terms." Stressing the need to shift production emphasis from quantity to quality, he declared that "we must bear in mind that our products are going onto world markets

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on a broader and broader front and are competing with goods which capitalist firms produce," and that "we can and must produce goods not worse but better than in the most highly developed countries." He praised the work of the Academy of Sciences, "the 250th anniversary of which we are observing." He went on to declare that "science now has turned into a direct productive force in society" and that "its achievements facilitate speeding the growth of labor productivity, savings in working time, and raising the quality and reliability of products." Only the reference to the academy's anniversary was included in PRAVDA's version of Demichev's speech.

Ustinov, like Demichev, also praised the Academy of Sciences, while Shelepin and Pelshe limited their praise to the general achievements of Soviet science.

Suslov's comments on the economy were notable primarily for the admission that meat shortages are continuing despite the efforts to overcome them. He stated that "we still have difficulties in supplying the population with some provisions, in particular, with meat and meat products" and that "although the production of meat in 1973 increased by 1.7 million tons over 1969, some oblasts are still short of meat." This passage appeared only in the LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA version of his speech.

TREATMENT OF BREZHNEV While almost all speakers lauded Brezhnev, some--Kirilenko, Mazurov, Pelshe, Grishin, Shelepin, Solomentsev and Rashidov--were lavish or even servile in their praise. Andropov, Mazurov, Kunayev, Suslov, Podgornyy, Romanov, Rashidov and Ponomarev referred to the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev--the first such usage by Andropov, Mazurov, and Suslov. This deference by the latter three Politburo members appears to reflect different motivations from those of Brezhnev's cronies Kirilenko and Kunayev and the habitually servile Rashidov. Presumably, the more independent-minded Politburo members were determined to project an image of solidarity on the eve of the Moscow summit.

Most praise centered on Brezhnev's role in foreign rather than domestic affairs, with some--especially Kirilenko--appearing to credit foreign policy successes to Brezhnev, while others--notably Andropov--appearing to champion their own viewpoints on foreign policy and to associate Brezhnev with those views. Kirilenko praised Brezhnev's "political wisdom, organizational talent and selfless work" and his "outstanding personal contribution" to

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foreign policy, and he attributed the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations largely to the two U.S.-Soviet summit meetings. Grishin, who called Brezhnev head of the Central Committee, also stressed the "important role" in detente played by Brezhnev's visits to the United States, France, West Germany and India, "the negotiations conducted by him and the treaties and agreements signed by him." Praising Brezhnev at length, Pelshe cited Brezhnev's "huge personal contribution" to formulating and conducting foreign policy and his "tireless, fruitful activity" in this sphere. Shelepin likewise called Brezhnev an "outstanding party and state figure" and attributed "the large number of important international actions" to the "huge personal contribution" of Brezhnev. Mazurov also praised Brezhnev's "big personal contribution" to developing the economy, culture and peace. Solomentsev called Brezhnev an "outstanding" leader and praised his "huge personal contribution" to socio-economic development, peace and agriculture."

Though not lavish in praise of Brezhnev, Kosygin managed to concede Brezhnev a "great creative contribution" to foreign policy. Gromyko also noted Brezhnev's "huge" contribution, and Andropov his "tireless" work for peace and his "selflessness, wisdom and courage" in foreign affairs. Outside of calling Brezhnev head of the Politburo, Suslov, Podgornyy and Ponomarev had few compliments for Brezhnev. Least solicitous toward Brezhnev was Grechko, whose speech reflected concern about possible military cutbacks.

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EUROPE

SOVIET LEADERS CALL FOR PROGRESS AT CSCE, MBFR TALKS

In their references to the CSCE and MBFR in their pre-election speeches, Soviet leaders have combined criticisms of the West with renewed professions of confidence that the deadlocks presently affecting both conferences could be broken. Kosygin, for example, in referring to the CSCE, called on the West to undertake a "high-level" assessment of the progress to date, seemingly suggesting that an appropriate response would find a corresponding resonance in Moscow and open the way to a successful conclusion of the second stage. Brezhnev, in referring to MBFR, avoided the usual criticism of the West for allegedly seeking one-sided advantages and professed the Soviet Union's willingness to enter into "partial measures." In the meantime, Soviet comment has begun to link the prospects for progress with the upcoming Presidential visit to Moscow, suggesting that the time is appropriate for a final push to reach agreement.

