

TCP

34-74

STATSPEC

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300070035-0

Confidential

1 of 1

Trends in Communist Propaganda

21 August 74

**Confidential**



# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

21 AUGUST 1974  
(VOL. XXV, NO. 34)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.



STATSPEC

National Security Information  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

## CONTENTS

### CYPRUS

Moscow Ambivalent on Turkish Action, Holds Options Open. . . . .	1
USSR, Warsaw Pact Allies Comment on Greek Withdrawal From NATO . . . .	6

### U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Soviet Scholar Sees Institutionalization of Detente in U.S. . . . .	9
---	---

### EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Moscow Plugs Brezhnev Call for Nuclear-Free Mediterranean. . . . .	11
--	----

### PORTUGAL

USSR Laudatory, Optimistic on Portugal's African Policy. . . . .	12
--	----

### VIETNAM

President's Speech Assailed, Calls for Thieu Ouster Revived. . . . .	14
--	----

### CHINA

New Stress on "Self-Criticism" Narrows Anti-Lin Biao Campaign. . . . .	18
--	----

### KOREA

Pyongyang Denies Involvement in Pak Assassination Attempt. . . . .	20
--	----

### USSR

Polyanskiy's Agriculture Ministry Rebuked by Central Committee . . . .	21
--	----

### NOTE

Moscow, East Europe on Rockefeller Nomination. . . . .	24
--	----

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . . .	1
--	---

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 1 -

## C Y P R U S

## MOSCOW AMBIVALENT ON TURKISH ACTION, HOLDS OPTIONS OPEN

In an apparent propaganda holding operation, Moscow has been providing reportage on the fighting in Cyprus, which was renewed on 14 August, and related developments while generally confining comment to standard charges that "certain NATO circles" are responsible for the creation and continuation of the crisis. While not identifying the "narrow NATO circles," Soviet media have obliquely indicated Washington and London in citing French press comment on the failure of Anglo-Saxon diplomacy. Britain, Turkey and Greece, as guarantors under the 1960 agreement, have been indirectly criticized in charges that the "so-called reliable guarantees" were used for direct NATO interference in Cyprus' affairs. The guarantor states have been tagged as members of the narrow NATO circles attempting, through the Geneva talks, to solve the Cyprus question behind the backs of the Cypriot people. Moscow has also replayed American press criticism of U.S. policy as too inflexible and ineffective, too little and too late.

Soviet media carried straightforward reports of Turkey's second military offensive, initiated on the 14th, to seize the northern third of the island. Moscow seems undecided as to how to approach the de facto division of the island resulting from the Turkish action. TASS director general Zamyatin, for instance, seemed to intimate on the 18th that the Soviet Union was adapting to the idea of a federated Cyprus, but other radio and press commentators on the 18th and 20th again conveyed concern that "NATO circles," under cover of the tripartite guarantees, planned consolidation of the situation, thus dividing the republic. Such expressions of concern, voiced as the Geneva talks reopened on 8 August, had diminished with the onset of Turkey's renewed military operation.

In denigrating the aborted Geneva negotiations conducted within the "NATO family," Soviet comment has continued to press for an enhanced Security Council role. But Moscow's suggestions for council actions have not gone beyond renewed calls for a council mission to Cyprus with the imprecise function of "collecting objective information" on the situation, along with even more vague demands for a "reliable system of international guarantees" to replace the Zurich-London agreements "imposed" on Cyprus.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUG'IST 1974

- 2 -

Moscow has not commented on the murder of U.S. Ambassador Davies in Nicosia on the 19th, but TASS dispatches have pointed to an EOKA-B hand: The initial TASS report, citing Kliridhis' announcement of the killing of the ambassador, noted that according to an AP correspondent eyewitnesses at the demonstration said EOKA members fired at the embassy. And TASS later reported from London that Makarios had blamed Davies' death on EOKA-B.

**TURKISH OFFENSIVE** TASS reports factually covered the advance of Turkish troops, but Moscow has refrained from explicit criticism of Ankara's action. Some press comment, however, has subsequently indicated disapproval and even seemed to deflate Ankara's claims of military prowess. TASS on the 16th noted Prime Minister Ecevit's statement that Turkey did not intend to capture the whole island but, despite its strength, would stop where it planned "if the disputable issues" were settled at the negotiating table. Reports the same day on the taking of Morphou said this meant Turkey's operation for establishment of control over the northern part of Cyprus was probably nearing completion. TASS on the 18th suggested some misgivings about Ankara's intentions when it cited unidentified "political commentators" for the view that the capture of the village of Pyroi "has shifted Turkish positions far south of the lines which were presumed to become the southern limit of the part of the island controlled by the Turks."

Without naming Turkey, a Vladimirov article in IZVESTIYA on the 18th criticized the "NATO military" for the buildup of "NATO troops" on the island and for using "brute force." An article in the military organ RED STAR the same day directly addressed itself to the Turkish operation, in effect questioning Ankara's military abilities in observing that Turkish troops, variously estimated at 20,000 to 40,000, faced a "considerably inferior force" in both men and arms, with the National Guard numbering only 10,000 and "12 tanks." As for Greek mainland troops, RED STAR cited Prime Minister Karamanlis' statement that it was impossible to dispatch them because of the distance involved.

RED STAR also intimated that it required no great military astuteness to assess Ankara's intentions prior to the second assault: Some three days before resumption of military actions, the paper said, REUTER had reported Turkish deployment near Nicosia and intensified military activity on the Nicosia-Kyrenia road. And it noted that Prime Minister Ecevit had told journalists last month that the government was discussing construction of a seaport and an aircraft landing strip for the supply of Turkish troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 3 -

Moscow continues to urge implementation of Resolution 353 of 20 July and particularly the "key point" on withdrawal of foreign troops. In charging that troops were still being sent to the island, Soviet commentators have pointed to British reinforcements sent to the sovereign base areas as well as the presence of Turkish troops, and have noted that Greece has not withdrawn the officers who led the 15 July coup. TASS on the 18th factually reported Ecevit as saying that "a certain number of troops might possibly stay on in Cyprus if the security of the island requires it."

