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1 of 1

Trends in Communist Propaganda

3 July 74

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# **TRENDS**


**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

3 JULY 1974  
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## CONTENTS

### NIXON USSR VISIT

- Brezhnev Cites "Substantial" Results, Stresses Arms Measures . . . 1
- Moscow's European Allies Hail "Significant" Results of Summit . . . 4

### PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

- Peking Hits Indian Nuclear Ambitions, Backs Pakistan . . . . . 7

### KOREA

- Pyongyang Claims ROK Vessel Sunk in DPRK Territorial Waters . . . 8

### INDOCHINA

- Cambodian Front Delegation Visits Laos, South Vietnam . . . . . 9

### USSR

- Liberal Philosopher Kedrov Steps Down as Institute Director . . . 12
- Deadlock Broken on Controversial Political Economy Textbook . . . 16
- Belated Awards to "KOMMUNIST" Editors Reflect Conflict . . . . . 19

### CHINA

- Party Anniversary Marked by Editorial on CCP's Leading Role . . . 21

### NOTES

- Palestinian Representation at Geneva; DRV Democratic Party Anniversary; Tito Visit to FRG . . . . . 23

### APPENDIX

- Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . i

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 1 -

## NIXON USSR VISIT

## BREZHNEV CITES "SUBSTANTIAL" RESULTS, STRESSES ARMS MEASURES

The results of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting (27 June-3 July) were characterized as "constructive and substantial" by the General Secretary in his 2 July speech at the dinner hosted by the President. And Brezhnev expressed particular satisfaction with agreements reached in the arms sphere.

Improvement in relations since the Moscow summit meeting in May 1972 was reflected in coverage of the visit by Soviet media and in Brezhnev's increased participation in protocol functions. As in 1972, the President's arrival at Vnukovo airport on 27 June was carried live by Moscow radio and television. But this year the media generally conveyed a warmer atmosphere; for example, TASS in reporting the arrival ceremonies said that the President and the Soviet leaders were "cheered by Muscovites" along the route to the Kremlin and that there were banners proclaiming "welcome, President Nixon." Unlike 1972, Brezhnev joined Podgorny and Kosygin in welcoming the President at the airport and in seeing him off on 3 July. Brezhnev spoke at the Supreme Soviet-Government dinner on the 27th as well as the President's dinner for Soviet leaders on 2 July. And, along with Podgorny and Kosygin, he accompanied Nixon to the Bolshoi Theater on the 28th. In 1972 Podgorny spoke at the first dinner, Kosygin at the second, and Podgorny and Kosygin accompanied the President to the Bolshoi.

**NUCLEAR ISSUES** The first indications in Soviet media that agreement had been reached on some nuclear issues came in TASS and radio reports of Brezhnev's 2 July speech. In expressing satisfaction with the results of his third meeting with the President, Brezhnev made it clear he was referring especially to the agreements reached in the area of arms control. He called containing the arms race the "central issue" in Soviet-American relations. According to Brezhnev, the ABM limitation protocol, the treaty limiting underground tests and the other arms measures signify "considerable progress" in this area--though he added that the package could "probably be broader."

TASS reported the official signing ceremonies, carried live on Moscow radio and television, the next day. There is thus far little available comment on nuclear issues at the summit, as Soviet media exhibited considerable caution in characterizing the prospects in this area while

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 2 -

talks were in progress. Progress reports had referred only to "intensive" negotiations between the two leaders.

Despite the uncertainty over the outcome of the arms negotiations, however, Moscow made clear all along that it viewed the strategic issues as the most critical and as those on which progress was most urgent. Brezhnev himself, at the Supreme Soviet-USSR Government dinner welcoming the President on the 27th, acknowledged that the "biggest contribution" the talks could make would be in measures further reducing the threat of war between the two countries.

**ECONOMIC ISSUES** Moscow has portrayed the economic agreement as a virtual replacement for Congressional action on the trade bill granting it most-favored-nation status and approving longterm credits. A commentator on the 30 June weekly Moscow radio international affairs roundtable stressed its implications: "The United States and the Soviet Union have now firmly agreed on extensive cooperation in the most important field of man's activities." He added that an underlying principle of the accord was that "there can be no infringement on each other's interests, no interference in each other's internal affairs"--charges Moscow has laid to Senator Jackson's amendment to the trade bill.

In discussion of economic issues surrounding the summit, Moscow has made clear its belief that, despite the President's stated goal of independence in energy sources by 1980, the prospects are bright for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in this area. The 30 June roundtable discussion mentioned specifically the possibility of U.S. participation in Siberian gas and oil exploitation. A 26 June PRAVDA article by Yevgeniy Shershnev, deputy head of the USA Institute, concluded that the U.S. would find it "difficult if not impossible" to fulfill its energy requirements without expanding "international cooperation."

**SUMMIT GOALS** Brezhnev went on record early to underscore the urgency of a successful summit at a critical stage in bilateral relations. In his statement read to the press by TASS director general Zamyatin on 28 June, Brezhnev said the main requirement was "to demonstrate to the whole world the inflexible resolve of the Soviet Union and the United States to continue along the course that has been jointly determined by the previously adopted decisions and documents." The implication in Brezhnev's statement that new "decisions and documents" should not be considered the gauge of a successful summit was made more explicit elsewhere. Soviet analyses prior to this summit had noted that it was unreasonable to expect as many new agreements this year as in the first meetings, which had

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
3 JULY 1974

- 3 -

followed a long hiatus in relations. An editorial in the journal USA had observed that the summit's importance lay in its ability to "create a favorable atmosphere" for implementation of existing agreements. According to the editorial, "depending on the requirements of the moment and on the further development of bilateral relations and the entire world situation, new agreements will also become possible and essential."