CSCE In his election speech on the 12th, Kosygin said that "a great deal" had been accomplished but that "along with the positive results some dark sides have emerged." Observing that the conference "cannot adopt decisions which would contradict the legitimate interests of its participants or would signify interference in their internal affairs," he went on to invite the West to undertake a serious assessment of the current situation. He said:

We hold that the time has come when every state participating in the conference should assess at a high political level the results of the work done so far at the conference and adopt responsible decisions that would open the road for completion of the European conference

The weekly Moscow radio international observers' roundtable on the 16th echoed this proposal, saying that "the time has come" for conference participants "to examine at a responsible level exactly where the diplomats in Geneva have now moved and to adopt decisions that will pave the way toward concluding efforts."

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Brezhnev, in his speech on the 14th, also struck a conciliatory tone, refraining from any charge that the West was attempting to interfere in Soviet domestic affairs. But he did assert that delegations of "some states" were introducing proposals "which they know are unacceptable and have no relation at all to the matter at stake." He then asked rhetorically whether those who were "pursuing tactics of delay and procrastination" could propose an "alternative" to a successful conclusion of the conference. While thus hinting at the possibility that agreement might be blocked, he expressed confidence that "satisfactory" decisions, "useful to all," could be found, providing that all "retain a sense of reality" and allow themselves to be guided by "concern for the peaceful future of Europe." He repeated his call that the concluding stage of the conference should be attended by "politicians of the very top level," but remained silent on the timing of the proposed summit.

The least conciliatory in tone of the leaders' speeches was that of Foreign Minister Gromyko in Minsk on the 10th. After noting that "a great deal of work useful to all" had been accomplished, Gromyko asserted that "there are continuing attempts to place various obstacles" in the path of the conference. He went on to declare that "we resolutely condemn such attempts." It may be significant that this passage was omitted in the TASS, central press, and Moscow radio summaries of the speech; the local Minsk radio carried the speech live. Podgorny on the 13th, although not explicitly mentioning CSCE, was also critical of the West. "In exchange for detente," he said, "some Western politicians are vainly counting on squeezing out for themselves unilateral military advantages, or trying to win from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries changes in their domestic order according to the recipes of bourgeois democracy."

MBFR Although little of substance regarding the force reduction talks was mentioned in the election speeches, two significant statements were made by Ponomarev and Brezhnev. Ponomarev, speaking on the 10th, in his brief passage on CSCE and MBFR made the most direct public linkage of the conference to the force reduction talks yet made by an elite-level spokesman. He stated that "positive results of the all-European conference would also give impetus to the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in central Europe." The linkage of progress at Vienna to a successful conclusion at Geneva has been all but ignored in routine Soviet comment, appearing only from time to time but never in the blunt language that Ponomarev used.

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Brezhnev's passage on MBFR included a hint that the Soviet Union would possibly agree to limited, partial measures as a first step in the force reduction negotiations. After observing that it is difficult to achieve the "great goal" of total disarmament, he went on to say:

We are willing to enter into partial measures to limit and reduce arms. This determines particularly our position at the talks on reducing armed forces and arms in central Europe. We consider that there is a possibility in the near future to achieve here the first concrete results--given, of course, good will on the part of all parties to the negotiations.

Brezhnev omitted any time element in his speculation on the possibility of an early agreement. The standard Moscow line since Brezhnev first introduced the general outline of the Soviet position at MBFR in his speech at the World Peace Congress in October 1973 has been that steps could be taken as early as 1975, and the Soviet formal proposal in Vienna in November proposed the first initial cut for 1975. It is also notable that Brezhnev avoided any criticism of the West for allegedly trying to achieve a one-sided advantage at the expense of the Warsaw Pact. This omission reinforces the impression that his remarks may herald a Soviet agreement to accept an initial partial reduction measure limited to U.S. and Soviet ground troops only. This would be in line with the idea of a symbolic cut aimed at getting the talks off dead center, which East European spokesmen have recently stressed.