TASS' ZAMYATIN ON  
CYPRIOT "EQUALITY"

TASS Director General Zamyatin, who seems to have been assuming the mantle of unofficial spokesman on the Cyprus situation, seemed in a broadcast on the 16th to be offering a hint that Moscow acknowledged the reality of the situation on the ground in Cyprus and might be amenable to a federated Cyprus. At the same time, however, other comment has again voiced apprehension over threats to Cyprus' independence and territorial integrity. Zamyatin concluded his comments on a domestic service feature program on Cyprus by stating the Soviet attitude that the internal affairs of Cyprus, "its constitutional arrangement," must be decided by the Cypriots themselves, both Greek and Turkish, on the basis of "equality" and without any outside interference. Zamyatin underscored the "equality" aspect, but not the reference to constitutional arrangements, by repeating it in a foreign-language commentary broadcast on the 19th. This commentary may have been drawn from an article he wrote in SOVIET RUSSIA, reviewed by TASS late on the 18th; the formula did not appear in TASS' summary of the article, which is not yet available in full. Previously, Moscow has supported, as in the 28 July Soviet government statement, the inalienable right of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to decide "their problems" themselves, to decide the future of their common motherland. Past repetitions of this formula have also asserted that the Cypriots should decide their fate "without outside interference."

Zamyatin first discussed the Cyprus issue in a new Moscow radio feature "International Situation--Questions and Answers" inaugurated by Moscow's domestic service on 10 August. Zamyatin then teamed up with Moscow radio/TV political observer Viktor Shragin, who had also participated in the earlier program, for the live broadcast feature on the 16th "On the Situation in Cyprus." It was in this broadcast--two days after Turkey had initiated its new military drive on Cyprus--that Zamyatin came out for "equality" in Cypriot decision-making.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 4 -

In this program, with Shragin playing the interlocutor, Zamyatin reviewed Turkey's proposals at the Geneva conference, offering no judgments on Ankara's suggestion that Cyprus should remain an independent state with two federated, autonomous "cantons" which would have "equal rights," and which would set up a federal government. In Turkey's opinion, Zamyatin noted, the Turkish Cypriot canton should hold 33 percent of the territory of Cyprus-- "in fact the territory which the Turkish troops have occupied by this date." Zamyatin observed that the Greek side found these proposals unacceptable, "believing they would lead to a division of the island into two parts." He went on to cite Greece as supporting preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and quoted the 14 August Turkish Government statement as stressing that Turkey had no territorial claims in Cyprus and did not pursue the aim of the island's militarization.

CRITICISM OF PARTITION      Whatever the authoritative-ness of Zamyatin's new formula, other commentators have again voiced qualms about possible partition. The RED STAR article on the 18th reiterated charges of "backstage and open" attempts by certain NATO circles to confront the world with partition as a fait accompli. IZVESTIYA the same day complained that under cover of the tripartite agreements "certain NATO circles" were trying to put an end to Cyprus' sovereignty and national independence.

On the 20th, a domestic service commentary by Kosovan noted that reports "appear in foreign papers" on establishing a state of Cyprus consisting of two autonomous administrations based on the territorial principle, and went on to urge that the Cypriots, Greeks and Turks, be given the opportunity and conditions to live and work together for the good of a sovereign, independent, and "territorially viable" Cyprus. And Shalygin in a foreign-language commentary the same day declared that the island "is being divided and the republic split up." Turkey, he said, was trying to present demands for "an allegedly federal solution," bypassing the legitimate government of Cyprus. IZVESTIYA correspondent Mikhaylov, in the weekly domestic service observers' roundtable on the 18th, also suggested disapproval in commenting that in conditions where "chauvinism can run riot" and where "foreign armed forces" are engaged in military actions, passions are inflamed and "the existence of the sovereign state and its territorial integrity" are endangered.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 5 -

PRAVDA OBSERVER  
ON GUARANTEES

The most authoritative Soviet comment since the new Turkish military operations were launched on the 14th came in a PRAVDA Observer article the following day which repeated standard charges of NATO interference in Cyprus affairs and urged implementation of Resolution 353. The Observer article introduced a new Soviet notion of the need to provide UN guarantees of the "legitimate rights" of the Cypriot people. Observer argued that the development of events on Cyprus had demonstrated the "complete groundlessness of NATO propaganda" regarding the "so-called reliability" of the guarantees assumed by Britain, Greece and Turkey under the Zurich-London agreements. Rather than insuring peace, freedom and independence for Cyprus, Observer said, the guarantees were "used for direct NATO interference" in Cyprus' internal affairs. Observer maintained that the people of Cyprus need "really reliable" guarantees of peace, independence, and integrity.

PRAVDA seemed to be laying the groundwork for Malik's call later on the 15th in the Security Council for a "more effective and dependable system of guarantees" which would insure Cyprus' independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to TASS' account on the 16th, Malik urged that such guarantees should replace the "vicious system" of decisions on Cyprus being taken within "narrow NATO circles." Subsequent comment, such as Vladimirov's IZVESTIYA article on the 18th, has echoed the demand for "reliable" guarantees.