A roundtable discussion in a broadcast to North America on the 30th, three days into the talks, likewise argued that the significance of the summit did not stem from the number of agreements signed but from its contribution to "maintaining the momentum" of improving relations. Predictably--given Moscow's desire to show progress in relations--the media professed to see signs already after the first four agreements were signed that the third Nixon-Brezhnev meeting would be "just as fruitful" as the two preceding it. Commentators were thus able to reject as unjustified what were described as excessively pessimistic predictions about the summit in the U.S. press.

**BROAD SUPPORT  
FOR DETENTE**

Commentary keyed to the summit has continued to underscore the broad support for improved U.S.-Soviet relations in the United States, an increasingly prominent feature of Soviet treatment of the internal U.S. picture in recent weeks. An article on 22 June by IZVESTIYA chief editor Tolkunov was notable for his publicizing observations by Senator Scott that any successful 1976 presidential candidate would support detente and that Congress as well "is pursuing a policy aimed at detente." On the 26th IZVESTIYA wrote that detente was increasingly "not only a personal policy of Nixon but a policy synonymous with defending the national interests of the United States, valid without regard to political parties or different personalities." As a concomitant of this trend of analysis, Moscow has been softpedaling its earlier intimations that opposition to the President on Watergate was virtually synonymous with opposition to his policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union. Increased appreciation for the role of Congress, apparent in Moscow in recent months, was also registered by Brezhnev in his 2 July dinner speech. He wished not only the President and the Administration but also "the Congress of your country success in translating into life the good beginnings of peace."

Nevertheless, Moscow has continued to pay due respect to the role of the personal relationship between the President and Brezhnev in improved relations. An IZVESTIYA article on the 29th cited U.S. commentary on the summit which attributed the warm atmosphere

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 4 -

surrounding the first day of meetings largely to the "personal relationship" of the two leaders. It also underscored the "importance of personal contacts between Brezhnev and Nixon for progress in U.S.-Soviet relations." Though some early Soviet reports of the President's remarks at the Kremlin dinner on the 27th appeared to obscure his discussion of the importance of his personal relationship with Brezhnev, the TASS English report and the version of the dinner speeches carried in the central press the next day more accurately reflected the emphasis the President placed on his relationship with the General Secretary.

The President's speech on television on 2 July was transmitted textually by TASS, although, as with his speech in 1972, it was not carried live by all-union radio. TASS on the 3d reported that central newspapers that day also gave "prominent" treatment to the text of his remarks. (Accounts of the President's 1972 TV speech carried by TASS, the central press, and the radio omitted some of his remarks, including a statement on the need for restraint by the great powers in supplying arms to other nations.)

#### MOSCOW'S EUROPEAN ALLIES HAIL "SIGNIFICANT" RESULTS OF SUMMIT

The media of Moscow's East European allies were forthcoming in reporting and commenting upon the President's second Moscow summit visit, seeing the Nixon-Brezhnev talks as "significant" for institutionalizing U.S.-Soviet summitry, rather than for providing any spectacular new agreements. Yugoslav media generally saw the summit in a similar light, while Romania, the Warsaw Pact independent, has thus far limited its coverage to brief reports--just as it did for the President's Middle East visit. Albania characteristically portrayed the talks as another example of imperialist-revisionist collusion.

Among other communist media, only the Vietnamese, in sparse reportage, have thus far acknowledged the President's trip.

The USSR's Warsaw Pact allies focused primarily on the Soviet Union's concern for consolidating long-term ties with the United States and sought to counteract criticism and pessimism that the summit was more cosmetic than substantive. Typically, Prague Radio in an English-language broadcast on 27 June forecast that the talks would be "imbued with a matter-of-fact and constructive spirit" and would be "as fruitful as the earlier summits." And Prague Radio on the 30th was even more clear about the need for the talks, noting that "because of Jackson-like cold war warriors, the prime issue is

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 5 -

to consolidate definitively all that has already been accomplished." Yugoslav media, while less upbeat in tone, clearly supported the need for the summit; on 1 July TANJUG, noting that "agreements of major importance should not be expected," emphasized that the major objective of the talks was "to give realistic content to the already existing agreements between the two countries."

**NEGOTIATING POSITIONS** In general the President was portrayed as a realist who has come to realize the necessity of negotiating with the Soviet Union, while the USSR was depicted as continuing its tried and tested policy of peaceful coexistence. Although most East European media observed that the President's bargaining position had been weakened by Watergate and economic difficulties, commentators contended that the USSR was not taking advantage of that fact. The reason for this, in the words of Ferenc Varnai in the Hungarian party daily NEPSZABANSAG on 26 July, is that "world peace cannot be safeguarded without the active participation of the United States, cooperation with its incumbent leaders at any given time, and mutual good will." Moreover, the Czechoslovak party daily RUDE PRAVO on 2 July, as reported by CTK, singled out the agreement on economic, industrial and technological cooperation as an example of the "mutual benefit" provided by the summit and as proof that U.S. Congressional arguments about "unilateral benefit for the Soviet Union" are "fabrications."

Varnai provided one of the most detailed commentaries on Nixon's Watergate difficulties and, while noting that "it is not our business to defend Nixon," reiterated charges that the "anti-Nixon campaign" was being led by opponents of detente. On the other hand, Belgrade radio commentator Kosta Timotijevic on 29 June not only maintained that critics of Nixon's involvement in Watergate were among the strongest supporters of detente but also asserted that "anybody else in his place would be acceptable in the same way, as long as he continues the initiated policy of detente, negotiations and cooperation."

**ARMS LIMITATION** In line with the emphasis on consolidating detente, East European media attached strong significance to the summit agreements that were signed but did not fail to point out that disarmament remained the key outstanding issue. Commentaries acknowledged that the complexity of the issue precluded the likelihood of a major breakthrough during the President's visit. While commentators avoided mentioning details on the early negotiations, a Warsaw Radio correspondent in New York reported on 1 July that U.S. commentators attributed the negotiating difficulties to Washington's "lack of a uniform approach." The Polish party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on 1 July, as

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JULY 1974

- 6 -

reported by PAP, noted that reaching a solution to arms control and limitation required "not only time but also much effort and good will on both sides." And East Berlin Radio commentator Guenter Leuschner on the same day remarked that while resolving the disarmament issue is "impossible today," it at least has not become an "obstacle to agreement on other questions."