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

MOSCOW PUBLICIZES STRONG CRITICISM OF JCP POLICIES

An article in the May 1974 issue of the CPSU Central Committee monthly journal PARTY LIFE, written by Argentine CP leader A. Fava, contains the first authoritative Moscow comment on the November 1973 Japanese Communist Party Congress. The piece, an abridgement of an article published in the Argentine CP theoretical journal, expresses "profound disagreement" with JCP positions. In November 1973 PRAVDA had carried brief summaries of the congress proceedings, but had withheld comment other than noting that the JCP had arbitrarily interpreted Soviet foreign policy and made an "unfounded" demand for the return of several islands held by the Soviet Union since World War II.

Fava concentrated his fire on three major areas of disagreement: Soviet detente with the United States, attitudes toward the international communist movement, and the JCP's call for the return of the northern islands. Demonstrating continued Soviet sensitivity to the charge that it is snuggling up to American imperialism at the expense of smaller socialist states, the article took pains to refute JCP charges that normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations aided U.S. efforts in Vietnam. The article also criticized the JCP policy of equating Soviet and Chinese efforts to normalize relations with the United States and for questioning steps toward peaceful coexistence.*

The article also charged that the JCP, which opposes the convening of a new world party conference, had attempted to "counterpose" fraternal parties. JCP calls for restoration of communist unity at its congress were dismissed by Fava as in fact "an appeal for the creation of a special grouping" and an attempt by the JCP to "legalize the formation of isolated groupings of individual parties." In this conjunction, the article recalled that the JCP had selectively invited delegations to its congress, excluding, among others, the Soviets and Mongolians.

* The article is similar to a February editorial in PARTY LIFE which ostensibly attacked the views of a Spanish CP official, but which also represented a comprehensive statement of Soviet views on detente and the international communist movements. See the TRENDS of 20 March 1974, pages 9-10.

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The Fava article saved its most biting criticism for the JCP stand on the northern territories issue. It called the JCP demand that the Soviet Union return the islands "unprecedented" in the history of the international communist movement. Further, it charged the JCP leadership with assisting Japan's "revanchist" forces and, worse still, with doing "great harm" to Japan's "workers and democratic movement."

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INDOCHINA

PRG MEMORANDUM DENOUNCES 'CONTINUED' U.S. VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT

The PRG Foreign Ministry has issued a 15 June memorandum on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the 13 June 1973 joint communique following the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Paris talks, "denouncing the continued U.S. military involvement and interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam." Although reported to have been sent to the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Hungary, Britain, France, Indonesia, and Iran as participants in the Paris international conference on Vietnam or as members of the International Commission for Control and Supervision, as well as to the UN Secretary General, it was not said to have been addressed to the United States or the GVN. Similar PRG documents sent to the Paris conferees in April and August 1973 had included the United States and Saigon as recipients, but more recent ones have not.*

Initial DRV endorsement of the memorandum came in a Hanoi radio commentary of the 19th pegged primarily to dissatisfaction with U.S. and Saigon actions, as revealed at the recently resumed Joint Military Commission (JMC) talks. This same commentary also offered Hanoi's first reaction to an 18 June statement issued by the U.S. embassy in Saigon, charging that it contained "shopworn slanderous allegations" that "distort the truth and distort the cause of the current tense situation in South Vietnam."

Transmitted by VNA on 18 June, the lengthy PRG memorandum reiterated long-standing communist charges that "more than 25,000 U.S. military personnel in civilian guise" are directing and commanding Saigon's military operations and that "many high-ranking U.S. military and intelligence personalities" have come to South Vietnam to "devise plans, supervise, and urge" Nguyen Van Thieu to step up the war. In its condemnation of the United States for "illegal introduction" of war materiel into South Vietnam, the memorandum repeated the now routine allegation that F-5E aircraft recently provided to the GVN have been "manned by U.S. pilots to take part in the operations of the Saigon army."

* For background on these previous notes and memoranda, see the TRENDS for 6 March 1974, pages 11-12, the TRENDS for 18 April 1973, pages 1-3, and the TRENDS for 11 October 1973, pages 12-14.