U.S. ROLE

Moscow has noted without comment U.S. diplomatic contacts with Greece and Turkey, reporting that Greece declined a U.S. proposal for Foreign Minister Mavros to go to Washington for talks and that Karamanlis later declined Secretary Kissinger's invitation for him to have talks in Washington with President Ford. TASS also reported Ecevit as saying, after meeting with the American ambassador, that the United States "supports our demand" for establishment of a federal system based on geographic division of the island, and cited him later as remarking that in Turkey's opinion the United States had acted "objectively and constructively" in the Cyprus question. (According to an AFP report, Ecevit used the same expression in describing the Soviet attitude.)

TASS and Moscow radio reported Secretary Kissinger's 19 August press conference in slightly varying accounts. Both noted that in a statement approved by President Ford, he said the United States would insist on compliance with the cease-fire and would

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 6 -

support efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table. The radio account added that the United States would help organize these talks (Kissinger in fact said the United States would play any role requested by the parties, and was prepared to support Foreign Secretary Callaghan's efforts in this regard.) TASS said the Secretary "stressed" that Turkey should show flexibility at the talks, Moscow radio adding that he said Turkey would have to take into account Greek views both in the matter of territory and the amount of armed forces on the island. According to TASS, Kissinger said Ecevit had assured him that Turkey would implement the cease-fire agreement and that it was clear from their phone conversation that the size of Turkey's occupation area could be reduced. The Secretary's statement in fact made no mention of Turkish assurances about the cease-fire, but did say Turkey considered the demarcation line negotiable and would carry out the Geneva agreement provisions on phased reduction of troops on the island.

Scattered indirect criticism of Washington's actions has come in the form of pickups of U.S. press comment. For example, a panelist on the weekly observers' roundtable, broadcast by the domestic service on the 18th, said the Athens AKROPOLIS considered that the July coup in Cyprus was carried out "with the knowledge of American diplomats," and he went on to assert that the New York TIMES "confirmed" this, writing that Washington bore the "main portion of the blame" for the tragedy in Cyprus. The panelist added that the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR "believes that the CIA had a hand in events" and that American Ambassador Tasca "was informed about what was going on."

#### USSR, WARSAW PACT ALLIES COMMENT ON GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO

Moscow reacted promptly to Greece's announcement on 15 August that it was withdrawing its armed forces from NATO. Initial comment was cautious as to the reasons behind the withdrawal, however, with the most candid comment coming only on the 19th when TASS director general Leonid Zamyatin stated that the action was "a reply" to the efforts of NATO's "leading states" to force Greece to accept unspecified "decisions" to settle the Cyprus crisis with Turkey. East European propaganda has been generally more forthcoming, with commentators portraying the withdrawal as pressure on NATO to act against Turkey.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 7 -

TASS on the 16th noted Western speculation that the withdrawal "may spark off the strongest crisis" in NATO since 1966, but Moscow's comment has been restrained in comparison to reaction to France's withdrawal that year, which had been depicted as a "grave crisis" affecting the very future of NATO. TASS on the 16th did cite NATO fears that the loss of Greece would weaken the "strategically important" southeastern flank of the alliance, and on the 17th the news agency reported NATO Secretary General Luns' statement that the alliance had indeed been "weakened." Also on the 17th PRAVDA commentator Yuriy Yakhontov estimated that Greece's move indicated that "faith" in the objectives and tasks of NATO was declining among its participants and he foresaw a growing conviction that "there is no future" for NATO.

The Greek action has been explained primarily as the result of an inevitable conflict between the "militarism" of NATO and the "national interests" of its individual members, a theme that was also used in separate Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts beamed to Asia that paralleled the status of smaller countries in NATO to those of SEATO and CENTO. The withdrawal also was attributed to rising "anti-Americanism" in Greece and to the inability of NATO to fulfill its role as "peace guarantor" between conflicting states.

REACTION FROM EAST EUROPE Judging from available propaganda, Bulgaria--neighbor to both Greece and Turkey--has refrained from comment on the Greek withdrawal from NATO, as has another Greek neighbor, PRC-aligned Albania. Romania has reported the action without comment, although an Athens paper quoted the Romanian ambassador to Greece as praising the withdrawal. Nonaligned Yugoslavia has used the situation to criticize all military alliances.

Both Poland and Czechoslovakia portrayed the withdrawal as primarily pressure on NATO to act against Turkey, Warsaw's PA on the 15th describing it as "only blackmail" and Prague radio on the 14th noting that Greece had "left the back door open," presumably referring to Athens' continued political ties with the Alliance. In a reference to the 1966 situation, Budapest's MTI on the 17th pointed out that the Karamanlis government has not the same "determination, sincerity and prestige" as had de Gaulle. MTI predicted that even though U.S.-Greek relations had become "tense," Athens would not "want or dare to touch" American military privileges. A Budapest TV commentator on the 19th indicated uncertainty over the Greek political situation and over the intentions

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 8 -

of the Karamanlis government in remarking that "people are waiting for the government to make a move--to the right or to the left; the outcome of the [internal political] struggle cannot be predicted yet."

Yugoslavia's position was spelled out by Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic on the 17th. Belgrade, he said, had not considered it appropriate to issue a statement for fear of making "a difficult situation for Greece even more difficult," considering that the United States "will do everything possible . . . to make" Greece return to the military alliance. Sundic added, however, that the government considered the action "very, very significant and far-reaching"; he attributed the withdrawal to Greek awareness that "membership in military alliances cannot guarantee anybody's independence and security, particularly not that of small countries."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 9 -

## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

### SOVIET SCHOLAR SEES INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DETENTE IN U.S.

A Soviet observer of U.S. affairs writing in the USA Institute's monthly journal has presented evidence suggesting that the new trends in U.S. foreign policy associated with the Administration of former President Nixon--particularly the pursuit of detente with Moscow--are being institutionalized in the foreign policy apparatus. S.B. Chetverikov, writing in the August issue of USA signed to press before President Nixon's resignation, noted that such steps as Kissinger's appointment as Secretary of State serve to insure the continuity of U.S. foreign policy regardless of the results of future elections. Chetverikov's article is only the latest in a series of articles by Soviet Americanologists in recent months which have stressed the fundamental nature of what they perceive as new, favorable trends in U.S. foreign policy. While addressed primarily to the longer term evolution of U.S. policy, these articles clearly serve the subsidiary purpose of justifying a continuing pursuit of U.S.-Soviet detente despite the uncertainties raised by the change in U.S. administration.