**VIETNAM MEDIA** Vietnamese communist media have provided only scant reportage on President Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union and no original comment. Both Hanoi and Liberation radios on 26 June broadcast identical, brief reports--citing AP--that told of his departure from Washington for Brussels en route to the Soviet Union and that described demonstrations held in Brussels on the 25th, urging Belgian withdrawal from NATO and protesting against Nixon. Media treatment of Nixon's Moscow arrival was confined to pickups of a TASS report noting that the President and Secretary of State Kissinger were welcomed at the airport on the 27th by Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin. The Liberation Radio version added that both sides engaged in talks on the same day. A Hanoi radio report of the 25th, citing Western reports on the House Judiciary Committee's decision to subpoena four more White House tapes, included speculation by REUTER that the President's trip abroad was an "attempt to use his old trick of making a fuss about his activities overseas to cover up his wrongdoings in the Watergate affair."

**PRC, DPRK SILENT** Though Peking media had earlier mentioned the President's Moscow visit in describing allegedly increasing U.S.-Soviet international rivalry, Peking has thus far not reported or commented on the President's stay in the Soviet Union. In treating the past two U.S.-Soviet summits, Peking in each instance waited until the visiting leader had returned home before issuing a straightforward NCNA report. Monitored North Korean media thus far have completely ignored the President's visit, offering neither reportage nor comment. Monitored Cuban media have provided no commentary upon the Moscow summit thus far.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JULY 1974

- 7 -

## PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

## PEKING HITS INDIAN NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, BACKS PAKISTAN

Peking, refraining from comment for more than a month after the 18 May Indian nuclear test, authoritatively criticized New Delhi's nuclear ambitions for the first time in a 28 June PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. The article was issued in support of Pakistani resolutions--adopted by the Islamic summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur in late June--that had noted India's test in voicing support for non-nuclear weapon states facing a nuclear threat. Though it did not directly attack New Delhi, the Commentator article alluded to India in noting that the resolutions exposed the "expansionist designs" of a "certain country" which harbors ambitions to become a sub-superpower and "resorts to nuclear blackmail and threat." It promised Chinese "support" for Pakistan against such a threat.

The article represents the firmest Chinese statement of support for Pakistan since the Indian test and underlines the recent hardening of the Chinese media's treatment of alleged Indian expansion designs against Pakistan and other areas in South Asia.\* In the weeks immediately following the test, Peking had avoided siding solidly with Islamabad, notably sidestepping public statements of support during the 6-10 June visit to Peking of Secretary of the Pakistan Foreign Ministry Agha Shahi. Underscoring the recent change in its attitude, however, Peking on 27 June released an NCNA report which quoted a Pakistani spokesman's disclosure that Shahi, during his China visit, had in fact received assurances of solid Chinese backing against outside nuclear intimidation.

The Commentator article was also at pains to reconcile Peking's development of nuclear weapons with its criticism of such development by the superpowers and India, stressing that "two opposite attitudes" exist concerning nuclear arms questions. It presented as the crucial differentiating element the fact that Peking, unlike the superpowers and India, has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, particularly against non-nuclear weapon countries and nuclear-free zones. It implied that failure to support a non-first-use proposal by a nuclear state indicates that state's intention to resort to nuclear "blackmail and threat."

\* A 3 July PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article notably condemned India's "intolerable bullying" in allegedly attempting to deprive the Sikkim king of power and to annex the state. For background on Peking's general treatment of Indian designs, see TRENDS of 26 June 1974, pages 16-17.

- 8 -

## K O R E A

### PYONGYANG CLAIMS ROK VESSEL SUNK IN DPRK TERRITORIAL WATERS

Pyongyang media have accorded low-key treatment to the 28 June sinking of an ROK ship by the DPRK. The initial 28 June Pyongyang radio report of the incident stated that an ROK naval vessel had "illegally infiltrated" to a point "11.3 miles east of Suwondon and 6.2 miles north of the military demarcation line (DML)." By contrast, radio and KCNA reports of the Military Armistice Commission meeting on 1 July stated that the vessel had "infiltrated to a point some 9 miles north of the DML and 8.8 north-east of Suwondon," then of having turned southeast where, just as in Pyongyang's 28 June version, it met, fired upon, and was sunk by the DPRK navy.

The 1 July report not only presented the intrusion as deeper than earlier accounts but raised for the first time the accusation that the ship had entered Northern territory to carry out espionage. It also charged for the first time that the ship acted "at the instigation" of the United States. Neither charge had been included in a 29 June NODONG SINMUN commentary on the incident. A 28 June KCNA account had claimed that the United States was responsible for sending ROK fighters into DPRK airspace after the naval clash, but had not blamed the United States for sending the ROK ship out. A KCNA authorized statement released on 1 July kept close to the original version, making no mention of espionage and charging only that the fighter incident was carried out at U.S. instigation.

The last similar such incident occurred on 15 February 1974, when the North sunk one ROK ship and captured another off Korea's west coast. At that time Pyongyang immediately accused the Southern vessels of espionage.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
3 JULY 1974

- 9 -

## INDOCHINA

## CAMBODIAN FRONT DELEGATION VISITS LAOS, SOUTH VIETNAM

Following an unusual delay of several weeks, the Cambodian Front news agency AKI reported on 30 June and 1 July that a Front delegation led by insurgent armed forces chief Khieu Samphan and his "special adviser" Ieng Sary had made official visits to the Lao liberated area on 5-8 June and to the Quang Tri liberated zone in South Vietnam on 11-13 June. Pathet Lao, Vietnamese communist, and PRC media subsequently replayed coverage of the trips. The visits came in the wake of the delegation's widely touted tour abroad, which began last March and was last marked in communist media by reports of the group's stopover in Hanoi on the way back to Cambodia in late May.\* The visits further enhance the rising international prestige of Front insurgent leaders led by Khieu Samphan who are based in Cambodia, as opposed to Prince Sihanouk and the China-based Front entourage. Sihanouk had visited Laos from 11 to 15 March,\*\* but Khieu Samphan's trip to Quang Tri represents the highest-level official Front visit to PRG-held territories.