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The memorandum charged that "authoritative circles" in the U.S. Government have made "extremely cynical and deceptive allegations" in an attempt to justify U.S. "involvement and interference" in South Vietnam. To back up these accusations, the memorandum quoted Secretary Schlesinger as claiming on 21 May that the United States was "naturally committed" to assist South Vietnam and cited recent Kissinger remarks that the United States was "morally and politically, if not juridically committed" and that the U.S. obligation to South Vietnam stems from its having been "long and deeply involved" there. Construing these remarks as a U.S. attempt to legalize its South Vietnam "military involvement," the memorandum argued that the United States was now using the Paris agreement as a "new political and juridical basis to prolong its commitments" to Saigon, and it recited in some detail the U.S. obligation and responsibility under the Paris agreement to "respect the independence and sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Vietnam. Declaring that the signing of the Paris agreement was the "only new commitment" the United States has made with regard to South Vietnam, the memorandum asserted that the Paris agreement constituted a "natural negation of any commitments the United States has made so far to the various groups of its henchmen in South Vietnam."

Uncharacteristically, the memorandum devoted relatively scant attention to condemning the Saigon administration. Its two major complaints against the GVN stemmed from it having "arrogantly rejected" the PRG's 22 March six-point proposal for achieving "peace and national concord" in the South and its actions that allegedly brought about the recent deadlock in negotiations at La Celle-Saint-Cloud and at the JMC talks.

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HANOI PRESSES DRIVE TO IMPROVE LABOR PRODUCTIVITY, MANAGEMENT

In the wake of the Third Congress of the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions (VFTU) this February, Hanoi has launched an emulation drive enlisting the trade union organization in overcoming long-standing problems of low productivity and poor economic management. The emulation movement--promoting "productive labor to build socialism with industry and thrift"--bears some resemblance to past movements but gives a greater role to the trade unions than did the last previous such campaign, which was launched in early 1970 and continued through the beginning of 1974.

Hanoi's continuing preoccupation with improving labor productivity reflects North Vietnam's very real and severe problems in labor management, problems graphically outlined, for example, in an article in the April issue of the party theoretical journal HOC TAP by Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission* Che Viet Tan:

The labor productivity of our economic sectors generally remains low, in some cases even tens of times lower than that in developed industrial countries. Due to the aftermaths of war and shortcomings in economic management, the labor productivity of a number of sectors recently dropped further, in some cases down to only 50-70 percent of prewar levels.

Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan and other speakers at the February trade union congress addressed themselves to these problems and anticipated the launching of the emulation movement. Le Duan asserted that the "number one task of the trade unions today is to launch an enthusiastic revolutionary movement of workers and civil servants emulating one another in productive labor, boosting labor productivity and practicing thrift, and successfully implementing the resolution adopted by the 22d Plenum of the VWP Central Committee."**

* Che Viet Tan has long been a member of the State Planning Commission, but the first known reference to him as a vice chairman was in the 10 April 1974 NHAN DAN. A report in an August 1970 journal, CONG TAC KE HOACH (THE PLANNING TASK), stated that Tan was in charge of salaried labor planning.

** Le Duan's 11 February speech to the congress is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 February 1974, pages 20-22.

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Hanoi first publicized the new labor emulation campaign on 27 March, when North Vietnamese media revealed that the DRV Council of Ministers and the Trade Union Federation Presidium had "recently" issued a joint resolution to launch an emulation movement for productive labor to build socialism with industry and thrift. Later propaganda identified the joint resolution as "Resolution No. 46" but did not publicize its text or report the date it was adopted. A speech by VFTU leader Hoang Quoc Viet, published in the trade union paper LAO DONG on 3 April, revealed that the VFTU Central Committee had met from 26 through 28 March to study the joint resolution and initiated a resolution guiding trade union echelons in the emulation movement.

The VFTU Central Committee resolution, published in the 17 April issue of LAO DONG and summarized by Hanoi radio 10 days later, offered detailed guidance on conducting the movement. In particular, it listed six measures to develop and organize the movement: Education of workers and civil servants in the new tasks; organization of conferences at lower levels to discuss state plan fulfillment, to participate in enterprise management, and to prepare to sign collective contracts; motivation of workers and cadres to make emulation pledges and to overfulfill plan goals; consolidation and expansion of "socialist teams and units" as the nuclei for the movement; implementation of the state's award system and policies; and solution of livelihood problems among workers and civil servants in coordination with state agencies.

VFTU-STATE RELATIONS

The labor emulation movement initiated in 1970 was launched by a resolution of the Council of Ministers,* not by a joint resolution with the VFTU as was the case this year. Some recent Hanoi propaganda has called attention to the need to increase the trade unions' stature and responsibility, and the issuance of the "joint" resolution seems to be a deliberate step serving this objective.