The Chetverikov article described a consistent pattern of action by the Administration "for the organizational registration and consolidation of the [new] foreign policy course and for its introduction into the activity of the state apparatus, that is, for its institutionalization." In addition to Kissinger's appointment and a move to ease bureaucratic resistance through greater involvement of the executive apparatus in the early stages of policy formation, the author claimed to see an intention in the White House to improve relations with Congress, restoring the "essential balance" of power between the two, in order to consolidate support for the new trends in foreign policy in that branch of government as well.

Chetverikov argued that one of the motives of the White House in retaining Kissinger in his National Security Council role while appointing him to head the State Department bureaucracy was to aid in curbing the Pentagon's influence on the formation of foreign policy. According to the article, the carefully planned institutionalization process also "attests to the fact that the desire for detente has become deeply rooted in all the most important, decisive spheres of American political life."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 10 -

U.S. DEBATE ON DETENTE      Americanologists such as Chetverikov, in attempting to assess the impact on U.S. foreign policy of a detente environment, have acknowledged that a simple pro and con division of American opinion on relations with Moscow is no longer sufficient to describe the complexity of the current situation among American observers and practitioners of foreign policy. USA Institute director Arbatov, for example, in a 13 July IZVESTIYA article discussing the recent summit showed considerable concern over the fact that some earlier supporters of detente were losing interest in the cause as the threat of nuclear war receded. Warning of the work left to be done, Arbatov criticized particularly U.S. liberals who like young butterflies "flutter from one fashionable political craze to another."

Despite this recognition of new complications, such Soviet observers of the American scene have discerned a broadly favorable trend in U.S. foreign policy thought and hence in the theoretical guidelines governing the formation of U.S. policy. USA Institute deputy head V.V. Zhurkin, for example, while noting that a preponderance of those U.S. figures criticizing "globalists" were only arguing for a more "selective" application of U.S. power in the world, argued in the June issue of USA that the emergence of a significant body of opinion espousing a more complete rejection of force in favor of diplomacy was "symptomatic" of new currents within the United States. A monograph on U.S. foreign policy reviewed in the same issue of USA emphasized that U.S. foreign policy had changed in "substance" as well as form.

Other articles in USA and WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, the organ of the institute of the same name, have over the last year detected new vitality in U.S. policy debates said to be exerting a moderating influence on U.S. intentions in such regions as the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. For example in the November 1973 issue of WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Yuriy Yartsev argued that "the very fact debate is developing over this question [of U.S. policy in the Mediterranean] is an important and noteworthy symptom of the new trends which are making themselves felt in American public opinion."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 11 -

## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

## MOSCOW PLUGS BREZHNEV CALL FOR NUCLEAR-FREE MEDITERRANEAN

The call for withdrawing U.S. and Soviet nuclear-armed vessels from the Mediterranean introduced by Brezhnev into his speech to the Polish Sejm on 21 July has been given new currency by Moscow in recent days. Articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA on 14 and 17 August, respectively, recalled Brezhnev's proposal in commenting on current world developments, particularly as they bore on the general status of East-West relations. Although both articles noted the relevance of the proposal to the current Cyprus crisis, neither expressed any particular urgency over the need to implement it. Rather, both stressed the importance of the proposal as an index of the Soviet Union's peaceful role in world affairs and as a potential contribution to East-West detente. The IZVESTIYA article reviewed favorable world reaction to Brezhnev's speech.

Although Brezhnev's remarks before the Polish Sejm constituted his most specific proposal for arms control measures in the Mediterranean to date, he has alluded to the subject in more general terms on several occasions over the past decade. His best known previous statement on the subject was his call at the 24th CPSU Congress for "turning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and friendly cooperation." Although he did not specify nuclear disarmament in that statement, he had earlier called for a "nuclear-free zone" in the Mediterranean at Karlovy Vary in 1967, and (along with Kosygin and Podgornyy) in a message to the Bulgarian leaders on the Bulgarian national holiday in 1969. The first official Soviet proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean was made in a 20 May 1963 note to the United States in response to the initial deployment of U.S. nuclear missile submarines in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 12 -

## PORTUGAL

### USSR LAUDATORY, OPTIMISTIC ON PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN POLICY

In comment on Portugal's efforts in recent weeks to achieve a political settlement for its three African colonies, Moscow has welcomed with unqualified approval the Portuguese provisional government's decision, announced by President Spinoza on 27 July, to move immediately toward granting full independence to Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola. The new policy on decolonization signified a sharp change from Portugal's previous position, which required that the political destiny of its colonies be determined through referenda and which recommended that the colonies elect to enter a confederation with Portugal. Soviet media have hailed the change in policy as a historic decision, beneficial to all sides, and in following the subsequent course of the policy's implementation have expressed confidence that Lisbon is sincere and that each of its African colonies will achieve full independence.

Moscow media had praised the mid-July Portuguese cabinet changes as presaging further democratization and TASS had reported Prime Minister Goncalves' initial policy statement on 18 July declaring that Portugal recognized the colonies' right to independence and that a government statement on the issue would be forthcoming. But Soviet comment has avoided any assessment of the decolonization policy change in terms of the internal Portuguese political line-up, instead typically viewing the new policy in generalized terms as a victorious culmination of national liberation struggles by the colonies for over a decade against "fascist Portugal supported by a NATO arsenal."