LAOS The delegation's stay in Laos elicited a lower-level Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) turnout than had Sihanouk's visit in March, since many high-level LPF officials left the liberated zone for Vientiane following the formation of the Lao coalition government in April. The visiting Cambodians were hosted this time by LPF Standing Committee member Nouhak Phoumsavan and also held talks with LPF Central Committee Vice Chairman Kayson Phomvihhan--the head of the Lao communist party--and Sithon Kommadam. Sihanouk had been hosted by LPF Chairman Prince Souphanouvong, who is presently chairman of the National Political Council of Coalition.

According to limited Cambodian Front coverage of the visit, the delegation was honored at a banquet on the 5th at which Khieu Samphan and Nouhak Phoumsavan spoke, held talks the next day with Nouhak, attended a dinner that evening hosted by Kayson Phomvihhan, and departed on the 8th. Banquet speeches and an 8 June "press communique" marking the visit testified to the two sides' solidarity based on

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\* See TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 10-12 for background.

\*\* Sihanouk's visit to Laos is discussed in TRENDS of 20 March 1974, pages 11-12.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 10 -

the 1970 Indochinese summit declaration, asserted that the "brilliant successes" of the visit marked a "new phase" in Lao-Cambodian relations, condemned the Nixon Doctrine in Indochina, and reaffirmed backing for each side's respective political positions.

**SOUTH VIETNAM** The delegation received full honors in South Vietnam, escorted throughout its stay by PRG Advisory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who hosted and spoke at a banquet for the Cambodians on the 11th, held official talks with them on the 12th, and attended a mass meeting for them that evening. PRG Vice President Nguyen Doa spoke at the meeting, while Khieu Samphan was the sole Cambodian speaker during the visit. A lengthy 13 June joint communique proclaimed the "success" of the visit, stating that the stay had made an "important contribution" to Cambodian-Vietnamese solidarity.

As reported by AKI, the communique seemed to suggest the presence of disagreements between the two sides when it failed to repeat the reference to "complete unity" of views which appeared in the 2 April 1974 joint communique marking Khieu Samphan's visit to Hanoi. It instead said that a "complete similarity" of views had been reached on problems discussed. AKI, but not available Vietnamese communist reports, also appeared to reflect some coolness in relations in noting that the banquet on the 11th had taken place in a warm atmosphere permeated with cordiality and "frankness."

The communique duly expressed mutual congratulations on the two sides' respective military and political "victories," testified to their bilateral solidarity, and voiced support for their respective political positions. It praised the "new and happy development" seen in the RGNU appointment of an ambassador to the PRG, and disclosed that Tho had received and accepted an invitation to visit Cambodia at an unspecified future date.

**FRONT STANCE** During both visits Khieu Samphan did not depart significantly from his comment in earlier stops on his long foreign tour. He noted Sihanouk's role as "head of state," criticized members of the Lon Nol regime by name, denounced U.S. aid to Lon Nol, and reaffirmed determination to pursue uncompromising struggle to achieve the five points. In a speech in South Vietnam on the 11th he affirmed his confidence in the current Front strategy of protracted military conflict, stating: "It is thanks to our correct political line, independent stand, spirit of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, and determination to endure hardships and difficulties and strive to build up in time our forces in all fields that we have won such great victories as are known today." Underlining his firm

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 11 -

position, he added that his recent tour abroad had served to familiarize Front allies with "the reason that made us resolved to carry on our uncompromising and unyielding struggle." He did not claim full allied agreement with his strategy or pledges of additional material support, but he said that the fact that the allies had reaffirmed support for the five points was "a strong encouragement to the fight waged by the Cambodian people."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
TRENDS  
3 JULY 1974

- 12 -

## U S S R

## LIBERAL PHILOSOPHER KEDROV STEPS DOWN AS INSTITUTE DIRECTOR

The release of liberal philosopher B.M. Kedrov from the directorship of the Institute of Philosophy "at his own request" ends one of the stormiest careers of any Soviet academic figure. The evidence is not conclusive on the position in philosophical controversies of Kedrov's successor, B.S. Ukraintsev, although what is available suggests he is more conservative. Ukraintsev is a writer on cybernetics and a onetime associate of the new director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, A.G. Yegorov. While age may have been a factor in Kedrov's release--he was 70 in December 1973--the primary reason more likely was his audacious campaign to liberate philosophy from dogmatism during his tenure of less than one year as director. This campaign had been capped by a defiant January 1974 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY editorial challenging party control and demanding the right to pursue objective truth.\* During his short directorship, Kedrov had rallied academic forces demanding change in philosophy, sociology and economics.

The precise date of Kedrov's release was not disclosed in the announcement carried in the June issue of the HERALD OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, but it was announced along with the appointment of A.L. Narochitskiy to replace revisionist historian P.V. Volobuyev as director of the Institute of USSR History, an action that occurred some time during January or February.\*\* The replacement of Kedrov and Volobuyev removes the two most outspoken foes of conservative CPSU Central Committee science supervisor S.P. Trapeznikov, who has been pressing an ideological crackdown on the social sciences.

**NEW DIRECTOR** Although the Institute of Philosophy's new director, B.S. Ukraintsev, does have a tie with moderate philosopher Yegorov, he appears to have little in common with outspoken liberal philosophers like Kedrov and Frolov. He was deputy chief editor of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY under conservative chief editor M.B. Mitin until December 1961, when he was reduced to an

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\* See the Supplementary Article "Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences" in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974.