Hoang Quoc Viet touched upon this point in his speech carried in the 3 April LAO DONG. He noted that the VWP third congress in 1960 had advocated "elevating the position of the trade union" and allowing it to become a school of state and economic management and of

* The 1970 Council of Ministers resolution, No. 20-CP, was dated 20 January 1970 and publicized in February of that year. The 1970 emulation movement is discussed in FBIS Special Report No. 301, 7 August 1970, "North Vietnamese Problems and Policies as Outlined in La Duan's February 1970 Article," page 27.

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communism. He suggested that the injunctions of the congress had not always been implemented, but that the current joint resolution was aimed at doing so. Again, in a report to a VFTU conference broadcast by Hanoi on 17 May, Hoang Quoc Viet cited Le Duan as stressing the importance of building a network of correct relations among the party, state, and masses and added that: ". . . we should begin by developing correct relations between the Council of Ministers and the trade union federation."

Le Duan had noted in his trade union congress speech that a "recent" Statute on the Organization and Activities of the Council of Ministers* had "listed the major principles on the relationship between the state and trade unions." He added that:

. . . we must have as soon as possible documents of legal value defining the responsibilities and rights of trade unions in connection with their participation in economic and state management. Trade unions have the right to take part in the drafting of such documents and all other state regulations having to do with labor productivity, work conditions, and living conditions of workers and civil servants.

COLLECTIVE CONTRACTS Propaganda on the current emulation movement has suggested that the primary initial step is the signing of collective contracts between the directors and trade union committees in industrial, construction, or business units. According to the VFTU Central Committee resolution, these contracts should "clearly state the primary norms and methods to be achieved, and clearly stipulate the responsibility of the management agency, workers and employees, and trade union in achieving the production plan, protecting socialist property, implementing labor policies and systems, and improving labor and daily living conditions for workers and employees."

* These statutes on the reorganization of the Council of Ministers have not been publicized in available Hanoi media but have been referred to on other occasions in the propaganda and seem likely to have provided the framework for changes in the Council of Ministers' leadership in recent months. The head of the DRV State Legislation Commission, Tran Cong Tuong, in a series of articles in NHAN DAN from 1 through 12 April, revealed that the statute had been promulgated by the Council of Ministers on 1 November 1973.

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Hanoi media have carried several reports on progress in signing the collective contracts, and on 15 June the radio revealed that the question was discussed in detail at an 11-13 June conference called by the VFTU to review implementation of joint resolution 46. In addition to the leadership of the trade union, the radio reported that the VFTU conference was attended by Vice Premier Phan Truong Tue, who has special responsibility for industry and communications, and by "several ministers and vice ministers and representatives of various branches at the central level."

The report on the conference indicated that efforts to sign collective contracts since the adoption of the joint resolution had improved in comparison with earlier periods, but that there were also "shortcomings and weak points." It revealed the severity of these shortcomings with the acknowledgement that about 30 percent of the contracts that were concluded "contained unrealistic commitments because measures to implement them were lacking and the responsibilities of the trade unions were not clearly defined."

Collective contracts have previously played a part in North Vietnam's industrial management,* but they were not a major ingredient in the last previous labor emulation movement and have not always been successful. Past problems with collective contracts were pointed out in a 29 May Hanoi radio interview with Minister of Trade Hoang Quoc Tinh. The minister praised the results in implementing resolution 46 and noted that prior to the guidance offered by the new resolution, contracts were signed in some localities but "suffered from many shortcomings." Judging by his remarks, the former problems were much like the current ones. He noted that there had been no coordination between the signing of the contracts and the training of the employees and that, as a result, the contracts were "undemocratic, unrealistic, and ineffective" and some were too broad or impractical to implement.

* The trade union's role in signing such contracts was discussed for example, in the North Vietnamese "trade union law" adopted at the seventh session of the DRV National Assembly, Second Legislature, on 14 September 1957.