A Moscow radio correspondent and specialist on African affairs, Vladimir Dunayev, acknowledged on 4 August that Soviet media were avoiding analysis of the factors behind Portugal's change in policy. Speaking on the weekly observers' roundtable on Moscow's domestic service, Dunayev remarked that observers in the West had recently been "guessing who it was that insisted on this in Portugal's new provisional government, who obstructed its previous passage, and so on." Dunayev allowed that "possibly it would be worth while having analysts and historians examine this," but professed to believe that at present what was important was not to ascertain the extent to which the change in policy had been "dictated by political and military necessity," but rather to applaud the fact of that change. Dunayev was only slightly more



CONFIDENTIAL

PMIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 13 -

forthcoming in the roundtable program on 19 August. Quoting from an unspecified interview given by Luis Cabral, head of the State Council of Guinea-Bissau, Dunayev noted that Cabral had been asked "how he explains the changes in Lisbon's position" on the colonies. Cabral, answering vaguely that democratic forces had recognized Portugal's true interests and had realized that democratization of the country required liberation from its colonial burden, observed in passing that "possibly among members of the Portuguese government, as in the Armed Forces Movement itself, there was no common, clear-cut position on the colonies." Dunayev characterized Cabral's explanation as having expressed "the very essence of the problem."

# OBSTACLES, PROSPECTS

In presenting an optimistic view of Portugal's decision to grant full independence to its African colonies, Soviet commentators have also warned that a variety of obstacles remain that may hinder its implementation, principally in Mozambique and Angola. Moscow radio's roundtable discussion on 19 August detailed several of these obstacles, giving primary attention to alleged plans of "white extremist settlers" in league with outside mercenary detachments. To underscore their warnings, Soviet commentators have drawn analogies with other decolonization experiences in recent African history, raising in this regard the specter of violence and turmoil resulting from mercenaries (Congo), a French-style "secret army" (Algeria), white separatism (Rhodesia), and "Katangization" (Congo). In addition, the regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia have been singled out as particular dangers, prepared to undermine decolonization of Mozambique and Angola through threats, propaganda, and military force. An unattributed commentary, broadcast by Moscow radio to Africa on 20 August, for instance, asserted that both regimes had concentrated troops along their borders with the Portuguese territories and were "hatching plans of armed intervention." Nevertheless, while taking note of various real and imagined obstacles that remain on the colonies' path to full independence, Soviet comment overall has exhibited a clear consensus that the major impediments have been overcome and that Portugal can soon turn its full attention to domestic problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 14 -

## VIETNAM

## PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ASSAILED, CALLS FOR THIEU OUSTER REVIVED

Vietnamese communist media have reacted with striking vigor to President Ford's remarks on Vietnam in his 12 August speech, which they have interpreted as evidence of his intent to pursue the "bankrupt" policies of the Nixon Administration. Both the PRG and the DRV issued foreign ministry statements on the speech--on the 15th and 17th, respectively--complaining that the new President has given assurances that U.S. Vietnam policy will not be changed, a policy they see as marked by continued assistance to the Thieu administration.

Even more notably, Hanoi press comment pegged to President Ford's speech has revived references to the southern people's struggle "to topple" the Thieu regime and to form a new regime which would implement the Paris agreement, restore peace, and achieve "national concord." Since the signing of the Paris peace agreement in January 1973, which the communists have interpreted as temporarily legitimizing both the Thieu and PRG administrations, Hanoi has called for opposition to Thieu but has stopped short of calling for the elimination of his government. The context and timing of the reappearance of the formulation on Thieu's ouster may mean that the communists have become even less sanguine regarding an achievement of their goals through the implementation of the peace agreement and that they have taken a decision to press their struggle in the South more vigorously and more openly, particularly in the urban areas.

PRG, DRV REACTION TO  
PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

While both the PRG and the DRV foreign ministries assailed President Ford's remarks in his speech before Congress as showing that previous policies on Vietnam would be continued, Vietnamese communist comment generally has avoided the personal vilification that has been aimed at former President Nixon since his resignation.\*

The PRG statement on the 15th interpreted the President's remarks on U.S. determination to see the observance of the Paris agreement as "demanding" respect for the agreement by the Vietnamese people

---

\* For a discussion of earlier Vietnamese communist reaction to President Ford's succession, see the TRENDS of 14 August 1974, pages 4-6.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 15 -

while making no mention of U.S. responsibility. The DRV statement two days later glossed over the President's actual remarks on the peace agreement, claiming that "the policy of the United States is to make a wreck of peace and the Paris agreement. The PRG statement saw evidence in the speech that the new Administration will continue "all-sided assistance" to the Thieu administration. And the DRV, embellishing the President's remarks on continued assistance to allies in Asia, claimed that "Gerald Ford stated that he would pursue Nixon's policy on Vietnam and would continue military and economic aid to the Nguyen Van Thieu administration."

The lengthy 15 August NHAN DAN editorial pegged to the President's 12 August address--mainly a chronicle of the Nixon Administration's policies on Vietnam--reiterated the oft-repeated Hanoi contention that the "basic and root cause" of Nixon's downfall stemmed from his "failure" in Vietnam. It quoted President Ford's 12 August remarks on Indochina in full and interpreted them to mean that Ford had not learned the lessons of the Nixon Administration and that he still "advocates continuing the U.S. neocolonialist war in South Vietnam." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article the same day, consistent with the other propaganda, took exception to the President's statement about observing the Paris agreement, claiming that it was made despite "systematic sabotage" of the agreement by the United States and Saigon.