\*\* See the TRENDS of 12 June 1974, pages 33-35.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 13 -

ordinary member of the editorial board, apparently in connection with his transfer to Agitprop. In February 1962 a Turkmen paper identified him as head of a sector of the CPSU Central Committee's Agitprop. In this post he presumably worked closely with Yegorov, who likewise in December 1961 was transferred from an editorial job--chief editor of POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION--to deputy head of Agitprop.

During the early 1960's Ukraintsev wrote articles in KOMMUNIST and QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, and in late 1964 he wrote an article on cybernetics and biology along with Lysenkoist G.V. Platonov, who soon afterward--in an August 1965 OKTYABR article defending Lysenko--harshly attacked Kedrov as an opportunist for criticizing Lysenko. In June 1968 Ukraintsev was dropped from QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY's editorial board in a mass reshuffle one month after Frolov became chief editor, and no more articles by Ukraintsev appeared in the journal until late 1972. When the USSR Philosophy Society was created in December 1971 to tighten control over philosophers,\* he was elected one of the seven vice presidents of the society. In 1967 and 1968 he was identified as a senior scientific worker at the Institute of Philosophy and in November 1972 he was listed in QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY as head of a sector in the institute.

**KEDROV'S 1973 DRIVE** Kedrov's resignation presumably was prompted by his bold campaign against doctrinaire ideas and his defiant challenge to Trapeznikov. Soon after becoming director of the Institute of Philosophy in the spring of 1973, Kedrov announced that he intended to turn the institute into a vehicle to promote new ideas. In April 1973 he organized a roundtable discussion to demand extension to the social sciences of the objective research methods used in natural sciences. Trapeznikov's response was to organize a May 1973 philosophy conference to criticize "innovators" and reassert the need for party spirit in philosophy.\*\*

A second conference to reassert party control over philosophers was held on 12 November 1973, according to an article in the May 1974 HERALD OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. Called to discuss the theme "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy and its Role in the Present Ideological Struggle," the conference's 800 participants heard conservative Moscow

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\* See the TRENDS of 24 May 1972, page 40.

\*\* For details on Kedrov's 1973 drive, see the TRENDS SUPPLEMENT of 29 May 1974, "The Struggle for Change in Soviet Social Sciences," pages 2-6.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 JULY 1974

- 14 -

Gorkom Ideology Secretary V.N. Yagodkin, in his opening remarks, call detente just another form of class warfare in which party spirit in philosophy was a "very sharp weapon." The keynoters, Academy of Sciences Vice President P.N. Fedoseyev and conservatives F.V. Konstantinov and M.B. Mitin, also stressed philosophy's role in the ideological war.

The developing crackdown was boldly attacked by a January 1974 editorial in QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY which criticized "cavalry raids" on social scientists and demanded the right to pursue truth, "no matter how bitter" it is.\* The editorial obviously reflected Kedrov's position, since he had openly declared his intention of closely supervising the work of his institute's organ, QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, and since chief editor Frolov was a close colleague and ally.

**KEDROV'S STORMY CAREER** Kedrov's 1973 unorthodoxy was by no means out of character--his career has been stormy by any standards. He is the son of M.S. Kedrov, who was a colleague of Lenin and a top official of the Cheka. Kedrov's father and brother Igor denounced Beriya to Stalin as a traitor in 1939, and as a result the two were arrested as "enemies of the people" and executed. Khrushchev in his 1956 secret speech discussed in detail Beriya's murder of Kedrov. Despite being the son and brother of "enemies of the people," B.M. Kedrov became deputy director of the Institute of Philosophy in 1945, at the age of 42, and became a bold critic of dogmatic ideas. His 1946 book "On Qualitative and Quantitative Changes in Nature" became a target of conservative philosophers such as Mitin, who called him a "menshevizing idealist."

Kedrov, more than anyone else, was responsible for the creation of the Institute of Philosophy's journal QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY. In a June 1947 philosophy debate Kedrov talked Central Committee Secretary Zhdanov into agreeing to create the journal. In a December 1973 interview in QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY Kedrov recalled the episode and how "we were in seventh heaven when we found out that the Central Committee had sanctioned the creation of the new journal." He himself was appointed chief editor, and he used the journal to publish a series of highly unorthodox articles on the philosophy of science.

However, as Kedrov noted in his December 1973 interview, his period as editor "unfortunately did not last long--just to the beginning of 1949." After Zhdanov's death and Lysenko's rise to power in

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\* For details, see the Supplementary Article "Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences" in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
3 JULY 1974

- 15 -

science, a purge began in 1949 and Kedrov was attacked for using his journal against Lysenko and to defend "cosmopolitan" views. Kedrov was forced to write a letter of confession in March 1949, was fired as QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY chief editor, and, as he recalled in his December 1973 interview, a book of his already in production was canceled and he was unable to work on his specialty or speak out again until after Stalin's death.

Kedrov returned to prominence in 1955, during the last stages of the post-Stalin leadership struggle, and Kedrov in a BOLSHEVIK article revived old accusations of philosophical errors against Malenkov protégé G.F. Aleksandrov, who was being ousted as minister of culture. In 1962 Kedrov became director of the Institute of History of Natural Science and Technology, and as director wrote articles in the November 1966 and May 1967 issues of MOLODOY KOMMUNIST seeking to prove that dialectical materialism and natural science were in fact compatible, despite the distorted impression caused by the Lysenkoist dominance in philosophy and science.

Young philosopher Frolov joined him in this endeavor, writing a 15 March 1967 PRAVDA article, two 1967 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY articles, and a book to prove that science and dialectical materialism work well together, especially now that "incompetent meddling in science" by Lysenkoist philosophers had been ended. Frolov also stressed the need to compete actively with Western ideas and to see such confrontations as an opportunity instead of a danger.