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CAMBODIAN DEVELOPMENTS DRAW MODERATE FRONT, PEKING COMMENT

While Cambodian Front propaganda routinely claims that recent student demonstrations in Phnom Penh and the Long Boret cabinet crisis are evidence of heightened contradictions within the Cambodian Government, at the same time Front media have avoided the references to an imminent insurgent military victory that marked propaganda at the start of the dry season last fall. Recent Front comment lauding the insurgents' advances during the past dry season has reflected the currently more cautious military outlook and stressed insurgent confidence that their objectives would be achieved through a protracted military struggle.

Typically, a 13 June AKI review played up the insurgents' ability to strike unexpectedly, hit enemy weak points, and gradually wear down the opposition--a shift from last fall's calls for massed attacks against Phnom Penh and other government strongholds. Less attention is also being paid to U.S. aid to Cambodia and alleged efforts to bring about a "sham peace"--issues which drew shrill complaints from the Front earlier this year.

Peking has endeavored to show solidarity with the Front, publishing an 8 June PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article supporting the Phnom Penh students and at the same time handling the United States with discretion. A 15 June PEOPLE'S DAILY article signed by Yin Chih-sheng treated the issue of the U.S. role in Cambodia more in sorrow than in anger. Highlighting the "tragedy" of American interference in Phnom Penh, it noted U.S. press reports that the Phnom Penh regime was beset with increasing problems despite extraordinary efforts to support Lon Nol by the recently appointed U.S. ambassador--whom PEOPLE'S DAILY did not name. Though acknowledging past and present U.S. assistance to Lon Nol, the article asserted confidently that the situation in Phnom Penh has nonetheless gone from "bad to worse." Drawing a lesson for the United States, it advised that the U.S. experience over the past four years has shown that "it is the Cambodian people fighting heroically, arms in hand, who determine the destiny of Cambodia, not the traitorous Lon Nol and his ilk, or the superpower on the other side of the Pacific." Suggesting that it is in the interest of the United States to accept this view and end its involvement in Cambodia, the paper added that "although the master of the Lon Nol clique admits and laments the helplessness of the United States before the situation in Cambodia, it is blind to a truth that is obvious to all, and here lies its tragedy."

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CHINA

COLLEGE ENROLLMENT BEGINS, NO NEW POLICY CHANGES INDICATED

Fukien and Kwangtung provinces have announced their annual college enrollment drives with pronouncements reflecting last year's campaign to retain cultural revolution educational reforms. That campaign had criticized those who sought to emphasize only academic criteria for admission. The formal procedures for admission this year remain "voluntary application, recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership and reexamination by the colleges concerned"--the same as before last year's reforms--but both provinces' enrollment announcements stress that political criteria receive primary emphasis in judging applicants.

Foochow radio on 8 June broadcast the first, and more detailed, discussion of enrollment procedures and requirements, noting that students must both "observe revolutionary discipline" and have the spirit of "going against the tide." Like last year, students must also have at least two years of practical work experience, and those with a poor class background but a good performance record are eligible for admission. So that the "masses" can choose applicants correctly, all educational policy directives are to be made available to them, outlining "procedures, qualifications and student quotas." Quotas are apparently complicated, with categories including women, youths with poor class backgrounds, youths sent to the countryside, Overseas Chinese and minorities. The broadcast stressed that while political qualities of applicants must be put "before everything else, their cultural level must be considered as an essential qualification."

Canton radio on 18 June carried a NANFANG DAILY commentary announcing that full-scale fall college enrollment work had begun, with the goal of creating "massive ranks of worker-intellectuals." The commentary stressed the role of the masses and warned of the danger of revisionist sabotage of the correct educational line. It also harkened back to the campaign last winter against admission "through the back door" in warning cadres against "selfish considerations" and making "indiscriminate use" of their powers. An accompanying broadcast related the recent experience of a Kwangtung county party committee in admissions work. The report noted that applicants "undergo examination in moral, intellectual and physical education," illustrating that the examination system has been modified but not eliminated.

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NOTES

PRC NUCLEAR TEST: Peking's 18 June announcement of its nuclear test on the 17th reflected no change from the Chinese nuclear disarmament stance set forth in Peking's last test announcement of 28 June 1973. Again using the concise format adopted in November 1971, the latest announcement repeated Peking's intention to break the superpowers' nuclear monopoly, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and to work toward the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. It added a reference to the "excellent situation" brought about by the Chinese campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Piao and specified that a "new nuclear test" had been conducted, in contrast to last June's announcement which cited a "hydrogen bomb test." The USSR promptly reported the test on TASS and Moscow radio, drawing from Western accounts before the test was officially announced in Peking. As usual, TASS has reported adverse reaction and official protests from Japan, Australia, and other Asian countries. A Moscow domestic radio report on the 18th made light of Peking's attempts to justify the tests by "defense needs."