**REMOVAL OF THIEU** The revival of claims that the people in the South were struggling "to topple" Thieu and form a new government appeared first on the 15th in Hanoi broadcasts in Vietnamese of the NHAN DAN editorial and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Commentator article on President Ford's 12 August address. In both the editorial and the Commentator article, the reference to the effort to overthrow Thieu came shortly after a standard evaluation of former President Nixon's resignation as a reflection of U.S. difficulties and weaknesses. The Commentator article, for example, maintained that Thieu's "U.S. masters are experiencing political difficulties, economic recession, and critical inflation, and are in a passive position at home and abroad."

The formulation was subsequently repeated on the 19th in a Liberation Radio commentary and the Hanoi radio version of a NHAN DAN editorial, both marking the 29th anniversary of the August Revolution.\* The

---

\* VNA in its English-language transmission carried excerpts of the NHAN DAN editorials of the 15th and 19th which omitted the passages on Thieu's ouster.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 16 -

19 August NHAN DAN editorial, while not directly stating that the circumstances surrounding former President Nixon's resignation redounded to the advantage of the communists in South Vietnam, implied that new opportunities now exist and referred to the resignation in the context of the struggle against Thieu:

In coordination with the fighting of the PLAF, which is vigorously attacking the enemy on many fronts, the compatriots in the southern cities are struggling to demand the overthrow of Thieu--a devoted, faithful valet of blood-thirsty aggressor Nixon who was eliminated--in order to set up a government in Saigon approving the implementation of the Paris agreement . . . .

The new formulation, presenting the objective of the overthrow of the GVN as a goal for the people in the southern cities, may indicate that the communists will be putting new stress on gaining support in the urban areas controlled by the Saigon government. Propaganda following the peace agreement had previously indicated that the "urban struggle" was focusing on demands for "peace, independence, democracy, a decent life, and national concord."

BACKGROUND: Hanoi's current revival of the call for the overthrow of Thieu and formation of a new government brings to mind the blueprint for revolution spelled out by North Vietnamese party First Secretary Le Duan in his programmatic February 1970 article which has been the major public document guiding Hanoi's policies in the years following Ho Chi Minh's death in September 1969. In that article, Le Duan stressed the importance of "flexibility" and prompt changes in strategy and tactics to adapt to new factors and possibilities. While placing great weight on the gradual strengthening of political and military forces, Le Duan also maintained that "seizing the right opportunity is an extremely important matter" and added that: "The opportunity can be created by the real strength of the revolution in the country and can also be brought about by the situation abroad." When the revolution is strong, Le Duan postulated, then "opportunities and advantages" will appear to develop "high tides" in the struggle and the only problem will be the "clear-sightedness and particular sensitivity of the leaders" to take advantage of them. He cited Lenin in stressing that it is important for leaders to grasp the fundamental direction of developments and dare to "act boldly."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 17 -

The current calls for overthrowing Thieu--rather than demanding social goals and Saigon compliance with the peace agreement--in effect represent a change in the communists' slogans, and Le Duan's 1970 article indicated the significance of such changes when it pointed out that: "The art of guiding revolutionary tactics, strategy, and struggle is manifested first by putting forward sharp, appropriate slogans compatible with the concrete situations." He cited Lenin as criticizing "those who, confronted with the sudden turning points of history, could not respond to the new situation but still clung to old slogans, slogans that were still correct yesterday but devoid of significance today." Le Duan also stressed the importance of the timing of new slogans, warning that "bringing the masses into offensives that are too late or too early is dangerous to the revolution."

Basic to Le Duan's argument and to the communists' actions and policies since the signing of the peace agreement is the assumption that circumstances sometimes require the adoption of limited demands rather than the open advocacy of ultimate goals, but that this is done with the knowledge that partial measures and reforms will not achieve the final objective and that only "revolutionary violence" can bring about the seizure of administrative power.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 18 -

## CHINA

## NEW STRESS ON 'SELF-CRITICISM' NARROWS ANTI-LIN PIAO CAMPAIGN

Peking's resolve to keep the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius under party control was again pointed up in an article in the August RED FLAG which appears aimed at curtailing criticism of errant cadres by the masses. Entitled "Be Promoters of Revolutionary Unity," the article called upon leading cadres at all levels to lead the masses "to talk less about others' shortcomings and mistakes and let others talk about their own shortcomings and mistakes," and it stressed the need to narrow the target of attack by "concentrating our animosity on the Lin Piao anti-party clique." The new guidelines on self-criticism appear designed to stop the campaign from deteriorating into a mire of debilitating recriminations between local factions which, as in the cultural revolution, Peking would find difficult to control and damaging to the economic base. Opposition to the new line was indicated by the article's admission that some people regard encouraging self-criticism as "blurring the line between right and wrong," but it declared flatly that "they are wrong."

The article singled out certain "wrong practices" as "detrimental to revolutionary unity," noting that "deviations in orientation" had resulted from people "ceaselessly harping on certain issues" and "opposing self-criticism among comrades." Indicating that differences between factional groups should be put aside to achieve greater unity, the article stressed that there is "no reason whatsoever" for divisiveness in criticizing Lin and declared that "it is necessary to be relentless in opposing the enemy and to be friendly with our comrades." The article lashed out at certain enemies of the masses who seek to "instigate dissension and create trouble," complicating "problems which are originally not hard to solve."