After Frolov became chief editor of QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY in mid-1968, he quickly set out to activate the journal and philosophy in general, much along the lines advocated by Kedrov. In February 1969 he submitted a work plan to the Academy of Sciences Presidium proposing to use the journal to stimulate debate, to bring philosophy and social and natural sciences closer together, and to expand the journal's international influence. He declared that the journal's "main function" must be to raise "sharp" theoretical problems and its "main section" must be the "debate section." The May 1969 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY account of the Presidium's discussion and approval of the work plan reported high praise from such important natural scientists as Academy of Sciences vice presidents M.D. Milionshchikov and N.N. Semenov, as well as by academic secretary F.V. Konstantinov of the academy's philosophy and law division and Institute of Marxism-Leninism Director P.N. Fedoseyev. Independent-minded physicist P.L. Kapitsa lauded Frolov's ambitious plans, noting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 16 -

that at present "our ideologues" lack any influence in the international struggle for ideas, and that in this international competition they "lose the privileges which they have in our country, where they do not encounter opposing views."

Frolov's position was reinforced when Kedrov became his supervisor as director of the Institute of Philosophy in early 1973. Frolov's relationship with the new director may be more difficult.

#### DEADLOCK BROKEN ON CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL ECONOMY TEXTBOOK

A three-year stalemate between modernist and conservative Soviet economists over writing a new basic textbook on political economy has been broken with the announcement that work on the textbook is resuming. The new work is designed to replace the present dogmatic textbooks; however, it is still unclear how many of the progressive concepts insisted upon by modernists will be included in this work. The announcement was made by QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS chief editor T.S. Khachaturov, writing in the May issue of his journal. While he presents his ideas of what the work should cover--including both traditional political economy theory and at least some of the practical subjects urged by modernists--he concedes that his own outline is only one of the possible variants and that further debate on controversial questions will be necessary. Khachaturov explains that some chapters of the textbook had already been written when work on it was suspended three years ago. The resumed effort is being organized once again by the Institute of Economics.

Khachaturov's statement was the first confirmation that work on the textbook had actually been suspended, although it is not surprising in view of the 1971 purge of the Institute of Economics. Preparation of the textbook had begun in 1969 under the supervision of the conservative Institute of Economics, but apparently was halted in 1971 when innovative economist N.P. Fedorenko became head of the Academy of Sciences' economics division and insisted on introducing modern economic concepts into the textbook. Fedorenko's ideas, promising practical economic results, won high-level support, as evidenced by 1971 revisions in the content of political economy courses, the December 1971 CPSU Central Committee decree attacking the Institute of Economics for resisting modern economics, the removal of the institute's director, and the reorganization of the institute. Since then, however, the struggle between conservative economists patronized by Central Committee science supervisor S.P. Trapeznikov and modernists led by Fedorenko had prevented any progress on the textbook.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDE

3 JULY 1974

- 17 -

**WORK ON TEXTBOOK BEGUN** Preparation of a new political economy textbook was called for as far back as 1968 by the Academy of Sciences Presidium, where the most influential economists then were innovator A.M. Romyantsev, academy vice president in charge of social sciences, and the more conservative Khachaturov, academic secretary of the academy's economics division and chief editor of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS. At the February 1970 annual meeting of the economics division, reported in the June 1970 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, Khachaturov had explained that work on the five-volume "Political Economy of Socialism" had begun, with outlines prepared and groups of authors already assembled for the individual volumes. In the January 1971 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS it was stated that the Institute of Economics, together with economists from other institutions, was continuing its work on the textbook.

By early 1971, however, evidence began to surface that work on the textbook had been disrupted. When the May 1971 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS reported the early 1971 annual meeting of the economics division, Khachaturov no longer mentioned work on the textbook in his annual report. In May 1971 Khachaturov himself was removed as academic secretary of the economics division at the annual session of the Academy of Sciences and was replaced by N.P. Fedorenko, director of the Central Mathematical Economics Institute. The innovators of the Fedorenko school clearly were gaining influence among economists throughout 1971, even though the conservatives managed to oust the liberals' patron, Romyantsev, as academy vice president at that same May session, and later in 1971 launched a crackdown on liberals in sociology and philosophy. L.M. Gatovskiy was replaced as director of the Institute of Economics in August 1971, and in December 1971 a Central Committee decree censured the institute for not producing practical results and for resisting the mathematical economic methods associated with Fedorenko. The Academy of Sciences Presidium followed this up with a 24 February 1972 decree attacking the institute and reorganizing its structure, according to the May 1972 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS. Moreover, in January 1973 the academy's social science section ordered the institute to work more closely with Fedorenko's institute and other innovative institutes, as this same journal reported in April 1973. In addition, Moscow Gorkom Ideology Secretary V.N. Yagodkin revealed in a July 1972 KOMMUNIST article that the institute's party committee secretary, L.V. Nikiforov, had been fired and severely censured for allowing ideologically mistaken works to be published.

**CHANGES DEMANDED** The modernist economists pressed their case throughout 1972 and 1973. The purge of the Institute of Economics coincided with a 21-23 December 1971 social sciences conference at which Central Committee Secretary Suslov and

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 18 -

new Academy of Sciences Vice President P.N. Fedoseyev appeared to attack conservative economists. Fedoseyev's speech, as reported in a January 1972 issue of *KOMMUNIST*, assailed the "prolonged, sometimes scholastic debates" which distracted economists from tackling urgent practical problems. Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education V.P. Yelyutin, according to the February 1972 *QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS*, announced at the conference that his ministry was revising the courses on political economy to include more study of production economics and use of computers, and other officials from his ministry explained that the political economy program was being broadened to include more than just traditional concepts. According to the same account, other speakers at the conference declared that a new political economy textbook must reflect modern economics. An article in the December 1972 *QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS* stated that the December 1971 conference had approved the changes in the political economy courses and that in conformity with these changes a new political economy textbook was under preparation.