PRC-INDIA RELATIONS: Demonstrating Peking's cautious receptivity to improved relations with India, Central Committee Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying on 13 June told a visiting Indian delegation that "the friendship between the Chinese and Indian peoples had a long history," adding: "We believe that the traditional friendship between the two peoples will surely be further consolidated." NCNA reported that the vice chairman had a "cordial and friendly conversation" with the delegation, composed of members of the D. S. Kont's Memorial Committee; Kontis was an Indian physician who worked in China during World War II. Yeh Chien-ying had received a Kontis delegation which visited China a year ago, but at that time NCNA did not report the vice chairman's remarks during the reception, noting only that there was "a cordial conversation in a friendly atmosphere." NCNA reported on 12 June the UN Security Council's resolution recommending that the General Assembly admit Bangladesh to the United Nations. UN Representative Chuang Yen noted that "new developments" in South Asia had made Bangladesh eligible for UN membership and repeated the line, voiced by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on 12 May, that "we are ready to develop good-neighborly relations with the countries on the subcontinent on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and to further enhance our traditional friendship with their peoples."

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MALAYAN CP: The clandestine Malayan CP radio station in China--the Voice of the Malayan Revolution--has recently taken pains to show that the 31 May establishment of PRC-Malaysian diplomatic relations has not affected Malayan CP policy toward the Razak government nor undermined the party's support for China. Broadcasts have continued to feature battle actions of the communist-led insurgents and to attack harshly the policies of the "Razak clique." An 8 June commentary rejected Razak's call for the surrender of the communist insurgents, made upon his return from China, and exhorted the Malayan "people" to persist in armed struggle. In justifying Peking's welcome for Razak, the clandestine broadcasts have highlighted the historical precedent of Chinese communist support for Stalin's efforts during World War II to reach nonaggression pacts with CCP enemies, including militarist Japan and Chiang Kai-shek. An 11 June article cited Mao's assurance at the time that Stalin's accommodation with the fascists was merely evidence of Moscow's "growing socialist strength" and would not affect CCP solidarity with the Soviet Union.

PRC IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN: Amplifying earlier RED FLAG articles, an 18 June PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial has called for the creation of a "huge contingent of Marxist theoretical workers" who will dare to make "frontal attacks" in fighting for the victory of Marxism. Suggesting that little relief is likely for leaders now being criticized, the editorial states that such contingents can be developed only in the "storms of mass struggle." The editorial calls on party committees to put the building of theoretical forces on their "agenda of major items." The editorial carefully indicates that the theorists will not operate without controls, specifying that "even the worker-peasant-soldier theoretical workers must pay attention to remodeling themselves" and must not be divorced from production or succumb to "ivory tower" specialization. To help insure that theorist contingents stay under party control, the editorial ordered that the contingents be built step by step "from the leading organs down."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 10 - 16 JUNE 1974

<u>Moscow (2337 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1081 items)</u>		
Supreme Soviet Elections	(13%)	24%	OAU Summit, Somalia	(--)	9%
[Brezhnev Speech	(--)	7%]	[Chou Greetings	(--)	3%]
[Podgorny Speech	(--)	4%]	Indochina	(26%)	6%
[Kosygin Speech	(--)	3%]	Criticism of Lin Piao	(7%)	6%
Soviet-GDR Friendship	(--)	5%	and Confucius		
Treaty 10th Anniversary			Middle East	(6%)	4%
Congratulations to	(--)	5%	[12th Palestine	(3%)	3%]
Mongolian Leaders on			National Council		
Election			Korea	(1%)	4%
Soviet-Portuguese	(--)	5%	"Superpower" Indian	(2%)	4%
Diplomatic Relations			Ocean Contention		
China	(4%)	3%	Bangladesh UN Seat	(--)	3%
Chile	(4%)	3%	Latin America Nuclear-	(--)	3%
OAU Summit, Somalia	(--)	3%	Free Zone Treaty		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.