The RED FLAG article's stress on achieving greater unity by overcoming shortcomings through self-criticism has thus far been echoed only in a 17 August Canton broadcast on the method used by a local county revolutionary committee to strengthen unity among feuding mass groups. The report told how a member of the revolutionary committee visited a poster writer regarding several sentences in his poster mentioning "certain shortcomings and errors of mass organizations whose views differed from those held by the writer." The revolutionary committee member pointed out to the poster writer that the main thrust of the campaign should be aimed at "Lin Piao's anti-party clique" and "not at the masses." The poster writer was instructed to "let people talk about their own shortcomings and errors."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIU TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 19 -

**BACKGROUND** For the past several months other authoritative articles in the central media have denounced factionalism and urged greater unity in conducting the campaign, but none has sought to substitute self-criticism for mass criticism as a major means of atonement. An article in the June issue of RED FLAG on strengthening unity, for example, contained no mention of self-criticism as a means for cadres under attack to return to the correct path. It stressed instead the need "to mobilize the masses to expose problems and criticize mistakes in order to make the problems clear and distinguish between right and wrong." By encouraging self-criticism and downplaying mass criticism, the new guidelines in the RED FLAG article recall an earlier stage of the long campaign against Lin. In January 1973 cadres were encouraged to press on with the anti-Lin campaign under the slogan that "criticism of revisionism comes first and only then rectification of the style of work," implying that only the close followers of Lin were under current attack. By February of this year, however, the movement had heated up and cadres were warned in an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial that the campaign would be a "test for every leading comrade." The editorial had called upon the masses to "rise in action" and carry out their role as the main force in the campaign.

**RED GUARDS** Perhaps symbolizing the themes of moderation and unity now being pressed, the eighth anniversary of Mao's 18 August 1966 Peking reception of Red Guards was marked in an unusually subdued manner this year, drawing comment only from Chekiang. Last year the anniversary of Mao's 18 August Red Guard reception triggered three PEOPLE'S DAILY articles as well as several provincial radio reports on youth settling in the countryside. The 18 August Chekiang commemoration this year did not call for a return to cultural revolution activism, but rather replayed themes common in recent reports from other provinces on the current status of Red Guards. It praised local youths for their contributions in building up the countryside, noted that many youths have been admitted to the party, and called for all youths to deepen their study of Mao's works and promote production. The current orderly role of Red Guard groups was illustrated in a 10 August NCNA report on Shanghai activities for vacationing students which revealed that Red Guard units are working with local militia units and taking part in night patrols in order to play "an active role in maintaining social order."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 20 -

## K O R E A

### PYONGYANG DENIES INVOLVEMENT IN PAK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT

North Korean reaction to the 15 August attempted assassination of ROK President Pak--initially limited to brief accounts of the incident and the death of Mrs. Pak--escalated sharply following South Korean charges on the 17th that the DPRK and the pro-DPRK General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon) were directly involved. DPRK denials of involvement were numerous and vigorous, including a KCNA authorized statement and a foreign ministry spokesman's statement on 19 August, and commentaries in NODONG SINMUN and MINJU CHOSON on the 20th.

Countering with its own propaganda attack, the KCNA statement accused Seoul of using the incident to divert world attention from the situation in the South, denying any connection with the assassin, whom it designated as a "criminal." The statement further claimed that "world opinion" views the incident as the "natural outcome" of Seoul's repressive policies "or probably a crafty plot" to save the South's rulers. Playing on the latter theme, the statement accused ROK and Japanese authorities of using the incident to crack down on Chongnyon and mute anti-Pak sentiment among Koreans in Japan. Demonstrating the North's concern on this point, the foreign ministry spokesman at the 19 August press conference strongly emphasized that Seoul and Tokyo were implicating Chongnyon so they could suppress it.

Pyongyang's response to these events is in marked contrast to its reaction during the January 1968 abortive attempt on Pak's life by infiltrators from the North. Then, Pyongyang media ignored Seoul's charges of Northern involvement and, extensively reporting on the group's exploits as they attempted to elude capture, referred to them as "armed guerrillas of the revolutionary South Korean people."

PEKING, MOSCOW      Peking's only response to the affair thus far has been a brief 16 August NCNA account of the shooting with the comment, attributed to Kyodo News Agency, that the incident reflects the present tense situation in South Korea. A 16 August Moscow broadcast in Korean cited "foreign observers" as attributing the incident to Pak's "relentless oppression," and an unattributed 19 August commentary on Moscow radio claimed the "democratic press abroad" viewed the incident as a sign of worsening political struggle in the South and alienation of the South Korean public.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 21 -

## U S S R

## POLYANSKIY'S AGRICULTURE MINISTRY REBUKED BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

In an implicit slap at Agriculture Minister and Politburo member Polyanskiy, a Central Committee decree published in the 10 August PRAVDA rebuked the Ministry for poor training of agricultural personnel. The criticism is surprising, since Polyanskiy, who was appointed to head the ministry in February 1973 when it was under sharp attack for bureaucratic inertia and resistance to innovation, has already taken steps to improve the ministry's training program and personnel policy. This suggests that he is being criticized not just for a general failure to correct inherited shortcomings but also for his specific policy positions as minister.

The Central Committee decree pointed out "serious shortcomings" in the ministry's training of leaders and specialists of kolkhozes and sovkhoses and "demanded a radical improvement" in this work and a revision of the ministry's training curricula. In a 14 August editorial on the decree, IZVESTIYA declared that, despite periodic revisions, "year in year out" the ministry includes "second-rate subjects" in its training programs while neglecting study of current problems, scientific achievements and new methods of organization and administration of production. Ironically, a 2 January 1974 radio broadcast had already stated that the ministry had made big changes in training of specialists, revising the curricula in universities and technical schools to include more teaching of planning, finance, cost accounting and new agricultural specializations.