The December 1971 conference was followed by a 21 January 1972 *PRAVDA* editorial calling for "bold, creative" research in social science and "liberation" of science from "any elements of dogmatism." At the February 1972 annual meeting of the economics division, reported in the May 1972 *QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS*, new academic secretary Fedorenko criticized the extremely slow progress on the textbook.

At a May 1973 Moscow State University conference, changes in the training of political economy students were hotly debated between traditional conservative political economists, who did not want their subject contaminated with practical economics, and modernists, who insisted that political economists must be taught the use of computers and modern economic methods in order to make a practical contribution to the economy.\* In the July 1973 *QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS*, an article by Fedorenko insisted that the new textbook "must not be 'just another textbook'" but a basis for practical leadership of a modern economy.

**TRAPEZNIKOV COUNTERATTACKS** Later in 1973, however, the conservatives went on the offensive. S.P. Trapeznikov, reactionary head of the Central Committee's science and educational institutions section, organized a high-level conference of economists

\* See the *TRENDS SUPPLEMENT* of 29 May 1974, "The Struggle for Change in the Soviet Social Sciences," page 7.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 19 -

in November 1973 at which he and other conservatives attacked Fedorenko. Reflecting the ideologists' desire to preserve political economy as a bastion of dogma, Trapeznikov, according to a January 1974 ECONOMIC GAZETTE account, warned that attempts to replace "Marxist-Leninist economic theory" with "any other varieties of economic knowledge and methods of economic analysis unavoidably lead to narrow practicisim . . . ." He blamed the shortcomings in economic research on poor leadership by Fedorenko's economics division and sought in particular to hold Fedorenko responsible for the failure to complete a new textbook. The Fedorenko group, he recalled, had run down the traditional political economists who were preparing the textbook and had insisted on a new "constructive" approach. However, the result, he declared, was that neither a traditional nor a "constructive" textbook had been produced.

Although academy Vice President Fedoseyev had appeared to side with Fedorenko against the conservatives in 1971, at the November 1973 conference he joined Trapeznikov in attacking Fedorenko, declaring, according to the February 1974 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, that such innovators were opening the door for bourgeois ideas. Judging by published versions of his speech, Fedorenko did not mention the textbook in his comments at the November conference. However, according to the February 1974 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS version, he did praise the newly issued first volume of the "Political Economy" encyclopedia edited by Romyantsev, which, he noted, reflected modern political economics.

At the November conference the new director of the Institute of Economics, Ye.I. Kapustin, noting that his institute had taken a "decisive turn" toward study of the "practical needs of the economy," declared his institute was ready to take on preparation of the textbook. According to a January 1974 ECONOMIC GAZETTE account, however, he stressed that other institutes should also play an important role in producing the textbook.

#### BELATED AWARDS TO "KOMMUNIST" EDITORS REFLECT CONFLICT

A continuing conflict between conservative and moderate factions in the Soviet leadership appeared to be reflected in the belated awards announced on 27 June in connection with the 50th anniversary of the journal KOMMUNIST.

Almost three months after the 5 April anniversary, which had been ignored at the time it normally would have been observed, PRAVDA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 20 -

awkwardly announced an Order of Lenin for former chief editor A.G. Yegorov\* and an Order of the October Revolution for deputy chief editor Ye.I. Bugayev. In singling out two persons instead of one--the moderate Yegorov and the conservative Bugayev--the leadership appears to have resorted to a compromise.

KOMMUNIST has now been without a chief editor for over five months.

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\* Yegorov was removed sometime in January 1974 as KOMMUNIST chief editor. See the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 22-24.

CONFIDENTIAL



- 21 -

## CHINA

## PARTY ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY EDITORIAL ON CCP'S LEADING ROLE

Peking welcomed the CCP's fifty-third anniversary on 1 July with an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial, marking the first time since the Lin Piao purge in 1971 that a central editorial has been issued on party day. Strongly asserting party supremacy over all aspects of Chinese society, the editorial focused on the need to conduct the current campaign against Lin and Confucius "under the centralized leadership of party committees." From 1968 through 1971, joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorials had been issued for the party anniversary, but subsequent to Lin's fall the occasion has been marked only by pictures of Mao and Mao quotations in Peking papers and an increase in the usual number of low-key articles on the party's role.

This year's editorial was tied to the current ideological campaign, welcoming ideological struggle inside party committees but warning that such struggle does not "imply that party leadership may be weakened." The editorial claimed that the current campaign has strengthened and unified party leadership by "tempering" vast numbers of party members.

The editorial stated that party committees must welcome mass "criticism and supervision," but, with possible reference to the current wall poster campaign, noted that the masses may also pick up "certain wrong ideas running counter to marxism," and that when this happens the party must provide guidance. To reinforce party authority, the editorial quoted a Mao statement that the party must lead the masses in carrying out duties, but educate them to correct wrong ideas.

PROVINCIAL COMMENT Peking's resolve to maintain unity and leadership initiative while continuing the criticism campaign was reiterated in several provincial articles on party day. Hofei radio on 1 July, for example, asserted that when a party leader is criticized, he should continue to exercise his leadership functions. The broadcast cited as examples some criticized leaders in a commune who were subsequently hesitant to assert leadership over the masses, fearing that they would be accused of suppressing mass opinions. The commune committee was said to have corrected its views in part through reviewing relevant portions of Wang Hung-wen's 10th Party Congress report.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

3 JULY 1974

- 22 -

This radio on the same day also praised the party committee at a local coal mine for blending criticism with unity and developing an "excellent situation" in revolution and production by resolving problems created when some individual party members at the mine apparently "forgot the general orientation of the struggle" and entangled themselves in "minor problems."

An example of how party committees should exercise leadership over mass organizations was set forth in a 1 July broadcast by Shanghai radio. The broadcast lauded the party committee of the local No. 17 cotton mill, a model unit that was formerly the Shanghai base of party Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen, for correctly guiding the activities of nonparty worker theorists in the current campaign. Party leaders at the mill were praised for working closely with local activists and for encouraging them to join with party cadres "to voice their views at criticism meetings, write mass criticism articles...and conduct lectures among the masses." Special roles have been given to those activists selected as candidates for party membership, who are permitted to take part in the leading role in the campaign so that they will have more opportunities "for educating and tempering themselves."

**PARTY AUTHORITY  
OVER COMMERCE**

Peking's determination to safeguard economic production from dislocations caused by the current ideological campaign was clearly illustrated in a 3 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial stressing the need for strengthening party leadership over all commercial work. The editorial, pegged to a separate investigation report published in PEOPLE'S DAILY the same day, lauded the party committee of Heng county in Kwangsi for successfully placing commercial work under party authority. It called upon all other party committees, particularly those at the county level, to emulate Heng county in "developing procurement and marketing and in fulfilling procurement and supply plans in stipulated places according to schedule."

The call for party committees to strengthen their leadership over commerce appears aimed at insuring that the marketing of this summer's harvest is not hampered by undisciplined mass groups operating outside of the party's authority. The editorial noted that summer crops are now being marketed and instructed party committees to take "active measures" to insure the "smooth and uninterrupted flow of commodities, further invigorate the economy in the cities and the countryside, and make the market further flourish in support of socialist construction."

- 23 -

## NOTES

PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA: Romania and Bulgaria have become the second and third East European countries, after Yugoslavia, to accord recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people and to call for PLO participation in the Geneva peace conference. In similar phraseology, the communique on Egyptian President as-Sadat's 27-30 June visit to Bucharest and his 30 June-2 July visit to Sofia both called for "full and independent" PLO participation at Geneva. Cairo's AL-AHRAM on 1 July greeted Bucharest's recognition as "a most significant feature" of the communique, pointing out that this was "the first document coming from a socialist state" to embody such explicit recognition. Yugoslavia--viewed by Egypt as a nonaligned, rather than socialist, friend--had earlier accorded similar recognition. The communique on as-Sadat's 28-30 March visit to Yugoslavia this year stressed the need for equal participation of the PLO, "as the only competent representative" of the Palestinians, in all efforts to solve the Mideast problem, and linked this with the Geneva talks in adding that the conference should insure full application of all relevant UN resolutions. Moscow has gone no further than to endorse an unspecified Palestinian presence at Geneva, and brief TASS reports on the Romanian and Bulgarian communiqués made no mention of the passages on the PLO. The 3 July communique on the Nixon-Brezhnev summit said that the United States and the USSR, as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference, considered that the conference should resume as soon as possible, with "the question of other participants from the Middle East area to be discussed at the conference."

DRV DEMOCRATIC PARTY ANNIVERSARY: Hanoi marked the 30th anniversary of the Vietnam Democratic Party (VDP)--a front organization composed of "progressives" from the ranks of intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie--with a standard celebration reflecting the party's subordinate position in the Vietnamese political hierarchy. The Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) lent its authority to a 30 June anniversary "get-together" with the presence of top leaders, First Secretary Le Duan and Politburo member Truong Chinh. The main speaker was VDP Secretary General Nghiem Xuan Yem, who had shared the podium with Truong Chinh at the 20th anniversary ceremonies in 1964. Yem's remarks at the latest celebration, as summarized by Hanoi radio on 1 July, predictably stressed the importance of the unity of the "national united front" and extended effusive praise to the VWP for its example of "unity and good faith" and for having helped the VDP contribute to the "revolution and the fatherland." In a lengthy letter from the VWP Central Committee read by Le Duan, the VDP was likewise extolled for its "glorious achievements, the relationship of unity, cordiality, long-standing cooperation, mutual assistance, and progress between the two parties."

CONFIDENTIAL

FRS 08200  
3 JULY 1974

- 24 -

TITO VISIT TO FRG: The lengthy communique issued at the end of Yugoslav President Tito's first official visit to the FRG 24-27 June reflected the emphasis on international affairs. Citing "a considerable similarity of views on many questions," the communique included agreed formulations on CSCE, the Middle East situation and international economic cooperation, while acknowledging differing FRG and Yugoslavia perspectives on the issue of the world's raw materials. While expressing understanding for the "justified concern" of the developing countries "for just prices and greater revenue from exports," the FRG noted that consumer countries are also "justified" in expecting to buy supplies at "appropriate prices." Yugoslavia on the other hand emphasized the "sovereign control" of the developing countries over their natural resources, "including the right to nationalization." On bilateral issues the communique reaffirmed the intentions outlined in the 1973 communique on Brandt's visit to Yugoslavia regarding the need to overcome the imbalance of trade and "take further steps" to improve the situation created by the half-million Yugoslavs working in the FRG. Though not referring specifically to the \$300 million loan on generous terms that the FRG granted to Yugoslavia a few days before the visit as partial compensation for war damages, the communique noted that the two sides had found a "mutually satisfactory solution" regarding the Tito-Brandt agreement on indemnification.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24 - 30 JUNE 1974

<u>Moscow (2551 items)</u>		<u>Peking (931 items)</u>	
Nixon in USSR	(--)	19%	Law of the Sea Conference (10%) 10%
China	(6%)	4%	Korea (--) 8%
Supreme Soviet Elections	(15%)	4%	[Korean War 24th Anniversary (--) 5%]
Chile	(3%)	4%	Criticism of Lin Piao and (10%) 7%
Arab-Israeli Issue	(5%)	3%	Confucius
Moscow International Technological, Economic Conference	(--)	3%	PRC/Venezuela Diplomatic Relations (--) 6%
			Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference, Kuala Lumpur
			Indochina (3%) 3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.