**PAST ATTACKS ON MINISTRY**      The decree comes against a background of criticism and administrative changes reflecting dissatisfaction with the entrenched agricultural bureaucracy. The ministry had come under sharp criticism in 1972 when V. V. Matskevich was still minister. In PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, RURAL LIFE and SOVIET RUSSIA it was accused of slowness in promoting new methods of administration and new forms of labor organization, such as unregulated mechanized links. In the 19 January 1972 PRAVDA, I. N. Kuznetsov, deputy head of the Central Committee's agriculture section, complained that innovations were being introduced "extremely slowly" and declared the promotion of scientific achievements "a most important duty" of the ministry. In an April 1972 PARTY LIFE article Kuznetsov praised the unregulated mechanized link system as having "a great future." Shortly thereafter, he was appointed deputy minister of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 22 -

agriculture, and in the 29 August 1972 RURAL LIFE, in answer to a 25 March 1972 attack on the ministry in the same paper, he acknowledged that the introduction of innovations in kolkhozes and sovkhoses was the ministry's "weakest sector" of work and announced that the ministry had adopted new measures to improve this work. On 2 September 1972 RURAL LIFE announced that the ministry had organized a council on economic education to improve training of ministry cadres and Kuznetsov was named chairman of the council.

On 2 February 1973, after heading the ministry for almost 14 years, Matskevich was removed and replaced by Polyanskiy, who was demoted from the post of First Deputy Premier to take over the ministry. Official dissatisfaction with the work of the agricultural bureaucracy--for which Polyanskiy bore ultimate responsibility as First Deputy Premier--was made even clearer when the Central Committee shortly thereafter called a conference of party secretaries of agricultural organs. With Central Committee Agriculture Secretary Kulakov supervising, the conference, as reported in a June 1973 PARTY LIFE, stressed the need to end the ministry's bureaucratic work style and improve its receptivity to new methods.

Since Polyanskiy's appointment, three of the nine deputy ministers have been replaced. Deputy minister for construction A. F. Dubrovin was fired in May 1973 in connection with bribetaking by his subordinates and was replaced by deputy rural construction minister I. P. Bystryukov. Longtime deputy minister K. S. Nazarenko was pensioned off in October 1973 and replaced by deputy RSFSR agriculture minister A. A. Goltsov. And a 10 April 1974 Council of Ministers decree pensioned off G. G. Petrov, longtime deputy minister in charge of cadres, and replaced him with A. A. Pomortsev, secretary of the ministry's party organization. Pomortsev had become party chief in mid 1972 after the arrest of one of Matskevich's assistants for bribetaking had shaken the ministry. A 2 July 1972 PRAVDA article had described the corruption in the ministry and quoted the new party secretary's promise to clean up the mess.

DIFFERENCES OVER POLICY      In correcting the ministry's shortcomings, Polyanskiy may be handicapped by the fact that he probably disagrees with some of the innovations his ministry is being urged to promote and by the fact that some of his deputies appear to be proteges of other Politburo members and may support innovations he opposes. One of the new methods of labor organization urged most strongly on the ministry is the unregulated mechanized link system. Through the years Polyanskiy has consistently ignored the link system, and only after heavy pressure during 1972 and 1973 did

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FPIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 23 -

deputy minister A. P. Chubarov promise in the 15 August 1973 PRAVDA that the ministry soon would issue recommendations on the links. Unlike Polyanskiy, both new deputy ministers appointed in 1972, I. N. Kuznetsov and L. I. Khitrin, appear to favor links and neither appears indebted to Polyanskiy for his job. Kuznetsov previously was an assistant to Kulakov in the Central Committee agriculture section, while first deputy minister Khitrin was a Belorussian deputy premier and protege of Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, who has been promoting his own pet agricultural innovations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 24 -

## NOTE

MOSCOW, EAST EUROPE ON ROCKEFELLER NOMINATION: Moscow promptly reported President Ford's nomination of Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President on 20 August, and initial comment has echoed that on Ford's assumption of the Presidency in expressing optimism regarding the continuity of U.S. foreign policy. Reporting Rockefeller's selection, a Moscow domestic radio commentator observed that "it is pertinent to recall that in 1972 he highly evaluated the steps taken by the governments of the USSR and the United States toward improving their mutual relations."

Scattered initial comment from Moscow's allies has favorably noted that Mr. Rockefeller is part of the liberal wing of the Republican Party and a proponent of realism in foreign policy, who can thus be expected to work well with President Ford in continuing the policy of detente. Without explicitly mentioning the Rockefeller family's connection with Chase Manhattan Bank, an East Berlin domestic service commentator on the 20th pointed to the presence of a subsidiary of the bank in Moscow as an indication that the nominee views promotion of economic relations with the Soviet Union as an important element of detente. A talk carried by Budapest TV the same day viewed Governor Rockefeller's willingness to accept the Vice Presidential nomination as evidence of the Republican Party's concern to restore its prestige, which had been "left in tatters by the Nixon crisis." The talk noted additionally that it was Mr. Rockefeller who had "discovered" Secretary Kissinger and recommended him to the Nixon Administration.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
21 AUGUST 1974

- 1 -

# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 12 - 18 AUGUST 1974

### Moscow (2466 items)

Cyprus Crisis	(7X)	8X
[PRAVDA Observer Article]	(--)	2X
China	(9X)	5X
U.S. Presidential Change	(8X)	5X
DPRK Liberation Anniversary	(--)	4X
Chile	(3X)	3X
Soviet Aviation Day	(--)	2X

### Peking (988 items)

Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius	(7X)	7X
PRC/Brazil Diplomatic Relations	(--)	7X
USSR/Japan Northern Territories Dispute	(3X)	4X
Burmese CP 45th Anniversary	(--)	4X
Law of the Sea Conference	(13X)	4X
Cambodia	(1X)	3X
Equatorial Guinea Delegation in PRC	(2X)	3X
Guinea-Bissau UN Seat	(--)	3X
U.S. Presidential Change	(--)	2X

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues. In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.